Anti-desynchronization attack industrial internet of things 5G identity authentication method based on PUF (Physical Unclonable Function)

Abstract

The invention discloses an anti-desynchronization attack industrial Internet of Things 5G identity verification method based on PUF, and relates to the technical field of communication security. According to the anti-desynchronization attack industrial Internet of Things 5G identity verification method based on the PUF provided by the invention, the protocol based on the PUF is improved by using the lightweight secure hash function based on XOR encryption, so that the encryption burden is reduced so as to be used for equipment with limited resources, and the user privacy and data integrity in an industrial environment are enhanced. And mutual authentication is carried out between the user equipment and the intelligent sensor, and a secret session key is established for each session, so that the communication security between the communication entities is ensured, and the communication security is enhanced. And meanwhile, the method has better functional characteristics in resisting various complex threats such as anonymous attacks, traceable attacks, physical attacks, replay attacks, imitation attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks and desynchronization attacks.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communication security technology, and in particular to an industrial Internet of Things 5G authentication method based on PUF that is resistant to desynchronization attacks. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) technology, more and more devices are connected to the internet, forming a vast and complex network ecosystem. In this context, ensuring the security and privacy of data transmission becomes particularly important. However, due to resource constraints, IIoT devices (Industrial Internet of Things) struggle to support traditional, complex encryption technologies. Therefore, lightweight yet robust encryption and authentication protocols have become a research priority.

[0003] Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), a method for generating unique device signatures using tiny differences during the manufacturing process, are considered an effective solution for IIoT security due to their lightweight, storage-free, and tamper-resistant properties. PUFs utilize tiny differences in devices during the manufacturing process to generate unique device signatures, which produce an unpredictable response each time a specific input (challenge) is received. Because these differences are physically inherent, attackers cannot replicate or predict the PUF output, thus providing a high level of security.

[0004] However, despite the many advantages of PUF, there are still some challenges and defects in practical applications. For example, the dual-protocol method commonly used in N2N and N2S communications in current IIoT networks can ensure the secure transmission of data to a certain extent, but it also brings high system overhead and performance loss. Especially in resource-scarce environments, this problem becomes increasingly prominent and seriously restricts the scalability of IoT networks.

[0005] In addition, existing PUF-based protocols also have shortcomings in facing desynchronization attacks, physical unclonable function attacks, and various forms of data interception and manipulation, and require more robust authentication mechanisms.

[0006] This section is intended to provide a background or context to the embodiments of the present application that are recited in the claims. No admission is made that the description herein is prior art by virtue of its inclusion in this section. Summary of the Invention

[0007] To solve the above technical problems, an embodiment of the present application provides an industrial Internet of Things 5G identity authentication method based on PUF that is resistant to desynchronization attacks, which can solve at least some of the above technical problems.

[0008] The PUF-based industrial IoT 5G authentication method, resistant to desynchronization attacks, provided in embodiments of this application, utilizes a lightweight secure hash function based on XOR encryption to improve upon the PUF-based protocol. This reduces the encryption burden for use on resource-limited devices and enhances user privacy and data integrity in industrial environments. Mutual authentication is performed between user devices and smart sensors, and a secret session key is established for each session to ensure communication security between communicating entities, enhancing communication security. Furthermore, it offers enhanced functionality in resisting various complex threats, including anonymous attacks, traceability attacks, physical attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and desynchronization attacks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0009] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work. In the drawings:

[0010] Figure 1 A structural diagram of a robust 5G authentication framework for industrial IoT that is resistant to desynchronization attacks and based on a physically unclonable function, provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0011] Figure 2 A signaling interaction diagram of the initialization phase of a PUF-based industrial IoT 5G authentication method that is resistant to desynchronization attacks provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0012] Figure 3 This is a signaling interaction diagram for the user registration phase of a PUF-based desynchronization attack-resistant industrial IoT 5G authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0013] Figure 4 This is a signaling interaction diagram for the smart sensor registration phase of a PUF-based desynchronization attack-resistant industrial IoT 5G authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0014] Figure 5 A signaling interaction diagram of the user login phase in a PUF-based desynchronization attack-resistant industrial IoT 5G authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0015] Figure 6 A signaling interaction diagram of the identity authentication and key agreement phases in a PUF-based desynchronization attack-resistant industrial IoT 5G authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0016] Figure 7 A schematic diagram of the physical structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0017] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present application more clear, the embodiments of the present application are further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Here, the illustrative embodiments of the present application and their descriptions are used to explain the present application, but are not intended to limit the present application.

[0018] It should be understood that the exemplary embodiments described herein are illustrative and not restrictive. Although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, it should be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes in form and detail may be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the present application as defined by the appended claims.

[0019] The information collected in the technical solution of this application is information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties, and the collection, storage, use, processing, transmission, provision, disclosure and application of relevant data comply with the relevant laws, regulations and standards of relevant countries and regions, take necessary confidentiality measures, do not violate public order and good morals, and provide corresponding operation entrances for users to choose to authorize or refuse.

[0020] It should be noted that in the embodiments of the present application, certain software, components, models and other existing solutions in the industry may be mentioned. They should be regarded as exemplary. Their purpose is only to illustrate the feasibility of implementing the technical solution of the present application, but it does not mean that the applicant has or will necessarily use the solution.

[0021] In view of the current technical problems, the embodiments of the present application provide an industrial Internet of Things robust 5G authentication framework based on physically unclonable functions that is resistant to desynchronization attacks, which is used to resist desynchronization and Puf-based attacks to enhance user privacy and data integrity in industrial environments.

[0022] like Figure 1 As shown, the authentication framework includes smart sensors, gateways, authentication servers and user devices.

