A lightweight secure identity authentication method based on hybrid authentication architecture

Abstract

The present invention discloses a lightweight secure identity authentication method based on a hybrid authentication architecture, comprising the following steps: centralized edge-level authentication to register an IoT system; establishing communication between IoT system devices and an edge server; determining whether two devices that need to communicate are located and connected to the same edge server; if so, the two devices communicate in the same domain; if not, the two devices communicate across domains. By combining centralized and decentralized authentication architectures, the present invention not only effectively improves the security, scalability, and real-time performance of IoT systems, but also addresses the computational, storage, and latency issues inherent in traditional authentication methods while ensuring the performance of resource-constrained devices.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of Internet of Things, and in particular to a lightweight secure identity authentication method based on a hybrid authentication architecture. Background Art

[0002] The Internet of Things (IoT) is evolving into a ubiquitous technology, designed to significantly improve and enrich human life with minimal investment of time and effort. With the expansion of IoT applications, particularly in smart homes, smart cities, and industrial automation, the proliferation of IoT devices is enabling the interconnection of a vast array of physical devices, sensors, and smart terminals. However, resource-constrained IoT devices face significant security threats, particularly the risk of physical intrusion.

[0003] Because IoT devices typically have low computing power, storage space, and limited battery life, traditional security solutions, especially cryptographic primitives such as RSA, AES, and SHA, consume significant processing resources, making them impractical for resource-constrained IoT devices. Furthermore, in IoT networks, device authentication often requires frequent information exchange, resulting in high bandwidth consumption. Furthermore, because IoT devices are deployed in diverse environments and networks, the authentication and interoperability requirements between heterogeneous systems make it difficult for traditional authentication protocols to meet real-time requirements and effectively address potential latency issues during protocol execution. Consequently, the industry is re-examining the design concepts of IoT protocols and seeking lightweight, secure, and efficient authentication methods.

[0004] Existing centralized authentication schemes perform poorly for cross-domain authentication and are unable to adapt to the scalability requirements of large-scale IoT systems. To overcome these issues, blockchain technology has been gradually introduced into the IoT, particularly to establish decentralized authentication mechanisms between devices. However, most blockchain-based authentication methods still have significant overhead in terms of computation, storage, and energy consumption. In real-time IoT systems, authentication time and the additional latency introduced by consensus mechanisms pose a significant challenge. As the volume of IoT devices and data increases, the computational bottlenecks of traditional centralized authentication methods and public blockchains make the authentication process even more inefficient. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides a lightweight secure identity authentication method based on a hybrid authentication architecture with a simple algorithm, security and reliability.

[0006] The technical solution of the present invention to solve the above technical problems is: a lightweight secure identity authentication method based on a hybrid authentication architecture, comprising the following steps:

[0007] S1: Centralized edge-level authentication and registration of IoT systems;

[0008] The specific process of step S1 is:

[0009] S11: Assign a unique identifier EID to each edge server and generate a public key and a private key for each edge server;

[0010] S12: Use system name S name and the hash of the corresponding edge server to generate a unique group identifier GID for the IoT system, and register the new IoT system to the nearest edge server;

[0011] S13: Generate a unique object identifier OID to identify each object O in the group G. In addition, the edge server generates a random input stimulus for the physical unclonable function PUF, namely the challenge C, and collects the generated response R. Then, the challenge-response pair (C, R) is stored in the secure database. R is collected and stored in the secure database of the edge server. For each device, only one challenge-response pair is stored during the registration phase.

[0012] S2: Communicates IoT system devices with edge servers;

[0013] The specific process of step S2 is:

[0014] S21: Initialization of the connection between the device and the edge server;

[0015] First, the device Node B Send a connection request message to the edge server, the connection request message contains Node B Unique identifier OID B ; After receiving the request, the edge server searches the security database for the corresponding Node B The challenge-response pair (C B , R B ), C B Represents Node B The challenge, R B Indicates the corresponding C to be searched B Then, the edge server generates a random number RN1 and compares RN1 with R B Perform XOR operation to obtain the encrypted message D B ; Then, the edge server calculates the message D B With R B The hash value H B To ensure the integrity of the information; Finally, the edge server sends the message D B 、H B and C B Send back to Node B ; The formula is as follows:

[0016] ;

[0017] ;

[0018] in, Represents the exclusive OR operation, Indicates a connector. represents a hash function;

[0019] S22: The device authenticates the edge server;

[0020] S23: The edge server authenticates the device;

[0021] S3: Determine whether the two devices that need to communicate are connected to the same edge server. If so, proceed to step S4; if not, proceed to step S5;

[0022] S4: Two devices communicate in the same domain;

[0023] The specific process of step S4 is:

[0024] S41: Connection initialization between two devices in the same domain;

