Lightweight and safe multi-receiver heterogeneous signcryption method suitable for Internet of Vehicles

Abstract

The invention discloses a lightweight and safe multi-receiver heterogeneous signcryption method suitable for the Internet of Vehicles. The method comprises the steps that a network manager generates system public parameters and public and private key pairs; the roadside unit and the vehicle respectively complete own key generation and certificate acquisition; the roadside unit performs signcryption operation on the front road condition information, generates a signcryption ciphertext and broadcasts the signcryption ciphertext to all vehicles in the vehicle set; all the vehicles in the vehicle set execute unsigncryption operation after receiving the signcryption ciphertext, so that the front road condition information is obtained, and the driving state is adjusted in real time. According to the invention, the roadside unit in the certificate-based public key cryptosystem can send encrypted data to a plurality of vehicles belonging to the certificateless public key cryptosystem at the same time, not only can confidentiality, unforgeability and non-repudiation be satisfied, but also privacy protection and traceability can be realized; and the security strength of data transmission in the Internet of Vehicles can be greatly improved due to various security characteristics such as unlinkability, temporary information security of known specific sessions and the like.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of data signcryption, and in particular to a lightweight and secure multi-recipient heterogeneous signcryption method applicable to an Internet of Vehicles. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of 5G and 6G technologies and the popularization of electric vehicles, the Internet of Vehicles, as the core of the intelligent transportation system, has an increasing influence in the construction of smart cities. The Internet of Vehicles connects vehicles, roadside units and other traffic participants to provide an efficient information sharing platform and realize the real-time transmission of traffic information. However, there are two important problems in the Internet of Vehicles: the heterogeneity of devices and the message transmission of multiple recipients. At present, roadside units and vehicles often use different cryptographic systems (such as certificate-based public key cryptographic systems and certificateless public key cryptographic systems). The data assurance mechanism under a single cryptographic system cannot achieve fast and secure authentication and data transmission between devices under heterogeneous cryptographic systems, which brings serious security issues to the data transmission of heterogeneous Internet of Vehicles. In addition, in the event of emergencies such as traffic accidents, roadside units need to send warning information to multiple vehicles at the same time, but the existing encryption signature mechanism can usually only support one-to-one communication, which is inefficient and consumes huge computing and storage resources. More importantly, with the continuous increase in cyber attacks, the Internet of Vehicles has higher and higher requirements for the security of data transmission, especially in terms of security attributes such as privacy protection, anonymity, and traceability. Existing solutions fail to fully meet these requirements. Therefore, how to efficiently and securely implement multi-receiver message transmission in a heterogeneous environment has become a technical problem that needs to be solved in the Internet of Vehicles. To this end, a privacy-preserving, secure, and efficient data transmission method suitable for the Internet of Vehicles is needed. Summary of the invention

[0003] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a lightweight and secure multi-recipient heterogeneous signcryption method suitable for the Internet of Vehicles.

[0004] To achieve the above object, the present invention is implemented according to the following technical solutions: The present invention comprises the following steps: The network administrator generates system public parameters and distributes them to all vehicles and roadside units; the roadside units and vehicles complete certificate acquisition and key generation respectively; The roadside unit performs a signcryption operation on the road condition information ahead, generates a signcrypted ciphertext and broadcasts it to all vehicles in the vehicle set; The vehicles in the vehicle set perform a decryption operation on the received signcrypted ciphertext information.

[0005] Further, the network manager includes a certificate authority and a key generation center, the key generation center selects an additive cycle group and a generator, and selects 6 secure one-way hash functions to generate system public and private keys; The six hash functions are defined as: , , , , , , in, Indicates the bit length of the vehicle and roadside unit RSU identifier in the Internet of Vehicles; The certificate authority is used for public key management operations and completes the initialization of the certificate-based public key cryptography system; The key generation center selects a random number as the main system key, calculates the system public key, and completes the initialization of the certificateless public key cryptography system.

[0006] Furthermore, the method of the signcryption step includes: The roadside unit selects a random number, calculates the random number, and calculates a temporary value and a summary value respectively by using a hash function and public key information of the vehicle; Select random numbers and calculate polynomial functions based on Lagrange interpolation theorem; Calculate a summary value based on the forward road condition information to be transmitted and the hash function; Based on its own private key, random number and hash function, it calculates the temporary value to generate the signed ciphertext and broadcasts it to all vehicles in the collection.

