Charging pile remote safety communication method, device and system

Abstract

The invention discloses a charging pile remote safety communication method, device and system, and relates to the field of communication, and the method comprises the steps: obtaining the current state parameters of one or more preset key physical nodes on a communication link with a remote monitoring platform; in response to an operation instruction issued by the remote monitoring platform, acquiring a current characteristic parameter of a communication channel by bidirectionally or unidirectionally receiving and transmitting a perturbation detection signal in a preset mode in the communication channel between the remote monitoring platform and the communication channel; obtaining an execution result and an operation timestamp of the operation instruction, and generating a trusted execution report including the operation timestamp and a charging pile identifier based on the execution result, the current state parameter and the current channel characteristic parameter; and establishing a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal based on the trusted execution report, and executing secure communication with the electronic terminal through the secure communication channel. The problem that physical layer nodes are subjected to short-distance malicious interference can be effectively avoided, and the safety of remote communication of the charging pile is improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The embodiments of the present application relate to the field of communications, and in particular to a method, device, and system for remote secure communication of charging piles. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of the electric vehicle industry and the increasing improvement of charging infrastructure, charging piles, as key equipment for EV energy replenishment, are crucial to the entire EV ecosystem in terms of safety and stability. Modern charging piles generally adopt a remote monitoring and management model, establishing a communication connection with a remote monitoring platform to enable remote control, monitoring, and management of the charging process.

[0003] During the exchange of critical commands between charging piles and remote monitoring platforms, such as starting / stopping charging, power adjustment, and firmware updates, the security of the communication link faces severe challenges. Especially in scenarios that rely on wireless communication, the physical layer nodes in the communication link (such as antennas and RF front-ends) are vulnerable to close-range malicious interference. These threats primarily include the following: Attackers can deploy rogue base station devices to intercept or hijack the communication signals between the charging pile and the remote monitoring platform, performing man-in-the-middle attacks to obtain sensitive information or send malicious commands; attackers can also inject interference signals in specific frequency bands near the charging pile antenna, reducing the signal-to-noise ratio and causing unstable or even interrupted communication links.

[0004] Therefore, there is an urgent need for a method to effectively prevent physical layer nodes from being subjected to close-range malicious interference and improve the security of charging pile remote communications. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The embodiments of the present application provide a charging pile remote secure communication method, device and system for effectively preventing physical layer nodes from being subjected to close-range malicious interference and improving the security of charging pile remote communication.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the embodiments of the present application adopt the following technical solutions: In a first aspect, a remote secure communication method for a charging pile is provided, which is applied to a communication system, wherein the communication system includes a charging pile and an electronic terminal, and the electronic terminal is equipped with a remote monitoring platform. The method includes: In response to the communication signal, the charging pile obtains current status parameters of one or more key physical nodes preset on the communication link between the charging pile and the remote monitoring platform; In response to the operation instruction issued by the remote monitoring platform, the charging pile obtains the current characteristic parameters of the communication channel by bidirectionally or unidirectionally sending and receiving a preset perturbation detection signal in the communication channel between the charging pile and the remote monitoring platform; The charging pile obtains the execution result and operation timestamp of the operation instruction, and generates a trusted execution report including the operation timestamp and the charging pile identification based on the execution result, current state parameters and current channel characteristic parameters; The charging pile establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal based on the trusted execution report, and performs secure communication with the electronic terminal through the secure communication channel.

[0007] In a possible implementation of the first aspect, the charging pile includes a security module that generates a trusted execution report including an operation timestamp and a charging pile identifier based on the execution result, the current state parameter, and the current channel characteristic parameter, including: Generates raw data of a trusted execution report based on the execution result, current state parameters, current channel characteristic parameters, operation timestamp, and charging pile identifier; Digitally sign the original data using the private key of the security module; The signed original data is encrypted using the session key negotiated with the remote monitoring platform to obtain a trusted execution report including the operation timestamp and charging pile identification.

[0008] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the charging pile is integrated with a 5G module or a 4G module, and the communication link is established through a 5G network or a 4G network.

[0009] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the charging pile establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal based on the trusted execution report, including: The charging pile receives the secure communication credential returned by the remote monitoring platform, wherein the secure communication credential is generated by the remote monitoring platform based on the security assessment result of the trusted execution report; The charging pile stores the secure communication credentials and performs identity authentication based on the secure communication credentials when establishing a communication connection with the electronic terminal to obtain an identity authentication result; The charging pile negotiates a communication key with the electronic terminal based on the identity authentication result, and establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal based on the negotiated communication key.

[0010] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the secure communication credential includes at least one of a temporary session key, a digital certificate, or a one-time token, and the secure communication credential has a preset validity period.

[0011] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the charging pile negotiates a communication key with the electronic terminal based on the identity authentication result, and establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal based on the negotiated communication key, including: When the identity authentication result is authentication passed, the charging pile generates a random value and sends the random value to the electronic terminal; The charging pile receives a response value generated by the electronic terminal based on the random value and the stored electronic terminal private key; The charging pile verifies the validity of the response value, and after the verification is passed, it executes the key exchange protocol with the electronic terminal to generate a communication key; The charging pile establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal through the communication key.

[0012] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the step of the remote monitoring platform generating the secure communication credential includes: The remote monitoring platform receives the trusted execution report sent by the charging pile, decrypts the trusted execution report using the session key negotiated with the charging pile, and verifies the digital signature of the trusted execution report to obtain the current state parameters and current channel characteristic parameters; The remote monitoring platform compares the current state parameters with the pre-stored baseline physical fingerprint data of the key physical nodes corresponding to the charging pile to obtain the comparison results; The remote monitoring platform compares the current channel characteristic parameters with the preset channel health status threshold to obtain a comparison result; Based on the comparison results, comparison results, and execution results of the operation instructions, the remote monitoring platform conducts a comprehensive assessment of the execution environment credibility and communication link security of the charging pile, and obtains a comprehensive assessment result; When the comprehensive assessment results meet the preset security standards, the remote monitoring platform generates secure communication credentials.

[0013] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the charging pile performs secure communication with the electronic terminal through a secure communication channel, including: The charging pile receives a charging control instruction sent by the electronic terminal through a secure communication channel, and performs a corresponding charging operation according to the received charging control instruction, wherein the charging control instruction includes at least one of charging parameter setting, charging status query or charging process control; The charging pile collects status data during the charging process in real time and sends the status data to the electronic terminal through a secure communication channel.

[0014] In a second aspect, the present application provides a communication system, comprising: Electronic terminals, deployed with remote monitoring platforms; and Charging pile, connected to the electronic terminal.

[0015] In a third aspect, the present application provides a charging pile, comprising: a communication device for establishing a communication connection with an electronic terminal; a memory configured to store instructions; and The processor is configured to: In response to the communication signal, obtaining current state parameters of one or more key physical nodes preset on the communication link between the remote monitoring platform; In response to an operation instruction issued by the remote monitoring platform, the system acquires current characteristic parameters of the communication channel by bidirectionally or unidirectionally transmitting and receiving a perturbation detection signal of a preset mode in the communication channel between the system and the remote monitoring platform; Obtain the execution result and operation timestamp of the operation instruction, and generate a trusted execution report including the operation timestamp and charging pile identification based on the execution result, current state parameters and current channel characteristic parameters; A secure communication channel is established with the electronic terminal based on the trusted execution report, and secure communication is performed with the electronic terminal through the secure communication channel.

[0016] Through the above technical solution, a dynamic perception security protection mechanism is established to address security threats faced during the interaction of key commands between charging piles and remote monitoring platforms. Specifically, by real-time monitoring of the status parameters of preset key physical nodes on the communication link, a physical layer security baseline is established to promptly detect anomalies. When the remote monitoring platform issues an operation command, the charging pile actively transmits and receives perturbation detection signals in a specific pattern on the communication channel, dynamically acquiring communication channel characteristic parameters, sensing channel anomalies in real time, and effectively identifying threats such as rogue base station attacks or jamming signal injection. The charging pile combines the execution results of the operation command with the physical node status parameters and communication channel characteristic parameters to generate a trusted execution report containing a timestamp and device identification to ensure the verifiability of the command execution. Based on these trusted execution reports, a secure communication channel is established to achieve reliable communication recovery and state synchronization. By combining physical layer status monitoring with channel characteristic detection, this technical solution builds a comprehensive protection system from the physical layer to the application layer. It can effectively counter close-range malicious interference such as rogue base station attacks and jamming signal injection. While ensuring the security of the communication link, it also ensures the reliable execution of remote control commands. This significantly improves the security and reliability of charging pile remote communications, providing a strong guarantee for the safe operation of electric vehicle charging infrastructure.

