Privacy enhanced edge resource auction method based on block chain

Abstract

The invention discloses a privacy-enhanced edge resource auction method based on a block chain, and the method comprises the steps: creating an auction process through a smart contract, encrypting and decomposing bidding information into a ciphertext and a polynomial commitment verification parameter recorded on a block chain; on-chain zero-knowledge verification and real-time bidding sorting based on a dynamic ranking matrix are carried out on encrypted bids by using a third-party computing node, and a fair anti-collusion and public verifiable transaction mechanism is realized under the condition of ensuring bid privacy. The privacy of the bidding comparison process is protected by adopting a triangular area encryption algorithm, the validity verification of the bid price is realized through the Kate polynomial commitment, and malicious tampering of the bid price and auction fraud behaviors are prevented. According to the method, the phenomenon of winner curses is reduced through dynamic security price comparison and a public verification mechanism, the resource allocation efficiency and incentive compatibility are improved, the characteristics of privacy protection, fraud resistance and low overhead are achieved, and the method is suitable for efficient and credible resource transaction of edge computing scenes such as smart cities and industrial Internet of Things.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the cross - field of blockchain and edge computing resource management, and specifically relates to a privacy - protected edge resource dynamic auction method combining secure multi - party computing and blockchain, which is applicable to distributed resource allocation in scenarios such as smart cities, the Internet of Things, and the Internet of Vehicles. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of technologies such as the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence, and 5G, edge computing, as a core technology to support digital transformation, has been widely applied in fields such as smart cities, smart healthcare, and smart agriculture. Edge nodes generally have problems of limited computing, storage, and communication resources, while the user's demand for computing power shows an exponential growth. In this context, how to achieve fast and fair resource allocation in a distributed edge environment has become an urgent technical problem. Traditional auction methods (such as English auctions and sealed - bid auctions) show economic effectiveness in resource allocation, but there is a fundamental contradiction between their inherent information transparency and privacy protection requirements. For example, the English auction ensures fairness in the process through open bidding, but exposes the bid information of all participants; the sealed - bid auction protects bid privacy but highly relies on a trusted third - party auctioneer. Existing auction algorithms generally ignore the protection of the privacy of both trading parties and the anti - fraud design of the auction process, and the existence of the "winner's curse" phenomenon seriously weakens the economic efficiency of the auction method.

[0003] Blockchain technology, with its characteristics of decentralization, immutability, and traceability, provides a new idea for constructing a trusted auction method. Existing solutions such as the CReam system have realized a decentralized electronic auction platform, ensuring incentive compatibility through smart contracts; the BBSBA scheme combines Bulletproofs zero - knowledge proofs and Pedersen commitments to construct a sealed - bid method without a third - party auctioneer. However, these solutions face significant limitations in the edge computing scenario: First, most blockchain auction models only reproduce traditional auction processes and fail to fully utilize blockchain characteristics to achieve dynamic bidding and real - time sorting functions. Existing methods lack an effective anti - fraud verification system, or rely on complex homomorphic encryption circuits or offline fraud detection models, which not only bring high on - chain computing overhead, but also their detection effects are limited by the quality of training data and are difficult to cope with complex malicious attack scenarios in the edge network.

[0004] In addition, existing edge auction models mostly adopt a static encryption commitment mechanism, sacrificing computational efficiency while protecting privacy, and it is difficult to balance the contradiction between the limited computing power of edge devices and complex cryptographic operations. Therefore, the present invention constructs a new auction architecture that takes into account characteristics such as privacy protection, dynamic bidding, and anti - fraud verification. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In response to the above-mentioned problems, the present invention provides a privacy-enhanced edge resource auction method based on blockchain. By deeply integrating blockchain smart contracts, secure multi-party computing protocols and cryptographic technologies, a decentralized, tamper-proof edge resource trading framework that supports real-time dynamic bidding is constructed to reduce the "winner's curse" phenomenon, improve resource allocation efficiency and incentive compatibility, and have the characteristics of privacy protection, anti-fraud and low overhead.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution: a privacy-enhanced edge resource auction method based on blockchain, comprising the following steps:

