Drone cluster data security transmission method supporting malicious node detection

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of unmanned aerial vehicle cluster data security transmission methods of supporting malicious node detection, solve the problems, such as many in the prior art multi-hop unmanned aerial vehicle network relay node, lack authentication;The method comprises: key distribution center initialization;According to initialization result, respectively to each unmanned aerial vehicle and ground control center completes registration authentication, any first data unmanned aerial vehicle in multi-hop unmanned aerial vehicle network collects transmission data, calculates certificate aggregation signature after data transmission to adjacent second data unmanned aerial vehicle;Second data unmanned aerial vehicle adds the data carried by itself to transmission data, obtains aggregation message, and is transmitted to aggregation unmanned aerial vehicle in multi-hop unmanned aerial vehicle network;Aggregation unmanned aerial vehicle verifies aggregation message, if not passed, then run malicious member detection, obtain the malicious member in link. Otherwise, aggregation unmanned aerial vehicle sends message to ground control center;The method realizes the non-interactive fast negotiation of session key, guarantees the high security in multi-hop transmission.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of information security, and in particular to a method for secure transmission of data of a UAV cluster supporting malicious node detection. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the continuous maturity of UAV terminal technology, UAVs can perform more and more tasks, such as surveillance and reconnaissance, target attack, and air early warning. After accessing the network, UAVs play a crucial role in disaster management, auxiliary network access, and rapid search and rescue. Due to the often harsh working environment of UAVs, the network quality is poor, such as the possible damage to infrastructure in disaster management and other emergency rescue scenarios. At the same time, some specific tasks, such as finding sporadic fire points in forest fires or large-scale earthquake search and rescue, require large-scale UAVs to form clusters to participate in the task. Due to the characteristics of highly exposed air interface channels and limited computing resources in UAV network communication, the communication and data transmission process in the UAV network is extremely vulnerable to attacks such as eavesdropping, replay, man-in-the-middle, and impersonation, resulting in privacy information leakage, denial of service, and other security problems. Considering that the multi-hop network of UAVs is often used in emergency scenarios involving public safety such as rapid search and rescue and disaster management, once the potential security threats are exploited by the enemy, it may cause major public safety incidents, even threatening the safety of public life and property. In addition, in large-scale UAV networks, data and instructions are often transmitted through multiple hops. However, once a malicious node participates in relay transmission, it will result in waste of limited communication resources.

[0003] At the same time, data transmission in the multi-hop network of UAVs in emergency scenarios also attracts a variety of security problems. First, since the UAV network is an air interface network, it is in a highly open channel, and entities in the network are extremely vulnerable to various attacks, such as replay attacks, forgery attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and even physical capture of entities in the network. Second, due to the characteristics of large-scale and multiple hops in the multi-hop network of UAVs, the communication delay of data communication and instruction delivery in the multi-hop network of UAVs is larger than that in other networks, and the entities at the edge of the network may even be unreachable, resulting in delayed or failed execution of instructions. Therefore, a mobile command center is generally introduced to replace the ground center at the edge of the network to issue instructions. Third, after introducing the mobile command center, the command authority needs to be issued to it, and the identity of the mobile command center needs to be authenticated. If the disaster area is large, multiple mobile command centers may be needed to coordinate and control, and the communication overhead of command authority delivery is large. At the same time, the command authority may contain sensitive information of the mobile command center, resulting in message leakage and even task failure. Finally, due to the short endurance time of UAVs and the limited computing resources, it is difficult to use high-complexity cryptographic techniques, which will make the network more vulnerable and more vulnerable to attacks. SUMMARY

[0004] The present application provides a kind of unmanned aerial vehicle cluster data security transmission method of supporting malicious node detection, solve the problems such as the number of multi-hop network relay node in unmanned aerial vehicle in the prior art for emergency rescue scene, air interface communication, lack of authentication and key agreement, the non-interactive fast negotiation of session key is realized, and the high security in multi-hop transmission is guaranteed.

[0005] The present application provides a kind of unmanned aerial vehicle cluster data security transmission method of supporting malicious node detection, which comprises:

[0006] The key distribution center is initialized, the key distribution center initialization result is obtained, and the initialization result is disclosed;

[0007] According to the key distribution center initialization result, each unmanned aerial vehicle is registered and authenticated, and the ground control center is registered and authenticated;

[0008] Any first data unmanned aerial vehicle in multi-hop unmanned aerial vehicle network Collect transmission data, first data unmanned aerial vehicle Use certificateless aggregate signature technology to digitally sign the transmission data, then transmit the data signature and the transmission data to adjacent second data unmanned aerial vehicle ;

[0009] The second data unmanned aerial vehicle Add the data carried by itself to the transmission data to obtain an aggregate message, and transmit the aggregate message to the aggregate unmanned aerial vehicle in the multi-hop unmanned aerial vehicle network ;

[0010] The aggregate unmanned aerial vehicle Verify the aggregate message, if verification fails, the aggregate unmanned aerial vehicle Run malicious node detection algorithm, and then obtain the identity of malicious data unmanned aerial vehicle in transmission link, and send the aggregate message to the ground control center after removing malicious data in the aggregate message;If verification succeeds, the aggregate unmanned aerial vehicle After processing the aggregate message, send it to the ground control center.

