Hidden area security management methods, hidden area file system, devices and media
By embedding a hidden file system in the device, combined with the preset security policies and permission verification of the security layer, the problem of low device data security is solved, and data protection and system stability are improved in the event of device disassembly.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411583163.7
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-11-07
- Publication Date
- 2025-11-14
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-11-07
AI Technical Summary
In existing technologies, device data security is low, and important data can easily be leaked after disassembly. There is an urgent need to improve data security and protection measures.
The device incorporates a hidden file system and, through an initialization module, application interface module, and execution module, combined with the preset security policies of the security layer, distinguishes the permissions of security administrators and ordinary users, performs strict permission and password verification, and ensures that only legitimate users can perform operations.
It improves system security and resistance to attacks, ensures that data is not easily leaked when the system is disassembled, enhances system stability and flexibility, is compatible with mandatory access control policies, and facilitates centralized management and maintenance.
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Figure CN119720232B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of computer technology, specifically to a method for secure management of hidden areas, a file system for hidden areas, devices, and media. Background Technology
[0002] Large-scale project delivery often involves delivering the software along with the hardware platform on which it runs, forming a user-friendly, relatively enclosed enclosure. This ensures that all user operations remain within a controllable range, establishing stable human-computer interaction boundaries. Simultaneously, only debugging interfaces for developers are provided within the internal system for maintenance and upgrades.
[0003] In delivered equipment, the integrated systems within the chassis typically offer upgrade capabilities based on the provided service life. However, the protection of core data and applications is generally achieved by restricting access permissions through the built-in operating system. If a third party forcibly disassembles the equipment, removes the disks, and attempts to mount and read them, it can easily lead to the leakage of important data, causing financial losses to the manufacturer.
[0004] Therefore, there is an urgent need for a secure management method for hidden areas that can reduce data risks and improve data security. Summary of the Invention
[0005] Therefore, the technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to overcome the problem of low data security in related technologies.
[0006] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this invention provides a method for secure management of hidden areas, applied to a hidden area file system, comprising:
[0007] The system receives a target user's request for a hidden area. The target user may be a security administrator or a regular user. The target operation request is at least one of a preset number of operation request types categorized according to the business scenario. The preset number of operation request types include a first operation request, a second operation request, a third operation request, and a fourth operation request. The first operation request represents a security administrator's request to add or delete files in the hidden area. The second operation request represents a regular user's request to change the attributes of the hidden area. The third operation request represents a security administrator's request to configure permissions and passwords for all regular users. The fourth operation request represents a regular user's request to perform routine operations on files in the hidden area.
[0008] The permissions of the target user, or permissions and password, are verified according to the preset security policy in the security layer; the preset security policy is the preset security policy corresponding to the hidden area; the preset security policy in the security layer is mapped according to the mandatory access control policy of the security layer;
[0009] The target operation request is executed when the target user's permissions, or permissions and password verification, are passed.
[0010] In an optional implementation, when the target operation request is a first operation request, receiving the target user's target operation request for the hidden area includes:
[0011] Receive requests from the security administrator to add or delete hidden areas;
[0012] The new operation request includes: the name of the target disk partition and the target space capacity;
[0013] The deletion request includes: the name of the hidden area to be deleted;
[0014] After receiving a request from the security administrator to add new operations to the hidden area, the method further includes:
[0015] Based on the name of the target disk partition in the new operation request, determine whether the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition is greater than or equal to the target space capacity. If the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition is greater than or equal to the target space capacity, divide the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition according to the target space capacity to obtain the target sector.
[0016] In one optional implementation, when the target operation request is a first operation request, the step of verifying the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, according to a preset security policy in the security layer includes:
[0017] After obtaining the target sector, the security administrator's attribute configuration permissions are verified according to the preset security policy in the security layer;
[0018] Alternatively, the security administrator's permission to change attributes can be verified according to the preset security policy in the security layer.
[0019] In one optional implementation, executing the target operation request upon successful verification of the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, includes:
[0020] When the security administrator's attribute configuration permission verification passes, the target sector is initialized, and the security policy of the initialized target sector is configured according to the pre-acquired mandatory access control policy to obtain the newly added hidden area;
[0021] Alternatively, when the security administrator's permission to change attributes passes the verification, the hidden area corresponding to the name of the hidden area to be deleted in the mount deletion operation request is removed, and the first disk partition is determined; the first disk partition is the disk partition obtained after removing the hidden area corresponding to the name of the hidden area to be deleted in the mount deletion operation request; the first attribute information in the attributes of the first disk partition is deleted, and the first disk partition is formatted; the first attribute information includes attribute information related to the hidden area.
[0022] In an optional implementation, when the target operation request is a second operation request, receiving the target user's target operation request for the hidden area includes:
[0023] Receive requests from ordinary users to change the attributes of the hidden area; the request includes the name of the hidden area to be changed, the change command, and the corresponding parameters to be changed.
[0024] In an optional implementation, when the target operation request is a third operation request, before receiving the target user's target operation request for the hidden area, the method further includes:
[0025] Determine whether the target user is a security administrator; wherein, if the target user is a security administrator, receive a configuration operation request from the security administrator for the permissions and passwords of all ordinary users;
[0026] Upon successful verification of the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, the target operation request is executed, including:
[0027] Once the security administrator's permissions are verified, execute the security administrator's request to configure permissions and passwords for all regular users.
[0028] In an optional implementation, when the target operation request is a fourth operation request, receiving the target user's target operation request for the hidden area includes:
[0029] Receive routine operation requests from ordinary users for files in the hidden area;
[0030] Upon successful verification of the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, the target operation request is executed, including:
[0031] Once the permissions and password of a regular user are verified, execute the regular user's normal operation request for files in the hidden area.
