A Comprehensive Prevention Approach to Hazardous Chemical Safety Accidents in Ports Based on WGT

Abstract

This invention discloses a comprehensive prevention method for hazardous chemical safety accidents in ports based on WGT (Warranty-Gross Theory), relating to the field of port safety technology. It collects risk influencing factors for different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents occurring in different ports; classifies these risk influencing factors using WSR theory; further filters and grades them using GRA (Gross Response Analysis); calculates the probability of occurrence of risk influencing factors for different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents in ports; and couples the selected risk influencing factors using TSS (Treatise on Risk-Gross Theory) to calculate the probability of occurrence of risk influencing factors for different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents in ports under a three-dimensional risk scenario; then identifies the risk influencing factor index corresponding to the maximum probability of coupled risk for each port in different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents; and formulates comprehensive preventive measures to avoid and reduce the risk of the same type of accident occurring in ports, preventing the same type of accident from recurring in other ports.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of port safety technology, specifically a comprehensive prevention method for port hazardous chemical safety accidents based on WGT (Waste Gas Tolerance). Background Technology

[0002] With the deepening of my country's industrialization, the demand for hazardous chemical logistics is large, the types of hazardous chemicals are numerous, and the risks are high. As a key node connecting land and water transportation, ports handle a large volume of hazardous chemical transport. In addition, the types of goods loaded and unloaded at ports are diverse, and hazardous chemicals at ports pose significant risks and are prone to safety accidents. Therefore, it is essential to conduct risk analysis on hazardous materials at ports to reduce the risks and to effectively manage them.

[0003] Currently, the WSR-TSS theoretical model is commonly used for accident risk analysis. WSR is short for "Wuli-Shili-Renli" system methodology, which interprets the core of complex project management problems from three different levels: the physical layer, the Shili layer, and the Renli layer. The physical layer refers to the fundamental attributes of things that exist naturally and are independent of human will; the Shili layer refers to the effective methods for handling affairs based on the attributes of things; and the Renli layer refers to the relationships between people and their attitudes and concepts in handling affairs. The Scenario Structuring (TSS) theory hypothesizes possible risk scenarios and assesses the risks during the changing process. The WSR-TSS theoretical model is currently widely used in risk research for accidents such as coal mine accidents and pipeline leaks, but its application in risk research for port hazardous chemical safety accidents is less common. This is mainly because port hazardous chemical safety accidents involve many Shili and Renli layer factors, and using the conventional WSR-TSS theoretical model requires constructing many risk scenarios, which is not conducive to subsequent risk assessment.

[0004] Furthermore, current research only focuses on the risk analysis of hazardous chemical safety accidents at individual ports, failing to conduct risk analysis and safety management across multiple ports nationwide. Studying safety accidents at a single port is inherently random; the results of risk analysis can only be applied to the safety management of that single port, presenting significant limitations. It cannot analyze the causes of different types of accidents at different ports, nor can it identify the commonalities of the same type of accident across different ports. Therefore, it is impossible to develop corresponding preventative measures and management standards to prevent the recurrence of similar accidents at other ports. Moreover, due to differences in port type, the probability of a particular risk factor affecting hazardous chemicals varies. However, current technology assumes that the probability of hazardous chemical risk factors occurring is the same across different ports, failing to classify port risk factors according to different port types. This leads to inaccurate probabilities of simultaneous occurrence of various risks calculated using the TSS theory for coupling hazardous chemical risk factors across different types of ports. Consequently, it is impossible to develop comprehensive preventative measures to effectively reduce the risk of different types of accidents across multiple ports nationwide.