[0011] In a possible implementation, the key distribution center is initialized, which comprises:

[0012] The key distribution center selects cyclic group , and determines the syndrome generating matrix with biorthogonal code ;Wherein, the order of the cyclic group is represented as , and the generator is ;

[0013] determining a Galois field and an extended syndrome generator matrix , wherein a primitive element of the Galois field is ;

[0014] determining a first matrix and a second matrix according to the Galois field and the syndrome generator matrix ; wherein a shape of the first matrix is , and a shape of the second matrix is ;

[0015] the key distribution center determines a system master private key , and calculates a corresponding system public key according to the master private key ;

[0016] the key distribution center generates a plurality of secure hash functions according to the cyclic group and the Galois field to complete initialization.

[0017] In a possible implementation, the registration and authentication of each drone according to the initialization result of the key distribution center respectively includes:

[0018] a first data drone determines a first random number , determines the first random number as a first partial private key of the first data drone , and calculates a first partial public key of the first data drone according to the first partial private key and a parameter of the cyclic group in the initialization result , and sends first information to the key distribution center, wherein represents an ID of the first data drone ;

[0019] the key distribution center determines a second random number , and calculates the first data drone according to the second random number , the system master private key corresponding pseudonym ;

[0020] The key distribution center determines a third random number , calculates a second partial public key of the first data unmanned aerial vehicle according to the third random number , calculates a second partial private key of the first data unmanned aerial vehicle according to the second partial public key , calculates a second partial confusion private key using the second partial private key ;

[0021] The key distribution center sends a second message to the first data unmanned aerial vehicle ;

[0022] The first data unmanned aerial vehicle verifies the second message by a first verification formula, if the verification is passed, the first data unmanned aerial vehicle calculates the second partial private key , accepts the pseudonym as the alias of the first data unmanned aerial vehicle , takes the first partial private key and the second partial private key as a certificateless private key pair, and takes the first partial public key and the second partial public key as a certificateless public key pair.

[0023] In a possible implementation, the first verification formula is expressed as:

[0024] ;

[0025] Wherein, represents the third random number; represents the generator of the cyclic group ; represents the system master private key; represents the second security hash function; represents the corresponding pseudonym of the unmanned aerial vehicle ; represents the first partial public key of the first data unmanned aerial vehicle ; represents the second partial public key of the first data unmanned aerial vehicle ; represents the third security hash function; Represents the system public key; Represents the first random number.

[0026] In a possible implementation, completing registration and authentication of the ground control center includes:

[0027] Ground Control Center Determine the fourth random number , determine the fourth random number For the ground control center The first part of the private key , and according to the ground control center The first part of the private key and the cyclic group in the initialization result The parameters are calculated by the ground control center The first part of the public key , the third information Sending to the key distribution center;

[0028] The key distribution center determines five random numbers and the cyclic group in the initialization result The parameters of the ground control center are calculated The second part of the public key , and according to the ground control center The second part of the public key Calculate the ground control center Ground Control Center The second part of the private key , using the ground control center The second part of the private key Calculated ground control center The second part of the obfuscated private key ;

[0029] The key distribution center sends a fourth message To the ground control center ;

[0030] The ground control center The fourth message is verified by the second verification formula Verification is carried out. If the verification is passed, the ground control center Calculate the ground control center The second part of the private key , the ground control center The first part of the private key and the ground control center The second part of the private key As a certificateless private key pair, the ground control center The first part of the public key and the ground control center The second part of the public key As a certificateless public key pair.

[0031] In a possible implementation, the second verification formula is expressed as:

[0032] ;

[0033] in, represents five random numbers; Represents a cyclic group Generators of Indicates the system master private key; represents a second secure hash function; Indicates the identity of the ground control center; Indicates ground control center The first part of the public key; Indicates ground control center The second part of the public key; represents a third secure hash function; Represents the system public key; Indicates ground control center The first part of the private key.

