System and method for performing resending of contactless cards

Abstract

Example embodiments relate to re-issuing or otherwise altering a contactless card. These embodiments are particularly suited for emergency reissuing in which many cards have been compromised due to data leakage from a primary credit card provider or department store. An exemplary contactless card includes a chip that stores encrypted authentication information that includes a primary account number (PAN) that identifies the card. The chip may include a first applet responsible for payment with the card; the first applet may manage a PAN. The second applet may be capable of interacting with the external application and may serve as a bridge with the first applet. The rewriting of the PAN may be triggered by issuing a write command to a second applet, or by interacting with the chip in a predetermined manner (e.g., tapping the card a predetermined number of times on an interactive element).

Description

[0001] This application is a divisional application of application number 202080006477.4, entitled “System and method for performing reissue of contactless card”.

[0002] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

[0003] This application claims priority to U.S. Patent Application No. 16 / 731,178, filed on December 31, 2019, which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. Patent Application No. 16 / 205,119, filed on November 29, 2018, which claims priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 62 / 740,352, filed on October 2, 2018, the disclosures of which are hereby incorporated by reference in their entireties. Technical Field

[0004] The present disclosure relates to authentication and authorization, and more particularly, to systems and methods for reissuing or otherwise changing information stored on contactless cards. Background Art

[0005] Data breaches that expose customer payment information are increasingly common and are becoming more widespread, with millions of credit card numbers being exposed in a given breach. These data breaches can occur when an unauthorized actor breaks into a computing system associated with a major department store, bank, or credit card issuer and steals large amounts of payment data (e.g., including credit card numbers, expiration dates, etc.).

[0006] Typically, credit card issuers can respond to such a breach by reissuing the affected cards. This involves assigning a new credit card number to the user's account, producing a new physical card with the new number imprinted on it, writing a new magnetic stripe, and placing the card in the mail. When the breach is widespread (involving a large number of cards), it may take weeks or months for users to receive their new cards. During this time, they may not be able to use their account to make payments because it is possible that the card number was invalidated when the breach was discovered (to prevent unauthorized use of the account). Obviously, this can be problematic for customers.

[0007] The reissue process can also be expensive from the card issuer's perspective, which typically absorbs the cost of producing and mailing new cards. Depending on the quality of the card material, the cost of creating a new card can range from $2 to $30. If a card needs to be reissued on an expedited basis, the additional processing costs can reach $10 per card. When millions of card numbers have been compromised, the resulting reissue costs can reach tens of millions of dollars. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0008] Figure 1A An environment suitable for use with the exemplary embodiments is depicted.

[0009] Figure 1B Depicting an example of a contactless card with a physical token.

[0010] Figure 1C Depicts the structure of an exemplary physical token.

[0011] Figure 2A Depicting an exemplary interface for a mobile application associated with an owner of a contactless card.

[0012] Figure 2B Depicts an exemplary interface when a physical token is read by a reader on an owner's mobile device.

[0013] Figure 2C Describes an example of data exchange between a contactless card and a client device.

[0014] Figure 2D Depicted are exemplary data structures suitable for use with the exemplary embodiments.

[0015] Figure 3 is a flow chart illustrating key operations according to an example embodiment.

[0016] Figure 4 is a diagram of a key system according to an example embodiment.

[0017] Figure 5 is a flowchart of a method of generating a password according to an example embodiment.

[0018] Figure 6A is a flow chart illustrating a key diversification process according to an example embodiment.

[0019] Figure 6B is a data flow diagram illustrating the exchange of communications in an exemplary embodiment.

[0020] Figure 6C is a flow chart depicting card-side logic for changing an identifier associated with a contactless card.

[0021] Figure 7 An exemplary computing system suitable for use with the exemplary embodiments is depicted.

[0022] Figure 8 An exemplary network environment suitable for use with the exemplary embodiments is depicted. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0023] Exemplary embodiments provide techniques for securely reissuing or otherwise changing the information stored on a contactless card based on a remote command. Thus, the number associated with the card can be quickly changed so that the card can continue to be used with the new number. If the card has a number printed or embossed on its front, the printed number (and / or the number stored on the magnetic stripe) may not match the number stored on the contactless chip; nonetheless, the card can be used for contactless payments until a new card with the new number can be issued. In some embodiments, the card may include an electronic ink (e-ink) display that displays the number; in this case, the e-ink display can also be updated when the number stored on the contactless chip of the card is updated.

[0024] The chip of card can comprise one or more applet that are activated in certain cases.For example, when paying with card, payment applet can be activated, and the number of card can be supplied to requesting device.In order to use the card with new number, this payment applet may need to be updated, but for the purpose of safety, payment applet can be restricted to directly communicate with external source.For this purpose, chip can comprise the second encryption and authorization applet that is responsible for transmitting card information back and forth with external source. The second applet can perform authentication, and can ensure that the information transmitted from payment applet is done in a safe manner (for example, using encryption).As described in more detail below, the second applet can also be responsible for performing verification function (for example, verifying the account stored on the card).According to exemplary embodiment, this second applet can be made to be used as the bridge between external source and payment applet, and the communication inside (chip) of this bridge makes the number on payment applet be rewritten.

[0025] In some cases, the second small application can be directly instructed to overwrite the number of the card with a new number. For example, the mobile device running the Android operating system can issue a near field communication (NFC) write command to the second small application, and the rewrite command is issued to the payment small application to trigger the second small application. However, some devices may not support such communication (Apple's iOS is an example of this). Therefore, the second small application can also or alternatively be configured to identify the predefined pattern that the rewrite command is issued. For example, the user can tap their contactless card five times to the NFC reader in less than one minute. Because the NFC reader is tapped to trigger the authentication and encryption operation of the second small application, the second small application can be preconfigured to identify this predefined pattern and in response, issue the rewrite command.

[0026] In various embodiments, the card may have the ability to limit the number of number rewrites that can be performed (e.g., during the life of the card, or during a specific time period). To this end, the card may maintain a counter of the number of rewrites and may further store a value representing the maximum number of rewrites that can be allowed. If a request to rewrite a number is received and the total number of requests (previous and current) exceeds the stored maximum value, the rewrite may be canceled.

[0027] The following description of the embodiments provides non-limiting representative examples of reference numbers that specifically describe the features and teachings of various aspects of the present invention. From the description of the embodiments, it should be understood that the described embodiments can be implemented individually or in combination with other embodiments. The description of the embodiments should facilitate understanding of the present invention to the extent that other implementations not specifically covered but within the knowledge of those skilled in the art after reading the description of the embodiments will be understood to be consistent with the application of the present invention.

[0028] Figure 1A The data transmission environment 100 is illustrated according to an example embodiment. As discussed further below, the system 100 may include a contactless card 130, a client device 104, a network 114, and a server 116 maintained by a provider of the contactless card 130. Figure 1A A particular configuration of components is illustrated, but one of ordinary skill in the art will understand that other configurations including more or fewer components, or components in another configuration, may be used.

[0029] Environment 100 may include the following references Figure 1B One or more contactless cards 130 are further described. In some examples, the contactless card 130 can communicate wirelessly with the client device 104, such as NFC communication. The contactless card can include a contactless chip (see Figure 1C ). The contactless chip may maintain a copy of the primary account number (PAN) associated with the card 130, which may be read by a reader (such as the NFC reader 110).

[0030] Environment 100 may include client device 104, which may be a network-enabled computer. As referred to herein, a network-enabled computer may include, but is not limited to, for example, a computer device or a communication device (including, for example, a server, a network appliance, a personal computer (PC), a workstation, a mobile device, a phone, a handheld PC, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a thin client, a fat client, an Internet browser, or other devices). Client device 104 may also be a mobile device; for example, a mobile device may include an iPhone, an iPod, a iPad, or iPad running Apple Any other mobile device running Microsoft's operating system Any device running a mobile operating system, and / or any other smartphone or similar wearable mobile device.

[0031] Client device 104 and / or contactless card 130 may be associated with user 102, who may be the owner of the contactless card. User 102 may define credentials for accessing mobile applications on client device 104, which may be applications associated with the contactless card's service provider.

[0032] In various examples according to the present disclosure, the client device 104 of the environment 100 may execute one or more applications, such as software applications. The software applications may enable network communications with one or more components of the environment 100 and may transmit and / or receive data. Among other computer-executable logic, the client device 104 may include client-side resend logic 112 (such as in conjunction with Figure 6B The logic is described in more detail).

[0033] The client device 104 can communicate with one or more servers 116 via one or more networks 114. For example, the client device 104 can operate as a front end for a card provider server 116, which is responsible for maintaining the security of the contactless card 130. In some embodiments, the card provider server 116 can also authorize transactions conducted via the card 130. The client device 104 can transmit one or more requests to the server 116, for example, from a mobile device application executing on the client device 104. Similarly, the server 116 can communicate with the client device 104 to initiate a card reissue process for the client device 104, such as when a data breach occurs.

[0034] To this end, server 116 may instruct client device 104 to change the PAN associated with user 102's card 130. Client device 104 may receive the instruction and notify user 102 (e.g., via a display such as Figures 2A-2B The client device 104 may cause one or more applets stored on the card 130 to be activated, such as through an express command (e.g., an NFC write command), or by requesting the user 102 to tap the card 130 against the NFC reader 110 in a predetermined pattern (e.g., a predetermined number of times, at a predetermined rate over a period of time, in a predetermined pattern, etc.).

[0035] The instruction to change the PAN may be sent individually from the server 116 (eg, when a single user's 102 card 130 is compromised), or the reissue instruction may be broadcast to a group of recipients (as may be done in the event of a large data breach).

