Method for evaluating influence of artificial obstacles on electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radar

Abstract

The invention provides a method for evaluating the influence of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of an air traffic control radar, belongs to the technical field of evaluation of the influence of the artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of the air traffic control radar in military and civil aviation airports, and solves the problem that the existing evaluation means only analyzes a certain performance index of the air traffic control radar; and the influence of the artificial obstacle on the electromagnetic environment of the air traffic control radar cannot be systematically and comprehensively evaluated. Comprising an information collection step, a protection distance judgment step, a shielding angle judgment step, a signal interference judgment step and an optimization judgment step. According to the method, whether the influence of the artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of the air traffic control radar meets the safe operation requirement or not is evaluated more comprehensively, comprehensively and accurately, optimization suggestions are provided for the design scheme of the artificial obstacles which do not meet the requirement, and the feasibility of the design scheme is improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of electromagnetic environment impact assessment of air traffic control radars in military and civil airports, and particularly to a method for assessing the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars in military and civil airports. Background Art

[0002] Air traffic control radars in military and civil airports are flight surveillance devices used in the aviation field, which can monitor the position and status information of aircraft in real time and play a crucial role in ensuring flight safety. With the rapid development of China's economy and the acceleration of modernization drive, the interference of the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars by surrounding artificial obstacles is increasing day by day, seriously affecting the safe operation of air traffic control radars and thus threatening the flight safety of aircraft. Considering the importance of the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars in military and civil airports, it is crucial to conduct assessment research on the impact of the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars.

[0003] Air traffic control radars communicate wirelessly by transmitting messages in the form of electromagnetic wave radiation. Their detection range is limited by factors such as line of sight, transmission power, and terrain and ground features. In particular, the reflection and occlusion of radio signals by large artificial obstacles will directly affect the airspace coverage ability of air traffic control radars. At present, there are few domestic literature materials on the assessment of the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars in military and civil airports. Pan Hao et al. analyzed the electromagnetic environment by calculating the safety protection area and distance of air traffic control radars; Xu Chao et al. evaluated the electromagnetic environment for safe operation by analyzing active interference phenomena. From the literature materials, it can be seen that there are few current studies on the assessment of the impact of the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars. Although some technical guidance is sporadically given in the specifications, no detailed specific indicators have been given and the content involved is less, lacking a systematic and comprehensive method for assessing the impact of the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars.

[0004] Considering the limitations of the above research, the electromagnetic environment impact of air traffic control radars has not been systematically and comprehensively evaluated, so it is impossible to rigorously and accurately evaluate whether the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars meets the requirements of safe operation. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a method for assessing the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars, which solves the problem that the existing assessment means only analyze certain performance indicators of air traffic control radars and cannot comprehensively evaluate the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars.

[0006] In the first aspect, a method for assessing the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars provided by the present invention includes the following steps:

[0007] An information collection step of collecting basic information of military and civil airports, air traffic control radar information, and artificial obstacle information;

[0008] Protection distance judgment step: judge whether the artificial obstacle meets the protection distance requirements of the air traffic control radar; if so, execute the masking angle judgment step; if not, execute the optimization judgment step;

[0009] Masking angle judgment step: judge whether the artificial obstacle meets the masking angle limit requirements of the air traffic control radar; if so, execute the signal interference judgment step; if not, execute the optimization judgment step;

[0010] Signal interference judgment step: judge whether the influence of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar meets the safety operation requirements of the air traffic control radar; if so, end the evaluation and output the evaluation result that the artificial obstacle meets the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar; if not, execute the optimization judgment step;

[0011] Optimization judgment step: judge whether the design scheme of the artificial obstacle can be optimized; if so, optimize the design scheme of the artificial obstacle and return to the information collection step; if not, end the electromagnetic environment impact assessment and output the evaluation result that the design scheme of the artificial obstacle does not meet the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar.

[0012] Furthermore, the basic information of military and civil aviation airports includes airport runways, flight procedure plans, minimum surveillance guidance altitudes, surrounding air routes, and area control zone information; the air traffic control radar information includes the geographical location, antenna altitude, equipment model, and antenna parameters of the air traffic control radar; the artificial obstacle information includes the geographical location, elevation, and design scheme of the type of the artificial obstacle to be evaluated.

[0013] Furthermore, the protection distance judgment step specifically includes:

[0014] Calculation of the maximum allowable interference voltage at the input end of the air traffic control radar receiver:

[0015]

[0016] Among them, is the effective value of the maximum allowable interference voltage, with the unit of μV; C is the increment coefficient of the maximum allowable interference voltage relative to white noise; is the effective value of the system noise voltage equivalent to the input end of the receiver, with the unit of μV, and takes 0.85 μV when 300 MHz to 3000 MHz;

[0017] Calculation of the maximum allowable interference field strength of the air traffic control radar for high-voltage overhead transmission lines, substations, railways, motor roads, and industrial, scientific, and medical radio frequency equipment:

[0018]

[0019] Among them, is the maximum allowable interference field strength, with the unit of dBμV / m; is the effective value of the maximum allowable interference voltage, with the unit of dBμV; is the operating frequency, with the unit of MHz; is the antenna gain, with the unit of dB; is the receiver input impedance, with the unit of Ω; represents the logarithmic function with base 10; is the difference between the quasi-peak field strength and the peak field strength, with the unit of dB; is the loss of the antenna-feed system, with the unit of dB;

[0020] Then, calculate the protection distance between different types of artificial obstacles and the air traffic control radar;

[0021] Calculation of the protection distance between the air traffic control radar and high-voltage overhead transmission lines and substations:

[0022]

[0023] Calculation of the protection distance between the air traffic control radar and railways:

[0024]

[0025] Calculation of the protection distance between the air traffic control radar and highways:

[0026]

[0027] Calculation of the protection distance between the air traffic control radar and high-frequency heat sealers:

[0028]

[0029] Calculation of the protection distance between the air traffic control radar and ultra-high frequency physiotherapy machines:

[0030]

[0031] Calculation of the protection distance between the air traffic control radar and high-frequency furnaces:

[0032]

[0033] Among them, is the radio interference field strength, with the unit of ; is the protection distance, with the unit of km; is the equivalent noise bandwidth of the receiver, with the unit of kHz; is the maximum allowable interference field strength, with the unit of dBμV / m; is the rated power of the high-frequency furnace, with the unit of kW;

[0034] Compare the distance between the artificial obstacle and the ATC radar with the calculated protection spacing value; if the distance between the artificial obstacle and the ATC radar is not less than the calculated value of the protection spacing, perform the shielding angle judgment step; if the distance between the artificial obstacle and the ATC radar is less than the calculated value of the protection spacing, perform the optimization judgment step.

[0035] Further, the shielding angle judgment step specifically includes:

[0036] According to the collected information of the artificial obstacle and the ATC radar, calculate the vertical shielding angle and the horizontal shielding angle of the artificial obstacle to the ATC radar. The algorithm is as follows:

[0037] Calculation of vertical shielding angle:

[0038]

[0039] Where, is the elevation of the artificial obstacle, in m; is the altitude of the ATC radar antenna, in m; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the ATC radar, in km;

[0040] If the calculated vertical shielding angle is greater than 0.25°, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the vertical shielding angle limit requirement of the ATC radar; if the calculated vertical shielding angle is not greater than 0.25°, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the vertical shielding angle limit requirement of the ATC radar;

[0041] Calculation of horizontal shielding angle:

[0042]

[0043] Where, W is the horizontal width of the artificial obstacle, in m; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the ATC radar, in km;

[0044] If the calculated horizontal shielding angle is greater than 1.5°, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the horizontal shielding angle limit requirement of the ATC radar; if the calculated horizontal shielding angle is not greater than 1.5°, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the horizontal shielding angle limit requirement of the ATC radar;

[0045] Judge whether the artificial obstacle meets the vertical shielding angle and horizontal shielding angle limit requirements of the ATC radar through the above calculations;

[0046] If at least one of the calculated vertical shielding angle and horizontal shielding angle meets the requirements, perform the signal interference judgment step; if both the vertical shielding angle and the horizontal shielding angle do not meet the requirements, perform the optimization judgment step.