[0032] Secondly, the present invention provides a hidden area file system, comprising:
[0033] Initialization module, application interface module, and execution module;
[0034] The initialization module is used to initialize disk sectors;
[0035] The application interface module is used to receive target operation requests from target users to the hidden area; the target users include security administrators or ordinary users; the target operation request is at least one of a preset number of operation request types divided according to business scenarios; the preset number of operation request types include a first operation request, a second operation request, a third operation request, and a fourth operation request; the first operation request represents a security administrator's request to add or delete the hidden area, the second operation request represents an ordinary user's request to change the attributes of the hidden area, the third operation request represents a security administrator's request to configure permissions and passwords for all ordinary users, and the fourth operation request represents an ordinary user's regular operation request for files in the hidden area;
[0036] The execution module is used to verify the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, according to the preset security policy in the security layer; the preset security policy is the preset security policy corresponding to the hidden area; the preset security policy in the security layer is mapped according to the mandatory access control policy of the security layer; when the target user's permissions, or permissions and password are verified, the target operation request is executed.
[0037] Thirdly, the present invention provides a computer device, including: a memory and a processor, the memory and the processor being communicatively connected to each other, the memory storing computer instructions, and the processor executing the computer instructions to perform the security management method for the hidden area described in the first aspect or any corresponding embodiment.
[0038] Fourthly, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions on a single computer-readable storage medium, the computer instructions being used to cause a computer to execute the security management method for the hidden area of the first aspect or any corresponding embodiment described above.
[0039] Fifthly, the present invention provides a computer program product, including computer instructions for causing a computer to execute the hidden area security management method of the first aspect or any corresponding embodiment described above.
[0040] The technical solution provided by this invention has the following technical effects: By distinguishing the permissions of security administrators and ordinary users, it ensures that only authorized users can operate on the hidden area, thereby enhancing system security. Pre-setting a number of operation request types allows the system to perform more granular access control on different types of operations, making permission management more flexible and precise. Verifying the permissions and passwords of target users through the preset security policies of the security layer ensures that only legitimate users can perform operations, improving system security and anti-attack capabilities. The preset security policies of the security layer are mapped from mandatory access control policies, meaning the system can enforce security policies to prevent unauthorized access and data leakage. The security policy of the hidden area is compatible with and inherits the mandatory access control policy configuration by default, ensuring that the security management of the hidden area is consistent with the overall system security policy, facilitating centralized management and maintenance. Security administrators can configure the permissions and passwords of all ordinary users, providing flexibility in access control for ordinary users, which can be adjusted according to business needs and security requirements. Ordinary user requests for file operations (CRUD operations) on the hidden area are also controlled by the security management method, ensuring that these operations are performed within the scope permitted by the security policy. By strictly controlling access to the hidden area, the abuse and misoperation of system resources are reduced, thereby improving the stability and reliability of the system. The hidden area security management method provided by this invention improves the security, flexibility, and stability of the system through meticulous access control and the implementation of mandatory access control policies. Attached Figure Description
[0041] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the specific embodiments or related technologies of the present invention, the drawings used in the description of the specific embodiments or related technologies will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained from these drawings without creative effort.
[0042] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the framework of the hidden area file system according to an embodiment of the present invention;
[0043] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the security management method for hidden areas according to an embodiment of the present invention;
[0044] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the overall process of the security management method for hidden areas according to an embodiment of the present invention;
[0045] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the hidden area file system according to an embodiment of the present invention;
[0046] Figure 5This is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of a computer device according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0047] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0048] In the computer field, intellectual property protection and anti-tampering protection for commercial software are important measures for manufacturers to form a closed business loop while providing software services to users.
[0049] Large-scale project delivery often involves delivering the software along with the hardware platform on which it runs, forming a user-friendly, relatively enclosed enclosure. This ensures that all user operations remain within a controllable range, establishing stable human-computer interaction boundaries. Simultaneously, only debugging interfaces for developers are provided within the internal system for maintenance and upgrades.
[0050] In delivered equipment, the integrated systems within the chassis typically offer upgrade capabilities based on the provided service life. However, the protection of core data and applications is generally achieved by restricting access permissions through the built-in operating system. If an attacker forcibly disassembles the device and removes the disks to read data via mount, there is a risk of leaking important business data, resulting in poor data security.
[0051] The relevant technologies generally include the following methods for protecting device data security and corresponding upgrade and maintenance:
[0052] (1) All of them are achieved through the multi-user permission control of the operating system.
[0053] This is the most common approach because the operating system itself has a user permission system. By presetting user permissions according to the device's operational needs and providing the customer with the specified ordinary user permissions upon delivery, the scope of user access and operational boundaries to the built-in operating system can be controlled.
[0054] Correspondingly, when it comes to upgrades and maintenance, using another dedicated user account can grant higher privileges to modify core data.
[0055] The drawbacks of this approach include the potential loss of account information and the uncontrollable boundaries of human intervention. In particular, changes in maintenance personnel or products can increase user account management costs and risks, leading to data security risks stemming from social engineering.
[0056] (2) This is achieved through user permission control of the operating system and secondary development of the operating system's interactive interface.
[0057] This approach complements the single-user-access-system approach. What is delivered to the user is a device running a custom operating system. Not only are user access permissions configured, but a custom-developed user interface is also included, blocking the common operating system login and access interfaces and forcing users to interact through this specific UI.
[0058] Similarly, a separate UI will be developed for maintenance personnel, providing them with a separate interaction boundary for upgrades and maintenance only.
[0059] This approach is commonly seen in devices with strong business requirements and highly specific functions, such as firewalls and switches. Due to their specialized industry use cases and relatively fixed business operation boundaries, developers can streamline operational logic and develop UI interfaces based on relatively stable operational scenarios. However, drawbacks emerge: limited versatility, high development costs, short update cycles, and suitability only for large-scale vendors in specific industries.
[0060] (3) It is achieved by combining user permission control with permission verification components.
[0061] This approach adds a permission verification component to the single-user permission control method to mitigate the implementation risks of key permission control links introduced by operators through social engineering.
[0062] Upon delivery, standard equipment is provided, along with a firmware device as a token. Different tokens are used to activate users' access to corresponding business functions and to grant upgrade and maintenance personnel operational permissions.
[0063] However, this method is essentially still a user permission system configuration at the software level, and it does not control the specific operations of various personnel or the protection of sensitive data.
[0064] The above protection mechanisms and corresponding upgrade and maintenance methods are all at the software level. If the device is directly disassembled, the disk is removed and mounted on another host to read data, the device's information will be leaked, tampered with, and malicious programs will be implanted. When the device is reassembled and used, there will be security risks.
