A fast frequency response security control method, device and medium under DoS attack

Abstract

This invention discloses a fast frequency response security control method, device, and medium under DoS attacks, relating to the field of power system control technology. The method involves acquiring the frequency deviation of the power system under a denial-of-service (DoS) attack; determining the target power for the energy storage system to participate in fast frequency response based on the frequency deviation; dividing the global reserve power of the energy storage system into positive reserve power, attack runaway power, and odd reserve power; using the positive reserve power equal to the power deficit caused by load disturbance as the control objective, iteratively decomposing the positive reserve power, attack runaway power, and odd reserve power using a proportionality coefficient to obtain the target value of the positive reserve power for the energy storage system to participate in fast frequency response; the proportionality coefficient of the odd reserve power is iteratively updated based on the target power and the positive reserve power; and controlling the energy storage system using the target positive reserve power value to enable the power system to complete frequency recovery. This method can solve the problem of power runaway during fast frequency response under DoS attacks.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of power system control technology, and in particular to a fast frequency response security control method, device, and medium under DoS attack. Background Technology

[0002] The new power system supports green energy generation, provides fast frequency response control based on high-performance computing and high-speed communication technologies, regulates the power output of energy storage systems, and participates in power regulation services to maintain the safe and stable operation of the power system. However, the new power system, which integrates information and communication technologies, exhibits cyber-physical integration characteristics, making it susceptible to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that can penetrate and affect the security of physical equipment and system stability. In particular, the high-precision, second-level response requirements of fast frequency response control in multi-regional interconnected power systems make them more reliant on the integrity and availability of data transmission from information and communication systems. DoS attacks reduce the controllability of backup power by disrupting the information availability of the frequency control system, essentially causing adjustable power to become unresponsive, severely affecting fast frequency response control, and causing the new power system to lose the optimal opportunity for frequency regulation under disturbances.

[0003] Therefore, there is an urgent need for a security control mechanism that can address the issue of rapid frequency response during DoS attacks. Summary of the Invention

[0004] Therefore, it is necessary to provide a fast frequency response security control method, device, and medium under DoS attack to address the above-mentioned technical problems. This method can solve the problem of rapid frequency runaway in power systems under DoS attack.

[0005] The present invention adopts the following technical solution:

[0006] This invention provides a fast frequency response security control method under DoS attack, including:

[0007] Obtain the frequency deviation of the power system under a denial-of-service (DoS) attack;

[0008] Based on the frequency deviation, determine the target power for the energy storage system of the power system to participate in the fast frequency response;

[0009] The global reserve power of the energy storage system is divided into positive reserve power, attack-induced uncontrolled power, and odd reserve power. Positive reserve power represents the actual effective output power of the energy storage system, attack-induced uncontrolled power represents the power generation of the uncontrollable energy storage system caused by a DoS attack, and odd reserve power represents the redundant reserve power used to compensate for the loss of attack-induced uncontrolled power.

[0010] With the positive reserve power equal to the power deficit caused by load disturbance as the control objective, the positive reserve power, attack runaway power, and odd reserve power are iteratively decomposed by the proportional coefficient to obtain the target value of positive reserve power for the energy storage system to participate in fast frequency response; the proportional coefficient of odd reserve power is iteratively updated based on the target power and the positive reserve power.

[0011] By using the target value of positive and reserve power, the energy storage system is controlled to enable the power system to complete frequency restoration.

[0012] Optionally, based on the frequency deviation, the target power for the power system's energy storage system to participate in fast frequency response is determined, including:

[0013] Substituting the frequency deviation into the proportional-derivative-integral (PDI) PID control law, we obtain the target frequency; the PDI PID control law is:

[0014]

[0015] Where, ΔP R Let Δf be the target power and Δf be the frequency deviation. K is the derivative of the frequency deviation. P For proportional control of gain, K D For derivative-controlled gain, K I This is for integral control gain.

[0016] Optionally, the global reserve power of the energy storage system can be divided into positive reserve power, attack runaway power, and surplus reserve power, including:

[0017] The global reserve power is divided into positive reserve power, attack failure power, and odd reserve power according to a preset division ratio; the relationship between global reserve power and positive reserve power, attack failure power, and odd reserve power is as follows:

[0018] ΔP RFE =ΔP D +ΔP S +ΔP I ;

[0019] Where, ΔP RFE For global reserve power, ΔP D For positive reserve power, ΔP S For attacking runaway power, ΔP I Reserve power.