[0047] Further, the signal interference judgment step specifically includes:

[0048] Based on the collected airport basic information, air traffic control radar information, and artificial obstacle information, the signal quality of the air traffic control radar is evaluated through the Fresnel zone calculation model and the line-of-sight obstruction calculation model;

[0049] Based on the collected airport basic information, air traffic control radar information, and artificial obstacle information, the signal strength of the air traffic control radar is evaluated by overlaying and analyzing the signal coverage range obtained from simulation with the airport flight procedure plan, the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the surrounding air routes, and the area control area;

[0050] If the impacts of artificial obstacles on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar simultaneously meet the safety operation requirements of the air traffic control radar, the evaluation is terminated and it is output that the artificial obstacles meet the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar; if the impacts of artificial obstacles on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar cannot simultaneously meet the safety operation requirements of the air traffic control radar, the optimization judgment step is executed.

[0051] Furthermore, the signal quality evaluation method includes the Fresnel zone and the line-of-sight obstruction calculation model, which are specifically as follows:

[0052] Calculation of the Fresnel zone radius of the air traffic control radar:

[0053]

[0054] Among them, is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, with the unit of km; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the receiving end, with the unit of km; is the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end, with the unit of km; is the electromagnetic wave propagation speed, with the unit of km / s; is the operating frequency of the air traffic control radar, with the unit of MHz;

[0055] Calculation of the theoretical altitude of the signal above the position of the artificial obstacle:

[0056]

[0057] Among them, is the altitude of the transmitting end antenna of the air traffic control radar, with the unit of m; is the elevation of the receiving end, with the unit of m;

[0058] Further calculation of the restricted height of the Fresnel zone of the air traffic control radar:

[0059]

[0060] Compare the elevation data of the artificial obstacle with the calculated Fresnel zone limit height of the air traffic control radar. If the calculated limit height is less than the elevation of the artificial obstacle, it indicates that the artificial obstacle does not meet the Fresnel zone limit requirements of the air traffic control radar; if the calculated limit height is not less than the elevation of the artificial obstacle, it indicates that the artificial obstacle meets the Fresnel zone limit requirements of the air traffic control radar;

[0061] The line-of-sight obstruction calculation model is as follows:

[0062] Calculation of the vertical obstruction angle of the artificial obstacle:

[0063]

[0064] Among them, is the elevation of the artificial obstacle, with the unit of m; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, with the unit of m; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, with the unit of km;

[0065] Further calculate the corrected obstruction angle:

[0066]

[0067] Among them, is the corrected obstruction angle, with the unit of °; is the vertical obstruction angle of the artificial obstacle, with the unit of °; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, with the unit of km;

[0068] Calculation of the line-of-sight coverage of the air traffic control radar:

[0069]

[0070] Among them, is the line-of-sight obstruction limit distance of the air traffic control radar, with the unit of km; is the corrected obstruction angle, with the unit of °; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, with the unit of m; is the elevation of the receiving end, with the unit of m;

[0071] Compare the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end with the calculated line-of-sight obstruction limit distance of the air traffic control radar. If the calculated limit distance is less than the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end, it indicates that the artificial obstacle does not meet the line-of-sight obstruction limit requirements of the air traffic control radar; if the calculated limit distance is not less than the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end, it indicates that the artificial obstacle meets the line-of-sight obstruction limit requirements of the air traffic control radar;

[0072] Judge whether the artificial obstacle meets the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction limit requirements of the air traffic control radar through the above calculations;

[0073] If it is assessed that the artificial obstacle meets both the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction limit requirements of the air traffic control radar, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality of the air traffic control radar meets the safety operation requirements; if it is assessed that the artificial obstacle cannot simultaneously meet both the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction limit requirements of the air traffic control radar, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality of the air traffic control radar does not meet the safety operation requirements.

[0074] Furthermore, the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end must be included in the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight shielding calculation models of the air traffic control radar. and the receiving end elevation Information is a known condition. At present, there is no research on the distance between air traffic control radar and receiver in China. and the receiving end elevation Make clear requirements on the specific indicators of the air traffic control radar and the receiving end; and the receiving end elevation As one of the key and difficult processes in the evaluation model, the scientific acquisition method is analyzed as follows:

[0075] Air traffic control radar is mainly used to provide surveillance data information services to controllers within the airport approach control area, while also taking into account the surveillance services of the air routes and routes around the airport and the regional control area; based on the analysis of the actual use and operating characteristics of air traffic control radar, the corresponding parameter acquisition methods for different application scenarios are studied, including analysis based on flight procedure plans, analysis based on minimum surveillance guidance altitude, analysis based on air routes and routes around the airport, and analysis based on regional control areas.

[0076] Furthermore, the analysis based on the flight procedure plan is as follows:

[0077] The flight procedure is one of the main reference bases for aircraft in the approach and departure phases. It is mainly composed of several lines representing the flight path, key points and procedure altitude representing the flight altitude, including traditional departure procedure, traditional approach procedure, traditional approach and missed approach procedure, PBN departure procedure, PBN approach procedure and PBN approach and missed approach procedure. In most cases, the aircraft will fly along the flight procedure plan; the positions of the key points of all traditional departure procedures, traditional approach procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN approach procedures and PBN approach and missed approach procedures involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacle are used as the analysis position of the air traffic control radar receiving end, and then the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end is obtained. At the same time, the program height corresponding to each key point is used as the analysis height of the air traffic control radar receiving end .

[0078] Furthermore, the analysis based on the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude is as follows:

[0079] The minimum surveillance guidance altitude usually includes several sectors with different altitude limits. Under radar guidance, air traffic controllers and flight crews use the minimum surveillance guidance altitude to interactively check and monitor whether the flight altitude of the aircraft is higher than the minimum limit altitude of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector; taking the boundary lines of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacle as the analysis positions of the receiving end of the air traffic control radar, and then obtaining the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end ; at the same time, taking the minimum limit altitude of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector as the analysis elevation of the receiving end of the air traffic control radar .

[0080] Furthermore, the analysis based on the air routes and flight paths around the airport is as follows:

[0081] There are usually air routes and flight paths in the airspace around the airport. The air routes and flight paths are mainly composed of several lines representing flight paths, waypoints, and the minimum safe altitude representing the minimum flight altitude. Aircraft fly along the air routes and flight paths at high altitudes; taking all the air routes and flight paths and waypoints involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacle as the analysis positions of the receiving end of the air traffic control radar, and then obtaining the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end ; at the same time, taking the minimum safe altitude corresponding to each air route as the analysis elevation of the receiving end of the air traffic control radar .

[0082] Furthermore, the analysis based on the area control zone is as follows:

[0083] The area control zone usually includes several sectors with different altitude limits and has a relatively large coverage area; taking the boundary lines of each area control zone sector involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacle as the analysis positions of the receiving end of the air traffic control radar, and then obtaining the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end ; at the same time, taking the minimum limit altitude of each area control zone sector as the analysis elevation of the receiving end of the air traffic control radar .

[0084] Furthermore, the signal strength evaluation method specifically includes:

[0085] Based on the geographical location of the air traffic control radar, the antenna altitude, the equipment model, and the antenna parameters, as well as the geographical location, elevation, and type of artificial obstacles, a design scheme is proposed. Using internationally recognized electromagnetic simulation tools, the radar signals are simulated to obtain the coverage range of the radar electromagnetic signals. At present, there is no specific evaluation requirement for the comprehensive analysis of the radar signal coverage range and the signal strength of air traffic control radars in China. Based on the analysis of the actual uses and operating characteristics of air traffic control radars, it is studied whether the signal strength meets the safety operation requirements under different application scenarios, including the superposition analysis of the signal coverage range and the flight procedure plan, the superposition analysis of the signal coverage range and the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the superposition analysis of the signal coverage range and the air routes around the airport, and the superposition analysis of the signal coverage range and the area control area.

[0086] If it is evaluated that the artificial obstacles simultaneously meet the signal coverage requirements of the air traffic control radar for the flight procedure plan, the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the air routes around the airport, and the area control area, it indicates that the impact of the artificial obstacles on the signal strength of the air traffic control radar meets the safety operation requirements. If it is evaluated that the artificial obstacles do not simultaneously meet the signal coverage requirements of the air traffic control radar for the flight procedure plan, the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the air routes around the airport, and the area control area, it indicates that the impact of the artificial obstacles on the signal strength of the air traffic control radar does not meet the safety operation requirements.

