A lightweight vehicle network communication method based on dynamic pseudo-random encryption

Abstract

This invention discloses a lightweight vehicle-to-vehicle communication method based on dynamic pseudo-random encryption. First, a cloud control platform establishes and maintains a trusted system, within which each node member is equipped with a corresponding security module. A security mechanism based on a pseudo-random algorithm is defined within the trusted system. The cloud control platform maintains the identity of each node within the trusted system and sends a variable calculation factor and displacement array to each node. Each node receives the calculation factor and displacement array from the cloud control platform and, based on the security mechanism, generates a local pseudo-random key and salts the session to encrypt it, achieving secure vehicle-to-vehicle communication. This method can address the current challenges of inter-node communication security (including vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-to-road, and vehicle-to-cloud) in mainstream autonomous driving scenarios, including platooning and campus / city operations.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of vehicle networking technology, and in particular to a lightweight vehicle networking communication method based on dynamic pseudo-random encryption. Background Art

[0002] The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) creates a dynamic, ultra-large-scale wireless network. In V2V scenarios, the rapidly changing network topology, highly self-organizing vehicle nodes, and high flexibility result in short-lived inter-vehicle communication connections, placing high demands on the timeliness and reliability of security authentication methods. Currently, mainstream security solutions use identity authentication as a foundational security capability to control access rights, providing a secure environment for subsequent vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-to-cloud (cloud control, over-the-air (OTA), HD maps, TSP), and vehicle-to-road (RSU, MEC) collaboration scenarios. Communication security technologies primarily focus on digital signatures, public-private key systems, hashing algorithms, and hybrid authentication. Aside from hashing algorithms, these other technologies involve the traditional X.509 CA system and the PCA system for IoV pseudonymous certificates. This creates an extremely complex security architecture, requiring ongoing maintenance of various certificates (registration certificates, pseudonymous certificates, application certificates, identity certificates, V2X certificates, etc.). In real-world scenarios, this involves managing, registering, maintaining, and deregistering a vast number of vehicle and roadside terminal certificates, resulting in significant system overhead.

[0003] Existing solutions include a hash algorithm that doesn't rely on a public-private key system, known as a hash algorithm. To ensure efficient vehicle-to-vehicle communication, some scenarios also employ symmetric key encryption to ensure confidentiality. However, these existing technologies present the following challenges: The hash algorithm is no longer a completely irreversible and secure algorithm; while symmetric encryption offers low overhead, it suffers from two significant drawbacks: 1) Symmetric encryption of BSM messages requires obtaining a one-time key from the cloud, posing the risk of direct transmission of the symmetric key across the network during cloud-to-ground communication; 2) Once a key is obtained and used continuously, if it is hijacked, cracked, analyzed, or leaked, the security mechanism becomes ineffective. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this invention is to provide a lightweight vehicle network communication method based on dynamic pseudo-random encryption. This method can solve the communication security issues between nodes (including vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-to-road, and vehicle-to-cloud) in current mainstream autonomous driving scenarios, including vehicle platooning, campus / city operations, and other autonomous driving scenarios.

[0005] The purpose of the present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0006] A lightweight vehicle network communication method based on dynamic pseudo-random encryption, the method comprising:

[0007] Step 1: The cloud control platform establishes and maintains a trusted system. Within the trusted system, each node member is equipped with a corresponding security module.

[0008] Step 2: A security mechanism based on a pseudo-random algorithm is defined in the trusted system. The cloud control platform maintains the identity of each node in the trusted system and sends a variable calculation factor and a displacement array to each node.

[0009] Step 3: Each node receives the calculation factor and displacement array sent by the cloud control platform, and generates a local pseudo-random key and salt encryption for the session based on the security mechanism to achieve secure communication in the vehicle network.

[0010] It can be seen from the technical solution provided by the above-mentioned present invention that the above-mentioned method can solve the problem of communication security between nodes (including vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-to-road, and vehicle-to-cloud) in current mainstream autonomous driving scenarios, including vehicle platooning, campus / city operations, and other autonomous driving scenarios, thereby covering more existing low-configuration or performance-sensitive scenarios. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0011] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.