[0007] Furthermore, during the signcryption process, the roadside unit constructs a polynomial through the Lagrange interpolation theorem to merge the ciphertexts sent to multiple recipients.

[0008] Furthermore, the vehicle achieves cross-system secure communication through a hybrid architecture based on a certificateless public key system.

[0009] Furthermore, the vehicle passes the temporary identity Protect client privacy and achieve traceability of the vehicle's true identity through the local database of the key generation center.

[0010] Furthermore, the method for decrypting the signcryption comprises: The vehicle determines whether the timestamp of the ciphertext is valid. If not, the ciphertext is discarded; Calculate the temporary value based on its own private key and ciphertext; Reconstruct the polynomial function based on Langrange's mean value theorem and coefficients of different degrees; Based on the hash function, calculate the summary value and perform the XOR operation; Based on the roadside unit's identity identifier, query the user's public key information and restore the plaintext data; Execute the verification equation and determine whether it is true. If it is true, the message is accepted, otherwise the ciphertext is discarded.

[0011] A lightweight and secure multi-recipient heterogeneous signcryption method applicable to the Internet of Vehicles, using the method, including: The network manager is used to generate system public parameters and distribute them to all vehicles and roadside units; The roadside unit is used to perform the signcryption operation after completing its own key generation and certificate acquisition, generate the signcryption ciphertext and broadcast it to all vehicles in the vehicle set; The vehicle, through on-board sensors and wireless devices, senses road conditions and its own driving status in real time, and sends the data to the roadside unit. The vehicle receives the road condition information ahead sent by the roadside unit in real time, completes its own key generation and certificate acquisition, and then performs a decryption operation on the received signed ciphertext information. After verifying and decrypting the message, it adjusts its own driving status in real time.

[0012] The beneficial effects of the present invention are: The present invention can realize that a roadside unit in a certificate-based public key cryptography system sends encrypted data to multiple vehicles in a certificateless public key cryptography system at the same time. In addition, to ensure the security of data transmission, based on the security assumption, this method can not only meet confidentiality, non-forgeability and non-repudiation, but also realize privacy protection, anonymity, traceability, non-linkability and temporary information security of known specific sessions and other security features, which can greatly improve the security strength of data transmission in the Internet of Vehicles. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0013] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a system model of a lightweight and secure multi-recipient heterogeneous signcryption method applicable to Internet of Vehicles of the present invention; Figure 2 It is a flow chart of a lightweight and secure multi-recipient heterogeneous signcryption method applicable to Internet of Vehicles of the present invention; DETAILED DESCRIPTION The present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. The illustrative embodiments and descriptions of the present invention are used to explain the present invention but are not intended to limit the present invention.

[0014] As attached Figure 1 and 2As shown, in the present invention, the multi-recipient heterogeneous signcryption mechanism of the system model of the present invention is specifically divided into four parts: system initialization, user registration, signcryption and decryption. In the system model of the heterogeneous Internet of Vehicles, three entities are mainly involved: vehicles, roadside units (RSU) and network managers.

[0015] (1) Vehicle: As a basic component of the Internet of Vehicles, a vehicle uses on-board sensors and wireless devices to perceive road conditions and its own driving status in real time, and sends the data to the roadside unit. The vehicle receives the road condition information ahead sent by the roadside unit in real time and adjusts its own driving status in real time.

[0016] (2) Roadside Unit: As a key component of the Internet of Vehicles, it is mainly responsible for communicating with network managers and vehicles. The roadside unit RSU sends the driving status of vehicles in the jurisdiction area to the network management for overall traffic system analysis, and transmits detailed information about the road conditions ahead to the vehicle.

[0017] (3) Network manager: As the core component of the Internet of Vehicles, it is responsible for building the entire Internet of Vehicles system and maintaining the entire traffic system in real time. The network manager collects driving information and road condition information from many vehicles and sends road condition warning information to vehicles, thereby realizing intelligent management and dynamic operation of the entire traffic system.