[0087] Furthermore, the superposition analysis of the signal coverage range and the flight procedure plan is as follows:

[0088] According to the procedure altitudes corresponding to different key points of all traditional departure procedures, traditional arrival procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN arrival procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures at the airport, the radar signal coverage ranges under different altitude scenarios are simulated. Then, the signal coverage range map is superimposed on all traditional departure procedures, traditional arrival procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN arrival procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures at the airport, and signal coverage analysis is performed on all key points of each flight procedure to determine whether each key point is included in the signal coverage range. If so, it indicates that the signal strength meets the flight procedure operation requirements. If not, it indicates that the signal strength does not meet the flight procedure operation requirements.

[0089] Furthermore, the superposition analysis of the signal coverage range and the minimum surveillance guidance altitude is as follows:

[0090] According to the minimum restricted altitude corresponding to different sectors of the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the radar signal coverage range in different altitude scenarios is simulated and obtained. Then, the signal coverage range map is overlaid with all sectors of the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, and signal coverage analysis is performed on all sectors to determine whether each sector is included in the signal coverage range. If so, it indicates that the signal strength meets the operating requirements of the minimum surveillance guidance altitude. If not, it indicates that the signal strength does not meet the operating requirements of the minimum surveillance guidance altitude.

[0091] Furthermore, the overlay analysis of the signal coverage range and the air routes around the airport is as follows:

[0092] According to the minimum safe altitude corresponding to the air routes around the airport, the radar signal coverage range in different altitude scenarios is simulated and obtained. Then, the signal coverage range map is overlaid with all the air routes around the airport, and signal coverage analysis is performed on the locations of each air route to determine whether each air route is included in the signal coverage range. If so, it indicates that the signal strength meets the operating requirements of the air routes around the airport. If not, it indicates that the signal strength does not meet the operating requirements of the air routes around the airport.

[0093] Furthermore, the overlay analysis of the signal coverage range and the area control area is as follows:

[0094] According to the minimum restricted altitude corresponding to different sectors of the area control area, the radar signal coverage range in different altitude scenarios is simulated and obtained. Then, the signal coverage range map is overlaid with all sectors of the area control area, and signal coverage analysis is performed on all sectors to determine whether each sector is included in the signal coverage range. If so, it indicates that the signal strength meets the operating requirements of the area control area. If not, it indicates that the signal strength does not meet the operating requirements of the area control area.

[0095] Furthermore, the optimization judgment steps specifically include:

[0096] The limit values meeting the safety requirements are calculated through the air traffic control radar protection distance, shielding angle, and signal interference evaluation model, and then fed back to the design party to judge whether it is reasonable and feasible, and to judge whether the proposed artificial obstacle can change the design plan, such as reducing the construction height or reselecting the location.

[0097] If so, after the design party provides a new design plan, return to the information collection step to evaluate the new design plan. If not, end the electromagnetic environment impact assessment and output the evaluation result that the artificial obstacle design plan does not meet the air traffic control radar electromagnetic environment requirements.

[0098] In a second aspect, the present invention also provides an evaluation device for the impact of artificial obstacles on the air traffic control radar electromagnetic environment, including:

[0099] An information collection module, configured to collect basic information of military and civil airports, air traffic control radar information, and artificial obstacle information;

[0100] A protection distance judgment module, configured to judge whether an artificial obstacle meets the protection distance requirements of an air traffic control radar; if so, execute the shielding angle judgment module; if not, execute the optimization judgment module;

[0101] A shielding angle judgment module, configured to judge whether an artificial obstacle meets the shielding angle limit requirements of an air traffic control radar; if so, execute the signal interference judgment module; if not, execute the optimization judgment module;

[0102] A signal interference judgment module, configured to judge whether the influence of an artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of an air traffic control radar meets the safe operation requirements of the air traffic control radar; if so, end the evaluation and output an evaluation result that the artificial obstacle meets the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar; if not, execute the optimization judgment module;

[0103] An optimization judgment module, configured to judge whether the design scheme of an artificial obstacle can be optimized; if so, optimize the design scheme of the artificial obstacle and return to the information collection module; if not, end the electromagnetic environment impact assessment and output an evaluation result that the design scheme of the artificial obstacle does not meet the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar.

[0104] Thirdly, the present invention further provides an electronic device, including a memory and a processor, where a computer program running on the processor is stored in the memory, and is characterized in that when the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the above method are implemented.

[0105] An evaluation method for the impact of an artificial obstacle on the electromagnetic environment of an air traffic control radar provided by the present invention evaluates the impact of the artificial obstacle on the air traffic control radar from multiple angles, more comprehensively, comprehensively, and accurately evaluates whether the impact of the artificial obstacle on the electromagnetic environment of the air traffic control radar meets the safe operation requirements, and proposes optimization suggestions for the design scheme of the artificial obstacle that does not meet the requirements, improving the feasibility of the design scheme.

[0106] Correspondingly, an evaluation device and an electronic device for the impact of an artificial obstacle on the electromagnetic environment of an air traffic control radar provided by an embodiment of the present invention also have the above technical effects. Description of the Drawings

[0107] In order to more clearly illustrate the specific embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings required for use in the description of the specific embodiments or the prior art. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are some embodiments of the present invention. For those of ordinary skill in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative efforts.

[0108] Figure 1 This is the flowchart of a method for evaluating the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of an air traffic control radar provided in the first embodiment of the present invention;

[0109] Figure 2 This is the schematic diagram of the horizontal shielding of a proposed artificial obstacle to an air traffic control radar provided in the method of the second embodiment of the present invention;

[0110] Figure 3 This is the schematic diagram of the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight shielding analysis based on the minimum surveillance guidance altitude provided in the method of the second embodiment of the present invention;

[0111] Figure 4 This is the schematic diagram of the signal coverage range corresponding to an altitude of 3600m provided in the method of the second embodiment of the present invention;

[0112] Figure 5 This is the schematic diagram of the superposition analysis of the 3600m sector of the minimum surveillance guidance altitude and the signal coverage range provided in the method of the second embodiment of the present invention;

[0113] Figure 6 This is the schematic diagram of the structure of the evaluation device provided in the third embodiment of the present invention;

[0114] Figure 7 This is the schematic diagram of the structure of the electronic device provided in the fourth embodiment of the present invention. Detailed implementation manners

[0115] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Apparently, the described embodiments are some, but not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. All other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without making creative efforts fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

[0116] The terms "including" and "having" and any variations thereof mentioned in the embodiments of the present invention are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion. For example, a process, method, system, product, or device that includes a series of steps or units is not limited to the listed steps or units, but optionally further includes other steps or units not listed, or optionally further includes other steps or units inherent to these processes, methods, products, or devices.

[0117] Embodiment 1:

[0118] As Figure 1 shown, a method for evaluating the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of an air traffic control radar provided in the embodiment of the present invention includes the following steps:

[0119] S101: Information collection step, collecting basic information of military and civil aviation airports, air traffic control radar information, and artificial obstacle information;

[0120] S102: Protection distance judgment step, judging whether the artificial obstacle meets the protection distance requirements of the air traffic control radar; if so, execute step S103; if not, execute step S105;

[0121] S103: Masking angle judgment step, judging whether the artificial obstacle meets the masking angle limit requirements of the air traffic control radar; if so, execute step S104; if not, execute step S105;

[0122] S104: Signal interference judgment step, judging whether the influence of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar meets the safe operation requirements of the air traffic control radar; if so, end the evaluation and output the evaluation result that the artificial obstacle meets the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar; if not, execute step S105;

[0123] S105: Optimization judgment step, judging whether the design scheme of the artificial obstacle can be optimized; if so, optimize the design scheme of the artificial obstacle and return to step S101; if not, end the electromagnetic environment impact assessment and output the evaluation result that the design scheme of the artificial obstacle does not meet the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar.

[0124] Evaluate the impact of artificial obstacles on air traffic control radar from multiple perspectives, more comprehensively and accurately evaluate whether the electromagnetic environment of the air traffic control radar meets the safe operation requirements, and put forward optimization suggestions for the design schemes of artificial obstacles that do not meet the requirements, improving the feasibility of the design schemes.

[0125] In a possible implementation manner, the basic information of military and civil aviation airports includes airport runways, flight procedure plans, minimum surveillance guidance altitudes, surrounding air routes, and area control area information; the air traffic control radar information includes the geographical location of the air traffic control radar, antenna altitude, equipment model, and antenna parameters; the artificial obstacle information includes the geographical location, elevation, and type design scheme of the artificial obstacle to be evaluated; collect the above information to complete the subsequent evaluation work.