[0034] In one possible implementation, any first data drone in the multi-hop drone network Collect and transmit data, the first data drone Transmitting the transmitted data to an adjacent second data drone via certificateless aggregate signature ,include:

[0035] The first data drone Determine the sixth random number , and according to the sixth random number and the cyclic group in the initialization result The first calculation result is obtained by calculating the parameters ;

[0036] The first data drone Utilizing the aggregated drone Aggregate drone public key , calculate the first data drone Corresponding temporary pseudonym ;

[0037] The first data drone computing an encryption key , and using the encryption key to encrypt a message to obtain ciphertext ;

[0038] the first data drone computes a first data drone corresponding signature , and uses a syndrome generator matrix with a bi-orthogonal code in the initialization result , a first matrix , a first calculation formula and a second calculation formula to obtain a second calculation result and a third calculation result ;

[0039] the first data drone sends transmission data to the second data drone .

[0040] In a possible implementation, the first calculation formula is represented as:

[0041] ;

[0042] The second calculation formula is represented as:

[0043] ;

[0044] wherein, denotes a first data drone corresponding signature; denotes a transpose of a syndrome generator matrix ; denotes a first part of an aggregated message authentication code with detection function generated by any one of third data drones ; denotes the last bits of , wherein is an order in the Galois field , denotes an eighth secure hash function, denotes a generator of a cyclic group ; denotes a transpose of a first matrix ; denotes a second part of an aggregated message authentication code with detection function generated by any one of third data drones .

[0045] ​​​​​In a possible implementation, the aggregated unmanned vehicle The aggregated message is verified, including:

[0046] The aggregated unmanned vehicle obtains a public key pair of each data unmanned vehicle according to the aggregated message;

[0047] The aggregated message is verified by using the public key pair and a third verification formula to obtain a verification result value To complete the verification, it is judged whether the verification result value is equal to 0, if yes, the aggregated unmanned vehicle accepts the aggregated message, if no, the aggregated unmanned vehicle performs malicious node detection.

[0048] In a possible implementation, the aggregated unmanned vehicle performs malicious node detection, including:

[0049] According to the syndrome generator matrix with double orthogonal codes in the initialization result , the verification result value and the extended syndrome generator matrix in the initialization result , a first vector is calculated, each row in the first vector is judged according to a first judgment condition and a second judgment condition, and matrix elements that do not satisfy the first judgment condition and the second judgment condition are deleted to obtain a sixth matrix ;

[0050] According to the first matrix and the second matrix in the initialization result, an error correction vector is calculated, and a second vector is obtained according to the error correction vector;

[0051] It is judged whether elements in the sixth matrix are equal to elements at corresponding positions in the second vector , if yes, the position of a malicious node is determined according to the position of the elements in the matrix;

[0052] If the verification result is 1, the aggregated unmanned vehicle sends the aggregated message to a next-hop unmanned vehicle.

[0053] One or more technical solutions provided in the application have at least the following technical effects or advantages:

[0054] (1) The present application is aimed at the problems of a large number of relay nodes in a multi-hop network of unmanned aerial vehicles, air interface communication, lack of authentication and key agreement in an emergency rescue scene, and a data security transmission method and system of an unmanned aerial vehicle cluster supporting malicious node detection are designed, which can quickly detect malicious nodes and ensure the authenticity and non-repudiation of effective nodes. After completing the registration process, the unmanned aerial vehicle can realize the non-interactive fast negotiation of the session key through the public and private key pair with the control center, ensuring the high security in multi-hop transmission;

[0055] (2) The present application effectively reduces the spread of malicious data in the communication network by combining the aggregated message authentication code with the detection function and moving the verification function to the aggregated unmanned aerial vehicle, thereby reducing the communication and calculation overhead of the scheme;

[0056] (3) The present application generates an anonymous identifier for each unmanned aerial vehicle participating in data transmission. In the presence of malicious communication nodes, the present application has a small overhead in terms of communication and calculation, and is suitable for resource-constrained unmanned aerial vehicle communication scenarios. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0057] Figure 1 The present application provides a data security transmission method for an unmanned aerial vehicle cluster supporting malicious node detection, and a step flow chart of the method is shown in the figure;

[0058] Figure 2 The present application provides a registration stage flow chart of an unmanned aerial vehicle, a key distribution center and a ground control center;

[0059] Figure 3 The present application provides a multi-hop unmanned aerial vehicle data transmission schematic diagram;

[0060] Figure 4 The present application provides an aggregated unmanned aerial vehicle data transmission and data verification schematic diagram. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0061] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be described clearly and completely in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present application, not all the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative labor are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0062] The present application provides a data security transmission method for an unmanned aerial vehicle cluster supporting malicious node detection, as shown in the figure, the method comprises the following steps S101-S105. Figure 1

[0063] S101, initialize the key distribution center to obtain the key distribution center initialization result, and disclose the initialization result;​

[0064] Specifically, in step S101, the key distribution center is initialized, including the following steps S1011 to S1015.

