Anti-tracking camouflage method, system and terminal for intelligent circulation box

Abstract

The present application relates to an anti-tracking camouflage method, system and terminal for an intelligent flow box, belonging to the technical field of intelligent flow boxes. The anti-tracking camouflage method includes: using the commercial cryptographic algorithm SM4 to generate a dynamic key K, and setting the validity period of the dynamic key K; splitting the dynamic key K into n segments according to the bandwidth limit of the Beidou message, with each segment length not exceeding 40 bytes; embedding a set protocol header in each key segment, mixing it into a Wi-Fi beacon frame or Bluetooth broadcast packet, and generating a Beidou message for transmission; obtaining the actual validity period of the dynamic key K in real time; judging whether the actual validity period is greater than the set validity period; if so, sending a key invalidation erase instruction. The present application has the beneficial effect of effectively preventing the key from being tracked and cracked, and improving the security and reliability of the intelligent flow box.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of smart flow boxes, and in particular to an anti-tracking camouflage method, system and terminal for smart flow boxes. Background Art

[0002] In the prior art, confidential documents are typically delivered by placing the document (e.g., a letter) in a sealed envelope. The envelope is then labeled with basic delivery information, such as the sender / receiver, information sensitivity level, delivery deadline, and letter number, and then sealed with a sealing strip. However, this packaging method has significant drawbacks: The paper envelopes lack security and confidentiality, and are less resistant to external attacks and sabotage. Furthermore, the security of the delivery process relies heavily on the confidentiality awareness and self-discipline of the delivery personnel, making human negligence a potential risk of information leakage.

[0003] To address the shortcomings of sealed document packaging and effectively improve document security, smart transport boxes are now being used for document transportation. These portable containers are encrypted and controlled in the cloud (using commercial cryptographic technology) via a management platform. While these smart transport boxes utilize encryption, these encryption methods often rely on static keys, making them susceptible to tracking and remote hacking during transportation. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In order to effectively prevent the key from being tracked and cracked and to improve the security and reliability of the smart flow box, the present application provides an anti-tracking and camouflage method, system and terminal for the smart flow box.

[0005] In the first aspect, the present application provides an anti-tracking camouflage method, system, and terminal for a smart flow box, which adopts the following technical solutions:

[0006] An anti-tracking camouflage method for a smart flow box, comprising:

[0007] The commercial cryptographic algorithm SM4 is used to generate a dynamic key K and set the validity period of the dynamic key K; the dynamic key K , is the UTC timestamp, It is the unique identifier of the smart flow box. It is a 16-bit random number;

[0008] Split the dynamic key K into n segments according to the bandwidth limit of the Beidou message, with each segment length not exceeding 40 bytes;

[0009] Embed the set protocol header in each key segment, mix it into the Wi-Fi beacon frame or Bluetooth broadcast packet, and generate a Beidou message for transmission;

[0010] Obtaining the actual validity period of the dynamic key K in real time;

[0011] Determine whether the actual validity period is greater than the set validity period;

[0012] If yes, send a key invalidation erase command.

[0013] By implementing the above technical solution, a dynamic key K is generated using the commercial cryptographic algorithm SM4, which inherently offers high security and attack resistance. The use of dynamic keys eliminates the risk of static keys being easily cracked. Even if an attacker were to obtain the key at a given moment, the key would become invalid after its validity period due to its dynamic nature, significantly improving the security of information transmission within the smart box. The dynamic key K is split into n segments and encapsulated within a protocol header, fragmenting the key during transmission. This approach makes it more difficult for an attacker to obtain the complete and valid key, as they must simultaneously obtain all segments and identify the correct protocol header to recover the complete key. This effectively prevents the key from being intercepted and cracked in its entirety. The actual validity period of the dynamic key K is obtained in real time and compared to the set validity period. If the actual validity period exceeds the set validity period, a key expiration and erasure command is sent, ensuring the key's timeliness and promptly removing expired keys, further enhancing the security and reliability of the smart box.

[0014] Optionally, the steps before sending a Beidou message include:

[0015] After integration into Beidou messages, obtain the environmental noise power;

[0016] Inputting the environmental noise power into the constructed frequency band selection formula to obtain the carrier frequency of the Beidou message;

[0017] The frequency band selection formula is: , is the carrier frequency, is the fundamental frequency, The channel spacing is 20MHz. is the ambient noise power, The noise threshold is -85dBm.