[0126] In a possible implementation manner, the step S102 specifically includes:

[0127] Calculation of the maximum allowable interference voltage at the input end of the air traffic control radar receiver:

[0128]

[0129] Among them, is the effective value of the maximum allowable interference voltage, with the unit of μV; C is the increment coefficient relative to the maximum allowable interference voltage of white noise, and the value is shown in Table 1; It is the effective value of the system noise voltage equivalent to the receiver input, with the unit of μV, taking 0.85 μV when the frequency is from 300 MHz to 3000 MHz;

[0130] Table 1 Increment Coefficients Corresponding to Different Types of Interference

[0131]

[0132] Calculation of the maximum allowable interference field strength of an air traffic control radar on high-voltage overhead transmission lines, substations, railways, motorways, and industrial, scientific, and medical radio frequency equipment:

[0133]

[0134] Among them, is the maximum allowable interference field strength, with the unit of dBμV / m; is the effective value of the maximum allowable interference voltage, with the unit of dBμV; is the operating frequency, with the unit of MHz; is the antenna gain, with the unit of dB; is the receiver input impedance, with the unit of Ω; represents the logarithmic function with base 10; is the difference between the quasi-peak field strength and the peak field strength, with the unit of dB, and the values are shown in Table 2; is the loss of the antenna-feed system, with the unit of dB;

[0135] Table 2 Difference between Quasi-Peak Field Strength and Peak Field Strength

[0136]

[0137] Then, calculate the protection distances between different types of artificial obstacles and the air traffic control radar;

[0138] Calculation of the protection distances of an air traffic control radar on high-voltage overhead transmission lines and substations:

[0139]

[0140] Calculation of the protection distance of an air traffic control radar on railways:

[0141]

[0142] Calculation of the protection distance of an air traffic control radar on motorways:

[0143]

[0144] Calculation of the protection distance of an air traffic control radar on high-frequency heat sealers:

[0145]

[0146] Calculation of the interference protection distance between an air traffic control radar and an ultra-high frequency physiotherapy machine:

[0147]

[0148] Calculation of the interference protection distance between an air traffic control radar and a high-frequency furnace:

[0149]

[0150] Among them, is the radio interference field strength, with the unit of ; is the protection distance, with the unit of km; is the equivalent noise bandwidth of the receiver, with the unit of kHz; is the maximum allowable interference field strength, with the unit of dBμV / m; is the rated power of the high-frequency furnace, with the unit of kW;

[0151] Compare the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar with the calculated value of the protection distance; if the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar is not less than the calculated value of the protection distance, then execute step S103; if the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar is less than the calculated value of the protection distance, then execute step S105.

[0152] In a possible implementation manner, the step S103 specifically includes:

[0153] According to the collected information of the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, calculate the vertical shielding angle and the horizontal shielding angle of the artificial obstacle to the air traffic control radar:

[0154] Calculation of the vertical shielding angle:

[0155]

[0156] Among them, is the elevation of the artificial obstacle, with the unit of m; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, with the unit of m; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, with the unit of km;

[0157] If the calculated vertical shielding angle is greater than 0.25°, it indicates that the artificial obstacle does not meet the vertical shielding angle limit requirement of the air traffic control radar; if the calculated vertical shielding angle is not greater than 0.25°, it indicates that the artificial obstacle meets the vertical shielding angle limit requirement of the air traffic control radar;

[0158] Calculation of the horizontal shielding angle:

[0159]

[0160] Wherein, W is the horizontal width of the artificial obstacle, with the unit of m; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the ATC radar, with the unit of km;

[0161] If the calculated horizontal masking angle is greater than 1.5°, it indicates that the artificial obstacle does not meet the requirements of the horizontal masking angle limit of the ATC radar; if the calculated horizontal masking angle is not greater than 1.5°, it indicates that the artificial obstacle meets the requirements of the horizontal masking angle limit of the ATC radar;

[0162] Determine whether the artificial obstacle meets the requirements of the vertical masking angle and horizontal masking angle limits of the ATC radar through the above calculations;

[0163] If at least one of the calculated vertical masking angle and horizontal masking angle meets the requirements, then execute step S104; if both the vertical masking angle and the horizontal masking angle do not meet the requirements, then execute step S105.

[0164] In a possible implementation manner, the step S104 specifically includes:

[0165] According to the collected airport basic information, ATC radar information, and artificial obstacle information, evaluate the signal quality of the ATC radar through the Fresnel zone calculation model and the line-of-sight masking calculation model;

[0166] According to the collected airport basic information, ATC radar information, and artificial obstacle information, evaluate the signal strength of the ATC radar by superimposing and analyzing the signal coverage range obtained from the simulation with the airport flight procedure plan, the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the surrounding air routes, and the area control area;

[0167] If the influence of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the ATC radar simultaneously meets the requirements for the safe operation of the ATC radar, then end the evaluation and output that the artificial obstacle meets the electromagnetic environment requirements of the ATC radar; if the influence of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the ATC radar cannot simultaneously meet the requirements for the safe operation of the ATC radar, then execute step S105.

[0168] Based on the research of relevant data, analyze and calculate the signal quality and signal strength of the ATC radar, and evaluate the influence degree of the artificial obstacle on the ATC radar.

[0169] In a possible implementation manner, the signal quality evaluation method includes the Fresnel zone and the line-of-sight masking calculation model, specifically as follows:

[0170] Calculation of the Fresnel zone radius of the ATC radar:

[0171]

[0172] Wherein, is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the receiving end, in km; is the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end, in km; is the electromagnetic wave propagation speed, in km / s; is the operating frequency of the air traffic control radar, in MHz;

[0173] Calculation of the theoretical altitude of the signal above the location of the artificial obstacle:

[0174]

[0175] Among them, is the altitude of the transmitting antenna of the air traffic control radar, in m; is the elevation of the receiving end, in m;

[0176] Further calculate the Fresnel zone limit height of the air traffic control radar:

[0177]

[0178] Compare the elevation data of the artificial obstacle with the calculated Fresnel zone limit height of the air traffic control radar. If the calculated limit height is less than the elevation of the artificial obstacle, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the Fresnel zone limit requirements of the air traffic control radar; if the calculated limit height is not less than the elevation of the artificial obstacle, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the Fresnel zone limit requirements of the air traffic control radar;

[0179] The line-of-sight occlusion calculation model is as follows:

[0180] Calculation of the vertical occlusion angle of the artificial obstacle:

[0181]

[0182] Among them, is the elevation of the artificial obstacle, in m; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, in m; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km;

[0183] Further calculate the corrected occlusion angle:

[0184]

[0185] Among them, is the corrected occlusion angle, in °; is the vertical occlusion angle of the artificial obstacle, in °; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km;

[0186] Air traffic control radar line-of-sight coverage calculation:

[0187]

[0188] in, The air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit distance, in km; To correct the shielding angle, the unit is °; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, in meters; is the receiving end elevation, in m;

[0189] Compare the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiver with the calculated air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit distance. If the calculated limit distance is smaller than the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiver, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit requirement. If the calculated limit distance is not smaller than the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiver, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit requirement.

[0190] The above calculations are used to determine whether the artificial obstacle meets the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction requirements of the air traffic control radar;

[0191] If it is assessed that the artificial obstacle meets both the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction limit requirements of the air traffic control radar, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality of the air traffic control radar meets the safety operation requirements; if it is assessed that the artificial obstacle cannot simultaneously meet both the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction limit requirements of the air traffic control radar, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality of the air traffic control radar does not meet the safety operation requirements.

[0192] In a possible implementation, the air traffic control radar Fresnel zone and the line-of-sight shielding calculation model must both include the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end. and the receiving end elevation Information is a known condition. At present, there is no research on the distance between air traffic control radar and receiver in China. and the receiving end elevation Make clear requirements on the specific indicators of the air traffic control radar and the receiving end; and the receiving end elevation As one of the key and difficult processes in the evaluation model, the scientific acquisition method is analyzed as follows:

[0193] Air traffic control radar is primarily used to provide surveillance data and information services to controllers within the airport approach control area. It also provides surveillance services for air routes and regional control areas surrounding the airport. Based on an analysis of the actual use and operational characteristics of air traffic control radar, this study studies the corresponding parameter acquisition methods for different application scenarios, including analysis based on flight procedures, analysis based on minimum surveillance guidance altitudes, analysis based on air routes and routes surrounding the airport, and analysis based on regional control areas.

