Edge-assisted lightweight deduplication-able encryption method

Abstract

The application discloses an edge-assisted lightweight deduplication encryption method, which constructs an edge-assisted hierarchical collaborative architecture, offloads calculation-intensive operations such as bilinear pairing to an edge server, so that an AIoT device with limited resources only needs to perform lightweight hash and XOR operations, and the edge server generates a deduplication label based on ciphertext, so that the cloud realizes efficient deduplication through ciphertext equivalence testing without decryption, and a security model is constructed based on bilinear assumption, and through formal proof, the indistinguishability IND-CPA and the one-wayness OW-CPA under the selected plaintext attack are realized, so that even if the edge node is attacked, the plaintext cannot be reversely deduced. The application has significant improvement in communication efficiency and computing performance. The innovation lies in the combination of edge-assisted encryption and deduplication functions, which forms an advantage that cannot be compared with traditional schemes.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The application belongs to the technical field of Internet of Things encryption, and relates to an edge-assisted lightweight deduplication encryption method. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the rapid development of artificial intelligence Internet of Things (AIoT), intelligent terminal devices have realized real-time collection and transmission of massive sensitive data, which has brought unprecedented double challenges to the field of data security. On the one hand, the confidentiality of data in the transmission and storage process needs to be ensured, and on the other hand, the performance constraints of resource-constrained devices also need to be considered to meet the real-time requirements. Traditional data encryption and deduplication technologies have been difficult to adapt to this complex scenario.

[0003] In the AIoT scenario, intelligent terminal devices such as sensors and wearable devices generally have limited computing power, memory capacity and energy supply. Traditional public key encryption schemes such as RSA and ECC involve complex modular exponentiation and key management mechanisms, which are difficult to efficiently execute on terminal devices. Although some studies have attempted to use symmetric encryption to optimize computing efficiency, the key distribution mechanism still relies on computationally intensive protocols, resulting in significant increases in energy consumption and delay of terminal devices, which cannot meet the real-time requirements. There is a difficult contradiction between resource-constrained devices and traditional encryption schemes.

[0004] Existing cloud-based encrypted storage schemes can guarantee data confidentiality, but the redundancy problem of encrypted data is prominent. Traditional deduplication techniques require decryption of data on the cloud to detect duplicate content, which seriously violates the privacy protection principle. Client-side encryption deduplication schemes can avoid cloud decryption, but require terminal devices to pre-compute data fingerprints and manage keys, further exacerbating resource consumption. The conflict between cloud-based encrypted storage and data redundancy needs to be resolved.

[0005] Existing edge-assisted encryption schemes attempt to offload computing tasks to edge servers to alleviate terminal stress, but they have trust and privacy risks. The edge server can directly access the plaintext or intermediate state during the encryption process, which is vulnerable to internal attackers or malicious nodes stealing sensitive information. Existing schemes rely on multiple rounds of interaction between the terminal and the cloud to verify data redundancy, which significantly increases communication overhead and cannot support large-scale device concurrency scenarios.

[0006] In summary, existing technologies have core problems such as imbalance between efficiency and security, incomplete privacy protection, and insufficient architecture scalability. Lightweight schemes often sacrifice security at the expense of performance, and high-security schemes are difficult to adapt to resource-constrained devices. Cloud deduplication requires decryption of data or relies on a trusted third party, and edge servers have privacy leakage risks. Existing schemes are mostly based on centralized cloud models and are difficult to meet the dynamic topology and massive terminal access requirements of AIoT. SUMMARY

[0007] To solve the technical problems in the background art, the present application provides an edge-assisted lightweight deduplication encryption method, which significantly improves the data security and storage efficiency of AIoT systems by innovatively combining edge computing and ciphertext equivalence testing technology.

[0008] Based on the first main aspect of the present application, an edge-assisted lightweight deduplication encryption method is provided, which constructs an edge-assisted hierarchical collaborative architecture, offloads computationally intensive operations such as bilinear pairing to edge servers, and makes resource-constrained AIoT devices only need to perform lightweight hash and XOR operations.

[0009] Moreover, the edge server generates a deduplication tag based on the ciphertext, so that the cloud can efficiently deduplicate without decryption through ciphertext equivalence testing;

[0010] In addition, a security model is constructed based on bilinear assumptions, and the indistinguishability IND-CPA and the one-wayness OW-CPA under chosen-plaintext attacks are achieved through formal proof, ensuring that even if the edge node is compromised, the plaintext cannot be inferred.