[0065] Therefore, manufacturers will design protection mechanisms that meet their own or specific user needs to achieve data security protection through a combination of hardware and software.
[0066] The technical solution of this invention, within the framework of a "device data security protection mechanism," embeds a hard disk sector within the working machine, formatted as a custom file system—a hidden file system—making it unrecognizable by ordinary file systems. This prevents the upper-level operating system from loading this hard disk; access and manipulation of the hidden sector are only possible through the application interface module's basic library SDK provided by the kernel, achieving data hiding. Simultaneously, a "security layer" is encapsulated over operations on this sector. This security layer acquires a security lock and verifies the password to unlock it each time a process attempts to access the hidden sector. Once the verification is successful, operation on the hidden sector is granted. This creates a storage unit, accessible only by a password holder through a special API interface, outside of the ordinary file system and user permission system within the operating system, protecting confidential information. This combination of hardware and software protection effectively prevents data access during device disassembly, thereby significantly improving data security.
[0067] The hidden area security management method provided in this embodiment of the invention is applied to, for example, Figure 1 The hidden file system shown is a basic system function available to operating system users (security administrators and ordinary users).
[0068] like Figure 1 The framework of the hidden file system shown includes: an initialization module (CQFFS-Init), an application interface module (CQFFS-API), and an execution module (ChangQing Fidden File System, CQFFS).
[0069] The initialization module is used to initialize disk sectors. It resides in the system application layer and is implemented as a built-in system toolset. It invokes system calls from the CQFFS execution module to initialize ordinary disk sectors. For example, it initializes a target sector.
[0070] The application interface module receives target operation requests from target users regarding the hidden area. Target users include security administrators or regular users. The target operation request is at least one of a preset number of operation request types categorized according to the business scenario. These preset number of operation request types include a first operation request, a second operation request, a third operation request, and a fourth operation request. A first operation request represents a security administrator's request to add or delete data from the hidden area; a second operation request represents a regular user's request to change the attributes of the hidden area; a third operation request represents a security administrator's request to configure permissions and passwords for all regular users; and a fourth operation request represents a regular user's request to perform routine operations on files within the hidden area. The application interface module belongs to the system's basic library and serves as an interface for upper-layer applications to perform business functions by manipulating the hidden area.
[0071] The execution module verifies the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, according to the preset security policy in the security layer. The preset security policy is the one corresponding to the hidden area. The preset security policy in the security layer is mapped based on the mandatory access control policy of the security layer. If the target user's permissions and password verification passes, the target operation request is executed. The execution module resides in the operating system's kernel module and is the core execution mechanism of the entire hidden area file system. It runs in parallel with the ordinary file system, providing system calls for various operations on the drive letter corresponding to the hidden area.
[0072] This invention provides a method for secure management of hidden areas, a file system for hidden areas, a device, and media to solve the above problems.
[0073] According to an embodiment of the present invention, a method for security management of a hidden area is provided. It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowchart in the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer device such as a set of computer-executable instructions. Furthermore, although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases, the steps shown or described may be executed in a different order than that shown here.
[0074] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the security management method for hidden areas according to an embodiment of the present invention.
[0075] like Figure 2 As shown, this embodiment of the invention provides a method for secure management of hidden areas, applied to a hidden area file system. The framework of the hidden area file system includes: an initialization module (CQFFS-Init), an application interface module (CQFFS-API), and an execution module (ChangQing Fidden File System, CQFFS). The method for secure management of hidden areas includes:
[0076] S101: Receive the target user's request for a target operation on the hidden area.
[0077] In this embodiment, the target user includes a security administrator or a regular user. The target operation request is at least one of a preset number of operation request types categorized according to the business scenario.
[0078] As an example, operations on the hidden area can be categorized into four types based on business scenarios. The corresponding preset number of operation requests for each type include: First Operation Request, Second Operation Request, Third Operation Request, and Fourth Operation Request. The First Operation Request represents a security administrator's request to add or delete a hidden area. The security administrator can format a disk sector as a hidden area or remove a hidden area. The Second Operation Request represents a request from a regular user to change the attributes of the hidden area. Regular users can perform business operations on a CQFFS mount point basis. The Third Operation Request represents a security administrator's request to configure permissions and passwords for all regular users. The security administrator can configure user permissions and passwords. The Fourth Operation Request represents a regular user's request for routine operations on files within the hidden area. Regular users can perform routine operations (visibility, read / write, etc.) on files within the hidden area.
[0079] S102: Verify the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, according to the preset security policy in the security layer. If the verification of the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, passes, execute the target operation request.
[0080] In this embodiment, the preset security policy is the preset security policy corresponding to the hidden area. The preset security policy in the security layer is mapped according to the mandatory access control policy of the security layer.
[0081] In this embodiment, if the permission verification for the target user, or the permission and password verification, fails, the current operation request is aborted, and a prompt message is given, such as a prompt message indicating that the permission verification failed, or a prompt message indicating that the password verification failed. The preset security policy includes ordinary users, operation requests, ordinary user permissions, passwords, security administrators, operation requests, and security administrator permissions. Specifically, the preset security policy can be an access control list, which is typically a permission list containing multiple entries. Each entry defines a subject (user or group) and corresponding permissions. For example, an entry could indicate that ordinary user A can modify the attributes of the hidden area, and the permission verification for ordinary user A's operation request to change the attributes of the hidden area has passed. In this embodiment, when permission and password verification is required, they are verified sequentially.