[0194] Analysis based on flight procedure plan: As one of the main references for aircraft during the departure and arrival phases, the flight procedure mainly consists of several lines representing flight paths, key points, and procedure altitudes representing flight heights, including traditional departure procedures, traditional arrival procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN arrival procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures. In most cases, the aircraft will fly along the flight procedure plan. Use AutoCAD to draw all the flight procedures of the airport. Take the positions of the key points of all traditional departure procedures, traditional arrival procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN arrival procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures involved in the direction of the connection line between the ATC radar and the artificial obstacle as the analysis positions of the ATC radar receiving end, and then obtain the distance between the ATC radar and the receiving end. At the same time, take the procedure altitude corresponding to each key point as the analysis elevation of the ATC radar receiving end. .

[0195] Analysis based on the minimum surveillance guidance altitude: The minimum surveillance guidance altitude usually consists of several sectors with different altitude restrictions. Under radar guidance, air traffic controllers and flight crews use the minimum surveillance guidance altitude to interactively check and monitor whether the flight altitude of the aircraft is higher than the minimum restricted altitude of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector. Use AutoCAD to draw the minimum surveillance guidance altitude of the airport. Take the boundary lines of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector involved in the direction of the connection line between the ATC radar and the artificial obstacle as the analysis positions of the ATC radar receiving end, and then obtain the distance between the ATC radar and the receiving end. At the same time, take the minimum restricted altitude of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector as the analysis elevation of the ATC radar receiving end. .

[0196] Analysis based on the air routes around the airport: There are usually air routes in the airspace around the airport. The air routes mainly consist of several lines representing flight paths, waypoints, and the minimum safe altitude representing the minimum flight height. Aircraft will fly along the air routes at high altitudes. Use AutoCAD to draw the air routes around the airport. Take all the air routes and waypoints involved in the direction of the connection line between the ATC radar and the artificial obstacle as the analysis positions of the ATC radar receiving end, and then obtain the distance between the ATC radar and the receiving end. At the same time, take the minimum safe altitude corresponding to each air route as the analysis elevation of the ATC radar receiving end. .

[0197] Analysis based on the Area Control Zone: The Area Control Zone usually contains several sectors with different altitude restrictions and has a relatively large coverage area. The Area Control Zone is drawn using AutoCAD. The sector boundary lines of each Area Control Zone involved in the connection direction between the ATC radar and the artificial obstacle are used as the analysis positions of the ATC radar receiving end, and then the distance between the ATC radar and the receiving end is obtained. At the same time, the lowest restricted altitude of each sector of the Area Control Zone is used as the analysis elevation of the ATC radar receiving end. .

[0198] In a possible implementation manner, the signal strength evaluation method specifically includes:

[0199] Based on the design scheme of the ATC radar geographical location, antenna altitude, equipment model, and antenna parameters, as well as the artificial obstacle geographical location, elevation, and type, software with electromagnetic wave propagation simulation and analysis functions is used. In this case, the software EMACS is selected to obtain the coverage area of the radar electromagnetic signal. Then, based on the analysis of the actual use and operation characteristics of the ATC radar, it is studied whether the signal strength meets the safety operation requirements under different application scenarios, including the superposition analysis of the signal coverage area and the flight procedure scheme, the superposition analysis of the signal coverage area and the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the superposition analysis of the signal coverage area and the airport surrounding air routes, and the superposition analysis of the signal coverage area and the Area Control Zone.

[0200] Superposition analysis of the signal coverage area and the flight procedure scheme: According to the procedure altitudes corresponding to different key points of all traditional departure procedures, traditional approach procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN approach procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures at the airport, the radar signal coverage areas in different altitude scenarios are simulated and obtained. The airport traditional departure procedures, traditional approach procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN approach procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures are drawn using AutoCAD. Then, the signal coverage area map is superimposed on all the flight procedures at the airport, and signal coverage analysis is performed on all the key points of each flight procedure to determine whether each key point is included in the signal coverage area. If so, it indicates that the signal strength meets the flight procedure operation requirements; if not, it indicates that the signal strength does not meet the flight procedure operation requirements.

[0201] Superposition analysis of signal coverage range and minimum surveillance guidance altitude: Based on the minimum restricted altitudes corresponding to different sectors of the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, simulate and obtain the radar signal coverage ranges under different altitude scenarios; use AutoCAD to draw the minimum surveillance guidance altitude of the airport; then superpose the signal coverage range map with all sectors of the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, and conduct signal coverage analysis on all sectors to determine whether each sector is included in the signal coverage range; if so, it indicates that the signal strength meets the operating requirements of the minimum surveillance guidance altitude; if not, it indicates that the signal strength does not meet the operating requirements of the minimum surveillance guidance altitude;

[0202] Superposition analysis of signal coverage range and air routes around the airport: Based on the minimum safe altitudes corresponding to the air routes around the airport, simulate and obtain the radar signal coverage ranges under different altitude scenarios; use AutoCAD to draw the air routes around the airport; then superpose the signal coverage range map with all air routes around the airport, and conduct signal coverage analysis on the locations of each air route to determine whether each air route is included in the signal coverage range; if so, it indicates that the signal strength meets the operating requirements of the air routes around the airport; if not, it indicates that the signal strength does not meet the operating requirements of the air routes around the airport;

[0203] Superposition analysis of signal coverage range and area control area: Based on the minimum restricted altitudes corresponding to different sectors of the area control area, simulate and obtain the radar signal coverage ranges under different altitude scenarios; use AutoCAD to draw the area control area; then superpose the signal coverage range map with all sectors of the area control area, and conduct signal coverage analysis on all sectors to determine whether each sector is included in the signal coverage range; if so, it indicates that the signal strength meets the operating requirements of the area control area; if not, it indicates that the signal strength does not meet the operating requirements of the area control area;

[0204] If it is evaluated that the artificial obstacle simultaneously meets the signal coverage requirements of the air traffic control radar for the flight procedure plan, minimum surveillance guidance altitude, air routes around the airport, and area control area, it indicates that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal strength of the air traffic control radar meets the safety operation requirements; if it is evaluated that the artificial obstacle cannot simultaneously meet the signal coverage requirements of the air traffic control radar for the flight procedure plan, minimum surveillance guidance altitude, air routes around the airport, and area control area, it indicates that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal strength of the air traffic control radar does not meet the safety operation requirements.

[0205] In a possible implementation manner, the step S105 specifically includes:

[0206] The limiting values that meet the safety requirements are calculated through the evaluation models of the protection distance, shielding angle, and signal interference of the air traffic control radar, and then fed back to the design party to determine whether it is reasonable and feasible, and to judge whether the proposed artificial obstacle can change the design plan, such as reducing the construction height or reselecting the site;

[0207] If so, after the design party provides a new design plan, return to step S101 to evaluate the new design plan; if not, end the electromagnetic environment impact assessment and output the evaluation result that the design plan of the artificial obstacle does not meet the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar.

[0208] Example 2:

[0209] The basic information of a certain airport and related air traffic control radars was collected through a combination of querying materials and actual sampling.

[0210] The basic information of the artificial obstacle to be evaluated was obtained by querying the design plan of the construction project.

[0211] Table 3 Relative position relationship between the proposed artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar

[0212]

[0213] Through consulting materials and on-site research, the following relevant parameters of the air traffic control radar and the substation were further obtained: the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna is 35m; the operating frequency of the air traffic control radar is 1030MHz; the antenna gain is 3dB; the input impedance of the receiver is 50Ω; the difference between the quasi-peak field strength and the peak field strength is -14dB; the loss of the antenna-feeder system is 1dB; the equivalent noise bandwidth of the receiver is 15MHz; the increment coefficient C of the maximum allowable interference voltage relative to white noise is 3; the substation level is 220kV, and the corresponding radio interference field strength limit value is 53dBμV / m. Substitute the data into the calculation model to calculate the protection distance between the substation and the air traffic control radar.

[0214] The maximum allowable interference voltage at the input end of the air traffic control radar receiver ;

[0215] The maximum allowable interference field strength of the air traffic control radar on the substation ;

[0216] [[ID=#]]The interference protection distance of the air traffic control radar on the substation .

