An anonymous authentication method for certificateless groups in Internet of Vehicles

Abstract

The present invention discloses an anonymous authentication method for certificateless groups in an Internet of Vehicles (IoV), comprising: 1) system initialization, including: system parameter generation, roadside unit registration, and vehicle registration; 2) vehicle-to-infrastructure communication authentication, including two-way identity authentication and secure key negotiation; 3) vehicle-to-vehicle communication authentication, including: pseudonym and signature generation, as well as signature authentication and efficient batch authentication; 4) a malicious vehicle revocation mechanism based on group key update, including: malicious vehicle identity disclosure, group key update and distribution, and recovery of legitimate vehicle keys and isolation of malicious vehicles. The present invention not only has more efficient processing capabilities in ensuring data security, privacy protection, and Sybil attack defense in the IoV system, but also meets the IoV's demand for efficient identity authentication and revocation in a resource-constrained environment, providing a secure, low-cost, and efficient overall solution for the IoV system.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of security and privacy protection in vehicle networking systems, and in particular to an improved certificateless group anonymous authentication method used in vehicle networking communications. The method supports batch authentication and improves authentication efficiency and security. Background Art

[0002] The Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) is becoming an essential component of intelligent transportation systems due to its dynamic networking capabilities and efficient information exchange. As a fusion of in-vehicle communication and wireless network technologies, VANET demonstrates broad application prospects in areas such as intelligent driving, traffic scheduling, fleet management, and emergency response. Through V2V (Vehicle-to-Vehicle) and V2I (Vehicle-to-Infrastructure) communication, vehicles can share real-time road condition information while driving, improving driving safety and traffic efficiency. However, because VANET communications utilize open wireless channels, their security faces significant challenges, requiring effective authentication and privacy protection mechanisms to ensure data security.

[0003] As the core of data transmission and identity authentication, information in VANETs is highly sensitive and vulnerable. The wireless communication environment makes it susceptible to information theft, forgery, tampering, and replay attacks, affecting data integrity and traceability. Although existing authentication schemes can provide identity authentication and communication security to a certain extent, they still have significant flaws. Some schemes rely on bilinear pairing operations, resulting in excessively high computational and communication costs, which increases the network burden. Many schemes do not support batch authentication, resulting in inefficient authentication in large-scale vehicle communication scenarios. In addition, some schemes cannot effectively resist Sybil attacks, allowing attackers to forge multiple false identities and disrupt network operations. Moreover, most schemes lack an efficient malicious vehicle revocation mechanism, making it difficult to accurately track and remove untrusted vehicles, affecting the security and manageability of the system.

[0004] To address data security and privacy issues in VANET systems, researchers have proposed a variety of certificateless signature-based authentication schemes in recent years to reduce key management costs and improve privacy protection. However, these schemes still have shortcomings in terms of computational overhead, communication costs, and security, making them difficult to operate efficiently in resource-constrained VANET environments. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In order to solve the problems of high computational overhead, high communication cost, lack of batch authentication and malicious vehicle revocation mechanism in the existing VANET authentication scheme, this paper proposes an anonymous authentication method for certificateless groups in the VANET, in order to ensure data security and privacy protection while realizing an authentication mechanism with low computational cost and high communication efficiency, thereby improving the security and feasibility of the VANET environment.

[0006] In order to achieve the above-mentioned object, the present invention adopts the following technical solutions:

[0007] The anonymous authentication method for a certificateless group in a vehicle network of the present invention is characterized in that it is applied to a vehicle network system consisting of a key generation center KGC, a roadside unit group, and a vehicle group, and includes the following steps:

[0008] Step 1: Initialization of the vehicle network system, including: generation of system parameters, registration of roadside units, and registration of vehicles;

[0009] Step 2: The jth vehicle V in the Internet of Vehicles system j With the i-th roadside unit RSU i Communication authentication between the two parties, including: two-way identity authentication and security key negotiation;

[0010] Step 3: When the jth vehicle V j and the kth vehicle V k Appears at the same time at the i-th roadside unit RSU i When within the range of the vehicle, communication authentication is performed between vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles system, including: pseudonym and signature generation, signature authentication;

[0011] Step 4: Malicious vehicle revocation based on group key update, including: malicious vehicle identity disclosure, group key update and distribution, and legitimate vehicle key update and malicious vehicle isolation.