[0020] Optionally, the proportional coefficient includes attack parameters for positive reserve power, frontal defense parameters for attack runaway power, and odd control parameters for odd reserve power; taking the positive reserve power equal to the power deficit caused by load disturbance as the control objective, the positive reserve power, attack runaway power, and odd reserve power are iteratively decomposed using the proportional coefficient to obtain the target value of positive reserve power for the energy storage system to participate in fast frequency response, including:

[0021] In each iteration, the positive reserve power of the current iteration is decomposed into the first output power and the slip-out power using attack parameters; the attack runaway power of the current iteration is decomposed into the over-constraint power and the recovery power using frontal defense parameters; and the odd reserve power of the current iteration is decomposed into the reserve power and the second output power using odd control parameters. The first output power and the second output power are used as the positive reserve power of the next iteration, the over-constraint power and the slip-out power are used as the attack runaway power of the next iteration, and the recovery power and the reserve power are used as the odd reserve power of the next iteration.

[0022] When the positive reserve power equals the power deficit caused by load disturbance, the positive reserve power of the corresponding iteration is determined as the target value of the positive reserve power for the energy storage system to participate in the fast frequency response.

[0023] Among them, the first output power refers to the actual generated power, the power of the missed attack refers to the power of the power unit not responding due to the interruption of scheduling communication under the DoS attack, the over-constraint power refers to the zero reserve power that is regarded by the fast frequency response system because the reserve power measurement information is not available under the DoS attack, the recovery power refers to the power that the out-of-control power is restored to controllable after the DoS attack ends, the reserve power refers to the power that is kept in reserve to defend against potential attacks, and the second output power refers to the actual generated power for defending against attacks.

[0024] Optionally, the decomposition formulas for positive reserve power, attack runaway power, and odd reserve power are as follows:

[0025]

[0026] Where, ΔP RFE (k) represents the global reserve power at the k-th iteration, ΔP D (k), ΔP S (k), ΔP I (k) represents the positive reserve power, attack failure power, and odd reserve power at the k-th iteration, respectively, ΔP D (k+1), ΔP S (k+1), ΔP I (k+1) represent the positive reserve power, attack failure power, and odd reserve power at the (k+1)th iteration, respectively, and 1-α k Indicates the attack parameters, 1-β kLet χ(k) represent the frontal defense parameters, and let χ(k) be the odd control parameter at the k-th iteration.

[0027] Optionally, the update methods for the odd control parameters include:

[0028] For any iteration of the odd control parameter, if the target power is 0, then the odd control parameter for the current iteration is determined to be 0.

[0029] If the target power is not 0, then the candidate odd control parameters are determined based on the target power and the reserve power of the current iteration.

[0030] If the candidate odd control parameter satisfies the parameter constraint conditions, the candidate odd control parameter is determined as the odd control parameter of the current iteration.

[0031] If the candidate odd control parameter does not meet the parameter constraints, the candidate odd control parameter is processed according to the sign function to obtain the odd control parameter for the current iteration.

[0032] Optionally, the formula for calculating the candidate odd control parameter is:

[0033] χ1(k)=δ|(ΔP R -ΔP D (k)) / ΔP R |,ΔP R ≠0;

[0034] Where χ1(k) is the candidate odd control parameter in the k-th iteration, δ is the reduction factor, and ΔP R For the target power, ΔP D (k) represents the positive reserve power at the kth iteration;

[0035]

[0036] Where χ(k) is the odd control parameter in the k-th iteration, χ1(k)≥1 is the parameter constraint condition, and sign(@) is the sign function.

[0037] Optionally, the safety constraints for fast frequency response control include energy storage generation capacity constraints, frequency deviation amplitude limits, and frequency change rate limits:

[0038] The energy storage power generation capacity constraint is:

[0039] Where, ΔP s,i Let ΔP be the power generation of the i-th energy storage unit, N be the number of energy storage units, and ΔP be the power output of the i-th energy storage unit. RFE As global backup power, This represents the upper limit of the power generation of the i-th energy storage power generation unit;

[0040] The frequency deviation amplitude limit constraint is: -Δf min ≤Δf≤Δf max ;

[0041] Where Δf is the frequency deviation, Δf min and Δf max These are the upper and lower bounds of the frequency deviation amplitude limit, respectively.

[0042] The frequency change rate constraint is:

[0043] in, R is the derivative of the frequency deviation, and R is the upper bound of the rate of change of frequency.

[0044] This invention provides a fast frequency response security control device under DoS attack, comprising:

[0045] The acquisition module is used to acquire the frequency deviation of the power system under a denial-of-service (DoS) attack.

[0046] The determination module is used to determine the target power for the energy storage system of the power system to participate in the fast frequency response based on the frequency deviation.

[0047] The partitioning module is used to divide the global reserve power of the energy storage system into positive reserve power, attack and runaway power, and odd reserve power. Positive reserve power represents the actual effective output power of the energy storage system, attack and runaway power represents the power generation of the energy storage system that is uncontrollable due to a DoS attack, and odd reserve power represents the redundant reserve power used to make up for the shortfall in attack and runaway power.

