Networked interconnection system security distributed control method and system
By designing a spoofing attack model and switching event triggering mechanism in a networked interconnect system, the controller gain matrix is optimized, and the stability and scalability problems of the networked interconnect system in the communication process are solved, and efficient distributed control and robustness are achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202510991519.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-07-18
- Publication Date
- 2025-08-19
- Estimated Expiration
- Not applicable · inactive patent
AI Technical Summary
Networked interconnected systems face problems such as packet loss, network attacks and excessive network bandwidth pressure during communication, which affects system stability and scalability.
Establish a state space model, design a spoof attack model and switch event triggering mechanism, design a robust and stable controller gain matrix through the condition matrix, and optimize controller inputs in combination with event triggering strategies to achieve distributed control.
It improves the robustness of the system and information interaction efficiency, reduces the complexity of communication wiring, enhances the scalability of the system, and can effectively resist spoofing attacks.
Smart Images

Figure CN120508073A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of security control methods, and in particular to a security distributed control method and system for a networked interconnected system. Background Art
[0002] With the development of technologies like 5G / V2X communications and edge computing, traditional centralized fleet control (reliant on a single controller) is gradually shifting to distributed control. Distributed control offers high efficiency, distributing tasks to subsystems while enabling information exchange between them, reducing the risk of a single subsystem failure paralyzing the entire system. However, due to their inherent characteristics and scenario limitations, networked interconnected systems require high scalability and typically utilize wireless communication networks (such as 5G and Wi-Fi) for data transmission. Therefore, managing packet loss, cyberattacks, and excessive network bandwidth pressure during communication is crucial. Summary of the Invention
[0003] The present invention provides a method and system for secure distributed control of a networked interconnected system, which can solve at least one of the technical problems in the background technology.
[0004] To achieve the above object, the present invention adopts the following technical solutions: A secure distributed control method for a networked interconnected system comprises the following steps: S100, establish a state space model of the networked interconnected system; S200, design a deception attack model and a switching event triggering mechanism, and perform attack tests on the state space model; S300, designing a condition matrix of a controller with robust stability performance based on the designed deception attack model and switching event triggering mechanism; S400 , based on steps S100 - S300 , obtain controller gain matrix values and set them to controller input and trigger strategy parameters to complete networked interconnected system control.
[0005] Furthermore, the networked interconnected system in step S100 of the present invention includes multiple subsystems, wherein the state space model of each subsystem is as follows:
[0006] Where, It is Subsystem state quantity, It is Subsystem control inputs, It is The subsystem is controlled to output vectors, It is The external disturbance of the subsystem. represents the state matrix of the subsystem itself, Representation subsystem The interconnection impact matrix for subsystem i, , , To adapt the system matrix of dimensions, is the total number of subsystems; The system The state vector, control input vector, controlled output vector, state matrix and interconnected subsystem influence matrix of each subsystem are organized as follows: Further get the following form:
[0007] in , , .
[0008] Furthermore, the method for performing attack testing on the state space module in step S200 of the present invention is as follows: S201. Design a deception attack model To better reflect the real world, a deception attack should be launched randomly at a specific time. Due to network security protocol limitations, the attack will also end within a certain period of time. The duration of a deception attack can be modeled as follows:
[0009] Among them, the symbol For the The start time of the round attack, symbol For the The duration interval of the round spoofing attack, symbol For the The duration of the round of spoofing attack, The closing time interval of the round spoofing attack is symbol , No. The closing time of the round spoofing attack is symbol .
[0010] Furthermore, deception attacks can be detected by analyzing network traffic patterns and detecting traffic that is inconsistent with normal communication behavior to determine whether the current attack is underway. The function for detecting traffic anomalies is as follows:
[0011] Among them is The normalized value, is the characteristic value of the current traffic node, is currently The average value of all traffic nodes in the time period, is currently The standard deviation of all traffic nodes in the time period is combined with the normal distribution probability statistics principle to set the traffic anomaly threshold as .