[0005] Based on this, the present invention aims to propose a comprehensive prevention method for port hazardous chemical safety accidents, thereby breaking the limitation of existing technologies that can only address safety management for a single port. Summary of the Invention

[0006] To overcome the shortcomings of existing technologies, the present invention aims to provide a comprehensive prevention method for port hazardous chemical safety accidents based on WGT (Warranty-Gravity-Sustainable Model). Based on data on risk influencing factors of different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents occurring in various ports across the country, a WGT (WSR-GRA-TSS) theoretical model is constructed. By utilizing the probability of occurrence of risk influencing factors in different types of port hazardous chemical safety accidents under a three-dimensional risk scenario, the risk influencing factor index corresponding to the maximum probability of coupled risk for each port in different types of port hazardous chemical safety accidents is identified, revealing the commonalities of most ports experiencing the same type of accident. This allows for the formulation of comprehensive preventative measures to avoid and reduce the risk of the same type of accident occurring in ports, breaking the limitation of existing technologies that can only address safety management for individual ports.

[0007] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution:

[0008] The comprehensive prevention method for port hazardous chemical safety accidents based on WGT includes the following steps:

[0009] (1) Collect data on hazardous chemical accidents at n ports across the country, and analyze and summarize the risk factors affecting different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents at different ports.

[0010] (2) Based on the WSR method, risk factors are identified and classified from the physical, event and human levels to identify the risk factors of the n port hazardous chemical safety accidents. Then, an accident risk identification framework is established.

[0011] (3) The GRA method was used to further screen the risk factors of different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents in different ports, and retain the more critical factors; the key risk factors were classified to obtain the secondary risk factors of different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents in different ports.

[0012] (4) Calculate the probability of occurrence of secondary risk factors of different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents in different ports. Use TSS theory to couple the secondary risk factors of different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents in different ports to obtain the maximum probability of coupling risks in the three-dimensional risk scenario of different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents in different ports.

[0013] (5) Based on the calculation of the maximum probability of coupled risks of different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents in different ports under the three-dimensional risk scenario, find the port hazardous chemical safety accident risk influencing factor index corresponding to the maximum probability of coupled risks of each port, find out the commonalities of the same type of hazardous chemical safety accidents in ports, analyze the reasons for the same type of hazardous chemical safety accidents in ports, and formulate comprehensive prevention measures for the same type of port hazardous chemical safety accidents to avoid the recurrence of the same type of accidents.

[0014] In this invention, the types of hazardous chemical safety accidents include hazardous chemical explosions, hazardous chemical leaks, and hazardous chemical spontaneous combustion.

[0015] In step (1) of this invention, data on hazardous chemical accidents are collected from no less than 60 ports; the number of ports where the same type of hazardous chemical safety accident occurs is no less than 6; and no less than 20 hazardous chemical risk factors that affect the occurrence of a certain type of accident at a port are collected.

[0016] In step (2) of this invention, the risk factor identification based on the WSR method includes the following physical layer port hazardous chemical logistics risk factors: storage tank capacity and quantity, number of berths, berth length, industrial emissions, dangerous goods throughput, port age, and population density.

[0017] Risk factors for hazardous chemical logistics at the administrative level include the degree of safety emphasis, the degree of operational standardization, the safety assessment agency, the annual design approval capacity, the complexity of hazardous chemical process approval, and port investment.

[0018] Risk factors for hazardous chemical logistics at ports at the management level include personnel training of hazardous chemical enterprises, transportation authorities, safety supervision departments, port administration departments, enterprise personnel qualifications, environmental protection departments, and public security organs.

[0019] This invention uses Bayesian theory to calculate the probability of secondary risk factors influencing different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents occurring in different ports. It uses expert scoring to determine the prior probability and the corrected probability, and uses Bayesian formula to calculate the posterior probability, i.e., the final probability.

[0020] The probability of coupled risk factors occurring in the three-dimensional risk scenario of this invention is the probability of each coupled risk occurring simultaneously. Therefore, the probability of coupled risk in the three-dimensional risk scenario is equal to the product of the probabilities of each coupled risk.