[0018] The heterogeneous multi-receiver signcryption method proposed in the present invention optimizes the efficiency and security of multi-receiver information transmission by introducing the Lagrange interpolation theorem. First, the method uses the signcryption mechanism to realize the parallel calculation of data encryption and signature to improve the efficiency and flexibility of the ciphertext. Secondly, in the Internet of Vehicles, the roadside unit needs to send information to multiple vehicles. The traditional scheme needs to encrypt each receiver separately, which has large calculation and communication overhead. Using the Lagrange interpolation theorem, the present invention combines the ciphertexts of multiple receivers through polynomial interpolation, avoiding the repeated calculation of encryption and decryption performed by the roadside unit for each receiver, thereby reducing the calculation complexity and communication cost. At the same time, the method improves the calculation efficiency while enhancing the security. The polynomial generated by Lagrange interpolation mixes the identity information of each receiver, ensuring that only the successfully verified receiver can decrypt the message information, preventing information leakage and forgery. In addition, the method also ensures the temporal freshness of the data. The receiver can verify the validity of the information according to the timestamp in the ciphertext to avoid the transmission of expired information.

[0019] System Initialization Input-based security parameters , the network manager selects a sequence The additive cyclic group of and A generator of . Afterwards, the network administrator selects 6 secure one-way hash functions: , , , , , , in, Indicates the bit length of the vehicle and roadside unit (RSU) identifier in the Internet of Vehicles.

[0020] Taking into account the different operating architectures between the certificate-based public key cryptography system and the certificateless public key cryptography system, according to the system model, the network manager includes two servers: a fully trusted certificate authority and a semi-trusted key generation center, which are responsible for the initialization of the certificate-based public key cryptography system and the certificateless public key cryptography system respectively.

[0021] (1) Initialization of certificate-based public key cryptography system The certificate authority implements public key management operations such as memory application and certificate structure initialization, and waits to verify the legitimacy and issue certificates for subsequent users. Among them, the initialization design of the certificate-based public key cryptography system is not the focus of the present invention.

[0022] (2) Initialization of the public key cryptography system without certificate Additive Cyclic Groups Generated Based on Network Managers , Generator order , the key generation center selects a random number As the master system key, calculate As the system public key.

[0023] Afterwards, the network administrator combines the information of the certificate authority and the key generation center, such as the system public key , generate system public parameters The system public parameters are sent to all vehicles and roadside units RSU through a secure channel.

[0024] User Registration The roadside unit RSU and vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles interact with the certificate authority and key generation center in the network manager to complete the generation of their own keys. Since the roadside unit RSU and vehicles belong to the certificate-based public key cryptography system and the certificateless public key cryptography system respectively, the calculations in their user registration phase are also different, as shown below.

[0025] Roadside Unit Registration The roadside unit RSU interacts with the certificate authority to generate its own key and obtain the certificate, mainly as follows.

[0026] The roadside unit RSU selects a random number As your own private key, calculate Generate a certificate request as its own public key And send it to the certificate authority to apply for a certificate, where: The unique identifier of the roadside unit (RSU).

[0027] After receiving the certificate application, the certificate authority first determines Is it in the list of legal roadside units RSU. If it is, after verifying the legitimacy of the roadside unit identity, sign the public key of the roadside unit RSU, generate the corresponding certificate, and send it to the roadside unit RSU; otherwise, directly discard the application.

[0028] After receiving the certificate, the roadside unit RSU verifies the certificate. If the verification passes, the roadside unit RSU completes its own key generation and publishes its public key. ; Otherwise, resend the certificate request.

[0029] Vehicle Registration The vehicle completes the generation of its own complete public and private key pair through secure interaction with the key generation center. The main process is as follows.

[0030] Secret value generation The vehicle selects a random number As its own secret value, calculate As part of your public key.

[0031] Partial private key application The vehicle applies for part of the private key through a secure channel Sent to the key generation center to apply for a partial private key, where: A real unique identifier of the vehicle, such as a license plate; The key generation center receives the partial private key application After that, choose a pseudonym Indicates the temporary status of the vehicle.

[0032] Based on hash function and generators , the key generation center selects a random number , calculate the random number , summary value and a partial private key .

[0033] Finally, the key generation center stores the vehicle identity information To the local database for tracing the real identity of the vehicle, and to reply part of the private key Sent to the vehicle via a secure channel.

[0034] Complete private key generation The vehicle receives a partial private key reply Then, with the help of hash function , calculate the summary value , execute the verification equation And determine whether it is established.

[0035] If the verification equation holds, the vehicle settings As your temporary identity, As your own private key, As its own public key; otherwise, the vehicle directly discards it and resends the partial private key application To the key generation center.