[0012] The improved certificateless anonymous authentication method for Internet of Vehicles according to the present invention is also characterized in that step 1 includes:

[0013] Step 1.1, Generation of system parameters:

[0014] Step 1.1.1, the key generation center KGC selects the elliptic curve group G and the basic parameter q, and * q Select two random numbers as the i-th roadside unit RSU i Master Key and the jth vehicle V j Master Key , and calculate the i-th roadside unit RSU i System public key and the jth vehicle V j System public key , where P is a base point on the elliptic curve group G, i = 1…n, n is the number of roadside units in the vehicle network system, j = 1…m, m is the number of vehicles in the vehicle network system;

[0015] Step 1.1.2. Select 7 secure hash functions H, H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6 to convert a binary string {0, 1} of any length into * Mapping to Z * q In this way, the system parameters {G,P,q, , ,H,H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6};

[0016] Step 1.2, the i-th roadside unit RSU i Registration:

[0017] Step 1.2.1, the i-th roadside unit RSU i In Z * q Generate the first private key and the first public key , and the i-th roadside unit RSU i Identity and Submit to KGC for registration;

[0018] Step 1.2.2, the key generation center KGC is at Z * q Select a random number r from the equation and calculate the i-th roadside unit RSU i The second public key and the second private key After that, the i-th RSU key pair ( , ) sent to RSU i , where h1 represents the first hash value, and h1=H1(GK, , , ), GK is the public key of the roadside unit group;

[0019] Step 1.2.3, the i-th roadside unit RSU i Verify the i-th RSU key pair ( , ) after completing the i-th roadside unit RSU i registration;

[0020] Step 1.3, the jth vehicle Vj Registration:

[0021] Step 1.3.1, the jth vehicle V j In Z * q Pick a random number As the first private key, and calculate the first public key Then, the jth vehicle V j Identity and Submit to KGC for registration;

[0022] Step 1.3.2, the key generation center KGC is at Z * q Pick a random number v and calculate the jth car V j The second public key and the second private key Then, the jth OBU key pair ( , ) is sent to the jth vehicle V j , where h2 represents the second hash value, and h2=H1(GK, , , );

[0023] Step 1.3.3, the jth vehicle V j Verify the jth OBU key pair ( , ) after completing the jth vehicle V j Registration.

[0024] Furthermore, the step 2 includes:

[0025] Step 2.1, two-way identity authentication:

[0026] Step 2.1.1, the i-th roadside unit RSU i In Z * q Randomly select a number t1 and calculate the first temporary public key T1=t1P, the third hash value h b =H( , ,tt i ,GK), the fourth hash value h3=H2(T1,T r ), then RSU i Send broadcast messages to the Internet of Vehicles system ={T1,tt i ,T r , ,RIRL, ,}; where T r Is to calculate RSU i The timestamp of the fourth hash value, RSU i The signature of , RIRL is the RSU revocation list, tt i Is to calculate RSU i The timestamp of the third hash value;

[0027] Step 2.1.2: When the i-th roadside unit RSU i The jth vehicle V in the range j Received broadcast message , the jth vehicle V j Check T r After verifying the freshness =T1+h b GK+h3( + +h1 ) is true, if so, go to step 2.1.3, otherwise, return to step 2.1.2 and wait for RSU i Send a new broadcast message;

[0028] Step 2.1.3, query RIRL, if RSU i In the revocation list, the jth vehicle V j Reject the i-th roadside unit RSU i If communication is established, return to step 2.1.2 and wait for the broadcast message sent by other roadside units to perform two-way identity authentication. Otherwise, go to step 2.1.4;

[0029] Step 2.1.4, V j In Z * q Randomly select two numbers t2 and d, and calculate the second temporary public key T2=t2P to generate the first combined pseudonym ={ , },in, is the first pseudonym of the car-road, and =dP, is the second pseudonym of the car-road, and = H(d( + )),in, It is an XOR calculation;