[0018] By adopting this technical solution, by obtaining the ambient noise power and dynamically selecting the Beidou message carrier frequency based on this power, key information can be better hidden in the ambient noise, reducing the probability of being monitored and tracked. Furthermore, different carrier frequencies can adapt to different environments, enhancing the anti-interference capability of key transmission and ensuring reliable key transmission in complex electromagnetic environments.

[0019] Optionally, the anti-tracking camouflage method further includes:

[0020] When transporting smart flow boxes, detect the characteristic frequencies of surrounding equipment;

[0021] determining a device type according to the characteristic frequency;

[0022] When the characteristic frequency corresponding to the device type reaches the interference condition, transmitting a composite wave to interfere;

[0023] The interference condition is: the characteristic frequency , M is the total number of device types, is the characteristic frequency band set of Class C equipment, is the signal power spectral density, is the ambient noise floor, The signal-to-noise ratio threshold related to the device type.

[0024] By adopting the above technical solution, for some devices that may steal information during transportation, by interfering with their characteristic frequencies, the signal characteristics obtained by the tracking device can be destroyed, making it difficult for the tracker to accurately determine the location and transportation status of the smart flow box, and preventing the communication information between the flow box and the outside world from being intercepted or tampered with.

[0025] Optionally, the composite wave , is the interference amplitude of each physical field, is the total radiated power limit, is the bandwidth of each interference signal; is the carrier center frequency, , is the frequency jitter, is the change value of environmental noise power; is the phase modulation function, is the frequency modulation slope; is the convolution modulation operator, n represents the index number of the pulse, is an ideal pulse of unit amplitude, is the pulse repetition interval.

[0026] Optionally, the anti-tracking camouflage method further includes:

[0027] Get the real coordinates of the real location of the smart flow box;

[0028] generating a plurality of virtual trajectories according to the real coordinates;

[0029] Calculating a path confusion value of each of the virtual trajectories;

[0030] Selecting the virtual trajectory with the smallest path confusion value as the optimal confusion trajectory;

[0031] Get a dynamic transmission time interval, the dynamic transmission time interval , is the average number of Beidou message transmissions per unit time, is the basic value of Beidou message transmission per unit time, ;

[0032] An optimal obfuscated trajectory is sent according to the dynamic transmission time interval.

[0033] By employing this technical solution, the real coordinates of the intelligent transfer box's actual location are obtained and multiple virtual tracks are generated, significantly confusing the tracker's vision. The optimal obfuscated track is selected and transmitted, further strengthening the protection of the transfer box's true location. The optimal obfuscated track closely mimics the characteristics of the real track, misleading the tracker into believing it is the real track, thereby diverting attention from the actual transfer box location and providing strong protection for the transfer box's safe transportation. However, transmitting the optimal obfuscated track at a dynamic transmission time interval further disrupts the tracker's tracking efforts. The dynamic time interval makes it difficult for the tracker to predict the transmission time of the track information, making it impossible to establish a stable tracking model.

[0034] Optionally, the step of generating multiple virtual tracks according to the real coordinates includes:

[0035] Retrieve the disturbance radius;

[0036] Generate a first virtual coordinate according to the real coordinate and the disturbance radius;

[0037] Taking the first virtual coordinate as a base point and according to a set offset radius, a plurality of second virtual coordinates are generated;

[0038] generating a corresponding virtual trajectory according to the first virtual coordinate and a plurality of the second virtual coordinates;

[0039] The first virtual coordinate , M is the real coordinate, R is the perturbation radius, N is the perturbation order, represents the random direction angle of the k-th order disturbance component.

[0040] By adopting the above technical solution, determining the perturbation radius can introduce a certain range of variation on the basis of the real coordinates, thereby generating different virtual coordinates and further obtaining diversified virtual trajectories, thereby increasing the difficulty of tracking.

[0041] Optionally, the anti-tracking camouflage method further includes:

[0042] Before generating the first virtual coordinate, obtaining the current power of the composite wave interference;

[0043] Determining whether the current power is less than a set power threshold;

[0044] If not, adjusting the disturbance radius according to the current power;

[0045] The disturbance radius , SPL is the composite wave interference power.