[0036] Signcryption Based on the actual data transmission situation of the Internet of Vehicles, it is assumed that the roadside unit RSU is a data sender. The area under the jurisdiction of RSU A collection of vehicles, RSU receives the road condition information ahead After that, the traffic information needs to be sent to this The RSU performs the following calculation process to generate the signcrypted ciphertext and sends the signcrypted ciphertext to the All vehicles in.

[0037] RSU chooses a random number , calculate the random number ,in, is the public key of the RSU; For vehicle collection All vehicles in , using the hash function , and vehicles Public key information , RSU calculates the summary value respectively , temporary value and summary value ; RSU chooses a random number , and based on Lagrange interpolation theorem, calculate Polynomial function :

[0038]

[0039] in, , representing the coefficients of different degrees in the polynomial function.

[0040] Based on the road condition information ahead to be transmitted , hash function , and , RSU calculation , summary value and summary value ,in, Indicates the timestamp when RSU is encrypted. Represents a bit-level XOR operation; Finally, the private key based on RSU and random numbers And hash functions , RSU calculates the temporary value and temporary values , generate the signcrypted ciphertext And send it to the collection through the public channel All vehicles in.

[0041] Decryption Vehicle collection After receiving the signcrypted ciphertext sent by the roadside unit RSU After that, perform the following decryption operation to complete the road condition information ahead The restoration and legality verification are as follows.

[0042] vehicle First, determine whether the timestamp of the ciphertext is valid, that is, determine Is it true? Indicates the current system time of the vehicle. Indicates the pre-set time threshold. If it is not true, it means that the ciphertext has expired and is directly discarded; otherwise, the vehicle Continue to the next step.

[0043] Based on your own private key and signcrypted ciphertext ,vehicle Calculating temporary values ; Based on the Langrange mean value theorem and coefficients of different orders ,vehicle Refactoring Polynomial function : (4) Based on hash function ,vehicle calculate and , and perform an XOR operation ,in, Represents a bit-level XOR operation; (5) Roadside unit (RSU) based identifier , query the user's public key information . Then, based on the hash function , , ,vehicle Restore the plaintext data , and calculate and ; (6) Vehicles Execute the verification equation And judge whether it is true. If the verification equation is true, it means that the roadside unit RSU and data Legal, vehicle Receive the message; otherwise, the vehicle The signcrypted ciphertext Illegal, discard directly .

[0044] Security Analysis In order to verify the correctness and security of the method proposed in this paper during operation, the present invention verifies and analyzes the calculation correctness and security of the proposed method.

[0045] Correctness Verification Restore Plaintext Correctness analysis For vehicle collection Each vehicle , we can calculate: Afterwards, by reconstructing the n-order polynomial function , each vehicle Ability to calculate: Finally, the vehicle By calculating the following equation, we can restore the plaintext : Verify the correctness of the equation Therefore, based on the correctness verification of the above equation, the present invention is computationally correct and feasible.

[0046] Security Analysis The present invention performs a security analysis on multiple security attributes of the proposed method, including privacy protection, anonymity, traceability, unlinkability, and temporary information security of known specific sessions.

[0047] In the proposed method, the roadside unit RSU selects a random number to ensure the confidentiality of data transmission. , for the ciphertext data Perform XOR operation to generate ciphertext Therefore, in order to realize the ciphertext data To plaintext data , the attacker must calculate the correct . Further, RSU adds the random number to Polynomial function , the attacker must calculate the correct and ,participate Calculation can generate the correct However, for The calculation must have a legal vehicle Long-term private key or roadside unit Private key With random numbers Generated To calculate the correct , which is undoubtedly a difficult task. Therefore, based on the CDH security assumption, the attacker cannot calculate the correct and , thereby realizing the restoration of plaintext data.

[0048] After the roadside unit RSU generates the signcrypted ciphertext , will generate a legal signature that cannot be forged , which is signed by the private key of the roadside unit RSU and random numbers Generate, used to ensure that the ciphertext is generated by the only legitimate RSU. At the same time, during the decryption process, the legitimate vehicle uses all its private keys Decrypt the ciphertext and signature , and calculate and After that, the vehicle executes the verification equation and uses the public key of the roadside unit RSU to participate in the calculation. If the verification equation passes, it means that the message is from the roadside unit send, The news cannot be denied.