[0048] The iterative decomposition module is used to take the positive reserve power equal to the power deficit caused by load disturbance as the control objective. It iteratively decomposes the positive reserve power, the attack runaway power, and the odd reserve power through a proportional coefficient to obtain the target value of the positive reserve power for the energy storage system to participate in the fast frequency response. The proportional coefficient of the odd reserve power is updated iteratively based on the target power and the positive reserve power.

[0049] The control module is used to control the energy storage system based on the positive and standby power target values, so that the power system can complete frequency restoration.

[0050] This invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the aforementioned fast frequency response security control method under DoS attacks.

[0051] The present invention provides a computer device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the program, it implements the above-mentioned fast frequency response security control method under DoS attack.

[0052] The above-mentioned at least one technical solution adopted in this invention can achieve the following beneficial effects:

[0053] Because DoS attacks disrupt communication, traditional centralized control becomes ineffective. The method of this invention reduces reliance on communication by measuring frequency deviation and distributively adjusting global reserve power. By dividing and iteratively adjusting the global reserve power, the overall system stability can be maintained even when an attack causes some nodes to become uncontrollable. Specifically, this involves using positive reserve power to cover major deficits, attack-induced power to handle additional fluctuations caused by the attack, and odd reserve power as a supplement. This layered approach enhances the system's robustness, enabling it to maintain frequency stability under DoS attacks and effectively solving the problem of rapid frequency response loss of power systems under DoS attacks. Attached Figure Description

[0054] The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of the invention and form part of this invention, illustrate exemplary embodiments of the invention and are used to explain the invention, but do not constitute an undue limitation of the invention. In the drawings:

[0055] Figure 1 This invention provides a flowchart illustrating a fast frequency response security control method under a DoS attack.

[0056] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of another fast frequency response security control method under DoS attack provided by the present invention;

[0057] Figure 3 A centralized odd-even safety control structure diagram provided by the present invention;

[0058] Figure 4 This invention provides a schematic diagram of the dynamic evolution of reserve power under a centralized odd-normal control strategy.

[0059] Figure 5 This is a comparison chart of the frequency deviation between the method of this invention and the traditional method;

[0060] Figure 6 A load disturbance diagram of a power system provided by the present invention;

[0061] Figure 7 A schematic diagram illustrating the changes of target power, positive, runaway, and odd reserve power over time, provided by the present invention;

[0062] Figure 8 A schematic diagram illustrating the change of odd control parameters over time, provided by the present invention;

[0063] Figure 9This is a schematic diagram of a fast frequency response security control device under DoS attack provided by the present invention;

[0064] Figure 10 This is a schematic diagram of a computer device for implementing a fast frequency response security control method under DoS attacks, as provided by the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0065] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the technical solutions of this invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with specific embodiments and corresponding drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of this invention, and not all of them. Based on the embodiments of this invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this invention.

[0066] Traditional DoS attack time-related impact mechanisms have not elucidated the vulnerability of frequency control systems, lack consideration for the dynamic characteristics of the physical layer of new power systems, and fail to fundamentally reflect the impact on frequency security. Furthermore, research on the rapid frequency response control problem of energy storage under network attacks is limited, and no studies have yet addressed the stability analysis and defense design of rapid frequency response control systems under DoS attacks.

[0067] Based on this, the present invention provides a fast frequency response security control method, device and medium under DoS attack, which can solve the problem of power runaway under fast frequency response of power system under DoS attack.

[0068] The technical solutions provided by the various embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0069] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of a fast frequency response security control method under a DoS attack according to the present invention, which specifically includes the following steps:

[0070] S101, obtain the frequency deviation of the power system under a denial-of-service (DoS) attack.

[0071] Obtaining the frequency deviation of the power system under a denial-of-service (DoS) attack includes: obtaining the frequency deviation through sampling and transmission via a wide-area measurement system.

[0072] S102, based on the frequency deviation, determine the target power for the energy storage system of the power system to participate in fast frequency regulation.

[0073] Among these, a fast frequency response system model can be constructed based on the oscillation equation:

[0074]

[0075] Where Δf is the frequency deviation. Let ΔP be the derivative of the frequency deviation, M and D represent the equivalent inertia and equivalent damping coefficients, respectively. D ΔP L These represent the standby power and the power deficit caused by load disturbances, respectively.

[0076] In one embodiment, the safety constraints of fast frequency response control include energy storage generation capacity constraints, frequency deviation amplitude limits, and frequency change rate limits.

[0077] The energy storage power generation capacity constraint is: Where, ΔP s,i Let ΔP be the power generation of the i-th energy storage unit, N be the number of energy storage units, and ΔP be the power output of the i-th energy storage unit. RFE As global backup power, This represents the upper limit of the power generation of the i-th energy storage power generation unit.