[0007] 1) The seller completes the initialization operation;

[0008] 2) The seller creates an auction event;

[0009] 3) All participating nodes register their identities with the smart contract, including buyers and sellers;

[0010] 4) The buyer communicates with the smart contract to obtain the auction parameters, generates auxiliary parameters based on the auction parameters, and calculates the encrypted bid triple and the corresponding Pedersen commitment;

[0011] 5) Buyers apply to bid;

[0012] 6) Buyers compare prices with each other;

[0013] 7) Announcement of winners;

[0014] 8) Transaction settlement and resource allocation: The smart contract automatically deducts P from the buyer's account and transfers it to the seller. The seller releases the edge resources, and the buyer obtains the resource access key. The deposit of unselected buyers is returned after deducting the handling fee.

[0015] 9) The auction ends.

[0016] Furthermore, the above step 1) includes the following steps:

[0017] 1.1) Randomly generate the initial point x0 and auxiliary point pair (x s ,y s ), random number r s1 ,r s2 ,r s3 The initial point p is the prime order of the elliptic curve group; the auxiliary point pair (x s ,y s ), satisfying x s <x0;所述随机数

[0018] 1.2) Calculate triangle encryption parameters The calculation formula is as follows:

[0019]

[0020] Among them, RP is the reserve price set by the seller;

[0021] 1.3) Construct Pedersen commitments (PC s1 , PC s2 , PC s3 ), and publicly store them in the blockchain; the method for constructing commitments is as follows:

[0022] PC s1 = RP·g + r s1 ·h

[0023] PC s2 = x s ·g + r s2 ·h

[0024] PC s3 = y s ·g + r s3 ·h

[0025] Among them, g and h are the generators of the elliptic curve group G.

[0026] Furthermore, step 2) includes the following steps:

[0027] 2.1) The seller submits a create auction request AuctionRequest to the smart contract on the blockchain; the auction request AuctionRequest includes the following fields: a resource description field, an auction parameter field, and an encryption parameter field; among them, the resource description includes the number of CPU cores, the memory size, and the bandwidth; the auction parameters include the starting price SP, the auction duration T, and the cache length L; the encryption parameters include and the corresponding Pedersen commitments PC s1 , PC s2 , PC s3 ;

[0028] 2.2) TPCN reads the auction request in the smart contract and verifies whether x s < x0 holds. If it does not hold, it means that the seller's request is invalid, cancels its request to create an auction, and goes back to step 2.1). Otherwise, TPCN creates an auction event on the blockchain through the smart contract, generates a unique auction identifier AID, and records the timestamp t start ; go to step 3).

[0029] Furthermore, step 3) includes the following steps:

[0030] 3.1) All participating nodes generate public-private key pairs (pk, sk) through Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECDSA), where pk = g sk mod p, the public key is registered in the blockchain smart contract, and the private key is stored locally;

[0031] 3.2) All participating buyers pay a deposit D to the smart contract.

[0032] Further, step 4) above includes the following steps:

[0033] 4.1) The buyer obtains the auction parameters, reads the auction event AID from the blockchain, and obtains x0, PC s1 、PC s3 and the remaining auction time T remain ;

[0034] 4.2) Randomly generate auxiliary point pairs (x a , y a ) and random numbers r a1 , r a2 , r a3 ; Among them, the auxiliary point (x a , y a ) satisfies x a > x0, and the random number

[0035] 4.3) Calculate the encrypted bidding triple; the calculation formula is as follows:

[0036]

[0037] 4.4) Construct a Pedersen commitment and publicly store it in the blockchain; the commitment formula is as follows:

[0038] PC a1 = P a ·g + r a1 ·h

[0039] PC a2 = x a ·g + r a2 ·h

[0040] PC a3 = y a ·g + r a3 ·h

[0041] g and h are the generators of the elliptic curve group G.