[0012] Figure 1 A schematic flow chart of a lightweight vehicle network communication method based on dynamic pseudo-random encryption provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0013] Figure 2 The figure is a schematic diagram of an implementation process of the method described in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0014] The following is a clear and complete description of the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, not all embodiments, and do not constitute a limitation of the present invention. All other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field based on the embodiments of the present invention without making any creative efforts shall fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0015] like Figure 1 FIG2 is a flow chart of a lightweight vehicle network communication method based on dynamic pseudo-random encryption provided by an embodiment of the present invention. The method includes:

[0016] Step 1: The cloud control platform establishes and maintains a trusted system. Within the trusted system, each node member is equipped with a corresponding security module.

[0017] In this step, since the autonomous vehicles involved in operations in limited scenarios (such as parks and mines) are known in advance, the nodes in the trusted system can be statically recorded using a ledger design.

[0018] Or dynamically add nodes, specifically by using the cloud control platform to actively detect, the node to actively initiate joining applications, and challenge authentication to add nodes;

[0019] The list of each node is maintained by the cloud control platform and synchronized to each node regularly.

[0020] For example, the following Table 1 shows the main data structure of the cloud control platform:

[0021] Table 1 Data format

[0022] Pseudorandom calculation factor Shift Array Number of nodes Member List Time [n,m] X Pointing to Table 2

[0023] Table 2 below shows the list of nodes maintained by the cloud control platform

[0024] Table 2 Node list

[0025] Node ID property state Joining time 11111 Retail Cart Online Time1 22222 Sweeper Online Time2 33333 Ordinary car Offline Time3 … … … … Nnnnn Charging piles Online Time n

[0026] Step 2: Define a security mechanism based on a pseudo-random algorithm (such as the LCG algorithm) within the trusted system. The cloud control platform maintains the identity of each node within the trusted system and sends a variable calculation factor and a displacement array to each node.

[0027] In this step, the cloud control platform selects a parameter (such as the current time) as the calculation factor of the pseudo-random sequence and randomly specifies a displacement array, taking a two-digit array as an example, such as [3,100];

[0028] And send the calculation factor and displacement array to each node.

[0029] In a specific implementation, the pseudo-random algorithm used may be a linear congruential generator (LCG).

[0030] Step 3: Each node receives the calculation factor and displacement array sent by the cloud control platform, and generates a local pseudo-random key and salt encryption for the session based on the security mechanism to achieve secure communication in the vehicle network.

[0031] In step 3, if Figure 2 FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing an implementation process of the method according to an embodiment of the present invention, with reference to FIG. Figure 2 :

[0032] Each node (including member vehicles, infrastructure, etc.) receives the calculation factor and displacement array sent by the cloud control platform, and calculates a series of pseudo-random strings through the calculation factor and pseudo-random algorithm (such as LCG algorithm) to construct the key sequence. Specifically:

[0033] First, the current timestamp is selected as the calculation factor or seed and passed as input to the pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). The pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) generates a random number as the seed for the next calculation. The generated seed is used for an XOR operation and the result is mapped to a character set to obtain a character. The above operation is repeated until a string of the required length is obtained, which is a pseudo-random string that meets the requirements. The corresponding two pseudo-random characters are taken out according to the displacement array and set as A and B, where A is the noise data used for organizational communication and B is the session key for organizational communication.

[0034] When any node that needs to send a message sends a basic security message BSM, it salts the message content with noise data A and concatenates it to the extension field at the end of the message to obtain [BSM + A].

[0035] Encrypt the salted message [BSM + A] using session key B to generate the salted encrypted message B[BSM | A] and send it.

[0036] When the salted encrypted message B[BSM|A] reaches any node in the trusted system, the node ID is first checked to see if it is in the locally maintained node list, i.e., the whitelist. If so, it is decrypted using the session key B, and then the noise data A is removed to restore the original basic security message BSM.

[0037] Among them, each time the sending node sends a basic safety message BSM, it adds 1 to the value of the noise data A, that is, A=A+1;

[0038] When receiving the basic safety message BSM, the receiving node judges the legitimacy of the message based on the node ID corresponding to the vehicle and the value of the noise data A. If the node ID is not in the whitelist, or the value of the noise data A remains unchanged or undergoes a significant jump, it is judged to be a replay or man-in-the-middle attack and the basic safety message BSM is discarded.