[0082] In this embodiment, the mandatory access control policy (CYSE security policy configuration file) is a control module built into the operating system, which is a secondary development of the native SELinux mandatory access control module of Linux. It is operationally compatible with SELinux and expands the attribute fields of the subject and object with fields such as "complete set". Combined with control commands, it can freely switch between the Biba access control model and the BLP access control model. The preset security policy corresponding to the hidden area, or the hidden area access control policy file, is a separate module file, but to simplify user operations and improve module reusability, the security attributes of the hidden area are directly made compatible with the CYSE security policy. When creating the hidden area, the default access configuration sets the mandatory access control policy to the preset security policy corresponding to the hidden area, inheriting the mandatory access control policy and converting it into the hidden area's configuration to achieve the desired effect. Security administrators can modify the attributes of the hidden area, centralizing security control in a single account. Ordinary users' permissions for reading, writing, visibility, mounting, and unmounting the hidden area are all changed by the security administrator. While achieving compatibility in terms of effect, the actual execution involves two separate modules, necessitating a mapping process. This involves mapping the CYSE security policy to the hidden area's own access control configuration. The default security policy configuration file records which principal classes can perform what operations on which access object classes. The principal classes (i.e., executors) can add and manage users; this is the "User GID." This "User GID" is a different file from the GID in the Linux user management module; the "User GID" can be understood as a group.
[0083] This invention enhances system security by differentiating the permissions of security administrators and ordinary users, and by classifying and processing different types of operation requests. Permissions and passwords are verified for both security administrators and ordinary users. Password verification is performed when logging into the security administrator account or switching from an ordinary user account to the security administrator account. The main focus of this invention is on verifying the permissions of the security administrator when the target user is a security administrator, and verifying the permissions and passwords of the ordinary user when the target user is an ordinary user, thus improving system security. A preset number of operation request types are categorized according to business scenarios, allowing for more granular access control for different types of operations, making permission management more flexible and precise. The execution module CQFFS verifies user permissions and passwords according to the preset security policies of the security layer, ensuring that the system can enforce security policies and prevent unauthorized access and data leakage. The application interface module CQFFS-API provides an easy-to-use interface for upper-layer applications, enabling developers to easily integrate the operation functions of the hidden area, improving development efficiency. The execution module CQFFS, as part of the operating system kernel, works in parallel with the regular file system. This allows the hidden area file system to be seamlessly integrated into existing operating systems without requiring large-scale modifications to the existing system architecture. Permission and password verification is performed before any operation is executed, adding a layer of security to ensure that only authorized users can perform operations. This invention allows the hidden area's security policy to be compatible with the operating system's mandatory access control policy, facilitating centralized management and maintenance.
[0084] For the target operation request being the first operation request (a security administrator's request to add or delete items from a hidden area):
[0085] In an optional implementation, when the target operation request is a first operation request, receiving the target user's target operation request for the hidden area in S101 specifically includes:
[0086] Receive requests from the security administrator to add or delete hidden areas.
[0087] In this embodiment, the new operation request includes: the name of the target disk partition and the target space capacity, as well as the name of the new hidden partition. The delete operation request includes: the name of the hidden partition to be deleted.
[0088] After receiving a request from the security administrator to add new operations to the hidden area, the security management method for this hidden area also includes:
[0089] Based on the name of the target disk partition in the new operation request, determine whether the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition is greater than or equal to the target space capacity. If the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition is greater than or equal to the target space capacity, divide the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition according to the target space capacity to obtain the target sector.
[0090] When the target operation request is the first operation request, step S102 verifies the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, according to the preset security policy in the security layer. Specifically, this includes:
[0091] After obtaining the target sector, the security administrator's attribute configuration permissions are verified according to the preset security policy in the security layer. New operation requests are then processed based on the security administrator's attribute configuration permissions.
[0092] Alternatively, the security administrator's permission to modify attributes can be verified according to the preset security policy in the security layer. The delete operation requests the corresponding security administrator's permission to modify attributes.
[0093] When the target operation request is the first operation request, in S102, if the permissions of the target user, or the permissions and password verification, are passed, the target operation request is executed, specifically including:
[0094] When the security administrator's attribute configuration permission verification passes, the target sector is initialized, and the security policy of the initialized target sector is configured according to the pre-obtained mandatory access control policy, thus obtaining the newly added hidden area.
[0095] Alternatively, when the security administrator's permission to change attributes passes verification, the system mounts the hidden partition corresponding to the name of the hidden partition to be deleted in the deletion request, thus determining the first disk partition. The first disk partition is the disk partition obtained after mounting the hidden partition corresponding to the name of the hidden partition to be deleted in the deletion request. The system then deletes the first attribute information in the attributes of the first disk partition and formats the first disk partition. The first attribute information includes attribute information related to the hidden partition.
[0096] For adding and deleting hidden sectors, when it is necessary to configure a regular disk sector as a hidden sector or to convert an existing hidden sector into a regular sector, the upper-layer application software calls the CQFFS-API interface, or the user enters a command in the shell terminal to send the configuration and parameters. The parameters included in the add operation request are as follows:
[0097] The name of the target disk partition: the actual sector of the disk, such as / dev / sda1, etc. (Only required when creating a new partition).
[0098] Target space capacity, partition space size; only required when adding a new partition.
[0099] It can also include the name of the newly added hidden area: the name of the virtual disk used to mount to the hidden area file system.
[0100] The background process preprocesses commands, identifying new and delete operation requests from the hidden area. It first loads the hardware devices currently identified by the system and then filters out the storage device. Hardware devices refer to the overall device list, including input / output devices, network devices, storage devices, and computing devices. Identifying hardware devices involves finding the storage device from this existing list of overall devices for further processing.
[0101] If a new hidden area is added, the following steps should be taken:
[0102] Based on the name of the target disk partition in the new operation request, determine whether the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition is greater than or equal to the target space capacity. In other words, it is necessary to first check whether there is any space available for allocation in the input disk drive letter (the name of the target disk partition).
[0103] If the remaining space on the target disk partition is greater than or equal to the target disk partition's capacity, the remaining space is divided according to the target disk partition's capacity to obtain the target sectors. In other words, if there is space, the fdisk tool can be used to divide the disk into sectors to obtain the target sectors.
[0104] In this embodiment, the sectors are divided according to the current system's default configuration or parameters specified by the administrator user. These parameters may include partition size, partition format, partition number, etc. The specific method for dividing sectors in this embodiment can be implemented using conventional techniques, and will not be elaborated upon here.
[0105] After obtaining the target sector, verify whether the target user (security administrator) has the permission to configure the hidden sector attribute. Specifically, the security administrator's attribute configuration permission can be verified according to the security layer's preset security policy, that is, by querying the "user GID" to determine whether the security administrator has the permission to configure the hidden sector attribute.