[0217] After analysis, the closest distance between the proposed artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar is 2,660 m, which is greater than the limit of the protection distance. Therefore, the proposed artificial obstacle meets the requirements of the protection distance for the air traffic control radar, and it is necessary to further conduct an evaluation of the shielding angle.

[0218] Calculate the vertical shielding angle based on the closest distance between the project boundary point and the air traffic control radar:

[0219]

[0220] According to the collected data, draw the horizontal shielding diagram of the proposed project for the air traffic control radar, as Figure 2 shown, Figure 2 in which A is the air traffic control radar and B is the proposed project. The horizontal width of the proposed project relative to the air traffic control radar is 150 m. Further calculate the horizontal shielding angle:

[0221]

[0222] After analysis, the horizontal shielding angle of the proposed artificial obstacle exceeds the limit requirements, and the vertical shielding angle meets the limit requirements. Through comprehensive evaluation, it is obtained that the artificial obstacle meets the requirements of the shielding angle for the air traffic control radar, and it is necessary to further conduct a signal interference evaluation.

[0223] The signal interference evaluation includes signal quality evaluation and signal strength evaluation. First, conduct an evaluation and analysis of the signal quality of the air traffic control radar.

[0224] With the help of AutoCAD, draw the flight procedures, minimum surveillance guidance altitude, en-route airways and routes around the airport, and area control area involved in the connection direction between the air traffic control radar and the proposed project. Figure 3 is the minimum surveillance guidance altitude map, Figure 3 in which 01 is the 900 m altitude sector, 02 is the 2,100 m altitude sector, 07 is the 3,000 m altitude sector, and 08 is the 3,600 m altitude sector; based on the minimum surveillance guidance altitude as an example, analyze the elevation of the receiving end corresponding to each sector and the distances from the air traffic control radar respectively, and then substitute the data into the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight shielding calculation models. The calculation results are as follows:

[0225] Table 4 Fresnel zone calculation results based on the minimum surveillance guidance altitude

[0226]

[0227] Table 5 Line-of-sight shielding calculation results based on the minimum surveillance guidance altitude

[0228]

[0229] After analysis, the artificial obstacles meet the limitation requirements for the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight occlusion of the ATC radar based on the minimum surveillance guidance altitude. Similarly, after extracting the data analyzed from the flight procedures, the air routes around the airport, and the area control area and substituting them into the calculation model, it is comprehensively evaluated that the artificial obstacles meet the requirements for the signal quality of the ATC radar, and the signal strength evaluation needs to be continued.

[0230] Based on the geographical location of the ATC radar, the antenna altitude, the equipment model, and the antenna parameters, as well as the design scheme of the geographical location, elevation, and type of the artificial obstacles, the EMACS simulation tool is used to simulate the radar signals, and the coverage range of the radar electromagnetic signals at different receiving altitudes is obtained. Figure 4 The figure shows the signal coverage corresponding to an altitude of 3600m as an example, and the red area represents the signal coverage area.

[0231] Next, AutoCAD is used to draw all the flight procedures of the airport, the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the air routes around the airport, and the area control area, and then the signal coverage maps at different receiving altitudes are respectively superimposed and analyzed with the corresponding flight procedures, the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the air routes around the airport, and the area control area. Figure 5 Taking the superposition analysis of the sector with a minimum surveillance guidance altitude of 3600m and the signal coverage map as an example, the signal strength of the ATC radar is evaluated. Figure 5 In the figure, 08 is the sector at an altitude of 3600m, and the evaluation result is that the signal strength requirement is met. Similarly, the other altitude sectors, the flight procedures, the air routes around the airport, and the area control area are respectively superimposed and analyzed with the signal coverage maps at different receiving altitudes, and it is comprehensively evaluated that the artificial obstacles meet the signal strength requirements of the ATC radar.

[0232] Finally, the evaluation is ended and the evaluation result that the proposed artificial obstacles meet the requirements of the electromagnetic environment of the ATC radar of the airport to be evaluated is output.

[0233] Embodiment 3:

[0234] As Figure 6 shown, the embodiment of the present invention also provides an evaluation device for the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of an ATC radar, including:

[0235] An information collection module 1, configured to collect basic information of military and civil airports, ATC radar information, and artificial obstacle information;

[0236] A protection distance judgment module 2, configured to judge whether the artificial obstacles meet the protection distance requirements of the ATC radar; if so, execute the occlusion angle judgment module; if not, execute the optimization judgment module;

[0237] The shielding angle judgment module 3 is used to judge whether the artificial obstacle meets the requirements of the shielding angle limit of the air traffic control radar; if so, the signal interference judgment module is executed; if not, the optimization judgment module is executed;

[0238] The signal interference judgment module 4 is used to judge whether the influence of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar meets the requirements for the safe operation of the air traffic control radar; if so, the evaluation is ended and the evaluation result that the artificial obstacle meets the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar is output; if not, the optimization judgment module is executed;

[0239] The optimization judgment module 5 is used to judge whether the design scheme of the artificial obstacle can be optimized; if so, the design scheme of the artificial obstacle is optimized and the information collection module is returned; if not, the electromagnetic environment impact assessment is ended and the evaluation result that the design scheme of the artificial obstacle does not meet the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar is output.

[0240] Embodiment 4:

[0241] The embodiment of the present invention also provides an electronic device, as Figure 7 shown, the electronic device 800 includes a memory 801 and a processor 802. A computer program running on the processor is stored in the memory. When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the method provided in the above embodiment are implemented.

[0242] As Figure 7 shown, the electronic device further includes: a bus 803 and a communication interface 804. The processor 802, the communication interface 804 and the memory 801 are connected through the bus 803; the processor 802 is used to execute the executable module stored in the memory 801, such as a computer program.

[0243] Among them, the memory 801 may include a high-speed random access memory, and may also include a non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk memory. Through at least one communication interface 804, a communication connection between the storage system network element and at least one other network element can be realized, and the Internet, wide area network, local area network, and metropolitan area network can be used.

[0244] The bus 803 may be an ISA bus, a PCI bus or an EISA bus. The bus can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, and a control bus. For the sake of convenience of representation, Figure 7 only a bidirectional arrow is used in the figure, but it does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.

[0245] Among them, the memory 801 is used to store a program. After receiving the execution instruction, the processor 802 executes the program. The method executed by the device defined by the process disclosed in any of the foregoing embodiments of the present invention can be applied to the processor 802 or implemented by the processor 802.

[0246] The processor 802 may be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capabilities. In the implementation process, each step of the above method can be completed by the integrated logic circuit in the hardware of the processor 802 or instructions in the form of software. The above-mentioned processor 802 may be a general-purpose processor, including a central processor and a network processor; it may also be a digital signal processor, an application-specific integrated circuit, a field-programmable gate array, or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components. It can implement or execute the various methods, steps, and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of the present invention. The general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor. The steps of the method disclosed in combination with the embodiments of the present invention can be directly embodied as being executed by a hardware decoding processor, or executed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor. The software module may be located in a random access memory, flash memory, read-only memory, programmable read-only memory, or electrically erasable programmable memory, register, which are mature storage media in the art. The storage media is located in the memory 801, and the processor 802 reads the information in the memory 801 and combines its hardware to complete the steps of the above method.

[0247] Corresponding to the above method, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores machine-executable instructions. When the computer-executable instructions are called and run by a processor, the computer-executable instructions cause the processor to run the steps of the above method.

[0248] The device provided by the embodiments of the present invention may be specific hardware on the device or software or firmware installed on the device. The implementation principle and the technical effects produced by the device provided by the embodiments of the present invention are the same as those of the foregoing method embodiments. For the sake of brief description, for the parts not mentioned in the device embodiments, reference may be made to the corresponding content in the foregoing method embodiments. Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the systems, devices, and units described above can all refer to the corresponding processes in the above method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0249] In several embodiments provided by the present invention, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and method can also be implemented in other ways. The apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For example, the flowcharts and block diagrams in the accompanying drawings show the possible architectures, functions, and operations of an apparatus, a method, and a computer program product according to multiple embodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each block in the flowchart or block diagram may represent a module, a program segment, or a part of code, and the module, program segment, or part of code contains one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function. It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions marked in the blocks may occur in a different order from that marked in the accompanying drawings. For example, two consecutive blocks may actually be executed substantially in parallel, and they may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending on the functions involved. It should also be noted that each block in the block diagram and / or flowchart, as well as the combination of blocks in the block diagram and / or flowchart, can be implemented by a dedicated hardware-based system for performing the specified functions or actions, or can be implemented by a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.