[0036] In some embodiments, client 104 (or another device instructing card 130 to change the PAN) can coordinate with server 116 to issue the change instruction to card 130. For example, server 116 can provision the PAN to be used on card 130, and client 104 can transmit the PAN to the communication logic / applet on card 130. In another example, the payment logic / applet on card 130 can be pre-programmed with multiple PANs, and server 116 can identify which PANs to use (or, if the PANs are arranged in a list in the card's memory, server 116 can instruct the payment logic / applet to skip a certain number of options and select the nth PAN in the list). In another example, the payment logic / applet can be able to derive the new PAN from the old PAN (or another identifier stored on the card, such as an identifier associated with user 102 or the user's account at a financial institution). Server 116 can provide instructions on how to derive the new PAN, or can provide a seed number to be used when generating the new PAN.

[0037] If the client device 104 is capable of issuing a write request directly to the card 130, the write request may include the information received from the server (e.g., the new PAN, the number of the skipped PAN in the list, the generation technique used to derive the new PAN, or the seed for the new PAN). If the client device 104 is unable to issue such a write request, the card 130 may still coordinate with the server 116, although perhaps in a more limited manner. For example, if, as noted above, the communication logic / applet on the card 130 is configured to recognize a predetermined tap pattern as an instruction to change the PAN, different patterns may be associated with different change instructions. For example, if a user taps the card 130 against the NFC reader 110 five times in less than one minute, this may be interpreted as an instruction to advance to the next PAN stored in the list. On the other hand, if the user taps the card 130 against the NFC reader 110 only four times in less than one minute, this may be interpreted as an instruction to skip forward two PANs in the list. The instructions from the server 116 to the client device 104 can identify the specific mode to be used, and the client device 104 can display appropriate instructions on the user interface. If multiple different modes are programmed into the communication logic / applet on the card 130, the device 104 can request the user to confirm the mode to ensure that the correct mode is used (e.g., by requiring the user to tap in a predetermined mode, wait briefly, and then requiring the user to confirm the change by tapping again in the same predetermined mode).

[0038] Once the PAN is changed, the communication logic / applet on the card 130 can report success to the server 116. The success can identify the new PAN that has been selected (either directly, by reporting the PAN or an encrypted version of the PAN, or indirectly, such as by transmitting a hash of the PAN or a subset of the PAN). If the updated PAN does not match the PAN expected by the server 116, the PAN can be invalidated and the process can be repeated. Alternatively, the server 116 can simply accept the PAN reported by the card 130.

[0039] In some examples, server 116 may include one or more processors coupled to a memory. Server 116 may be configured as a central system, server, or platform that controls and calls various data at different times to perform multiple workflow actions.

[0040] Figure 1BOne or more contactless cards 130 are illustrated. Contactless cards 130 may include payment cards, such as credit cards, debit cards, or gift cards issued by a service provider 132 and displayed on the front or back of card 130. In some examples, contactless cards 130 are unrelated to payment cards and may include, but are not limited to, identification cards. In some examples, payment cards may include dual-interface contactless payment cards. Contactless cards 130 may include a substrate 134, which may include a single layer or one or more laminated layers composed of plastic, metal, or other materials. Example substrate materials include polyvinyl chloride, polyvinyl chloride acetate, acrylonitrile butadiene styrene, polycarbonate, polyester, anodized titanium, palladium, gold, carbon, paper, and biodegradable materials. In some examples, contactless cards 130 may have physical characteristics conforming to the ID-1 format of the ISO / IEC 7810 standard. Alternatively, contactless cards may conform to the ISO / IEC 14443 standard. However, it is understood that a contactless card 130 according to the present disclosure may have different characteristics, and the present disclosure does not require that the contactless card be implemented in a payment card.

[0041] The contactless card 130 may also include identification information 136 displayed on the front and / or back of the card. In some embodiments, the identification information 136 may be printed or embossed directly on the card. Optionally, an e-ink display 149 (or another type of rewritable display using technology such as liquid crystal diodes) may be provided for displaying some or all of the identification information 136. For example, the e-ink display 149 may display the card number associated with the card. The e-ink display 149 may be powered by a magnetic field (such as a magnetic field emitted from the client device 104). The antenna of the card 130 (e.g., the antenna of the contact pad 138 discussed below) may collect power from the magnetic field and, when the card 130 is in close proximity to the client device 104, power the e-ink display 149. As discussed herein, this allows the e-ink display 149 to be changed to match the new number assigned to the small application on the card 130.

[0042] The contactless card 130 may further include a contact pad 138. The contact pad 138 may be configured to establish contact with another communication device, such as a user device, a smartphone, a laptop, a desktop, or a tablet computer. The contactless card 130 may also include Figure 1C The contactless card 130 may also include a magnetic stripe or tape that may be located on the back of the card (in the Figure 1B not shown).

[0043] like Figure 1C As shown, Figure 1B Contact pads 138 may include processing circuitry 140 for storing and processing information, processing circuitry 140 including a microprocessor 142 and memory 144. It is understood that processing circuitry 140 may contain additional components necessary to perform the functions described herein, including processors, memories, error and parity / CRC checkers, data encoders, anti-collision algorithms, controllers, command decoders, security primitives, and anti-tamper hardware.

[0044] Memory 144 can be read-only memory, write-once-read-many memory, or read / write memory, such as RAM, ROM, and EEPROM, and contactless card 500 may include one or more of these memories. Read-only memory can be factory-programmable to read-only or one-time programmable. One-time programmable memory provides the opportunity to write once and then read multiple times. Write-once-read-many memory can be programmed at a point in time after the memory chip has left the factory. Once the memory is programmed, it cannot be rewritten, but it can be read multiple times. Read / write memory can be programmed and reprogrammed multiple times after leaving the factory. It can also be read multiple times.

[0045] Memory 144 can be configured to store one or more applet 146, one or more counters 108 and customer identifier 148.Described one or more applet 146 can comprise one or more software applications that are configured to carry out on one or more contactless cards, such as Java card applet.Yet, understand that applet 146 is not limited to Java card applet, but can be any software application that can operate on contactless card or other devices with limited memory.Described one or more counters 108 can comprise the numerical value counter that is enough to store integer.Customer identifier 148 can comprise the unique alphanumeric identifier that is assigned to the user of contactless card 130, and this identifier can distinguish the user of contactless card and other contactless card users.In some examples, customer identifier 148 can identify customer and be assigned to this customer's account these two, and can further identify the contactless card that is associated with customer's account.

[0046] Small application 146 may include a payment small application configured to carry out payment transactions with card 130. The payment small application may be responsible for maintaining or may use the primary account number (PAN) of the card, which may be transmitted from the card as a part for a transaction. Small application 146 may further include an authentication and / or encryption small application called when an external source (such as client device 104, point-of-sale terminal, automated teller machine, etc.) attempts to establish communication with card 130 (such as when contact pad 138 is placed against or adjacent to reader (such as NFC reader 110)). The payment small application may not directly communicate with an external source (that is, a source outside the processing circuit system 140), but may be able to safely communicate with another small application (such as authentication and encryption small application) on the processing circuit system 140. Information may be passed from the payment small application to the authentication and encryption small application for communication outside the card.

[0047] Alternatively, the payment applet can be pre-loaded (e.g., when the card is issued) with predefined PANs, one of which is designated as the currently active PAN, with the remaining PANs held in reserve. When the applet is called to issue a new PAN, the applet can select the next PAN in the list and designate it as the active PAN. Alternatively, the applet can randomly generate a new PAN according to a PAN generation rule, or can generate a new PAN based on a previous PAN.

[0048] The processor and memory elements of the aforementioned exemplary embodiments are described with reference to the contact pads, but the present disclosure is not limited thereto. It is understood that these elements may be implemented external to the pads 138, or completely separate from it, or as further elements in addition to the processor 142 and memory 144 housed within the contact pads 138.

[0049] In some examples, contactless card 130 may include one or more antennas 150. The one or more antennas 150 may be positioned within contactless card 130, around processing circuitry 140 at contact pads 138. For example, the one or more antennas 150 may be integrated with processing circuitry 140, or the one or more antennas 150 may be used in conjunction with an external booster coil. As another example, the one or more antennas 150 may be external to contact pads 138 and processing circuitry 142.

[0050] In one embodiment, the coil of the contactless card 130 can function as the secondary of an air-core transformer. The terminal can communicate with the contactless card 130 by disconnecting power or by amplitude modulation. The contactless card 130 can infer data transmitted from the terminal by using the gaps when the contactless card is connected to a power source. This power connection can be functionally maintained by one or more capacitors. The contactless card 130 can also transmit communications back by switching the load on the contactless card coil or by load modulation. Load modulation can be detected in the terminal coil through interferometry.

[0051] As explained above, contactless card 130 can be built on a software platform operable on other devices (such as JavaCard) with limited memory, and one or more applications or applet can be safely executed. Applet can be added to contactless card to provide a one-time password (OTP) for the multi-factor authentication (MFA) under the use case for various mobile applications. Applet can be configured to respond to one or more requests (such as near field data exchange request (NDEF)) from a reader (such as a mobile NFC reader), and generate an NDEF message comprising an OTP that is encoded as an NDEF text tag, that is cryptographically secure.

[0052] As noted above, an exemplary transaction may be via logic 112 executing on the client device 104 to verify the requested transaction with the account associated with the contactless card. Figures 2A-2B Depicted are exemplary interfaces that may be presented on a client device in response to the described logic.