[0023] The present application also provides a robust 5G authentication method for industrial IoT that is resistant to desynchronization attacks and based on a physically unclonable function, for use in the authentication framework. The method includes an initialization phase, a user registration phase, a smart sensor registration phase, a user login phase, and an identity authentication and key agreement phase.

[0024] Initialization phase: Before establishing communication between smart sensors and gateways (such as routers), the device registration process must be carried out to ensure that the device's identity and the trust relationship with the authentication server have been established. It is assumed that the authentication server has generated a unique pre-shared key (PSK) for each router and smart sensor device node and distributed it through a secure channel. Figure 2 As shown, system initialization includes the following steps:

[0025] S101: The smart sensor sends a registration request Req to an authentication server.

[0026] S102: After receiving the registration request Req, the authentication server generates a challenge value C.

[0027] S103: The authentication server sends the challenge value C as a challenge to the smart sensor.

[0028] S104 , after receiving the challenge value C, the smart sensor generates a response value R=PUF(C) based on a physical unclonable function (PUF), and stores the challenge value C in its memory.

[0029] The initialization phase is for the subsequent authentication phase. The authentication server will also store the response result R to facilitate the authentication server to quickly authenticate the smart sensor in the future. This is because a challenge C can only generate a unique corresponding R through the device's PUF, ensuring the initial trust between the smart sensor and the authentication server and laying a security foundation for subsequent authentication protocols.

[0030] User registration phase: A necessary step to obtain real-time data of smart sensor device nodes when users register. Users complete the interaction with smart sensor device nodes through the gateway and generate a key bound to the user identity during the registration phase. Figure 3 The specific steps are as follows:

[0031] S201, user identity input. User U k Enter your real ID on the user device (such as a mobile device) uk and password PW k ,The user equipment transmits this information to the gateway through a secure channel.

[0032] S202, gateway processing. The gateway receives the ID uk After that, three random numbers are generated: User temporary identity TID uk , user temporary key K gu and random seed b k , and initialize TID uk TID new ,TIDold Set to null. Then, use formula B k =h(ID uk ||b k ) Calculate the first parameter B k , and fill {ID uk ,TID new ,TID old ,K gu ,B k}. Then the gateway sends {TID uk , B k , K gu}Sent back to the user device.

[0033] S203, the user device generates a key. After receiving the above message, the user device generates a random number r k , calculate the authentication parameter A k =h(PW k ||r k ), encryption key and session key And set the gateway key flag to 0, then uk ,E k ,B k ,K i}Secure storage.

[0034] S204, biometric binding. User U k Enter the user's biometric BM on the user's device uk , user equipment based on biometric BM uk Generate biometric key σ uk and the common replication parameter τ uk And generate a device-specific challenge value C Uk :

[0035] (σ uk ,τ uk )=GeN1(BM uk );

[0036] C Uk =GeN2(BM uk ).

[0037] S205, PUF challenge generation. The user equipment will challenge the value C Uk PUF applied to the device generates a response value Rp Uk :

[0038]

[0039] Through the above process, the user registration phase completes the binding between the user identity and the smart sensor device, while ensuring the uniqueness of the smart sensor device and the security of authentication.

[0040] The smart sensor registration phase is used for smart sensors to register with the gateway, such as Figure 4 As shown, the specific steps include:

[0041] S301, the smart sensor uses a dedicated channel to identify its real identity (ID) si Sent to the gateway.

[0042] S302: The gateway generates a random number K gs , and then calculate the temporary identity of the smart sensor And set STid old =STid, store {K gs ,STid,STid old ,ID si}; Then, the gateway sends {K gs , STid, STid old}Sent to the smart sensor.

[0043] S303, the intelligent sensor receives {K gs , STid, STid old}, store all received parameters.

[0044] like Figure 5 As shown, the user login stage is used for user login, and the specific steps include:

[0045] S401, from user U k Enter the PW on the user device k and BM uk Initially, user equipment uses GeN2(BM uk ) function generates a challenge value Then, the PUF is applied to calculate the response value And then check Rp Uk Is it equal to If so, the challenge value Sent to smart sensors through the gateway.

[0046] S402, the smart sensor then calculates a temporary identifier r k * , used to identify the session during transmission. This identifier is generated by combining encryption and hash functions, using the following formula: Once the identifier r k* Generate, then calculate its temporary key A k * =h(PW k ||r k * ) and the gateway's key K i If the gateway key flag is not set (ie flag = 0), it means that the gateway has not been synchronized and the gateway key needs to be updated. Specifically, the existing K gu * Perform hashing to update the gateway's key K gu *, and set the gateway key flag to 1: Flag = 1; In addition, the smart sensor will generate a new random number N1 and timestamp T1, which are used to ensure the uniqueness of data transmission in the protocol and prevent replay attacks. Then calculate the response S i It is a random number generated during the registration phase of the smart sensor device and will be updated with the authentication rounds. It is a flag that identifies the state of the smart sensor; and derives the message component The session key P1 is composed of structure.

[0047] Ultimately, smart sensors will uk 、M1、H1、 P1 and T1 are packaged into a message Msg1, which is sent to the gateway. The message Msg1 contains sufficient information to ensure the smooth progress of security authentication and subsequent communications.

