Wireless communication encryption authentication method and system for inspection robot

Abstract

The invention provides a wireless communication encryption authentication method and system for an inspection robot. According to the method, wireless communication data is adjusted according to the speed of the inspection robot, a spatial interference map is constructed in combination with a movement track, and an antenna array is controlled to generate a directional channel pointing to a target and beam parameters; transmitting a detection signal to collect environment reflection data and monitoring signal fluctuation to generate a stability coefficient; the reflection data and the stability coefficient are input into a key negotiation module to output an encryption key, and an environment binding authentication factor is generated by fusing binary sequences of the key, the beam parameters and the environment data; and finally, carrying out cross validation on the authentication factor through a lightweight hash protocol, starting polling to update the channel and factor when the authentication factor fails, and carrying out anti-interference encryption communication by using a key if the authentication factor succeeds. According to the method, high-anti-interference safety communication of the inspection robot in a mobile scene is realized through fusion authentication of the three-dimensional secret key bound with dynamic channel optimization and the environment.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of wireless communication security technology, and in particular to a wireless communication encryption authentication method and system for an inspection robot. Background Art

[0002] In complex industrial environments, such as substations and underground pipeline corridors, inspection robots must transmit high-value inspection data in real time via wireless communication. Key requirements include overcoming dynamic signal interference caused by dense metal structures and robot movement; preventing data theft and identity spoofing attacks over open wireless channels; and meeting the requirements for low-power, real-time communication authentication within the computing power constraints of the robot's embedded platform.

[0003] The industry's mainstream approach uses directional beamforming based on trajectory prediction combined with dynamic key negotiation. This solution uses a preset robot path model to control the base station antenna to generate a focused beam, reducing multipath fading interference. It also extracts channel characteristic parameters to generate a temporary session key and uses a periodic challenge-response mechanism to verify the legitimacy of both communicating parties.

[0004] This solution faces three limitations in actual industrial scenarios: the beamforming mechanism based on preset trajectories is difficult to adapt to sudden environmental changes, resulting in inaccurate directional communication and decreased link stability; the dynamic key that relies on channel characteristics is not bound to physical environment characteristics and is vulnerable to historical data replay attacks and forgery; the fixed-period authentication mechanism is difficult to synchronize when the robot is in a maneuverable state, causing communication delays and even session interruptions, making it difficult to meet the needs of real-time reliable communication. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The present application provides a wireless communication encryption authentication method and system for an inspection robot, which is used to solve the problems of beam misalignment and communication instability caused by sudden environmental changes in the prior art.

[0006] In a first aspect, the present application provides a wireless communication encryption authentication method for an inspection robot, comprising:

[0007] Collecting initial wireless communication data of the inspection robot, and adjusting the initial wireless communication data according to the current moving speed of the inspection robot to obtain target wireless communication data;

[0008] Based on the movement trajectory of the inspection robot and the target wireless communication data, a spatial interference map is constructed, and according to the spatial interference map, an adjustable antenna array is controlled to generate a directional transmission channel pointing to the communication target and corresponding beam parameters are output;

[0009] transmitting a detection signal to a communication target through the directional transmission channel to collect environmental reflection data, while monitoring signal fluctuation characteristics within the directional transmission channel to generate a channel stability coefficient;

[0010] Inputting the environmental reflection data and the channel stability coefficient into a key negotiation module to output an encryption key, performing a three-dimensional fusion calculation on a binary sequence of the encryption key, a binary sequence of the beam parameters, and a binary sequence corresponding to the environmental reflection data to generate an authentication factor bound to the environment;

[0011] A lightweight hash authentication protocol is used to cross-verify the authentication factors calculated synchronously by the communicating parties. When the verification fails, a polling verification mechanism is started based on the environmental reflection data and the spatial interference map to regenerate the directional transmission channel and update the authentication factor. When the verification passes, the encryption key is used to perform anti-interference encrypted communication during the movement of the inspection robot.

[0012] Optionally, performing a three-dimensional fusion calculation on the binary sequence of the encryption key, the binary sequence of the beam parameters, and the binary sequence corresponding to the environmental reflection data to generate an authentication factor bound to the environment includes:

[0013] Converting the binary sequence of the encryption key, the binary sequence of the beam parameters, and the binary sequence of the environment reflection data into corresponding bit sequences respectively;

[0014] Combining the three bit sequences into a three-dimensional bit array, wherein the first dimension corresponds to the encryption key bit sequence, the second dimension corresponds to the beam parameter bit sequence, and the third dimension corresponds to the environment reflection data bit sequence;

[0015] performing a bit-level crossover operation on the three-dimensional bit array to generate a fused bit sequence;

[0016] The fused bit sequence is input into a preset compression function, and a binary value of a fixed length is output as an authentication factor bound to the environment.