[0065] S1011, the key distribution center selects a cyclic group , and determines a syndrome generating matrix ; wherein the order of the cyclic group is represented as , and the generator is ;

[0066] S1012, determine the Galois field , wherein the Galois field primitive element is ;

[0067] S1013, according to the Galois field and the syndrome generating matrix , determine the first matrix and the second matrix ;

[0068] S1014, the key distribution center determines the system master private key , and calculates the corresponding system public key according to the master private key ;

[0069] S1015, the key distribution center generates a plurality of secure hash functions according to the cyclic group and the Galois field to complete the initialization.

[0070] Exemplarily, before the system starts, the key distribution center first needs to be initialized, and the specific steps are as follows.

[0071] (1) the key distribution center selects a cyclic group , whose order is , and the generator is ;

[0072] (2) let , , wherein , set and ;

[0073] (3) randomly select a Galois field , whose primitive element is ;

[0074] (4) let , ;

[0075] (5) Order ,Right now For a shape Matrix of

[0076] (6) Selection of the Key Distribution Center Secret is the system master private key, and calculates the corresponding system public key , ;

[0077] (7) Generate a secure hash function. The specific secure hash function is expressed as:

[0078] ;

[0079] ;

[0080] ;

[0081] ;

[0082] ;

[0083] ;

[0084] ;

[0085] ;

[0086] (8) The key distribution center publicly releases the initialization result and secretly stores the system master private key. , the initialization result is expressed as: .

[0087] S102: Complete registration and authentication for each drone based on the initialization result of the key distribution center, and complete registration and authentication for the ground control center;

[0088] Specifically, such as Figure 2 As shown, in step S102, registration and authentication are completed for each drone according to the initialization result of the key distribution center, including:

[0089] (1) First Data UAV Determine the first random number , , determine the first random number First Data UAV The first part of the private key , and according to the first part of the private key and the cyclic group in the initialization result The first data of parameter calculation of UAV the first part of the public key , the first information is sent to the key distribution center; wherein, represents the ID of the first data drone ;

[0090] Here, the calculation formula of the first part of the public key is: ;

[0091] (2) The key distribution center determines a second random number , , according to the second random number , the system master private key and the first secure hash function in the initialization result, the corresponding pseudonym of the first data drone is calculated;

[0092] Here, the calculation formula of the pseudonym is: , wherein, represents the ID of the drone ;

[0093] (3) The key distribution center determines a third random number , , according to the third random number , the second part of the public key of the first data drone is calculated, and the second part of the private key of the first data drone is calculated according to the second part of the public key , and the second part of the confusion private key is calculated by using the second part of the private key ;

[0094] Here, the calculation formula of the second part of the public key is: ; the calculation formula of the second part of the private key is: ; and the calculation formula of the second part of the confusion private key is: ;

[0095] (4) The key distribution center sends a second message to the first data drone ;

[0096] (5) The first data drone verifies the second message by the first verification formula, if the verification is passed, the drone calculating the second partial private key , , accepting a pseudonym as an alias of the UAV, taking the first partial private key and the second partial private key as a certificateless private key pair, taking the first partial public key and the second partial public key as a certificateless public key pair.

[0097] Here, the first verification formula is expressed as:

[0098] ;

[0099] wherein, represents a third random number; represents a generator of a cyclic group ; represents a system master private key; represents a second secure hash function; represents a corresponding pseudonym of the UAV ; represents a first partial public key of the first data UAV ; represents a second partial public key of the first data UAV ; represents a third secure hash function; represents a system public key; represents a first random number.

[0100] Specifically, in step S102, the ground control center completes registration authentication, including:

[0101] (1) The ground control center determines a fourth random number , determines the fourth random number as the first partial private key of the ground control center , and calculates the first partial public key of the ground control center according to the first partial private key of the ground control center and the parameters of the cyclic group in the initialization result, and sends the third information to the key distribution center;

[0102] Here, the calculation formula of the first partial public key of the ground control center is:​ ;

[0103] (2) The key distribution center determines five random numbers , and the cyclic group in the initialization result The parameters of the ground control center are calculated The second part of the public key , and according to the ground control center The second part of the public key Calculate the ground control center Ground Control Center The second part of the private key , using the ground control center The second part of the private key Calculated ground control center The second part of the obfuscated private key ;

[0104] Here, the ground control center The second part of the public key The calculation formula is: Ground Control Center The second part of the private key The calculation formula is: Ground Control Center The second part of the obfuscated private key The calculation formula is: ;

[0105] (3) The key distribution center sends the fourth message To ground control center ;

[0106] (4) Ground Control Center The fourth message is verified by the second verification formula Verification is carried out. If the verification is passed, the ground control center Calculate the ground control center The second part of the private key , , the ground control center The first part of the private key and ground control center The second part of the private key As a certificateless private key pair, the ground control center The first part of the public key and ground control center The second part of the public key As a certificateless public key pair.