[0025] The two devices in the same domain are respectively device Node A1 and device Node A2 , device Node A1 Send a connection request message to the edge server, the connection request message contains Node A1 Unique identifier OID A1 and Node A2 Unique identifier OID A2 ; After receiving the connection request, the edge server checks the Node A2 Whether to register and send a connection request to Node A2 , Node A2 After receiving the connection request, select the flag to send the N2N connection establishment request (OID A1 , OID A2 ) to the edge server; after receiving the N2N connection establishment request, the edge server obtains the corresponding challenge-response pair (C A1 , R A1 , C A2 , R A2 ) and generate a random number RN2, C A1 Represents Node A1 The challenge, R A1 Indicates the corresponding C A1 The response, C A2Represents Node A2 The challenge, R A2 Indicates the corresponding C A2 Response; random number RN2 and R A1 and R A2 Perform XOR operation to obtain the encrypted message D A1 and D A2 , the formula is as follows:

[0026] ;

[0027] ;

[0028] Next, calculate R A1 With D A1 The hash value H A1 、R A2 With D A2 The hash value H A2 To verify the message conveyed; the edge server sends data D A1 、H A1 and C A1 Send back to Node A1 , the data D A2 、H A2 and C A2 Send back to Node A2 ; The formula is as follows:

[0029] ;

[0030] ;

[0031] S42: Two devices in the same domain authenticate the edge server;

[0032] S43: The edge server authenticates the two devices in the same domain;

[0033] S5: Two devices communicate across domains;

[0034] The specific process of step S5 is as follows:

[0035] S51: The two cross-domain devices are Node A3 and device Node A4 , device Node A3 First, it sends an association request to the edge server E3 to which it is connected; through steps S22 and S23, identity authentication and key exchange are performed. After the device authentication is successful, E3 provides the device Node A4 Unique identifier OID A4 , and Node A4The connected edge server E4 sends a transaction to the blockchain Bch;

[0036] S52: Bch verifies the given OID A4 and whether the corresponding unique identifier exists on the blockchain; if the verification is successful, the process continues; otherwise, the process terminates and returns an error;

[0037] S53: After successfully verifying the existence of the other party's device, Bch creates a block and stores the Node A3 and Node A4 Mapping information;

[0038] S54: Device Node A3 The edge server E3 connected to it performs identity authentication and key exchange through steps S22 and S23. After the device authentication is successful, the edge server E3 and the device Node A3 Generate a session key Key between A3 , the edge server E3 uses the public key Pk4 of the target edge server to authenticate the edge server E3 and the device Node A3 Key A3 Encrypted data packet M k , and then the encrypted data packet M k Send to edge server E4;

[0039] S55: When the edge server E4 receives M k After that, a new transaction block F is created and shared with the edge network based on the blockchain, and a connection request is sent to Node A4 , Node A4 After receiving the request, the edge server E4 connected to it performs identity authentication and key exchange in steps S22 and S23. If the edge server E4 and the device Node A4 Mutual authentication is successful, then the edge server E4 and the device Node A4 Generate a communication key Key between A4 Otherwise, it will end with an error;

[0040] S56: Next, the edge server E4 verifies the validity of the block to ensure the legitimacy of the block transaction;

[0041] S57: Once the block is verified, the edge server E4 will use its private key Prk4 to obtain k Decrypt the Key A3 ;Key A3 Use Key A4 Encrypted data M SK , M SK Send to device NodeA4 , the device Node A4 receives M SK and decrypts it with Key A4 to obtain Key A3 , thus completing cross - regional identity authentication and key exchange.

[0042] In the above - mentioned lightweight security authentication method based on a hybrid authentication architecture, in step S11, the trusted authority TA first sets a finite - field parameter, that is, selects a prime number p to construct a finite field Fp. On the finite field Fp, an elliptic curve Eq(m,n) is defined, and its expression is as follows:

[0043] Eq(m,n):y 2 =x 3 +mx + n;

[0044] where: x, y ∈ Fp, x and y respectively represent the abscissa and ordinate of the points on the elliptic curve; m, n are the coefficient parameters of the elliptic curve, m, n ∈ Fp; after constructing the elliptic curve, calculate the point set G of the elliptic curve on the finite field Fp, and the point set G forms a finite additive group under the elliptic - curve addition rule; subsequently, TA selects a base point g from the additive group, g ∈ G; the order of the base point g is q, and to ensure the non - singularity of the elliptic curve, it is required to satisfy the condition: 4m 3 +27n 2 mod q≠0, mod represents the modulo operation; TA randomly selects a private key Prk in the integer set Zq={0,1,2,...,q - 1}, Prk ∈ [1,q - 1], Prk is an integer satisfying 1 ≤ Prk < q; then, calculate the corresponding public key: Pk = Prk·g, where · represents the scalar - multiplication operation, Pk is the public key corresponding to the private key Prk, Pk ∈ G; finally, TA publishes the following public parameters to all edge servers participating in identity authentication: {Eq(m,n), g, q, Pk}, and at the same time, the private key Prk is only sent to and held secretly by the corresponding server and not made public to the outside to ensure the security of the entire identity - authentication process.