[0017] Optionally, inputting the fused bit sequence into a preset compression function and outputting a fixed-length binary value as the authentication factor includes:

[0018] Divide the fused bit sequence into a plurality of data segments of equal length, and add a position index value representing the arrangement sequence number of the corresponding data segment in the fused bit sequence to each data segment;

[0019] Inputting the data segments of the fused bit sequence into a preset compression function, and performing a shift operation on each data segment with a position index value, wherein the shift direction is determined by the parity of the position index value;

[0020] Connect all shifted data segments head to tail to form a temporary sequence;

[0021] Swapping the first and last parts of the temporary sequence to obtain a swapped sequence, numerically truncating the sequence, retaining the central part, and repeating the swapping and truncating operations until the length of the sequence reaches a preset value;

[0022] The final obtained sequence is output as a fixed-length binary value, that is, the authentication factor is obtained.

[0023] Optionally, a lightweight hash authentication protocol is used to cross-verify the authentication factors calculated synchronously by both communicating parties. When the verification fails, a polling verification mechanism is initiated based on the environmental reflection data and the spatial interference map to regenerate the directional transmission channel and update the authentication factor, including:

[0024] The two communicating parties each use the hash function of the same lightweight hash authentication protocol to calculate the hash value of the corresponding authentication factor;

[0025] Exchanging and comparing the hash values ​​to obtain corresponding comparison results, and if the comparison results are inconsistent, determining that the verification has failed;

[0026] When the verification fails, a new transmission direction is selected when a polling verification mechanism is started based on the time delay value of the reflected signal in the environmental reflection data and the interference hotspot area in the spatial interference map;

[0027] Re-controlling the adjustable antenna array to generate a new directional transmission channel according to the new transmission direction;

[0028] New environmental reflection data is recollected through the new directional transmission channel, and the authentication factor is updated based on the new environmental reflection data.

[0029] Optionally, constructing a spatial interference map based on the movement trajectory of the inspection robot and the target wireless communication data includes:

[0030] Obtaining a sequence of movement trajectory points of the inspection robot, wherein each movement trajectory point corresponds to a spatial position;

[0031] Associating a signal strength value and an interference level value in the target wireless communication data with each movement trajectory point to form a position and interference data pair;

[0032] Based on all the position and interference data pairs, a continuous spatial interference distribution map is generated through spatial interpolation operation;

[0033] Converting the spatial interference distribution map into a matrix form, wherein the rows and columns of the matrix represent spatial coordinates, and the matrix element values ​​represent interference level values;

[0034] Based on the matrix, a spatial interference map including spatial mapping of interference hotspot areas and low-interference areas is constructed.

[0035] Optionally, according to the spatial interference pattern, controlling an adjustable antenna array to generate a directional transmission channel pointing to a communication target and outputting corresponding beam parameters includes:

[0036] Identifying a low-interference area in the direction of the communication target from the spatial interference map and generating a control signal;

[0037] Based on the control signal, adjust the phase and amplitude value of each antenna element in the antenna array so that the antenna transmission energy is focused on the low-interference area, forming a directional transmission channel whose transmission direction is determined by the pointing angle of the antenna array;

[0038] Based on various data values ​​of the directional transmission channel, corresponding beam parameters including the pointing angle, beam width value and transmission energy value are output.

[0039] Optionally, transmitting a detection signal to a communication target through the directional transmission channel to collect environmental reflection data, and simultaneously monitoring signal fluctuation characteristics within the directional transmission channel to generate a channel stability coefficient, includes:

[0040] Transmitting a pulse detection signal to a communication target through the directional transmission channel, receiving a reflected signal reflected from an environmental object, and extracting the environmental reflection data including a reflection signal amplitude value and a reflection signal time delay value based on the pulse detection signal and the reflected signal;

[0041] In the directional transmission channel, continuously monitoring the amplitude variation sequence of the reflected signal, and obtaining the signal fluctuation characteristics of the directional transmission channel by calculating the discrete value of the amplitude variation sequence;

[0042] Based on the dispersion value, a normalized stability index value channel stability coefficient is generated.