[0106] When the security administrator's attribute configuration permission verification passes, the target sector is initialized. The security policy of the initialized target sector is configured according to the pre-obtained mandatory access control policy, resulting in a new hidden area. Specifically, the target sector can be initialized according to the hidden area file system format. However, the initialized new hidden area needs to be configured to determine who can and cannot access the partition; that is, the security policy for the new hidden area needs to be configured. In this invention, the security policy of the hidden area is compatible with and inherits the CYSE security policy configuration by default. Therefore, the default CYSE security policy configuration file can be obtained in advance. Then, after initialization, the permission configuration in the CYSE security policy configuration file is converted into the security attribute parameters of the new hidden area, thereby realizing the configuration of the security policy corresponding to the new hidden area.
[0107] Initialize the target sector according to the hidden sector file system format, which may include specifying the appropriate file system type. For example, format the newly created target sector (such as / dev / sda4) as an ext4 file system: `sudomkfs.ext4 / dev / sda4`. Other common file system formatting commands include formatting to xfs, btrfs, vfat, etc. After formatting, the newly added hidden sector can be mounted to the system directory for access. First, create a mount point, and then use the `mount` command to mount the newly added hidden sector.
[0108] If a hidden sector is converted to a normal sector, the following processing is performed:
[0109] Upon receiving a request from the security administrator to delete the hidden area, the system verifies the administrator's permission to modify attributes according to the security layer's preset security policy, directly proceeding to the "verify user GID" permission step. This step checks whether the user's group has permission to modify the attributes of the hidden area. If there is a mismatch, insufficient permissions are indicated, and the verification fails. If there is a match, modification is permitted, and the verification passes.
[0110] When the security administrator's permission to change attributes passes verification, the hidden sector corresponding to the name of the hidden sector to be deleted in the deletion request is mounted, thus determining the first disk partition. The first disk partition is the disk partition obtained after removing the hidden sector corresponding to the name of the hidden sector to be deleted in the deletion request. The first attribute information in the attributes of the first disk partition is deleted, and the first disk partition is formatted. The first attribute information includes the attribute information related to the hidden sector. If the verification passes, an attempt will be made to mount it. If no other process is using it, the mounting will succeed. After unmounting, the first disk partition is obtained, and the attribute field of the hidden sector of the first disk partition is removed. The first disk partition is then formatted as a normal disk partition. At this point, the formatted first disk partition is a normal disk sector that can be directly mounted.
[0111] In a disk partition, the attribute fields indicating that the partition is a hidden area are as follows:
[0112] For Windows systems: In the globally unique identifier partition table, there is a dedicated area (8 bytes, or 64 bits) used to represent partition attributes. Here are some attribute fields related to hidden partitions: 0x0000000000000001 (bit 0): Indicates the partition is required, and user data modification is not allowed (marked as an OEM partition in Windows). 0x80000000000000000 (bit 63): No drive letter is assigned by default when the hard drive is mounted to another computer. 0x40000000000000000 (bit 62): Indicates the partition is undetectable. 0x20000000000000000 (bit 61): Describes the partition as a volume shadow copy of another partition. 0x10000000000000000 (bit 60): Sets the partition to read-only.
[0113] For Linux systems: In Linux, the hidden attribute of a disk partition can be achieved by modifying file attributes. For example, the `chattr` command can be used to add the `+i` attribute to a file or directory, making it immutable and thus achieving the hidden effect. Furthermore, universally unique identifiers (UUIDs) in Linux systems are attributes of disk partitions and are crucial when managing servers with hundreds of drives, but the UUID itself does not directly indicate whether a partition is hidden.
[0114] The above attribute fields and methods can be used to identify and manage hidden areas, ensuring the security and privacy of the partition.
[0115] For the target operation request being the second operation request (a request from a regular user to change the attributes of the hidden area):
[0116] In an optional implementation, when the target operation request is a second operation request, receiving the target user's target operation request for the hidden area in S101 specifically includes:
[0117] This function receives requests from regular users to modify the attributes of a hidden partition. The request includes the name of the hidden partition to be modified, the command to modify, and the corresponding parameters to be changed. The command to modify is a subcommand for the hidden partition operation. For example, you can use the `mount` command to mount the hidden partition to a specified mount point: `sudo mount / dev / vdb1 / mnt / partition1`, and you can use the `mount` command to unmount the mounted hidden partition: `sudo umount / mnt / partition1`.
[0118] When there is a need to change the attributes of the hidden area (such as mounting, unmounting, changing the mount point, etc.), the parameters are first sent through the application interface module CQFFS-API or shell command, as follows:
[0119] The name of the hidden area to be changed, the command to change it, and the corresponding parameters to be changed.
[0120] In this embodiment, when the target operation request is a second operation request, step S102 verifies the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, according to the preset security policy in the security layer. If the verification of the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, passes, the target operation request is executed. Specifically, this includes:
[0121] At this point, a preset security policy is obtained in advance, and the "user GID" is verified to determine whether the ordinary user has the right to change the attributes of the hidden area. If the verification is successful, and a password is configured, the user needs to enter the password and authenticate. After successful authentication, the request to change the attributes of the hidden area is executed. Since changing the attributes of the hidden area requires processing by the corresponding kernel module, the processing module needs to be temporarily loaded and then released after modification. In other words, when the target operation request is the second operation request, the permissions and password of the target user (ordinary user) are verified according to the preset security policy in the security layer. If the permissions and password verification of the target user (ordinary user) is successful, the target operation request is executed.
[0122] For the target operation request being a third-party operation request (a security administrator's request to configure permissions and passwords for all ordinary users):
[0123] In an optional implementation, when the target operation request is a third operation request, before receiving the target user's target operation request for the hidden area, the security management method for the hidden area further includes:
[0124] Determine if the target user is a security administrator. If the target user is a security administrator, receive configuration requests from the security administrator regarding permissions and passwords for all regular users.
[0125] The receiving of the target user's target operation request for the hidden area in S101 specifically includes:
[0126] Receives configuration requests from security administrators regarding permissions and passwords for all regular users.