[0046] By employing this technical solution, the system dynamically adjusts the perturbation radius based on the actual interference situation by obtaining the current power of the composite wave interference and comparing it with a set power threshold. When the composite wave interference power is high, it indicates strong external interference, making it easier for a tracker to break through the interference and obtain target information. Adjusting the perturbation radius based on the current power can expand the interference range, enhance the interference effect, and more effectively conceal the true target's location, thereby improving the success rate of anti-tracking.

[0047] In the second aspect, the present application provides an anti-tracking camouflage system for intelligent flow boxes, which adopts the following technical solutions:

[0048] An anti-tracking camouflage system for intelligent flow boxes, comprising:

[0049] The key generation module uses the commercial cryptographic algorithm SM4 to generate a dynamic key K and sets the validity period of the dynamic key K; the dynamic key , is the UTC timestamp, It is the unique identifier of the smart flow box. It is a 16-bit random number;

[0050] The key processing and sending module is used to split the dynamic key K into n segments according to the bandwidth limit of the Beidou message, with each segment length not exceeding 40 bytes; and embed a set protocol header in each segment of the key, mix it into the Wi-Fi beacon frame or Bluetooth broadcast packet, and generate a Beidou message for transmission;

[0051] A duration acquisition module, used to obtain the actual validity period of the dynamic key K in real time;

[0052] A judgment module, used to judge whether the actual validity period is greater than the set validity period;

[0053] The instruction sending module is used to send the key invalidation erasure instruction.

[0054] In a third aspect, the present application provides a terminal that adopts the following technical solution:

[0055] A terminal, comprising:

[0056] A memory storing an anti-tracking disguise program of the intelligent transfer box;

[0057] The processor is used to execute the program stored in the memory to implement the steps of the anti-tracking camouflage method for the above-mentioned intelligent flow box.

[0058] In summary, this application has at least the following beneficial effects:

[0059] The dynamic key K is generated using the commercial cryptographic algorithm SM4, which inherently offers high security and anti-attack capabilities. The use of dynamic keys eliminates the risk of static keys being easily cracked. Even if an attacker were to obtain the key at a given moment, the key would become invalid after its expiration date due to its dynamic nature, significantly improving the security of information transmission within the smart box. The dynamic key K is split into n segments and encapsulated within a protocol header, fragmenting the key during transmission. This approach makes it more difficult for attackers to obtain the complete and valid key, as they must simultaneously obtain all segments and identify the correct protocol header to recover the complete key. This effectively prevents the key from being intercepted and cracked in its entirety. The actual expiration date of the dynamic key K is obtained in real time and compared with the set expiration date. If the actual expiration date exceeds the set expiration date, a key expiration and erasure command is sent, ensuring the key's timeliness and promptly removing expired keys, further enhancing the security and reliability of the smart box. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0060] Figure 1 This is a first flow chart of an embodiment of the method of the present application;

[0061] Figure 2 This is a second flow chart of the method embodiment of the present application;

[0062] Figure 3 This is a third flow chart of the method embodiment of the present application;

[0063] Figure 4 This is the fourth flow chart of the method embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0064] To make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the following will be combined with the appended drawings of the embodiments of the present invention. Figure 1 -Attached Figure 4 The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention are clearly and completely described. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of them. All other embodiments derived by persons of ordinary skill in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0065] The first embodiment of the present application discloses an anti-tracking camouflage method for a smart flow box. Figure 1As an implementation of the anti-tracking disguise method, the anti-tracking disguise method may include S110-S160:

[0066] S110, using commercial cryptographic algorithm SM4 to generate a dynamic key K and setting a validity period for the dynamic key K;

[0067] S120: Split the dynamic key K into n segments according to the bandwidth limit of the Beidou message, with each segment length not exceeding 40 bytes;

[0068] S130: embed a set protocol header in each key segment, mix it into a Wi-Fi beacon frame or Bluetooth broadcast packet, and integrate it into a Beidou message for transmission;

[0069] S140, obtaining the actual validity period of the dynamic key K in real time;

[0070] S150, determining whether the actual validity period is greater than the set validity period;

[0071] S160: If yes, send a key invalidation and erasure instruction.

[0072] Specifically, the dynamic key , is the UTC timestamp, It is the unique identifier of the smart flow box. A 16-bit random number.