[0011] As a further preferred scheme, the aforementioned edge-assisted lightweight deduplication encryption method includes one or a combination of the following steps:

[0012] S1, initialization and key generation: generate system public parameters based on bilinear pairing, generate public and private key pairs for AIoT devices and edge servers respectively;

[0013] S2, edge-assisted parameter calculation: the edge server calculates edge-assisted encryption parameters (Y u ,Y s ) according to the user public key and its own public key, and returns them to the AIoT device;

[0014] S3, data encryption: the AIoT device uses edge-assisted encryption parameters and random numbers to perform lightweight encryption on plaintext, generating ciphertext C=(C1,C2,C3);

[0015] S4, deduplication tag generation: the edge server receives two ciphertexts and calculates edge-assisted deduplication tags updates the ciphertext;

[0016] S5, cloud ciphertext deduplication: the cloud server verifies the deduplication tag to determine whether the ciphertext is duplicated and performs deduplication without decryption;

[0017] S6, data decryption: the data user recovers the plaintext from the ciphertext using the private key.

[0018] As a further preferred aspect, in the aforementioned edge-aided lightweight deduplication encryption method, the bilinear pairing satisfies bilinearity, non-degeneracy and computability, wherein is an additive cyclic group, is a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order.

[0019] As a further preferred aspect, in the aforementioned edge-aided lightweight deduplication encryption method, in the generation process of the edge-aided encryption parameter (Y u ,Y s ), the edge server replaces the AIoT device to perform high-computational-complexity operations through bilinear pairing operations, so that the encryption computational complexity of the AIoT device is reduced to O(1) hash and XOR operations.

[0020] As a further preferred aspect, in the aforementioned edge-aided lightweight deduplication encryption method, in the data encryption step, the AIoT device combines the plaintext M with the hash value by XOR operation to generate C2, combines the hash value with H2(M) by XOR operation to generate C3, avoiding complex exponential operations and key management.

[0021] As a further preferred aspect, in the aforementioned edge-aided lightweight deduplication encryption method, the generation of the edge-aided deduplication tag T only depends on the XOR operation of the ciphertext components C3 and C3', without parsing the plaintext M and M', ensuring that the deduplication process is completed in the ciphertext domain and does not leak privacy.

[0022] As a further preferred aspect, in the aforementioned edge-aided lightweight deduplication encryption method, in the cloud ciphertext deduplication step, the cloud server performs ciphertext equivalence test using the edge server private key sk s , verifies the validity of T through bilinear pairing and hash operations, and realizes zero-knowledge deduplication.

[0023] As a further preferred aspect, in the aforementioned edge-aided lightweight deduplication encryption method, the method satisfies the indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) and the one-way property (OW-CPA), and proves that the advantage of the adversary and are negligible functions by reducing to the difficulty of the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem.

[0024] Based on the second main aspect of the present application, an electronic device is provided, comprising: at least one processor; a memory connected in communication with the at least one processor; the memory stores a computer program, which, when executed by the at least one processor, enables the at least one processor to implement the edge-assisted lightweight deduplication encryption method as described above.

[0025] Based on the third main aspect of the present application, a computer readable storage medium is provided, which stores a computer program, which, when executed, implements the edge-assisted lightweight deduplication encryption method as described above.

[0026] Advantages and beneficial effects of the present application:

[0027] Firstly, compared with the prior art, the present application innovatively constructs an edge-assisted hierarchical collaborative architecture, completely offloading computationally intensive operations such as bilinear pairing to edge servers, and fundamentally solving the pain point of insufficient computing power of resource-constrained devices in traditional encryption schemes. Specifically, the edge server pre-computes edge-assisted parameters based on the user public key and its own public key, where bilinear pairing is one of the most complex operations in cryptography. The AIoT device only needs to receive the pre-computed parameters, complete the encryption through simple hash operation and XOR operation, and the computational complexity is reduced to O(1) level. This division of labor mode makes the terminal device (such as sensor, wearable device) not need to integrate high-power encryption module, significantly prolongs the endurance time, adapts to the low-power and low-energy characteristics of AIoT devices, and realizes the perfect balance between "strong security" and "light terminal".

[0028] Secondly, in the data encryption link, the present application discards the complex encryption mode relying on exponential operation or elliptic curve point multiplication in the traditional scheme, and instead adopts a lightweight combination of "hash mask + XOR operation", constructing an efficient and secure encryption mechanism. The AIoT device generates a hash value using the edge-assisted parameters and a random number, generates a ciphertext component through XOR operation combined with the plaintext, and realizes the secondary protection of the plaintext digest through the calculation of the ciphertext component C3. This design, on the one hand, the reversibility of XOR operation ensures that only one hash and one XOR are needed to restore the plaintext during decryption, and the computational overhead is negligible; on the other hand, the combination of random number and bilinear pairing parameters makes the ciphertext generated by the same plaintext each time completely different (semantic security), effectively resisting statistical analysis attacks.