[0048]

[0049] like Figure 6 As shown in Figure 1, the identity authentication and key agreement phase is used to authenticate the secure session and establish a secret session key for each session. The specific steps are as follows:

[0050] S501. After receiving the authentication request Msg1, the gateway performs the following operations: Check the time difference to ensure that it is within an acceptable range: |T1*-T1|<ΔT, T1* is the current time. If it meets the requirements, the verification process is started and the gateway continues to search for TID in the database. uk , to retrieve the ID uk , K gu and B k Then determine the TID uk The value is verified:

[0051] The first case: when the conditions TID are met uk =TIDnew , then for the above K gu * Hash to continue updating the gateway's key: K gu * =h(K gu * ), and calculate the key Calculate H1 * =h(C * k ||K ij ||N1), check H1 * Is it consistent with H1, P1 * Is it consistent with P1? If they are consistent, it means the synchronization state is valid. Generate a new temporary identity TID new * , and set TID old =TID uk , TID new =TID new * .

[0052] The second case: when the conditions TID are met uk =TID old When the gateway calculates Verify P1 * Is it equal to P1? If so, generate a new temporary identity TID new * , and set TID new =TID new * .

[0053] It should be understood that the first and second situations mentioned above are in parallel relationship and only one can be executed.

[0054] Then generate a random number N2 and a timestamp T2 for subsequent calculations and synchronization. Then calculate the temporary session key SK, the formula is as follows: SK = h(N1||K ij || N2); M1′=h(K ij ||N2);C′=h(N1||N2||C);k ij ′=h(PSK||C′); generate M2′ and H3′: H3′=H(M1′||SK||M2′||N1||TID new * ),

[0055] Finally, the gateway packages M1′, M2′, H3′, Te1, and T2 into a message Msg2 and sends the message Msg2 to the smart sensor.

[0056] Msg2=〈M1′, M2′, H3′, Te1, T2〉.

[0057] S502: After receiving Msg2, the smart sensor first checks whether the time difference meets the synchronization condition: |T2 * -T2|≤ΔT condition is met, T2 * is the current time, and then calculate a new random number calculate The challenge C′ is generated by hashing N1 and N2, and the response R′ is generated by PUF, C′=h(N1||N2||C). S i ′ is the new flag of the smart sensor. Each round of authentication will update the flag of the smart sensor. Then the smart sensor restores the session key SK, SK = h(N1||k ij ||N2).

[0058] Then check whether H3′ is equal to h(M1′||SK||M2′||N1||TID new * ), and calculate M1″, M1″=h(N2||SK), the role of M1″ is to avoid SK being directly stored in plain text. SK is the key for communication between the two parties after the authentication is completed.

[0059] Last updated TID uk =TID new * , reset Flag=0, store session parameters (S i ′,C′).

[0060] This embodiment improves the PUF-based protocol by using a lightweight secure hash function based on XOR encryption through five stages: initialization, user registration, sensor node registration, login, authentication, and key agreement. This reduces the encryption burden for use in resource-limited devices and enhances user privacy and data integrity in industrial environments.

[0061] Mutual authentication is performed between user devices and smart sensors, and a secret session key is established for each session to ensure communication security between communicating entities, thereby enhancing communication security. It also offers enhanced functionality in defending against various complex threats, including anonymous attacks, traceability attacks, physical attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and desynchronization attacks.

[0062] It should be stated that the same symbols in the embodiments of the present application represent the same parameters. The parameters used by the smart sensor, gateway, authentication server and user device at each stage, if the parameter is not generated by the user end, then it must be transmitted from its generating end to the user end through the data transmission step. Since the identity authentication method provided by the present application involves a large number of multi-end interactions, the description of some data transmission steps is omitted. Based on the description of the present application, those skilled in the art can understand the method of obtaining each parameter.

[0063] The following describes the PUF-based industrial IoT 5G authentication method that is resistant to desynchronization attacks provided in the embodiments of the present application from the perspective of each execution end.

[0064] The embodiment of the present application provides a PUF-based industrial IoT 5G authentication method that is resistant to desynchronization attacks and is applied to a user device. The method includes:

[0065] Send the user's real identity ID to the gateway uk and password PW k , wherein the gateway generates a user temporary identity TID based on the real identity and password uk , user temporary key K gu and the first parameter B k ;

[0066] Get the user's temporary identity TID uk , user temporary key K gu and the first parameter B k ;

[0067] Generate a first random number r k ;

[0068] Based on the first random number r k 、Password PW k , real identity ID uk and user temporary key K gu , generate the encryption key E k and the first session key K i ;

[0069] Save the user's temporary identity TID uk , encryption key E k 、The first parameter B k and the first session key K i ;

[0070] Utilize the first generation function according to the biometric information BM of the user Uk Generate biometric key σ uk and the common replication parameter τuk ;

[0071] Utilize the second generation function according to the biometric information BM of the user Uk Generate the first challenge value C Uk ;

[0072] Calculate the first challenge value C through the Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) Uk The response is the first response value Rp Uk ;

[0073] Send the real identity ID to the gateway uk 、Password PW k , User temporary identity TID uk , user temporary key K gu , encryption key E k and biometric information BM Uk , so that the gateway can use the real identity ID uk 、Password PW k , User temporary identity TID uk , user temporary key K gu , encryption key E k and biometric information BM Uk forwarding to the smart sensor;

[0074] In response to entering the password PW k and biometric information BM Uk operation, using a second generating function according to the biometric information BM Uk Generate a second challenge value

[0075] Calculate the second challenge value using a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) The response of the second response value is obtained

[0076] Check the second response value Is it equal to the first response value Rp Uk ;

[0077] If so, the second challenge value Send to the gateway so that the gateway will send the second challenge value Sent to the smart sensor, the smart sensor is used to identify the real ID uk 、Password PW k , User temporary identity TID uk , user temporary key K gu , encryption key E k , biometric information BMUk and the second challenge value Perform user authentication and key negotiation operations with the gateway.