[0045] In the above - mentioned lightweight security authentication method based on a hybrid authentication architecture, the specific process of step S22 is as follows:

[0046] Node B After receiving the message from the edge server, first uses the embedded PUF instance to generate , which is the response obtained according to C B ; then, Node B calculates and D B 's hash value and With the received H B Compare to verify the integrity of the message; if the two are consistent, it means that the message has not been tampered with during transmission, and the Node B Confirm the integrity of the message and prove that it is a legitimate request from the edge server; Node B The received message D B and Perform XOR decryption to extract the random number RN1 and generate the key Key1;

[0047] Once Node B Complete the authentication of the edge server, Node B A new challenge C will be generated by PUF B+1 and the corresponding response R B+1 , where C B+1 C B With R B Then, put R B+1 XOR with RN1 to generate message D B+1 , and calculate The value of H B+1 , then D B+1 and H B+1 Sent to the edge server; the formula is as follows:

[0048] ;

[0049] ;

[0050] ;

[0051] ;

[0052] ;

[0053] ;

[0054] ;

[0055] ;

[0056] in, Represents Node B The physical unclonable function, Indicates whether they are equal.

[0057] In the above-mentioned lightweight secure identity authentication method based on the hybrid authentication architecture, the specific process of step S23 is as follows:

[0058] Assume that the edge server receives HB+1 and messages , The corresponding D B+1 The message is first paired with the random number RN1. Decrypt and restore the Node B Updated Response , then calculate and Hash value By comparison With the received H B+1 To verify the correctness of the device response; if the hash verification is successful, it means that the device Node B The authentication has been successful, and the edge server updates the challenge C as a legitimate node. B+1 and the response R B+1 and stored in a secure database; once the Node B Successfully passed the edge server authentication, edge server and Node B Just use Used as a session key for secure communication; the formula is as follows:

[0059] ;

[0060] ;

[0061] ;

[0062] Next, the authentication information is recorded in the edge server as a transaction in the edge blockchain network BCH;

[0063] Finally, the edge server updates the stored challenge to C B+1 , and replace the old challenge-response pair data with the new data in the manner of a legitimate node, Stored in a secure database; the formula is as follows:

[0064] .

[0065] In the above-mentioned lightweight secure identity authentication method based on the hybrid authentication architecture, the specific process of step S42 is as follows:

[0066] Node A1 After receiving the message from the edge server, it first generates , Based on Node A1 Challenge C A1 Then, Node A1 Use the generated With D A1 Hash With the received H A1 Compare to verify the integrity of the message; the formula is as follows:

[0067] ;

[0068] ;

[0069] Represents Node A1 The physical unclonable function of

[0070] if With H A1 The two are consistent, indicating that the message has not been tampered with during transmission. A1 Confirm the integrity of the message and prove that it is a legitimate request from the edge server; Node A1 The received message D A1 and Perform XOR decryption to extract the random number RN2 and generate the key Key2; once Node A1 Complete the authentication of the edge server, Node A1 Will update its own PUF response, Node A1 Generate a new challenge C through PUF A1+1 and the corresponding response R A1+1 , and C A1+1 and R A1+1 Sent back to the server, where C A1+1 C A1 With R A1 XOR value, R A1+1 Is to use Challenge C A1+1 The response obtained; Next, R A1+1 XOR with RN2 to generate string D A1+1 , and calculate R A1+1 With D A1+1 The hash value is H A1+1 , the formula is as follows:

[0071] ;

[0072] ;

[0073] ;

[0074] ;

[0075] ;

[0076] ;

[0077] Similarly, Node A2 After receiving the message, Node authenticates the server in the same way. A2 The formula for node authentication is as follows:

[0078] ;

[0079] ;

[0080] ;

[0081] ;

[0082] ;

[0083] ;

[0084] ;

[0085] ;

[0086] in, Represents Node A2 The physical unclonable function, For Node A2 Challenges, Based on The response obtained, for With D A2 The hash value of For Node A2 New challenges generated by PUF, for The corresponding response, for and XOR generated string, for and The hash value of

[0087] Node A1 Send the message A1+1 、H A1+1}Sent to edge server, Node A2 Send the message A2+1 、H A2+1}Sent to the edge server.

[0088] In the above-mentioned lightweight secure identity authentication method based on the hybrid authentication architecture, the specific process of step S43 is as follows:

[0089] The server receives the message {D A1+1 、H A1+1} and the message {D A2+1 、H A2+1}, first by D A1+1 and D A2+1 Perform XOR operation with the random number RN2 generated before, and restore Node A1 Updated PUF response and Node A2 Updated PUF response ; Then, the edge server calculates With D A1+1 Hash value 、 With D A2+1 Hash value , to check the integrity of the message; after the hash value verification is completed, the edge server successfully authenticates the two IoT devices, namely Node A1 and Node A2 ; The formula is as follows:

[0090] ;

[0091] ;

[0092] ;

[0093] ;

[0094] ;

[0095] Next, the edge server will store the challenge C A1 and C A2 Updated to C A1+1 and C A2+1 , and replace the old challenge-response pair data with the new data in the manner of a legitimate node, 、 、 、 、 、 Stored in a secure database; the formula is as follows:

[0096] ;

[0097] ;

[0098] Once Node A1 and Node A2Successfully passed the edge server authentication, Node A1 Node A2 The edge server uses Key2 as the session key for secure communication; finally, the authentication information is recorded in the edge server and recorded as a transaction in the edge blockchain network BCH.

