Illegal station handling in ranging

Abstract

The present disclosure relates to illegal station handling in ranging. A device is configured to: determine the occurrence of a timing clock attack from an illegal responding station (R-rSTA) when performing a ranging operation; initiate a selection process to select two responding stations (rSTA) from a plurality of rSTAs other than the R-rSTA, wherein the selected two rSTAs have lower received signal strength indicator (RSSI) values ​​than other rSTAs in the plurality of rSTAs; and perform the ranging operation using the R-rSTA and the selected two rSTAs to determine a location of the device.

Description

[0001] Priority / Incorporated by Reference

[0002] This patent application claims priority to U.S. Provisional Application Serial No. 63 / 586,474, filed on September 29, 2023, entitled “Rogue Station Handling in Ranging,” which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. Background Art

[0003] Ranging can be used to locate the position of a mobile communication device (MCD). Ranging can be performed by an MCD measuring the travel time or signal strength of radio signals exchanged with three or more stations, such as Wi-Fi access points (APs). In general, increasing the number of APs increases the accuracy of the determined positioning because the MCD can triangulate its position relative to different groups of APs.

[0004] In some scenarios, malicious actors can exploit rogue APs to cause ranging measurements to vary inaccurately. In some cases, rogue APs can also be caused by timing or signaling errors (e.g., path loss, blocking, etc.), and not necessarily always by malicious actors. This is unacceptable in certain scenarios where positioning accuracy is critical, such as during an emergency call in a crowded stadium. Positioning inaccuracies in these scenarios can waste critical rescuer time searching for a location where the user / MCD does not exist. Mitigating rogue AP ranging errors is an ongoing concern in the art. Summary of the invention

[0005] Some example embodiments relate to an apparatus having a processing circuit configured to: determine an occurrence of a timing clock attack from an illegal responder station (R-rSTA) when performing a ranging operation; initiate a selection process to select two responder stations (rSTAs) from a plurality of rSTAs other than the R-rSTA, wherein the selected two rSTAs have lower received signal strength indicator (RSSI) values ​​than other rSTAs in the plurality of rSTAs; and perform a ranging operation using the R-rSTA and the selected two rSTAs to determine a location of the apparatus.

[0006] Other example embodiments relate to a method for: determining an occurrence of a timing clock attack from an illegal responding station (R-rSTA) when performing a ranging operation; initiating a selection process to select two responding stations (rSTAs) from a plurality of rSTAs other than the R-rSTA, wherein the selected two rSTAs have lower received signal strength indicator (RSSI) values ​​than other rSTAs in the plurality of rSTAs; and performing a ranging operation using the R-rSTA and the selected two rSTAs to determine a location of a device performing the method. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0007] Figure 1 Example network arrangements are shown according to various example embodiments.

[0008] Figure 2 An example MCD is shown according to various example embodiments.

[0009] Figure 3 Range finding diagrams according to various example embodiments are shown.

[0010] Figure 4 Methods according to various example embodiments are shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0011] Example embodiments may be further understood with reference to the following description and associated drawings, wherein like elements have the same reference numerals. Example embodiments relate to improved processing of ranging location calculations for an MCD communicating with an illegal responder station.

[0012] Example embodiments are described with respect to a mobile communication device (MCD). However, reference to an MCD is provided for illustration purposes only. Example embodiments may be used with any electronic component that can establish a connection with a network and is configured with hardware, software, and / or firmware for exchanging information and data with the network. Thus, MCD as described herein is used to represent any electronic component.

[0013] Malicious actors can use various actions (e.g., clock attacks) to affect the ranging operations performed by the MCD. The precise mechanism of clock attacks is beyond the scope of this disclosure, but those skilled in the art will recognize that such clock attacks can result in ranging errors of tens of meters. Errors from minor obstacles when a person is navigating become unacceptable in various situations (e.g., emergency situations). An emergency caller in a crowded location (e.g., a stadium, airport, festival, hospital, etc.) may report their location to an emergency responder that is tens of meters away from their true location. Such errors can cause first responders to arrive at a completely different floor / level / section of a building / venue. This is dangerous when time is of the essence.