[0053] Figure 2A The initial interface 200 for an application associated with a card (e.g., an application provided by a card provider) is depicted. The initial interface 200 can be displayed on the client device 104 when the client device 104 receives an instruction from the server 116 to reissue a card or otherwise reallocate or change the information stored on the card. The interface 200 includes a message area 202 that displays information regarding the reissue of the card information. The message area 202 can explain, for example, that the user's card has been reissued, why the reissue has occurred, and the next steps the user needs to take to change the card information.

[0054] Interface 200 may further include interactive element 204. To change the information stored on the card, the user may optionally first be required to select interactive element 204 in order to verify the user's desire to reissue the card number (so that the user does not accidentally overwrite the card information by placing the card adjacent to an NFC reader).

[0055] When an interactive element is selected, such as Figure 2BAs shown, the user can rewrite the PAN or other information stored on the card 130 by bringing the card's chip's contact pads 138 into proximity with the NFC reader of the device 104. When the card is brought into proximity with the NFC reader and the applet on the card confirms that the card's PAN has been successfully changed, a confirmation message 206 can be displayed indicating that the card's information has been successfully rewritten.

[0056] As Figures 2A-2B Alternatively to the process shown, the user may be prompted (in interface 200) to tap their card on the client device's NFC reader in a predetermined pattern. The authentication and encryption applet may register the predetermined pattern.

[0057] although Figures 2A-2B The card 130 is depicted as being rewritten when brought into proximity with the mobile client device 104 , but it is also contemplated that the card may be rewritten by an automated teller machine, point-of-sale terminal, or any other device having a suitable transmitter (e.g., an NFC transmitter) for communicating with the contact pad 138 .

[0058] like Figure 2B As shown, when a new PAN is written to the chip on a contactless card, the new card number may not match the number printed or embossed on the card or the information stored on the card's magnetic stripe. In this case, it may still be desirable to have a new physical card created and sent to the user so that all of the card's payment options can be used. Nevertheless, while the card is being sent to the user, the card's contactless payment functionality can still be used using the information stored on the chip. If the card includes an e-ink display, as noted above, the e-ink display can be updated when the PAN is rewritten to reflect the new card number. In this case, it may not be necessary to reissue a physical card, especially if the card does not include a magnetic stripe, or if the user primarily uses the card for contactless payments.

[0059] Figure 2C is a timing diagram illustrating an example sequence for providing authenticated access according to one or more embodiments of the present disclosure.A system may include a contactless card 130 and a client device 104, which may include an application (which may include logic 112) and a processor.

[0060] At 202, the application communicates with the contactless card 130 (e.g., after being brought into proximity with the contactless card 130). The communication between the application and the contactless card 130 may involve the contactless card 130 being brought sufficiently close to a card reader (not shown) of the client device 104 to enable NFC data transfer between the application and the contactless card 130.

[0061] In step 204, after communication has been established between the client device 104 and the contactless card 130, the contactless card 130 generates a message authentication code (MAC) password. In some examples, this may occur when the contactless card 130 is read by the application hosted by the logic 112. Specifically, this may occur when a near field data exchange (NDEF) tag is read (such as an NFC reader), where the NDEF tag is created according to the NFC data exchange format. For example, a reader (such as the logic 112) may transmit a message with the applet ID of the NDEF applet that generates the applet, such as an applet selection message. Once the selection is confirmed, a sequence of a select file message followed by a read file message may be transmitted. For example, the sequence may include "select capabilities file," "read capabilities file," and "select NDEF file." At this point, a counter value maintained by the contactless card 130 may be updated or incremented, which may be followed by "read NDEF file." At this point, a message may be generated that may include a header and a shared secret. A session key may then be generated. A MAC password may be created from the message that includes the header and the shared secret. The MAC password may then be concatenated with one or more blocks of random data, and the MAC password and random number (RND) may be encrypted using the session key. Thereafter, the password and header may be concatenated, encoded as ASCII hexadecimal, and returned in the NDEF message format (in response to the "Read NDEF File" message).

[0062] In some examples, the MAC password may be transmitted as an NDEF tag, and in other examples, the MAC password may be included with the uniform resource indicator (eg, as a formatted string).

[0063] In some examples, logic 112 may be configured to transmit a request to contactless card 130 that includes instructions to generate a MAC password.

[0064] At step 206, the contactless card 130 sends the MAC password to the logic 112. In some examples, the transmission of the MAC password occurs via NFC, however, the present invention is not limited thereto. In other examples, the communication can occur via Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, or other wireless data communication means.

[0065] At step 208, the logic 112 transmits the MAC password to the processor.

[0066] At step 210, the processor verifies the MAC password according to instructions from the logic 122. For example, the MAC password may be verified as described below.

[0067] In some examples, verifying the MAC password may be performed by a device other than client device 104, such as server 116 in data communication with client device 104. For example, the processor may output the MAC password for transmission to server 116, which may verify the MAC password.

[0068] In some examples, a MAC password can be used as a digital signature for verification purposes. Other digital signature algorithms (such as public key asymmetric algorithms, for example, the Digital Signature Algorithm and the RSA algorithm) or zero-knowledge protocols can be used to perform the verification.

[0069] Figure 2D An exemplary technique for generating a protected message 230 is depicted in accordance with an exemplary embodiment.

[0070] Message 230 can be configured to deliver information or content from a sender to a recipient. The information or content can be represented by message plaintext 234 (although the content can optionally be encrypted).

[0071] Message plaintext 234 can be combined with shared secret 232. Shared secret 232 can be a random number known to both the sender and the recipient. For example, if message plaintext 234 relates to an authentication action for a contactless card as described above, the process of setting up or initializing the card can involve sharing a random number between the chip on the card and the transaction verification server. In one embodiment, the random number can be a 32-bit random number. Alternatively or additionally, a communication session can be set up by the sender and the recipient; the process of setting up the communication session can involve sharing a random number between the sender and the recipient, which can be used as shared secret 232.

[0072] The message plaintext 234 and the shared secret 232 may be combined in various ways. In one embodiment, the message plaintext 234 may be encoded in a format such that the message plaintext 234 may be multiplied by the shared secret 232. The resulting product may then be applied to a MAC algorithm.

[0073] When a recipient (e.g., a receiving server) retrieves the combined MAC data, the recipient can consult its version of the shared secret 232 and can reverse the process used to combine the MAC data with the shared secret (e.g., divide the combined MAC data and shared secret 232 to retrieve the original MAC data).

[0074] Those skilled in the art will recognize that other techniques exist for combining two different data instances, any of which may be suitable for use with the exemplary embodiments.

[0075] After the message plaintext 234 and the shared secret 232 are combined, they may be provided to a MAC algorithm 236. The MAC algorithm 236 may be any suitable MAC algorithm, such as the Data Authentication Algorithm (DAA), the Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC), the Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC), and the Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC), among many others.

[0076] MAC algorithm 236 may operate using a key. In an exemplary embodiment, the key may be a first diversified key 250 created using diversification algorithm 248. The diversification algorithm may operate on counter 108 received from the contactless card and a first master key 244 (described in more detail below) stored on the contactless card to generate first diversified key 250. Using first diversified key 250 and the combined shared secret / plaintext, MAC algorithm 236 may generate MAC output 238.

[0077] MAC output 238 may optionally be encrypted using encryption algorithm 240 to produce encrypted MAC 242. Encryption algorithm 240 may be any suitable encryption algorithm, such as Data Encryption Standard (DES), TripleDES (3DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), and RSA, among many others.

[0078] In some embodiments, MAC output 238 may be truncated and / or combined with random data 254. For example, in one embodiment, the beginning of MAC output 238 may be discarded so that, for example, only the last 8 bytes remain. The remainder of MAC output 238 may be combined with the 8 bytes of randomly generated data 254. When a recipient receives message 300, the recipient may decrypt encrypted MAC 242 and discard the random data. The recipient may calculate its own version of the MAC as described below and may compare the last 8 bytes of the recipient-generated MAC with the remaining data from encrypted MAC 242 received as part of message 230.

[0079] The encryption algorithm 240 may operate using a key. In an exemplary embodiment, the key may be a second diversified key 252 created using the diversification algorithm 248. The diversification algorithm may operate on the counter 108 received from the contactless card and the second master key 246 (described in more detail below) stored on the contactless card to generate the second diversified key 252. Using the second diversified key 252 and the MAC output 238, the encryption algorithm 240 may generate an encrypted MAC 232, which may be included in the header of the message 230.

[0080] The encrypted MAC 232 may be transmitted along with the message plaintext 234. The counter value 108 may optionally be transmitted as part of the message plaintext 234 and may be consulted by the recipient (e.g., a server) when authenticating the message. The shared secret 232 is not sent directly as part of the message.

[0081] Figure 3 FIG. 3 is a flow chart illustrating key operations 300 according to an example embodiment. Figure 3 As shown, at block 310, two bank identifier number (BIN)-level master keys may be used in conjunction with the account identifier and the card serial number to generate two unique derivation keys (UDKs) per card. In some examples, the bank identifier number may include a single number or a combination of one or more numbers, such as an account number or an unpredictable number provided by one or more servers, which may be used for session key generation and / or diversification. The UDKs (AUTKEY and ENCKEY) may be stored on the card during the personalization process.

[0082] At block 320, the counter can be used as diversification data because it changes with each use and provides a different session key each time, as opposed to master key derivation, where each card generates a unique set of keys. In some examples, it is preferred to use a 4-byte method for both operations. Thus, at block 320, two session keys can be created from the UDK for each transaction, i.e., one session key from the AUTKEY and one from the ENCKEY. In the card, for the MAC key (i.e., the session key created from the AUTKEY), the lower two bytes of the OTP counter can be used for diversification. For the ENC key (i.e., the session key created from the ENCKEY), the entire length of the OTP counter can be used for the ENC key.