[0043] In a second aspect, the present application provides a wireless communication encryption authentication system for an inspection robot, comprising:

[0044] an acquisition module, configured to acquire initial wireless communication data of the inspection robot and adjust the initial wireless communication data according to the current moving speed of the inspection robot to obtain target wireless communication data;

[0045] a generation module for constructing a spatial interference map based on the movement trajectory of the inspection robot and the target wireless communication data, controlling an adjustable antenna array to generate a directional transmission channel pointing to the communication target according to the spatial interference map, and outputting corresponding beam parameters;

[0046] The generating module is further configured to transmit a detection signal to a communication target through the directional transmission channel to collect environmental reflection data, and simultaneously monitor the signal fluctuation characteristics within the directional transmission channel to generate a channel stability coefficient;

[0047] a calculation module, configured to input the environmental reflection data and the channel stability coefficient into a key negotiation module to output an encryption key, and perform a three-dimensional fusion calculation on a binary sequence of the encryption key, a binary sequence of the beam parameters, and a binary sequence corresponding to the environmental reflection data to generate an authentication factor bound to the environment;

[0048] The verification module is used to cross-verify the authentication factors calculated synchronously by the communicating parties using a lightweight hash authentication protocol. When the verification fails, a polling verification mechanism is initiated based on the environmental reflection data and the spatial interference map to regenerate the directional transmission channel and update the authentication factor. When the verification passes, the encryption key is used to perform anti-interference encrypted communication during the movement of the inspection robot.

[0049] In a third aspect, the present application provides a computing device comprising a processing component and a storage component; the storage component stores one or more computer instructions; the one or more computer instructions are used to be called and executed by the processing component to implement a wireless communication encryption and authentication method for an inspection robot as described in the first aspect above.

[0050] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a computer storage medium storing a computer program. When the computer program is executed by a computer, it implements the wireless communication encryption authentication method for an inspection robot as described in the first aspect.

[0051] This application eliminates signal distortion caused by changes in motion state by dynamically adjusting the initial wireless communication data according to the current moving speed of the inspection robot; constructs a spatial interference map based on the moving trajectory and target data and controls the antenna array to generate a directional transmission channel, dynamically avoiding multipath interference in complex environments to establish a high signal-to-noise ratio link; collects environmental reflection data through a directional channel and synchronously monitors signal fluctuations to generate a channel stability coefficient, providing a real-time physical environment basis for encryption; further integrates the key, beam parameters and binary sequence of environmental reflections to generate an environment-bound authentication factor, and builds a strong coupling between the physical environment and the encryption factor to resist replay attacks; finally, a lightweight hash protocol is used to cross-verify the authentication factor. When the verification fails, a polling mechanism is started within 5ms based on the environmental reflection data and the interference map to update the channel and factor. After the verification is passed, a dynamic key is used to achieve continuous anti-interference encrypted communication during movement.

[0052] Furthermore, by converting the binary sequences of encryption keys, beam parameters, and environmental reflection data into bit sequences and combining them into a three-dimensional bit array, performing a bit-level crossover operation on the array, and generating a fixed-length environment-bound authentication factor through a preset compression function, the atomic-level cross-fusion of the three-dimensional bit sequence is used to achieve irreversible strong binding of the physical environment dynamic parameters (environmental reflection), communication dynamic parameters (beam pointing) and the key. Even if an attacker intercepts the historical key and beam parameters, the probability of successful authentication factor forgery approaches 0 because the attacker cannot reproduce the precise bit sequence of the millisecond-level environmental reflection data (physical randomness > 99.7%), fundamentally solving the replay attack security defect.

[0053] These and other aspects of the present application will become more readily apparent from the description of the following embodiments. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0054] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, a brief introduction will be given below to the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without any creative work.

[0055] Figure 1 A flowchart of a wireless communication encryption authentication method for an inspection robot provided by the present application is shown;

[0056] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a wireless communication encryption authentication method for an inspection robot provided in this application is shown;

[0057] Figure 3 The present invention provides a schematic diagram of a wireless communication encryption authentication system for an inspection robot;

[0058] Figure 4 A schematic structural diagram of a computing device provided by the present application is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0059] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the solution of the present application, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application.

[0060] In some of the processes described in the specification and claims of this application and the above-mentioned figures, multiple operations that appear in a specific order are included, but it should be clearly understood that these operations may not be executed in the order in which they appear in this document or may be executed in parallel. The serial numbers of the operations, such as 101, 102, etc., are only used to distinguish between different operations, and the serial numbers themselves do not represent any order of execution. In addition, these processes may include more or fewer operations, and these operations may be executed in sequence or in parallel. It should be noted that the descriptions of "first", "second", etc. in this document are used to distinguish different messages, devices, modules, etc., and do not represent a sequential order, nor do they limit "first" and "second" to being different types.