[0017] Other features and advantages of the embodiments of the present application will be described in detail in the subsequent detailed description. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0018] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a flow chart of a remote secure communication method for a charging pile provided in an embodiment of the present application; Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the structure of a communication system provided in an embodiment of the present application; Figure 3 A flowchart of generating secure communication credentials for the remote monitoring platform provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0019] To make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that the specific implementation methods described herein are only used to illustrate and explain the embodiments of the present application and are not used to limit the embodiments of the present application. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0020] It should be noted that if the embodiments of the present application involve directional indications (such as up, down, left, right, front, back, etc.), such directional indications are only used to explain the relative position relationship, movement status, etc. between the various components under a certain specific posture (as shown in the accompanying drawings). If the specific posture changes, the directional indication will also change accordingly.

[0021] In addition, if there are descriptions involving the first, second, etc. in the embodiments of the present application, the descriptions of the first, second, etc. are only for descriptive purposes and cannot be understood as indicating or implying their relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of the indicated technical features. Therefore, the features defined as the first and second may explicitly or implicitly include at least one of the features. In addition, the technical solutions between the various embodiments can be combined with each other, but they must be based on the ability of ordinary technicians in this field to implement them. When the combination of technical solutions is contradictory or cannot be implemented, it should be deemed that such a combination of technical solutions does not exist and is not within the scope of protection required by this application.

[0022] Figure 1 The following schematically shows a flow chart of a charging pile remote secure communication method according to an embodiment of the present application. Figure 1 As shown, an embodiment of the present application provides a remote secure communication method for a charging pile, which is applied to a communication system. The communication system includes a charging pile and an electronic terminal. The electronic terminal is deployed with a remote monitoring platform. The method may include the following steps.

[0023] S110. In response to the communication signal, the charging pile obtains current status parameters of one or more key physical nodes preset on the communication link between the charging pile and the remote monitoring platform; S120. In response to an operation instruction issued by the remote monitoring platform, the charging pile obtains current characteristic parameters of the communication channel by bidirectionally or unidirectionally transmitting and receiving a perturbation detection signal of a preset pattern in the communication channel between the charging pile and the remote monitoring platform. S130: The charging pile obtains the execution result and operation timestamp of the operation instruction, and generates a trusted execution report including the operation timestamp and the charging pile identifier based on the execution result, current state parameters, and current channel characteristic parameters; S140: The charging pile establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal based on the trusted execution report, and performs secure communication with the electronic terminal through the secure communication channel.

[0024] In this embodiment, the charging pile obtains the current characteristic parameters of the communication channel by bidirectionally or unidirectionally sending and receiving a preset perturbation detection signal in the communication channel between the charging pile and the remote monitoring platform, including the following steps: S1. Generate a perturbation detection signal having pseudo-random and dynamically variable parameters, wherein the parameters include at least one of a pseudo-random sequence seed, a modulation mode, and a transmit power level; S2. Sending the perturbation detection signal by orthogonal code division multiplexing or superimposing it on the main signal at very low power; S3. Receive the perturbation detection signal after propagation through the communication channel, and extract the distortion characteristics generated during the channel propagation, including at least one of amplitude attenuation change, phase jitter characteristics, arrival time fluctuation, arrival angle fluctuation, or channel impulse response parameter change; S4. Using the distortion characteristics as current characteristic parameters of the communication channel to evaluate the physical integrity and purity of the current communication channel.

[0025] In this embodiment, the electronic terminal can be a tablet computer, desktop computer, laptop computer, handheld computer, wearable device, notebook computer, ultra-mobile personal computer (UMPC), netbook computer, or other device with a processor. Of course, the electronic terminal can also be a server. The specific form of the electronic terminal is not particularly limited in this embodiment of the application.

[0026] The communication system in this embodiment includes a charging pile and an electronic terminal, and the electronic terminal is deployed with a remote monitoring platform. Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a remote secure communication system for a charging pile according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown. Figure 2 The charging pile establishes a communication connection with the remote monitoring platform via a wireless communication network (such as a 5G / 4G network). The charging pile integrates a communication module, a safety detection unit, a signal processing module, and a safety execution module to implement each step of the method.

[0027] During the exchange of critical commands between charging piles and remote monitoring platforms, the security of the communication link faces severe challenges. Especially in scenarios that rely on wireless communication, the physical layer nodes in the communication link are vulnerable to close-range malicious interference. This embodiment effectively ensures the communication security between the charging pile and the remote monitoring platform by enhancing physical layer security.

[0028] Specifically, in response to the communication signal, the charging pile obtains the current state parameters of one or more preset key physical nodes on the communication link between the charging pile and the remote monitoring platform. In specific implementations, the charging pile integrates a dedicated micro-detection unit, which can be a near-field probe array based on a micro-millimeter-wave transceiver chip. Upon receiving the communication signal, the detection unit automatically activates and scans the preset key physical nodes. Key physical nodes include, but are not limited to, the antenna interface connector of the 5G / 4G module, specific sensitive areas on the RF front-end circuit board, and the inner surface of the shielding cover of the communication module itself. These locations have pre-set physical fingerprints that produce stable and distinguishable response signals under specific stimuli. For example, when a micro-millimeter-wave probe illuminates the antenna interface connector at a frequency of 60 GHz, it produces specific reflected / scattered signal spectral characteristics. The detection unit captures these response signals and, using built-in signal processing algorithms, extracts quantified characteristic parameters, such as spectral peak distribution, resonant frequency offset, and acoustic impedance curve. These parameters constitute the current state parameters, which accurately reflect the physical integrity of the key physical nodes. Unexpected changes in these parameters beyond preset thresholds strongly indicate that the physical node may have been physically tampered with, its components illegally replaced, or subjected to close-range interference sufficient to alter its physical properties. This allows charging stations to physically verify the security of key nodes in the communication link, providing a foundation for subsequent secure communications.

[0029] In response to the operation instructions issued by the remote monitoring platform, the charging pile obtains the current characteristic parameters of the communication channel by bidirectionally or unidirectionally sending and receiving perturbation detection signals of a preset pattern in the communication channel between the charging pile and the remote monitoring platform. After receiving the operation instructions, the charging pile first generates a perturbation detection signal with pseudo-random and dynamically variable parameters. These parameters include pseudo-random sequence seeds, modulation methods, and transmission power levels. For example, the charging pile can use a combination of the current timestamp and the device's unique identifier to generate a pseudo-random sequence seed, select a modulation method such as QPSK, 16QAM, or OFDM, and set the transmission power to a level 20dB lower than the main data signal.

[0030] In this embodiment, the design of the perturbation detection signal ensures that it has minimal impact on normal business communications while effectively detecting the channel status. The charging pile sends the perturbation detection signal through orthogonal code division multiplexing or by superimposing it on the main signal at extremely low power.

[0031] In code division multiplexing (CDM) mode, the charging station modulates the perturbation signal using a spread spectrum code sequence orthogonal to the main data signal. In superposition mode, the perturbation signal power is typically controlled to less than 1% of the main signal power to ensure it does not affect the demodulation of the main signal. After receiving the perturbation detection signal, the remote monitoring platform reflects it back to the charging station. Alternatively, the platform can generate its own perturbation detection signal and send it to the charging station. The charging station receives the perturbation detection signal after propagating through the communication channel and extracts the distortion characteristics caused by the channel propagation, including amplitude attenuation changes, phase jitter characteristics, arrival time fluctuations, arrival angle fluctuations, and changes in channel impulse response parameters. For example, the charging station can calculate the amplitude ratio between the received and transmitted signals at different frequencies, measure the statistical distribution of phase noise, or analyze the delay spread caused by multipath effects. These distortion characteristics are highly sensitive to the real-time status of the entire end-to-end physical channel, including the charging station antenna, feeder, spatial propagation path, and potential abnormal paths or interference sources introduced by illegal relay devices. The charging station uses these distortion characteristics as the current characteristic parameters of the communication channel to assess the physical integrity and purity of the current communication channel. Through dynamic channel perturbation detection, the charging station can monitor the security status of the communication channel in real time and promptly detect possible man-in-the-middle attacks or signal interference.