[0029] Thirdly, to solve the problem of data redundancy in the cloud, the application proposes an edge-assisted deduplication technology in the ciphertext domain. The edge server generates a deduplication tag, realizing the key breakthrough of "deduplication without decryption". In the traditional scheme, the cloud deduplication needs to decrypt the data to extract the fingerprint, which has a serious risk of privacy leakage. In the present scheme, the edge server only performs XOR operation based on the ciphertext components, without parsing the plaintext, and the generated deduplication tag only contains the difference information of the hash value. The cloud completes the equivalence test by verifying the deduplication tag, without touching the plaintext throughout, ensuring the privacy of user data.

[0030] Finally, the application first introduces the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption into the edge-assisted encryption scenario, and through strict formal proof (theorems 1 and 2), ensures the indistinguishability (IND-CPA) and one-wayness (OW-CPA) of the scheme under the chosen plaintext attack, and constructs a theoretical security boundary. Specifically, the scheme reduces the security to the difficulty of the DBDH problem - if the adversary can distinguish the ciphertext or recover the plaintext with a non-negligible advantage, it can use the advantage to solve the DBDH problem, which is contradictory to the known cryptography assumption. This design makes the scheme partially trusted at the edge node (e.g. in the scenario where an internal attacker obtains the private key of the edge server, the plaintext is still unrecoverable. At the same time, the scheme of the application optimizes the ciphertext structure (only contains three lightweight components (C1, C2, C3)) and the calculation process (no pairing operation at the terminal, no decryption operation at the cloud), realizing the deep synergy of security proof and engineering efficiency.

[0031] In summary, the application is superior to similar schemes in terms of encryption efficiency, communication overhead and other key indicators, and provides a complete solution for AIoT data sharing that is "theoretically secure and provable, and engineering efficient and feasible", with significant technical leading and industrial application value. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0032] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the application or the prior art, brief descriptions will be given to the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments or prior art descriptions. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the application, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained from these drawings without creative labor.

[0033] Figure 1 The overall framework layout of the system model in one embodiment of the application is shown;

[0034] Figure 2 The comparison of several schemes in terms of communication cost in one embodiment of the application is shown;

[0035] Figure 3Comparison of encryption time in RP for several schemes in one embodiment of the application is shown;

[0036] Figure 4 Comparison of decryption time in PC for several schemes in one embodiment of the application is shown;

[0037] Figure 5 Comparison of total time for several schemes in one embodiment of the application is shown;

[0038] Figure 6 Comparison of encryption number ratio for several schemes in one embodiment of the application is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0039] The preferred embodiments of the present application will be described in detail with the following examples, so as to make the objects, features and advantages of the present application more apparent. It should be understood that the following examples are only used to illustrate the substantial spirit of the technical scheme of the present application, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present application.

[0040] In the following description, for the purposes of explaining the various embodiments disclosed herein, specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the various embodiments. However, persons of ordinary skill in the relevant art will recognize that embodiments can be practiced without one or more of the specific details, or with other methods, components, materials, and so forth. In other instances, well-known structures associated with the present application have not been shown or described in order to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the descriptions of the embodiments.

[0041] Reference throughout this specification to "one embodiment" or "an embodiment" means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment is included in at least one embodiment. Thus, the appearances of the phrase "in one embodiment" or "in an embodiment" in various places throughout this specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment. Furthermore, the particular features, structures, or characteristics can be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments.

[0042] Embodiment 1:

[0043] The meanings of the parameters that can be involved in the following detailed implementation are as follows:

[0044] K: security parameter;

[0045] Multiplicative cyclic group of prime order q;

[0046] Bilinear target group;

[0047] e: bilinear pairing operation, i.e. the mathematical operation of mapping

[0048] ​Modular q multiplication group, i.e. a group consisting of positive integers coprime to q, in the present invention is a set of positive integers between 1 and q;

[0049] Params: public parameters, i.e. a set of cryptographic parameters globally disclosed by the system;

[0050] g, Q: group Two generators of the group can generate the entire group by power operation Primitive element of the group

[0051] H1, H2: two global anti-collision hash functions, i.e. cryptographic hash functions resistant to collision attacks, acting on the entire system;

[0052] sk u , pk u : public-private key pair of data user (DU), wherein sk u is the secret key of the user, and pk u is the public key of the user;

[0053] sk s , pk s : public-private key pair of edge server (ES), wherein sk s is the private key of the edge server, and pk s is the public key;

[0054] Y u , Y s : edge-assisted encryption parameter, i.e. an auxiliary encryption parameter generated by the edge server through bilinear pairing;

[0055] M: plaintext message, i.e. original data to be encrypted;

[0056] T: edge-assisted deduplication parameter, a label for ciphertext equivalence test, generated by the edge server;

[0057] C, C': ciphertext for equivalence test, i.e. encrypted text, supporting detection of duplication without decryption.