[0021] In step (5) of this invention, during the process of formulating comprehensive preventive measures, due to the objective uncontrollability of physical factors, improvements are made through the rational and human factors to reduce the probability of a certain type of accident occurring in the port.

[0022] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0023] 1. The comprehensive prevention method for port hazardous chemical safety accidents based on WGT proposed in this invention can classify port hazardous chemical risk factors according to different port types, and accurately calculate the probability of different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents occurring in different ports under a three-dimensional risk scenario. It can also derive the maximum probability of coupled risks of different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents occurring in different ports under a three-dimensional risk scenario and the corresponding port hazardous chemical safety accident risk influencing factor index, analyze the causes of different types of accidents occurring in different ports, and find the commonalities of the same type of accident in different ports. Thus, it is possible to formulate comprehensive prevention measures for different accidents to prevent the same type of accident from recurring in other ports across the country.

[0024] 2. This invention incorporates the Grey Relational Analysis (GRA) method into the WSR-TSS theoretical model for the identification of key factors, and further constructs the WGT (WSR-GRA-TSS) theoretical model. Under the premise of identifying key factors, it constructs accurate risk scenarios, laying the foundation for subsequent reasonable risk assessment. Moreover, the study of multiple port hazardous chemical safety accidents involves more risk factors, thus also establishing a good foundation for the identification of key influencing factors of multiple port hazardous chemical safety accidents. Attached Figure Description

[0025] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the method of the present invention.

[0026] Figure 2 This is a flowchart for identifying risk factors at hazardous chemical ports according to the present invention.

[0027] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating the identification of risk factors at hazardous chemical ports based on the GRA method of this invention.

[0028] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the three-dimensional risk coupling of hazardous chemical ports according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0029] The technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings of the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments.

[0030] Combination Figure 1-4 The present invention provides a detailed description of a comprehensive prevention method for port hazardous chemical safety accidents based on WGT, as follows:

[0031] 1. Collect information on the different port risk factors corresponding to different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents.

[0032] The risk factors influencing hazardous chemicals at ports consist of a series of interconnected and influential indicators related to the risks associated with hazardous chemicals at ports. This study collected data on hazardous chemical safety accidents at nearly 60 ports and a large amount of literature. Analyzing and summarizing the six ports (A, B, C, D, E, and F) where hazardous chemical explosions occurred, 20 risk factors influencing the occurrence of hazardous chemical explosions at ports were identified. These factors include: "tank capacity and number," "number of berths," "berth length," "industrial emissions," "hazardous cargo throughput," "port age," "population density," "level of safety emphasis," "standardization of operations," "safety assessment agency," "annual design approval capacity," "complexity of hazardous chemical process approval," "port investment," "personnel training for hazardous chemical enterprises," "transportation authorities," "safety supervision departments," "port administrative departments," "personnel qualifications," "environmental protection departments," and "public security organs." This provides a foundation for developing a port hazardous chemical safety accident prevention model based on the WGT risk assessment system.