[0012] The success probability of a deception attack can be modeled as a variable It obeys Bernoulli distribution, takes value 1 or 0, and has:
[0013] The symbols Indicates that the system is under spoofing attack. Indicates that the system has not been attacked by deception. is the probability constant; S202: Switching event triggering mechanism In order to dynamically switch the event trigger mechanism according to the abnormal situation of the traffic node, thereby adjusting the trigger difficulty and reducing the transmission of deception attacks or tampered data to the controller, an event trigger mechanism that can be switched according to the traffic abnormality signal is proposed. The content of the trigger mechanism is as follows:
[0014] in is the sampling moment of the current transmission, It is the transmission moment of the future, yes With the latest transfer status The error between , and Is the trigger threshold parameter, when it is detected , when the current traffic node is normal , using the trigger threshold parameter The trigger mechanism, when detected hour , using the trigger threshold parameter trigger mechanism.
[0015] Furthermore, the method for designing the conditional matrix in step S300 of the present invention includes: S301. Design a distributed controller based on a switching event trigger mechanism; Distributed control is as follows:
[0016] in, For subsystem At the time of update, It is a subsystem The controller gain matrix is It is a subsystem and subsystems The interconnected controller gain matrix, ; right Further arrangement can be written as follows:
[0017] in ; S302: The condition matrix that satisfies the system stability given in step S301 is as follows: For a given positive constant , a positive number , , , the controller gain matrix , if there exists a matrix , so that the system is stable and meets the following conditions: , in
[0018]
[0019] is the lower bound of communication delay, is the upper limit of communication delay, is the system interference immunity index, is the scaling factor constant; S303, performing linearization processing on the conditional matrix; There is a positive constant , a positive number , , , the controller gain matrix ; If there is a matrix , so that the system is stable, the following conditions are met:
[0020]
[0021] in,
[0022] Controller gain matrix .
[0023] On the other hand, a networked interconnected system security distributed control system includes: an event triggering unit, a system computing unit, and a networked interconnected system distributed control unit; The event triggering unit is connected to the system computing unit, and the system computing unit is connected to the distributed control unit of the networked interconnected system; The event trigger unit has the function of identifying abnormal signals of traffic nodes and switching event trigger mechanism to decide whether these data packets are transmitted to the network controller according to the system sampling information; The system calculation unit is used to calculate the controller gain and event trigger parameters that can ensure stable operation of the system based on the switching event trigger mechanism using the conditions of S300 when the system is subjected to a deception attack; The distributed control units of the networked interconnected system are used to finally design the controller input.
[0024] As can be seen from the above technical solutions, the present invention's secure distributed control method and system for networked interconnected systems reduces the complexity of system communication wiring through network communication, while also improving scalability. System expansion can be achieved rapidly by simply adding network communication interfaces. Furthermore, considering the risks inherent in network environments, a switching event triggering mechanism has been designed to effectively protect against spoofing attacks. Furthermore, the use of a distributed control approach improves the efficiency of information exchange between systems and the robustness of the interconnected system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0025] Figure 1 It is a flowchart of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a block diagram of the networked interconnected fleet system of the present invention; Figure 3 It is the state response diagram under the switching event trigger mechanism; Figure 4 Schematic diagram of control system error under deception attack; Figure 5 The triggering time interval diagram of the four vehicle systems; Figure 6 Switching diagram for traffic detection evaluation diagram and event trigger mechanism. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0026] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments.
[0027] like Figure 1 As shown, the networked interconnected system security distributed control method described in this embodiment includes the following steps: S100, establish a state space model of the networked interconnected system; S200, design a deception attack model and a switching event triggering mechanism, and perform attack tests on the state space model; S300, designing a condition matrix of a controller with robust stability performance based on the designed deception attack model and switching event triggering mechanism; S400 , based on steps S100 - S300 , obtain controller gain matrix values and set them to controller input and trigger strategy parameters to complete networked interconnected system control.