[0078] In some embodiments, the first random number r k 、Password PW k , real identity ID uk and user temporary key K gu , generate the encryption key E k and the first session key K i ,include:

[0079] The first random number r k and the password PW k As input parameter, generate authentication parameter A through hash function operation k ;

[0080] The real identity ID uk and the password PW k As an input parameter, a first intermediate parameter is generated by a hash function operation;

[0081] The first intermediate parameter and the first random number r k Perform XOR operation to generate encryption key E k ;

[0082] The authentication parameter A k and the user temporary key K gu Perform XOR operation to generate the first session key K i .

[0083] This embodiment of the present application provides an industrial IoT 5G authentication method based on PUF that is resistant to desynchronization attacks and is applied to smart sensors. The method includes:

[0084] Get the user's real identity ID sent by the user's device uk 、Password PW k , User temporary identity TID uk , user temporary key K gu , encryption key E k , biometric information BM Uk ;

[0085] In response to the second challenge value sent by the gateway Based on the encryption key E k , the real identity ID uk , the password PW k , generate a temporary identifier r k * ;

[0086] Based on the password PW k and the temporary identifier r of the smart sensor k * , generate the key A of the smart sensor * k ;

[0087] Smart sensor based key A * k and a preset value K i , generate the first key K gu * ;

[0088] Determine whether the gateway key flag is equal to the first value 0;

[0089] If so, the first key K gu * As an input parameter, the first update key K of the gateway is generated by a hash function operation. gu * ;

[0090] Update the gateway key flag to a second value of 1;

[0091] Generate a second random number N1 and a first timestamp T1;

[0092] Calculate the second challenge value using a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) The fifth response value R is obtained i ;

[0093] Based on the second random number N1, the first timestamp T1, the user temporary key K gu , User temporary identity TID uk 、The first parameter B k , temporary identity STid of the smart sensor, second challenge value Smart sensor flag S i , the fifth response value R i , generating a first conversation message Msg1;

[0094] Sending a first session message Msg1 to the gateway, wherein the gateway verifies the synchronization state of the session based on the first session message Msg1 and generates a second session message Msg2 after the verification is successful;

[0095] Obtain the second session message Msg2;

[0096] Based on the second session message Msg2, a temporary private session key SK is generated, wherein the temporary private session key SK is used for communication between the smart sensor and the gateway.

[0097] In some embodiments, the encryption key E k , the real identity ID uk , the password PW k , generate a temporary identifier r k * ,include:

[0098] The real identity ID uk and the password PW k As an input parameter, a second intermediate parameter is generated through a hash function operation;

[0099] The encryption key E k Perform an XOR operation on the second intermediate parameter to generate a temporary identifier r k * .

[0100] In some embodiments, the password PW k and the temporary identifier r of the smart sensor k * , generate the key A of the smart sensor * k ,include:

[0101] The password PW k and the temporary identifier r of the smart sensor k * As an input parameter, the key A of the smart sensor is generated through a hash function operation * k .

[0102] In some embodiments, the smart sensor-based key A * k and a preset value K i , generate the first key K gu * ,include:

[0103] Key A for the smart sensor * k and a preset value K i Perform XOR operation to generate the first key K gu * .

[0104] In some embodiments, the method is based on the second random number N1, the first timestamp T1, the user temporary key Kgu , User temporary identity TID uk 、The first parameter B k , temporary identity STid of the smart sensor, second challenge value Smart sensor flag S i , the fifth response value R i , generating a first conversation message Msg1, including:

[0105] Calculate the second challenge value using a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) The fifth response value R is obtained i ;

[0106] Flag S for smart sensors i and the fifth response value R i Perform XOR operation to generate the second key k ij ;

[0107] For the second key k ij Perform an XOR operation on the second random number N1 to generate a first message component M1;

[0108] The second challenge value The second key k ij and the second random number N1 as input parameters, generating a second message component H1 through a hash function operation;

[0109] The user temporary identity TID uk 、The first parameter B k and user temporary key K gu As an input parameter, a third intermediate parameter is generated through a hash function operation;

[0110] Performing an XOR operation on the second random number N1, the temporary identity Stid of the smart sensor, and the third intermediate parameter to generate a second session key P1;

[0111] The user temporary identity TID uk , first message component M1, second message component H1, second challenge value The second session key P1 and the first timestamp T1 are packaged into an array to obtain a first session message Msg1.

[0112] In some embodiments, generating a temporary private session key SK based on the second session message Msg2 includes:

[0113] Parse the second conversation message Msg2 to obtain a second timestamp T2, a third message component M1′, a fourth message component M2′, a sixth message component H3′, and a seventh message component Te1;

[0114] Determining whether the second session message Msg2 meets the time synchronization condition based on the second timestamp T2;

[0115] If satisfied, then the seventh message component Te1, the first parameter B k , and the second random number N1 are XORed to generate a new identity TID new * ;

[0116] The second key k ij As an input parameter, a fourth intermediate parameter is generated by a hash function operation;

[0117] Performing an XOR operation on the third message component M1′ and the fourth intermediate parameter to generate a third random number N2;

[0118] The second random number N1, the third random number N2 and the third challenge value C are used as input parameters to generate a fourth challenge value C′ through a hash function operation;

[0119] Calculating a response to the fourth challenge value C′ using a physical unclonable function (PUF) to obtain a fourth response value R′;

[0120] Using the third random number N2 as an input parameter, a fifth intermediate parameter is generated through a hash function operation;

[0121] Perform an XOR operation on the fourth message component M2′, the fifth intermediate parameter and the fourth response value R′ to generate a new flag bit S of the smart sensor. i ';

[0122] The second random number N1 and the second key k ij and the third random number N2 as input parameters, generating a temporary private session key SK through a hash function operation;

[0123] The third message component M1′, the temporary secret session key SK, the fourth message component M2′, the second random number N1 and the new identity TID new * As an input parameter, a sixth intermediate parameter is generated by a hash function operation;

[0124] checking whether the sixth message component H3′ is equal to the sixth intermediate parameter;

[0125] If they are equal, the third random number N2 and the temporary secret session key SK are used as input parameters to generate an encrypted session key M1″ through a hash function operation;

[0126] The user temporary identity TIDuk Update to the new identity TID new * ;

[0127] Update the gateway key flag to a first value of 0;

[0128] Store the new flag S of the smart sensor i ' and the fourth challenge value C'.