[0030] Step 2.1.5. Calculate the jth vehicle V j Authentication message =( ,tt i ,T2,T v ) and V j Signature =t2+h d gk+h4( + ), thus the message signature group { , }Send to RSU i ; Among them, T v is the current timestamp, h d is the public key hash value, and h d =H( , ,tt i ,GK), h4 is the fifth hash value, and h4=H3( ,T2,T v ), gk is the private key of the RSU group;

[0031] Step 2.1.6, RSU i Receive the jth vehicle V j The message signature group { , }, check T v If the freshness is exceeded, the j-th vehicle V is rejected. j Communication, return to step 2.1.6, wait for the message signature group to be received again, otherwise, calculate = H(( + ) ), the jth vehicle V j The third temporary public key = + +H1( , , ) , thus verifying P=T2+h d GK+h4 Is it true? If so, then RSU i Allow V j Join the Internet of Vehicles system and proceed to step 2.2; otherwise, return to step 2.1.6 and wait for the message signature group to be received again;

[0032] Step 2.2, Security Key Negotiation:

[0033] Step 2.2.1. RSU i In Z *q Randomly select four random numbers {z i ,r1,r2,m}, and calculate the fourth temporary public key Z i =z i P, fifth temporary public key R1=r1P, sixth temporary public key R2=r2P, public public key P pub =mP,RSU i The first identity binding value y i =z i +mH5( ), the first vehicle identity hash value C=r1( + )+P pub H1( , , ), session key N=H(C) ( ||gk||y i || R2), the sixth hash value h6=H4(N,P pub ,Z i ,R1,R2,T r ), RSU i Authentication message M i ={N,P pub ,Z i ,R1,h6,T r}, RSU i Message signature =r2+h4( + ), then RSU i The identity authentication message {M i , }Sent to the jth vehicle V j Among them, P pub RSU i The local master key of

[0034] Step 2.2.2, V j Upon receiving RSU i The identity authentication message {M i , }, and verify T r After the freshness is calculated, the second vehicle identity hash value is calculated =R1( + )+P pub H1( , , ), identity key authentication parameters ||gk||y|| =H( ) N, the seventh hash value h7=H4(N,P pub ,Z i ,R1, ,T r ), and store the unknown number set {y i ,Z i};

[0035] Step 2.2.3, V j Calculating RSUs i Identity binding value = + +H1( , , ) and verify P= +h7 Is it true? If so, it means RSU i Authentication successful, RSU i With V j Use N as the session key for encrypted communication; otherwise, return to step 2.2.2 and wait for re-authentication.

[0036] Furthermore, step 3 includes:

[0037] Step 3.1: Generate pseudonym and signature:

[0038] Step 3.1.1, the jth vehicle V j In Z * q Randomly select a number , and calculate the second combined kana =( , ),in, is the first pseudonym of car-car, and , is the second pseudonym of car-car, and = H( ), calculate the identity binding public key Z * i =Z i + , k=1,2,…,m, m is the number of vehicles in the vehicle network system;

[0039] Step 3.1.2, V j Calculate the authentication signature +h8 , where h8 is the eighth hash value, and h8=H6( ,GK, ,T m ), then the identity authentication information { , , ,Z * i ,T m}Sent to the jth vehicle V j ;in, It is information related to traffic safety. m is the timestamp when the authentication signature is calculated, RSU i Second identity binding value, and =y i + ;

[0040] Step 3.2, Signature Verification:

[0041] When V k Receive V j The authentication message { , , ,Z * i ,T m}, verify T m After the freshness, calculate V j The ninth hash value h 9,j =H6( ,GK, ,T m ), =Z * i -Z i , thus verifying = +h9(Z * i +H(P pub H5( )) is true, if true, then V k Accept V j If the vehicle is a trusted one, then return to step 3.2 and receive a new vehicle identity authentication message for signature authentication.

[0042] When V k Receive the i-th roadside unit RSU i When multiple vehicles are within range of the authentication message, verify +P pub H5( ) Is it true? If so, it means that the batch authentication is successful and all vehicles have passed the authentication. Otherwise, return to step 3.2, re-receive the new vehicle identity authentication message, and perform signature authentication; where a represents the i-th roadside unit RSU i The number of vehicles within the range.