[0028] The following is a detailed description of each step: S100. Establish a state space model for networked interconnected systems: A large networked interconnected system includes multiple subsystems, where the state space model of each subsystem is as follows:
[0029] Where, It is Subsystem state quantity, It is Subsystem control inputs, It is The subsystem is controlled to output vectors, It is The external disturbance of the subsystem. represents the state matrix of the subsystem itself, Representation subsystem Subsystem The interconnected influence matrix, , , To adapt the system matrix of dimensions, is the total number of subsystems.
[0030] The system The state vector, control input vector, controlled output vector, state matrix and interconnected subsystem influence matrix of each subsystem are organized as follows: It is further organized into the following form:
[0031] in , , . S200, design a deception attack model and a switching event triggering mechanism, and perform attack tests on the state space model; Since networked interconnected systems involve network communications, in order to design a control method that can resist deception attacks, it is necessary to introduce an attack model and design a switching event trigger mechanism based on the attack model to design the subsequent controller gain matrix.
[0032] The method for attack testing the state space module is as follows: S201. Design a deception attack model To better reflect the real world, a deception attack should be launched randomly at a specific time. Due to network security protocol limitations, the attack will also end within a certain period of time. The duration of a deception attack can be modeled as follows:
[0033] Among them, the symbol For the The start time of the round attack, symbol For the The duration interval of the round spoofing attack, symbol For the The duration of the round of spoofing attack, The closing time interval of the round spoofing attack is symbol , No. The closing time of the round spoofing attack is symbol .
[0034] Furthermore, deception attacks can be detected by analyzing network traffic patterns and detecting traffic that is inconsistent with normal communication behavior to determine whether the current attack is underway. The function for detecting traffic anomalies is as follows:
[0035] Among them is The normalized value, is the characteristic value of the current traffic node, is currently The average value of all traffic nodes in the time period, is currently The standard deviation of all traffic nodes in the time period is combined with the normal distribution probability statistics principle to set the traffic anomaly threshold as .
[0036] The success probability of a deception attack can be modeled as a variable It obeys Bernoulli distribution, takes value 1 or 0, and has:
[0037] The symbols Indicates that the system is under spoofing attack. Indicates that the system has not been attacked by deception. is the probability constant; S202: Switching event triggering mechanism In order to dynamically switch the event trigger mechanism according to the abnormal situation of the traffic node, thereby adjusting the trigger difficulty and reducing the transmission of deception attacks or tampered data to the controller, an event trigger mechanism that can be switched according to the traffic abnormality signal is proposed. The content of the trigger mechanism is as follows:
[0038] in is the sampling moment of the current transmission, It is the transmission moment of the future, yes With the latest transfer status The error between , and Is the trigger threshold parameter, when it is detected , when the current traffic node is normal , using the trigger threshold parameter The trigger mechanism, when detected hour , using the trigger threshold parameter trigger mechanism.
[0039] S300, designing a condition matrix of a controller with robust stability performance based on the designed deception attack model and switching event triggering mechanism; Since the conditional matrix may contain nonlinear terms, in order to be able to solve it in the software, it is necessary to obtain a linear matrix inequality through matrix contract transformation and scaling method; S301. Design of distributed controller based on switching event triggering mechanism as follows:
[0040] in, For subsystem At the time of update, It is a subsystem The controller gain matrix is It is a subsystem and subsystems The interconnected controller gain matrix, .
[0041] right Further arrangement can be written as follows:
[0042] in .
[0043] S302: The condition matrix that satisfies the system stability given in step S301 is as follows: For a given positive constant , a positive number , , , the controller gain matrix , if there exists a matrix , so that the system is stable, the following conditions are met: , in
[0044]
[0045] is the lower bound of communication delay, is the upper limit of communication delay, is the system interference immunity index, is the scaling factor constant.
[0046] S303, linearize the conditional matrix of S302, and there is a positive constant , a positive number , , , the controller gain matrix , if there exists a matrix , so that the system is stable, the following conditions are met:
[0047]
[0048] in
[0049] Controller gain matrix .
[0050] S400 , based on steps S100 - S300 , obtain controller gain matrix values and set them to controller input and trigger strategy parameters to complete networked interconnected system control.