[0014] If the MCD detects a certain clock error, some implementations may cause the MCD to discard the ranging error. For example, the clock error may be 50 parts per million (ppm). However, in some cases, even in the presence of rogue APs, it may still be prudent to calculate a position fix by attempting to minimize the error caused by the rogue AP.

[0015] Existing implementations will add illegal responding APs (R-rAPs) to a deny list, and the MCD will attempt to perform ranging with other responding APs (rAPs). However, if the number of rAPs is limited (i.e., less than three) or in the presence of more than one R-rAP, there is no mechanism to reliably complete the ranging operation. Returning to the emergency scenario described above, a moderately inaccurate reported position (on the order of tens of meters or less) may be preferable to not reporting a position fix to the first responders at all.

[0016] Figure 1 A networking arrangement 100 is shown according to various example embodiments. The networking arrangement 100 shows an MCD 110. The MCD 110 may be any type of electronic component configured to communicate via a network, such as a mobile phone, tablet computer, desktop computer, smart phone, phablet, embedded device, wearable device, Internet of Things (IoT) device, etc.

[0017] The networking arrangement 100 shows several stations ("STAs") 112, 114, 116, 118, and 120. The STAs 112-120 may be any device configured to communicate via a network, such as a mobile phone, a tablet computer, a desktop computer, a smartphone, a smart phone, an embedded device, a wearable device, an Internet of Things (IoT) device, etc. Throughout the example embodiment, the STAs are described as access points (APs), but this is merely an example, and the STAs may be any type of STAs.

[0018] exist Figure 1 In the example of , STAs 112, 114, 116, 118, and 120 may form part of a wireless network such as Wi-Fi. Example embodiments will be described with reference to MCD 110 performing ranging operations with devices (e.g., STAs 112, 114, 116, 118, and 120) of a Wi-Fi network. This is by way of example only, as MCD 110 may perform ranging operations with devices of other types of networks, including but not limited to public / private cellular networks, Bluetooth networks, Zigbee networks, etc.

[0019] The MCD 110 may perform ranging operations with the STAs 112-120. The ranging operations are generally independent of active communications between the MCD 110 and any individual STA in the STAs 112-120. The STAs 112-120 may each have individual signal strengths and be located at various distances from the MCD 110.

[0020] Figure 2 An example mobile communication device (MCD) 110 is shown according to various example embodiments. The MCD 110 may be any type of electronic component configured to communicate via a network, such as a mobile phone, a tablet computer, a smart phone, an embedded device, a wearable device, an Internet of Things (IoT) device, etc. The MCD 110 may communicate with devices of one or more wireless networks, such as Figure 1 The Wi-Fi network STAs 112, 114, 116, 118, and 120 are shown. The MCD 110 may include a processor 205, a memory arrangement 210, a display device 215, an input / output (I / O) device 220, a transceiver 225, and other components 230. The other components 230 may include, for example, an audio input device, an audio output device, a battery providing a limited power source, a data acquisition device (such as a camera), a port for electrically connecting the MCD 110 to other electronic devices, a sensor for detecting the status of the MCD 110, and the like.

[0021] The processor 205 may be configured to execute multiple engines of the MCD 110. For example, the engines may include a ranging engine 235 for performing operations related to improved MCD handling of illegal responding stations (R-rSTAs) for ranging operations.

[0022] The above-described engine as an application (e.g., a program) executed by the processor 205 is merely an example. The functionality associated with the engine may also be represented as a separate integrated component of the MCD 110, or may be a modular component coupled to the MCD 110, such as an integrated circuit with or without firmware. For example, an integrated circuit may include input circuits for receiving signals and processing circuits for processing signals and other information. The engine may also be embodied as an application or a standalone application. In addition, in some MCDs, the functionality described for the processor 205 is split between two or more processors, such as a baseband processor and an application processor. The example implementation may be implemented in any of these or other configurations of the MCD.

[0023] The memory arrangement 210 may be a hardware component configured to store data related to operations performed by the MCD 110. The display device 215 may be a hardware component configured to display data to a user, and the I / O device 220 may be a hardware component that enables user input. The display device 215 and the I / O device 220 may be separate components or may be integrated together (such as a touch screen).