[0058] 1. Cryptographic definitions

[0059] Definition 1 (Bilinear Pairing): denoted as is a mathematical operation involving two groups and , wherein is a q-order additive group, and is a multiplicative group of the same order. If the function e satisfies the following properties, it is called bilinear:

[0060] 1) Bilinear: For all P, and,

[0061] 2) Non-degeneracy: P exists. And e(P,Q)≠1.

[0062] 3) Computability: For all P, There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q).

[0063] Definition 2 (Decision-oriented bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem): Let... This refers to the bilinear pairing defined above. Given a tuple (P, aP, bP, cP, X), where P is... The generator, and, Determine whether

[0064] 2. System Model

[0065] like Figure 1 As shown, the solution proposed in this invention consists of five entities: an AIoT device, an edge server (ES), a cloud server (CS), a key generation center (KGC), and a data user (DU).

[0066] In this system, AIoT devices are responsible for data generation, possessing sensing and secure communication capabilities, performing basic encryption, and intelligently offloading complex computations. Edge servers (ES) connect devices to the cloud, handling intensive tasks and initial data deduplication, reducing latency and protecting data privacy. Cloud servers (CS) store data and perform final deduplication. The KGC manages system cryptography and key distribution. Data users (DUs) securely access and decrypt data in the cloud using their unique private keys.

[0067] 3. Basic framework of this embodiment

[0068] The solution proposed in this embodiment includes the following six algorithms or steps:

[0069] Set (K) → Params: Given the security parameter K, the algorithm outputs the public key parameter Parms.

[0070] User key generation KeyGen-User(Params)→(pku, sku): Given the public key parameter Parms, the algorithm outputs the public and private key pair of DU.

[0071] Edge server key generation KeyGen-Server(Params)→(pks, sks): Given the public key parameter Parms, the algorithm outputs the public and private key pair of ES.

[0072] Edge-Assisted Encrypt (Parms, pk u , pk s )→(Y u , Y s ): Given public key parameters Parms, the public key pk u of the DU and the public key pk s of the ES, the system outputs edge-assisted encryption parameters.

[0073] Encrypt (Params, M, Y u , Y s )→(C): Given public key parameters Params, the plaintext message M, the public key pk u of the DU and the public key pk s of the ES, the algorithm outputs the ciphertext C.

[0074] Assisted Deduplicate (Params, C, C')→(T): Given public key parameters Params and two ciphertexts C, C' for equality test, the algorithm outputs edge-assisted deduplication parameters T.

[0075] Deduplicate (Params, C, C')→(0, 1): Given public parameters Params and two ciphertexts C, C', the algorithm judges whether the ciphertexts C, C' are equal. If equal, delete C' and keep C; otherwise, store C' and C.

[0076] Decrypt (Params, C, sku)→(M): Given public key parameters Params, the ciphertext M and the private key sk u of the DU, the algorithm outputs the plaintext message M.

[0077] 4. Security model and implementation process of actual attacks

[0078] The security model of the scheme proposed in this embodiment is introduced through a double-type game, which simulates an adversary obtaining capabilities through different types of queries. There are two types of adversaries: (1) A1 is a malicious external attacker, (2) A1 is a malicious internal attacker, who can obtain the private key sk s of the cloud server.

[0079] Definition 3 (IND-CPA): If there is no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary who can win the following security game with a non-negligible advantage, the proposed scheme realizes indistinguishability under the chosen plaintext attack.

[0080] Game 1: The game is defined by the interaction of a challenger C and an adversary A1.

[0081] Initialization: After the setup algorithm is executed, the challenger C obtains (pk u , sk u ) and (pk s , sk s ). The challenger C keeps (sk u , sk s ) secret and provides (Parms, pk u , pk s ) to the adversary A1.

[0082] Query: The adversary A1 adaptively performs polynomial bounded queries as follows:

[0083] Edge helper parameter query O Edge : The adversary A1 submits a tuple (Params, pk u , pk s ), and the challenger C returns (Y u , Y s ).