[0032] The charging pile obtains the execution result and operation timestamp of the operation instruction. Based on the execution result, current state parameters, and current channel characteristic parameters, it generates a trusted execution report including the operation timestamp and charging pile identifier. After executing an operation instruction issued by the remote monitoring platform (such as starting / stopping charging, power adjustment, firmware update, etc.), the charging pile records the execution result of the instruction, including the execution status (success, failure, or partial completion), key parameter changes during execution (such as increasing charging power from 0 to 7kW), and possible error codes or exception information. The charging pile also obtains the precise operation timestamp, typically in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) format, with millisecond accuracy. The charging pile integrates this information with the current state parameters and current channel characteristic parameters obtained in the previous two steps to generate a structured trusted execution report. The report uses a standardized data format (such as JSON) and contains multiple key fields: the unique identifier of the charging pile (such as a serial number, MAC address, or subject name in a digital certificate), an operation timestamp, a summary of the operation instruction, a detailed description of the execution result, PKFP-CLKN status parameters (including the characteristic values ​​of each key physical node and their deviation from the baseline value), DCMP characteristic parameters (including quantitative indicators of channel distortion characteristics and their safety assessment results), etc.

[0033] To ensure the authenticity and integrity of the report, the charging pile uses its internal security module (such as a secure element (SE) or trusted platform module (TPM)) to digitally sign the report using its stored private key. This signing process ensures that the report cannot be tampered with during transmission and can only be generated by a device holding the authentic charging pile private key. In this way, the charging pile binds the physical layer security test results with the operation execution results, forming a complete and verifiable security proof chain, providing the remote monitoring platform with a comprehensive basis for assessing operational safety.

[0034] Based on the trusted execution report, the charging pile establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal and conducts secure communication with the electronic terminal through the secure communication channel. After generating the trusted execution report, the charging pile encrypts the report using a session key pre-negotiated with the remote monitoring platform to protect the sensitive information contained in the report. Symmetric encryption is typically used. The encrypted report is transmitted to the remote monitoring platform via the 5G / 4G network. Upon receiving the encrypted report, the remote monitoring platform first decrypts it using the session key and then verifies the digital signature to confirm the authenticity and integrity of the report. Once verified, the platform conducts a detailed analysis of the report content: PKFP-CLKN status parameters are rigorously compared with baseline fingerprint data pre-registered and stored for the charging pile to calculate a similarity score; DCMP feature parameters are compared and analyzed with the expected channel model, historical data, or real-time health thresholds to assess the channel security status; and the execution results are checked to ensure they meet expectations and to determine whether any abnormal behavior exists. Based on these analysis results, the platform comprehensively assesses the current communication security level and decides whether to continue maintaining the secure communication channel with the charging pile. If the assessment indicates the communication environment is secure and reliable, the platform sends a confirmation message to the charging station, and both parties can continue to communicate using the existing encrypted channel. If potential security risks are detected, the platform may trigger security response mechanisms, such as renegotiating encryption parameters, switching communication channels, reducing sensitive operation permissions, or temporarily suspending remote control functions. Through this communication mechanism based on physical layer security proof, the charging station and remote monitoring platform can establish a highly secure communication channel in untrusted network environments, effectively resisting various network attacks and physical layer interference.

[0035] In this embodiment, the charging station acquires the current characteristic parameters of the communication channel by bidirectionally or unidirectionally transmitting and receiving a preset perturbation detection signal in a preset pattern in the communication channel between the charging station and the remote monitoring platform. The method includes the following steps: First, a perturbation detection signal with pseudo-random and dynamically variable parameters is generated. The parameters include at least one of a pseudo-random sequence seed, a modulation method, and a transmit power level. The pseudo-random sequence seed can be generated based on a combination of the charging station's unique identifier, the current timestamp, and a session identifier, ensuring that the sequence used for each detection is unpredictable. The modulation method can be dynamically selected based on current network conditions, such as using high-order modulation (such as 64QAM) when the signal-to-noise ratio is high and low-order modulation (such as BPSK) when the signal-to-noise ratio is low. The transmit power level is typically set 10-20 dB lower than the main data signal to ensure that it does not interfere with normal communication. Second, the perturbation detection signal is transmitted via orthogonal code division multiplexing or superimposed on the main signal at very low power. In code division multiplexing (CDM), the perturbation signal uses a spreading code orthogonal to the main data signal, enabling the receiver to separate the two signals. In superposition mode, the perturbation signal power is strictly controlled, typically not exceeding 1% of the main signal power. The perturbation signal, after propagating through the communication channel, is then received and its distortion characteristics generated during channel propagation are extracted. These distortion characteristics include at least one of amplitude attenuation, phase jitter, arrival time fluctuation, arrival angle fluctuation, or changes in channel impulse response parameters. These distortion characteristics are extracted using high-precision digital signal processing algorithms such as fast Fourier transform (FFT), wavelet analysis, and autocorrelation analysis. Finally, these distortion characteristics are used as the current characteristic parameters of the communication channel to assess the physical integrity and purity of the current communication channel. During this assessment, the extracted characteristics are compared with historical baseline data or theoretical models to calculate the degree of deviation, and the channel status is determined based on preset safety thresholds.

[0036] This embodiment addresses security threats faced during the interaction of key commands between charging piles and remote monitoring platforms by establishing a dynamic perception security protection mechanism. Specifically, by real-time monitoring of the status parameters of preset key physical nodes on the communication link, a physical layer security baseline is established to promptly detect abnormal conditions. When the remote monitoring platform issues an operation command, the charging pile actively transmits and receives perturbation detection signals in a specific pattern on the communication channel, dynamically acquiring communication channel characteristic parameters, sensing channel anomalies in real time, and effectively identifying threats such as pseudo-base station attacks or jamming signal injection. The charging pile combines the execution results of the operation command with the physical node status parameters and communication channel characteristic parameters to generate a trusted execution report containing a timestamp and device identification to ensure the verifiability of the command execution. Based on these trusted execution reports, a secure communication channel is established to achieve reliable communication recovery and state synchronization. By combining physical layer status monitoring with channel characteristic detection, this technical solution builds a comprehensive protection system from the physical layer to the application layer. It can effectively counter close-range malicious interference such as pseudo-base station attacks and jamming signal injection. While ensuring the security of the communication link, it also ensures the reliable execution of remote control commands, significantly improving the security and reliability of charging pile remote communications and providing a strong guarantee for the safe operation of electric vehicle charging infrastructure.

[0037] In one implementation of this embodiment, the charging pile includes a security module that generates a trusted execution report including an operation timestamp and a charging pile identifier based on the execution result, current state parameters, and current channel characteristic parameters, including the following steps: S210: Generate raw data of a trusted execution report based on the execution result, current state parameters, current channel characteristic parameters, operation timestamp, and charging pile identifier; S220. Digitally sign the original data using the private key of the security module; S230: Encrypt the signed original data using the session key negotiated with the remote monitoring platform to obtain a trusted execution report including an operation timestamp and a charging pile identifier.

[0038] During secure communication with a charging station, the raw data for a trusted execution report is generated based on the execution result, current state parameters, current channel characteristic parameters, operation timestamp, and charging station identifier. Specifically, the execution result includes the execution status and detailed parameters of the operation command (such as starting charging, adjusting power, and stopping charging). For example, for a command to start charging, the execution result will record whether charging was successfully initiated, the current charging mode (such as fast or slow charging), the actual output voltage and current values ​​(such as 380V output voltage and 32A current), the charging power (such as 22kW), and the battery response status. The current state parameters are security status data of key physical nodes obtained through physical fingerprint detection. These parameters include the physical characteristic values ​​of each preset node (such as the antenna interface connector and the RF front-end circuit board) and their deviation from the baseline values. For example, the spectrum characteristics of the reflected signal of the antenna interface connector under 60 GHz millimeter wave illumination may be represented as a set of frequency-amplitude pairs: {(59.8 GHz, -42 dBm), (60.0 GHz, -38 dBm), (60.2 GHz, -44 dBm)}, and the Euclidean distance with the stored baseline value is calculated to be 0.05 (indicating a high match).

[0039] The current channel characteristic parameters record the communication channel state obtained through dynamic channel perturbation detection, such as the signal amplitude attenuation curve, phase noise distribution, and multipath delay spread parameters. These parameters can be quantified as a set of discrete sampling points of the channel transfer function H(f) or as characteristic parameters of the channel impulse response h(t). The operation timestamp uses a high-precision time format, typically UTC, with millisecond accuracy. The charging station identifier includes its unique serial number, physical location information (such as GPS coordinates), and device model. This information is organized into a standardized data structure (such as JSON format) to form the raw data for the trusted execution report. The data structure design follows a hierarchical principle, grouping and storing different categories of information to facilitate subsequent processing and verification. In this way, the raw data comprehensively records the complete context of the operation execution, providing a rich evidentiary foundation for security verification and ensuring the integrity and traceability of the trusted execution report.