[0129] In some embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0130] The real identity ID of the smart sensor si Send to the gateway so that the gateway can identify the real ID of the smart sensor based on the real ID of the smart sensor si Generate a temporary identity STid of the smart sensor;

[0131] Obtain a temporary identity STid of the smart sensor.

[0132] In some embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0133] Sending a registration request Req to the authentication server, so that the authentication server generates a third challenge value C according to the registration request;

[0134] Obtaining the third challenge value C;

[0135] A response to the third challenge value C is calculated using a physical unclonable function (PUF) to obtain a third response value R.

[0136] The present application also provides a PUF-based industrial IoT 5G authentication method that is resistant to desynchronization attacks and is applied to a gateway. The method includes:

[0137] Obtain the first session message Msg1 sent by the smart sensor;

[0138] Parse the first session message Msg1 to obtain the user temporary identity TID uk , first message component M1, second message component H1, second challenge value A second session key P1 and a first timestamp T1;

[0139] Determining whether the first session message Msg1 meets a time synchronization condition based on the first timestamp T1;

[0140] If satisfied, search the user temporary identity TID stored in the gateway uk , the user's real identity ID uk , user temporary key Kgu and the first parameter B k ;

[0141] If the user temporary identity TID uk Equal to the latest user identity TID new , then the first update key K of the gateway gu * As an input parameter, the second updated key K of the gateway is generated by a hash function operation. gu * ; The pre-shared key PSK between the gateway and the smart sensor and the second challenge value As input parameters, the second key K is generated by hash function operation ij ; For the second key K ij Perform an XOR operation on the first message component M1 to obtain a second random number N1; based on the second random number N1, the temporary identity identifier Stid of the smart sensor, the temporary identity identifier TID of the user uk 、The first parameter B k and user temporary key K gu , generating the first expected value P1 * Based on the second challenge value The second key K ij , the second random number N1, generates the second expected value H1 * ; Check the second expected value H1 * Is the first expected value P1 equal to the second message component H1? * Is the old user identity TID equal to the second session key P1? If so, generate a first identity. old Equal to the user's temporary identity TID uk ; Set the latest user identity TID new is equal to the first identity;

[0142] If the user temporary identity TID uk Equal to the old user identity TID old , the pre-shared key PSK between the gateway and the smart sensor and the second challenge value As input parameters, the second key K is generated by hash function operation ij Based on the second key K ij , the old identity STid of the smart sensor old , old user identity TID old 、The first parameter B k and user temporary key K gu, generate the second expected value R k * ; Determine whether the second session key P1 is equal to the first expected value P1 * ; If equal, generate a second identity; set the latest user identity TID new is equal to the second identity identifier;

[0143] Generate a third random number N2 and a second timestamp T2;

[0144] The second random number N1 and the second key K ij and the third random number N2 as input parameters, and generate a temporary private session key SK through a hash function operation;

[0145] Based on the second key K ij and the third random number N2, generating a third message component M1′;

[0146] Using the second random number N1, the third random number N2 and the third challenge value C as input parameters, a fourth challenge value C′ is generated through a hash function operation;

[0147] The pre-shared key PSK and the fourth challenge value C' are used as input parameters to generate a third key k through a hash function operation. ij ';

[0148] Based on the third key k ij ' and the third random number N2, generating a fourth message component M2';

[0149] The third message component M1′, the temporary private session key SK, the fourth message component M2′, the second random number N1, the latest user identity TID new As input parameters, generate the sixth message component H3′ through a hash function operation;

[0150] The latest user identity TID new 、The first parameter B k , performing an XOR operation on the second random number N1 to generate a seventh message component Te1;

[0151] IDsi and the second expected value R k * As input parameters, a new identity S of the smart sensor is generated by hash function operation. TIDnew ;

[0152] Generate a second session message Msg2 based on the third message component M1′, the fourth message component M2′, the sixth message component H3′, the seventh message component Te1 and the second timestamp T2;

[0153] The second session message Msg2 is sent to the smart sensor.

[0154] In some embodiments, the second random number N1, the temporary identity STid of the smart sensor, the temporary identity TID of the user uk 、The first parameter B k and user temporary key K gu , generating the first expected value P1 * ,include:

[0155] The user temporary identity TID uk 、The first parameter B k and user temporary key K gu As an input parameter, a seventh intermediate parameter is generated by a hash function operation;

[0156] Perform an XOR operation on the second random number N1, the temporary identity STid of the smart sensor and the seventh intermediate parameter to generate a first expected value P1 * .

[0157] In some embodiments, the second key K ij , the old identity STid of the smart sensor old , old user identity TID old 、The first parameter B k and user temporary key K gu , generate the second expected value R k * ,include:

[0158] The old user identity TID old 、The first parameter B k and user temporary key K gu As an input parameter, an eighth intermediate parameter is generated by a hash function operation;

[0159] For the second key K ij , the old identity STid of the smart sensor old , and the eighth intermediate parameter are XORed to generate a second expected value R k * .