[0084] Encryption query O En : The adversary A1 submits a tuple (Params, M, Y u , Y s ), and the challenger C

[0085] returns a ciphertext T.

[0086] Challenge: The adversary A1 submits two equal-length messages (M0, M1) to the challenger C, and then the challenger C returns the challenge ciphertext to the adversary A1, where ξ∈{0,1}.

[0087] Guess: A1 outputs a bit value ξ′∈{0,1}, and if ξ′=ξ, it wins.

[0088] The advantage of A1 is defined as:

[0089]

[0090] If the advantage of all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversaries A 1， is negligible, then the scheme is secure under the chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA).

[0091] In the above scheme, adversary Ai tries to guess which message the challenger C encrypts by comparing the result of his guess with the actual equality or not to determine whether he wins. The advantage of Ai is defined by calculating the absolute value of the difference between the probability of the adversary guessing correctly and the probability of random guessing (1 / 2). If this advantage is negligible, it means that the adversary is difficult to distinguish which message is encrypted by attacking, which means that the scheme has good security under chosen-plaintext attack.

[0092] Definition 4 (OW-CPA): If there is no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A2 that can win the following security game with a non-negligible advantage under chosen-plaintext attack, the proposed scheme realizes one-wayness.

[0093] Game 2: This game is defined by the confrontation between the challenger C and the adversary A2.

[0094] Initialization: After the execution of the setup algorithm, the challenger C obtains (pk u , sk u ) and (pk s , sk s ), the challenger C keeps sk u secret, and provides (Params, pk u , pk s ) and CS secret key sk s to the adversary A2.

[0095] Query: The adversary A2 adaptively performs polynomial bounded queries as follows:

[0096] Edge auxiliary parameter query O Edge : The adversary A2 submits a tuple (Params, pk u , pk s ), and the challenger C returns (Y u , Y s ).

[0097] De-labeling query O Dedup-T : The adversary A2 submits a tuple (Params, C, C'), and the challenger C returns a ciphertext T.

[0098] Encryption query O En : The adversary A2 submits a tuple (Params, M, Y u , Y s ), and the challenger C returns a ciphertext T.

[0099] Challenge: The challenger C randomly selects a message M * ∈{0,1} n , calculates the ciphertext C * , and then provides C* Return to adversary A2.

[0100] Output: Adversary A2 outputs a message M' e {0, 1} n If M' = M * Then the winner is.

[0101] The advantage of adversary A2 is defined as:

[0102]

[0103] If for all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversaries A2, their advantage is negligible, then the scheme is one-way secure under chosen plaintext attack (OW-CPA secure).

[0104] The following section provides a specific edge-assisted encryption and duplicate data elimination scheme for this embodiment.

[0105] The specific implementation process of this scheme is as follows:

[0106] Setup (K) → Params: Let K be the security parameter in the system. Let and be a multiplicative cyclic group of order q ≥ 2K modulo a prime number q, where g and Q are two generators of The system selects two global collision-resistant hash functions:

[0107]

[0108] H2: {0, 1}*→ {0, 1} n .

[0109] Finally, the algorithm publishes the system parameters as follows:

[0110]

[0111] KeyGen-User (Params) → (pk u , sk u ): The key generation algorithm takes Params as input, selects a random number as the private key sk u , and calculates as the public key pk u , where represents randomly selecting an element from the set. The output public and private key pair is:

[0112] sk u = x u , pk u = y u .

[0113] KeyGen-Server(Params)→(pk s , sk s ): This step algorithm takes system parameters Params as input, selects a random number as a private key sk s , and calculates as a public key pk s . It outputs the public-private key pair as follows:

[0114] sk s = x s , pk s = y s .

[0115] Edge-assisted encryption (Params, pk u , pk s )→(Y u , Y s ): To alleviate the computational burden of AIoT devices, ES is responsible for performing pairing computation. This step takes the public key of the DU and the public key of the ES as input. It outputs the tuple (Y u , Y s ) as follows:

[0116]

[0117] Encryption (Params, M, Yu, Ys)→(C): After receiving the tuple (Y u , Y s ), the AIoT device performs the encryption algorithm. This algorithm takes the message M∈{0,1} n and the tuple (Y u , Y s ) as input, then selects a random number outputs the tuple C = (C1, C2, C3):

[0118] C1 = (g r ),

[0119]

[0120] where C1 provides a randomization factor to ensure the uniqueness of the ciphertext each time; C2 implements lightweight masking encryption of the plaintext, relying on the hash value generated by C1 and Y u ; C3 provides support for the deduplication function, generating a deduplication tag T through XOR with C3', while protecting the plaintext digest through double-layer hashing.