[0033] 2. Classifying the risk factors influencing different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents at different ports using WSR theory. WSR methodology is short for Wuli-Shili-Renli system methodology. This methodology analyzes the object system through three dimensions: physical, Shili, and Renli. "Physical" refers to the use of quantitative analysis and tight logical reasoning; "Shili" refers to the rational arrangement of all personnel, equipment, and materials; and "Renli" refers to the analysis of human psychology and behavior by combining knowledge from psychology, behavioral science, and other disciplines, thereby further mobilizing human initiative and creativity to participate in social practice activities. For example... Figure 2 As shown, based on the WSR method, 20 risk factor indicators for port hazardous chemical explosion accidents were identified and classified from the physical, event, and human levels, resulting in 7 physical, 6 event, and 7 human levels. An accident risk identification framework was then established to lay the foundation for subsequent risk assessment. In the port hazardous chemical logistics risk assessment model, the physical layer involves the hazardous goods themselves, port infrastructure, and the state of the hazardous goods logistics process. After analysis and summarization, "tank capacity and quantity (w1)," "number of berths (w2)," "berth length (w3)," "industrial emissions (w4)," "hazardous goods throughput (w5)," "port age (w6)," and "population density (w7)" were classified as physical layers. The set of port hazardous chemical logistics risk factors for the physical layer is denoted as W = {w1, w2, ..., w...}. i}(i=1,2…,m), where m=7 represents the number of physical layer risk factors. The principle refers to the rationale behind actions, that is, the methods guiding human practical activities. Evaluating the risks of hazardous chemical logistics in ports essentially involves analyzing the hazardous chemical logistics process and the arrangement of personnel, finances, and materials within that process. Through analysis and summarization, the following factors are divided into the principle layer: “degree of safety emphasis (s1)”, “operational standardization (s2)”, “safety assessment agency (s3)”, “annual design approval capacity (s4)”, “complexity of hazardous chemical process approval (s5)”, and “port investment (s6)”. Let the set of port hazardous chemical logistics risk factors in the principle layer be S={s1, s2,…, s…} i}(i=1,2…,n), where n=6, representing the number of risk factors in the event layer. Human factors describe the relationships between people in the management object and process, and people's concepts and attitudes in handling matters. Through analysis and summarization, "Hazardous Chemical Enterprise Personnel Training (r1)", "Transportation Authority (r2)", "Safety Production Supervision Department (r3)", "Port Administration Department (r4)", "Enterprise Personnel Qualification (r5)", "Environmental Protection Department (r6)", and "Public Security Organ (r7)" are divided into the human factors layer. Let the set of port hazardous chemical logistics risk factors in the human factors layer be R={r1,r2…,r… i}(i=1,2……,j), where j=7, representing the number of risk factors in the human management layer.

[0034] 3. Use the GRA method to further screen and classify risk factors.

[0035] The GRA (Gradual Relationship Analysis) method is used to measure the degree of correlation between factors. Through certain data processing, it determines the degree of correlation between each factor and the target value in the system, thereby effectively distinguishing between primary and secondary factors. It is defined as: a certain parameter Y... i Let Y be the target parameter, and its value in the sequence. ij Form a reference sequence, denoted as Y = {Y}ij}. Influencing parameter X i Value X in the same sequence ij Form a comparison sequence, denoted as X = {X ij Grey relational analysis can be used to assess and rank the degree of correlation between different influencing factors at each level and port hazardous chemical safety accidents by calculating the correlation degree.

[0036] Therefore, drawing on the GRA methodology, a correlation data sequence of risk factors and effect influencing factors of hazardous chemicals in ports is constructed, and a grey relational analysis method based on these factors is proposed.

[0037] 1) First, select the risk factor indicators of each layer as the comparison sequence X, as shown in equation (1).

[0038]

[0039] Where, x ij This represents the j-th value of the i-th influencing factor, where i ranges from 1 to a and j ranges from 1 to b.

[0040] 2) Select the effect impact factor corresponding to each influencing factor as the reference sequence Y, as shown in equation (2).

[0041]

[0042] Among them, y ij This represents the value of the j-th effect factor corresponding to the i-th influencing factor.

[0043] 3) Standardize the data. Since the dimensions of the indicators within each layer are different and the values ​​differ significantly, direct comparison is not possible. Therefore, it is necessary to standardize x according to equations (3) to (4). ij y ij After standardization, we get x' ij y' ij .

[0044]

[0045]

[0046] 4) Calculate x one by one ij y ij The absolute difference forms a new difference matrix Δ ij As shown in equation (5).

[0047] Δ ij =|x ij -y ij | (5)

[0048] According to equations (6) to (7), the maximum and minimum values ​​are taken out from the difference matrix respectively.

[0049] Δ max =maxΔ ij (6)

[0050] Δ min =minΔ ij (7)

[0051] 5) Calculation of the correlation coefficient matrix. The correlation coefficient l can be obtained from equation (8) using the difference matrix. ij Then, the correlation coefficient matrix L is obtained from equation (9).