[0040] The original data is digitally signed using the security module's private key. The charging station integrates a dedicated security module, which can be a physically isolated secure element, trusted platform module, or hardware security module. The security module is tamper-resistant, securely stores key material, and performs cryptographic operations. In practice, an asymmetric key pair is pre-stored in the security module. The private key never leaves the security module, while the public key is registered with the remote monitoring platform during the charging station initialization phase. The digital signing process begins by pre-processing the original data, typically including normalization (to ensure data format consistency) and computing a data digest. The data digest is calculated using a secure hash algorithm (such as SHA-256), which maps raw data of any length to a fixed-length hash value. For example, for raw data in JSON format, normalization is first performed (such as removing extraneous whitespace and sorting by field name), followed by a SHA-256 hash calculation to produce a 256-bit (32-byte) digest. The security module then signs this digest using its stored private key. Signature algorithms typically employ the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA, such as using the P-256 curve) or RSA-PSS (such as using a 2048-bit key). These algorithms offer high security and computational efficiency. Taking ECDSA as an example, the signing process involves selecting a random number k, calculating the point kG (G being the base point of the elliptic curve), and then calculating the signature value (r, s) using the private key, message digest, and random number. The signature result is typically encoded in DER or ASN.1 format and appended to the original data. The entire signing process is completed within the security module, and the private key remains within the secure boundary, preventing external exposure. Even if the charging station's main processor is compromised, an attacker cannot obtain the private key or forge the signature. This hardware-based signing mechanism ensures the unforgeability and non-repudiation of the trusted execution report. Any tampering with the original data will cause signature verification to fail, thus guaranteeing the authenticity and integrity of the report.

[0041] The signed raw data is encrypted using the session key negotiated with the remote monitoring platform, resulting in a trusted execution report that includes the operation timestamp and the charging station's identity. In practical applications, a secure communication session needs to be established between the charging station and the remote monitoring platform, typically achieved through a key agreement protocol. Common key agreement methods include protocols based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange (such as ECDHE) or pre-shared key (PSK) schemes. In an ECDHE-based implementation, the charging station and the platform each generate a temporary public-private key pair. After exchanging public keys, both parties can independently calculate the same shared key. This process can be represented as follows: the charging station generates private key a and public key A = aG, while the platform generates private key b and public key B = bG. After the public keys are exchanged, the charging station calculates K = aB = abG, and the platform calculates K = bA = bAG, resulting in the same shared key K. To enhance security, this shared key is often input into a key derivation function (KDF) along with other contextual information (such as the identities of both parties and a session nonce) to generate the actual session key used for encryption. Session keys are typically renewed per session, or after predetermined intervals (such as 24 hours) to limit the useful life of a single key.

[0042] The encryption process uses a symmetric encryption algorithm, such as AES-GCM. Taking AES-GCM as an example, the encryption process requires a session key K (typically 128 or 256 bits), an initialization vector IV (typically 96 bits and different for each encryption), the data to be encrypted (the original data after signing), and optional additional authentication data AAD (such as the plaintext portion of the operation timestamp and charging station identifier). The encryption result consists of the ciphertext and an authentication tag (typically 128 bits), which verifies the integrity of the ciphertext. The final trusted execution report contains the encrypted data, authentication tag, initialization vector, and necessary metadata (such as the encryption algorithm identifier used). The operation timestamp and charging station identifier are typically included in plaintext in the report header, facilitating preliminary processing by the remote monitoring platform without first decrypting the entire report. This design protects sensitive information while providing the necessary processability, enabling the platform to efficiently route and manage large amounts of report data.

[0043] This implementation method realizes the security protection of the entire process from data collection, signature to encryption. By structured integration of multi-dimensional information such as execution results, physical state parameters, channel characteristic parameters, etc., a rich content and sufficient evidence original data set is created, providing a comprehensive basis for security assessment. The digital signature operation performed by the hardware security module ensures the authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation of the report, and effectively prevents data tampering and forgery. The encryption mechanism based on dynamic session keys ensures the confidentiality of data during transmission and resists eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks. While ensuring high security, this solution achieves a balance between computing and communication efficiency, enabling charging piles to safely report their operating status and safety status to the remote monitoring platform in an untrusted network environment, providing a solid guarantee for the safe operation of smart grids and electric vehicle charging infrastructure.

[0044] In one implementation of this embodiment, the charging pile is integrated with a 5G module or a 4G module, and the communication link is established through a 5G network or a 4G network.

[0045] In this embodiment, the communication function is integrated into an independent hardware unit inside the charging pile. The communication module can be a 5G / 4G module with a standard M.2 interface or mini PCIe interface, or it can be an industrial-grade LGA package module that is directly soldered to the main control board of the charging pile. Taking the 5G module as an example, it integrates core components such as baseband processor, RF transceiver, power amplifier, filter, etc. The baseband processor is responsible for digital signal processing, including channel encoding and decoding, modulation and demodulation, encryption and decryption, etc. The RF transceiver converts the digital baseband signal into a RF signal, or converts the received RF signal into a digital baseband signal; the power amplifier increases the power of the transmitted signal to ensure that the signal can be transmitted to a sufficiently long distance; the filter filters out unnecessary frequency bands to reduce interference.

[0046] In terms of physical implementation, 5G modules support multiple frequency bands, including sub-6GHz (such as 3.5GHz and 2.6GHz) and millimeter wave bands (such as 28GHz and 39GHz). Charging piles can select the appropriate frequency band for communication based on their deployment environment and network coverage. The 5G module communicates with the charging pile's main control system via standard interfaces (such as USB, UART, and PCIe), exchanging control commands and data.

[0047] Establishing a communication link over a 5G or 4G network is essential for achieving secure remote communication for charging stations. In practical applications, the charging station must first complete network registration and access. Upon powering on, the integrated 5G / 4G module automatically searches for available base station signals in the surrounding area and selects the optimal base station for connection based on factors such as signal strength and network quality. The connection process follows the standard cellular network access procedure, including synchronization, random access, authentication, and network attachment. During the authentication phase, the module uses the IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity), authentication key K, and algorithm identifier stored on the internal SIM card (physical SIM card or eSIM) to perform a two-way authentication with the operator's authentication center, ensuring that only legitimate devices can access the network. Once authentication is successful, the network assigns an IP address to the charging station and establishes a data channel. In 5G networks, charging stations can select different network slices based on service requirements, such as enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), ultra-reliable low-latency communications (URLLC), or massive machine-type communications (mMTC). For critical control instructions, URLLC slicing can be selected to ensure the real-time and reliability of communication; for daily monitoring data, mMTC slicing can be selected to optimize the use of network resources.

[0048] After establishing a network connection, the charging station establishes an end-to-end secure channel with the remote monitoring platform. This is typically achieved using TLS (Transport Layer Security) or DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security), which provide encryption, integrity protection, and authentication. During the TLS handshake, the charging station and the platform exchange certificates, verify each other's identities, and negotiate encryption parameters. To mitigate network fluctuations and base station handovers, the communication link implements automatic reconnection and session recovery mechanisms. When a network outage is detected, the module attempts to reconnect and, upon success, resumes the previous secure session without requiring a complete re-authentication and key negotiation process. In the event of network congestion, the communication module adjusts data transmission strategies based on service priorities to ensure timely delivery of critical instructions. This establishes a secure, reliable, and efficient communication link between the charging station and the remote monitoring platform, providing a solid foundation for subsequent business interactions.

[0049] This implementation method builds a secure remote communication system by integrating 5G / 4G communication modules into charging piles and establishing communication links based on cellular mobile networks. Compared with traditional wired connections or local wireless networks, 5G / 4G networks provide wider coverage, higher mobility support, and stronger anti-interference capabilities, enabling charging piles to be deployed in various complex environments and maintain stable connections. In particular, the low latency, high reliability, and large connection characteristics of 5G technology provide technical support for remote real-time control, status monitoring, and safety protection of charging piles. This cellular network-based communication solution lays a solid foundation for the intelligent and networked operation of charging infrastructure, significantly improving the quality and safety of electric vehicle charging services.