[0127] S102 verifies the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, according to the preset security policy in the security layer. If the verification of the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, passes, the target operation request is executed, specifically including:
[0128] The security administrator's permissions are verified according to the preset security policies in the security layer.
[0129] Once the security administrator's permissions are verified, execute the security administrator's request to configure permissions and passwords for all regular users.
[0130] In the operating system, the security administrator is originally the management user of the security access module of the mandatory access control module. It is a built-in security administrator account of the system, and the configuration of security permissions and passwords in the hidden area is entrusted to this user.
[0131] First, confirm whether the target user sending the third operation request is a security administrator. If the target user is a security administrator, load the current security policy module and allow operations such as adding, deleting, modifying, and querying users who can access the hidden area, as well as updating passwords. This part eliminates the need for password verification for the security administrator because the user is using the system's built-in security administrator account, which has already been verified when the user switches to this account.
[0132] The target operation request is the fourth operation request (a regular operation request from a normal user on a file in the hidden area):
[0133] In an optional implementation, when the target operation request is the fourth operation request, receiving the target user's target operation request for the hidden area in S101 specifically includes:
[0134] It accepts routine operation requests from ordinary users for files in the hidden area.
[0135] S102 verifies the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, according to the preset security policy in the security layer. If the verification of the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, passes, the target operation request is executed, specifically including:
[0136] The permissions and passwords of ordinary users are verified according to the preset security policy in the security layer. When the permissions and passwords of ordinary users are verified, the ordinary user's normal operation request for files in the hidden area is executed.
[0137] In this embodiment, whether a regular user can see a hidden area and whether they have read, write, or execute permissions is determined by a preset security policy in the security layer. When a user accesses the hidden area, firstly, the user's GID needs to be verified. Secondly, if an access password is configured, the user needs to enter the access password the first time or after the password-free period is configured in the security policy, and then they can operate on it like a normal file directory.
[0138] In this invention, when an upper-layer application calls interfaces in the base library or toolsets provided by the system for operation, the interfaces and toolsets only perform preprocessing of the data to be processed. Afterwards, the data must pass through a security layer for permission verification before being sent to the kernel for execution. Security administrators do not perform operations on business logic and do not use passwords subsequently, while ordinary users can only perform business-related operations, and if passwords are enabled, they must be entered for verification during the call. This invention's technical solution uses a customized file system formatted with hidden sectors, employs an operation interface independent of ordinary file systems, and incorporates a security layer permission verification mechanism, providing an additional specific storage option compared to ordinary file systems and user permission mechanisms. This effectively prevents network attacks on user systems, effectively prevents internal privilege escalation, and effectively prevents data security attacks on critical information within the system through the file system.
[0139] A schematic diagram of the overall process of the security management method for the hidden area of this invention is shown below. Figure 3 As shown.
[0140] It should be noted that the contents not described in detail in this specification are common knowledge to those skilled in the art.
[0141] This embodiment also provides a hidden area file system. A single system is used to implement the above embodiments and optional implementation methods, and details already described will not be repeated. As used below, the term "module" can be a combination of software and / or hardware that implements a predetermined function. Although the systems described in the following embodiments are preferably implemented in software, hardware implementations, or a combination of software and hardware, are also possible and contemplated.
[0142] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the hidden area file system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
[0143] This invention provides a hidden area file system, such as... Figure 4 As shown, the hidden area file system includes:
[0144] Initialization module 11, application interface module 12, and execution module 13.
[0145] Initialization module 11 is used to initialize disk sectors.
[0146] Application interface module 12 is used to receive target operation requests from target users to the hidden area. Target users include security administrators or ordinary users. The target operation request is at least one of a preset number of operation request types categorized according to the business scenario. The preset number of operation request types include a first operation request, a second operation request, a third operation request, and a fourth operation request. The first operation request represents a security administrator's request to add or delete files from the hidden area; the second operation request represents a request from an ordinary user to change the attributes of the hidden area; the third operation request represents a security administrator's request to configure permissions and passwords for all ordinary users; and the fourth operation request represents a regular operation request from an ordinary user to access files in the hidden area.
[0147] Execution module 13 is used to verify the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, according to the preset security policy in the security layer. If the verification of the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, passes, the target operation request is executed. The preset security policy is the same as the preset security policy corresponding to the hidden area. The preset security policy in the security layer is mapped according to the mandatory access control policy of the security layer.
[0148] In this invention, each module is further divided into security function class and storage function class according to its functional type.
[0149] Security functions permeate disk initialization, system calls, and upper-layer interfaces, providing access control mechanisms for the hidden area. Their effectiveness is achieved through the concepts of a security layer and a user password for the hidden area.
[0150] Each time a business operation is performed on the hidden area, user permissions or permissions and passwords must be verified through the security layer. The "security administrator" user controls the operation permissions and passwords assigned to ordinary users by the hidden area. Even if an ordinary user uses the interface of the basic library, the password of the user running the process must be verified at the security layer when the process loads the module before permission can be granted. During the initialization phase, the attribute configuration of the corresponding mount point of the hidden area file system at the security layer needs to be initialized. During use, instructions for security layer operations, user permission verification, encryption, etc., are issued through the basic library and executed in the execution module. Access control for the hidden area is not independent but is incorporated into another built-in mandatory access control module that uniformly manages operating system operation permissions. This ensures that the security management of the hidden area does not conflict with the mandatory access control of the entire operating system and is easy to centralize. Storage function classes also exist in the three modules, satisfying most of the functions of a normal operating system for file systems, making it easy for upper-layer applications or secondary developers to get started quickly.
[0151] In one optional implementation, when the target operation request is the first operation request, the application interface module 12 is specifically used to receive the security administrator's request to add a hidden area or the security administrator's request to delete a hidden area.
[0152] The new operation request includes: the name of the target disk partition and the target space capacity.
[0153] The deletion request includes: the name of the hidden area to be deleted.
[0154] After receiving a request from the security administrator to add a new operation to the hidden area, the application interface module 12 or the initialization module 11 can determine whether the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition is greater than or equal to the target space capacity based on the name of the target disk partition in the new operation request. If the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition is greater than or equal to the target space capacity, the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition is divided according to the target space capacity to obtain the target sector.