[0052]

[0053] Where ρ is the resolution coefficient, 0 < ρ < 1. The smaller ρ is, the higher the correlation coefficient. ij The greater the difference between them, the stronger the distinguishing ability. ρ is usually taken as 0.5.

[0054] 6) Calculate the correlation degree Q using equation (10). i .

[0055]

[0056] Q i Let Q be the change within the interval [0,1]. i The closer Q is to 1, the better the correlation; conversely, the closer Q is to 1, the better the correlation. i The closer the correlation is to 0, the weaker the correlation. According to Q... i Size can be used to classify the risk impact factors of hazardous chemicals in ports into three levels. If Q i If Q is greater than 0.7, then the corresponding i-th influencing factor is an important factor. i If Q is between 0.5 and 0.7, then the i-th influencing factor is a relatively important factor. i If the value is less than 0.5, then the i-th influencing factor is a non-important factor.

[0057] Taking the average values ​​of the risk factor indicators at the human resources level of ports A, B, C, D, E, F, and G, where hazardous chemical explosions have occurred, as an example, the key risk factor indicators at the human resources level are calculated:

[0058] 1) Calculate the comparison sequence X of risk factor indicators of the human management layer according to formula (1).

[0059]

[0060] 2) The reference sequence Y is obtained according to equation (2).

[0061]

[0062] 3) The range is standardized using equations (3) to (4), and then the difference matrix is ​​obtained using equation (5).

[0063]

[0064] 4) Then, by using equations (6) to (9), we obtain the correlation coefficient matrix L.

[0065]

[0066] 5) Finally, according to equation (10), calculate the relationship between the human layer r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7 and Q. r1 =0.932, and the correlation coefficients of E and Q are respectively r1 =0.932, Q r2 =0.901, Q r3 =0.892, Q r4 =0.852, Q r5 =0.474, Q r6 =0.457, Q r6 =0.336, resulting in the following correlation ranking: Q r1 >Q r2 >Q r3 >Q r4 >0.5>Q r5 >Q r6 >Q r7 Therefore, personnel training in hazardous chemical enterprises (r1), transportation authorities (r2), safety supervision departments (r3), and port administration departments (r4) were identified as key influencing factors for hazardous chemical management at ports.

[0067] Following the steps outlined above, the GRA method is used to recalculate the key influencing factors for hazardous chemicals at the physical and theoretical levels of ports. This ultimately determines five physical-level influencing factors, four theoretical-level hazardous chemical logistics risk factors, and four psychological-level hazardous chemical logistics risk factors. Figure 3 As shown, the factors influencing hazardous chemicals in ports at the physical level include the capacity and number of storage tanks (w1), number of berths (w2), hazardous cargo throughput (w3), port age (w4), and population density (w5); the factors influencing hazardous chemical logistics in ports at the theoretical level include the safety assessment agency (s1), annual design capacity (s2), complexity of hazardous chemical process approval (s3), and port investment (s4); and the factors influencing hazardous chemical logistics in ports at the administrative level include personnel training for hazardous chemical enterprises (r1), transportation authorities (r2), safety supervision departments (r3), and port administration departments (r4).

[0068] Because the indicator parameters differ for different types of ports, the 13 risk indicator factors are further classified, as shown in Table 1. Taking "tank capacity and quantity w1" in the physical layer as an example, when the capacity of refined oil storage tanks is greater than 5 million cubic meters, it is set as "large port tank capacity and quantity w1". 11 The section defines "Capacity and Quantity of Medium-Sized Port Storage Tanks" as follows: This section specifies tanks with a capacity of 5 million cubic meters or less but 1 million cubic meters or more. 12 When the capacity of refined oil storage tanks is less than 1 million cubic meters, it is set as "small port storage tank capacity and quantity w". 13 The 13 risk indicators were divided into three levels according to different port types, resulting in 39 secondary risk indicators.