[0042] Further, step 5) above includes the following steps:

[0043] 5.1) The buyer submits a bid request BidRequest to the smart contract on the blockchain; the bid request BidRequest contains the following fields: Encryption parameters: and the corresponding Pedersen commitment PC a1 , PC a2 , PC a3 ;

[0044] 5.2) TPCN listens to the bid events on the blockchain, performs verification on each bid, and the verification method is as follows:

[0045]

[0046] If the equation holds, the bid is determined to be valid and proceed to step 6); otherwise, it is marked as invalid and the abnormal behavior is recorded, and then proceed to step 5.1).

[0047] Furthermore, the following steps are included in the comparison of prices between buyers A and B in the above step 6):

[0048] 6.1) Buyer A constructs a linear polynomial where j is the index randomly specified by TPCN;

[0049] 6.2) Use the Kate commitment algorithm to generate the commitment KC a and the witness π SP , The formula is as follows:

[0050]

[0051] 6.3) Buyer B constructs a linear polynomial where j is the index randomly specified by TPCN;

[0052] 6.4) Use the Kate commitment algorithm to generate the commitment KC a and the witness π SP , The formula is as follows;

[0053]

[0054] 6.5) Buyers A and B submit the generated commitments and witnesses to the smart contract;

[0055] 6.6) TPCN verifies the Kate commitments of buyers A and B; the method is to judge the following equation

[0056]

[0057] where r is the random challenge number, λ SPThe λ value corresponding to the starting price; if the equation holds, go to step 6.7); otherwise, it is identified as a cheating behavior, the deposit is confiscated, and it is prohibited from participating in the auction, then go to step 6);

[0058] 6.7) Compare the bid prices; the comparison method is as follows: if λ ab > 0 and λ ba < 0, then determine that P a >P b ; if λ ab < 0 and λ ba > 0, then determine that P a < P b ; if λ ab = 0 and λ ba = 0, then determine that P a = P b ; go to step 7); if the above situation is not met, that is, a contradictory result is detected (λ ab and λ ba have the same sign or are not both zero at the same time), go to step 6.8);

[0059] 6.8) Cheating detection process; buyers A and B disclose the original parameters (x a , y a ), (r a1 , r a2 , r a3 ), and recalculate the encrypted parameters. Then, TPCN checks whether the publicly disclosed parameters of both parties are consistent with the commitments on the chain. The party whose parameters are consistent with the commitments on the chain is considered honest, and the party with inconsistent parameters is determined to have malicious bidding. It is prohibited from participating in the auction, and the deposit D is confiscated. The deposit D of the cheating party is compensated to the honest party; go to step 6).

[0060] Further, the above step 7) includes the following steps:

[0061] 7.1) TPCN reads the address Addr winner of the buyer with the highest price from the smart contract and publicizes it as the proposed winner; if the bid price P w of the proposed winner is higher than the reserve price RP set by the seller, go to step 7.2), otherwise, it is considered that the auction fails and the auction ends; go to step 9)

[0062] 7.2) TPCN requires the proposed winner to open the Pederson commitment and disclose the following data: the plaintext bid price P w , the auxiliary point (x w , y w ), and the random numbers (r w1 , r w2 , r w3 );

[0063] 7.3) The TPCN performs a bilinear mapping detection to verify whether the public parameters satisfy:

[0064]

[0065] If the equation holds, the proposed winner is judged valid, and go to step 7.4); otherwise, it is considered that the proposed winner cheats, record it in the blacklist and confiscate the deposit D, compensate the deposit to other participants and re - conduct the price comparison process, and go to step 6);

[0066] 7.4) Public verification; in the case that other buyers raise objections within the valid time S, a new TPCN is selected by the buyers' vote for verification, and go to step 7), otherwise, the proposed winner is confirmed as the winner of this auction, and go to step 8).