[0250] For another example, the division of the units is only a logical function division, and there may be other division methods in actual implementation. For another example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the displayed or discussed coupling or direct coupling or communication connection to each other may be through some communication interfaces, and the indirect coupling or communication connection of the devices or units may be in an electrical, mechanical, or other form.

[0251] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed to multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

[0252] If the described function is implemented in the form of a software function unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art or part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for causing a computer device to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: USB flash drives, mobile hard disks, read-only memories, random access memories, magnetic disks, or optical discs, and various media that can store program codes.

[0253] Finally, it should be noted that the above-described embodiments are only specific embodiments of the present invention, used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than limiting it. The protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those of ordinary skill in the art should understand that any person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention can still modify the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments or can easily think of changes, or perform equivalent replacements on some of the technical features; and these modifications, changes or replacements do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention. All should be covered within the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. An evaluation method for the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radar, characterized in that, It includes the following steps: Information collection step: Collect basic information of military and civil airports, air traffic control radar information, and artificial obstacle information; Protection distance judgment step: Judge whether the artificial obstacle meets the protection distance requirements of the air traffic control radar; if so, execute the shielding angle judgment step; if not, execute the optimization judgment step; Shielding angle judgment step: Judge whether the artificial obstacle meets the shielding angle limit requirements of the air traffic control radar; if so, execute the signal interference judgment step; if not, execute the optimization judgment step; Signal interference judgment step: Judge whether the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar meets the safety operation requirements of the air traffic control radar; if so, end the evaluation and output the evaluation result that the artificial obstacle meets the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar; if not, execute the optimization judgment step; Optimization judgment step: Judge whether the design scheme of the artificial obstacle can be optimized; if so, optimize the design scheme of the artificial obstacle and return to the information collection step; If not, end the electromagnetic environment impact assessment and output the evaluation result that the design scheme of the artificial obstacle does not meet the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The basic information of the military and civil airports includes airport runways, flight procedure plans, minimum surveillance guidance altitudes, surrounding air routes, and area control area information; the air traffic control radar information includes the geographical location of the air traffic control radar, antenna altitude, equipment model, and antenna parameters; the artificial obstacle information includes the geographical location, elevation, and type of the artificial obstacle to be evaluated.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The protection distance judgment step specifically includes: Calculation of the maximum allowable interference voltage at the input end of the air traffic control radar receiver: ； Among them, is the effective value of the maximum allowable interference voltage, with the unit of μV; C is the increment coefficient relative to the maximum allowable interference voltage of white noise; is the effective value of the system noise voltage equivalent to the input end of the receiver, with the unit of μV, and it is taken as 0.85 μV when it is 300 MHz to 3000 MHz; Calculation of the maximum allowable interference field strength of the air traffic control radar for high-voltage overhead transmission lines, substations, railways, motorways, and industrial, scientific, and medical radio frequency equipment: ； Among them, is the maximum allowable interference field strength, with the unit of dBμV / m; is the effective value of the maximum allowable interference voltage, with the unit of dBμV; is the operating frequency, with the unit of MHz; is the antenna gain, with the unit of dB; is the receiver input impedance, with the unit of Ω; represents the logarithmic function with base 10; is the difference between the quasi-peak field strength and the peak field strength, with the unit of dB; is the loss of the antenna-feed system, with the unit of dB; Then calculate the protection distance between different types of artificial obstacles and the air traffic control radar; Calculation of the interference protection distance of the air traffic control radar for high-voltage overhead transmission lines and substations: ； Calculation of the interference protection distance of the air traffic control radar for railways: ； Calculation of the interference protection distance of the air traffic control radar for motorways: ； Calculation of the interference protection distance of the air traffic control radar for high-frequency heat sealers: ； Calculation of the interference protection distance of the air traffic control radar for ultra-high frequency physiotherapy machines: ； Calculation of the interference protection distance of the air traffic control radar for high-frequency furnaces: ； Among them, is the radio interference field strength, with the unit of ; is the protection distance, with the unit of km; is the equivalent noise bandwidth of the receiver, with the unit of kHz; is the maximum allowable interference field strength, with the unit of dBμV / m; is the rated power of the high-frequency furnace, with the unit of kW; Compare the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar with the calculated protection distance value; if the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar is not less than the calculated protection distance value, execute the shielding angle judgment step; if the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar is less than the calculated protection distance value, execute the optimization judgment step.

4. The method according to claim 3, wherein The shielding angle judgment step specifically includes: According to the collected artificial obstacle information and air traffic control radar information, calculate the vertical shielding angle and horizontal shielding angle of the artificial obstacle to the air traffic control radar. The algorithm is as follows: Calculation of the vertical shielding angle: ； wherein, is the elevation of the artificial obstacle, in m; is the altitude of the ATC radar antenna, in m; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the ATC radar, in km; If the calculated vertical shielding angle is greater than 0.25°, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the vertical shielding angle limit requirements of the air traffic control radar; if the calculated vertical shielding angle is not greater than 0.25°, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the vertical shielding angle limit requirements of the air traffic control radar; Calculation of the horizontal shielding angle: ； Wherein, W is the horizontal width of the artificial obstacle, with the unit of m; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, with the unit of km; If the calculated horizontal masking angle is greater than 1.5°, it indicates that the artificial obstacle does not meet the requirements of the horizontal masking angle limit of the ATC radar; if the calculated horizontal masking angle is not greater than 1.5°, it indicates that the artificial obstacle meets the requirements of the horizontal masking angle limit of the ATC radar; Judge whether the artificial obstacle meets the requirements of the vertical masking angle and horizontal masking angle limits of the ATC radar through the above calculations; If at least one of the calculated vertical masking angle and horizontal masking angle meets the requirements, execute the signal interference judgment step; if both the vertical masking angle and the horizontal masking angle do not meet the requirements, execute the optimization judgment step.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The signal interference judgment step specifically includes: According to the collected basic airport information, ATC radar information and artificial obstacle information, evaluate the signal quality of the ATC radar through the Fresnel zone calculation model and the line-of-sight masking calculation model; According to the collected basic airport information, ATC radar information and artificial obstacle information, evaluate the signal strength of the ATC radar by overlaying and analyzing the signal coverage range obtained from simulation with the airport flight procedure plan, the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the surrounding air routes and the area control area; If the impacts of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the ATC radar simultaneously meet the requirements for the safe operation of the ATC radar, end the evaluation and output that the artificial obstacle meets the electromagnetic environment requirements of the ATC radar; if the impacts of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the ATC radar cannot simultaneously meet the requirements for the safe operation of the ATC radar, execute the optimization judgment step.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The signal quality evaluation method includes the Fresnel zone and the line-of-sight masking calculation model, specifically as follows: Calculation of the Fresnel zone radius of the ATC radar: ； Among them, is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, with the unit of km; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the receiving end, with the unit of km; is the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end, with the unit of km; is the propagation speed of electromagnetic waves, with the unit of km / s; is the operating frequency of the air traffic control radar, with the unit of MHz; Calculation of the theoretical elevation of the signal above the location of the artificial obstacle: ； Among them, is the elevation of the transmitting end antenna of the air traffic control radar, with the unit of m; is the elevation of the receiving end, with the unit of m; Further calculation of the restricted height of the Fresnel zone of the ATC radar: ； Compare the elevation data of the artificial obstacle with the calculated restricted height of the Fresnel zone of the ATC radar. If the calculated restricted height is less than the elevation of the artificial obstacle, it indicates that the artificial obstacle does not meet the requirements of the Fresnel zone limit of the ATC radar; if the calculated restricted height is not less than the elevation of the artificial obstacle, it indicates that the artificial obstacle meets the requirements of the Fresnel zone limit of the ATC radar; The line-of-sight masking calculation model is as follows: Calculation of the vertical masking angle of the artificial obstacle: ； wherein, is the elevation of the artificial obstacle, in m; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, in m; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km; Further calculation of the corrected masking angle: ； Among them, is the corrected masking angle, in °; is the vertical masking angle of the artificial obstacle, in °; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km; Calculation of the line-of-sight coverage of the ATC radar: ； wherein, is the line-of-sight masking limit distance of the air traffic control radar, with the unit of km; is the corrected masking angle, with the unit of °; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, with the unit of m; is the elevation of the receiving end, with the unit of m; Compare the distance between the ATC radar and the receiving end with the calculated line-of-sight masking restricted distance of the ATC radar. If the calculated restricted distance is less than the distance between the ATC radar and the receiving end, it indicates that the artificial obstacle does not meet the requirements of the line-of-sight masking limit of the ATC radar; if the calculated restricted distance is not less than the distance between the ATC radar and the receiving end, it indicates that the artificial obstacle meets the requirements of the line-of-sight masking limit of the ATC radar; Judge whether the artificial obstacle meets the requirements of the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight masking limits of the ATC radar through the above calculations; If it is assessed that the artificial obstacle meets both the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction limit requirements of the air traffic control radar, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality of the air traffic control radar meets the safety operation requirements; if it is assessed that the artificial obstacle cannot simultaneously meet both the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction limit requirements of the air traffic control radar, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality of the air traffic control radar does not meet the safety operation requirements.