[0155] In an optional implementation, when the target operation request is the first operation request, the execution module 13 is specifically used to verify the security administrator's attribute configuration permissions according to the preset security policy in the security layer after obtaining the target sector, or to verify the security administrator's attribute change permissions according to the preset security policy in the security layer.
[0156] In an optional implementation, the execution module 13 is further configured to initialize the target sector when the attribute configuration permission verification of the security administrator passes, configure the security policy of the initialized target sector according to the pre-acquired mandatory access control policy, and obtain the newly added hidden area.
[0157] Alternatively, when the security administrator's permission to change attributes passes verification, the hidden partition corresponding to the name of the hidden partition to be deleted in the deletion request is mounted, and the first disk partition is determined. The first disk partition is the disk partition obtained after mounting the hidden partition corresponding to the name of the hidden partition to be deleted in the deletion request. The first attribute information in the attributes of the first disk partition is deleted, and the first disk partition is formatted. The first attribute information includes attribute information related to the hidden partition.
[0158] In an optional implementation, when the target operation request is a second operation request, the application interface module 12 or the initialization module 11 can be used to receive a request from a regular user to change the attributes of the hidden area. The change operation request includes the name of the hidden area to be changed, the change command, and the corresponding parameters to be changed.
[0159] In an optional implementation, when the target operation request is a third operation request, before receiving the target user's target operation request for the hidden area, module 13 is executed, specifically to determine whether the target user is a security administrator. Specifically, if the target user is a security administrator, the module receives the security administrator's configuration operation request for permissions and passwords of all ordinary users. If the security administrator's permissions are verified, the module executes the security administrator's configuration operation request for permissions and passwords of all ordinary users.
[0160] In an optional implementation, when the target operation request is the fourth operation request, the application interface module 12 or the initialization module 11 can be used to receive regular operation requests from ordinary users for files in the hidden area. Specifically, the execution module is further used to execute the regular operation request from the ordinary user for files in the hidden area when the user's permissions and password verification are successful.
[0161] Further functional descriptions of the above modules and units are the same as those in the corresponding embodiments described above, and will not be repeated here.
[0162] In this embodiment, the hidden area file system is presented in the form of functional units. Here, a unit refers to an ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) circuit, a processor and memory that execute one or more software or fixed programs, and / or other devices that can provide the above functions.
[0163] This invention also provides a computer device having the above-described features. Figure 4 The hidden file system shown.
[0164] Please see Figure 5 , Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of a computer device according to an embodiment of the present invention, such as... Figure 5 As shown, the computer device includes one or more processors 10, memory 20, and interfaces for connecting the components, including high-speed interfaces and low-speed interfaces. The components communicate with each other via different buses and can be mounted on a common motherboard or otherwise installed as needed. The processors can process instructions executed within the computer device, including instructions stored in or on memory to display graphical information of a GUI on external input / output devices (such as display devices coupled to the interfaces). In an alternative implementation, multiple processors and / or multiple buses can be used with multiple memories and multiple memory modules, if desired. Similarly, multiple computer devices can be connected, each providing some of the necessary operations (e.g., as a server array, a group of blade servers, or a multiprocessor device). Figure 5 Take a processor 10 as an example.
[0165] Processor 10 may be a central processing unit, a network processor, or a combination thereof. Processor 10 may further include a hardware chip. The hardware chip may be an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a programmable logic device (PLD), or a combination thereof. The programmable logic device may be a complex programmable logic device (CAMP), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), a general-purpose array logic (GDA), or any combination thereof.
[0166] The memory 20 stores instructions executable by at least one processor 10 to cause at least one processor 10 to perform the method shown in the above embodiments.
[0167] The memory 20 may include a program storage area and a data storage area, wherein the program storage area may store application programs required for operating the device and at least one function. The data storage area may store data created based on the use of the computer device. Furthermore, the memory 20 may include high-speed random access memory and may also include non-transitory memory, such as at least one disk storage device, flash memory device, or other non-transitory solid-state storage device. In an alternative embodiment, the memory 20 may optionally include memory remotely located relative to the processor 10, and these remote memories may be connected to the computer device via a network. Examples of such networks include, but are not limited to, the Internet, intranets, local area networks, mobile communication networks, and combinations thereof.
[0168] Memory 20 may include volatile memory, such as random access memory. Memory may also include non-volatile memory, such as flash memory, hard disk, or solid-state drive. Memory 20 may also include combinations of the above types of memory.
[0169] The computer device also includes a communication interface 30 for communicating with other devices or communication networks.
[0170] This invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium. The methods described above according to embodiments of the invention can be implemented in hardware or firmware, or implemented as computer code that can be recorded on a storage medium, or implemented as computer code downloaded over a network and originally stored on a remote storage medium or a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium and then stored on a local storage medium. Thus, the methods described herein can be processed by software stored on a storage medium using a general-purpose computer, a dedicated processor, or programmable or dedicated hardware. The storage medium can be a magnetic disk, optical disk, read-only memory, random access memory, flash memory, hard disk, or solid-state drive, etc. Further, the storage medium may also include combinations of the above types of memory. It is understood that computers, processors, microprocessor controllers, or programmable hardware include storage components capable of storing or receiving software or computer code, which, when accessed and executed by the computer, processor, or hardware, implements the methods shown in the above embodiments.
[0171] A portion of this invention can be applied as a computer program product, such as computer program instructions, which, when executed by a computer, can invoke or provide the methods and / or technical solutions according to the invention through the operation of the computer. Those skilled in the art will understand that the forms in which computer program instructions exist in a computer-readable medium include, but are not limited to, source files, executable files, installation package files, etc. Correspondingly, the ways in which computer program instructions are executed by a computer include, but are not limited to: the computer directly executing the instructions, or the computer compiling the instructions and then executing the corresponding compiled program, or the computer reading and executing the instructions, or the computer reading and installing the instructions and then executing the corresponding installed program. Here, the computer-readable medium can be any available computer-readable storage medium or communication medium accessible to a computer.
[0172] Although embodiments of the invention have been described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, those skilled in the art can make various modifications and variations without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention, and such modifications and variations all fall within the scope defined by the appended claims.