[0083] At block 330, a MAC password may be prepared using the MAC key and the password may be encrypted using the ENC key. For example, a MAC session key may be used to prepare the password and the result may be encrypted using the ENC key before being transmitted to the one or more servers.

[0084] At block 340, MAC verification and processing are simplified because 2-byte diversification is directly supported in the payment HSM's MAC authentication function. Password decryption is performed before MAC verification. Session keys are independently derived at the one or more servers to produce a first session key (ENC session key) and a second session key (MAC session key). The second derived key (i.e., the ENC session key) can be used to decrypt the data, and the first derived key (i.e., the MAC session key) can be used to verify the decrypted data.

[0085] For contactless cards, different unique identifiers are derived, which can be related to the application primary account number (PAN) and PAN serial number encoded in the card. Key diversification can be configured to receive an identifier as input together with a master key so that one or more keys can be created for each contactless card. In some examples, these diversified keys can include a first key and a second key. The first key can include an authentication master key (card password generation / authentication key - Card-Key-Auth) and can be further diversified to create a MAC session key used when generating and verifying a MAC password. The second key can include an encryption master key (card data encryption key - Card-Key-DEK) and can be further diversified to create an ENC session key used when encrypting and decrypting encrypted data. In some examples, the first key and the second key can be created in the following manner, that is, by combining the issuer master key with the unique ID number (pUID) of the card and the PAN serial number (PSN) of the payment app to diversify the issuer master key. The pUID can include a 16-bit value. As described above, the pUID can include a 16-bit BCD encoded number. In some examples, the pUID may comprise a 14-bit value.

[0086] In some examples, because the EMV session key derivation method may encapsulate at 2^16 uses, a counter (such as a full 32-bit counter) may be added to the initialization array of the diversification method.

[0087] In other examples, such as a credit card, a number (such as an account number or an unpredictable number provided by one or more servers) can be used for session key generation and / or diversification.

[0088] Figure 4 A diagram illustrating a system 400 configured to implement one or more embodiments of the present disclosure is shown. As described below, during the contactless card creation process, two cryptographic keys can be uniquely assigned to each card. The cryptographic keys can include symmetric keys that can be used for both data encryption and decryption. The Triple DES (3DES) algorithm can be used by EMV and is implemented in hardware in contactless cards. By using a key diversification process, one or more keys can be derived from a master key based on uniquely identifiable information for each entity that requires a key.

[0089] Regarding master key management, two issuer master keys 405, 410 may be required for each portion of a folder on which the one or more applets are published. For example, the first master key 405 may include an issuer cryptographic generation / authentication key (Iss-Key-Auth), and the second master key 410 may include an issuer data encryption key (Iss-Key-DEK). As further described herein, the two issuer master keys 405, 410 are diversified into card master keys 425, 430, both of which are unique to each card. In some examples, a network profile record ID (pNPR) 415 and a derived key index (pDKI) 420, as back-office data, may be used to identify which issuer master keys 405, 410 are used for authentication in cryptographic processing. The system performing the authentication may be configured to retrieve the values of the pNPR 415 and pDKI 420 for contactless cards during authentication.

[0090] In some examples, in order to improve the security of solution, session keys (such as the unique key of each session) can be derived, rather than using master keys, as described above, unique card derivation keys and counters can be used as diverse data. For example, when each card was used in operation, different keys could be used to create message authentication code (MAC) and perform encryption. About session keys, generation can be used to produce passwords in one or more applets and the key that data are translated into passwords can comprise session keys (Card-Key-Auth 425 and Card-Key-Dek430) based on card unique keys. Session keys (Aut-Session-Key 435 and DEK-Session-Key 440) can be produced by described one or more applets, and by using application transaction counter (pATC) 445, utilize one or more algorithms to derive. In order to put data into one or more algorithms, only 2 low-order bytes are used among the 4-byte pATC 445. In some examples, the four-byte session key derivation method may include: F1:=PATC(low 2 bytes)||'F0'||'00'||PATC(four bytes)F1:=PATC(low 2 bytes)||'0F'||'00'||PATC(four bytes)SK:={(ALG(MK)[F1])||ALG(MK)[F2]}, where ALG may include 3DES ECB, and MK may include a master key uniquely derived from the card.

[0091] As described herein, the lower two bytes of the pATC 445 counter can be used to derive one or more MAC session keys. Each time a contactless card is tapped, the pATC 445 is configured to be updated, and the card master keys Card-Key-AUTH 425 and Card-Key-DEK 430 are further diversified into session keys Aut-Session-Key 435 and DEK-Session-KEY 440. The pATC 445 can be initialized to zero during personalization or applet initialization. In some examples, the pATC counter 445 can be initialized prior to or during personalization and can be configured to increment by one each time an NDEF read is made.

[0092] Furthermore, updates for each card can be unique and assigned either through personalization or algorithmically using a pUID or other identifying information. For example, odd-numbered cards can be incremented or decremented by 2, and even-numbered cards can be incremented or decremented by 5. In some examples, updates can also read changes sequentially, so that a card can be incremented by 1, 3, 5, 2, 2, and so on. A specific or algorithmic sequence can be defined during personalization or from one or more processes derived from a unique identifier. This can make it more difficult for a replay attacker to generalize from a small number of card instances.

[0093] The authentication message may be delivered as the content of a text NDEF record in hexadecimal ASCII format. In some examples, only the authentication data and an 8-byte random number followed by a MAC of the authentication data may be included. In some examples, the random number may precede the password A and may be one block long. In other examples, there may be no restriction on the length of the random number. In further examples, the total data (i.e., the random number plus the password) may be a multiple of the block size. In these examples, an additional 8-byte block may be added to match the block generated by the MAC algorithm. As another example, if the algorithm employed uses 16-byte blocks, even multiples of that block size may be used, or the output may be automatically or manually padded to a multiple of that block size.

[0094] A MAC may be performed using a function key (AUT-Session-Key) 435. The data specified in the cryptogram may be processed using the javacard.signature method: ALG_DES_MAC8_ISO9797_1_M2_ALG3 to relate to the EMV ARQC validation method. As described above, the key used for this calculation may include the session key AUT-Session-Key 435. As described above, the lower two bytes of the counter may be used to diversify one or more MAC session keys. As described below, the AUT-Session-Key 435 may be used to MAC data 450, and the resulting data or cryptogram A 455 and random number RND may be encrypted using the DEK-Session-Key 440 to create the cryptogram B or output 460 sent in the message.

[0095] In some examples, one or more HSM commands may be processed for decryption such that the final 16 (binary, 32 hexadecimal) bytes may include a 3DES symmetric encryption using CBC mode with a random number and zero IV, followed by the MAC authentication data. The key used for this encryption may include the session key DEK-Session-Key 440 derived from the Card-Key-DEK 430. In this case, the ATC value used for session key derivation is the least significant byte of the counter pATC 445.

[0096] The following format represents an example embodiment of a binary version: In some examples, the first byte may be set to ASCII "A".

[0097]

[0098]

[0099] Another exemplary format is shown below. In this example, the tag can be encoded in hexadecimal format.

[0100]

[0101]

[0102] The UID field of the received message can be extracted to derive the card master keys (Card-Key-Auth 425 and Card-Key-DEK 430) for that particular card from the master keys Iss-Key-AUTH 405 and Iss-Key-DEK 410. Using the card master keys (Card-Key-Auth 425 and Card-Key-DEK 430), the counter (pATC) field of the received message can be used to derive the session keys (Aut-Session-Key 435 and DEK-Session-Key 440) for that particular card. The DEK-Session-KEY can be used to decrypt Cryptogram B 460, which yields Cryptogram A 455 and RND, which can be discarded. The UID field can be used to look up the contactless card's shared secret, which, along with the Ver, UID, and pATC fields of the message, can be processed through Cryptogram MAC using the recreated Aut-Session-Key to create a MAC output, such as MAC'. If the MAC' is the same as the cipher A 955, this indicates that the message decryption and MAC verification have all passed. The pATC can then be read to determine if it is valid.

[0103] During the authentication session, one or more applications may generate one or more passwords. For example, the one or more passwords may be generated as a 3DES MAC using ISO 9797-1 algorithm 3 with method 2 padding via one or more session keys (such as Aut-Session-Key 435). The input data 450 may take the following form: version (2), pUID (8), pATC (4), shared secret (4). In some examples, the number in brackets may include a length in bytes. In some examples, the shared secret may be generated by one or more random number generators that may be configured to ensure that the random number is unpredictable through one or more security processes. In some examples, the shared secret may include a random 4-byte binary number that is injected into the card during personalization and is known to the authentication service. During the authentication session, the shared secret may not be provided from the one or more applets to the mobile application. Method 2 padding may include adding a mandatory 0x'80' byte to the end of the input data and adding a 0x'00' byte that may be added to the end of the resulting data up to an 8-byte boundary. The resulting password may comprise 8 bytes in length.

[0104] In some examples, one benefit of encrypting an unshared random number as the first block with the MAC cipher is that it serves as an initialization vector when using the CBC (block chaining) mode of a symmetric encryption algorithm. This allows "crawl" between blocks without having to pre-establish a fixed or dynamic IV.