[0107] Here, the second verification formula is expressed as:

[0108] ;

[0109] wherein, represents a fifth random number; represents a syndrome generation matrix ; represents a system master private key; represents a second secure hash function; represents; represents a first part of a public key of a ground control center ; represents a second part of a public key of a ground control center ; represents a third secure hash function; represents a system public key; represents a first part of a private key of a ground control center .

[0110] S103, any first data drone in the multi-hop drone network collects transmission data, the first data drone digitally signs the transmission data using a certificateless aggregate signature technique, and then transmits the data signature and the transmission data to an adjacent second data drone ;

[0111] At this stage, as shown in Figure 3 , any first data drone in the multi-hop drone network collects data and securely transmits it to a ground control center . In the process of secure data transmission, the first data drone appends its data to the received data, reducing the communication overhead in the network through a certificateless aggregate signature. After receiving data from a data drone , the first data drone application appends its own data to the data from the data drone , and sends the transmission data to the next-hop second data drone .

[0112] Specifically, in step S103, any first data drone in the multi-hop drone network collects transmission data, the first data drone transmits the transmission data to an adjacent second data drone through a certificateless aggregate signature, including steps S1031 to S1035.

[0113] S1031, the first data drone determines the sixth random number , and according to the sixth random number and the parameters of the cyclic group in the initialization result to obtain the first calculation result , ;

[0114] S1032, the first data drone uses the aggregation drone public key of the aggregation drone to calculate the temporary pseudonym corresponding to the first data drone , ;

[0115] S1033, the first data drone calculates the encryption key , and uses the encryption key to encrypt the encrypted message to obtain the ciphertext , ;

[0116] Here, the calculation formula of the encryption key is:

[0117] S1034, the first data drone calculates the signature corresponding to the first data drone , and uses the syndrome generation matrix and the first matrix in the initialization result to obtain the second calculation result and the third calculation result ;

[0118] Here, the first data drone calculates the signature corresponding to the first data drone , and uses the syndrome generation matrix and the first matrix in the initialization result to obtain the second calculation result and the third calculation result , including: using the first calculation formula and the second calculation formula to obtain the second calculation result and the third calculation result ;

[0119] The first calculation formula is represented as:

[0120] ;

[0121] The second calculation formula is represented as:

[0122] ;

[0123] wherein, represents the first data drone corresponding signature; represents the syndrome generation matrix transpose; represents the first part of the aggregated message authentication code with detection function generated by any one of the third data drones ; represents the last bit of , wherein is the order in the Galois field ; represents the eighth secure hash function, represents the generator of the cyclic group ; represents the transpose of the first matrix ; represents the second part of the aggregated message authentication code with detection function generated by any one of the third data drones .

[0124] S1035, the first data drone sends the transmission data to the second data drone .

[0125] S104, the second data drone adds the data carried by itself to the transmission data to obtain an aggregated message, and transmits the aggregated message to an aggregation drone in the multi-hop drone network;

[0126] When the aggregation drone receives the message, the aggregation drone will first remove the temporary pseudonym of the data drone and perform verification, as shown in Figure 4 .

[0127] S105, the aggregation drone verifies the aggregated message, if the verification fails, the aggregation drone runs a malicious node detection algorithm to obtain the identity of the malicious data drone in the transmission link, and sends the aggregated message after removing the malicious data to the ground control center; if the verification is successful, the aggregation drone After the aggregation message is processed, it is sent to the ground control center.

[0128] Specifically, in step S105, the aggregation UAV verifies the aggregation message, including the following steps S1051-S1052.

[0129] S1051, the aggregation UAV obtains the public key pair of each data UAV according to the aggregation message ;

[0130] S1052, the aggregation message is verified using the public key pair and the third verification formula to obtain a verification result value , to complete the verification, and determine whether the verification result value is equal to 0, if yes, the aggregation UAV accepts the aggregation message, if not, the aggregation UAV performs malicious node detection.

[0131] For example, the calculation , wherein . Let , verify , if the equation holds, output 1, otherwise output 0.

[0132] Specifically, in step S1052, the aggregation UAV performs malicious node detection, including:

[0133] According to the syndrome generator matrix with biorthogonal code in the initialization result , the verification result value , and the extended syndrome generator matrix in the initialization result , a first vector is calculated, according to the first judgment condition and the second judgment condition, each row in the first vector is judged, and the matrix elements that do not satisfy the first judgment condition and the second judgment condition are deleted to obtain a sixth matrix ;

[0134] According to the first matrix and the second matrix in the initialization result, an error correction vector is calculated, and a second vector is obtained according to the error correction vector ;

[0135] Judge whether the elements in the sixth matrix are equal to the elements at the corresponding positions in the second vector , if equal, the position of the malicious node is determined according to the position of the element in the matrix;

[0136] If the verification result is 1, the aggregation UAV sends the aggregation message to the next hop UAV.