[0067] In summary, through the deep coupling of blockchain and cryptography technologies, the present invention constructs the first edge resource auction system that supports full privacy protection, real - time dynamic bidding and has fraud resistance. This scheme reduces the "winner's curse" phenomenon through a dynamic security price comparison and public verification mechanism, improves resource allocation efficiency and incentive compatibility, and has the characteristics of privacy protection, anti - fraud and low overhead. This scheme provides a verifiable, scalable and cost - effective resource allocation solution for edge computing scenarios such as smart cities, industrial Internet of Things, and vehicle - to - everything networks that have strict requirements for privacy and real - time performance, and is expected to promote the evolution of the distributed edge computing ecosystem towards a more secure and fair direction. Brief Description of the Drawings

[0068] Figure 1 It is a flowchart of a blockchain - based privacy - enhanced edge resource auction method of the present invention. Detailed Embodiment

[0069] Next, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, rather than all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative efforts shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

[0070] The edge resource auction system of the present invention consists of four core components: seller nodes, buyer nodes, smart contracts, and third - party computing nodes (TPCN). The system realizes decentralized interaction through a blockchain network and combines cryptography technologies to ensure privacy and verifiability.

[0071] A blockchain - based privacy - enhanced edge resource auction method disclosed by the present invention, as Figure 1 shown, includes the following steps:

[0072] 1) The seller completes the initialization operation.

[0073] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, it includes the following steps:

[0074] 1.1) Randomly generate an initial point x0, an auxiliary point pair (x s , y s ), and random numbers r s1 , r s2 , r s3 ; where the initial point p is the prime order of the elliptic curve group; the auxiliary point pair (x s , y s ) satisfies x s < x0; the random numbers

[0075] 1.2) Calculate the triangular encryption parameters The calculation formula is as follows:

[0076]

[0077] where RP is the reserve price set by the seller;

[0078] 1.3) Construct Pedersen commitments (PC s1 , PC s2 , PC s3 ), and publicly store them in the blockchain; the method of constructing the commitments is as follows:

[0079] PC s1 = RP·g + r s1 ·h

[0080] PC s2 = x s ·g + r s2 ·h

[0081] PC s3 = y s ·g + r s3 ·h

[0082] where g and h are the generators of the elliptic curve group G;

[0083] 2) The seller creates an auction event.

[0084] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, it includes the following steps:

[0085] 2.1) The seller submits an auction request AuctionRequest to the smart contract on the blockchain; the auction request AuctionRequest includes the following fields: a resource description field, an auction parameter field, and an encryption parameter field; where the resource description includes the number of CPU cores, memory size, and bandwidth; the auction parameters include a starting price SP, an auction duration T, and a cache length L; the encryption parameters include and the corresponding Pedersen commitment PC s1 , PC s2 , PC s3 ;

[0086] 2.2) TPCN reads the auction request in the smart contract and verifies whether x s < x0 holds. If it does not hold, it indicates that the seller's request is invalid, cancels its request to create an auction, and goes back to step 2.1). Otherwise, TPCN creates an auction event on the blockchain through the smart contract, generates a unique auction identifier AID, and records the timestamp t start ; Go to step 3);

[0087] 3) All participating nodes register their identities with the smart contract, where the participating nodes include buyers and sellers.

[0088] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, it includes the following steps:

[0089] 3.1) All participating nodes generate a public-private key pair (pk, sk) through elliptic curve cryptography (ECDSA), where pk = g sk mod p, the public key is registered with the blockchain smart contract, and the private key is stored locally;

[0090] 3.2) All participating buyers pay a deposit D to the smart contract;

[0091] 4) The buyer communicates with the smart contract to obtain the auction parameters, generates auxiliary parameters based on the auction parameters, and calculates the encrypted bidding triple and the corresponding Pedersen commitment.