7. The method according to claim 6, wherein In the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight occlusion calculation models of the air traffic control radar, the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end as well as the elevation of the receiving end must be used as known conditions. At present, there are no clear requirements for the specific indicators of the distance L between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end and the elevation of the receiving end ; the scientific acquisition of the distance L between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end and the elevation of the receiving end is one of the key and difficult processes in the evaluation model. The acquisition methods are analyzed as follows: Air traffic control radar is mainly used to provide surveillance data information services to controllers within the airport approach control area, while also taking into account the surveillance services of the air routes and routes around the airport and the regional control area; based on the analysis of the actual use and operating characteristics of air traffic control radar, the corresponding parameter acquisition methods for different application scenarios are studied, including analysis based on flight procedure plans, analysis based on minimum surveillance guidance altitude, analysis based on air routes and routes around the airport, and analysis based on regional control areas.

8. The method according to claim 7, wherein The analysis based on the flight procedure plan is as follows: As one of the main references for aircraft during the departure and arrival phases, a flight procedure mainly consists of several lines representing flight paths, key points, and procedure altitudes representing flight altitudes, including traditional departure procedures, traditional arrival procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN arrival procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures. In most cases, an aircraft will fly along the flight procedure plan; the positions of the key points of all traditional departure procedures, traditional arrival procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN arrival procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures involved in the direction of the line connecting the ATC radar and the artificial obstacle are used as the analysis positions of the ATC radar receiving end, and then the distance between the ATC radar and the receiving end is obtained. At the same time, the procedure altitude corresponding to each key point is used as the analysis elevation of the ATC radar receiving end. .

9. The method according to claim 7, wherein The analysis based on the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude is as follows: The minimum surveillance guidance altitude usually consists of several sectors with different altitude limits. Under radar guidance, air traffic controllers and flight crews use the minimum surveillance guidance altitude to interactively check and monitor whether the flight altitude of the aircraft is higher than the minimum altitude limit of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector; the boundary lines of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacle are used as the analysis positions of the receiving end of the air traffic control radar, and then the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end is obtained. At the same time, the minimum altitude limit of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector is used as the analysis elevation of the receiving end of the air traffic control radar. .

10. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The analysis based on the air routes around the airport is as follows: There are usually air routes in the airspace around the airport. The air routes mainly consist of several lines representing flight paths, waypoints, and the minimum safe altitude of the air route representing the minimum flight altitude. Aircraft will fly along the air routes at high altitudes; all the air routes and waypoints involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacle are used as the analysis positions of the receiving end of the air traffic control radar, and then the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end is obtained. At the same time, the minimum safe altitude corresponding to each air route is used as the analysis elevation of the receiving end of the air traffic control radar. .

11. The method according to claim 7, wherein The analysis based on regional control zones is as follows: An area control area usually contains several sectors with different altitude restrictions and has a relatively large coverage area. The sector boundary lines of each area control area involved in the direction of the line connecting the ATC radar and the artificial obstacle are used as the analysis positions of the ATC radar receiving end, and then the distance between the ATC radar and the receiving end is obtained. At the same time, the lowest restricted altitude of each sector of the area control area is used as the analysis elevation of the ATC radar receiving end. .

12. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The signal strength evaluation method specifically includes: Based on the design scheme of the air traffic control radar's geographical location, antenna altitude, equipment model and antenna parameters, as well as the geographical location, elevation and type of artificial obstacles, the radar signal is simulated using internationally recognized electromagnetic simulation tools to obtain the radar electromagnetic signal coverage range. Currently, there are no specific evaluation requirements for the comprehensive analysis of radar signal coverage range and air traffic control radar signal strength in China. Based on the analysis of the actual use and operating characteristics of air traffic control radar, it is studied whether the signal strength meets the safe operation requirements in different application scenarios, including the superposition analysis of signal coverage range and flight procedure plan, the superposition analysis of signal coverage range and minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the superposition analysis of signal coverage range and airway routes around the airport, and the superposition analysis of signal coverage range and regional control area. If, after evaluation, the artificial obstacle simultaneously meets the air traffic control radar's signal coverage requirements for the flight procedure plan, the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the air routes around the airport, and the regional control zone, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the air traffic control radar's signal strength meets the safety operation requirements; if, after evaluation, the artificial obstacle cannot simultaneously meet the air traffic control radar's signal coverage requirements for the flight procedure plan, the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the air routes around the airport, and the regional control zone, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the air traffic control radar's signal strength does not meet the safety operation requirements.

13. The method according to claim 12, characterized in that, The superposition analysis of the signal coverage and flight procedure plan is as follows: According to the program altitudes corresponding to different key points of all traditional departure procedures, traditional arrival procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN arrival procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures at the airport, simulate and obtain the radar signal coverage ranges under different altitude scenarios. Then, superimpose the signal coverage range map on all traditional departure procedures, traditional arrival procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN arrival procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures at the airport, and conduct signal coverage analysis on all key points of each flight procedure to determine whether each key point is included in the signal coverage range. If so, it indicates that the signal strength meets the operating requirements of the flight procedure. If not, it indicates that the signal strength does not meet the operating requirements of the flight procedure.

14. The method according to claim 12, wherein The superposition analysis of the signal coverage range and the minimum surveillance guidance altitude is as follows: According to the minimum restricted altitude corresponding to different sectors of the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, simulate and obtain the radar signal coverage ranges under different altitude scenarios. Then, superimpose the signal coverage range map on all sectors of the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, and conduct signal coverage analysis on all sectors to determine whether each sector is included in the signal coverage range. If so, it indicates that the signal strength meets the operating requirements of the minimum surveillance guidance altitude. If not, it indicates that the signal strength does not meet the operating requirements of the minimum surveillance guidance altitude.

15. The method according to claim 12, wherein The superposition analysis of the signal coverage range and the air routes around the airport is as follows: According to the minimum safe altitude corresponding to the air routes around the airport, simulate and obtain the radar signal coverage ranges under different altitude scenarios. Then, superimpose the signal coverage range map on all air routes around the airport, and conduct signal coverage analysis on the locations of each air route to determine whether each air route is included in the signal coverage range. If so, it indicates that the signal strength meets the operating requirements of the air routes around the airport. If not, it indicates that the signal strength does not meet the operating requirements of the air routes around the airport.

16. The method according to claim 12, wherein The superposition analysis of the signal coverage range and the area control area is as follows: According to the minimum restricted altitude corresponding to different sectors of the area control area, simulate and obtain the radar signal coverage ranges under different altitude scenarios. Then, superimpose the signal coverage range map on all sectors of the area control area, and conduct signal coverage analysis on all sectors to determine whether each sector is included in the signal coverage range. If so, it indicates that the signal strength meets the operating requirements of the area control area. If not, it indicates that the signal strength does not meet the operating requirements of the area control area.

17. The method according to claim 1, wherein The optimization judgment steps specifically include: Calculate the limit values that meet the safety requirements through the air traffic control radar protection distance, masking angle, and signal interference evaluation model, and then feedback them to the design party to judge whether they are reasonable and feasible, and judge whether the proposed artificial obstacle can change the design plan, such as reducing the construction height or reselecting the location. If so, after the design party provides a new design plan, return to the information collection step to evaluate the new design plan. If not, end the electromagnetic environment impact assessment and output the evaluation result that the artificial obstacle design plan does not meet the air traffic control radar electromagnetic environment requirements.

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