[0049] In order to ensure that data is not tampered with during data transmission, the proposed method mainly uses hash function and To ensure that the plaintext data is not modified during transmission. In the signcryption process, the roadside unit RSU uses a hash function and Calculate the summary value of the data and generate a signature that can verify its own identity , and the signature cannot be forged. In the decryption phase, if the ciphertext or data is modified, the vehicle will not be able to calculate the correct , and the correct digest value and , and then judge whether the ciphertext data is legal or maliciously modified by verifying the verification equation. Therefore, the proposed method can meet the security requirements of integrity.

[0050] Similar to the proof of unforgeability, during the signcryption process, the roadside unit RSU will generate a valid signature , which is generated by the private key of the roadside unit RSU and cannot be forged. In addition, during the decryption process, the vehicle calculates , using the target roadside unit The public key of the signature is used to verify the signature. Once the verification is passed, it means that the signed ciphertext message By target roadside unit Generate, target unit There is no way to deny that it sent the message.

[0051] The attacker receives two signed ciphertexts and After receiving the two signcrypted ciphertexts, it is still impossible to determine whether the two signcrypted ciphertexts belong to the same signcrypted instance. The specific proof is as follows. After receiving the two signcrypted ciphertexts, the attacker needs to calculate , thus calculating and , and then calculate and judge However, for and , the attacker needs to know that he must have a legal vehicle Long-term private key or roadside unit Private key With random numbers Generated Otherwise, based on the CDH security assumption, the attacker cannot calculate the correct and , thus judging In addition, for the ciphertext in the , , and , and The calculation uses random numbers , and The calculation uses , are all random, and attackers cannot , , and Determine whether two signcrypted ciphertexts belong to the same instance. Therefore, the proposed method satisfies the unlinkability property.

[0052] In order to ensure the security of data transmission in the event of long-term private key leakage of vehicles or roadside units RSU, perfect forward security becomes an indispensable part of data security. The encryption is based on However, Is a random number that ensures the accuracy of each encryption. At the same time, to prevent attackers from calculating the long-term private keys of both parties after obtaining them, , proposed a solution using To prevent the calculation of the correct .exist Even if the attacker obtains and , but due to the random number Based on the CDH security assumption, the attacker cannot calculate the correct , thus achieving decryption of subsequent communications. Therefore, the proposed method satisfies perfect forward security.

[0053] Similar to the proof process of perfect forward security, in the proposed method, in order to decrypt the ciphertext, it is necessary to calculate the correct Even if the attacker knows the random number in each communication process However, due to the CDH security assumption, the attacker cannot obtain the long-term private key of the two parties' communication. and , and thus the ciphertext cannot be decrypted. Therefore, the proposed method satisfies the temporary information security of a known specific session.

[0054] In order to prevent attackers from obtaining the real identity information of the vehicle and thus track and monitor the communication process of the target vehicle, the proposed method mainly adopts the method of providing pseudonyms and communication anonymity to achieve anonymous protection of vehicle communication. First, in order to prevent attackers from monitoring the communication process of the target vehicle based on the real identity of the target vehicle, the proposed method provides a temporary identity for each user during the key initialization phase of the vehicle, thereby preventing attackers from obtaining and tracking the real identity of the vehicle. Secondly, attackers cannot obtain any explicit information about the real identity of the data recipient based on the ciphertext, thereby achieving anonymous protection of the real identity of the target vehicle.

[0055] In order to protect the real information of the vehicle (such as key information such as the license plate), the proposed method provides a temporary identity for each vehicle and completely uses the temporary identity of the vehicle during the communication process, thereby avoiding the exposure of the real identity of the vehicle and protecting the vehicle's privacy data.

[0056] In order to quickly identify and track malicious devices, the key generation center can search the target vehicle identity information from the database after obtaining the temporary identity of the vehicle. ,The mapping of the temporary identity of the vehicle to the real identity is realized, thus the rapid identification of malicious vehicles can be achieved.,Therefore, the proposed method can meet the traceability.

[0057] In the proposed method, for each signcrypted ciphertext There is a timestamp information , used to identify the freshness of the message. This freshness can be used to prevent other users from replaying the data after stealing the ciphertext. After receiving the message, the vehicle can determine and execute the verification equation To determine whether the signed ciphertext is within the validity period.