[0069] Table 1 Risk Assessment Indicators for Tank Capacity and Quantity Classification

[0070]

[0071] 4. Calculate the probability of occurrence of risk factors affecting different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents at different ports, and use the TSS theory to couple the selected risk factors.

[0072] Based on Bayesian theory, the probability of risk factors in port hazardous chemical logistics can be calculated. Bayesian theory allows for the use of both subjective and objective methods to determine the prior probability (P). a ) and correction probability (P b The subjective method relies primarily on the knowledge and experience of experts, while the objective method is based on a large amount of statistical data. Considering the limited historical statistical data on hazardous chemical logistics at ports, an expert scoring method is used to determine the prior probability (P). a ) and correction probability (P b ), based on Bayes' theorem according to P a and P b Calculate the posterior probability (P) t This refers to the final probability. For example, the risk factor r at the human level. ij Taking the probability of occurrence as an example, the formula for calculating the posterior probability is shown in equation (11).

[0073]

[0074] Finally, the probability of occurrence of risk factors affecting port hazardous chemical safety accidents is calculated based on port type. Then, the TSS theory is used to couple the risk factors affecting different types of port hazardous chemical safety accidents. The TSS theory is widely used in risk assessment and decision-making, and based on this theory, identified risk factors are divided into different risk scenarios. Combining previous research and the characteristics of hazardous chemical terminals, it is known that the risk factors leading to accidents come from multiple aspects. Therefore, by constructing a three-dimensional risk scenario—selecting one risk factor from each of the physical, event-related, and human-related levels—the risk factors from different dimensions are extracted to constitute coupled risks. Figure 4 According to the hazardous chemical port risk indicator system, there are 80 shared three-dimensional risk scenarios. When constructing the hazardous chemical port logistics risk scenarios, the three-dimensional risk scenarios are named WΘSΘR. The probability of coupled risk factors occurring under a three-dimensional risk scenario is the probability of each coupled risk occurring simultaneously; therefore, the probability of a risk factor occurring under a three-dimensional risk scenario is equal to the product of the probabilities of each coupled risk. The probabilities of risk factors occurring in different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents at different ports under the three-dimensional risk scenarios are calculated to obtain the maximum probability of coupled risks in different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents at different ports under the three-dimensional risk scenarios.

[0075] Human factors influencing the risk of a hazardous chemical explosion at Port A: personnel training at hazardous chemical enterprises (r) 11 For example:

[0076] (1) P was obtained from the expert scoring results of the questionnaire survey. a (r 11 ) = 0.676, P b (r 11 If ) = 0.543, then The calculated posterior probability is P t (r 11 = 0.713.

[0077] (2) The probability of occurrence of port hazardous chemical safety accident risk factors is calculated according to port type, as shown in Table 2.

[0078] Table 2. Probability of Risk Factors for Hazardous Chemical Explosion Accidents at a Port

[0079]

[0080] (3) As shown in Table 3, the TSS theory is then used to couple the risk factors of the hazardous chemical explosion accident at Port A. The probability of the occurrence of risk factors at Port A under the three-dimensional risk scenario is obtained, and the port hazardous chemical risk factor index corresponding to the maximum probability is found. As shown in Table 3, under the three-dimensional risk scenario, the risk values ​​with higher values ​​are w. 33 Θs 43 Θr11 The risk value is 0.121, and the corresponding port hazardous chemicals risk influencing factor index is the low-load hazardous cargo throughput (w 33 ), low investment in ports (s 43 ) and the number of training sessions for personnel in hazardous chemical enterprises is relatively high (r 11 ).

[0081] Table 3. Probability of occurrence of risk factors for hazardous chemical explosion accidents at a certain port.