[0121] Edge-assisted deduplication (Params, C, C') -> (T): Upon receiving the two ciphertexts (C, C'), where C = (C1, C2, C3) and C' = (C1', C2', C3'), the ES computes with C3 and C3' replaced by T. The algorithm then outputs the updated ciphertexts:

[0122] C = (C1, C2, T),

[0123] C' = (C1', C2', T).

[0124] When computing it is noted that if M = M', the expression simplifies to:

[0125]

[0126] The key point here is that by delegating the deduplication process to the ES, the computation avoids directly manipulating the plaintext messages M and M', thus significantly enhancing security and protecting sensitive data.

[0127] Deduplication (Params, C, C') -> (0, 1): Upon receiving the updated ciphertexts (C, C'), the CS performs the following steps to determine whether deduplication is possible:

[0128]

[0129] where If the equality holds, the algorithm deletes C' and keeps C; otherwise, it saves both C and C'.

[0130] Decryption (Params, C, sk u ) -> (M): Once the data user (DU) downloads the ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3), the DU can perform decryption using the DU's private key sk u . This algorithm takes as input the system parameters Params, the ciphertext C, and the private key sku, and computes to obtain the plaintext M.

[0131] In the above scheme, decryption must rely on the private key sk u of a legitimate user, ensuring that only authorized users can recover the plaintext, resisting both external attackers and partial internal attacks. Moreover, by combining the random number r in the ciphertext with the user's private key sk u , the mathematical properties of the bilinear pairing are used to form a consistent hash input as in encryption, ensuring the correctness of decryption. The decryption process only involves one bilinear pairing, one hash operation, and one XOR operation, with low computational complexity, making it suitable for resource-constrained AIoT devices.

[0132] The proposed scheme is illustrated below by a formal cryptographic proof.

[0133] Theorem 1: Assuming the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem is hard, the proposed scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA).

[0134] Proof: Let (g, g a , g b , g c ) be an instance of the BDH problem. Challenger C will compute X = e(g, g) abc when simulating the secure game for adversary A1.

[0135] Initialization: Set Q = g a , pk u = g b , and randomly select Compute Challenger C executes the system initialization algorithm Setup to obtain the parameters:

[0136]

[0137] and returns (Params, pk u , pk s ) to adversary A1.

[0138] Query phase: Adversary A1 adaptively performs the following queries and maintains the corresponding list to record the responses.

[0139] Edge auxiliary parameter query O Edge : Adversary A1 submits a tuple (Params, pk u , pk s ), and challenger C computes:

[0140] Y u = e(pk u , Q)

[0141] Y s = e(pku, Q).

[0142] Then returns (Y u , Y s ) to adversary A1.

[0143] Encryption query O En : Adversary A1 submits a tuple (Params, M, Y u , Y s ), and challenger C randomly selects and computes:

[0144] C1 = (gr ),

[0145]

[0146] Then return the ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3).

[0147] Challenge phase: adversary A1 submits an equal-length message pair (M0, M1) that satisfies the requirements of Game 1. Challenger C randomly selects ξ ∈ {0, 1}, and computes the challenge ciphertext C * :

[0148] C1 * = g c ,

[0149]

[0150] Guess phase: adversary A1 outputs a guess bit value ξ' ∈ {0, 1}. If ξ = ξ', challenger C returns "1", otherwise returns "0".

[0151] Solve the DBDH problem: if X = e(g, g) abc , then:

[0152]

[0153] Theorem 2. Assuming the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption is hard, the scheme is one-way under a chosen-plaintext attack (OW-CPA secure).

[0154] Proof: Let (g, g a , g b , g c ) be an instance of the BDH problem. Challenger C will compute X = e(g, g)

[0155] e(g, g) abc while simulating the secure game to deal with adversary A1.

[0156] Initialization: Challenger C sets Q = g a , pk u = g b , and selects

[0157] Compute Challenger C executes Setup to obtain Then return (Params, pk u , pk s ) and the private key sk s = x s of the cloud server to adversary A2.

[0158] Query: Adversary A2 runs the following query adaptively and maintains a corresponding list to record the responses.

[0159] Edge-assisted parameter query (O Edge ): Adversary A2 submits a tuple (Params, pk u , pk s ), and challenger C computes:

[0160] Y u = e(pk u , Q)

[0161] Y s = e(pku, Q).

[0162] Then returns (Y u , Y s ) to adversary A2.