[0105] By including an application transaction counter (pATC) as part of the data included in the MAC password, the authentication service can be configured to determine whether the value passed in the clean data has been tampered with. Furthermore, by including the version in the one or more passwords, it is more difficult for an attacker to intentionally misrepresent the application version in an attempt to reduce the advantage of the password solution. In some examples, the pATC can start at zero and be updated by 1 each time one or more applications generate authentication data. The authentication service can be configured to track the pATC used during the authentication session. In some examples, when authentication data uses a pATC that is equal to or lower than the previous value received by the authentication service, this can be interpreted as an attempt to replay an old message, and authentication can be denied. In some examples, if the pATC is greater than the previous value received, this can be evaluated to determine whether it is within an acceptable range or threshold, and if it exceeds the range or threshold, or if it is outside the range or threshold, the authentication can be deemed to have failed or is unreliable. In a MAC operation 436, data 450 is processed by MAC using Aut-Session-Key 435 to generate a MAC output (Cipher A) 455, which is encrypted.

[0106] To provide additional protection against brute force attacks that expose the key on the card, it is desirable that the MAC password 455 be encrypted. In some examples, the data or password A 455 to be included in the cipher text may include: random number (8), password (8). In some examples, the number in brackets may include a length in bytes. In some examples, the random number may be generated by one or more random number generators that may be configured to ensure that the random number is unpredictable through one or more security processes. The key used to encrypt the data may include a session key. For example, the session key may include a DEK-Session-Key 440. In an encryption operation 441, the data or password A 455 and RND are processed using the DEK-Session-Key 440 to generate encrypted data, password B 460. In cipher block chaining mode, the data 455 may be encrypted using 3DES to ensure that an attacker must run any attack on all of the cipher text. As a non-limiting example, other algorithms such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) may be used. In some examples, an initialization vector of 0x'00000000000000000" may be used. Any attacker trying to brute force the key used to encrypt the data will not be able to determine when the correct key has been used because correctly decrypted data will be indistinguishable from incorrectly decrypted data due to its random appearance.

[0107] In order for the authentication service to verify one or more passwords provided by one or more applets, the following data must be transmitted in plain text from the one or more applets to the mobile device during the authentication session: a version number to determine the cryptographic method used and the message format used to verify the password, which allows the method to change in the future; a pUID to retrieve the cryptographic asset and derive the card key; and a pATC to derive the session key for the password.

[0108] Figure 5 A method 500 for generating a cryptogram is illustrated. For example, at block 510, a network profile record ID (pNPR) and a derived key index (pDKI) can be used to identify which issuer master key to use for authentication in a cryptographic process. In some examples, the method can include performing authentication to retrieve the values of the pNPR and pDKI for the contactless card at the time of authentication.

[0109] At block 520 , the issuer master key may be diversified by combining it with the card's unique ID number (pUID) and the PAN serial number (PSN) of one or more applets (eg, a payment applet).

[0110] At block 530 , Card-Key-Auth and Card-Key-DEK (unique card keys) may be created by diversifying the issuer master key to generate a session key that may be used to generate a MAC password.

[0111] At block 540, the keys used to generate cryptograms and encrypt data in one or more applets may include session keys based on the card-unique keys (Card-Key-Auth and Card-Key-DEK) of block 530. In some examples, these session keys may be generated by the one or more applets and derived using pATC to obtain the session keys Aut-Session-Key and DEK-Session-Key.

[0112] FIG6 depicts an exemplary process 600 illustrating key diversification according to an example. Initially, two different master keys may be provisioned for a sender and a receiver. For example, the first master key may include a data encryption master key, and the second master key may include a data integrity master key. The sender has a counter value that may be updated at block 602 and other data (such as data to be protected) that may be shared with the receiver.

[0113] At block 604, the counter value may be encrypted by the sender using the data encryption master key to generate a data encryption-derived session key, and the counter value may also be encrypted by the sender using the data integrity master key to generate a data integrity-derived session key. In some examples, the entire counter value or a portion of the counter value may be used during both encryptions.

[0114] In some examples, the counter value may not be encrypted. In these examples, the counter may be transmitted between the sender and the receiver in plain text, i.e., not encrypted.

[0115] At block 606, the sender processes the data to be protected using a cryptographic MAC operation using the data integrity session key and a cryptographic MAC algorithm. The protected data (including the plaintext and the shared secret) may be used to generate a MAC using one of the session keys (AUT-Session-Key).

[0116] The sender may use the session key derived from the data encryption in conjunction with a symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt the data to be protected at block 608. In some examples, the MAC is combined with an equal amount of random data (e.g., each 8 bytes long) and then encrypted using a second session key (DEK-Session-Key).

[0117] At block 610, the encrypted MAC is transmitted from the sender to the recipient along with information sufficient to identify additional secret information (such as a shared secret, master key, etc.) for use in verifying the secret.

[0118] At block 612, the recipient uses the received counter value to independently derive two derived session keys from the two master keys as described above.

[0119] At block 614, the session key derived from the data encryption is used in conjunction with a symmetric decryption operation to decrypt the protected data. Additional processing on the exchanged data then occurs. In some examples, after the MAC is extracted, it may be desirable to recreate and match the MAC. For example, when verifying a password, a properly generated session key can be used to decrypt it. The protected data can then be reconstructed for verification. A MAC operation can be performed using the properly generated session key to determine if it matches the decrypted MAC. Because the MAC operation is an irreversible process, the only way to verify it is to attempt to recreate it from the source data.

[0120] At block 616, the data integrity derived session key is used in conjunction with a cryptographic MAC operation to verify that the protected data has not been modified.

[0121] Some examples of the methods described herein can advantageously confirm when successful authentication is determined when the following conditions are met. First, the ability to verify the MAC indicates that the derived session key is appropriate. The MAC can only be correct if the decryption is successful and the appropriate MAC value is obtained. Successful decryption can indicate that the correctly derived encryption key was used to decrypt the encrypted MAC. Because the derived session key is created using a master key that only the sender (e.g., a transmitting device) and the receiver (e.g., a receiving device) know, it can be trusted that the contactless card that originally created the MAC and encrypted the MAC is actually authentic. Moreover, the counter value used to derive the first session key and the second session key can be shown as valid and can be used to perform the authentication operation.

[0122] Thereafter, the two derived session keys may be discarded, and the next data exchange iteration will update the counter value (returning to block 602), and a new set of session keys may be created (at block 604).In some examples, the combined random data may be discarded.

[0123] Figure 6B Depicted is a sequence diagram illustrating an exemplary exchange of messages in accordance with an embodiment. Figure 6C An exemplary flow diagram illustrating logic 650 executed by an applet, logic, or program on card 130 is depicted and is associated with Figure 6B Discuss in parallel.

[0124] from Figure 6C Initially, the payment / transaction applet may, at block 652, store one or more PANs for a card. The PAN may be written to the card when it is initially issued. In some embodiments, the payment / transaction applet maintains the PAN or accesses it in a defined location in memory as long as a PAN is issued to the card. The payment / transaction applet may be able to write or rewrite the PAN and may do so when a new PAN is needed. In other embodiments, multiple PANs may be issued to the card and may be stored in a list. A PAN (such as the first PAN in the list) may be designated as the active PAN for payments and transactions. When a new PAN is needed, the old PAN may be deleted and the next PAN in the list may become the active PAN; alternatively or in addition, a different PAN in the list may be designated as the current PAN.

[0125] Turn to Figure 6B The reissue process may begin when the server 116 transmits a reissue message 620 to the client 104. The reissue message may indicate that a particular card belonging to an account holder associated with the client device 104 should have its identifier / PAN reissued, altered, or otherwise changed. The account holder may be associated with the client device 104 by installing an application on the client device 104 belonging to the card issuer (which may also maintain the server 116).

[0126] For example, a user may install an application that allows the user to review their outstanding balance, make payments, etc., and the user's specific card may be associated with the application based on the account number / card number assigned to the user. The application may communicate with the server 116 and may register the device 104 with the server. The user may log into their account with the card provider through the application, thereby associating their account with the device 104.

[0127] The application can also communicate with the user's card 130, thereby establishing a communication link from the server 116 to the card 130. When the server 116 determines that the user's account has been compromised (or the card number needs to be reissued for another reason), the server 116 can contact the user's application on the device 104 to achieve this. The user's old number or old identifier can be invalidated before, during, or after sending the reissue message 620.

[0128] Upon receiving the reissue message, the application on the client 104 can recognize that the PAN must be reissued. The application can be programmed to use a number of techniques to communicate this information to the communication / authentication applet on the card in a reissue instruction or tap mode 622.

[0129] One technique may involve issuing an NFC write command (or another suitable command using a different communication protocol) to a communication / authentication applet on the card 130. The NFC write command may identify that the card number or card identifier is to be changed. This technique may be suitable for devices that can issue NFC write commands directly to an applet on the card, such as those running the Android operating system.

[0130] Some operating systems, such as the iOS operating system, cannot issue NFC write commands directly to these applets. Therefore, the app may be programmed with logic configured to cause the display device to pass instructions to the user requesting the user to tap their card 130 against the NFC reader on the device 104 in a predetermined pattern. This logic may have a corresponding portion on the communication / authentication applet configured to recognize the predetermined pattern and interpret the pattern as a reissued PAN or identification number.

[0131] At 624, the communication / authentication applet on the card recognizes the instruction or pattern 622 and initiates the card change process ( Figure 6C 654).

[0132] First, in 626 ( Figure 6C At block 656, the communication / authentication applet sets up a secure communication channel or secure data transfer format between the communication / authentication applet and the payment / transaction applet. This communication channel may be built into the chip on the card 130 so that a fast setup process is not required, or it may be a peer-to-peer communication channel or data transfer format that is set up on demand.