[0160] In some embodiments, the second key K ij and the third random number N2, generating a third message component M1′, including:

[0161] For the second key K ijPerform an XOR operation on the random number and the third random number N2 to generate a ninth intermediate parameter;

[0162] The ninth intermediate parameter is used as an input parameter and a third message component M1′ is generated through a hash function operation.

[0163] In some embodiments, the method is based on the third key k ij ' and the third random number N2, generate a fourth message component M2', including:

[0164] Using the third random number N2 as an input parameter, generating a tenth intermediate parameter through a hash function operation;

[0165] For the third key k ij ' and the tenth intermediate parameter are subjected to an exclusive OR operation to generate a fourth message component M2'.

[0166] In some embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0167] Get the user's real identity ID sent by the user's device uk and password PW k ;

[0168] Generate the user temporary identity TID uk , user temporary key K gu and a random seed b k ;

[0169] Set the latest user identity TID new Equal to the user's temporary identity TID uk ;

[0170] Set the old user identity TID old is empty;

[0171] The user's real identity ID uk and the random seed b k As the input parameter, the first parameter B is generated by hash function operation k ;

[0172] The user temporary identity TID uk , user temporary key K gu and the first parameter B k Send to the user equipment.

[0173] In some embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0174] Get the real identity ID of the smart sensor sent by the smart sensor si ;

[0175] Generate a fourth random number K gs ;

[0176] The fourth random number K gs and the real identity ID of the smart sensor si Perform an XOR operation to generate a temporary identity STid of the smart sensor;

[0177] Set the old identity STid of the smart sensor old Equal to the temporary identity STid of the smart sensor;

[0178] The fourth random number K gs , the temporary identity STid of the smart sensor and the old identity STid of the smart sensor old Sent to the smart sensor.

[0179] Figure 7 The physical structure diagram of the electronic device provided in the embodiment of the present application is as follows: Figure 7 As shown, the electronic device 003 includes a processor 301 , a memory 302 and a bus 303 . The processor 301 and the memory 302 communicate with each other via the bus 303 .

[0180] The processor 301 is configured to call program instructions in the memory 302 to execute the method provided by any of the above method embodiments.

[0181] An embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and the computer program implements the above method when executed by a processor.

[0182] An embodiment of the present application further provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program, and implements the above method when the computer program is executed by a processor.

[0183] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present application can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present application can adopt the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment in combination with software and hardware. Moreover, the present application can adopt the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to magnetic disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) that contain computer-usable program code.

[0184] The present application is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that each process and / or box in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of the processes and / or boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the steps in the process. Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0185] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to work in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0186] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operational steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing the instructions executed on the computer or other programmable device for implementing the process. Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A step that specifies a function in one or more boxes.

[0187] The specific embodiments described above further illustrate the purpose, technical solutions and beneficial effects of the present application. It should be understood that the above description is only a specific embodiment of the present application and is not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present application. Any modifications, equivalent replacements, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present application should be included in the scope of protection of the present application.

Claims

1. A PUF-based 5G authentication method for industrial IoT that is resistant to desynchronization attacks, applied to user equipment, characterized in that: include: Send the user's real identity ID to the gateway uk and password PW k , wherein the gateway generates a user temporary identity TID based on the real identity and password uk , user temporary key K gu and the first parameter B k ; Get the user's temporary identity TID uk , user temporary key K gu and the first parameter B k ; Generate a first random number r k ; Based on the first random number r k 、Password PW k , real identity ID uk and user temporary key K gu , generate encryption key E k and the first session key K i ; Save the user's temporary identity TID uk , encryption key E k 、The first parameter B k and the first session key K i ; Utilize the first generation function according to the biometric information BM of the user Uk Generate biometric key σ uk and the common replication parameter τ uk ; Utilize the second generation function according to the biometric information BM of the user Uk Generate the first challenge value C Uk ; Calculate the first challenge value C through PUF Uk The response is the first response value Rp Uk ; Send the real identity ID to the gateway uk 、Password PW k , User temporary identity TID uk , user temporary key K gu , encryption key E k and biometric information BM Uk , so that the gateway can use the real identity ID uk 、Password PW k , User temporary identity TID uk , user temporary key K gu , encryption key E k and biometric information BM Uk Forward to smart sensor; In response to entering the password PW k and biometric information BM Uk operation, using a second generating function according to the biometric information BM Uk Generate a second challenge value Calculate the second challenge value through PUF The response of the second response value is obtained Check the second response value Is it equal to the first response value Rp Uk ; If so, the second challenge value Send to the gateway so that the gateway will send the second challenge value Send to the smart sensor, the smart sensor is used to identify the real ID uk 、Password PW k , User temporary identity TID uk , user temporary key K gu , encryption key E k , biometric information BM Uk and the second challenge value Perform user authentication and key negotiation operations with the gateway.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The first random number r k 、Password PW k , real identity ID uk and user temporary key K gu , generate encryption key E k and the first session key K i ,include: The first random number r k and the password PW k As input parameter, generate authentication parameter A through hash function operation k ; The real identity ID uk and the password PW k As an input parameter, a first intermediate parameter is generated by a hash function operation; The first intermediate parameter and the first random number r k Perform XOR operation to generate encryption key E k ; The authentication parameter A k and the user temporary key K gu Perform XOR operation to generate the first session key K i .