[0043] Furthermore, step 4 includes:

[0044] Step 4.1: Malicious vehicle identity revealed:

[0045] KGC passed H( )= Calculating the identity of the malicious vehicle , thereby passing the Sent to the roadside units in the area to reveal the identity of the malicious vehicle;

[0046] Step 4.2: Key update and distribution:

[0047] The roadside unit in the area where the malicious vehicle is located receives After that, in Z * q Randomly select a number As the new private key of the RSU group, calculate the new public key of the RSU group , collect the public keys of all legal vehicles within its range { |l=1,2,…,a}, and define a new key update function ; Where x is the key recovery value; thereby updating the key of the roadside unit group;

[0048] The roadside unit in the area where the malicious vehicle is located broadcasts the update message to all legal vehicles within its range. };in, is the timestamp of the broadcast;

[0049] Step 4.3: Update the key of legitimate vehicles and isolate them from malicious vehicles:

[0050] The first legal vehicle When receiving an update message, verify After the freshness, calculate and enter In the solution , to update the legal vehicle The key is , and isolate malicious vehicles.

[0051] Furthermore, the i-th roadside unit RSU in step 1.2 i verify Is it true? If so, it means the verification is successful. Otherwise, the i-th roadside unit RSU i Wait for KGC to resend RSU i The key pair is used for authentication.

[0052] Furthermore, the j-th on-board unit OBU in step 1.3 j verify Is it true? If so, it means the verification is passed. Otherwise, the j-th on-board unit OBU j Wait for KGC to resend OBU j The key pair is used for authentication.

[0053] The electronic device of the present invention includes a memory and a processor, wherein the memory is used to store a program that supports the processor to execute the anonymous authentication method, and the processor is configured to execute the program stored in the memory.

[0054] The present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein a computer program is stored on the computer-readable storage medium, and the computer program executes the steps of the anonymous authentication method when the computer program is executed by a processor.

[0055] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0056] 1. This paper proposes an authentication scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and a group key update mechanism, which provides a secure authentication method for VANET and solves the data security and privacy protection issues in the Internet of Vehicles system.

[0057] 2. The present invention proposes an authentication method that supports batch authentication and efficient malicious vehicle revocation. Compared with traditional authentication schemes based on bilinear pairings, the present invention significantly reduces computing and communication costs and improves authentication efficiency while ensuring data security.

[0058] 3. The present invention proposes an authentication mechanism based on dynamic anonymous identity and group key update, which provides an efficient identity authentication and revocation process in the resource-constrained environment of the VANET system, meeting the requirements of the VANET system for data security, privacy protection and efficient communication.

[0059] 4. This paper proposes an optimized anonymous identity generation method, which dynamically generates and binds random numbers in V2V communication, ensures the anonymity of vehicle identity, effectively defends against Sybil attacks, and improves the security of the Internet of Vehicles system.

[0060] 5. The present invention proposes a group key update mechanism based on polynomial functions, which can quickly revoke the access rights of malicious vehicles after they are discovered, while reducing storage and computing overhead and improving revocation efficiency.

[0061] 6. The present invention proposes an authentication scheme with low communication overhead. By optimizing the message structure and authentication process, it reduces the amount of data exchange during single identity authentication and batch authentication, and improves the overall performance of the Internet of Vehicles system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0062] Figure 1 This is a system model diagram of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0063] In this embodiment, Figure 1 As shown in the figure, an anonymous authentication method for certificateless groups in the Internet of Vehicles is applied to a vehicle network system consisting of a key generation center KGC, a roadside unit group, and a vehicle group. The key generation center KGC serves as the registration center for all participants in the Internet of Vehicles system, and is responsible for completing identity registration and key distribution for the entire system. After detecting a malicious node, it tracks its true identity and notifies relevant entities to revoke it to ensure overall security. One function of the roadside unit group is to receive encrypted information sent by the vehicle during the authentication phase and verify the RSU. i The authentication value is verified to be legal, and the updated group key is calculated and broadcast to the vehicle to ensure the security of information transmission. One function of the vehicle group is that the vehicle sends authentication information to the RSU through its own device to complete login and identity authentication, and at the same time generates a vehicle session key to complete session key establishment, and uses batch signature authentication technology to achieve fast signature verification between vehicles, thereby ensuring the real-time and confidentiality of inter-vehicle communication. Specifically, the method includes the following steps:

[0064] Step 1: Initialization of the vehicle network system, including: generation of system parameters, registration of roadside units, and registration of vehicles;

[0065] Step 1.1, Generation of system parameters:

[0066] Step 1.1.1, the key generation center KGC selects the elliptic curve group G and a large prime number as the basic parameter q, and * q Select two random numbers as the i-th roadside unit RSU i Master Key and the jth vehicle V j Master Key , and calculate the i-th roadside unit RSU i System public key and the jth vehicle V j System public key , where P is a base point on the elliptic curve group G, i = 1…n, n is the number of roadside units in the vehicle network system, j = 1…m, m is the number of vehicles in the vehicle network system;

[0067] Step 1.1.2. Select 7 secure hash functions H, H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6 to convert a binary string {0, 1} of any length into * Mapping to Z * q In this way, the system parameters {G,P,q, , ,H,H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6}.

[0068] Step 1.2, the i-th roadside unit RSU i Registration:

[0069] Step 1.2.1, the i-th roadside unit RSU i In Z * q Generate the first private key and the first public key , and the i-th roadside unit RSU i Identity and Submit to KGC for registration;

[0070] Step 1.2.2, the key generation center KGC is at Z * q Select a random number r from the equation and calculate the i-th roadside unit RSU i The second public key and the second private key After that, the i-th RSU key pair ( , ) sent to RSU i , where h1 represents the first hash value, and h1=H1(GK, , , ), GK is the public key of the roadside unit group;

[0071] Step 1.2.3, the i-th roadside unit RSU i Verify the i-th RSU key pair ( , ) and verify Is it true? If so, it means the verification is successful. Otherwise, the i-th roadside unit RSU i Wait for KGC to resend RSU i The key pair is used for authentication.

[0072] Step 1.3, the jth vehicle V j Registration:

[0073] Step 1.3.1, the jth vehicle V j In Z * q Pick a random number As the first private key, and calculate the first public key Then, the jth vehicle V j Identity and Register at KGC;

[0074] Step 1.3.2, the key generation center KGC is at Z * q Pick a random number v and calculate the jth car V j The second public key and the second private key Then, the jth OBU key pair ( , ) is sent to the jth vehicle V j , where h2 represents the second hash value, and h2=H1(GK, , , );

[0075] Step 1.3.3, the jth vehicle V j Verify the jth OBU key pair ( , ) and verify Is it true? If so, it means the verification is successful. Otherwise, the j-th on-board unit OBU j Wait for KGC to resend OBU j The key pair is used for authentication.

[0076] Step 2: The jth vehicle V in the Internet of Vehicles system j With the i-th roadside unit RSU i Communication authentication between the two parties, including: two-way identity authentication and security key negotiation;

[0077] Step 2.1, two-way identity authentication:

[0078] Step 2.1.1, the i-th roadside unit RSU i In Z * q Randomly select a number t1 and calculate the first temporary public key T1=t1P, the third hash value h b =H( , ,tt i ,GK), the fourth hash value h3=H2(T1,T r ), then RSU i Send broadcast messages to the Internet of Vehicles system ={T1,tt i ,T r , ,RIRL, , }; where T r Is to calculate RSU i The timestamp of the fourth hash value, RSU i The signature of , RIRL is the RSU revocation list, tt i Is to calculate RSU i The timestamp of the third hash value;

[0079] Step 2.1.2: When the i-th roadside unit RSU i The jth vehicle V in the range j Received broadcast message , the jth vehicle V j Check T r After verifying the freshness =T1+h b GK+h3( + +h1 ) is true, if so, go to step 2.1.3, otherwise, return to step 2.1.2 and wait for RSU i Send a new broadcast message.

[0080] Step 2.1.3, query RIRL, if RSU i In the revocation list, the jth vehicle V j Reject the i-th roadside unit RSU i If communication is established, return to step 2.1.2 and wait for the broadcast message sent by other roadside units to perform two-way identity authentication. Otherwise, go to step 2.1.4;

[0081] Step 2.1.4, V j In Z * q Randomly select two numbers t2 and d, and calculate the second temporary public key T2=t2P to generate the first combined pseudonym ={ , },in, is the first pseudonym of the car-road, and =dP, is the second pseudonym of the car-road, and = H(d( + )),in, It is an XOR calculation.