[0133] The communication / authentication applet can be used via a secure communication channel ( Figure 6C In response, the payment / transaction app may send the reissue command 628 to the payment / transaction app at block 658. Figure 6C 6), selects a new identifier or PAN (e.g., advances to the next PAN in the list, generates an entirely new PAN from the scratch, derives the new PAN from the old PAN and / or other information stored on the card, etc.). In some cases, the process for selecting a new identifier or PAN may be coordinated with server 116, as previously discussed.

[0134] The payment / transaction applet may determine whether the change of identifier or PAN was successful (e.g., whether a new PAN has been generated that meets certain predefined requirements). If there is a problem in the process, or if the new PAN cannot be verified according to the requirements, the payment / transaction applet may report the failure to the communication / authentication applet ( Figure 6C The card's chip may optionally be deauthorized to perform the transaction at this time.

[0135] If the update of the PAN or identifier is successful, the payment / transaction applet may confirm 632 the success to the communication / authentication applet, which may forward the confirmation back toward the server 116 ( Figure 6C 652).

[0136] If the card includes a rewritable display, such as an e-ink display, then at 634 the communications / authentication applet (or other suitable logic on the card) may cause the display to be rewritten with the new card identifier (see Figure 6C Optionally, the card may remain in the magnetic field caused by the communication with the device 104 during this process so that energy from the communication can be used to update the display.

[0137] Example embodiments of the systems and methods described herein may be configured to provide security factor authentication. Security factor authentication may include multiple processes. As part of the security factor authentication, a first process may include logging in and authenticating a user via one or more applications executing on a device. As a second process, the user may engage in one or more actions associated with one or more contactless cards in response to successful logging in and authentication of the first process via the one or more applications. In practice, security factor authentication may include both securely proving the identity of a user and engaging in one or more types of actions, including, but not limited to, one or more tap gestures associated with a contactless card. In some examples, the one or more tap gestures may include a user tapping a contactless card of the device. In some examples, the device may include a mobile device, a kiosk, a terminal, a tablet, or any other device configured to process a received tap gesture.

[0138] In some examples, a contactless card can be tapped against a device (such as one or more computer kiosks or terminals) to verify identity in order to receive a transaction item in response to a purchase, such as coffee. By using a contactless card, a secure method for proving identity in a loyalty program can be established. Proving identity securely, for example, to obtain rewards, coupons, special offers, etc., or to receive benefits is established in a manner different from simply scanning a barcode card. For example, an encrypted transaction can occur between a contactless card and the device, which can be configured to process one or more tap gestures. As described above, the one or more applications can be configured to verify the user's identity and then have the user act or respond to it, for example, via one or more tap gestures. In some examples, data such as bonus points, loyalty points, reward points, health information, etc. can be written back to the contactless card.

[0139] In some examples, a contactless card may be tapped against a device (such as a mobile device). As described above, the user's identity may be verified by the one or more applications, which then grant the user desired benefits based on the verification of identity.

[0140] In some examples, a contactless card can be activated by tapping it against a device (such as a mobile device). For example, the contactless card can communicate with an application on the device via a card reader on the device via NFC communication. The communication, during which the card is tapped against the device's card reader, can allow the device's application to read data associated with the contactless card and activate the card. In some examples, activation can authorize the card to be used to perform other functions, such as making purchases, accessing accounts or restricted information, or other functions. In some examples, the tap can activate or launch the device's application, which then initiates one or more actions or communications with one or more servers to activate the contactless card. If the application is not installed on the device, tapping the contactless card against the card reader can initiate downloading the application, such as navigating to the application's download page. After installation, tapping the contactless card can activate or launch the application, which then initiates activation of the contactless card, for example, via the application or other backend communications. After activation, the contactless card can be used for various activities, including, but not limited to, commercial transactions.

[0141] In some embodiments, a dedicated application can be configured to execute on the client device to perform activation of the contactless card. In other embodiments, a website portal, a web-based application, a small application, etc. can perform the activation. The activation can be performed on the client device, or the client device can simply act as a middleman between the contactless card and an external device (e.g., an account server). According to some embodiments, when providing activation, the application can indicate to the account server the type of device performing the activation (e.g., a personal computer, smart phone, tablet, or point of sale (POS) device). In addition, the application can output different and / or additional data for transmission to the account server depending on the type of device involved. For example, such data can include information associated with the merchant (such as merchant type, merchant ID), and information associated with the device type itself (such as POS data and POSID).

[0142] In some embodiments, the example authentication communication protocol can, with some modifications, mimic the EMV standard's offline dynamic data authentication protocol typically performed between transaction cards and point-of-sale devices. For example, because the example authentication protocol is not used to complete payment transactions with the card issuer / payment processor itself, some data values are not required, and authentication can be performed without involving a real-time online connection to the card issuer / payment processor. As is known in the art, a point-of-sale (POS) system submits a transaction, including a transaction value, to the card issuer. Whether the issuer approves or rejects the transaction can be based on whether the card issuer recognizes the transaction value. Furthermore, in certain embodiments of the present disclosure, transactions originating from mobile devices do not have a transaction value associated with the POS system. Therefore, in some embodiments, a dummy transaction value (i.e., a value that is recognizable to the card issuer and sufficient to allow activation to occur) can be communicated as part of the example authentication communication protocol. POS-based transactions can also reject transactions based on the number of transaction attempts (e.g., a transaction counter). Exceeding a buffered value can result in a soft rejection, which requires further verification before accepting the transaction. In some implementations, the buffered value for the transaction counter can be modified to avoid rejecting legitimate transactions.

[0143] In some examples, contactless cards can selectively transmit information based on the recipient device. Once tapped, the contactless card can identify the device being tapped, and based on that identification, the contactless card can provide the appropriate data for that device. This advantageously allows the contactless card to transmit only the information required to complete the immediate action or transaction (such as payment or card authentication). By limiting the transmission of data and avoiding the transmission of unnecessary data, both efficiency and data security can be improved. The identification and selective communication of information can be applied to a variety of scenarios, including card activation, balance transfers, account access attempts, commercial transactions, and step-up fraud reduction.

[0144] If the contactless card tap is for a device running Apple If the device has an operating system (e.g. iPhone, iPod or iPad), the contactless card can be recognized The operating system transmits the appropriate data to communicate with the device. For example, a contactless card can provide the encrypted identity information necessary to authenticate the card using an NDEF tag via, for example, NFC. Similarly, if a contactless card tap is directed to a running Operating system devices (e.g. smartphone or tablet), the contactless card can be recognized The system operates and transmits appropriate data to communicate with the device (such as encrypted identity information necessary for authentication via the methods described herein).

[0145] As another example, a contactless card tap can be performed against a POS device, including, but not limited to, a kiosk, checkout register, payment station, or other terminal. Once the tap is performed, the contactless card can identify the POS device and transmit only the information necessary for the action or transaction. For example, once the POS device used to complete a commercial transaction is identified, the contactless card can transmit the payment information necessary to complete the transaction in accordance with EMV standards.

[0146] In some examples, a POS device participating in a transaction may request or specify additional information to be provided by the contactless card, such as device-specific information, location-specific information, and transaction-specific information. For example, once the POS device receives data communications from the contactless card, the POS device may recognize the contactless card and request additional information necessary to complete the action or transaction.

[0147] In some examples, the POS device may be affiliated with an authorized merchant or other entity that is familiar with certain contactless cards or accustomed to performing certain contactless card transactions. However, it is understood that such affiliation is not required to perform the described methods.

[0148] In some examples (such as shopping malls, grocery stores, convenience stores, etc.), a contactless card can be tapped against a mobile device, without having to open an app, to indicate a desire or intent to cover one or more purchases with one or more of reward points, loyalty points, coupons, special offers, etc., thereby providing the intent behind the purchase.

[0149] In some examples, the one or more applications may be configured to determine that it was initiated via one or more tap gestures of a contactless card such that the activation occurred at 3:51 PM and the transaction was processed or conducted at 3:56 PM to verify the user's identity.

[0150] In some examples, the one or more applications can be configured to control one or more actions in response to the one or more tap gestures. For example, the one or more actions can include collecting rewards, collecting points, determining the most important purchase, determining the cheapest purchase, and / or reconfiguring to another action in real time.

[0151] In some examples, data about the tapping behavior can be collected as biometric / gesture authentication. For example, a unique identifier that is cryptographically secure and not easily intercepted can be transmitted to one or more backend services. The unique identifier can be configured to retrieve secondary information about the individual. The secondary information can include personally identifiable information about the user. In some examples, the secondary information can be stored in a contactless card.

[0152] In some examples, the device may include an application for splitting bills or checking payments among multiple individuals. For example, each individual may have a contactless card and may be a customer of the same issuing financial institution, but this is not required. Each of these individuals may receive a push notification via the application on their device to split the purchase. Rather than accepting a single card tap to indicate payment, other contactless cards may be used. In some examples, individuals with different financial institutions may have contactless cards that provide information to initiate one or more payment requests from the individual whose card was tapped.

[0153] The following example use cases describe examples of specific implementations of the present disclosure. These are intended for illustrative purposes only, not limiting purposes. In one scenario, a first friend (the payer) owes a second friend (the payee) money. Rather than going to an ATM or requesting an exchange through a peer-to-peer application, the payer wishes to pay using a contactless card via the payee's smartphone (or other device). The payee logs into the appropriate application on their smartphone and selects the payment request option. In response, the application requests authentication via the payee's contactless card. For example, the application displays a display requesting the payee to tap their contactless card. Once the payee, with the application enabled, taps their contactless card against the screen of their smartphone, the contactless card is read and authenticated. The application then displays a prompt for the payer to tap their contactless card to send payment. After the payee taps their contactless card, the application reads the card information and, via an associated processor, transmits the payment request to the payee's card issuer. The card issuer processes the transaction and sends a status indicator to the smartphone. The application then outputs a status indicator of the transaction for display.