3. A PUF-based 5G authentication method for industrial IoT that is resistant to desynchronization attacks, applied to smart sensors, characterized in that: include: Get the user's real identity ID sent by the user's device uk 、Password PW k , User temporary identity TID uk , user temporary key K gu , encryption key E k , biometric information BM Uk ; In response to the second challenge value sent by the gateway Based on the encryption key E k , the real identity ID uk , the password PW k , generate a temporary identifier r k * ; Based on the password PW k and the temporary identifier r of the smart sensor k * , generate the key A of the smart sensor * k ; Smart sensor based key A * k and a preset value K i , generate the first key K gu * ; Determine whether the gateway key flag is equal to the first value 0; If so, the first key K gu * As an input parameter, the first update key K of the gateway is generated by a hash function operation. gu * ; Update the gateway key flag to a second value of 1; Generate a second random number N1 and a first timestamp T1; Calculate the second challenge value through PUF The fifth response value R is obtained i ; Based on the second random number N1, the first timestamp T1, the user temporary key K gu , User temporary identity TID uk 、The first parameter B k , temporary identity STid of the smart sensor, second challenge value Smart sensor flag S i , the fifth response value R i , generating a first conversation message Msg1; Sending a first session message Msg1 to the gateway, wherein the gateway verifies the synchronization state of the session based on the first session message Msg1 and generates a second session message Msg2 after the verification is successful; Obtain the second session message Msg2; Based on the second session message Msg2, a temporary private session key SK is generated, wherein the temporary private session key SK is used for communication between the smart sensor and the gateway.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The encryption key E k , the real identity ID uk , the password PW k , generate a temporary identifier r k * ,include: The real identity ID uk and the password PW k As an input parameter, a second intermediate parameter is generated through a hash function operation; The encryption key E k Perform an XOR operation on the second intermediate parameter to generate a temporary identifier r k * .

5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The password based on the PW k and the temporary identifier r of the smart sensor k * , generate the key A of the smart sensor * k ,include: The password PW k and the temporary identifier r of the smart sensor k * As an input parameter, the key A of the smart sensor is generated through a hash function operation * k .

6. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The key A based on the smart sensor * k and a preset value K i , generate the first key K gu * ,include: Key A for the smart sensor * k and a preset value K i Perform XOR operation to generate the first key K gu * .

7. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that Based on the second random number N1, the first timestamp T1, the user temporary key K gu , User temporary identity TID uk 、The first parameter B k , temporary identity STid of the smart sensor, second challenge value Smart sensor flag S i , the fifth response value R i , generating a first session message Msg1, including: Calculate the second challenge value through PUF The fifth response value R is obtained i ; Flag S for smart sensors i and the fifth response value R i Perform XOR operation to generate the second key k ij ; For the second key k ij Perform an XOR operation on the second random number N1 to generate a first message component M1; The second challenge value The second key k ij and the second random number N1 as input parameters, generating a second message component H1 through a hash function operation; The user temporary identity TID uk 、The first parameter B k and user temporary key K gu As an input parameter, a third intermediate parameter is generated through a hash function operation; Performing an XOR operation on the second random number N1, the temporary identity STid of the smart sensor, and the third intermediate parameter to generate a second session key P1; The user temporary identity TID uk , first message component M1, second message component H1, second challenge value The second session key P1 and the first timestamp T1 are packaged into an array to obtain a first session message Msg1.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The generating of a temporary private session key SK based on the second session message Msg2 includes: Parse the second conversation message Msg2 to obtain a second timestamp T2, a third message component M1′, a fourth message component M2′, a sixth message component H3′, and a seventh message component Te1; Determining whether the second session message Msg2 meets the time synchronization condition based on the second timestamp T2; If satisfied, then the seventh message component Te1, the first parameter B k , and the second random number N1 are XORed to generate a new identity TID new * ; The second key k ij As an input parameter, a fourth intermediate parameter is generated by a hash function operation; Performing an XOR operation on the third message component M1′ and the fourth intermediate parameter to generate a third random number N2; The second random number N1, the third random number N2 and the third challenge value C are used as input parameters to generate a fourth challenge value C′ through a hash function operation; Calculating a response to the fourth challenge value C′ through the PUF to obtain a fourth response value R′; Using the third random number N2 as an input parameter, a fifth intermediate parameter is generated through a hash function operation; Perform an XOR operation on the fourth message component M2′, the fifth intermediate parameter and the fourth response value R′ to generate a new flag bit S of the smart sensor. i '; The second random number N1 and the second key k ij and the third random number N2 as input parameters, generating a temporary private session key SK through a hash function operation; The third message component M1′, the temporary secret session key SK, the fourth message component M2′, the second random number N1 and the new identity TID new * As an input parameter, a sixth intermediate parameter is generated by a hash function operation; checking whether the sixth message component H3′ is equal to the sixth intermediate parameter; If they are equal, the third random number N2 and the temporary secret session key SK are used as input parameters to generate an encrypted session key M1″ through a hash function operation; The user temporary identity TID uk Update to the new identity TID new * ; Update the gateway key flag to a first value of 0; Store the new flag S of the smart sensor i ' and the fourth challenge value C'.

9. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The method further comprises: The real identity ID of the smart sensor si Send to the gateway so that the gateway can identify the real ID of the smart sensor based on the real ID of the smart sensor si Generate a temporary identity STid of the smart sensor; Obtain a temporary identity STid of the smart sensor.

10. The method according to claim 3 or 8, characterized in that The method further comprises: Sending a registration request to an authentication server, so that the authentication server generates a third challenge value C according to the registration request; Obtaining the third challenge value C; The PUF calculates a response to the third challenge value C to obtain a third response value R.