[0082]

[0083] (4) Following the steps above, calculate the probability of the occurrence of risk influencing factors in ports B, C, D, E, F, and G where hazardous chemical explosions occur under the three-dimensional risk scenario, and find the port hazardous chemical risk influencing factor index corresponding to the maximum probability. As shown in Table 4, among the physical layer risk influencing factors affecting ports A, B, C, D, E, F, and G, the port hazardous cargo throughput accounts for the largest proportion, with the physical layer risk influencing factor for 6 ports being the port hazardous cargo throughput; among the rational layer risk influencing factors affecting ports A, B, C, D, E, F, and G, port investment accounts for the largest proportion, with the physical layer risk influencing factor for 5 ports being the port investment; among the human layer risk influencing factors affecting ports A, B, C, D, E, F, and G, the number of times port hazardous chemical enterprise personnel training accounts for the largest proportion, with the physical layer risk influencing factor for 6 ports being the number of times hazardous chemical enterprise personnel training. Ultimately, the physical risk factor influencing port hazardous chemical explosion accidents can be identified as the dangerous goods throughput (w3), the theoretical risk factor as port investment (s4), and the human risk factor as the number of times hazardous chemical enterprise personnel receive training (r1).

[0084] Table 4. Indicators of Port Hazardous Chemicals Risk Influencing Factors Corresponding to Maximum Probability Values

[0085]

[0086] 5. Develop comprehensive preventative measures to avoid and reduce the risk of different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents at ports.

[0087] Based on the calculation of the maximum coupled risk probability of different types of hazardous chemical safety accidents occurring at different ports under a three-dimensional risk scenario, this study identifies the risk influencing factors of hazardous chemical safety accidents at ports corresponding to the maximum coupled risk probability for each port. This reveals the commonalities of similar types of hazardous chemical safety accidents at ports, analyzes the causes of such accidents, and formulates comprehensive preventative measures to avoid their recurrence. Since physical factors are objectively uncontrollable, improvements can be made at the theoretical and human levels to reduce the probability of a particular type of accident occurring at a port.

[0088] Taking the hazardous chemical explosions at ports A, B, C, D, E, F, and G as examples, comprehensive preventive measures to avoid and reduce the risk of such accidents are formulated. The above analysis reveals that the physical risk factor influencing hazardous chemical explosions at ports is the throughput of dangerous goods (w3), the theoretical risk factor is port investment (s4), and the human risk factor is the number of times personnel in hazardous chemical enterprises receive training (r1). Furthermore, comprehensive preventive measures for the risk of hazardous chemical explosions at each port are formulated according to port type. Taking Table 5 as an example, the comprehensive preventive measures to reduce the risk of hazardous chemical explosions at ports from a human perspective are: ① If port investment is high (s4... 41 If the investment is moderate, then innovative investment and financing models can be adopted to increase port investment to 100 billion; ② If port investment is moderate (s 42 If the investment is low, then innovative investment and financing models can be adopted to increase port investment to 60 billion; ③ If port investment is low (s 43 If this is the case, innovative investment and financing models can be used to increase port investment to 30 billion. Taking Table 6 as an example, comprehensive preventive measures to reduce the risk of hazardous chemical explosions at ports from a management perspective are: ① If the number of training sessions for personnel in hazardous chemical enterprises is high (r 11 If the number of training sessions for hazardous chemical company personnel is moderate (r), then online and offline teaching methods can be used to increase the number of training sessions to 20; ② If the number of training sessions for hazardous chemical company personnel is moderate (r 12 If the number of training sessions for hazardous chemical company personnel is low (r), then online and offline teaching methods can be used to increase the number of training sessions to 15; ③ If the number of training sessions for hazardous chemical company personnel is low (r 13 In cases where this is not the case, online and offline teaching methods can be used to increase the number of training sessions for personnel in hazardous chemical enterprises to up to 10. The data in Tables 5 and 6 are derived from relevant literature and can be adjusted according to actual circumstances.