[0073] The current UTC timestamp can be obtained using system-provided time functions, such as the server's built-in time acquisition function. Each smart flow box is assigned a unique identifier, which can be numbers, letters, or a combination. This identifier can be assigned during production or initialization and recorded in the system database. A 16-bit random number can be generated using a random number generator. A secure random number generation algorithm, such as the random number generation function provided by the operating system, can be used to ensure randomness and security. The obtained UTC timestamp, smart flow box unique identifier, and 16-bit random number are concatenated in a specific order. For example, the order can be "UTC timestamp - smart flow box unique identifier - 16-bit random number" to form a string to be encrypted. The concatenated string is converted into a byte array suitable for SM4 processing. For example, UTF-8 encoding can be used to ensure data consistency and compatibility. A fixed SM4 key is then selected, with a key length of 128 bits (16 bytes). The pre-processed byte array is encrypted using the selected SM4 key. During the encryption process, the byte array is grouped into 16-byte groups, and each group of data is encrypted. After the encryption is completed, the encryption result is the dynamic key K.

[0074] Validity period of the dynamic key K , D is the transport mileage. For S120, the splitting method can be:

[0075] Split the dynamic key K into n segments according to bandwidth limitation , i is the segment number, L is the maximum length of a single segment, and L is no more than 40 bytes. A set protocol header (e.g., header identifier "33" + CRC16 checksum) is embedded in each segment, which is then mixed into a Wi-Fi beacon frame or Bluetooth broadcast packet to form a Beidou message and send it to the smart transfer box management and control platform. Timing begins the moment the Beidou message is sent. When the total time (actual validity period) exceeds the set validity period, a key expiration and erasure instruction is sent to the management and control platform to erase the dynamic key K. If the smart transfer box is still in transit and has not arrived at the handover location, a new dynamic key K is regenerated and steps S110-S130 are re-executed.

[0076] Furthermore, before sending a BeiDou message, the ambient noise power can be obtained through the RF receiving device, and then the ambient noise power can be input into the pre-built frequency band selection formula to obtain the carrier frequency of the BeiDou message. The frequency band selection formula is: , is the carrier frequency, is the fundamental frequency, The channel spacing is 20MHz. is the ambient noise power, The noise threshold is -85dBm.

[0077] In addition, when the dynamic key K is split, the maximum length L of a single segment can be updated according to the environmental noise power. .

[0078] When the smart transfer box is transported, the anti-tracking disguise method can also include the following steps:

[0079] Detect the characteristic frequencies of surrounding devices and determine the device type based on the characteristic frequencies. When the characteristic frequencies corresponding to the device type reach the interference condition, a composite wave is emitted to interfere.

[0080] Interference conditions are: characteristic frequency , M is the total number of device types, is the characteristic frequency band set of Class C equipment, is the signal power spectral density, is the ambient noise floor, The signal-to-noise ratio threshold for the device type. For example, for a recording device 18KHz-22KHz, radio frequency equipment 2.4GHz-5.8GHz, infrared device 30KHz-50KHz; recording equipment 3dB, RF equipment 6dB, infrared equipment is 10dB.

[0081] Composite Wave , is the interference amplitude of each physical field, is the total radiated power limit, is the bandwidth of each interference signal; is the carrier center frequency, , is the frequency jitter, is the change value of environmental noise power; is the phase modulation function, is the frequency modulation slope; is the convolution modulation operator, n represents the index number of the pulse, is an ideal pulse of unit amplitude, is the pulse repetition interval. , It is the protection range of the civilian frequency band.

[0082] Reference Figure 2 During the transportation of the intelligent flow box, the anti-tracking disguise method may further include S210-S260:

[0083] S210, obtaining the real coordinates of the real position of the smart flow box;

[0084] S220, generating multiple virtual trajectories according to the real coordinates;

[0085] S230, calculating the path confusion value of each virtual trajectory;

[0086] S240, screening the virtual trajectory with the smallest path confusion value as the optimal confusion trajectory;

[0087] S250, obtaining a dynamic transmission time interval;

[0088] S260: Send the optimal obfuscated trajectory according to the dynamic transmission time interval.

[0089] Specifically, the global positioning system (GPS) or Beidou satellite module can be used to obtain the real coordinates of the smart flow box.