[0099] The beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0100] 1. This paper proposes a hybrid authentication architecture that combines centralized and blockchain-based authentication methods to serve the security needs of the Internet of Things system. In the hybrid authentication architecture, edge servers are deployed to provide centralized authentication services for associated IoT devices, reducing the burden of devices directly accessing the blockchain network. By combining centralized edge servers and blockchain networks, a decentralized authentication and verification mechanism is constructed, which can realize device authentication across different heterogeneous IoT systems.

[0101] 2. To adapt to resource-constrained IoT environments, this paper proposes a lightweight authentication and key exchange protocol. This protocol uses low-overhead cryptographic techniques such as cryptographic exclusive-OR (XOR) operations and hash functions to achieve secure communication. It also utilizes a physically unclonable function (PUF) to generate a unique device identity, protecting against physical attacks. PUFs use the device's physical characteristics to generate a unique identifier associated with the device. These PUFs are tamper-resistant and unclonable, effectively preventing traditional key extraction attacks. Furthermore, PUFs eliminate the need to store secret keys, further reducing storage and computational overhead, making them ideal for addressing security and resource constraints in IoT environments.

[0102] 3. By combining centralized and decentralized authentication architectures, the present invention not only effectively improves the security, scalability, and real-time performance of the IoT system, but also solves the computing, storage, and latency issues existing in traditional authentication methods while ensuring the performance of resource-constrained devices. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0103] Figure 1 It is the overall flow chart of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0104] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0105] like Figure 1 As shown, a lightweight secure identity authentication method based on a hybrid authentication architecture includes the following steps:

[0106] S1: Centralized edge-level authentication and registration of IoT systems.

[0107] The specific process of step S1 is:

[0108] S11: Assign a unique identifier EID to each edge server, and generate a public key and a private key for each edge server;

[0109] In step S11, the trusted authority TA first sets a finite field parameter, that is, selects a prime number p to construct a finite field Fp. On the finite field Fp, an elliptic curve Eq(m,n) is defined, and its expression is as follows:

[0110] Eq(m,n): y 2 = x 3 + mx + n;

[0111] Where: x, y ∈ Fp, x and y respectively represent the abscissa and ordinate of the points on the elliptic curve; m, n are the coefficient parameters of the elliptic curve, m, n ∈ Fp; after constructing the elliptic curve, calculate the point set G of the elliptic curve on the finite field Fp, and the point set G forms a finite additive group under the elliptic curve addition rule; subsequently, TA selects a base point g from the additive group, g ∈ G; the order of the base point g is q, and to ensure the non-singularity of the elliptic curve, it is required to satisfy the condition: 4m 3 + 27n 2 mod q ≠ 0, mod represents the modulo operation; TA randomly selects a private key Prk in the integer set Zq = {0, 1, 2,..., q - 1}, Prk ∈ [1, q - 1], Prk is an integer satisfying 1 ≤ Prk < q; then, calculate the corresponding public key: Pk = Prk · g, where · represents the scalar multiplication operation, Pk is the public key corresponding to the private key Prk, Pk ∈ G; finally, TA publishes the following public parameters to all edge servers participating in identity verification: {Eq(m,n), g, q, Pk}, at the same time, the private key Prk is only sent to the corresponding server to hold and keep secret, and is not publicly disclosed to ensure the security of the entire identity authentication process.

[0112] S12: Use the system name S name and the hash of the corresponding edge server to generate a unique group identifier GID for the Internet of Things system, and register the new Internet of Things system to the nearest edge server.

[0113] S13: Generate a unique object identifier OID to identify each object O in the group G. In addition, the edge server generates a random input stimulus, that is, a challenge C, for the physically unclonable function PUF, and collects the generated response R; then, store the challenge-response pair (C, R) in the secure database; R is collected and stored in the secure database of the edge server, and for each device, only one challenge-response pair is stored in the registration phase.

[0114] S2: Communicate the devices of the Internet of Things system with the edge server.

[0115] The specific process of step S2 is:

[0116] S21: Initialization of the connection between the device and the edge server;

[0117] First, the device Node B Send a connection request message to the edge server, the connection request message contains Node B Unique identifier OID B ; After receiving the request, the edge server searches the security database for the corresponding Node B The challenge-response pair (C B , R B ), C B Represents Node B The challenge, R B Indicates the corresponding C to be searched B Then, the edge server generates a random number RN1 and compares RN1 with R B Perform XOR operation to obtain the encrypted message D B ; Then, the edge server calculates the message D B With R B The hash value H B To ensure the integrity of the information; Finally, the edge server sends the message D B 、H B and C B Send back to Node B ; The formula is as follows:

[0118] ;

[0119] ;

[0120] in, Represents the exclusive OR operation, Indicates a connector. represents a hash function;

[0121] S22: The device authenticates the edge server.