[0163] De-duplication label query (O Dedup-T ): Adversary A2 submits a tuple (Params, C, C'), and challenger C returns

[0164] Encrypted query (O En ): Adversary A2 submits a tuple (Params, M, Y u , Y s ), and challenger C selects a random number r from , and computes: C1= g r ,

[0165]

[0166]

[0167] Then returns the ciphertext C.

[0168] Challenge: Challenger C randomly selects a message M*∈{0,1} n , and computes the following ciphertext C*.

[0169] C1 * = g c ,

[0170]

[0171] Output: Adversary A2 submits a message M'∈{0,1}n. If M' = M*, challenger C returns "1". Otherwise, returns "0".

[0172] Solving the DBDH problem: If X = e(g,g) abc , then: ​

[0173]

[0174] The performance of the proposed scheme is analyzed by theoretical analysis and actual simulation experiments in comparison with the existing technology.

[0175] Limited computing power is an important constraint for secure data sharing systems. For this purpose, the performance of the scheme is evaluated by two key indicators: computational efficiency and communication cost. Four encryption schemes based on bilinear pairing are compared and analyzed: CWJZ (L. Cheng, Q. Wen, Z. Jin, and H. Zhang, “Cryptanalysis and improvement of a certificateless encryption scheme in the standard model,” Frontiers of Computer Science, vol. 8, 2014, pp. 163–173.), CT (S. Canard and V. C. Trinh, “Certificateless public key cryptography in the standard model,” 2014 Fundamenta informaticae, vol. 161, 2018, pp. 219–248.), DXH (L. Deng, T. Xia, and X. He, “Provably secure certificateless encryption scheme in the standard model,” KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS), vol. 14, 2020, pp. 2534–2553.), and ZDT (M. Zhao, Y. Ding, S. Tang, H. Liang, C. Yang, and H. Wang, “Dual server certificateless public key encryption with authorized equality test for outsourced IoT data,” Journal of Information Security and Applications, vol. 73, 2023, p. 103441.).

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[0177] Benchmarking evaluates four computationally intensive operations: bilinear pairing (Bp),​ group scalar multiplication (Esm), group exponentiation (Psm) and hash-to-point mapping The cryptographic parameter configuration is as follows: a bilinear group and With a security strength of 1024 bits, the multiplicative group is 160 bits, and the plaintext and hash value |l| are 256 bits.

[0178] As Figures 2-6 shown, first, from the aspect of communication cost comparison, through the analysis of the four schemes, the scheme of the present application shows significant advantages. In the comparison scheme, the ciphertext size of CWJZ is bytes, CT is bytes, DXH is bytes, and ZDT is bytes. Compared with the present application, the scheme only needs bytes, which is 45% lower than the most efficient ZDT scheme. As Figure 2 shown, it is illustrated that the scheme of the present application has significant advantages in communication overhead.

[0179] Secondly, from the comparison of computing efficiency, the scheme of the present application is slightly better than DXH in encryption efficiency, and adds the edge auxiliary deduplication function. The decryption efficiency is equivalent to DXH, but is much higher than ZDT. Simulation experiments show that the scheme of the present application is 6.3 times faster than ZDT, and the total computing cost is reduced by 89%. While maintaining the basic performance, the advanced edge deduplication function is integrated, providing the optimal solution for AIoT data sharing.

[0180] In order to verify the performance of the scheme in the actual computing environment, the present application designs a system experiment evaluation. The test platform includes: Raspberry Pi 4B (Raspbian system, Cortex-A7 1.5GHz processor, 8GB memory) simulating resource-constrained AIoT devices, and PC (Intel i5-9500 processor, 8GB memory) simulating data users. The benchmark test results of each operation on the device are shown in Table 1.

[0181] Table 1: Running time table (ms) of each operation on the device

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[0183] The experiment takes Raspberry Pi (RP) as the encryption node and PC as the decryption end to evaluate the performance advantage of the scheme in the computing-intensive cryptographic operation. The results show that after 100 repeated tests, the encryption time of the present application is 13.15ms, and the decryption time is 3.39ms, which is 89% lower than the encryption overhead of the ZDT scheme. Figure 3 and Figure 4The time distribution data further verifies the advantages and confirms the practical value of the application in resource-constrained environments.

[0184] Performance results Figure 5 and Figure 6 show that when the number of ciphertexts increases from 1 to 50, the encryption time of schemes CWJZ, CT, DXH and ZDT ranges from 30.65-1450ms, 46.78-2289ms, 65.16-3156ms, 126.96-6315ms, while the application maintains linear growth (12.08-672ms). The larger the data volume, the more obvious the advantages, and this scalable performance makes the scheme particularly suitable for large-scale AIoT data encryption scenarios.