[0051] According to the conditions given in S303, Take values and substitute these values into the linear condition matrix by using the solving software MATLAB Solving in can obtain the controller gain matrix and trigger weight matrix , the controller gain matrix is obtained Value set to controller input , and perform high-precision calculation of the system input to control the stability of the system.
[0052] Finally, a simulation example can be used to verify the effectiveness of the above method. Consider the interconnected vehicle fleet system consisting of a master vehicle and four slave vehicles as shown in the figure below. The parameters of the interconnected vehicle control system are set as
[0053] Set the system initial state separately , the sampling time interval of a given system , the upper and lower limits of communication delay are , The attack probabilities of the two channels are , and the other parameters are set to , , the system disturbance is as follows:
[0054] After completing the above parameter settings, the reliability of the S100-S400 method was simulated and verified.
[0055] The simulation results are as follows Figure 3 and Figure 4 As shown in , the system state still converges quickly under deception attacks and disturbances. Figure 5 As shown in Figure 2, the triggering time and interval of data under the control of the switching event trigger mechanism are relatively sparse, indicating that the triggering mechanism has a certain effect on alleviating communication pressure. Figure 6 Figure 2 shows the flow detection evaluation and event triggering mechanism switching based on flow anomalies. The experimental results of this simulation example show that under deception attack environments, the proposed event triggering strategy can not only stabilize the closed-loop system but also improve the communication resource utilization efficiency of the networked interconnected system.
[0056] On the other hand, the present invention discloses a safe distributed control system based on a switching event triggered control strategy, which is based on an interconnected network system and includes the following modules: an event triggering unit, a system computing unit, and a networked interconnected system distributed control unit; The event triggering unit is connected to the system computing unit, and the system computing unit is connected to the distributed control unit of the networked interconnected system; The event trigger unit has the function of identifying abnormal signals of traffic nodes and switching event trigger mechanism to decide whether these data packets are transmitted to the network controller according to the system sampling information; The system calculation unit is used to calculate the controller gain and event trigger parameters that can ensure stable operation of the system based on the switching event trigger mechanism using the conditions of S300 when the system is subjected to a deception attack; The distributed control units of the networked interconnected system are used to finally design the controller input.
[0057] In another embodiment provided by the present application, a computer program product including instructions is also provided, which, when executed on a computer, enables the computer to execute any of the networked interconnected system security distributed control methods in the above embodiments.
[0058] It is understandable that the system, device and storage medium provided in the embodiments of the present invention correspond to the method provided in the embodiments of the present invention, and the explanation, examples and beneficial effects of the relevant contents can refer to the corresponding parts of the above methods.
[0059] In the above embodiments, all or part of the embodiments can be implemented using software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented using software, all or part of the embodiments can be implemented in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions described in the embodiments of the present application are generated. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another. For example, the computer instructions can be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center via a wired (e.g., coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) method. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server or data center that includes one or more available media. The available medium can be a magnetic medium (e.g., a floppy disk, hard disk, tape), an optical medium (e.g., a DVD), or a semiconductor medium (e.g., a solid-state drive (SSD)).
[0060] It should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as first and second, etc., are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply the existence of any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article, or device comprising a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or device. In the absence of further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising a ..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or device comprising the element.
[0061] Each embodiment in this specification is described in a related manner. Similar parts between the various embodiments can be referred to in conjunction with each other. Each embodiment focuses on the differences between the other embodiments. In particular, the system embodiment is generally similar to the method embodiment, so the description is relatively simple. For related parts, refer to the description of the method embodiment.
[0062] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit the same. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the various embodiments of the present invention.
Claims
1. A secure distributed control method for a networked interconnected system, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S100, establish a state space model of the networked interconnected system; S200, design a deception attack model and a switching event triggering mechanism, and perform attack tests on the state space model; S300, designing a condition matrix of a controller with robust stability performance based on the designed deception attack model and switching event triggering mechanism; S400 , based on the conditions of steps S100 - S300 , substitute the condition matrix to obtain the controller gain matrix value, and set it to the controller input and trigger strategy parameters to complete the networked interconnected system control.