[0137] For example, if the algorithm outputs 0 in the previous step, there is a malicious transmission node in the system. The aggregation drone will run the following steps to find the malicious transmission node.

[0138] (1) Let , ;

[0139] (2) Calculate , where satisfies the error vector ;

[0140] (3) If , let , , where , so that the element in the row of the matrix satisfies this condition for ;

[0141] (4) For , calculate ;

[0142] (5) Let , , ;

[0143] (6) Let , , where ;

[0144] (7) Let , where , at this time, all elements in are the IDs of the malicious transmission nodes.

[0145] If the algorithm outputs 1 in the previous step, there is no malicious transmission node in the system. The following steps will be run to deliver the message to the next hop.

[0146] (1) Let .

[0147] (2) Generate a random number and calculate .

[0148] (3) Generate a signature .

[0149] (4) Send to next hop .

[0150] Finally, the message is passed to . The following steps are run:

[0151] (1) For each message from , compute to obtain all the data drone pseudonyms and their public keys.

[0152] (2) Verify the aggregate signature by , if it fails, discard the message. Otherwise, compute for each data drone and decrypt the message ; .

[0153] The present application aims at the problems of large number of relay nodes, air interface communication, lack of authentication and key agreement in multi-hop network of unmanned aerial vehicles in emergency rescue scenarios, designs an unmanned aerial vehicle cluster data security transmission method and system supporting malicious node detection, can quickly detect malicious nodes, and ensures the authenticity and non-repudiation of effective nodes. After completing the registration process, the unmanned aerial vehicle can realize the non-interactive fast negotiation of the session key through the public and private key pair with the control center, guarantee the high security in multi-hop transmission, and effectively reduce the spread of malicious data in the communication network by combining the aggregate message authentication code with detection function and moving the verification function to the aggregate unmanned aerial vehicle, reduce the communication and calculation overhead of the method; in order to protect the real identity information of the unmanned aerial vehicle, the present application generates an anonymous identifier for each unmanned aerial vehicle participating in data transmission, and when there is a malicious communication node, the present application has small communication and calculation overhead, and is suitable for resource-limited unmanned aerial vehicle communication scenarios.

[0154] Security analysis of the present application:

[0155] (1) Key security: during the registration of the entity, the entity sends part of the public key to the key distribution center, and receives another part of the private key and the public key through a secure channel. The attacker cannot obtain part of the private key of the entity, so it cannot access the complete private key pair of the entity.

[0156] (2) Anonymity: during the registration of the entity, the key distribution center uses the master private key to calculate the basic pseudonym ​Entity uses the system public key Verify and accept Since the attacker cannot obtain the system's master private key , so it is not possible to generate a valid During secure data transmission, use Partial public key and random numbers right Encrypt and generate a temporary pseudonym The attacker cannot obtain Part of the private key or random numbers , so it cannot be decrypted To obtain .

[0157] (3) Mutual Authentication: Can be verified by including Private key pair and , related information and ciphertext Hashes and random numbers Signature To verify Since this private key is only used by Hold, therefore Can ensure Verification. Can be verified by including Private key pair and , relevant information and data The hash of the random number and To verify Since this private key is only used by Hold, therefore Can ensure Verification.

[0158] (4) Data encryption: During secure data transmission, use Public key pair And part of the private key obtained by its own DH key exchange Encrypt your own data and obtain a shared key The attacker cannot obtain The private key pair and Therefore, it is impossible to calculate or obtain the corresponding public key , making it impossible to decrypt the ciphertext.

[0159] (5) Malicious user detection: In most secure data transmission schemes, if the data transmission is abnormal, the entire data set will be discarded. However, the scheme in this paper can output a list of malicious members through the aggregation message verification coding scheme with detection capability. If , it indicates that there is a malicious message. Then, the receiver can use the malicious member detection algorithm to detect and output the list of malicious identities, effectively helping the group to troubleshoot and enhance the robustness of the group. In schemes that do not use aggregation message verification codes with detection functions, malicious users can usually only be identified through exhaustive search or binary search methods. Their time complexity is and .

[0160] (6) Anti-replay attack: In the process of secure data transmission, the UAV entity uses random numbers to resist replay attacks. Even if the attacker replays the data from the previous transmission of the legitimate UAV, the receiving entity can resist the replay attack by checking whether the random number has been received before and verifying the correctness of the signature.