[0050] In one implementation of this embodiment, the charging pile establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal based on the trusted execution report, including the following steps: S410: The charging pile receives the secure communication credential returned by the remote monitoring platform, wherein the secure communication credential is generated by the remote monitoring platform based on a security assessment result of the trusted execution report; S420: The charging pile stores the secure communication credential and performs identity authentication based on the secure communication credential when establishing a communication connection with the electronic terminal to obtain an identity authentication result; S430: The charging pile negotiates a communication key with the electronic terminal based on the identity authentication result, and establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal based on the negotiated communication key.

[0051] After the charging station sends the trusted execution report to the remote monitoring platform, the platform conducts a comprehensive security assessment of the report. This assessment process includes verifying the digital signature, checking physical fingerprint status parameters, analyzing channel characteristic parameters, and evaluating the operation execution results. Based on the assessment results, the platform generates a secure communication credential, essentially a digital certificate or token containing multiple key pieces of information. This credential typically uses an X.509 certificate format or a JSON WebToken (JWT) structure. It contains fields such as the charging station identifier, validity period (typically a few hours to a few days), authorization level (such as full access, monitoring only, or limited control), scope of operational permissions, and the platform's digital signature. During credential generation, the platform dynamically adjusts the validity period and scope of permissions based on the assessed security level. For example, if the physical fingerprint status parameters show a minor anomaly but are within an acceptable range, the platform may issue a credential with limited permissions and a shorter validity period. If everything is normal, a full-featured credential with a longer validity period will be issued. The credential is transmitted over an established encrypted channel with the charging station to ensure secure transmission. After receiving the credential, the charging station verifies its validity, including checking the signature, confirming whether the credential has expired, and verifying whether the charging station identifier in the credential matches. This step establishes a trust relationship between the charging station and the remote monitoring platform, providing a reliable trust anchor for subsequent secure communication with the electronic terminal.

[0052] The charging station stores the secure communication credentials and performs identity authentication based on them when establishing a communication connection with the electronic terminal. This is a critical step in ensuring communication security. After receiving the secure communication credentials, the charging station stores them in a secure storage area, such as a secure element, trusted platform module, or hardware security module. These secure storage areas are tamper-resistant, protecting against physical and software attacks and preventing unauthorized access or modification of the credentials. During storage, the credentials may be encrypted, with the encryption key accessible only within the security module. When an electronic terminal (such as a maintenance worker's handheld device, a user's smartphone, or other charging device) attempts to establish a connection with the charging station, the charging station initiates the identity authentication process. This authentication process typically uses a challenge-response mechanism. The charging station first generates a random challenge value (such as a 128-bit random number) and sends it to the electronic terminal. The electronic terminal then signs the challenge value using its private key and sends the signature along with its identity certificate to the charging station. The charging station uses the stored secure communication credentials as a trust anchor to verify the electronic terminal's certificate chain. The verification process includes checking the certificate's digital signature, confirming that the certificate has not expired, verifying whether the certificate has been revoked, and confirming that the permission declaration in the certificate meets the current operational requirements. The charging station also verifies the electronic terminal's signature on the challenge value to confirm that it holds the private key stated in the certificate. The authentication result includes whether the authentication is successful, the electronic terminal's identity information, and the authorization level. Through this strict credential-based authentication mechanism, the charging station can effectively prevent unauthorized devices from accessing it, ensuring that only legitimate, authorized terminals can establish communication connections with it.

[0053] The charging pile negotiates a communication key with the electronic terminal based on the identity authentication result, and establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal based on the negotiated communication key. After successful identity authentication, the charging pile and the electronic terminal need to establish an encrypted communication channel to protect the sensitive data subsequently exchanged. The key negotiation process usually uses the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol or its elliptic curve variants. These protocols enable the two parties to securely negotiate a shared key over an insecure channel. In the ECDHE implementation, the charging pile and the electronic terminal each generate a temporary public-private key pair. After exchanging public keys, both parties can independently calculate the same shared key. To enhance security, the results of identity authentication are incorporated into the negotiation process. For example, the identity information of both parties and the random number used in the authentication process are used as input to the key derivation function to ensure that the key is tightly bound to the current session context.

[0054] Specifically, the negotiated original shared key is typically not used directly for encryption. Instead, it is used through a key derivation function (KDF) to generate multiple session keys for different purposes, such as encryption keys, integrity protection keys, and initialization vectors. After the session keys are generated, the two parties establish a secure communication channel, typically using TLS (Transport Layer Security) or a similar protocol. Within this secure channel, all communication data is encrypted and authenticated to prevent eavesdropping and tampering. Once the secure channel is established, the charging station controls the functions and data accessible to the electronic terminal based on the authorization level determined by the identity authentication results. For example, a maintenance terminal with full administrative privileges may be allowed access to all functions, while a user's smartphone may only be allowed to view the charging status and control the charging process. Through this refined identity authentication-based permission control, combined with strong key negotiation and secure channel protection, the charging station can flexibly support interaction requirements with different types of terminals while ensuring security.

[0055] This implementation method establishes a trust foundation based on dynamic security assessment by receiving secure communication credentials issued by a remote monitoring platform, enabling the charging pile to adjust its communication strategy according to the real-time security status. The secure storage and use of credentials provide a reliable trust anchor for subsequent identity authentication, effectively preventing access by unauthorized devices. Strict identity authentication based on a challenge-response mechanism ensures that only legitimate and authorized terminals can establish a connection with the charging pile. Secure key negotiation and communication channel establishment through modern cryptographic protocols ensure the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of data transmission, allowing the charging pile to safely interact with various terminal devices in an open and complex network environment, effectively resisting network attacks such as eavesdropping, tampering, replay and man-in-the-middle, and providing a solid guarantee for the safe operation of electric vehicle charging infrastructure.

[0056] In one implementation manner of this embodiment, the secure communication credential includes at least one of a temporary session key, a digital certificate, or a one-time token, and the secure communication credential has a preset validity period.

[0057] Secure communication credentials, including at least one of a temporary session key, a digital certificate, or a one-time token, serve as the core trust material for establishing secure communication between the charging station and the electronic terminal. A temporary session key is a symmetric encryption key, typically 128, 192, or 256 bits in length, dynamically generated by the remote monitoring platform based on the current session context and security assessment results. This key is created using a pseudo-random number generation algorithm, ensuring that each session uses a unique key. Even if the previous session key is compromised, the security of the current or future sessions will not be affected.

[0058] A digital certificate is an identity credential based on a public key infrastructure (PKI) and typically uses the X.509v3 format. The certificate contains fields such as the charging station's public key, identity information (such as serial number, model, and manufacturer), certificate validity period, certificate authority (CA) information, certificate usage restrictions, and the CA's digital signature. Digital certificates can be used for two-way authentication, allowing the charging station to prove its identity to the electronic terminal and also verify the identity of the electronic terminal.

[0059] A one-time token is a lightweight, temporary credential, typically formatted as a JSON Web Token (JWT) or similar format. It contains a charger identifier, a timestamp, a random challenge value, a permission statement, and the platform's digital signature. One-time tokens are designed to be used only once and expire immediately, significantly reducing the risk of credential replay attacks.

[0060] In practice, remote monitoring platforms will select the appropriate credential type or combine multiple credentials based on the sensitivity of the operation and security requirements. For example, for highly sensitive operations (such as firmware updates), a digital certificate and a one-time token might be used simultaneously; for routine operations (such as status queries), only a temporary session key might be used. This flexible credential mechanism strikes a good balance between security and efficiency, providing the appropriate level of protection for different scenarios.

[0061] Secure communication credentials have a preset validity period and are an important security mechanism to prevent the credentials from being abused in the long term. For temporary session keys, the validity period is usually short, ranging from a few minutes to a few hours. For example, a session key for charging control may be set to a validity period of 30 minutes, which means that after 30 minutes, even if the key is not used, it will automatically expire and need to be renegotiated. The validity period of a session key is usually implemented through a timer, which starts when the key is generated and is automatically marked as invalid after the preset time is reached. The validity period of a digital certificate is usually a few days to a few months. The secure communication credential explicitly contains two timestamp fields: the effective time and the expiration time, and the format follows the UTC time standard.