[0185] Therefore, the application has significant improvements in communication efficiency and computing performance. Its innovation lies in the combination of edge-assisted encryption and deduplication functions, forming an advantage that traditional schemes cannot match.

[0186] The parts of the application not described in detail are well-known to those skilled in the art.

[0187] The above shows and describes the basic principles and main features of the application and the advantages of the application. Those skilled in the art should understand that the application is not limited by the above examples, and the above examples and descriptions in the specification are only to illustrate the principles of the application. Without departing from the spirit and scope of the application, various changes and improvements can be made to the application, and these changes and improvements all fall within the scope of the claimed application. The scope of protection of the application is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. An edge-assisted lightweight deduplication- resistant encryption method, characterized in that, The method constructs an edge-assisted layered collaborative architecture, offloads computationally intensive operations such as bilinear pairing to edge servers, and makes resource-constrained AIoT devices only need to perform lightweight hash and XOR operations; Moreover, the edge server generates a deduplication tag based on the ciphertext, so that the cloud can achieve efficient deduplication through ciphertext equivalence testing without decryption; In addition, a security model is constructed based on bilinear assumptions, and the indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack IND-CPA and the one-wayness OW-CPA are achieved through formal proof, ensuring that even if the edge node is compromised, the plaintext cannot be inferred; The method comprises one or a combination of the following steps: S1, initialization and key generation: generate system public parameters based on bilinear pairing, and generate public and private key pairs for AIoT devices and edge servers respectively; S2, edge auxiliary parameter calculation: the edge server calculates edge auxiliary encryption parameters (Y u , Y s ) according to the user public key and the self public key, and returns to the AIoT device; S3, Data Encryption: After receiving the edge-assisted encryption parameters (Y u , Y s ), the AIoT device executes an encryption algorithm; the algorithm takes the message M∈{0,1} n and the edge-assisted encryption parameters (Y u , Y s ) as inputs, and then selects a random number , and outputs the tuple C = (C1, C2, C3): C1 = ( r ), C2 = H1 ( ) ⊕ M, C3 = H1 ( ) ⊕ H2(M); S4, deduplication tag generation: the edge server receives two ciphertexts, calculates the edge-assisted deduplication tag T = C3⊕C3', and updates the ciphertexts; S5, cloud ciphertext deduplication: the cloud server verifies the deduplication tag to determine whether the ciphertexts are duplicated and performs deduplication without decryption; S6, data decryption: the data user recovers the plaintext from the ciphertext using the private key; In the data encryption step, the AIoT device uses an XOR operation to combine the plaintext M with the hash value H1 ( Combined with the generated C2, the hash value H1 is then XORed. The combination of H2(M) and C3 generates C3, avoiding complex exponential operations and key management; The generation of the edge-assisted deduplication tag T only depends on the XOR operation of the ciphertext components C3 and C3', without parsing the plaintext M and M', ensuring that the deduplication process is completed in the ciphertext domain and privacy is not leaked; In the cloud ciphertext deduplication step, the cloud server uses the edge server private key sk s The ciphertext equivalence test is performed, the validity of T is verified through bilinear pairing and hash operation, and zero-knowledge deduplication is realized.

2. The edge-assisted lightweight deduplication-encryption method of claim 1, wherein, The bilinear pairing satisfies bilinearity, non-degeneracy and computability, where is an additive cyclic group, is a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order.

3. The edge-assisted lightweight deduplication-encryption method of claim 1, wherein, The edge auxiliary encryption parameter (Y u , Y s ) is generated in the process, and the edge server replaces the AIoT device to perform high-computing-complexity operations through a bilinear pairing operation, so that the encryption computing complexity of the AIoT device is reduced to O (1) hash and XOR operations.

4. The edge-assisted lightweight deduplication-encryption method of claim 1, wherein, The method satisfies the indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack IND-CPA and the one-wayness OW-CPA under a selected plaintext attack, and proves the advantage of an enemy by being reduced to difficulty of a bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem and are all negligible functions.

5. An electronic device, comprising: It comprises: At least one processor; A memory connected in communication with the at least one processor; The memory stores a computer program, which, when executed by the at least one processor, enables the at least one processor to implement the edge-assisted lightweight dedupable encryption method according to any one of claims 1-4.

6. A computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program, characterized in that, The program is executed to implement the edge-assisted lightweight dedupable encryption method according to any one of claims 1-4.

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