[0078] The frequency deviation amplitude limit constraint is: -Δf min ≤Δf≤Δf max Where Δf is the frequency deviation, Δf min and Δf max These are the upper and lower bounds of the frequency deviation amplitude limit, respectively.

[0079] The frequency change rate constraint is: in, R is the derivative of the frequency deviation, and R is the upper bound of the rate of change of frequency.

[0080] Furthermore, the impact of DoS attacks on the physical layer power output of the power system is analyzed. It is described as an increase in the uncontrollable constraint of the power system's reserve power. Specifically, the DoS attack intrudes into the communication network between the power system's control center and the energy storage power station, causing the loss of fast frequency response control commands, resulting in the energy storage system becoming uncontrollable and unable to provide the preset power output to support frequency recovery.

[0081] Optionally, the fast frequency response safety control strategy employs a proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control law. Therefore, based on the frequency deviation, the target power for the energy storage system to participate in the fast frequency response is determined, including: substituting the frequency deviation into the proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control law to obtain the target frequency; the proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control law is as follows:

[0082]

[0083] Where, ΔP R Let Δf be the target power and Δf be the frequency deviation. K is the derivative of the frequency deviation. PFor proportional control of gain, K D For derivative-controlled gain, K I This is for integral control gain.

[0084] S103 divides the global reserve power of the energy storage system into positive reserve power, attack runaway power, and odd reserve power.

[0085] Among them, positive reserve power represents the actual effective output power of the energy storage system, attack runaway power represents the power generation of the uncontrollable energy storage system caused by a DoS attack, and extra reserve power represents the redundant reserve power used to make up for the shortfall in attack runaway power.

[0086] Optionally, the global reserve power of the energy storage system is divided into positive reserve power, attack / runaway power, and odd reserve power, including: dividing the global reserve power into positive reserve power, attack / runaway power, and odd reserve power according to a preset division ratio; the relationship between the global reserve power and the positive reserve power, attack / runaway power, and odd reserve power is as follows:

[0087] ΔP RFE =ΔP D +ΔP S +ΔP I (3)

[0088] Where, ΔP RFE For global reserve power, ΔP D For positive reserve power, ΔP S For attacking runaway power, ΔP I Reserve power.

[0089] For example, the proportions of positive reserve power, attack failure power, and odd reserve power can be determined according to actual needs. For instance, if the proportion of positive reserve power is 30%, the proportion of attack failure power is 50%, and the proportion of odd reserve power is 20%, then 30% of the global reserve power will be used as positive reserve power, 50% of the global reserve power will be used as attack failure power, and 20% of the global reserve power will be used as odd reserve power.

[0090] S104 takes the positive reserve power equal to the power deficit caused by load disturbance as the control objective. Iteratively decomposes the positive reserve power, attack runaway power, and odd reserve power through the proportional coefficient to obtain the target value of positive reserve power for the energy storage system to participate in fast frequency response. The proportional coefficient of odd reserve power is updated iteratively based on the target power and the positive reserve power.

[0091] In one embodiment, the proportionality coefficient includes attack parameters for positive reserve power, frontal defense parameters for attack runaway power, and odd control parameters for odd reserve power. With the control objective of positive reserve power equal to the power deficit caused by load disturbance, the positive reserve power, attack runaway power, and odd reserve power are iteratively decomposed using the proportionality coefficient to obtain the target value of positive reserve power for the energy storage system to participate in rapid frequency response. This includes: in each iteration, decomposing the positive reserve power of the current iteration into first output power and slip-through power using the attack parameters; decomposing the attack runaway power of the current iteration into over-constraint power and recovery power using the frontal defense parameters; and decomposing the odd reserve power of the current iteration into reserve power and second output power using the odd control parameters. The first output power and second output power are used as the positive reserve power of the next iteration, the over-constraint power and slip-through power are used as the attack runaway power of the next iteration, and the recovery power and reserve power are used as the odd reserve power of the next iteration. When the positive reserve power equals the disturbance power deficit, the positive reserve power of the corresponding iteration is determined as the target value of positive reserve power for the energy storage system to participate in rapid frequency response.

[0092] The decomposition formulas for positive reserve power, attack runaway power, and odd reserve power are as follows:

[0093]

[0094] Where, ΔP RFE (k) represents the global reserve power at the k-th iteration, ΔP D (k), ΔP S (k), ΔP I (k) represents the positive reserve power, attack failure power, and odd reserve power at the k-th iteration, respectively, ΔP D (k+1), ΔP S (k+1), ΔP I (k+1) represent the positive reserve power, attack failure power, and odd reserve power at the (k+1)th iteration, respectively, and 1-α k Indicates the attack parameters, 1-β k Let χ(k) represent the frontal defense parameters, and let χ(k) be the odd control parameter at the k-th iteration.