2. The secure distributed control method for a networked interconnected system according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S100, the networked interconnected system includes multiple subsystems, wherein the state space model of each subsystem is as follows: Where, It is Subsystem state quantity, It is Subsystem control inputs, It is The subsystem is controlled to output vectors, It is External disturbance of subsystems; matrix represents the state matrix of the subsystem itself, Representation subsystem The interconnection impact matrix for subsystem i, , , To adapt the system matrix of dimensions, is the total number of subsystems; The system The state vector, control input vector, controlled output vector, state matrix and interconnected subsystem influence matrix of each subsystem are organized as follows: Further get the following form: in , , 。 3. The secure distributed control method for a networked interconnected system according to claim 2, wherein: The method for performing attack testing on the state space module in step S200 is as follows: S201. Design a deception attack model To better reflect the real-world environment, a deception attack should be launched randomly at a specific time. Due to network security protocol restrictions, the attack will also end within a period of time. The duration of a deception attack can be modeled as follows: Among them, the symbol For the The start time of the round attack, symbol For the The duration interval of the round spoofing attack, symbol For the The duration of the round of spoofing attack, The closing time interval of the round spoofing attack is symbol , No. The closing time of the round spoofing attack is symbol ; Furthermore, deception attacks can be detected by analyzing network traffic patterns and detecting traffic that is inconsistent with normal communication behavior to determine whether the current attack is underway. The function for detecting traffic anomalies is as follows: Among them is The normalized value, is the characteristic value of the current traffic node, is currently The average value of all traffic nodes in the time period, is currently The standard deviation of all traffic nodes in the time period is combined with the normal distribution probability statistics principle to set the traffic anomaly threshold as ; The success probability of a deception attack can be modeled as a variable It obeys Bernoulli distribution, takes value 1 or 0, and has: The symbols Indicates that the system is under spoofing attack. Indicates that the system has not been attacked by deception. is the probability constant; S202: Switching event triggering mechanism In order to dynamically switch the event trigger mechanism according to the abnormal situation of the traffic node, thereby adjusting the trigger difficulty and reducing the transmission of deception attacks or tampered data to the controller, an event trigger mechanism that can be switched according to the traffic abnormality signal is proposed. The content of the trigger mechanism is as follows: in is the sampling moment of the current transmission, It is the transmission moment of the future, yes With the latest transfer status The error between , and Is the trigger threshold parameter, when it is detected , when the current traffic node is normal , using the trigger threshold parameter The trigger mechanism, when detected hour , using the trigger threshold parameter trigger mechanism.
4. The secure distributed control method for a networked interconnected system according to claim 1, wherein: The method for designing the condition matrix in step S300 includes: S301. Design a distributed controller based on a switching event trigger mechanism; Distributed control is as follows: in, For subsystem At update time, It is a subsystem The controller gain matrix, It is a subsystem and subsystems The interconnected controller gain matrix, ; right Further arrangement can be written as follows: in ; S302: The condition matrix that satisfies the system stability given in step S301 is as follows: For a given positive constant , a positive number , , , the controller gain matrix , if there exists a matrix , so that the system is stable and meets the following conditions: , in is the lower bound of communication delay, is the upper limit of communication delay, is the system interference immunity index, is the scaling factor constant; S303, performing linearization processing on the conditional matrix; There is a positive constant , a positive number , , , the controller gain matrix ; If there is a matrix , so that the system is stable, the following conditions are met: in, Controller gain matrix .
5. A networked interconnected system security distributed control system, used to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that: include: Event triggering unit, system computing unit, distributed control unit of networked interconnected system; The event triggering unit is connected to the system computing unit, and the system computing unit is connected to the distributed control unit of the networked interconnected system; The event trigger unit has the function of identifying abnormal signals of traffic nodes and switching event trigger mechanism to decide whether these data packets are transmitted to the network controller according to the system sampling information; The system calculation unit is used to calculate the controller gain and event trigger parameters that can ensure stable operation of the system based on the switching event trigger mechanism using the conditions of S300 when the system is subjected to a deception attack; The distributed control units of the networked interconnected system are used to finally design the controller input.
Citation Information
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