[0154] In another example scenario, a credit card customer may receive a new credit card (or debit card, other payment card, or any other card that needs activation) in the mail. Rather than activating the card by calling a provided phone number associated with the card issuer or visiting a website, the customer may decide to activate the card via an application on his or her device (e.g., a mobile device, such as a smartphone). The customer may select a card activation feature from an application menu displayed on the device's display. The application may prompt the customer to tap their credit card against the screen. When the credit card is tapped against the device's screen, the application may be configured to communicate with a server (such as a card issuer's server that activates the customer's card). The application may then display a message indicating successful activation of the card. Card activation will then be complete.

[0155] The above-described methods may be implemented as instructions on a computer-readable medium or as part of a computing architecture. Figure 7The illustration illustrates an embodiment of an exemplary computing architecture 700 suitable for implementing various embodiments as previously described. In one embodiment, computing architecture 700 may include or be implemented as part of an electronic device, such as computer 701. The embodiments are not limited in this context.

[0156] As used herein, the terms "system" and "component" are intended to refer to a computer-related entity, whether hardware, a combination of hardware and software, software, or software in execution, examples of which are provided by exemplary computing architecture 700. For example, a component can be, but is not limited to, a process running on a processor, a processor, a hard drive, multiple storage drives (of optical and / or magnetic storage media), an object, executable instructions, an execution thread, a program, and / or a computer. For example, both an application running on a server and the server can be components. One or more components can reside within a process and / or execution thread, and components can be localized on a single computer and / or distributed between two or more computers. Furthermore, components can be coupled to each other via various types of communication media to coordinate operations. Such coordination can involve a unidirectional or bidirectional exchange of information. For example, components can transmit information in the form of signals transmitted via a communication medium. Such information can be implemented as signals assigned to various signal lines. In such an assignment, each message is a signal. However, further embodiments may alternatively employ data messages. Such data messages can be sent via various connections. Exemplary connections include parallel interfaces, serial interfaces, and bus interfaces.

[0157] The computing architecture 700 includes various common computing elements, such as one or more processors, multi-core processors, coprocessors, memory units, chipsets, controllers, peripherals, interfaces, oscillators, timing devices, video cards, audio cards, multimedia input / output (I / O) components, power supplies, etc. However, embodiments are not limited to implementation via the computing architecture 700.

[0158] like Figure 7 As shown, computing architecture 700 includes a processing unit 702, a system memory 704, and a system bus 706. Processing unit 702 can be any of various commercially available processors, including, but not limited to, and processor; application, embedded, and security processors; and and Processor; IBM and Cell processor; Core(2) and Dual microprocessors, multi-core processors, and other multi-processor architectures may also be used as the processing unit 702 .

[0159] The system bus 706 provides an interface for system components, including, but not limited to, system memory 704 to processing unit 702. The system bus 706 may be any of several types of bus structures that may further interconnect to a memory bus (with or without a memory controller), a peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of a variety of commercially available bus architectures. Interface adapters may be connected to the system bus 706 via a slot architecture. Example slot architectures may include, but are not limited to, Accelerated Graphics Port (AGP), Card Bus, (Extended) Industry Standard Architecture ((E)ISA), Micro Channel Architecture (MCA), NuBus, Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI(X)), PCI Express, Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA), and the like.

[0160] The computing architecture 700 may include or implement various articles of manufacture. Articles of manufacture may include computer-readable storage media that store logic. Examples of computer-readable storage media may include any tangible media that stores electronic data, including volatile or non-volatile memory, removable or non-removable memory, erasable or non-erasable memory, writable or non-writable memory, etc. Examples of logic may include executable computer program instructions implemented using any suitable code type, such as source code, compiled code, interpreted code, executable code, static code, dynamic code, object-oriented code, visual code, etc. Embodiments may also be implemented at least in part as instructions contained in or on a non-transitory computer-readable medium that can be read and executed by one or more processors to enable performance of the operations described herein.

[0161] The system memory 704 may include various types of computer-readable storage media in the form of one or more higher-speed memory units, such as read-only memory (ROM), random-access memory (RAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), double-data-rate DRAM (DDRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), static RAM (SRAM), programmable ROM (PROM), erasable programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), flash memory, polymer memory (such as ferroelectric polymer memory), austenite memory, phase change or ferroelectric memory, silicon-oxide-nitride-oxide-silicon (SONOS) memory, magnetic or optical cards, device arrays (such as redundant array of independent disks (RAID) drives), solid-state memory devices (e.g., USB memory, solid-state drives (SSDs), and any other type of storage medium suitable for storing information. Figure 7 In the illustrated embodiment shown, system memory 704 may include non-volatile memory 708 and / or volatile memory 710. A basic input / output system (BIOS) may be stored in non-volatile memory 708.

[0162] The computing architecture 700 may include various types of computer-readable storage media in the form of one or more lower-speed memory units, including an internal (or external) hard disk drive (HDD) 712, a magnetic floppy disk drive (FDD) 714 that reads from or writes to a removable magnetic disk 716, and an optical drive 718 that reads from or writes to a removable optical disk 720 (e.g., a CD-ROM or DVD). The HDD 712, FDD 714, and optical drive 720 may be connected to the system bus 706 via an HDD interface 722, an FDD interface 724, and an optical drive interface 726, respectively. The HDD interface 722 for external drive implementations may include at least one or both of Universal Serial Bus (USB) and IEEE 694 interface technologies.

[0163] The drives and associated computer-readable media provide volatile and / or nonvolatile storage of data, data structures, computer-executable instructions, etc. For example, several program modules may be stored in the drives and memory units 708, 712, including an operating system 728, one or more application programs 730, other program modules 732, and program data 734. In one embodiment, the one or more application programs 730, other program modules 732, and program data 734 may include, for example, various applications and / or components of the messaging system 500.

[0164] A user can enter commands and information into the computer 701 through one or more wired / wireless input devices, such as a keyboard 736 and a pointing device, such as a mouse 738. Other input devices may include a microphone, an infrared (IR) remote control, a radio frequency (RF) remote control, a game pad, a stylus, a card reader, a dongle, a fingerprint reader, a glove, a graphic tablet, a joystick, a keyboard, a retina reader, a touch screen (e.g., capacitive, resistive, etc.), a trackball, a trackpad, a sensor, a stylus, and the like. These and other input devices are typically connected to the processing unit 702 through an input device interface 740 coupled to the system bus 706, but may be connected through other interfaces such as a parallel port, an IEEE 694 serial port, a game port, a USB port, an IR port, and the like.

[0165] A monitor 742 or other type of display device is also connected to the system bus 706 via an interface, such as a video adapter 744. The monitor 742 may be internal or external to the computer 701. In addition to the monitor 742, computers typically include other peripheral output devices, such as speakers, printers, and the like.

[0166] Computer 701 can operate in a networked environment using logical connections via wired and / or wireless communications with one or more remote computers, such as remote computer 744. Remote computer 744 can be a workstation, server computer, router, personal computer, portable computer, microprocessor-based entertainment appliance, peer device, or other common network node, and typically includes many or all of the elements described with respect to computer 701, but, for example, only memory / storage device 746 is illustrated for the sake of simplicity. The depicted logical connections include wired / wireless connections to a local area network (LAN) 748 and / or a larger network, such as a wide area network (WAN) 750. Such LAN and WAN networking environments are common in offices and companies and facilitate enterprise-wide computer networks, such as intranets, all of which can be connected to a global communication network, such as the Internet.

[0167] When used in a LAN networking environment, the computer 701 is connected to the LAN 748 through a wired and / or wireless communication network interface or adapter 752. The adapter 752 may facilitate wired and / or wireless communication with the LAN 748, which may also include a wireless access point provided thereon for communicating with the wireless functionality of the adapter 752.

[0168] When used in a WAN networking environment, the computer 701 can include a modem 754, or be connected to a communications server on the WAN 750, or have other means for establishing communications over the WAN 750 (such as through the Internet). The modem 754, which can be internal or external to a wired and / or wireless device, is connected to the system bus 706 via the input device interface 740. In a networked environment, program modules described relative to the computer 701, or portions thereof, can be stored in the remote memory / storage device 746. It will be appreciated that the network connections shown are exemplary and other means of establishing a communications link between the computers can be used.

[0169] The computer 701 is operable to communicate with wired and wireless devices or entities using the IEEE 802 family of standards, such as wireless devices operatively configured for wireless communications (e.g., IEEE 802.13 over-the-air modulation techniques). This includes at least Wi-Fi (or Wireless Fidelity), WiMax, and Bluetooth, among other technologies. TM Wireless technology. Therefore, communication can be a predefined structure like a conventional network, or simply a peer-to-peer communication between at least two devices. Wi-Fi networks use a radio technology called IEEE 802.13x to provide secure, reliable, and fast wireless connections. Wi-Fi networks can be used to connect computers to each other, to the Internet, and to wired networks (which use IEEE 802.3 related media and functions).

[0170] Figure 8 8 is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary communication architecture 800 suitable for implementing various embodiments as described above. The communication architecture 800 includes various common communication elements, such as transmitters, receivers, transceivers, radios, network interfaces, baseband processors, antennas, amplifiers, filters, power supplies, etc. However, the embodiments are not limited to implementation via the communication architecture 800.