[0082] Step 2.1.5. Calculate the jth vehicle V j Authentication message =( ,tt i ,T2,T v ) and V j Signature =t2+h d gk+h4( + ), thus the message signature group { , }Send to RSU i ; Among them, T v is the current timestamp, h d is the public key hash value, and h d =H( , ,tt i ,GK), h4 is the fifth hash value, and h4=H3( ,T2,T v ), gk is the private key of the RSU group;

[0083] Step 2.1.6, RSU i Receive the jth vehicle V j The message signature group { , }, check T v If the freshness is exceeded, the j-th vehicle V is rejected. j Communication, return to step 2.1.6, wait for the message signature group to be received again, otherwise, calculate = H(( + ) ), the jth vehicle V j The third temporary public key = + +H1( , , ) , thus verifying P=T2+h d GK+h4 Is it true? If so, then RSUi Allow V j Join the Internet of Vehicles system and execute step 2.2; otherwise, return to step 2.1.6 and wait for receiving the message signature group again.

[0084] Step 2.2, Security Key Negotiation:

[0085] Step 2.2.1. RSU i In Z * q Randomly select four random numbers {z i ,r1,r2,m}, and calculate the fourth temporary public key Z i =z i P, fifth temporary public key R1=r1P, sixth temporary public key R2=r2P, public public key P pub =mP,RSU i The first identity binding value y i =z i +mH5( ), the first vehicle identity hash value C=r1( + )+P pub H1( , , ), session key N=H(C) ( ||gk||y i || R2), the sixth hash value h6=H4(N,P pub ,Z i ,R1,R2,T r ), RSU i Authentication message M i ={N,P pub ,Z i ,R1,h6,T r}, RSU i Message signature =r2+h4( + ), then RSU i The identity authentication message {M i , }Sent to the jth vehicle V j Among them, P pub RSU i The local master key.

[0086] Step 2.2.2, V j Upon receiving RSU i The identity authentication message {M i , }, and verify T r After the freshness is calculated, the second vehicle identity hash value is calculated =R1( + )+P pub H1( , , ), identity key authentication parameters ||gk||y|| =H( ) N, the seventh hash value h7=H4(N,P pub ,Z i ,R1, ,T r ), and store the unknown number set {y i ,Z i};

[0087] Step 2.2.3, V j Calculating RSUs i Identity binding value = + +H1( , , ) and verify P= +h7 Is it true? If so, it means RSU i Authentication successful, RSU i With V j Use N as the session key for encrypted communication; otherwise, return to step 2.2.2 and wait for re-authentication.

[0088] Step 3: When the jth vehicle V j and the kth vehicle V k Appears at the same time at the i-th roadside unit RSU i Within the scope of the Internet of Vehicles system, communication authentication is performed between vehicles, including: pseudonym and signature generation, signature authentication;

[0089] Step 3.1, Pseudonym and Signature Generation:

[0090] Step 3.1.1, the jth vehicle V j In Z * q Randomly select a number , and calculate the second combined kana =( , ),in, is the first pseudonym of car-car, and , is the second pseudonym of car-car, and = H( ), calculate the identity binding public key Z * i =Z i + , k=1,2,…,m, m is the number of vehicles in the vehicle network system;

[0091] Step 3.1.2, V j Calculate the authentication signature +h8 , where h8 is the eighth hash value, and h8=H6( ,GK, ,T m ), then the identity authentication information { , , ,Z * i ,T m}Sent to the jth vehicle V j ;in, It is information related to traffic safety. m is the timestamp when the authentication signature is calculated, RSU i Second identity binding value, and =y i + .

[0092] Step 3.2, Signature Verification:

[0093] When V k Receive V j The authentication message { , , ,Z * i ,T m}, verify T m After the freshness is calculated, the ninth hash value h9=H6( ,GK, ,T m ), =Z * i -Z i , thus verifying = +h9(Z * i +H(Ppub H5( )) is true, if true, then V k Accept V j If the vehicle is a trusted one, then return to step 3.2 and receive a new vehicle identity authentication message for signature authentication.