[0062] This implementation method supports multiple credential types such as temporary session keys, digital certificates, and one-time tokens. It can select the most appropriate authentication method based on the security requirements and resource constraints of different scenarios to achieve the optimal balance between security and efficiency. Temporary session keys provide efficient symmetric encryption capabilities, digital certificates support reliable identity authentication, and one-time tokens ensure that operations are non-replayable. The preset validity period mechanism further enhances security and significantly reduces the risk of credentials being stolen, replayed, or brute-forced by limiting the valid time window of the credentials. It not only effectively protects the remote communication security of the charging pile, but also provides a solid guarantee for the safe operation of the entire electric vehicle charging infrastructure, enabling it to maintain a high level of security and reliability in a complex and changing network environment.

[0063] In one implementation of this embodiment, the charging pile negotiates a communication key with the electronic terminal based on the identity authentication result, and establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal based on the negotiated communication key, including the following steps: S610: When the identity authentication result is authentication passed, the charging pile generates a random value and sends the random value to the electronic terminal; S620: The charging pile receives a response value generated by the electronic terminal based on the random value and the stored private key of the electronic terminal; S630: The charging pile verifies the validity of the response value, and after the verification is passed, executes a key exchange protocol with the electronic terminal to generate a communication key; S640: The charging pile establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal through the communication key.

[0064] After the charging station completes initial authentication of the electronic terminal, it needs to further verify the terminal's actual possession of the private key and prepare the necessary random materials for subsequent key exchange. A random number generator is used to generate random values, ensuring sufficient entropy and unpredictability. In practical implementations, the charging station can use a certified software pseudo-random number generator. The random value may include multiple components, such as a challenge random number, a temporary session identifier, and a timestamp. These components are formatted into a specific data structure, using ASN.1, DER encoding, or a simple binary format. After the random value is generated, the charging station sends it to the electronic terminal via the previously established initial secure channel. During transmission, the random value may be appended with metadata, such as the charging station's identification information, a list of supported cryptographic algorithms, and the protocol version number. By generating and sending random values, the charging station provides the necessary randomness for subsequent key exchange, effectively preventing replay and prediction attacks.

[0065] The charging pile receives a response value generated by the electronic terminal based on the random value and the stored private key of the electronic terminal, which is used to verify the authenticity of the terminal identity. After the electronic terminal receives the random value sent by the charging pile, it will use its securely stored private key to perform cryptographic operations on the random value to generate a response value. This process usually uses a digital signature algorithm, such as ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) or RSA-PSS (RSA with probabilistic signature scheme). Taking ECDSA as an example, the electronic terminal first uses a secure hash algorithm (such as SHA-256) to calculate the hash value H of the random value, and then uses the private key d and the random number k to calculate the signature (r, s). G is a base point on the elliptic curve, and kG means that point G is subjected to k elliptic curve addition operations to obtain another point on the elliptic curve. The x coordinate is extracted from the calculated point kG, and this x coordinate is modulo n to obtain r. In other words, r is the x coordinate of point kG modulo n. , G is the base point of the elliptic curve, and n is the order of the elliptic curve. The generated response value contains the signature (r, s) and possible additional information, such as the terminal's public key certificate, supported encryption algorithms, and protocol parameters. This information is encoded in a standard format, such as ASN.1 DER, and sent back to the charging station. In this way, the electronic terminal proves to the charging station that it holds the private key corresponding to its claimed identity without directly exposing the private key itself. This effectively prevents identity impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0066] The charging pile verifies the validity of the response value, and after the verification is passed, it executes the key exchange protocol with the electronic terminal to generate the communication key. After the charging pile receives the response value from the electronic terminal, it first needs to verify its validity. For responses based on digital signatures, the charging pile uses the public key of the terminal to verify whether the signature is valid. Taking ECDSA as an example, the charging pile calculates , , , then calculate the point (x, y) = u1·G + u2·Q, where Q is the endpoint's public key. If x mod n equals r, the signature is valid. The verification process also includes checking that the timestamp is within the permitted range to prevent replay attacks and verifying the validity of the endpoint's certificate chain, including checking whether the certificate has been revoked.

[0067] After verification, the charging station and the electronic terminal execute a key exchange protocol, which can be the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol or its elliptic curve variant (ECDHE). In ECDHE, the charging station generates a temporary private key a and the corresponding public key A=a·G, and the electronic terminal generates a temporary private key b and the corresponding public key B=b·G. After the two parties exchange public keys, the charging station calculates a shared key K=a·B=a·b·G, and the terminal calculates the same K=b·A=b·a·G. To enhance security, the shared key K is typically not used directly as the communication key. Instead, it is input into a key derivation function (KDF) and, along with the previously exchanged random value and the identities of both parties, derives the actual communication key. For example, HKDF (HMAC-based key derivation function) is used: communication key = HKDF(K||random value||identity information). This method ensures that even if the temporary key of a session is cracked, it will not affect the security of other sessions, thus achieving forward secrecy.

[0068] After obtaining the communication key, the charging station needs to establish a secure channel. This can be accomplished by implementing a secure transport layer protocol, such as TLS (Transport Layer Security), DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security), or a customized security protocol. In a TLS-based implementation, the communication key is used to generate multiple working keys, including encryption keys, message authentication code (MAC) keys, initialization vectors (IVs), and so on. For example, the derived communication key K and different context strings can be used to generate keys for different purposes through HKDF: encryption key = HKDF(K, key, 32), MAC key = HKDF(K, mackey, 32).

[0069] Once a secure channel is established, all data transmitted through it is encrypted and authenticated. Encryption typically uses a symmetric encryption algorithm, such as AES-GCM. The secure channel also implements message sequence numbers and replay protection. Each message has a unique sequence number. The receiver checks the continuity and validity of the sequence number and rejects replayed messages. To address network instability, the secure channel includes a session resumption mechanism, allowing the secure channel to be quickly reestablished after a brief disconnection without having to re-perform the full authentication and key exchange process.

[0070] This implementation method implements strict verification of the identities of both communicating parties, effectively preventing identity impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks. The key exchange protocol based on Diffie-Hellman or elliptic curve cryptography ensures the secure generation of communication keys, and can establish secure shared keys even in an insecure network environment, and achieves perfect forward secrecy. The secure communication channel established by adopting modern symmetric encryption and authentication algorithms provides comprehensive protection for data confidentiality, integrity and authenticity, and can resist various network attacks such as eavesdropping, tampering, and replay, thus building a highly secure and reliable communication system. It ensures the secure transmission of charging control instructions, prevents grid instability, equipment damage or safety accidents that may be caused by malicious attacks, and provides a solid guarantee for the safe operation of electric vehicle charging networks.

[0071] In one implementation of this embodiment, the steps of generating a secure communication credential by the remote monitoring platform include the following: S710. The remote monitoring platform receives the trusted execution report sent by the charging pile, decrypts the trusted execution report using the session key negotiated with the charging pile, and verifies the digital signature of the trusted execution report to obtain the current state parameters and current channel characteristic parameters. S720: The remote monitoring platform compares the current state parameters with pre-stored baseline physical fingerprint data of the key physical nodes corresponding to the charging pile to obtain a comparison result. S730: The remote monitoring platform compares the current channel characteristic parameter with a preset channel health status threshold to obtain a comparison result. S740: The remote monitoring platform performs a comprehensive assessment of the execution environment credibility and communication link security of the charging pile based on the comparison result, the comparison result, and the execution result of the operation instruction, and obtains a comprehensive assessment result. S750: When the comprehensive evaluation results meet the preset security standards, the remote monitoring platform generates a secure communication credential.

[0072] Figure 3 The flowchart of the remote monitoring platform generating secure communication credentials provided by the embodiment of the present application is shown. Figure 3 The remote monitoring platform includes an authentication module, an evaluation engine and a credential generator. The authentication module is used to process steps S710 to S730, the evaluation engine is used to process step S740, and the credential generator is used to process step S750.

[0073] The remote monitoring platform receives trusted execution reports from charging piles, which are transmitted to the platform's secure communication interface via the 5G / 4G network. These reports are structured data packets containing the results of the charging pile's execution of the operation instruction, the current state parameters of the physical fingerprint of key nodes in the communication link, the acquired current channel characteristic parameters, the charging pile's unique identifier, and the operation timestamp.

[0074] After receiving the report, the platform first decrypts the report using the session key pre-negotiated with the charging station. The session key is usually dynamically generated at the beginning of each communication session based on an asymmetric key exchange protocol to ensure that even if the key of a session is leaked, it will not affect the security of other sessions. After decryption, the platform uses the public key of the charging station to verify the digital signature of the report to ensure that the report is indeed from the claimed charging station and has not been tampered with. The verification process uses a standard digital signature verification algorithm, such as ECDSA or RSA-PSS, which is selected according to the specific signature algorithm used by the internal security module of the charging station. After verification, the platform extracts the current status parameters and current channel characteristic parameters in the report in preparation for subsequent comparison and evaluation. If the verification fails, the platform will immediately terminate the processing flow and record the possible security incident.