[0058] The embodiments of the present invention are described in detail above. Specific examples are used herein to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of the present invention. The description of the above embodiments is only used to help understand the core idea of ​​the present invention. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, according to the idea of ​​the present invention, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. In summary, the content of this specification should not be understood as limiting the present invention.

Claims

1. A lightweight and secure multi-recipient heterogeneous signcryption method suitable for Internet of Vehicles, characterized in that: include: The network manager generates system parameters and public-private key pairs, and distributes the system public parameters to all vehicles and roadside units; The roadside unit and the vehicle complete the certificate acquisition and their own key generation respectively; The roadside unit performs a signcryption operation on the road condition information ahead, generates a signcrypted ciphertext and broadcasts it to all vehicles in the vehicle set in the jurisdiction area; The vehicles in the vehicle set in the jurisdiction area perform a decryption operation on the received signcrypted ciphertext information.

2. According to claim 1, a lightweight and secure multi-recipient heterogeneous signcryption method applicable to the Internet of Vehicles, characterized in that: The network manager includes a certificate authority and a key generation center. The network manager selects an additive cycle group and a generator, and selects 6 secure one-way hash functions to generate system public and private keys; The six hash functions are defined as: ， ， ， ， ， ， in, Indicates the bit length of the vehicle and roadside unit RSU identifier in the Internet of Vehicles; The certificate authority is used for public key management operations and completes the initialization of the certificate-based public key cryptography system; The key generation center selects a random number as the main system key, calculates the system public key, and completes the initialization of the certificateless public key cryptography system.

3. The lightweight and secure multi-recipient heterogeneous signcryption method applicable to the Internet of Vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method of the signcryption step comprises: The roadside unit selects a random number, calculates the random number, and calculates a temporary value and a summary value respectively by using a hash function and public key information of the vehicle; Select random numbers and calculate the sub-polynomial function based on Lagrange interpolation theorem; Calculate a summary value based on the forward road condition information to be transmitted and the hash function; Based on its own private key, random number and hash function, it calculates the temporary value, generates the ciphertext and sends it to all vehicles in the collection through a public channel.

4. The lightweight and secure multi-recipient heterogeneous signcryption method applicable to the Internet of Vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: During the signcryption process, the roadside unit constructs a polynomial through the Lagrange interpolation theorem to merge the ciphertexts sent to multiple receivers.

5. The lightweight and secure multi-recipient heterogeneous signcryption method applicable to the Internet of Vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: The vehicle is based on a certificateless public key system, and the roadside unit is based on a certificate-based public key cryptographic system, and secure communication across different cryptographic systems is achieved through a hybrid architecture.

6. The lightweight and secure multi-recipient heterogeneous signcryption method applicable to the Internet of Vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: The vehicle has a temporary identity Protect client privacy and achieve traceability of the vehicle's true identity through the local database of the key generation center.

7. The lightweight and secure multi-recipient heterogeneous signcryption method applicable to the Internet of Vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: The decryption method comprises: The vehicle determines whether the timestamp of the ciphertext is valid, and discards the ciphertext if it is not valid; Calculate the temporary value based on its own private key and ciphertext; Reconstruct polynomial functions based on Langrange's mean value theorem and coefficients of different degrees; Calculate the summary value based on the hash function and perform an XOR operation; Based on the roadside unit's identity identifier and public key information, restore the plaintext data; Execute the verification equation and determine whether it is true. If it is true, the message is accepted, otherwise the ciphertext is discarded.

8. A lightweight and secure multi-recipient heterogeneous signcryption system suitable for Internet of Vehicles, characterized in that: A lightweight and secure multi-recipient heterogeneous signcryption method applicable to the Internet of Vehicles as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 7, comprising: The network manager is used to generate system parameters and public-private key pairs, and distribute the system public parameters to all vehicles and roadside units; The roadside unit is used to perform the signcryption operation after completing its own key generation and certificate acquisition, generate the signcryption ciphertext and broadcast it to all vehicles in the vehicle set; The vehicle, through on-board sensors and wireless devices, senses road conditions and its own driving status in real time, and sends the data to the roadside unit. The vehicle receives the road condition information ahead sent by the roadside unit in real time, performs decryption operations on the received signed ciphertext information after completing its own key generation, verifies and decrypts the message, and adjusts its own driving status in real time.

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