[0095] Among them, the first output power refers to the actual generated power, the power of the missed attack refers to the power of the power unit not responding due to the interruption of scheduling communication under the DoS attack, the over-constraint power refers to the zero reserve power that is regarded by the fast frequency response system because the reserve power measurement information is not available under the DoS attack, the recovery power refers to the power that the out-of-control power is restored to controllable after the DoS attack ends, the reserve power refers to the power that is kept in reserve to defend against potential attacks, and the second output power refers to the actual generated power for defending against attacks.

[0096] The above iterative process can be viewed as a dynamic evolution process of positive-offensive-short-reserve power. Based on the above evolutionary decomposition, one-step iteration re-aggregates the decomposed power into a new state of reserve power. The ultimate control objective is to achieve active power balance under safety and stability constraints, that is, the positive reserve power output equals the power deficit ΔP caused by load disturbance. D (n)=ΔP L .

[0097] Optionally, the update method for the odd control parameter includes: for any iteration of the odd control parameter, if the target power is 0, then the odd control parameter for the current iteration is determined to be 0; if the target power is not 0, then a candidate odd control parameter is determined based on the target power and the reserve power for the current iteration; if the candidate odd control parameter satisfies the parameter constraint conditions, then the candidate odd control parameter is determined as the odd control parameter for the current iteration; if the candidate odd control parameter does not satisfy the parameter constraint conditions, then the candidate odd control parameter is processed according to the sign function to obtain the odd control parameter for the current iteration.

[0098] The formula for calculating the candidate odd control parameter is as follows:

[0099] χ1(k)=δ||(ΔP R -ΔP D (k)) / ΔP R |,ΔP R ≠0 (5)

[0100] Where χ1(k) is the candidate odd control parameter in the k-th iteration, δ is the reduction factor, and ΔP R For the target power, ΔP D (k) represents the positive reserve power at the kth iteration;

[0101]

[0102] Where χ(k) is the odd control parameter in the k-th iteration, χ1(k)≥1 is the parameter constraint condition, and sign(·) is the sign function.

[0103] S105 controls the energy storage system by using the positive and standby power target value to enable the power system to complete frequency restoration.

[0104] Specifically, the target value of the positive and standby power is used as a control command to control the energy storage system to generate electricity, supporting the fast frequency response system to complete the frequency restoration of the power system.

[0105] In one exemplary embodiment, the present invention also provides a fast frequency response security control method under DoS attacks, such as... Figure 2 Specifically, it includes the following steps:

[0106] S201, Establish a fast frequency response control system model.

[0107] S202, Analysis of System Transient Frequency Security Constraints and the Impact of DoS Attacks.

[0108] S203 calculates the target power for the energy storage system to participate in rapid frequency response based on the frequency deviation measured by feedback and the PID control law.

[0109] S204 establishes a centralized Qizheng security controller based on the dynamic evolution of attack and defense.

[0110] Because DoS attacks cause power control to fail, the centralized Qizheng security controller presets global backup power based on the target power and divides the globally perceptible backup power into positive backup power, attack-out-of-control power, and odd backup power units. The positive and odd backup powers are controlled by positive and odd control strategies, respectively. Under a DoS attack, power scheduling commands or backup power status measurement signals become unavailable, causing some backup power to degrade into uncontrollable backup power. For the positive backup power for which control commands cannot be obtained, the odd backup power is activated. Through attack and defense simulations, the stable odd backup power output required under a certain attack condition is obtained to compensate for the insufficient positive backup power caused by the attack-out-of-control power.

[0111] The dynamic evolution process of centralized odd-even attack and defense can be modeled as a class of time-varying discrete difference equations, as shown in formula (4).

[0112] S205, Establish a method for solving odd-normal control parameters.

[0113] The method of this invention includes: First, from the perspective of power generation unit space, revealing the impact mechanism of uncontrollable DoS attacks on physical layer power units, and quantitatively characterizing its dynamic process in relation to positive and odd control. Second, proposing an odd-positive control method with a binary structure, which, unlike the univariate elastic load frequency control method that balances asymptotic stability and global disturbance suppression performance, offers flexibility in responding to DoS attack disturbances, thus helping to ensure the transient frequency security performance of new power systems.

[0114] like Figure 3 As shown, Figure 3 This is a structural diagram of a centralized Qizheng safety control system. The frequency dynamics of the fast frequency response control system are quantified by an oscillation equation. Under load disturbances and the influence of low system inertia, the oscillation equation outputs a frequency deviation, which is fed back to the centralized Qizheng control center. Based on the interaction between the centralized Qizheng control center and the energy storage system providing fast frequency support, and considering the uncontrollable power mechanism caused by attacks, the Qizheng reserve power output is dynamically adjusted according to the Qizheng reserve power dynamic equation to ensure power balance and make the frequency deviation meet transient safety constraints.