[0075] The remote monitoring platform accurately compares the current status parameters parsed from the trusted execution report with pre-stored baseline physical fingerprint data for the charging pile's key physical nodes. This baseline physical fingerprint data is a reference dataset collected in a secure state after the charging pile's initial deployment or maintenance and stored in the platform's security database. The comparison process uses similarity analysis of multidimensional feature vectors, with specific implementations employing algorithms such as Euclidean distance, cosine similarity, or Mahalanobis distance. The comparison result is typically expressed as a similarity score or difference value, along with a Boolean match / mismatch judgment. If a significant change in the physical fingerprint is detected (e.g., a difference value exceeding a preset threshold), this may indicate that the charging pile's key physical nodes have been physically tampered with, illegally replaced, or subjected to strong interference. The comparison result will be marked as abnormal; otherwise, it will be marked as normal.

[0076] The remote monitoring platform compares current channel characteristic parameters with preset channel health thresholds across multiple dimensions to assess the real-time security status of the communication link. Current channel characteristic parameters are a set of quantitative indicators obtained through dynamic channel perturbation detection technology, including the perturbation signal's amplitude attenuation change rate, phase jitter characteristic values, signal arrival time deviation, multipath effect characteristics, and key parameters of the channel impulse response. The preset channel health thresholds are reference values ​​derived from statistical analysis of extensive historical data. The comparison process utilizes a multi-indicator weighted scoring mechanism, evaluating each characteristic parameter individually before calculating an overall score. If the deviation exceeds a preset value (e.g., 0.8), the indicator is considered abnormal. The comparison results include detailed scores for each indicator and a comprehensive assessment. If multiple indicators are abnormal or the combined score falls below the security threshold, the comparison result is marked as abnormal, indicating that the communication link may be subject to a man-in-the-middle attack, signal hijacking, or interference. Otherwise, the comparison result is marked as normal.

[0077] Based on the comparison and comparison results obtained in the preceding steps, as well as the command execution results, the remote monitoring platform conducts a comprehensive assessment of the charging pile's execution environment trustworthiness and communication link security. This assessment utilizes a multi-factor weighted decision model, assigning different weights to each result based on its security importance. For example, the physical fingerprint comparison result might be weighted 40%, the channel feature comparison result 30%, and the command execution result 30%. The assessment engine first analyzes the command execution results to check whether they conform to expected behavior patterns. For example, whether a charging start command actually causes a change in the charging state, and whether the change parameters (such as voltage and current) are within reasonable ranges. The physical fingerprint comparison results are then combined with the channel feature comparison results to construct a security confidence score. The assessment process also considers temporal context, such as the consistency of the current operation with historical operations and the appropriateness of the timing of command execution. Furthermore, external factors such as geographic location, network conditions, and current threat intelligence are incorporated into the comprehensive assessment. The assessment engine uses methods such as fuzzy logic and Bayesian networks to handle various uncertainties, ultimately generating a comprehensive assessment score between 0 and 100. Based on a preset threshold (e.g., 75 points), the results are classified as highly credible, credible, suspicious, or untrustworthy. The assessment also includes a detailed risk analysis report, identifying the specific type and severity of potential security threats.

[0078] If the comprehensive assessment results meet the pre-set security standards, the remote monitoring platform generates a secure communication credential, which serves as a trust anchor for subsequent communication sessions. These pre-set security standards typically require a comprehensive assessment score of trusted or highly trusted (e.g., a score ≥ 75) and no critical anomalies in key security indicators. A secure communication credential is a digital proof document consisting of several key components: a randomly generated unique session identifier, a validity period (typically short, such as 30 minutes or a specific operation duration), the charging station's identity, a description of the scope of authorized operations, a platform issuance timestamp, and the platform's digital signature. The credential generation process first creates a data structure containing this information and then digitally signs it with the platform's private key to ensure the credential's integrity and non-repudiation. For high-security operations, the credential also embeds a one-time challenge code generated based on the current session context for dynamic verification in subsequent interactions. The generated credential is sent to the charging station via a secure channel. Upon receipt, the charging station verifies its validity and includes it in subsequent communications to prove its trustworthiness and authorization to operate. If the comprehensive assessment results fail to meet the preset security standards, the platform will refuse to generate credentials and may trigger security warning mechanisms, such as notifying administrators, recording abnormal events, restricting charging pile functions, or requiring manual intervention.

[0079] This implementation effectively solves the physical layer security threats faced by remote communications of charging piles. By combining physical fingerprint technology with dynamic channel perturbation detection, it is possible to detect the physical integrity and purity of the communication link in real time, and effectively identify possible physical tampering, signal hijacking and interference attacks. Based on strict digital signature verification and multi-factor weighted evaluation models, the platform can make accurate judgments on the credibility of the execution environment of the charging pile and the security of the communication link, ensuring that secure communication credentials are generated only when high security standards are met. This method based on the dual protection of physical security and cryptography has significantly improved the network security protection capabilities of the charging infrastructure, especially for physical layer attacks that are difficult to deal with by traditional methods. It provides a reliable trust basis for remote operation of charging piles and is of great value to ensuring the safe and stable operation of the electric vehicle charging network.

[0080] In one implementation of this embodiment, the charging pile performs secure communication with the electronic terminal through a secure communication channel, including the following steps: S810: The charging pile receives a charging control instruction sent by the electronic terminal through a secure communication channel, and performs a corresponding charging operation according to the received charging control instruction, wherein the charging control instruction includes at least one of charging parameter setting, charging status query, or charging process control; S820. The charging pile collects status data of the charging process in real time and sends the status data to the electronic terminal through a secure communication channel, including at least one of charging voltage, current, power, remaining time or abnormal alarm.

[0081] The charging pile receives charging control instructions sent by the electronic terminal through a secure communication channel, which is an encrypted communication link established based on the aforementioned secure communication credentials. The secure communication channel uses TLS 1.3 or higher protocols to ensure end-to-end communication security and prevent data from being eavesdropped or tampered with during transmission. When the electronic terminal needs to operate the charging pile, it will first send a charging control instruction through this secure communication channel. The charging control instruction uses a structured JSON or XML format and contains fields such as instruction type, parameter value, timestamp, instruction sequence number, and a digital signature based on the private key of the electronic terminal. After receiving the instruction, the charging pile first verifies the validity of the instruction's digital signature and timestamp to prevent replay attacks and forged instructions. After verification, the charging pile's instruction processing module will parse the instruction content and identify the specific instruction type.

[0082] Charging control instructions mainly include three categories: charging parameter setting (such as setting the charging power upper limit, charging voltage mode, charging time limit, etc.), charging status query (such as current charging status, charged amount, charging time, etc.) and charging process control (such as starting charging, pausing charging, terminating charging, adjusting charging power, etc.). For charging parameter setting instructions, the charging pile will first verify whether the parameters are within the safe allowable range. For example, check whether the set charging power exceeds the maximum rated power of the charging pile or the maximum allowable charging power of the connected vehicle. For charging status query instructions, the charging pile will obtain relevant data from the internal status management system and format it into a standard response. For charging process control instructions, the charging pile will determine whether the instruction is executable based on the current status. For example, the start charging instruction can only be executed if the vehicle is connected and authenticated.

[0083] After parsing and verifying the charging control instructions, the charging pile's charging control module executes the corresponding charging operation. During all operations, the charging control module monitors various safety parameters in real time, such as temperature, voltage fluctuations, and grounding status. If any anomalies are detected, safety measures are immediately implemented and an abnormal event record is generated.

[0084] The charging pile collects real-time status data during the charging process. This data is transmitted to the central processing unit via an internal high-speed bus (such as CAN or RS-485). After digital filtering, outlier detection, and data fusion, a complete status data set is generated. This status data primarily includes charging voltage (real-time output voltage value and fluctuation range), current (real-time charging current and its stability indicator), power (current charging power and its deviation from the set value), remaining time (estimated completion time based on the current charging rate and battery status), and abnormality alarms (such as overtemperature warnings, voltage anomalies, and communication interruptions). This data is continuously updated according to a preset sampling period (typically ranging from 100ms to 1s, dynamically adjusted based on parameter importance and rate of change).