[0171] like Figure 8 As shown, communication architecture 800 includes one or more clients 802 and servers 804. Client 802 may implement client device 510. Server 804 may implement server device 526. Client 802 and server 804 are operatively connected to one or more respective client data stores 806 and server data stores 808, which may be used to store information local to the respective client 802 and server 804, such as cookies and / or associated contextual information.

[0172] The client 802 and the server 804 can communicate information with each other using a communication framework 810. The communication framework 810 can implement any well-known communication technologies and protocols. The communication framework 810 can be implemented as a packet-switched network (e.g., a public network such as the Internet, a private network such as a corporate intranet), a circuit-switched network (e.g., a public switched telephone network), or a combination of a packet-switched network and a circuit-switched network (with appropriate gateways and translators).

[0173] The communication framework 810 can implement various network interfaces that are arranged to receive, communicate, and connect to a communication network. A network interface can be considered a special form of an input / output interface. The network interface can use a connection protocol including, but not limited to, a direct connection, Ethernet (e.g., fat, thin, twisted pair 10 / 100 / 1000Base T, etc.), a token ring, a wireless network interface, a cellular network interface, an IEEE 802.8ax network interface, an IEEE 802.16 network interface, an IEEE 802.20 network interface, etc. In addition, multiple network interfaces can be used to participate in various communication network types. For example, multiple network interfaces can be used to allow communication through broadcast, multicast, and unicast networks. If processing requirements dictate a larger amount of rate and capacity, a distributed network controller architecture can similarly be used to centralize the communication bandwidth required by the client 802 and server 804, load balance the communication bandwidth, and otherwise increase the communication bandwidth. The communication network can be any one or combination of wired and / or wireless networks, including, but not limited to, direct interconnections, secured custom connections, private networks (e.g., corporate intranets), public networks (e.g., the Internet), personal area networks (PANs), local area networks (LANs), metropolitan area networks (MANs), operating missions as nodes on the Internet (OMNI), wide area networks (WANs), wireless networks, cellular networks, and other communication networks.

[0174] The components and features of the above-described devices may be implemented using any combination of discrete circuitry, application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), logic gates, and / or single-chip architectures. Furthermore, where appropriate, the features of the devices may be implemented using a microcontroller, a programmable logic array, and / or a microprocessor, or any combination of the foregoing. Note that hardware, firmware, and / or software elements may be collectively or individually referred to herein as "logic" or "circuitry."

[0175] It will be appreciated that the exemplary devices shown in the above block diagrams may represent an example of a functional description of many possible implementations. Therefore, the division, omission, or inclusion of block functions depicted in the accompanying drawings does not infer that hardware components, circuits, software, and / or elements for implementing these functions will necessarily be divided, omitted, or included in the embodiments.

[0176] At least one computer-readable storage medium may include instructions that, when executed, cause a system to perform any of the computer-implemented methods described herein.

[0177] Some embodiments may be described using the expression "one embodiment" or "an embodiment" along with their derivatives. These terms mean that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment is included in at least one embodiment. The appearance of the phrase "in one embodiment" in various places in the specification does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. Furthermore, unless otherwise indicated, the above-described features are understood to be applicable to be used together in any combination. Therefore, any features discussed individually can be combined with each other unless otherwise indicated that the features are incompatible with each other.

[0178] Generally speaking, the symbols and nomenclature used herein may be used to present the detailed description herein in terms of program processes executed on a computer or computer network. These process descriptions and representations are used by those skilled in the art to more effectively convey the substance of their work to others skilled in the art.

[0179] A process is generally conceived here to be a self-consistent sequence of operations leading to a desired result. These operations are those requiring physical manipulations of physical quantities. Usually, though not necessarily, these quantities take the form of electrical, magnetic, or optical signals capable of being stored, transferred, combined, compared, and otherwise manipulated. It proves convenient at times, principally for reasons of common usage, to refer to these signals as bits, values, elements, symbols, characters, terms, numbers, or the like. It should be noted, however, that all of these and similar terms are to be associated with the appropriate physical quantities and are merely convenient labels applied to these quantities.

[0180] Furthermore, the manipulations performed are often referred to in terms typically associated with mental operations performed by a human operator, such as adding or comparing. Such capabilities of a human operator are not necessary, or in most cases desirable, for any of the operations described herein that form part of one or more embodiments. Instead, the operations are machine operations. Useful machines for performing the operations of the various embodiments include general-purpose digital computers or similar devices.

[0181] Some embodiments may be described using the expressions "coupled" and "connected," along with their derivatives. These terms are not necessarily intended to be synonyms for each other. For example, some embodiments may be described using the terms "connected" and / or "coupled" to indicate that two or more elements are in direct physical or electrical contact with each other. However, the term "coupled" may also mean that two or more elements are not in direct contact with each other, but still cooperate or interact with each other.

[0182] Various embodiments also relate to apparatus or systems for performing these operations. The apparatus may be specially constructed for the desired purpose, or it may comprise a general-purpose computer selectively activated or reconfigured by a computer program stored in the computer. The processes presented herein are not inherently related to a particular computer or other apparatus. Various general-purpose machines may be used with programs written in accordance with the teachings herein, or it may prove convenient to construct more specialized apparatus to perform the required method steps. The required structure for a variety of these machines will be apparent from the given description.

[0183] It is emphasized that the Abstract of the Disclosure is provided to enable the reader to quickly ascertain the nature of the technical disclosure. It is submitted with the understanding that it will not be used to interpret or limit the scope or meaning of the claims. In addition, in the foregoing Detailed Description, it can be seen that various features are grouped together in a single embodiment for the purpose of streamlining the disclosure. This approach to the disclosure is not to be interpreted as reflecting an intention that the claimed embodiments require more features than expressly recited in each claim. Rather, as reflected in the claims, the inventive subject matter lies in fewer than all features of a single disclosed embodiment. Accordingly, the claims are hereby incorporated into the Detailed Description, with each claim standing on its own as a separate embodiment. In the appended claims, the terms "including" and "in which" are used as the plain-English equivalents of the respective terms "comprising" and "wherein," respectively. Moreover, the terms "first," "second," "third," etc. are used merely as labels and are not intended to impose numerical requirements on their objects.

[0184] The above description includes examples of the disclosed architecture. It is, of course, not possible to describe every conceivable combination of components and / or methodologies, but one skilled in the art will recognize that many further combinations and permutations are possible. Accordingly, the novel architecture is intended to embrace all such alterations, modifications, and variations that fall within the spirit and scope of the appended claims.

Claims

1. A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing: a first applet configured to authorize transactions for a contactless card and maintain a first primary account number (PAN) for the contactless card, the first PAN identifying the contactless card in the transaction; a second applet, the second applet being different from the first applet and configured to interact with an external application and function as a bridge between the external application and the first applet; Instructions configured to cause the processing circuit to perform the following steps: receiving, at the second applet, an instruction to change the first PAN; authenticating the contactless card by instructing the contactless card to generate a password, transmitting the password generated by the contactless card to an authentication server, and receiving authentication approval from the authentication server; In response to authenticating the contactless card, instructing the first applet from the second applet over a secure communication channel to change the first PAN; and The first PAN is changed to a second PAN at the first applet, wherein changing the first PAN causes the first applet to use the second PAN instead of the first PAN in future transactions.

2. The medium of claim 1, wherein the first applet is preloaded with a plurality of PANs when the contactless card is issued, and changing the first PAN to the second PAN comprises advancing to a next preloaded PAN. 3 . The medium of claim 1 , wherein the instruction to change the first PAN received at the second applet is received via near field communication (NFC).

4. The medium of claim 1, wherein changing the first PAN received at the second applet involves tapping the contactless card against an interactable element in a predetermined pattern.

5. The medium of claim 1, wherein the instruction to change the instruction received at the second applet is received from an automated teller machine (ATM) or a point of sale (POS) terminal.

6. The medium of claim 1 , wherein the contactless card includes an electronic ink (e-ink) display configured to display an identification number of the card derived from a PAN currently assigned to the contactless card, and wherein changing the first PAN to the second PAN comprises updating the e-ink display.

7. The medium of claim 1, wherein instructing the first applet to change the first PAN comprises coordinating the change of the first PAN with a backend server associated with the second applet.

8. A method comprising: Storing the original number of the credit account in the digital payment logic on the chip of the contactless card; receiving, at communication logic stored on the chip and remote from the digital payment logic, an instruction to update the origin number of the credit account; authenticating the contactless card by instructing the contactless card to generate a password, transmitting the password generated by the contactless card to an authentication server, and receiving authentication approval from the authentication server; establishing a secure data transmission from the communication logic to the digital payment logic in response to authenticating the contactless card; issuing a command to update the original number from the communication logic to the digital payment logic using the secure data transmission; In response to receiving the command, the original number is updated to an updated number using the digital payment logic.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein the digital payment logic derives the updated number from the original number.

10. A device having a contact pad, comprising: an antenna configured to receive short-range communications from the device; a microprocessor circuit powered by the antenna using energy from the short-range communication; a memory storing: transaction logic configured to reference an identifier associated with a transaction for the device; as well as encryption and authentication logic configured to communicate with the device via the antenna, wherein The encryption and authentication logic is further configured to: recognize an indication command from the device and received by the antenna, the indication command indicating that the identifier is to be rewritten; authenticating the contactless card by instructing the contactless card to generate a password, transmitting the password generated by the contactless card to an authentication server, and receiving an authentication approval from the authentication server; and in response to authenticating the contactless card, transmitting the instruction command to the transaction logic; and The transaction logic is further configured to rewrite the identifier based on the instruction command.

Images