[0090] Reference Figure 3 , according to the real coordinates, the step of generating multiple virtual trajectories may include S310-S340:

[0091] S310, calling the disturbance radius;

[0092] S320, generating a first virtual coordinate according to the real coordinate and the disturbance radius;

[0093] S330, using the first virtual coordinate as a base point and according to a set offset radius, generating a plurality of second virtual coordinates;

[0094] S340: Generate a corresponding virtual trajectory according to the first virtual coordinate and the plurality of second virtual coordinates.

[0095] Specifically, the first virtual coordinate , M is the real coordinate, R is the perturbation radius, N is the perturbation order, represents the random direction angle of the k-th order disturbance component.

[0096] Reference Figure 4 Furthermore, before generating the first virtual coordinates, the anti-tracking camouflage method may further include S410-S440:

[0097] S410, obtaining the current power of the composite wave interference;

[0098] S420, determining whether the current power is less than a set power threshold;

[0099] S430, if yes, maintain the original disturbance radius unchanged;

[0100] S440: If not, adjust the disturbance radius according to the current power.

[0101] Specifically, a power meter can be used to measure the current power of the composite wave interference, and then the current power is compared with the set power threshold to determine whether the current power is less than the set power threshold. If so, the disturbance radius can be adjusted. , SPL is the composite wave interference power.

[0102] After generating the first virtual coordinates according to the real coordinates and the perturbation radius, the polar coordinate conversion method is used to randomly generate multiple points as the second virtual coordinates within the set offset radius with the first virtual coordinates as the center of the circle; then the first virtual coordinates and the multiple second virtual coordinates are connected in a certain order to form a virtual trajectory. Of course, in other embodiments, it is also possible to The algorithm performs virtual path planning.

[0103] After generating multiple virtual paths, the path confusion value of each virtual trajectory is calculated. The path confusion value can be defined as the similarity between the virtual trajectory and the real trajectory. The lower the similarity, the higher the confusion value.

[0104] The path obfuscation value is calculated as follows:

[0105] ;

[0106] in, is the economic cost item, is the transportation economic cost of the virtual trajectory e, including:

[0107] Fuel cost: is the trajectory length, is the fuel consumption coefficient, For oil prices.

[0108] Labor costs: , To estimate the travel time, Hourly wage.

[0109] The trajectory length and estimated travel time of each virtual trajectory are extracted from the road network topology data. Then, the basic cost is calculated based on the real-time oil price and the labor rate (hourly wage) agreed in the contract to obtain the economic cost item of each virtual trajectory.

[0110] Economic cost weight Can be adjusted dynamically, the adjustment rules are: , is the initial value, is the actual transportation cost, For technology costs.

[0111] is the risk cost item, is the risk factor weight, is the quantified risk value of the i-th category of virtual trajectory k, including:

[0112] Tracking exposure risks: is the risk sensitivity coefficient, is the length of the unobstructed section in the trajectory.

[0113] Environmental threat risks: is the number of real-time threat detections for trajectory e, Threshold for threat detections.

[0114] Signal interference risk: is the trajectory average signal-to-noise ratio, is the trajectory signal-to-noise ratio threshold.

[0115] The GIS system and sensors collect the length of the unobstructed section of each trajectory, the number of real-time threat detections, and the average signal-to-noise ratio of the trajectory in real time; then normalize it according to the cost function and determine it according to the weight distribution method. .

[0116] Risk cost weight Can be adjusted dynamically, the adjustment rules are: , is the initial value, The threat level. The larger the value of tracking exposure risk, environmental threat risk, and signal interference risk, the greater the threat level. Each threat level value corresponds to a range of values.

[0117] is the trajectory deviation penalty term, is the similarity penalty coefficient; For virtual path With the real path The Euclidean distance deviation.

[0118] In addition, when the disturbance radius remains unchanged, the virtual track is regenerated every 200 meters; if the disturbance radius changes, the distance for regenerating the virtual track is shortened, for example, to 150 meters.

[0119] Dynamic transmission time interval , is the average number of Beidou message transmissions per unit time, is the basic value of Beidou message transmission per unit time, ,one Corresponding to a U.

[0120] In addition, the relevant thresholds and base values ​​in this application are empirical values ​​and are determined based on historical relevant data.