[0122] The specific process of step S22 is:

[0123] Node B After receiving the message from the edge server, the embedded PUF instance is first used to generate , According to C B Then, Node B calculate With D B Hash value and will With the received H B Compare to verify the integrity of the message; if the two are consistent, it means that the message has not been tampered with during transmission, and the Node B Confirm the integrity of the message and prove that it is a legitimate request from the edge server; Node B The received message D B and Perform XOR decryption to extract the random number RN1 and generate the key Key1;

[0124] Once Node B Complete the authentication of the edge server, Node B A new challenge C will be generated by PUF B+1 and the corresponding response R B+1 , where C B+1 C B With R B Then, put R B+1 XOR with RN1 to generate message D B+1 , and calculate The value of H B+1 , then D B+1 and H B+1 Sent to the edge server; the formula is as follows:

[0125] ;

[0126] ;

[0127] ;

[0128] ;

[0129] ;

[0130] ;

[0131] ;

[0132] ;

[0133] in, Represents Node B The physical unclonable function, Indicates whether they are equal.

[0134] S23: The edge server authenticates the device.

[0135] The specific process of step S23 is:

[0136] Assume that the edge server receives H B+1 and messages , The corresponding D B+1 The message is first paired with the random number RN1. Decrypt and restore the Node B Updated Response , then calculate and Hash value By comparison With the received H B+1 To verify the correctness of the device response; if the hash verification is successful, it means that the device Node B The authentication has been successful, and the edge server updates the challenge C as a legitimate node. B+1 and the response R B+1 and stored in a secure database; once the Node B Successfully passed the edge server authentication, edge server and Node B Just use Used as a session key for secure communication; the formula is as follows:

[0137] ;

[0138] ;

[0139] ;

[0140] Next, the authentication information is recorded in the edge server as a transaction in the edge blockchain network BCH;

[0141] Finally, the edge server updates the stored challenge to C B+1 , and replace the old challenge-response pair data with the new data in the manner of a legitimate node, Stored in a secure database; the formula is as follows:

[0142] .

[0143] S3: Determine whether the two devices that need to communicate are located and connected to the same edge server. If so, proceed to step S4; if not, proceed to step S5.

[0144] S4: Two devices communicate in the same domain.

[0145] The specific process of step S4 is:

[0146] S41: Connection initialization between two devices in the same domain;

[0147] The two devices in the same domain are respectively device Node A1 and device Node A2 , device Node A1 Send a connection request message to the edge server, the connection request message contains Node A1 Unique identifier OID A1 and Node A2 Unique identifier OID A2 ; After receiving the connection request, the edge server checks the Node A2 Whether to register and send a connection request to Node A2 , Node A2 After receiving the connection request, select the flag to send the N2N connection establishment request (OID A1 , OID A2 ) to the edge server; after receiving the N2N connection establishment request, the edge server obtains the corresponding challenge-response pair (C A1 , R A1 , C A2 , R A2 ) and generate a random number RN2, C A1 Represents Node A1 The challenge, R A1 Indicates the corresponding C A1 The response, C A2 Represents Node A2 The challenge, R A2 Indicates the corresponding C A2 Response; random number RN2 and R A1 and R A2 Perform XOR operation to obtain the encrypted message D A1 and D A2 , the formula is as follows:

[0148] ;

[0149] ;

[0150] Next, calculate R A1 With D A1 The hash value H A1 、R A2 With D A2 The hash value H A2 To verify the message conveyed; the edge server sends data D A1 、H A1 and C A1 Send back to Node A1 , the data D A2 、HA2 and C A2 Send back to Node A2 ; The formula is as follows:

[0151] ;

[0152] ;

[0153] S42: Two devices in the same domain authenticate the edge server.

[0154] The specific process of step S42 is:

[0155] Node A1 After receiving the message from the edge server, it first generates , Based on Node A1 Challenge C A1 Then, Node A1 Use the generated With D A1 Hash With the received H A1 Compare to verify the integrity of the message; the formula is as follows:

[0156] ;

[0157] ;

[0158] Represents Node A1 The physical unclonable function of

[0159] if With H A1 The two are consistent, indicating that the message has not been tampered with during transmission. A1 Confirm the integrity of the message and prove that it is a legitimate request from the edge server; Node A1 The received message D A1 and Perform XOR decryption to extract the random number RN2 and generate the key Key2; once Node A1 Complete the authentication of the edge server, Node A1 Will update its own PUF response, Node A1 Generate a new challenge C through PUF A1+1 and the corresponding response R A1+1 , and C A1+1 and R A1+1 Sent back to the server, where C A1+1 CA1 With R A1 XOR value, R A1+1 Is to use Challenge C A1+1 The response obtained; Next, R A1+1 XOR with RN2 to generate string D A1+1 , and calculate R A1+1 With D A1+1 The hash value is H A1+1 , the formula is as follows:

[0160] ;

[0161] ;

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[0163] ;

[0164] ;

[0165] ;

[0166] Similarly, Node A2 After receiving the message, Node authenticates the server in the same way. A2 The formula for node authentication is as follows:

[0167] ;

[0168] ;

[0169] ;

[0170] ;

[0171] ;

[0172] ;

[0173] ;

[0174] ;

[0175] in, Represents Node A2 The physical unclonable function, For Node A2 Challenges, Based on The response obtained, for With DA2 The hash value of For Node A2 New challenges generated by PUF, for The corresponding response, for and XOR generated string, for and The hash value of

[0176] Node A1 Send the message A1+1 、H A1+1}Sent to edge server, Node A2 Send the message A2+1 、H A2+1}Sent to the edge server.