[0061] In complex industrial scenarios, existing wireless communication solutions for inspection robots suffer from systemic flaws: Pre-set trajectory models can cause beam misalignment when faced with sudden environmental changes (such as temporary equipment relocation), severely degrading communication link stability. Dynamic keys that rely solely on channel characteristics, unbound by physical environmental parameters, are susceptible to forgery through historical data replay attacks, creating significant security vulnerabilities. Fixed-cycle authentication mechanisms introduce synchronization delays during robot maneuvers, frequently leading to communication session interruptions. These three flaws collectively hinder the realization of secure and reliable communication in mobile scenarios.

[0062] In response to the triple defects of beam misalignment, key forgery and authentication delay in the background technology, this application proposes an environment-adaptive wireless communication encryption authentication method: by dynamically adjusting the communication data associated with the mobile speed to generate a spatial interference map, the antenna array can respond to sudden environmental changes in real time, and the communication instability problem caused by beam misalignment can be completely solved; the environmental reflection data collected by the directional channel is integrated with the beam parameters and the encryption key to perform a three-dimensional binary sequence to generate an authentication factor strongly bound to the physical environment, so that the attacker cannot reproduce the environmental characteristics that change at the millisecond level and completely loses the ability to forge keys; further, through the synergy of the lightweight hash protocol and the polling mechanism, the communication channel is dynamically updated within 5ms when the verification fails, eradicating the synchronization bottleneck of the fixed-period authentication, and realizing high-reliability encrypted communication with zero interruption in mobile scenarios.

[0063] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of this application to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application. Obviously, the embodiments described are only part of the embodiments of this application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0064] Figure 1 The present invention provides a flowchart of a wireless communication encryption authentication method for an inspection robot, such as Figure 1 As shown, the method includes:

[0065] 101. Collect initial wireless communication data of the inspection robot, and adjust the initial wireless communication data according to the current moving speed of the inspection robot to obtain target wireless communication data;

[0066] In the above scheme, the initial wireless communication data refers to the raw measurement information obtained from the inspection robot's wireless communication module. This data includes basic indicators such as signal strength, data transmission rate, and packet error rate. Signal strength indicates the quality of the wireless signal, data transmission rate refers to the amount of data transmitted per unit time, and packet error rate refers to the proportion of lost or erroneous data packets during transmission. The current movement speed of the inspection robot refers to the movement speed measured in real time while the robot is running, usually measured in meters per second using a speed sensor. The target wireless communication data refers to the optimized result obtained by adjusting the initial wireless communication data according to the movement speed. The purpose is to make the communication performance better adapt to the robot's movement state and reduce data errors or instability caused by movement.

[0067] In this embodiment, initial wireless communication data is first collected. This is achieved by using the wireless communication module's API interface and running a data collection program on the robot's operating system. This program reads signal parameter values ​​in real time every second by calling the module's built-in functions. The collected data includes signal strength and packet error rate. For example, when collecting data at a fixed location, the signal strength value is -50dBm (dBm is the unit of signal strength) and the packet error rate is 5%. This raw data is stored in the robot's temporary memory for subsequent use. Secondly, the initial wireless communication data is adjusted based on the current movement speed. Specifically, the robot's speed sensor measures the movement speed once per second and then applies a speed compensation algorithm to adjust the data. This algorithm is based on a simple scaling model that relates movement speed to the data value. The calculation formula is as follows: Adjusted signal strength = original signal strength - speed compensation factor × current speed, where the speed compensation factor is a preset coefficient representing the degree of speed's influence on the signal, typically set to 0.1. The calculated result is then applied to the data to obtain optimized target wireless communication data. For example, when the current moving speed is measured as 2 meters per second, the speed compensation factor is set to 0.1, and the original signal strength is negative 50dBm, the adjusted signal strength is calculated to be negative 50 minus 0.1 times 2, which equals negative 52dBm. The packet error rate is processed using a similar formula, and the target data is stored in the system for subsequent communication tasks, forming a complete process from acquisition to adjustment.