Claims
1. A method for secure management of hidden areas, applied to a hidden area file system, characterized in that, The hidden file system is obtained by formatting hard disk sectors in the device. The hidden file system includes an initialization module, an application interface module, and an execution module. The method includes: The application interface module receives target operation requests from target users to the hidden area; the target users include security administrators or ordinary users; the target operation request is at least one of a preset number of operation request types divided according to business scenarios; the preset number of operation request types include a first operation request, a second operation request, a third operation request, and a fourth operation request; the first operation request represents a security administrator's request to add or delete the hidden area, the second operation request represents an ordinary user's request to change the attributes of the hidden area, the third operation request represents a security administrator's request to configure permissions and passwords for all ordinary users, and the fourth operation request represents an ordinary user's regular operation request for files in the hidden area; The execution module uses a preset security policy in the security layer to verify the target user's permissions, or permissions and password; the preset security policy is the preset security policy corresponding to the hidden area; the preset security policy in the security layer is mapped according to the mandatory access control policy of the security layer. The target operation request is executed when the target user's permissions, or permissions and password verification, are passed, in order to prevent data leakage when the device is disassembled. The new operation request includes: the name of the target disk partition and the target space capacity; After receiving a request from the security administrator to add new operations to the hidden area, the method further includes: The initialization module or the application interface module determines whether the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition is greater than or equal to the target space capacity based on the name of the target disk partition in the new operation request. If the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition is greater than or equal to the target space capacity, the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition is divided according to the target space capacity to obtain the target sector. When the permissions of the target user, or the permissions and password verification, are passed, the target operation request is executed, including: when the attribute configuration permission verification of the security administrator is passed, initializing the target sector, configuring the security policy of the initialized target sector according to the pre-acquired mandatory access control policy, and obtaining a new hidden area; wherein, the security policy of the hidden area is compatible with and inherits the mandatory access control policy configuration by default, so that the security management of the hidden area is consistent with the security policy of the entire operating system.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, When the target operation request is a first operation request, receiving the target user's target operation request for the hidden area includes: Receive requests from the security administrator to add or delete hidden areas; The deletion request includes the name of the hidden area to be deleted.
3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, When the target operation request is a first operation request, the step of verifying the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, according to the preset security policy in the security layer includes: After obtaining the target sector, the security administrator's attribute configuration permissions are verified according to the preset security policy in the security layer; Alternatively, the security administrator's permission to change attributes can be verified according to the preset security policy in the security layer.
4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The step of executing the target operation request when the target user's permissions, or permissions and password verification, are passed also includes: When the security administrator's permission to change attributes is verified, the hidden area corresponding to the name of the hidden area to be deleted in the mount deletion operation request is removed, and the first disk partition is determined; the first disk partition is the disk partition obtained after removing the hidden area corresponding to the name of the hidden area to be deleted in the mount deletion operation request; the first attribute information in the attributes of the first disk partition is deleted, and the first disk partition is formatted; the first attribute information includes attribute information related to the hidden area.
5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, When the target operation request is a second operation request, receiving the target user's target operation request for the hidden area includes: Receive requests from ordinary users to change the attributes of the hidden area; the request includes the name of the hidden area to be changed, the change command, and the corresponding parameters to be changed.
6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, When the target operation request is a third operation request, before receiving the target user's target operation request for the hidden area, the method further includes: Determine whether the target user is a security administrator; wherein, if the target user is a security administrator, receive a configuration operation request from the security administrator for the permissions and passwords of all ordinary users; Upon successful verification of the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, the target operation request is executed, including: Once the security administrator's permissions are verified, execute the security administrator's request to configure permissions and passwords for all regular users.
7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, When the target operation request is the fourth operation request, receiving the target user's target operation request for the hidden area includes: Receive routine operation requests from ordinary users for files in the hidden area; Upon successful verification of the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, the target operation request is executed, including: Once the permissions and password of a regular user are verified, execute the regular user's normal operation request for files in the hidden area.
8. A hidden area file system, characterized in that, The hidden area file system is obtained by formatting the hard disk sectors in the device, including: Initialization module, application interface module, and execution module; The initialization module is used to initialize disk sectors; The application interface module is used to receive target operation requests from target users to the hidden area; the target users include security administrators or ordinary users; the target operation request is at least one of a preset number of operation request types divided according to business scenarios; the preset number of operation request types include a first operation request, a second operation request, a third operation request, and a fourth operation request; the first operation request represents a security administrator's request to add or delete the hidden area, the second operation request represents an ordinary user's request to change the attributes of the hidden area, the third operation request represents a security administrator's request to configure permissions and passwords for all ordinary users, and the fourth operation request represents an ordinary user's regular operation request for files in the hidden area; The execution module is used to verify the target user's permissions, or permissions and password, according to the preset security policy in the security layer; the preset security policy is the preset security policy corresponding to the hidden area; the preset security policy in the security layer is mapped according to the mandatory access control policy of the security layer; when the target user's permissions, or permissions and password are verified, the target operation request is executed to avoid data leakage when the device is disassembled; The new operation request includes: the name of the target disk partition and the target space capacity; After receiving a request from the security administrator to add a new operation to the hidden area, the application interface module or the initialization module is used to determine whether the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition is greater than or equal to the target space capacity based on the name of the target disk partition in the new operation request. If the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition is greater than or equal to the target space capacity, the remaining space capacity of the target disk partition is divided according to the target space capacity to obtain the target sector. The execution module is further configured to initialize the target sector when the attribute configuration permission verification of the security administrator passes, configure the security policy of the initialized target sector according to the pre-acquired mandatory access control policy, and obtain a new hidden zone; wherein the security policy of the hidden zone is compatible with and inherits the mandatory access control policy configuration by default, so that the security management of the hidden zone is consistent with the security policy of the entire operating system.
9. A computer device, characterized in that, include: A memory and a processor are communicatively connected, the memory stores computer instructions, and the processor executes the computer instructions to perform the security management method for the hidden area according to any one of claims 1 to 7.
10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores computer instructions for causing the computer to execute the security management method for the hidden area as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.
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