[0092] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, it includes the following steps:

[0093] 4.1) The buyer obtains the auction parameters, reads the auction event AID from the blockchain, and obtains x0, PC s1 , PC s3 and the remaining auction time T remain ;

[0094] 4.2) Randomly generate an auxiliary point pair (x a , y a ) and random numbers r a1 , r a2 , r a3; Among them, the auxiliary point (x a , y a ) satisfies x a > x0, and the random number

[0095] 4.3) Calculate the encrypted bidding triple; the calculation formula is as follows:

[0096]

[0097] 4.4) Construct a Pedersen commitment and publicly store it on the blockchain; the commitment formula is as follows:

[0098] PC a1 = P a ·g + r a1 ·h

[0099] PC a2 = x a ·g + r a2 ·h

[0100] PC a3 = y a ·g + r a3 ·h

[0101] g and h are the generators of the elliptic curve group G;

[0102] 5) The buyer applies to bid. As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, it includes the following steps:

[0103] 5.1) The buyer submits a bid request BidRequest to the smart contract on the blockchain; among them, the bid request BidRequest contains the following fields: encryption parameters: and the corresponding Pedersen commitment PC a1 , PC a2 , PC a3 ;

[0104] 5.2) TPCN listens to the bid events on the blockchain and verifies each bid. The verification method is as follows:

[0105]

[0106] If the equation holds, it is determined that the bid is valid and go to step 6), otherwise it is marked as invalid and the abnormal behavior is recorded, and go to step 5.1);

[0107] 6) The buyers compare the prices pairwise. As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the price comparison between buyer A and buyer B includes the following steps:

[0108] 6.1) Buyer A constructs a linear polynomial where j is an index randomly specified by TPCN;

[0109] 6.2) Generate the commitment KC a and the witness π SP 、 The formula is as follows:

[0110]

[0111] 6.3) Buyer B constructs a linear polynomial where j is an index randomly specified by TPCN;

[0112] 6.4) Generate the commitment KC a and the witness π SP 、 The formula is as follows;

[0113]

[0114] 6.5) Buyer A and B submit the generated commitments and witnesses to the smart contract;

[0115] 6.6) TPCN verifies the Kate commitments of Buyer A and Buyer B; The method is to judge the following equation

[0116]

[0117] where r is a random challenge number, and λ SP is the λ value corresponding to the starting price; If the equation holds, go to step 6.7); Otherwise, it is regarded as cheating behavior, the deposit is confiscated, and it is prohibited from participating in the auction, then go to step 6);

[0118] 6.7) Compare the bid prices;

[0119] The comparison method is as follows: If λ ab > 0 and λ ba < 0, then determine that P a >P b ; If λ ab < 0 and λ ba > 0, then determine that P a < P b ; If λ ab = 0 and λ ba = 0, then determine that P a = P b ; Go to step 7); If the above situation is not met, that is, a contradictory result is detected (λ ab and λ ba have the same sign or are not both zero at the same time), go to step 6.8);

[0120] 6.8) Cheating detection process;

[0121] Buyers A and B disclose the original parameters (x a ,y a ),(r a1 ,r a2 ,r a3 ) and recalculate the encryption parameters. TPCN then checks whether the public parameters of both parties are consistent with the on-chain commitment. The party that is consistent with the on-chain commitment is considered honest. The party that is inconsistent is judged to be a malicious bidder and is banned from participating in the auction. The deposit D is confiscated and the cheating party’s deposit D is paid to the honest party. Go to step 6)

[0122] 7) Winner announcement: As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the following steps are included:

[0123] 7.1) TPCN reads the highest price buyer address from the smart contract winner And be announced as the intended winner; if the intended winner bids P w If the price is higher than the reserve price set by the seller, go to step 7.2). Otherwise, the auction is deemed unsold and ends; go to step 9.

[0124] 7.2) TPCN requires the potential winner to open the Pederson commitment and disclose the following data: the plaintext bid price P w 、Auxiliary point (x w ,y w ), random number (r w1 ,r w2 ,r w3 );

[0125] 7.3) TPCN performs bilinear mapping detection to verify whether the public parameters meet the following requirements:

[0126]

[0127] If the equation holds, the proposed winner is considered valid and the process goes to step 7.4). Otherwise, the proposed winner is considered cheating and is blacklisted, with the deposit D confiscated. The deposit is compensated to the other participants and the price comparison process is repeated, so the process goes to step 6).