[0115] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the dynamic evolution of reserve power under a centralized odd-positive control strategy. The blue sphere RFE represents the global reserve power ΔP. RFE The white ball represents the positive reserve power ΔP. D (Simplified as D in the diagram), the red ball represents the runaway power ΔP under a DoS attack. S (Simplified as S in the diagram), black represents the odd reserve power ΔP I (Simplified as I in the diagram). Under the influence of the positive control strategy and the DoS attack strategy, the dynamic evolution process of reserve power is described as follows: the positive reserve power increases by a ratio α. k Decomposed into output power and runaway power, where output power refers to the actual generated power, and runaway power refers to the power unit's failure to respond due to scheduling communication interruption under a DoS attack; runaway power is expressed as a percentage β. k Decomposed into over-constrained power and recovery power, where over-constrained power refers to the power being considered zero by the fast frequency response control system because reserve power measurement information is unavailable under attack, and recovery power refers to the power returning to controllability after the DoS attack ends; odd reserve power is expressed as a percentage of χ. k The power is decomposed into reserve power and output power. Reserve power refers to the power maintained in a standby state to defend against potential attacks, while output power refers to the actual power generated to defend against attacks. Based on the above evolutionary decomposition, the decomposed power is re-aggregated into a new state of reserve power. The ultimate control objective is to achieve active power balance under the constraint of safety and stability, that is, the global positive reserve power output of energy storage equals the disturbance power deficit ΔP. D =ΔP L .

[0116] The effectiveness of the method of the present invention will be verified by taking a specific power system as a numerical simulation example.

[0117] First, set the simulation time to 100s, the sampling period to 0.001s, and the initial frequency deviation Δf(0) = 0.001. The equations for the wide-area closed-loop fast frequency response control system are as follows:

[0118]

[0119] The frequency deviation can be obtained through simulation, such as Figure 5 As shown, the blue trajectory is the trajectory diagram of the method of this invention, and the red trajectory is the trajectory diagram of the traditional control method, that is, only one-dimensional positive control. By comparison, it is found that the present invention has better transient performance and safer frequency deviation performance. Therefore, compared with traditional control, the odd-positive control result is superior, and the load disturbance ΔP L Set as a step disturbance Figure 6 As shown.

[0120] The centralized control center of the fast frequency response system uses a PID control law to calculate the target power of energy storage participating in fast frequency regulation. like Figure 7 As shown by the red curve in the upper middle section of the graph.

[0121] The aforementioned frequency system must meet the following power generation capacity and transient frequency safety constraints: Energy storage power generation capacity constraint: ΔP RFE =ΔP D +ΔP S +ΔP I =1.2ΔP R ,|ΔP D |≤0.03,|ΔP S |≤0.03,|ΔP I |≤0.03, Frequency deviation amplitude safety constraint: -0.02≤Δf≤0.02, Rate of change of frequency (RoCoF) safety constraint:

[0122] Centralized odd-positive controller initial state ΔP Dc (1)=0.1ΔP RFE ΔP Sc (1) = 0.4ΔP RFE ΔP Ic (1) = 0.5ΔP RFE The dynamic iteration process is as follows:

[0123]

[0124] In formula (8), the update rule for the odd standby power control parameters and the simulation results are as follows: Figure 8 As shown.

[0125]

[0126] The above calculation result u d (t)=ΔP Dc (30), u s (t)=ΔP Sc (30), u i (t)=ΔP Ic (30) will be used as the control input for the energy storage power generation result, generating positive reserve power, runaway power under attack, and extra reserve power, such as Figure 7 As shown, due to the attack causing the reserve power to run out of control, the positive reserve power is less than the power deficit caused by the load disturbance, i.e., the target power. At this time, the odd reserve power is converted into positive reserve power according to the design ratio to make up for the deficiency of positive reserve power and finally achieve active power balance.

[0127]

[0128] The simulation results show that when a DoS attack causes the backup power to run out of control, the backup power is used as a physical layer defense measure by iterative calculation through a centralized odd-positive controller to actively eliminate the impact of the attack, so that the transient frequency deviation of the power system can be quickly restored and meet the safety constraints.

[0129] When applying the fast frequency response security control method under DoS attack provided by this invention, it is not necessary to... Figure 1 The steps shown are executed in sequence. The specific execution order of each step can be determined as needed, and this invention does not impose any restrictions on it.

[0130] The above describes a fast frequency response security control method under DoS attacks provided by one or more embodiments of the present invention. Based on the same idea, the present invention also provides a corresponding fast frequency response security control device under DoS attacks, such as... Figure 9 As shown.