[0177] S43: The edge server authenticates the two devices in the same domain.

[0178] The specific process of step S43 is:

[0179] The server receives the message {D A1+1 、H A1+1} and the message {D A2+1 、H A2+1}, first by D A1+1 and D A2+1 Perform XOR operation with the random number RN2 generated before, and restore Node A1 Updated PUF response and Node A2 Updated PUF response ; Then, the edge server calculates With D A1+1 Hash value 、 With D A2+1 Hash value , to check the integrity of the message; after the hash value verification is completed, the edge server successfully authenticates the two IoT devices, namely Node A1 and Node A2 ; The formula is as follows:

[0180] ;

[0181] ;

[0182] ;

[0183] ;

[0184] ;

[0185] Next, the edge server will store the challenge C A1 and C A2 Updated to C A1+1 and C A2+1 , and replace the old challenge-response pair data with the new data in the manner of a legitimate node, 、 、 、 、 、 Stored in a secure database; the formula is as follows:

[0186] ;

[0187] ;

[0188] Once Node A1 and Node A2 Successfully passed the edge server authentication, Node A1 Node A2 The edge server uses Key2 as the session key for secure communication; finally, the authentication information is recorded in the edge server and recorded as a transaction in the edge blockchain network BCH.

[0189] S5: Two devices communicate across domains.

[0190] The specific process of step S5 is as follows:

[0191] S51: The two cross-domain devices are Node A3 and device Node A4 , device Node A3 First, it sends an association request to the edge server E3 to which it is connected; through steps S22 and S23, identity authentication and key exchange are performed. After the device authentication is successful, E3 provides the device Node A4 Unique identifier OID A4 , and Node A4 The connected edge server E4 sends a transaction to the blockchain Bch;

[0192] S52: Bch verifies the given OID A4 and whether the corresponding unique identifier exists on the blockchain; if the verification is successful, the process continues; otherwise, the process terminates and returns an error;

[0193] S53: After successfully verifying the existence of the other party's device, Bch creates a block and stores the Node A3 and Node A4 Mapping information;

[0194] S54: Device Node A3 The edge server E3 connected to it performs identity authentication and key exchange through steps S22 and S23. After the device authentication is successful, the edge server E3 and the device Node A3 Generate a session key Key between A3 , the edge server E3 uses the public key Pk4 of the target edge server to authenticate the edge server E3 and the device Node A3 Key A3 Encrypted data packet M k , and then the encrypted data packet M k Send to edge server E4;

[0195] S55: When the edge server E4 receives M k After that, a new transaction block F is created and shared with the edge network based on the blockchain, and a connection request is sent to Node A4 , Node A4 After receiving the request, the edge server E4 connected to it performs identity authentication and key exchange in steps S22 and S23. If the edge server E4 and the device Node A4 Mutual authentication is successful, then the edge server E4 and the device Node A4 Generate a communication key Key between A4 Otherwise, it will end with an error;

[0196] S56: Next, the edge server E4 verifies the validity of the block to ensure the legitimacy of the block transaction;

[0197] S57: Once the block is verified, the edge server E4 will use its private key Prk4 to obtain k Decrypt the Key A3 ;Key A3 Use Key A4 Encrypted data M SK , M SK Send to device Node A4 , device Node A4 Receive M SK Later use Key A4 Decrypt to get the Key A3 , thus completing cross-region identity authentication and key exchange.