[0089] Table 5. Comprehensive preventative measures to reduce the risk of hazardous chemical explosions at ports.

[0090]

[0091] Table 6. Comprehensive preventive measures by management to reduce the risk of hazardous chemical explosions at ports.

[0092]

[0093] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any equivalent substitutions or modifications made by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in the present invention, based on the technical solution and inventive concept of the present invention, should be covered within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A comprehensive prevention method for port hazardous chemical safety accidents based on WGT, characterized in that, The method comprises the following steps: (1) collecting data of dangerous chemical accidents in n ports nationwide, analyzing and summarizing risk influencing factors of different types of dangerous chemical accidents in different ports, wherein the types of dangerous chemical accidents include dangerous chemical explosion, dangerous chemical leakage and dangerous chemical spontaneous combustion; (2) identifying risk factors based on the WSR method, classifying the collected risk influencing factor indexes of dangerous chemical accidents in n ports from the physical layer, the matter layer and the human layer, and then establishing an accident risk identification framework; (3) further screening the collected risk influencing factor indexes of different types of dangerous chemical accidents in different ports by using the GRA method, retaining more critical influencing factors, classifying the key risk influencing factors according to different port types, and obtaining secondary risk influencing factor indexes of different types of dangerous chemical accidents in different ports; (4) calculating the probability of occurrence of the secondary risk influencing factors of different types of dangerous chemical accidents in different ports, coupling the secondary risk influencing factors of different types of dangerous chemical accidents in different ports by using the TSS theory, obtaining the maximum value of the coupling risk probability of different types of dangerous chemical accidents in different ports under a three-dimensional risk scenario, and the coupling risk factor probability under the three-dimensional risk scenario is the probability of simultaneous occurrence of the coupled risks, so the coupling risk probability under the three-dimensional risk scenario is equal to the product of the probabilities of the coupled risks; (5) based on the calculation of the maximum value of the coupling risk probability of different types of dangerous chemical accidents in different ports under a three-dimensional risk scenario, finding out the port dangerous chemical accident risk influencing factor indexes corresponding to the maximum coupling risk probability of each port, obtaining the commonness of the same type of dangerous chemical accidents in the port, analyzing the reasons for the same type of dangerous chemical accidents in the port, and formulating comprehensive prevention measures for the same type of port dangerous chemical accidents to avoid the recurrence of the same type of accidents; in the process of formulating the comprehensive prevention measures, due to the objective uncontrollability of the physical layer factors, the matter layer and the human layer are improved to reduce the probability of the occurrence of a certain type of accident in the port.

2. The WGT-based port safety accident comprehensive prevention method for dangerous chemicals according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step (1), the data of dangerous chemical accidents of no less than 60 ports are collected; the number of ports of the same type of dangerous chemical accidents collected is not less than 6; and the dangerous chemical risk factors influencing the occurrence of a certain type of accident in the port are not less than 20.

3. The WGT-based port safety accident comprehensive prevention method for dangerous chemicals according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step (2), the risk factors are identified based on the WSR method, the physical layer port dangerous chemical logistics risk factors include tank capacity and quantity, number of berths, length of berths, industrial discharge, dangerous goods throughput, port age, population density; the matter layer port dangerous chemical logistics risk factors include safety emphasis, operation specification, safety evaluation agency, annual design capacity, dangerous chemical process approval complexity, port investment; the human layer port dangerous chemical logistics risk factors include dangerous chemical enterprise personnel training, transportation department, safety production supervision department, port administrative department, enterprise personnel qualification, environmental protection department, public security organ.

4. The WGT-based port safety accident comprehensive prevention method for dangerous chemicals according to claim 1, characterized in that, The probabilities of the secondary risk factors of different types of dangerous chemical accidents in different ports are calculated by using the Bayesian theory. The prior probability and the revised probability are determined by using the expert scoring method. The posterior probability, i.e. the final probability, is calculated by the Bayesian formula according to the prior probability and the revised probability.

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