[0131] Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of a fast frequency response security control device under a DoS attack provided by the present invention. The device 900 includes:

[0132] The acquisition module 901 is used to acquire the frequency deviation of the power system under a denial-of-service (DoS) attack.

[0133] The determination module 902 is used to determine the target power of the energy storage system of the power system to participate in the fast frequency response based on the frequency deviation.

[0134] The partitioning module 903 is used to divide the global reserve power of the energy storage system into positive reserve power, attack-induced uncontrolled power, and odd reserve power. Positive reserve power represents the actual effective output power of the energy storage system, attack-induced uncontrolled power represents the power generation of the energy storage system that is uncontrollable due to a DoS attack, and odd reserve power represents the redundant reserve power used to compensate for the loss of attack-induced uncontrolled power.

[0135] The iterative decomposition module 904 is used to take the positive reserve power equal to the power deficit caused by load disturbance as the control target, and to iteratively decompose the positive reserve power, the attack runaway power and the odd reserve power through the proportional coefficient to obtain the target value of the positive reserve power for the energy storage system to participate in the fast frequency response; the proportional coefficient of the odd reserve power is updated iteratively based on the target power and the positive reserve power.

[0136] The control module 905 is used to control the energy storage system by using the positive and standby power target values ​​to enable the power system to complete frequency restoration.

[0137] Specific limitations regarding the fast frequency response security control device under DoS attacks can be found in the above description of the fast frequency response security control method under DoS attacks, and will not be repeated here. Each module in the aforementioned fast frequency response security control device under DoS attacks can be implemented entirely or partially through software, hardware, or a combination thereof. These modules can be embedded in or independent of the processor in the computer device in hardware form, or stored in the memory of the computer device in software form, so that the processor can call and execute the corresponding operations of each module.

[0138] The present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that can be used to execute the above-described... Figure 1 Provides a fast frequency response security control method for DoS attacks.

[0139] The present invention also provides Figure 10 The schematic diagram of the computer device shown is as follows: Figure 10 As shown, at the hardware level, this computer device includes a processor, internal bus, network interface, memory, and non-volatile memory, and may also include other hardware required for business operations. The processor reads the corresponding computer program from the non-volatile memory into memory and then executes it to achieve the above. Figure 1 Provides a fast frequency response security control method for DoS attacks.

[0140] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the methods described above. Any references to memory, storage, databases, or other media used in the embodiments provided by this invention can include at least one of non-volatile and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory, or optical storage, etc. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM can be in various forms, such as static random access memory (SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (DRAM), etc.

[0141] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined in any way. For the sake of brevity, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this invention.