[0094] When V k Receive the i-th roadside unit RSU i When multiple vehicles are within range of the authentication message, verify +P pub H5( ) Is it true? If so, it means that the batch authentication is successful and all vehicles have passed the authentication. Otherwise, return to step 3.2, re-receive the new vehicle identity authentication message, and perform signature authentication; where a represents the i-th roadside unit RSU i The number of vehicles within the range, h 9,j is the 9th hash value of the jth vehicle, is the sum of signatures sent by a vehicles, is the sum of the first parts of the anonymous identities of a vehicles, is the sum of the public key parts of the identities of a vehicles, P pub H5( ) It is the sum of the public key parts of the identity authentication of a vehicles.

[0095] Step 4: Malicious vehicle revocation based on group key update, including: malicious vehicle identity disclosure, group key update and distribution, and legitimate vehicle key update and isolation from malicious vehicles;

[0096] Step 4.1: Malicious vehicle identity revealed:

[0097] KGC passed H( )= Calculating the identity of the malicious vehicle , thereby passing the Sent to the roadside units in the area to reveal the identity of malicious vehicles.

[0098] Step 4.2: Key update and distribution:

[0099] The roadside unit in the area where the malicious vehicle is located receives After that, in Z * q Randomly select a number As the new private key of the RSU group, calculate the new public key of the RSU group , collect the public keys of all legal vehicles within its range { |l=1,2,…,a}, and define a new key update function ; Where x is the key recovery value; thereby updating the key of the roadside unit group;

[0100] The roadside unit in the area where the malicious vehicle is located broadcasts the update message to all legal vehicles within its range. };in, is the timestamp of the broadcast;

[0101] Step 4.3: Update the key of legitimate vehicles and isolate them from malicious vehicles:

[0102] The first legal vehicle When receiving an update message, verify After verifying the freshness, calculate and enter In the solution , to update the legal vehicle The key is .

[0103] because The calculation method excludes the public key of the malicious vehicle, so the malicious vehicle cannot obtain the correct x, even if the malicious vehicle tries to calculate , and ultimately cannot be recovered , ensuring that malicious vehicles are completely excluded and cannot affect the communication security of the Internet of Vehicles.

[0104] In this embodiment, an electronic device includes a memory and a processor, wherein the memory is used to store a program that supports the processor to execute the above method, and the processor is configured to execute the program stored in the memory.

[0105] In this embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the above method are executed.

Claims

1. An anonymous authentication method for a certificate-less group in an Internet of Vehicles, characterized in that: It is applied to a vehicle network system consisting of a key generation center KGC, a roadside unit group, and a vehicle group, and includes the following steps: Step 1: Initialization of the vehicle network system, including: generation of system parameters, registration of roadside units, and registration of vehicles; Step 2: The jth vehicle V in the Internet of Vehicles system j With the i-th roadside unit RSU i Communication authentication between the two parties, including: two-way identity authentication and security key negotiation; Step 3: When the jth vehicle V j and the kth vehicle V k Appears at the same time at the i-th roadside unit RSU i When within the range of the vehicle, communication authentication is performed between vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles system, including: pseudonym and signature generation, signature authentication; Step 3.1: Generate pseudonym and signature: Step 3.1.1, the jth vehicle V j In the finite field Z * q Randomly select a number , and calculate the second combined kana =( , ),in, is the first pseudonym of car-car, and , is the second pseudonym of car-car, and = H( ), calculate the identity binding public key Z between the jth car and the kth car * i,j =Z i + , k=1,2,…,m, m is the number of vehicles in the vehicle network system; represents the jth vehicle V j The identity of ; H represents the first secure hash function; is the jth vehicle V j The system public key; P is the base point on the elliptic curve group G; Is the XOR calculation; Z i is the fourth temporary public key, and Z i =z i P, z i RSU i In Z * q A random number randomly selected from Step 3.1.2, V j Calculate the authentication signature +h8 , where h8 is the eighth hash value, and h8=H6( ,GK, ,T m ), then the identity authentication information { , , ,Z * i,j ,T m }Sent to the jth vehicle V j ; Where GK is the public key of the roadside unit group; It is information related to traffic safety. m is the timestamp when the authentication signature is calculated, RSU i Second identity binding value, and =y i + , where y i RSU i The first identity binding value of , and y i =z i +mH5( ), m is RSU i In Z * q A random number randomly selected from , H5 represents the 6th secure hash function, is the i-th roadside unit RSU i ; H6 represents the 7th secure hash function; Step 3.2, Signature Verification: When V k Receive V j The authentication message { , , ,Z * i,j ,T m }, verify T m After the freshness, calculate V j The ninth hash value h 9,j =H6( ,GK, ,T m ), =Z * i,j -Z i , thus verifying = +h 9,j (Z * i,j +P pub H5( )) is true, if true, then V k Accept V j If it is a trusted vehicle, otherwise, return to step 3.2, receive a new vehicle identity authentication message again, and perform signature authentication; where P pub Represents RSU i The local master key of When V k Receive the i-th roadside unit RSU i When multiple vehicles are within range of the authentication message, verify +P pub H5( ) Is it true? If so, it means that the batch authentication is successful and all vehicles have passed the authentication. Otherwise, return to step 3.2, re-receive the new vehicle identity authentication message, and perform signature authentication; where a represents the i-th roadside unit RSU i Number of vehicles within range; Step 4: Malicious vehicle revocation based on group key update, including: malicious vehicle identity disclosure, group key update and distribution, and legitimate vehicle key update and malicious vehicle isolation.