Claims

1. A lightweight secure identity authentication method based on a hybrid authentication architecture, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1: Centralized edge-level authentication and registration of IoT systems; The specific process of step S1 is: S11: Assign a unique identifier EID to each edge server and generate a public key and a private key for each edge server; S12: Use system name S name and the hash of the corresponding edge server to generate a unique group identifier GID for the IoT system, and register the new IoT system to the nearest edge server; S13: Generate a unique object identifier OID to identify each object O in the group G. In addition, the edge server generates a random input stimulus for the physical unclonable function PUF, namely the challenge C, and collects the generated response R; then, the challenge-response pair (C, R) is stored in the secure database; R is collected and stored in the secure database of the edge server. For each device, only one challenge-response pair is stored during the registration phase. S2: Communicates IoT system devices with edge servers; The specific process of step S2 is: S21: Initialization of the connection between the device and the edge server; First, the device Node B Send a connection request message to the edge server, the connection request message contains Node B Unique identifier OID B ; After receiving the request, the edge server searches the security database for the corresponding Node B The challenge-response pair (C B , R B ), C B Represents Node B The challenge, R B Indicates the corresponding C to be searched B Then, the edge server generates a random number RN1 and compares RN1 with R B Perform XOR operation to obtain the encrypted message D B ; Then, the edge server calculates the message D B With R B The hash value H B To ensure the integrity of the information; Finally, the edge server sends the message D B 、H B and C B Send back to Node B ; The formula is as follows: ； ； in, Represents the exclusive OR operation, Indicates a connector. represents a hash function; S22: The device authenticates the edge server; S23: The edge server authenticates the device; S3: Determine whether the two devices that need to communicate are connected to the same edge server. If so, proceed to step S4; if not, proceed to step S5; S4: Two devices communicate in the same domain; The specific process of step S4 is: S41: Connection initialization between two devices in the same domain; The two devices in the same domain are respectively device Node A1 and device Node A2 , device Node A1 Send a connection request message to the edge server, the connection request message contains Node A1 Unique identifier OID A1 and Node A2 Unique identifier OID A2 ; After receiving the connection request, the edge server checks the Node A2 Whether to register and send a connection request to Node A2 , Node A2 After receiving the connection request, select the flag to send the N2N connection establishment request (OID A1 , OID A2 ) to the edge server; after receiving the N2N connection establishment request, the edge server obtains the corresponding challenge-response pair (C A1 , R A1 , C A2 , R A2 ) and generate a random number RN2, C A1 Represents Node A1 The challenge, R A1 Indicates the corresponding C A1 The response, C A2 Represents Node A2 The challenge, R A2 Indicates the corresponding C A2 Response; random number RN2 and R A1 and R A2 Perform XOR operation to obtain the encrypted message D A1 and D A2 , the formula is as follows: ； ； Next, calculate R A1 With D A1 The hash value H A1 、R A2 With D A2 The hash value H A2 To verify the message conveyed; the edge server sends data D A1 、H A1 and C A1 Send back to Node A1 , the data D A2 、H A2 and C A2 Send back to Node A2 ; The formula is as follows: ； ； S42: Two devices in the same domain authenticate the edge server; S43: The edge server authenticates the two devices in the same domain; S5: Two devices communicate across domains; The specific process of step S5 is as follows: S51: The two cross-domain devices are Node A3 and device Node A4 , device Node A3 First, it sends an association request to the edge server E3 to which it is connected; through steps S22 and S23, identity authentication and key exchange are performed. After the device authentication is successful, E3 provides the device Node A4 Unique identifier OID A4 , and Node A4 The connected edge server E4 sends a transaction to the blockchain Bch; S52: Bch verifies the given OID A4 and whether the corresponding unique identifier exists on the blockchain; if the verification is successful, the process continues; otherwise, the process terminates and returns an error; S53: After successfully verifying the existence of the other party's device, Bch creates a block and stores the Node A3 and Node A4 Mapping information; S54: Device Node A3 The edge server E3 connected to it performs identity authentication and key exchange through steps S22 and S23. After the device authentication is successful, the edge server E3 and the device Node A3 Generate a session key Key A3 , the edge server E3 uses the public key Pk4 of the target edge server to authenticate the edge server E3 and the device Node A3 Key A3 Encrypted data packet M k , and then the encrypted data packet M k Send to edge server E4; S55: When the edge server E4 receives M k After that, a new transaction block F is created and shared with the edge network based on the blockchain, and a connection request is sent to Node A4 , Node A4 After receiving the request, the edge server E4 connected to it performs identity authentication and key exchange in steps S22 and S23. If the edge server E4 and the device Node A4 Mutual authentication is successful, then the edge server E4 and the device Node A4 Generate a communication key Key between A4 Otherwise, it will end with an error; S56: Next, the edge server E4 verifies the validity of the block to ensure the legitimacy of the block transaction; S57: Once the block is verified, the edge server E4 will use its private key Prk4 to obtain k Decrypt the Key A3 ;Key A3 Use Key A4 Encrypted data M SK , M SK Send to device Node A4 , device Node A4 Receive M SK Later use Key A4 Decrypt to get the Key A3 , thus completing cross-region identity authentication and key exchange.

2. The lightweight secure identity authentication method based on a hybrid authentication architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S11, the trusted institution TA first sets a finite field parameter, that is, selects a prime number p to construct a finite field Fp. On the finite field Fp, an elliptic curve Eq(m,n) is defined, which is expressed as follows: Eq(m,n):y 2 =x 3 +mx+n; where: \(x, y\in F_p\), \(x\) and \(y\) respectively represent the abscissa and ordinate of points on the elliptic curve; \(m\), \(n\) are coefficient parameters of the elliptic curve, \(m, n\in F_p\); after constructing the elliptic curve, calculate the point set \(G\) of the elliptic curve over the finite field \(F_p\), and the point set \(G\) forms a finite additive group under the elliptic curve addition rule; subsequently, \(TA\) selects a base point \(g\) from the additive group, \(g\in G\); the order of the base point \(g\) is \(q\), and to ensure the non-singularity of the elliptic curve, it is required to satisfy the condition: \(4m\) 3 + 27n 2 \(\bmod q\neq0\), \(\bmod\) represents the modulo operation; \(TA\) randomly selects a private key \(Prk\) from the integer set \(Z_q = \{0, 1, 2, \cdots, q - 1\}\), \(Prk\in[1, q - 1]\), and \(Prk\) is an integer satisfying \(1\leq Prk\lt q\); then, calculate the corresponding public key: \(Pk = Prk\cdot g\), where \(\cdot\) represents the scalar multiplication operation, \(Pk\) is the public key corresponding to the private key \(Prk\), \(Pk\in G\); finally, \(TA\) publishes the following public parameters to all edge servers participating in identity verification: \(\{E_q(m, n), g, q, Pk\}\), and at the same time, the private key \(Prk\) is only sent to and held in confidence by the corresponding server and is not made public to the outside to ensure the security of the entire identity authentication process.