Claims

1. A fast frequency response security control method under DoS attack, characterized in that, The method comprises the following steps: acquiring a frequency deviation of a power system under a denial of service (DoS) attack; determining a target power of a storage system of the power system participating in a fast frequency response according to the frequency deviation; dividing a global backup power of the storage system into positive backup power, attack out-of-control power and odd backup power; the positive backup power represents an actually effective output power of the storage system, the attack out-of-control power represents a power generated by the storage system that is uncontrollable due to the DoS attack, and the odd backup power represents a redundant backup power used to make up for a deficiency of the attack out-of-control power; taking the positive backup power equal to a power deficiency caused by a load disturbance as a control target, and iteratively decomposing the positive backup power, the attack out-of-control power and the odd backup power through a proportional coefficient to obtain a target value of the positive backup power of the storage system participating in the fast frequency response; a proportional coefficient of the odd backup power is iteratively updated according to the target power and the positive backup power; controlling the storage system through the target value of the positive backup power to enable the power system to complete frequency recovery; wherein the proportional coefficient comprises an attack parameter of the positive backup power, a positive defense parameter of the attack out-of-control power and an odd control parameter of the odd backup power; taking the positive backup power equal to the power deficiency caused by the load disturbance as the control target, and iteratively decomposing the positive backup power, the attack out-of-control power and the odd backup power through the proportional coefficient to obtain the target value of the positive backup power of the storage system participating in the fast frequency response comprises: in each iteration process, decomposing the positive backup power of the current iteration time into a first output power and a step-out power through the attack parameter, decomposing the attack out-of-control power of the current iteration time into an over-constrained power and a recovery power through the positive defense parameter, and decomposing the odd backup power of the current iteration time into a backup power and a second output power through the odd control parameter; and taking a sum of the first output power and the second output power as the positive backup power of the next iteration time, taking a sum of the over-constrained power and the step-out power as the attack out-of-control power of the next iteration time, and taking a sum of the recovery power and the backup power as the odd backup power of the next iteration time; in a case where the positive backup power is equal to the power deficiency caused by the load disturbance, determining the positive backup power of the corresponding iteration time as the target value of the positive backup power of the storage system participating in the fast frequency response; wherein the first output power refers to an actually completed power generation, the step-out power refers to a power unit that does not respond due to a dispatch communication interruption under the DoS attack; the over-constrained power refers to zero backup power considered by the fast frequency response control in a case where backup power measurement information is not available under the DoS attack, the recovery power refers to controllable power of the out-of-control power after the DoS attack ends; the backup power refers to power kept in a backup state for defense against potential attacks, and the second output power refers to actual power generation for defense against attacks.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The method further comprises the following steps: substituting the frequency deviation into a proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control law to obtain a target frequency; the PID control law is as follows: ； wherein, is a target power, is a frequency deviation, is a frequency deviation derivative, is a proportional control gain, is a derivative control gain, is an integral control gain.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein, The global backup power of the energy storage system is divided into positive backup power, attack runaway power and odd backup power, including: The global backup power is divided into positive backup power, attack runaway power and odd backup power according to a preset division ratio; the relationship between the global backup power and the positive backup power, the attack runaway power and the odd backup power is: ； wherein, is a global reserve power, is a positive reserve power, is an attack run-away power, is an odd reserve power.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein, The decomposition formula of the positive backup power, the attack runaway power and the odd backup power is: ； wherein is the global reserve power at the first iteration, is the global reserve power at the first iteration, is the positive reserve power, the attack runaway power and the odd reserve power at the first iteration, respectively, is the positive reserve power, the attack runaway power and the odd reserve power at the first iteration, respectively, is the positive reserve power, the attack runaway power and the odd reserve power at the first iteration, respectively, is the positive reserve power, the attack runaway power and the odd reserve power at the first iteration, respectively, denotes the attack parameter, denotes the positive defense parameter, is the odd control parameter at the first iteration, is the odd control parameter at the first iteration.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein, The updating mode of the odd control parameter includes: For any iteration of the odd control parameter, if the target power is 0, it is determined that the odd control parameter of the current iteration is 0; If the target power is not 0, the candidate odd control parameter is determined according to the target power and the backup power of the current iteration; In the case that the candidate odd control parameter meets the parameter constraint condition, the candidate odd control parameter is determined as the odd control parameter of the current iteration; In the case that the candidate odd control parameter does not meet the parameter constraint condition, the candidate odd control parameter is processed according to the sign function to obtain the odd control parameter of the current iteration.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein, The calculation formula of the candidate odd control parameter is: ； wherein is the candidate odd control parameter at the th iteration, is the reduction factor, is the target power, is the positive reserve power at the th iteration; ； wherein is the first iteration, is the odd control parameter at the n-th iteration, is the parameter constraint condition, is the sign function.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein, The safety constraints of the fast frequency response control include energy storage power generation capacity constraints, frequency deviation amplitude limit constraints and frequency change rate limit constraints: The energy storage generation capacity constraint is: ; wherein, is the power generation of the th energy storage power generation unit, is the number of energy storage power generation units, is the global backup power, is the power generation upper limit of the th energy storage power generation unit; The frequency deviation amplitude limit constraint is: ; wherein is a frequency deviation amount, and are respectively a frequency deviation amplitude limit lower and upper bound; The frequency change rate limit constraint is: ; wherein, is the derivative of the frequency deviation, is the upper bound of the frequency change rate limit.

8. A fast frequency response security control device under DoS attack, characterized by, The device is used to implement the method of any one of claims 1-7, and the device includes: An acquisition module is configured to acquire a frequency deviation amount of a power system under a denial of service (DoS) attack. A determination module is configured to determine a target power of an energy storage system of the power system participating in fast frequency response according to the frequency deviation amount. A division module is configured to divide global backup power of the energy storage system into positive backup power, attack runaway power and odd backup power; the positive backup power represents actually effective output power of the energy storage system, the attack runaway power represents power generated by the uncontrollable energy storage system caused by the DoS attack, and the odd backup power represents redundant backup power used to make up for the shortage of the attack runaway power. An iterative decomposition module is configured to take the positive backup power equal to a power shortage caused by load disturbance as a control target, and perform iterative decomposition on the positive backup power, the attack runaway power and the odd backup power through a proportionality coefficient to obtain a target value of the positive backup power of the energy storage system participating in fast frequency response; the proportionality coefficient of the odd backup power is updated according to the target power and the positive backup power. A control module is configured to control the energy storage system through the target value of the positive backup power, so that the power system completes frequency recovery.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The storage medium stores a computer program, and the computer program is executed by a processor to implement the method of any one of claims 1-7. The storage medium stores a computer program, and the computer program is executed by a processor to implement the method of any one of claims 1-7.

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