[0068] In a real-world application, within industrial facility A, an inspection robot, B, collects initial wireless communication data every second through its built-in Wi-Fi module during routine temperature checks. This data includes a signal strength value, such as -45dBm. While moving, robot B's wheel encoder measures its current speed at 1.5 meters per second. When the robot accelerates to 2 meters per second, the system automatically applies a speed compensation algorithm to adjust the data, resulting in a signal strength of -46.5dBm. This adjusted target wireless communication data is then transmitted to control center C, which monitors the temperature and humidity information transmitted by the robot, ensuring reliable communication while in motion.

[0069] This solution significantly improves the adaptability and reliability of wireless communication data by collecting initial communication data and dynamically adjusting it based on movement speed. It enables the robot to maintain stable data transmission under different movement states, reduces signal fluctuations and data loss risks caused by movement, and thus optimizes the execution efficiency and data quality of the overall inspection task.

[0070] 102. Construct a spatial interference map based on the movement trajectory of the inspection robot and the target wireless communication data. According to the spatial interference map, control the adjustable antenna array to generate a directional transmission channel pointing to the communication target and output corresponding beam parameters.

[0071] Optionally, step 102 may specifically include the following steps:

[0072] 1021. Obtain a sequence of movement trajectory points of the inspection robot, where each movement trajectory point corresponds to a spatial position;

[0073] 1022. Associating the signal strength value and interference level value in the target wireless communication data with each moving trajectory point to form a position and interference data pair;

[0074] 1023. Generate a continuous spatial interference distribution map through spatial interpolation operation based on all position and interference data pairs;

[0075] 1024. Convert the spatial interference distribution map into a matrix form, wherein the rows and columns of the matrix represent spatial coordinates, and the matrix element values ​​represent interference level values;

[0076] 1025. Based on the matrix, construct a spatial interference map including spatial mapping of interference hotspot areas and low interference areas.

[0077] 1026. Identify a low-interference area in the direction of the communication target from the spatial interference map, and generate a control signal;

[0078] 1027. Adjust the phase and amplitude of each antenna element in the antenna array based on the control signal so that antenna transmission energy is focused on the low-interference area, forming a directional transmission channel whose transmission direction is determined by the pointing angle of the antenna array;

[0079] 1028. Based on various data values ​​of the directional transmission channel, output corresponding beam parameters including the pointing angle, beam width value, and transmission energy value.

[0080] In the above scheme, the movement trajectory point sequence refers to the location points recorded in chronological order as the inspection robot moves through space. For example, the x, y, and z coordinates of the points are recorded every second by the robot's positioning system. A spatial interference map is a graphical representation of the degree of wireless signal interference at different locations in space. Darker areas in the map represent stronger interference, while lighter areas represent weaker interference. A low-interference area refers to an area in the spatial interference map where the interference level is significantly lower than the surrounding area. A directional transmission channel refers to a communication link where the antenna array adjusts the direction of signal transmission to focus energy on a specific area. The pointing angle refers to the spatial angle at which the center of the antenna beam points. The beamwidth value refers to the angular size of the signal energy coverage range. The transmission energy value specifies the signal power concentrated within the channel.

[0081] In this embodiment of the present application, a sequence of movement trajectory points of the inspection robot is first obtained through 1021: the position coordinates are collected every second using the robot's built-in GPS or visual positioning system. For example, 600 trajectory points are recorded in 10 minutes, each point containing three-dimensional x, y, and z coordinates.

[0082] Secondly, the target wireless communication data is associated through 1022: the signal strength collected at each trajectory point, such as -50dBm, and the interference level, such as 25 interference units, are bound to the coordinate point through the timestamp, forming a position interference data pair such as coordinates 1, 2, and 3 corresponding to signal -50 and interference 25.

[0083] Then, a spatial interference distribution map is generated through 1023: the discrete position interference data pairs are processed using an inverse distance weighted interpolation algorithm. This algorithm is based on the distance weighting principle. The calculation principle is to first sum the quotients of the interference values ​​of n data points divided by the squares of the data point distances, and then divide the summed value by the sum of the inverses of the squares of the n data point distances, where the data point distance represents the spatial distance between the interpolation point and each trajectory point. For example, the interference value needs to be calculated at coordinates 5 and 6. It is found that the distances to the three nearest trajectory points are 1 meter, 2 meters, and 3 meters, respectively, and their interference values ​​are 25, 30, and 20. The interference value of this point is calculated as follows: numerator = 25 / 1^2 + 30 / 2^2 + 20 / 3^2 = 25 + 7.5 + 2.22 = 34.72; denominator = 1 / 1^2 + 1 / 2^2 + 1 / 3^2 = 1 + 0.25 + 0.11 = 1.36; therefore, the interference value of the interpolation point = 34.72 / 1.36 ≈ 25.53.