[0085] After preprocessing and formatting, the status data is sent to the electronic terminal via the previously established secure communication channel. To improve transmission efficiency, the charging station differentially encodes the data, transmitting only the modified data fields, significantly reducing bandwidth usage. After receiving this status data, the electronic terminal can update the user interface in real time to display the charging progress, estimated completion time, and various parameters. For any detected abnormal conditions, the charging station will immediately generate a high-priority alarm message containing information such as the abnormality type, severity, and recommended action, ensuring that users or management systems can respond promptly to potential safety risks.

[0086] This implementation method can accurately understand and safely execute various charging control instructions while maintaining effective defenses against abnormal operations. A high-precision, multi-dimensional status data acquisition system, combined with a prioritized, real-time data transmission strategy, ensures that electronic terminals can obtain comprehensive, timely, and accurate information about the charging process, providing a solid foundation for user decision-making and system monitoring. This method, combining secure communication with real-time monitoring, not only improves the safety and reliability of the charging process, but also enhances user experience and system transparency. It is of great value in building a reliable and efficient electric vehicle charging infrastructure, and lays the technical foundation for future smart grid and vehicle-grid interactive applications.

[0087] Reference Figure 2 , an embodiment of the present application further provides a communication system, including: Electronic terminals, deployed with remote monitoring platforms; and Charging pile, connected to the electronic terminal.

[0088] The present application also provides a charging pile, including: a communication device for establishing a communication connection with an electronic terminal; a memory configured to store instructions; and The processor is configured to: In response to the communication signal, obtaining current state parameters of one or more key physical nodes preset on the communication link between the remote monitoring platform; In response to an operation instruction issued by the remote monitoring platform, the system acquires current characteristic parameters of the communication channel by bidirectionally or unidirectionally transmitting and receiving a perturbation detection signal of a preset mode in the communication channel between the system and the remote monitoring platform; Obtain the execution result and operation timestamp of the operation instruction, and generate a trusted execution report including the operation timestamp and charging pile identification based on the execution result, current state parameters and current channel characteristic parameters; A secure communication channel is established with the electronic terminal based on the trusted execution report, and secure communication is performed with the electronic terminal through the secure communication channel.

[0089] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present application may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Furthermore, the present application may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to magnetic disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0090] The present application is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that each process and / or block in the flowchart and / or block diagram and the combination of processes and / or blocks in the flowchart and / or block diagram can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0091] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to work in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0092] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operational steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing the instructions executed on the computer or other programmable device for implementing the process. Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A step that specifies a function in one or more boxes.

[0093] In a typical configuration, a computing device includes one or more processors (CPUs), input / output interfaces, network interfaces, and memory.

[0094] The memory may include non-permanent memory in a computer-readable medium, random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory in the form of read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM. The memory is an example of a computer-readable medium.

[0095] Computer-readable media includes both permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media that can be implemented using any method or technology for information storage. Information can be computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase-change RAM (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technologies, compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disc (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other non-transmission media that can be used to store information that can be accessed by a computing device. As defined herein, computer-readable media does not include transitory computer-readable media, such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.

[0096] It should also be noted that the terms include, comprise, or any other variations thereof are intended to encompass non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, commodity, or apparatus that includes a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not explicitly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, commodity, or apparatus. In the absence of further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "includes a..." does not preclude the presence of additional identical elements in the process, method, commodity, or apparatus that includes the element.

[0097] The above are merely embodiments of the present application and are not intended to limit the present application. For those skilled in the art, the present application may have various changes and variations. Any modifications, equivalent replacements, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present application should all be included within the scope of the claims of the present application.

Claims

1. A charging pile remote security communication method, characterized in that: Applied to a communication system, the communication system includes a charging pile and an electronic terminal, and the electronic terminal is deployed with a remote monitoring platform. The method includes: In response to the communication signal, the charging pile obtains current status parameters of one or more key physical nodes preset on the communication link between the charging pile and the remote monitoring platform; In response to the operation instruction issued by the remote monitoring platform, the charging pile obtains the current characteristic parameters of the communication channel by bidirectionally or unidirectionally sending and receiving a preset perturbation detection signal in the communication channel between the charging pile and the remote monitoring platform; The charging pile obtains the execution result and operation timestamp of the operation instruction, and generates a trusted execution report including the operation timestamp and the charging pile identification based on the execution result, current state parameters and current channel characteristic parameters; The charging pile establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal based on the trusted execution report, and performs secure communication with the electronic terminal through the secure communication channel.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The charging pile includes a security module that generates a trusted execution report including an operation timestamp and a charging pile identifier based on the execution result, current state parameters, and current channel characteristic parameters, including: Generates raw data of a trusted execution report based on the execution result, current state parameters, current channel characteristic parameters, operation timestamp, and charging pile identifier; Digitally sign the original data using the private key of the security module; The signed original data is encrypted using the session key negotiated with the remote monitoring platform to obtain a trusted execution report including the operation timestamp and charging pile identification.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The charging pile is integrated with a 5G module or a 4G module, and the communication link is established through the 5G network or the 4G network.

4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The charging pile establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal based on the trusted execution report, including: The charging pile receives the secure communication credential returned by the remote monitoring platform, wherein the secure communication credential is generated by the remote monitoring platform based on the security assessment result of the trusted execution report; The charging pile stores the secure communication credentials and performs identity authentication based on the secure communication credentials when establishing a communication connection with the electronic terminal to obtain an identity authentication result; The charging pile negotiates a communication key with the electronic terminal based on the identity authentication result, and establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal based on the negotiated communication key.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The secure communication credential includes at least one of a temporary session key, a digital certificate, or a one-time token, and the secure communication credential has a preset validity period.

6. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The charging pile negotiates a communication key with the electronic terminal based on the identity authentication result, and establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal based on the negotiated communication key, including: When the identity authentication result is authentication passed, the charging pile generates a random value and sends the random value to the electronic terminal; The charging pile receives a response value generated by the electronic terminal based on the random value and the stored private key of the electronic terminal; The charging pile verifies the validity of the response value, and after the verification is passed, executes the key exchange protocol with the electronic terminal to generate a communication key; The charging pile establishes a secure communication channel with the electronic terminal through the communication key.

7. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The steps for the remote monitoring platform to generate secure communication credentials include: The remote monitoring platform receives the trusted execution report sent by the charging pile, decrypts the trusted execution report using the session key negotiated with the charging pile, and verifies the digital signature of the trusted execution report to obtain the current state parameters and current channel characteristic parameters; The remote monitoring platform compares the current state parameters with the pre-stored baseline physical fingerprint data of the key physical nodes corresponding to the charging pile to obtain the comparison results; The remote monitoring platform compares the current channel characteristic parameters with the preset channel health status threshold to obtain a comparison result; Based on the comparison results, comparison results, and execution results of the operation instructions, the remote monitoring platform conducts a comprehensive assessment of the execution environment credibility and communication link security of the charging pile, and obtains a comprehensive assessment result; When the comprehensive assessment results meet the preset security standards, the remote monitoring platform generates secure communication credentials.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The charging pile performs secure communication with the electronic terminal through a secure communication channel, including: The charging pile receives a charging control instruction sent by the electronic terminal through a secure communication channel, and performs a corresponding charging operation according to the received charging control instruction, wherein the charging control instruction includes at least one of charging parameter setting, charging status query or charging process control; The charging pile collects status data during the charging process in real time and sends the status data to the electronic terminal through a secure communication channel.

9. A communication system, applied to the charging pile remote secure communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that: include: Electronic terminals are equipped with remote monitoring platforms; as well as Charging pile, connected to the electronic terminal.

10. A charging pile, characterized in that: include: a communication device for establishing a communication connection with an electronic terminal; a memory configured to store instructions; as well as The processor is configured to: In response to the communication signal, obtaining current state parameters of one or more key physical nodes preset on the communication link between the remote monitoring platform; In response to an operation instruction issued by the remote monitoring platform, the system acquires current characteristic parameters of the communication channel by bidirectionally or unidirectionally transmitting and receiving a perturbation detection signal of a preset mode in the communication channel between the system and the remote monitoring platform; Obtain the execution result and operation timestamp of the operation instruction, and generate a trusted execution report including the operation timestamp and charging pile identification based on the execution result, current state parameters and current channel characteristic parameters; A secure communication channel is established with the electronic terminal based on the trusted execution report, and secure communication is performed with the electronic terminal through the secure communication channel.

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