2. The anonymous authentication method for a certificateless group in an Internet of Vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step 1 comprises: Step 1.1, Generation of system parameters: Step 1.1.1, the key generation center KGC selects the elliptic curve group G and the basic parameter q, and * q Select two random numbers as the i-th roadside unit RSU i Master Key and the jth vehicle V j Master Key , and calculate the i-th roadside unit RSU i System public key and the jth vehicle V j System public key , where P is a base point on the elliptic curve group G, i = 1…n, n is the number of roadside units in the vehicle network system, j = 1…m, m is the number of vehicles in the vehicle network system; Step 1.1.

2. Select 7 secure hash functions H, H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6 to convert a binary string {0, 1} of any length into * Mapping to Z * q In this way, the system parameters {G,P,q, , ,H,H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6}; Step 1.2, the i-th roadside unit RSU i Registration: Step 1.2.1, the i-th roadside unit RSU i In Z * q Generate the first private key and the first public key , and the i-th roadside unit RSU i Identity and Submit to KGC for registration; Step 1.2.2, the key generation center KGC is at Z * q Select a random number r from the equation and calculate the i-th roadside unit RSU i The second public key and the second private key After that, the i-th RSU key pair ( , ) sent to RSU i , where h1 represents the first hash value, and h1=H1(GK, , , ), GK is the public key of the roadside unit group; Step 1.2.3, the i-th roadside unit RSU i Verify the i-th RSU key pair ( , ) after completing the i-th roadside unit RSU i registration; Step 1.3, the jth vehicle V j Registration: Step 1.3.1, the jth vehicle V j In Z * q Pick a random number As the first private key, and calculate the first public key Then, the jth vehicle V j Identity and Submit to KGC for registration; Step 1.3.2, the key generation center KGC is at Z * q Pick a random number v and calculate the jth car V j The second public key and the second private key Then, the jth OBU key pair ( , ) is sent to the jth vehicle V j , where h2 represents the second hash value, and h2=H1(GK, , , ); Step 1.3.3, the jth vehicle V j Verify the jth OBU key pair ( , ) after completing the jth vehicle V j Registration.

3. The anonymous authentication method for a certificateless group in an Internet of Vehicles according to claim 2, characterized in that: The i-th roadside unit RSU in step 1.2 i verify Is it true? If so, it means the verification is successful. Otherwise, the i-th roadside unit RSU i Wait for KGC to resend RSU i The key pair is used for authentication.

4. The anonymous authentication method for a certificateless group in an Internet of Vehicles according to claim 2, characterized in that: The j-th on-board unit OBU in step 1.3 j verify Is it true? If so, it means the verification is passed. Otherwise, the j-th on-board unit OBU j Wait for KGC to resend OBU j The key pair is used for authentication.

5. An electronic device comprising a memory and a processor, characterized in that: The memory is used to store a program that supports the processor to execute the anonymous authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, and the processor is configured to execute the program stored in the memory.

6. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the anonymous authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 4 are executed.

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