[0024] The transceiver 225 may be a hardware component configured to establish a connection with one or more wireless networks, such as a local area network (WLAN), a Wi-Fi network, etc. Thus, the transceiver 225 may operate on a plurality of different frequencies or channels (e.g., a continuous frequency group). The transceiver 225 includes a circuit configured to send and / or receive signals (e.g., a control signal, a data signal). Such signals may be encoded with information that implements any of the methods described herein. The processor 205 may be operably coupled to the transceiver 225 and configured to receive signals from and / or send signals to the transceiver 225. The processor 205 may be configured to encode and / or decode signals (e.g., signaling from a base station of a network) for implementing any of the methods described herein.

[0025] The example embodiments provide operations and logic for reducing errors in R-rAPs during ranging calculations at the MCD 110. The example embodiments may be performed using one R-rAP out of three identified rAPs (e.g., two "clean" rAPs) for ranging calculations, and the two clean rAPs are approximately equidistant from each other. However, the example embodiments do not require that the two clean rAPs be approximately equidistant from each other. The example embodiments may be performed for ranging calculations with various multiple rAPs.

[0026] In this scenario, if there are more than two normally functioning rAPs within range of the MCD 110, the MCD 110 may select two clean rAPs (or two rAPs with the lowest possible received signal strength indicator (RSSI)). Selecting the two rAPs with the lowest possible RSSI values ​​may indicate that the clean rAPs overlap to the minimum possible extent, which may allow for a reduced margin of error. In some example embodiments, the selected RSSI may be the lowest detectable level of a signal, such as less than -80 dBm. Figure 3 Describe this selection and minimization of ranging error.

[0027] Figure 3A range diagram 300 is shown according to various example embodiments. The range diagram 300 shows rAP1 302, rAP2 304, R-rAP 306, and R-rAP 307. R-rAP 306 may be a true sphere range of R-rAPs, and R-rAP 307 may be a sphere range that is erroneously reported to the MCD 110 (e.g., via a timing attack and / or R-rAP error). rAP1 302 and rAP2 304 may be properly functioning (e.g., clean) APs.

[0028] An MCD (e.g., MCD 110) may operate within the range (e.g., spherical coverage area) of rAP1 302, rAP2, and R-rAPs 306-307. According to an example embodiment, MCD 110 may identify that R-rAPs associated with R-rAP 306 and R-rAP 307 are illegitimate, e.g., R-rAP 306 and / or R-rAP 307 are erroneous ranging measurements. MCD 110 may learn that R-rAP 306 and R-rAP 307 are illegitimate based on, for example, receiving inconsistent measurements from R-rAP 306 and R-rAP 307 (whether through timing attacks or errors). In this scenario, MCD 110 may select two clean APs (e.g., rAP1 302 and rAP2 304) with the lowest possible RSSI values ​​as measured at MCD 110. Return to Reference Figure 1 , the two APs with the lowest RSSI values ​​may be the two APs located farthest from MCD 110, e.g., STAs 114 and 116. However, distance is not the only determining factor in RSSI strength, and this is only used as an example of selecting two clean APs. For example, another factor in RSSI strength may be whether MCD 110 is in line of sight (LoS) with the AP or in non-LoS with the AP.

[0029] Return to Figure 3 , performing ranging calculations with rAP1 302, rAP2 304, and r-AP 306 may result in the determined position being MCD position A 308. Performing ranging calculations with rAP1 302, rAP2 304, and r-AP 307 may result in the determined position being MCD position B 310. The distance between MCD position A 308 and MCD position B 310 is an error margin 312.

[0030] This selection of the clean rAP with the lowest possible RSSI value ensures that the clean rAPs 302 and 304 overlap to the minimum possible extent, thereby reducing the error margin 312 between potential Position A 308 and Position B 310 for the MCD 110 .

[0031] Figure 4 A method 400 is shown according to various example embodiments. The method 400 may be performed by an MCD, such as MCD 110.

[0032] In 402, the MCD 110 determines whether a clock attack of greater than 50 ppm has been detected, for example, whether the measurement from one of the APs being used for ranging varies by greater than 50 ppm. It should be noted here that a clock attack may also include errors introduced by the AP, and the malicious actor need not be the cause of the rogue AP. Furthermore, while the example embodiment uses a clock error of 50 ppm to determine whether an rogue AP is present, this is merely an example, and the MCD 110 may be configured to use any clock error value to determine whether an rogue AP is present. For example, for applications requiring higher positioning accuracy, the error threshold may be set to a value below 50 ppm, while for applications with loose positioning accuracy, the error threshold may be set to a value greater than 50 ppm.