[0039] In the specific implementation, the defined security mechanism includes active and passive updates, specifically:

[0040] Active update: The cloud control platform sets a fixed aging period N. When the aging time expires, the offset is resent, triggering the node to change the key. Alternatively, the cloud control platform sets a longer aging period M, where M>N. When the aging time expires, the calculation factor is reselected and the process is restarted to generate a new session key.

[0041] Passive update: When a node is attacked or leaked, the cloud control platform replaces the displacement array, triggering all nodes to update their local keys; extreme cases can trigger the pseudo-random algorithm to update and upgrade.

[0042] It should be noted that the contents not described in detail in the embodiments of the present invention belong to the prior art known to those skilled in the art.

[0043] Based on the above method, an embodiment of the present invention further provides an electronic device, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor is configured to run the computer program to execute the method.

[0044] An embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer storage medium, wherein the computer storage medium stores a plurality of instructions, wherein the instructions are suitable for being loaded by a processor and executing the method.

[0045] For example, this example simulates the effect of two devices using the same pseudo-random algorithm (such as the LCG algorithm) and the same calculation factor to perform asynchronous, remote calculations, proving that pseudo-random keys can be matched on different devices. The Linear Congruential Generator (LCG) is a classic pseudo-random number generation algorithm, in which:

[0046] When the LCG algorithm is run simultaneously on devices A and B, and the same seed, such as 42, is input, device A generates the pseudo-random number sequence: [1083814273, 253101556, 3323581837, 1455299994, 2603103143]. Device B, using the same algorithm and seed, also outputs the pseudo-random number sequence: [1083814273, 253101556, 3323581837, 1455299994, 2603103143]. This proves cross-device symmetry.

[0047] In summary, the method described in the embodiment of the present invention has the following advantages:

[0048] 1. Security: Because the transmission of symmetric keys over the network is eliminated, even a man-in-the-middle attack cannot obtain the encryption key. Furthermore, pseudo-randomness offers a long cycle (making it difficult to encounter repeating sequences) and unpredictability (it's difficult to predict the next number without knowing the seed and algorithm), thus meeting the high-encryption security requirements for important messaging in the Internet of Vehicles.

[0049] 2. Flexibility: This solution's flexibility lies in the fact that the calculation factor can be adjusted in real time by the cloud control platform. This dynamic session key is more secure than the one-time keys used in traditional solutions. Furthermore, if the pseudo-random algorithm is compromised or illegally disclosed, the system can quickly resolve the issue by negotiating an overall upgrade or switching to another algorithm.

[0050] 3. Compatibility: This solution achieves consistency in security, fine-grainedness, lightweightness, and efficiency. It can work with existing solutions to achieve authentication, attribution, revocability, and non-repudiation. It can also be used independently to cover more existing low-spec or performance-sensitive scenarios.

[0051] 4. Efficiency: Compared to true randomness, which requires a physical entropy source (such as keyboard and mouse input movement) and is slow, the PRNG in this application can be generated through calculation, has obvious speed advantages, and has sufficient statistical properties to pass strict randomness tests, thereby maintaining high efficiency while meeting the requirements of the effect and meeting the interactive characteristics of the Internet of Vehicles.

[0052] 5. This application can be used independently in controllable scene environments such as cities and parks, and can also adapt to more complex cross-zone (pilot) communications: During cross-zone communications, if both regional vehicles / nodes are equipped with the security module of the solution of the present invention, the security problem of cross-zone communication can be solved by simply establishing a master-slave relationship between the two cloud controls (the master cloud control is responsible for sending the calculation factor, displacement and aging time to the slave cloud control).

[0053] In addition, those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps in the above-mentioned embodiment method can be implemented by instructing the relevant hardware through a program, and the corresponding program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. The above-mentioned storage medium can be a read-only memory, a disk or an optical disk, etc.