[0128] 7.4) Public verification;

[0129] If other buyers raise objections within the valid time S, the buyers vote to select a new TPCN for verification, and go to step 7). Otherwise, the proposed winner is confirmed as the winner of this auction, and go to step 8. In a specific embodiment of the present invention, S = 0.1T;

[0130] 8) Transaction settlement and resource allocation: The smart contract automatically deducts P from the buyer's account and transfers it to the seller. The seller releases the edge resources and the buyer obtains the resource access key. The deposit of unselected buyers is returned after deducting the handling fee.

[0131] 9) The auction has ended.

Claims

1. A privacy-enhanced edge resource auction method based on blockchain, characterized in that The steps include: 1) The seller completes the initialization operation; 2) The seller creates an auction event; 3) All participating nodes register their identities with the smart contract, including buyers and sellers; 4) The buyer communicates with the smart contract to obtain the auction parameters, generates auxiliary parameters based on the auction parameters, and calculates the encrypted bid triple and the corresponding Pedersen commitment; 5) Buyers apply to bid; 6) Buyers compare prices with each other; 7) Announcement of winners; 8) Transaction settlement and resource allocation: The smart contract automatically deducts P from the buyer's account and transfers it to the seller. The seller releases the edge resources, and the buyer obtains the resource access key. The deposit of unselected buyers is returned after deducting the handling fee. 9) The auction ends.

2. The privacy-enhanced edge resource auction method based on blockchain according to claim 1, wherein The step 1) comprises the following steps: 1.1) Randomly generate an initial point \(x_0\), an auxiliary point pair \((x s , y s ), a random number \(r s1 , r s2 , r s3 ; The initial point p is the prime order of the elliptic curve group; The auxiliary point pair \((x s , y s ), satisfies \(x s < x_0\); The random number 1.2) Calculate the triangular encryption parameters The calculation formula is as follows: Where RP is the reserve price set by the seller; 1.3) Construct the Pedersen Commitment (PC s1 , PC s2 , PC s3 ), and publicly store it in the blockchain; the commitment construction method is as follows: PC s1 = RP·g + r s1 ·h PC s2 = x s · g + r s2 · h PC s3 = y s · g + r s3 · h Among them, g and h are generators of the elliptic curve group G.

3. The blockchain-based privacy-enhanced edge resource auction method according to claim 1, wherein The step 2) comprises the following steps: 2.1) The seller submits an auction request AuctionRequest to the smart contract on the blockchain; the auction request AuctionRequest includes the following fields: a resource description field, an auction parameter field, and an encryption parameter field; where the resource description includes the number of CPU cores, the memory size, and the bandwidth; the auction parameters include the starting price SP, the auction duration T, and the cache length L; the encryption parameters include and the corresponding Pedersen commitment PC s1 ,PC s2 ,PC s3 ; 2.2) The TPCN reads the auction request in the smart contract and verifies x s <to check if x0 holds. If not, it indicates that the seller's request is invalid, cancels its request to create an auction, and goes back to step 2.1). Otherwise, the TPCN creates an auction event on the blockchain through the smart contract, generates a unique auction identifier AID, and records the timestamp t start ; Proceed to step 3).

4. The privacy-enhanced edge resource auction method based on blockchain according to claim 1, characterized in that The step 3) comprises the following steps: 3.1) All participating nodes generate public-private key pairs (pk, sk) through Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECDSA), where pk = g sk mod p, the public key is registered in the blockchain smart contract, and the private key is stored locally; 3.2) All participating buyers pay a deposit D to the smart contract.

5. The privacy-enhanced edge resource auction method based on blockchain according to claim 1, wherein, The step 4) comprises the following steps: 4.1) The buyer obtains the auction parameters, reads the auction event AID from the blockchain, and obtains x0, PC s1 , PC s3 and the remaining auction time T remain ; 4.2) Randomly generate auxiliary point pairs (x a , y a ) and random numbers r a1 , r a2 , r a3 ; among them, the auxiliary point (x a , y a ) satisfies x a > x0, and the random number 4.3) Calculate the encrypted bid triplet; the calculation formula is as follows: 4.4) Construct a Pedersen commitment and store it publicly on the blockchain. The formula for constructing the commitment is as follows: PC a1 = P a ·g + r a1 ·h PC a2 = x a ·g + r a2 ·h PC a3 = y a ·g + r a3 ·h g and h are generators of the elliptic curve group G.