[0161] (7) Resisting impersonation attacks: In order to implement impersonation attacks, the adversary needs to forge a valid signature. However, during secure data transmission, the adversary cannot obtain the complete private key pair of any entity. Since mutual authentication has been completed, the adversary cannot calculate the correct signature without the private key pair, so it cannot impersonate any entity to transmit data.

[0162] (8) Resisting man-in-the-middle attacks: Similar to resisting impersonation attacks, the attacker cannot obtain the complete private key pair of any entity, so it cannot generate a correct signature. Therefore, the attacker cannot impersonate any entity or act as a middleman to communicate with two entities at the same time to transmit data. Therefore, the present invention can resist man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0163] The present invention first uses the aggregation message verification code mechanism with detection function, and designs a traceable aggregation signature method combined with certificateless public key cryptography, which can quickly detect malicious nodes in large-scale nodes of UAV multi-hop network and ensure the authenticity and non-repudiation of effective nodes. Second, using the public and private key pair of the data UAV and the control center, non-interactive fast negotiation of session key is realized, and secure transmission of multi-hop data is realized. Thirdly, an anonymous identifier is designed for each UAV node in the secure transmission, which protects the real identity of the entity. Finally, since the detection of malicious nodes is placed on the aggregation nodes in the group.

[0164] Therefore, when the malicious node exists, the application can perform verification in the front end of data transmission, discover and trace malicious entities in the network in time, and reduce communication overhead in data transmission. In addition, the application has wide application scenarios and is suitable for various types of unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles launched by different agencies. In terms of overhead, compared with the current method, the application has smaller calculation overhead and communication overhead when the malicious node exists in the group.

[0165] The various embodiments in the specification are described in a progressive manner, and the same or similar parts between the various embodiments can be referred to each other. Each embodiment focuses on the difference from other embodiments. The whole or part of the application can be used in a plurality of general or special computer system environments or configurations. For example: personal computers, server computers, handheld devices or portable devices, tablet devices, mobile communication terminals, multi-processor systems, microprocessor-based systems, programmable electronic devices, network PCs, small computers, large computers, distributed computing environments including any of the above systems or devices, and the like.

[0166] The above examples are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the application, and are not limited to the application. Although the application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing examples, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions recorded in the foregoing examples can be modified, or some or all of the technical features can be replaced by equivalents. The modification or replacement does not make the essence of the corresponding technical solution deviate from the scope of the technical solutions of the application.