[0121] The implementation principle of this embodiment is:

[0122] A dynamic key K is generated using the commercial cryptographic algorithm SM4 and its validity period is set. The dynamic key K is then split into n segments based on the bandwidth limit of the BeiDou message. A protocol header is embedded in each segment and mixed into Wi-Fi beacon frames or Bluetooth broadcast packets to form a BeiDou message. The ambient noise power is then obtained and input into the frequency band selection formula to determine the carrier frequency of the BeiDou message, which is then sent.

[0123] When the intelligent flow box is transported, it detects the characteristic frequency of the surrounding equipment and determines the set type based on the characteristic frequency. When the characteristic frequency corresponding to the equipment type reaches the interference condition, a composite wave is emitted to interfere.

[0124] And obtain the real coordinates of the real position of the smart flow box, then call the disturbance radius, generate the first virtual coordinate according to the real coordinate and the disturbance radius, and use the first virtual coordinate as the base point, generate multiple second virtual coordinates according to the set offset radius, and then generate corresponding virtual trajectories based on the first virtual coordinate and the multiple second virtual coordinates, calculate the path confusion value of each virtual trajectory, and select the virtual trajectory with the smallest path confusion value as the optimal confusion trajectory; then send the optimal confusion trajectory according to the obtained dynamic transmission time interval.

[0125] During the transportation of intelligent flow boxes, the actual validity period of the dynamic key K is obtained in real time, and it is determined whether the actual validity period is greater than the set validity period. If so, a key expiration and erasure instruction is sent.

[0126] Based on the above method embodiments, the second embodiment of the present application discloses an anti-tracking camouflage system for a smart flow box. The anti-tracking camouflage system for a smart flow box in the embodiment of the present application can implement any of the above anti-tracking camouflage methods for smart flow boxes, and the specific working process of each module in the anti-tracking camouflage system for a smart flow box can refer to the corresponding process in the above method embodiments.

[0127] For ease of understanding, an example is given below: an anti-tracking camouflage system for intelligent flow boxes, including:

[0128] The key generation module uses the commercial cryptographic algorithm SM4 to generate the dynamic key K and sets the validity period of the dynamic key K; the dynamic key , is the UTC timestamp, It is the unique identifier of the smart flow box. It is a 16-bit random number;

[0129] The key processing and sending module is used to split the dynamic key K into n segments according to the bandwidth limit of the Beidou message, with each segment length not exceeding 40 bytes; and embed the set protocol header in each key segment, mix it into the Wi-Fi beacon frame or Bluetooth broadcast packet, and generate a Beidou message for transmission;

[0130] Duration acquisition module, used to obtain the actual validity period of the dynamic key K in real time;

[0131] A judgment module is used to judge whether the actual validity period is greater than the set validity period;

[0132] The instruction sending module is used to send the key invalidation erasure instruction.

[0133] The third embodiment of the present application provides a terminal. As an implementation of the terminal, the terminal may include: a memory and a processor; wherein,

[0134] The memory is used to store the anti-tracking disguise program of the intelligent flow box;

[0135] The processor is used to execute the program stored in the memory to implement the steps of the anti-tracking camouflage method for the above-mentioned intelligent flow box.

[0136] The memory may be communicatively connected to the processor via a communication bus, and the communication bus may be an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, or the like.

[0137] In addition, the memory may include a random access memory (RAM) and may also include a non-volatile memory (NVM), such as at least one disk storage.

[0138] The processor can be a general-purpose processor, including a central processing unit (CPU), a network processor (NP), etc.; it can also be a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc.

[0139] The above are all preferred embodiments of the present application and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present application. Unless otherwise specified, any feature disclosed in this specification (including the abstract and drawings) may be replaced by other equivalent or similar features. In other words, unless otherwise specified, each feature is merely an example of a series of equivalent or similar features.