[0033] If the MCD 110 does not determine that a clock attack greater than 50 ppm has occurred, the MCD 110 proceeds to 404 and uses its calculated position fix via ranging.

[0034] If the MCD 110 determines that a clock attack greater than 50 ppm has occurred, the method proceeds to 406, where the MCD 110 attempts to select other rSTAs (eg, rAPs) until the clock attack is less than 50 ppm. Figure 1 , the MCD 110 may select various combinations of STAs 112, 114, 116, 118, and 120 to determine whether any of the combinations results in a measurement with a variation of less than 50 ppm.

[0035] In 408, the MCD 110 determines whether it has identified any rSTA configurations that reduce the clock attack to less than 50 ppm.

[0036] If the MCD 110 has identified any rSTA configurations that reduce clock aggression to less than 50 ppm, the method proceeds to 404 and uses the calculated position fix via ranging based on the selected AP combination.

[0037] If the MCD 110 has not identified any rSTA configurations that reduce the clock attack to less than 50 ppm, the method proceeds to 410 where the MCD selects three rSTAs with approximately equal distances and with the weakest possible RSSIs possible. In some example embodiments, the MCD 110 may alternatively select two clean rSTAs in addition to the illegal rSTAs.

[0038] In 412, the MCD 110 determines whether the selection operation 410 was successful. If the operation 410 was successful, the method proceeds to 414 where the MCD 110 uses the location calculated via ranging with the selected rSTA from 410.

[0039] If operation 410 is unsuccessful, the MCD 110 proceeds to 404 and may use the calculated position via ranging with the initially selected rSTA. In some example embodiments, the MCD may ignore the ranging measurement and not provide a position fix because the margin of error is too large.

[0040] Thus, the example embodiments provide a means for the MCD to reduce the margin of error in positioning measurements when one of the STAs used for ranging is an illegal STA. As described above, in some examples, a moderately inaccurate reported position (on the order of tens of meters or less) may be preferred to not reporting positioning at all. Thus, the example embodiments may be implemented on an application basis, for example, those applications that prefer moderately inaccurate reported positions rather than having no position at all. Examples of such applications or scenarios may include emergency applications, navigation applications for indoor or closely spaced areas, and the like, where it is better to have a positioning estimate with a few meters of inaccuracy rather than having no positioning estimate at all.

[0041] Example

[0042] In a first embodiment, a method includes: determining an occurrence of a timing clock attack from an illegal responder station (R-rSTA) when performing a ranging operation; initiating a selection process to select two responder stations (rSTAs) from a plurality of rSTAs other than the R-rSTA, wherein the selected two rSTAs have lower received signal strength indicator (RSSI) values ​​than other rSTAs in the plurality of rSTAs; and performing the ranging operation using the R-rSTA and the selected two rSTAs to determine a location of the device.

[0043] In a second embodiment, the method according to the first embodiment, wherein the selected two rSTAs have two lowest RSSI values ​​compared to other rSTAs of the plurality of rSTAs.

[0044] In a third embodiment, the method according to the second embodiment, wherein the two lowest RSSI values ​​are less than -80 dBm.

[0045] In a fourth embodiment, according to the method of the first embodiment, the distances between the two selected rSTAs and each other or the device are less than a predetermined distance threshold.

[0046] In a fifth embodiment, the method according to the fourth embodiment, wherein the predetermined distance threshold is based on whether the two rSTAs have line of sight (LoS) to each other or whether a mobile communication device (MCD) including the apparatus has LoS to one or both of the two rSTAs.

[0047] In a sixth embodiment, according to the method of the first embodiment, the timing clock attack is determined based on a measurement of a signal received from the R-rSTA that varies by more than a predetermined threshold.

[0048] In a seventh embodiment, the method of the sixth embodiment, wherein the predetermined threshold is greater than 50 parts per million (ppm).

[0049] In an eighth embodiment, the method according to the first embodiment further comprises preparing to send the location to emergency services or a predefined trusted contact.