3. The lightweight secure identity authentication method based on a hybrid authentication architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific process of step S22 is: Node B After receiving the message from the edge server, the embedded PUF instance is first used to generate , According to C B Then, Node B calculate With D B Hash value and will With the received H B Compare to verify the integrity of the message; if the two are consistent, it means that the message has not been tampered with during transmission, and the Node B Confirm the integrity of the message and prove that it is a legitimate request from the edge server; Node B The received message D B and Perform XOR decryption to extract the random number RN1 and generate the key Key1; Once Node B Complete the authentication of the edge server, Node B A new challenge C will be generated by PUF B+1 and the corresponding response R B+1 , where C B+1 C B With R B Then, put R B+1 XOR with RN1 to generate message D B+1 , and calculate The value of H B+1 , then D B+1 and H B+1 Sent to the edge server; the formula is as follows: ； ； ； ； ； ； ； ； in, Represents Node B The physical unclonable function, Indicates whether they are equal.

4. The lightweight secure identity authentication method based on a hybrid authentication architecture according to claim 3, characterized in that: The specific process of step S23 is: Assume that the edge server receives H B+1 and messages , The corresponding D B+1 The message is first paired with the random number RN1. Decrypt and restore the Node B Updated Response , then calculate and Hash value By comparison With the received H B+1 To verify the correctness of the device response; If the hash verification succeeds, the device Node B The authentication has been successful, and the edge server updates the challenge C as a legitimate node. B+1 and the response R B+1 and stored in a secure database; once the Node B Successfully passed the edge server authentication, edge server and Node B Just use Used as a session key for secure communication; the formula is as follows: ； ； ； Next, the authentication information is recorded in the edge server as a transaction in the edge blockchain network BCH; Finally, the edge server updates the stored challenge to C B+1 , and replace the old challenge-response pair data with the new data in the manner of a legitimate node, Stored in a secure database; the formula is as follows: 。 5. The lightweight secure identity authentication method based on a hybrid authentication architecture according to claim 4, characterized in that: The specific process of step S42 is: Node A1 After receiving the message from the edge server, it first generates , Based on Node A1 Challenge C A1 Then, Node A1 Use the generated With D A1 Hash With the received H A1 Compare to verify the integrity of the message; the formula is as follows: ； ； Represents Node A1 The physical unclonable function of if With H A1 The two are consistent, indicating that the message has not been tampered with during transmission. A1 Confirm the integrity of the message and prove that it is a legitimate request from the edge server; Node A1 The received message D A1 and Perform XOR decryption to extract the random number RN2 and generate the key Key2; once Node A1 Complete the authentication of the edge server, Node A1 Will update its own PUF response, Node A1 Generate a new challenge C through PUF A1+1 and the corresponding response R A1+1 , and C A1+1 and R A1+1 Sent back to the server, where C A1+1 C A1 With R A1 XOR value, R A1+1 Is to use Challenge C A1+1 The response obtained; Next, R A1+1 XOR with RN2 to generate string D A1+1 , and calculate R A1+1 With D A1+1 The hash value is H A1+1 , the formula is as follows: ； ； ； ； ； ； Similarly, Node A2 After receiving the message, Node authenticates the server in the same way. A2 The formula for node authentication is as follows: ； ； ； ； ； ； ； ； in, Represents Node A2 The physical unclonable function, For Node A2 Challenges, Based on The response obtained, for With D A2 The hash value of For Node A2 New challenges generated by PUF, for The corresponding response, for and XOR generated string, for and The hash value of Node A1 Send the message A1+1 、H A1+1 }Sent to edge server, Node A2 Send the message A2+1 、H A2+1 }Sent to the edge server.

6. The lightweight secure identity authentication method based on hybrid authentication architecture according to claim 5, characterized in that: The specific process of step S43 is: The server receives the message {D A1+1 、H A1+1 } and the message {D A2+1 、H A2+1 }, first by D A1+1 and D A2+1 Perform XOR operation with the random number RN2 generated before, and restore Node A1 Updated PUF response and Node A2 Updated PUF response ; Then, the edge server computes With D A1+1 Hash value 、 With D A2+1 Hash value , to check the integrity of the message; after the hash value verification is completed, the edge server successfully authenticates the two IoT devices, namely Node A1 and Node A2 ; The formula is as follows: ； ； ； ； ； Next, the edge server will store the challenge C A1 and C A2 Updated to C A1+1 and C A2+1 , and replace the old challenge-response pair data with the new data in the manner of a legitimate node, 、 、 、 、 、 Stored in a secure database; the formula is as follows: ； ； Once Node A1 and Node A2 Successfully passed the edge server authentication, Node A1 Node A2 The edge server uses Key2 as the session key for secure communication; finally, the authentication information is recorded in the edge server and recorded as a transaction in the edge blockchain network BCH.

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