Claims

1. A method for secure transmission of data in a UAV swarm supporting malicious node detection, the method comprising: Comprise: Initializing the key distribution center to obtain a key distribution center initialization result and disclosing the initialization result; The key distribution center discloses the initialization result and secretly holds the system master private key The initialization result is expressed as: ; The initialization of the key distribution center comprises: The key distribution center selects a cyclic group And determines a syndrome generator matrix with biorthogonal codes ; wherein the cyclic group Has order And generator ; Determining a Galois field and expanding syndrome generation matrices wherein a primitive element of the Galois field is ; According to the Galois field and the syndrome generation matrix , a first matrix and a second matrix are determined; wherein the first matrix has a shape of , and the second matrix has a shape of ; The key distribution center determines a system master private key and calculates a corresponding system public key according to the system master private key ; The key distribution center generates a plurality of secure hash functions according to the cyclic group and the Galois field to complete initialization; According to the key distribution center initialization result, each unmanned aerial vehicle completes registration authentication, and the ground control center completes registration authentication; specifically comprising: First data drone Determining a first random number , determining the first random number , determining a first partial private key of the first data drone , and calculating a first partial public key of the first data drone according to the first partial private key and a parameter of a cyclic group in the initialization result , sending first information to the key distribution center, wherein, represents an ID of the first data drone . The key distribution center determines a second random number , according to the second random number , the system master private key and the first security hash function in the initialization result, the first data unmanned aerial vehicle corresponding pseudonym ; The key distribution center determines a third random number , according to the third random number Calculate the first data drone The second part of the public key , and according to the second part of the public key Calculate the first data drone The second part of the private key , using the second part of the private key Calculate the second part of the obfuscated private key ; The key distribution center sends a second message to the first data drone ; The first data drone The second message is verified by a first verification formula If the verification is passed, the first data drone Calculates the second partial private key Accepts the pseudonym As an alias of the first data drone The first partial private key And the second partial private key As a certificateless private key pair, the first partial public key And the second partial public key As a certificateless public key pair The ground control center completes registration authentication, comprising: Ground Control Center Determine the fourth random number , determine the fourth random number For the ground control center The first part of the private key , and according to the ground control center The first part of the private key and the cyclic group in the initialization result The parameters are calculated by the ground control center The first part of the public key , the third information Sending to the key distribution center; The key distribution center determines five random numbers and the cyclic group in the initialization result The parameters of the ground control center are calculated The second part of the public key , and according to the second part of the public key of the ground control center Calculate the ground control center Ground Control Center The second part of the private key , using the ground control center The second part of the private key Calculated ground control center The second part of the obfuscated private key ; The key distribution center sends a fourth message to the ground control center ; The ground control center The fourth message is verified by the second verification formula Verification is carried out. If the verification is passed, the ground control center Calculate the ground control center The second part of the private key , the ground control center The first part of the private key and the ground control center The second part of the private key As a certificateless private key pair, the ground control center The first part of the public key and the ground control center The second part of the public key As a certificateless public key pair; Any one of the first data drones in the multi-hop drone network Collecting transmission data, the first data drone Digitally signing the transmission data using a certificateless aggregate signature technique, and then transmitting the data signature and the transmission data to an adjacent second data drone ; The second data drone adding data carried by itself to the transmission data to obtain an aggregated message, and transmitting the aggregated message to an aggregation drone in the multi-hop drone network The method further includes The aggregated unmanned vehicle The aggregated message is verified, and if the verification fails, the aggregated unmanned vehicle A malicious node detection algorithm is run to obtain the identity of a malicious data unmanned vehicle in the transmission link, and the malicious data in the aggregated message is removed and sent to the ground control center; if the verification is successful, the aggregated unmanned vehicle The aggregated message is processed and sent to the ground control center. 2.The method of claim 1, wherein, The first verification formula is represented as: ； wherein, denotes a third random number; denotes a generator of a cyclic group ; denotes a system master private key; denotes a second secure hash function; denotes a drone corresponding pseudonym; denotes a first part public key of a first data drone ; denotes a second part public key of a first data drone ; denotes a third secure hash function; denotes a system public key; denotes a first random number. 3.The method of claim 1, wherein, The second verification formula is represented as: ； wherein, represents a fifth random number; represents a cyclic group of generators; represents a system master private key; represents a second secure hash function; represents an identity of a ground control center; represents a first part public key of a ground control center ; represents a second part public key of a ground control center ; represents a third secure hash function; represents a system public key; represents a first part private key of a ground control center . 4.The method of claim 1, wherein, Any one of the first data drones in the multi-hop drone network Collecting transmission data, the first data drone Transmitting the transmission data to an adjacent second data drone by a certificateless aggregate signature , comprising: The first data drone Determining a sixth random number And calculating a first calculation result according to the sixth random number And the parameter of the cyclic group in the initialization result ;​ The first data drone With the aggregated drone The aggregated drone public key , the first data drone Corresponding temporary pseudonym ; The first data drone Computing an encryption key And using the encryption key To encrypt the message To encrypt, get ciphertext ; The first data drone Computing the first data drone Corresponding signature And using the syndrome matrix with the bi-orthogonal code in the initialization result First matrix Second calculation result calculated by the first calculation formula and the second calculation formula And the third calculation result ; the first data drone transmitting transmission data to the second data drone .

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the method further comprises: The first calculation formula is represented as: ； The second calculation formula is represented as: ； in, Indicates the first data drone The corresponding signature; Representation of syndrome generation matrix The transpose of Indicates that any third data drone The first part of the generated aggregate message authentication code with detection function; express After bits, of which Galois Field The order in , represents the eighth secure hash function, Represents a cyclic group Generators of Represents the first matrix The transpose of Indicates that any third data drone The second part of the generated aggregate message authentication code with detection function. 6.The method of claim 1, wherein, The aggregated drones validating the aggregated message, including: The aggregation unmanned aerial vehicle obtains the public key pair of each data unmanned aerial vehicle according to the aggregation message; The aggregate message is verified using the public key pair and the third verification formula to obtain a verification result value. , to complete the verification and determine the verification result value Is it equal to 0? If so, the aggregated drone accepts the aggregated message; if not, the aggregated drone performs malicious node detection.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein the method further comprises: The aggregation unmanned aerial vehicle performs malicious node detection, comprising: generate a syndrome matrix according to the initialization result with the double-orthogonal code , the verification result value , and the extended syndrome matrix in the initialization result to obtain a first vector , judge each row in the first vector according to a first judgment condition and a second judgment condition, and delete the matrix elements that do not satisfy the first judgment condition and the second judgment condition to obtain a sixth matrix ; According to the first matrix in the initialization result and the second matrix , a correction vector is calculated, and a second vector is obtained according to the correction vector ; determining whether elements in the sixth matrix are equal to elements at corresponding positions in the second vector , and if so, determining the position of the malicious node according to the positions of the elements in the matrix; If the verification result is 1, the aggregated drone sends the aggregated message to the next-hop drone.

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