[0050] In a ninth embodiment, the method according to the first embodiment further comprises determining that an installed application or service from a predefined list of applications and services has requested user location.

[0051] In a tenth embodiment, the method according to the ninth embodiment is provided, wherein the application list includes emergency applications or navigation applications.

[0052] In an eleventh embodiment, according to the method of the first embodiment, the R-rSTA and the selected two rSTAs include access points (APs) of a Wi-Fi network.

[0053] In a twelfth embodiment, a processor is provided, wherein the processor is configured to execute any one of the methods described in accordance with the first to eleventh embodiments.

[0054] In a thirteenth embodiment, a mobile communication device is provided. The mobile communication device is configured to execute any one of the methods described in accordance with the first to eleventh embodiments.

[0055] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the example embodiments described above may be implemented with any suitable software configuration or hardware configuration or combination thereof. Example hardware platforms for implementing the example embodiments may include, for example, Intel x86-based platforms with compatible operating systems, Windows OS, Mac platforms and MAC OS, mobile devices with operating systems such as iOS, Android, etc. The example embodiments of the above methods may be embodied as a program comprising lines of code stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, which, when compiled, may be executed on a processor or microprocessor.

[0056] Although this patent application describes various combinations of various embodiments each having different features, those skilled in the art will understand that any feature of an embodiment may be combined with features of other embodiments in any manner not publicly denied or with features that are not functionally or logically inconsistent with the operation or function of the device of the embodiments disclosed in the present invention.

[0057] As described above, one aspect of the present technology is to collect and use data obtained from specific and legitimate sources to improve the delivery of inspirational content or any other content that may be of interest to users. The present disclosure contemplates that, in some instances, the collected data may include personal information data that uniquely identifies or can be used to identify a specific person. Such personal information data may include demographic data, location-based data, online identifiers, phone numbers, email addresses, home addresses, data or records related to the user's health or fitness level (e.g., vital signs measurements, medication information, exercise information), date of birth, or any other personal information.

[0058] The present disclosure recognizes that use of such personal information data in the present technology can be used to benefit users.

[0059] The present disclosure envisions that entities responsible for collecting, analyzing, disclosing, transmitting, storing or otherwise using such personal information data will comply with established privacy policies and / or privacy practices. Specifically, such entities will be expected to implement and consistently apply privacy practices that are generally recognized as meeting or exceeding the requirements of the industry or government that maintain user privacy. Such information about the use of personal data should be highlighted and easily accessible to users, and should be updated as the collection and / or use of data changes. The user's personal information should be collected only for legal use. In addition, such collection / sharing should only occur after receiving user consent or other legal basis specified in applicable law. In addition, such entities should consider taking any necessary steps to protect and safeguard access to such personal information data and ensure that other entities with access to personal information data comply with their privacy policies and procedures. In addition, such entities may subject themselves to third-party assessments to demonstrate that they comply with widely accepted privacy policies and practices. In addition, policies and practices should be adjusted for specific types of personal information data collected and / or accessed, and applied to applicable laws and standards, including considerations that are exclusive to jurisdictions that can be used to impose higher standards. For example, in the United States, collection or access to certain health data may be governed by federal and / or state laws, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA); while health data in other countries may be subject to other regulations and policies and should be handled accordingly.

[0060] Regardless of the foregoing, the present disclosure also contemplates implementation schemes in which users selectively block the use or access of personal information data. That is, the present disclosure contemplates hardware elements and / or software elements to prevent or block access to such personal information data. For example, the technology of the present invention can be configured to allow users to choose to "opt in" or "opt out" of collecting personal information data at any time during or after registration for a service. In addition to providing "opt-in" and "opt-out" options, the present disclosure also contemplates providing notifications related to access or use of personal information. For example, a user may be notified that their personal information data will be accessed when downloading an application, and then reminded again just before the personal information data is accessed by the application.

[0061] In addition, it is the intention of the present disclosure that personal information data should be managed and processed in a manner that minimizes the risk of unintentional or unauthorized access or use. Once the data is no longer needed, the risk can be minimized by limiting the collection of data and deleting the data. In addition, and when applicable, including in certain health-related applications, data de-identification can be used to protect the privacy of users. De-identification can be promoted when appropriate by removing identifiers, controlling the amount or specificity of stored data (e.g., collecting location data at the city level rather than at the address level), controlling how data is stored (e.g., aggregating data among users), and / or other methods such as differential privacy.