6. The privacy-enhanced edge resource auction method based on blockchain according to claim 1, wherein The step 5) comprises the following steps: 5.1) The buyer submits a bid request BidRequest to the smart contract on the blockchain; the bid request BidRequest contains the following fields: Encryption parameters: and the corresponding Pedersen commitment PC a1 , PC a2 , PC a3 ; 5.2) TPCN monitors bidding events on the blockchain and verifies each bid. The verification method is as follows: If the equation holds, the bid is deemed valid and go to step 6), otherwise it is marked as invalid and the abnormal behavior is recorded, and go to step 5.1).

7. The privacy-enhanced edge resource auction method based on blockchain according to claim 1, wherein Step 6) buyers A and B compare prices, including the following steps: 6.1) Buyer A constructs a linear polynomial where j is an index randomly assigned by TPCN; 6.2) Generate a commitment KC using the Kate commitment algorithm a and a witness π SP 、π Pa , the formula is as follows: 6.3) Buyer B constructs a linear polynomial where j is an index randomly specified by TPCN; 6.4) Generate the commitment KC using the Kate commitment algorithm a and the witness π SP 、 The formula is as follows; 6.5) Buyers A and B submit the generated commitment and witness to the smart contract; 6.6) TPCN verifies the Kate commitments of buyers A and B by checking the following equation where r is a random challenge number, and λ SP is the λ value corresponding to the starting price; if the equation holds, go to step 6.7); otherwise, it is regarded as cheating behavior, the deposit is confiscated, and it is prohibited from participating in the auction, then go to step 6); 6.7) Compare the bid prices; the comparison method is as follows: If λ ab > 0 and λ ba < 0, then it is determined that P a > P b ; If λ ab < 0 and λ ba > 0, then it is determined that P a < P b ; If λ ab = 0 and λ ba = 0, then it is determined that P a = P b ; Go to step 7); If the above situation is not met, that is, a contradictory result is detected (λ ab and λ ba have the same sign or are not both zero at the same time), go to step 6.8); 6.8) Cheating detection process; Buyers A and B disclose the original parameters (x a , y a ), (r a1 , r a2 , r a3 ), and recalculate the encrypted parameters. Then, TPCN checks whether the publicly disclosed parameters of both parties are consistent with the commitments on the chain. The party whose parameters are consistent with the commitments on the chain is considered honest, while the party with inconsistent parameters is determined to have engaged in malicious bidding, prohibited from participating in the auction, and its deposit D is confiscated. The deposit D of the cheating party is then paid to the honest party; go to step 6).

8. The privacy-enhanced edge resource auction method based on blockchain according to claim 1, wherein, The step 7) comprises the following steps: 7.1) TPCN reads the address Addr of the highest bidder from the smart contract winner and publicizes it as the prospective winner; if the bid P of the prospective winner w is higher than the reserve price RP set by the seller, go to step 7.2); otherwise, consider the auction to have failed and end the auction; go to step 9 7.2) The TPCN requires the prospective winner to open the Pederson commitment and disclose the following data: the plaintext bid price P w , the auxiliary point (x w , y w ), and the random numbers (r w1 , r w2 , r w3 ); 7.3) TPCN performs bilinear mapping detection to verify whether the public parameters meet the following requirements: If the equation holds, the proposed winner is considered valid and the process goes to step 7.4). Otherwise, the proposed winner is considered cheating and is blacklisted, with the deposit D confiscated. The deposit is compensated to the other participants and the price comparison process is repeated, so the process goes to step 6). 7.4) Public Verification: If other buyers raise objections within the valid time S, the buyers vote to select a new TPCN for verification and proceed to step 7). Otherwise, the proposed winner is confirmed as the winner of this auction and proceed to step 8).

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