Claims

1. An anti-tracking camouflage method for intelligent flow boxes, characterized in that: include: Generate a dynamic key K using the commercial cryptographic algorithm SM4 and set a validity period for the dynamic key K; The dynamic key K=SM4(T c ,DeviceID,Nonce),T c is the UTC timestamp, DeviceID is the unique identifier of the smart flow box, and Nonce is a 16-bit random number; Split the dynamic key K into n segments according to the bandwidth limit of the Beidou message, with each segment length not exceeding 40 bytes; Embed the set protocol header in each key segment, mix it into the Wi-Fi beacon frame or Bluetooth broadcast packet, and generate a Beidou message for transmission; Obtaining the actual validity period of the dynamic key K in real time; Determine whether the actual validity period is greater than the set validity period; If yes, send a key invalidation erase command; The steps before sending a BeiDou message include: After integration into Beidou messages, obtain the environmental noise power; Inputting the environmental noise power into the constructed frequency band selection formula to obtain the carrier frequency of the Beidou message; is the ambient noise power, P t The noise threshold is -85dBm; The anti-tracking camouflage method further includes: Get the real coordinates of the real location of the smart flow box; generating a plurality of virtual trajectories according to the real coordinates; Calculating a path confusion value of each of the virtual trajectories; Selecting the virtual trajectory with the smallest path confusion value as the optimal confusion trajectory; Get a dynamic transmission time interval, the dynamic transmission time interval λ is the average number of Beidou message transmissions per unit time, base is the basic value of Beidou message transmission per unit time, U∈(0,1); according to the dynamic transmission time interval, the optimal obfuscation trajectory is sent.

2. The anti-tracking camouflage method for a smart flow box according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The anti-tracking camouflage method further includes: When transporting smart flow boxes, detect the characteristic frequencies of surrounding equipment; determining a device type according to the characteristic frequency; When the characteristic frequency corresponding to the device type reaches the interference condition, transmitting a composite wave to interfere; The interference condition is: the characteristic frequency and M is the total number of device types, Ω c is the characteristic frequency band set of the c-th type equipment, S(f) is the signal power spectrum density, N(f) is the environmental noise floor, γ c The signal-to-noise ratio threshold related to the device type.

3. The anti-tracking camouflage method for a smart flow box according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The composite wave A c is the interference amplitude of each physical field, P max is the total radiated power limit, B c is the bandwidth of each interference signal; f c is the carrier center frequency, is the frequency jitter, is the change value of environmental noise power; is the phase modulation function, μ is the frequency modulation slope; is the convolution modulation operator, n represents the index number of the pulse, δ(t-nT p ) is an ideal pulse of unit amplitude, T p is the pulse repetition interval.

4. The anti-tracking camouflage method for a smart flow box according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The step of generating a plurality of virtual tracks according to the real coordinates comprises: Retrieve the disturbance radius; Generate a first virtual coordinate according to the real coordinate and the disturbance radius; Taking the first virtual coordinate as a base point and according to a set offset radius, a plurality of second virtual coordinates are generated; generating a corresponding virtual trajectory according to the first virtual coordinate and a plurality of the second virtual coordinates; The first virtual coordinate θ k ∈(0,2π), M is the real coordinate, R is the perturbation radius, N is the perturbation order, θ k represents the random direction angle of the k-th order disturbance component.

5. The anti-tracking camouflage method for a smart flow box according to claim 4 is characterized in that: The anti-tracking camouflage method further includes: Before generating the first virtual coordinate, obtaining the current power of the composite wave interference; Determining whether the current power is less than a set power threshold; If not, adjusting the disturbance radius according to the current power; The disturbance radius R=1.1+0.015×(SPL-100), where SPL is the composite wave interference power. 6.An anti-tracking camouflage system for intelligent circulation boxes, characterized in that: The anti-tracking camouflage method for the smart flow box according to any one of claims 1 to 5 is implemented, comprising: The key generation module uses the commercial cryptographic algorithm SM4 to generate a dynamic key K and sets the validity period of the dynamic key K; the dynamic key K=SM4(T c ,DeviceID,Nonce),T c is the UTC timestamp, DeviceID is the unique identifier of the smart flow box, and Nonce is a 16-bit random number; The key processing and sending module is used to split the dynamic key K into n segments according to the bandwidth limit of the Beidou message, with each segment length not exceeding 40 bytes; and embed a set protocol header in each segment of the key, mix it into the Wi-Fi beacon frame or Bluetooth broadcast packet, and generate a Beidou message for transmission; A duration acquisition module, used to obtain the actual validity period of the dynamic key K in real time; A judgment module, used to judge whether the actual validity period is greater than the set validity period; The instruction sending module is used to send the key invalidation erasure instruction.

7. A terminal, characterized in that: include: A memory storing an anti-tracking disguise program of the intelligent transfer box; A processor is used to execute the program stored on the memory to implement the steps of the anti-tracking camouflage method for the smart flow box as described in any one of claims 1-5.

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