[0062] Thus, while the present disclosure broadly covers the use of personal information data to implement one or more of the various disclosed embodiments, the present disclosure also contemplates that various embodiments may also be implemented without access to such personal information data. That is, various embodiments of the present technology will not fail to function properly due to the lack of all or a portion of such personal information data. For example, content may be selected and delivered to a user based on aggregated non-personal information data or an absolute minimum amount of personal information, such as content processed only on the user's device or other non-personal information that may be used for content delivery services.

[0063] It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications may be made to the present disclosure without departing from the spirit or scope of the present disclosure. Therefore, the present disclosure is intended to cover modifications and variations of the present disclosure, provided that these modifications and variations are within the scope of the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. An apparatus comprising a processing circuit, the processing circuit being configured to: Determining the occurrence of a timing clock attack from a rogue responding station (R-rSTA) when performing a ranging operation; Initiating a selection process to select two responding stations (rSTAs) from a plurality of rSTAs other than the R-rSTA, wherein the selected two rSTAs have lower received signal strength indicator (RSSI) values ​​than other rSTAs in the plurality of rSTAs; and The ranging operation is performed using the R-rSTA and the selected two rSTAs to determine the location of the device. 2 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the selected two rSTAs have two lowest RSSI values ​​compared to other rSTAs of the plurality of rSTAs.

3. The apparatus of claim 2, wherein the two lowest RSSI values ​​are less than -80 dBm. 4 . The apparatus according to claim 1 , wherein the distances between the two selected rSTAs and each other or the apparatus are smaller than a predetermined distance threshold.

5. The apparatus of claim 4, wherein the predetermined distance threshold is based on whether the two rSTAs have line of sight (LoS) to each other or whether a mobile communication device (MCD) including the apparatus has LoS to one or both of the two rSTAs.

6. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the timing clock attack is determined based on a measurement of a signal received from the R-rSTA that varies by more than a predetermined threshold.

7. The apparatus of claim 6, wherein the predetermined threshold is greater than 50 parts per million (ppm).

8. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the processing circuit is further configured to: Prepare to send the location to emergency services or predefined trusted contacts.

9. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the processing circuit is further configured to: It is determined that an installed application or service from a predefined list of applications and services has requested user location. 10 . The apparatus of claim 9 , wherein the application list includes emergency applications or navigation applications.

11. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the R-rSTA and the selected two rSTAs comprise an access point (AP) of a Wi-Fi network.

12. A method comprising: Determining the occurrence of a timing clock attack from a rogue responding station (R-rSTA) when performing a ranging operation; Initiating a selection process to select two responding stations (rSTAs) from a plurality of rSTAs other than the R-rSTA, wherein the selected two rSTAs have lower received signal strength indicator (RSSI) values ​​than other rSTAs in the plurality of rSTAs; and The ranging operation is performed using the R-rSTA and the selected two rSTAs to determine a location of a device performing the method.

13. The method of claim 12, wherein the selected two rSTAs have two lowest RSSI values ​​compared to other rSTAs of the plurality of rSTAs. The method according to claim 12 , wherein the distances between the two selected rSTAs and each other or the device are smaller than a predetermined distance threshold.

15. The method of claim 14, wherein the predetermined distance threshold is based on whether the two rSTAs have line of sight (LoS) to each other or whether a mobile communication device (MCD) performing the method has LoS to one or both of the two rSTAs.

16. The method of claim 12, wherein the timing clock attack is determined based on a measurement of a signal received from the R-rSTA that varies by more than a predetermined threshold.

17. The method according to claim 12, further comprising: Prepare to send the location to emergency services or predefined trusted contacts.

18. The method according to claim 12, further comprising: It is determined that an installed application or service from a predefined list of applications and services has requested user location. The method according to claim 18 , wherein the application list includes emergency applications or navigation applications.

20. The method of claim 12, wherein the R-rSTA and the selected two rSTAs comprise an access point (AP) of a Wi-Fi network.

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