[0054] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily thought of by any person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in the present invention should be included in the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention should be based on the scope of protection of the claims. The information disclosed in the background technology section of this article is only intended to deepen the understanding of the overall background technology of the present invention, and should not be regarded as an admission or any form of implication that the information constitutes prior art already known to those skilled in the art.

Claims

1. A lightweight vehicle network communication method based on dynamic pseudo-random encryption, characterized in that: The method comprises: Step 1: The cloud control platform establishes and maintains a trusted system. Within the trusted system, each node member is equipped with a corresponding security module. Step 2: A security mechanism based on a pseudo-random algorithm is defined in the trusted system. The cloud control platform maintains the identity of each node in the trusted system and sends a variable calculation factor and a displacement array to each node. Step 3: Each node receives the calculation factor and displacement array sent by the cloud control platform, and generates a local pseudo-random key and salt encryption for the session based on the security mechanism to achieve secure communication in the vehicle network; Each node receives the calculation factor and displacement array sent by the cloud control platform, calculates a series of pseudo-random strings through the calculation factor and pseudo-random algorithm, and constructs the key sequence. Specifically: Each node receives the calculation factor sent by the cloud control platform and passes it as input to the pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). The pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) generates a random number as the seed for the next calculation, performs an XOR operation on the generated seed, and maps the result to a character set to obtain a character. This operation is repeated until a string of the required length is obtained, which is a pseudo-random string that meets the requirements. According to the displacement array, the corresponding two pseudo-random characters are taken out and set as A and B, where A is the noise data used for organization communication and B is the session key for organization communication; When any node that needs to send a message sends a basic security message BSM, it salts the message content with noise data A and concatenates it to the extension field at the end of the message to obtain [BSM + A]. Encrypt the salted message [BSM + A] using session key B to generate the salted encrypted message B[ BSM |A ] and send it. When the salted encrypted message B[BSM|A] reaches any node in the trusted system, the node ID is first checked to see if it is in the locally maintained node list, i.e., the whitelist. If so, it is decrypted using the session key B, and then the noise data A is removed to restore the original basic security message BSM. Among them, each time the sending node sends a basic safety message BSM, it adds 1 to the value of the noise data A, that is, A=A+1; When receiving the basic safety message BSM, the receiving node judges the legitimacy of the message based on the node ID corresponding to the vehicle and the value of the noise data A. If the node ID is not in the whitelist, or the value of the noise data A remains unchanged or undergoes a significant jump, it is judged to be a replay or man-in-the-middle attack and the basic safety message BSM is discarded.

2. The lightweight vehicle network communication method based on dynamic pseudo-random encryption according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step 1, the nodes in the trusted system are statically recorded using a ledger design.

3. The lightweight vehicle network communication method based on dynamic pseudo-random encryption according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step 1, nodes in the trusted system are added dynamically, specifically by actively detecting on the cloud control platform, actively initiating joining applications on the part of nodes, and challenging authentication.

4. The lightweight vehicle network communication method based on dynamic pseudo-random encryption according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step 1, the node list is maintained by the cloud control platform and synchronized to each node regularly.

5. The lightweight vehicle network communication method based on dynamic pseudo-random encryption according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step 2, the cloud control platform selects a parameter as the calculation factor of the pseudo-random sequence and randomly specifies a displacement array; And send the calculation factor and displacement array to each node.

6. The lightweight vehicle network communication method based on dynamic pseudo-random encryption according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The defined security mechanisms include active updates and passive updates. The active update process is as follows: The cloud control platform sets a fixed aging period N. When the aging time expires, the offset is resent to trigger the node to change the key; alternatively, the cloud control platform sets a longer aging period M, M>N. When the aging time expires, the calculation factor is reselected and the process is restarted to generate a new session key.

7. The lightweight vehicle network communication method based on dynamic pseudo-random encryption according to claim 6 is characterized in that: The passive update process is: When a node is attacked or leaked, the cloud control platform changes the displacement array, triggering all nodes to update their local keys.

8. An electronic device comprising a memory and a processor, characterized in that: A computer program is stored in the memory, and the processor is configured to run the computer program to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

9. A computer storage medium, characterized in that The computer storage medium stores a plurality of instructions, and the instructions are suitable for being loaded by a processor and executing the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

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