11. A PUF-based 5G authentication method for industrial IoT that resists desynchronization attacks, applied to a gateway, characterized in that: include: Obtain the first session message Msg1 sent by the smart sensor; Parse the first session message Msg1 to obtain the user temporary identity TID uk , first message component M1, second message component H1, second challenge value A second session key P1 and a first timestamp T1; Determining whether the first session message Msg1 meets a time synchronization condition based on the first timestamp T1; If satisfied, search the user temporary identity TID stored in the gateway uk , the user's real identity ID uk , user temporary key K gu and the first parameter B k ; If the user temporary identity TID uk Equal to the latest user identity TID new , then the first update key K of the gateway gu * As an input parameter, the second updated key K of the gateway is generated by a hash function operation. gu * ; The pre-shared key PSK between the gateway and the smart sensor and the second challenge value As input parameters, the second key K is generated by hash function operation ij ; For the second key K ij Perform an XOR operation on the first message component M1 to obtain a second random number N1; based on the second random number N1, the temporary identity STid of the smart sensor, the temporary identity TID of the user uk 、The first parameter B k and user temporary key K gu , generating the first expected value P1 * Based on the second challenge value The second key K ij , the second random number N1, generates the second expected value H1 * ; Check the second expected value H1 * Is the first expected value P1 equal to the second message component H1? * Is the old user identity TID equal to the second session key P1? If so, generate a first identity. old Equal to the user's temporary identity TID uk ; Set the latest user identity TID new is equal to the first identity; If the user temporary identity TID uk Equal to the old user identity TID old , the pre-shared key PSK between the gateway and the smart sensor and the second challenge value As input parameters, the second key K is generated by hash function operation ij Based on the second key K ij , the old identity STid of the smart sensor old , old user identity TID old 、The first parameter B k and user temporary key K gu , generate the second expected value R k * ; Determine whether the second session key P1 is equal to the first expected value P1 * ; If they are equal, a second identity identifier is generated; Set the latest user identity TID new is equal to the second identity identifier; Generate a third random number N2 and a second timestamp T2; The second random number N1 and the second key K ij and the third random number N2 as input parameters, and generate a temporary private session key SK through a hash function operation; Based on the second key K ij and the third random number N2, generating a third message component M1′; Using the second random number N1, the third random number N2 and the third challenge value C as input parameters, a fourth challenge value C′ is generated through a hash function operation; The pre-shared key PSK and the fourth challenge value C' are used as input parameters to generate a third key k through a hash function operation. ij '; Based on the third key k ij ' and the third random number N2, generating a fourth message component M2'; The third message component M1′, the temporary private session key SK, the fourth message component M2′, the second random number N1, the latest user identity TID new As input parameters, generate the sixth message component H3′ through a hash function operation; The latest user identity TID new 、The first parameter B k , performing an XOR operation on the second random number N1 to generate a seventh message component Te1; The real identity IDsi of the smart sensor and the second expected value R k * As input parameters, a new identity S of the smart sensor is generated by hash function operation. TIDnew ; Generate a second session message Msg2 based on the third message component M1′, the fourth message component M2′, the sixth message component H3′, the seventh message component Te1 and the second timestamp T2; The second session message Msg2 is sent to the smart sensor.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The temporary identity identifier STid of the smart sensor based on the second random number N1, the temporary identity identifier TID of the user uk 、The first parameter B k and user temporary key K gu , generating the first expected value P1 * ,include: The user temporary identity TID uk 、The first parameter B k and user temporary key K gu As an input parameter, a seventh intermediate parameter is generated by a hash function operation; Perform an XOR operation on the second random number N1, the temporary identity STid of the smart sensor and the seventh intermediate parameter to generate a first expected value P1 * .

13. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The second key K ij , the old identity STid of the smart sensor old , old user identity TID old 、The first parameter B k and user temporary key K gu , generate the second expected value R k * ,include: The old user identity TID old 、The first parameter B k and user temporary key K gu As an input parameter, an eighth intermediate parameter is generated by a hash function operation; For the second key K ij , the old identity STid of the smart sensor old , and the eighth intermediate parameter are XORed to generate a second expected value R k * .

14. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The second key K ij and the third random number N2, generating a third message component M1′, including: The second key K ij Perform an XOR operation on the random number and the third random number N2 to generate a ninth intermediate parameter; The ninth intermediate parameter is used as an input parameter and a third message component M1′ is generated through a hash function operation.

15. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The method based on the third key k ij ' and the third random number N2, generate a fourth message component M2', including: Using the third random number N2 as an input parameter, generating a tenth intermediate parameter through a hash function operation; For the third key k ij ' and the tenth intermediate parameter are subjected to an exclusive OR operation to generate a fourth message component M2'.

16. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The method further comprises: Get the user's real identity ID sent by the user's device uk and password PW k ; Generate the user temporary identity TID uk , user temporary key K gu and a random seed b k ; Set the latest user identity TID new Equal to the user's temporary identity TID uk ; Set the old user identity TID old is empty; The user's real identity ID uk and the random seed b k As the input parameter, the first parameter B is generated by hash function operation k ; The user temporary identity TID uk , user temporary key K gu and the first parameter B k Send to the user equipment.

17. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The method further comprises: Get the real identity ID of the smart sensor sent by the smart sensor si ; Generate a fourth random number K gs ; The fourth random number K gs and the real identity ID of the smart sensor si Perform an XOR operation to generate a temporary identity STid of the smart sensor; Set the old identity STid of the smart sensor old Equal to the temporary identity STid of the smart sensor; The fourth random number K gs , the temporary identity STid of the smart sensor and the old identity STid of the smart sensor old Sent to the smart sensor.

18. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein: When the processor executes the computer program, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 2, 3 to 10, or 11 to 17 is implemented.

19. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 2, 3 to 10, or 11 to 17 is implemented.

20. A computer program product, comprising a computer program, characterized in that When the computer program is executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 2, 3 to 10 or 11 to 17 is implemented.

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