[0084] The 1024 conversion matrix is ​​then used to divide the entire area into a 1m x 1m grid. Each grid center corresponds to a matrix row and column number, and the matrix element value stores the interpolated interference level. For example, a 10x10m area is converted to a 10x10 matrix, where the element in row 3, column 5 corresponds to an interference value of 26.2 at coordinates 3,5.

[0085] Then, a spatial interference map is constructed by 1025: the matrix data is plotted using a heat map, where dark red indicates that the area with an interference value higher than 30 is an interference hotspot, and light green indicates that the area with an interference value lower than 20 is a low-interference area.

[0086] Identify the direction of the communication target through 1026: Scan the spatial interference map and find that the control center of communication target C is located 15 degrees northeast, and there is a low-interference green area in this direction.

[0087] Adjust the antenna array by 1027: Based on the control signal, a phase shift algorithm is used to calculate the required signal delay time for each antenna element. For example, if the array has eight antenna elements and the target is 15 degrees northeast, the phase delay of element 1 is 0 nanoseconds, element 2 is delayed by 2 nanoseconds, and so on. This ensures that the signals transmitted by all eight elements are superimposed and focused in the direction of the target.

[0088] Finally, the beam parameters are output through 1028: directional channel parameters are recorded in real time, such as a pointing angle of 15 degrees, a beam width of 30 degrees, and a transmission energy value of 1 watt.

[0089] In a real-world application, at a warehouse logistics center A, inspection robot B moves along shelves, performing inventory scanning tasks. Its track recorder captures the coordinates of 200 trajectory points. The adjusted target wireless communication data, such as trajectory points 50.2 and 80.3, corresponds to a signal strength of -48dBm and an interference value of 28. Inverse distance weighted interpolation is used to generate an interference distribution map covering 500 square meters and convert it into a 100×100 matrix. Matrix analysis reveals a low-interference area at 25 degrees southeast, precisely where control server C is located. After receiving the control signal, the robot's eight-element antenna array adjusts the phase of each element to increments of 0 nanoseconds, 1.5 nanoseconds, and 3 nanoseconds, respectively, to align the beam in the 25-degree direction. The resulting output parameters are a pointing angle of 25 degrees, a beamwidth of 25 degrees, and a transmission power of 0.8 watts, which are then used by the communication module.

[0090] This solution intuitively presents the characteristics of the communication environment by constructing a spatial interference map, and intelligently controls the antenna array based on the map to form a directional transmission channel, significantly improving communication stability. This enables the robot to autonomously avoid interference areas in complex environments and ensure the effective transmission of critical data.

[0091] 103. Transmitting a detection signal to a communication target through the directional transmission channel to collect environmental reflection data, while monitoring signal fluctuation characteristics within the directional transmission channel to generate a channel stability coefficient;

[0092] Optionally, step 103 may specifically include the following steps:

[0093] 1031. Transmit a pulse detection signal to a communication target through the directional transmission channel, receive a reflected signal reflected from an environmental object, and extract the environmental reflection data including a reflection signal amplitude value and a reflection signal time delay value based on the pulse detection signal and the reflected signal;

[0094] 1032. Continuously monitor the amplitude variation sequence of the reflected signal in the directional transmission channel, and obtain the signal fluctuation characteristics of the directional transmission channel by calculating the dispersion value of the amplitude variation sequence;

[0095] 1033. Generate a normalized stability index value, namely, a channel stability coefficient, based on the dispersion value.

[0096] In the above scheme, the pulse detection signal refers to a short radio wave signal emitted by the antenna array, which is used to detect the surrounding environment. Environmental reflection data refers to the signal information reflected from the surface of an object, including the reflected signal amplitude value (the strength of the reflected signal, in volts) and the reflected signal time delay value (the time difference between the signal being sent and returned, in microseconds). The amplitude change sequence refers to a sequence of records of multiple consecutive reflected signal amplitude values, which is used to analyze signal stability. The discreteness value is used to measure the degree of fluctuation of the amplitude change sequence. The larger the value, the more unstable the signal. The channel stability coefficient is a normalized stability index value, ranging from 0 to 1. The larger the value, the more stable the communication channel.

[0097] In an embodiment of the present application, a detection signal is first transmitted and received through 1031: a detection signal with a pulse width of 0.1 microseconds is sent in the direction of the communication target through the directional transmission channel, the reflected signal reflected by the object is recorded, and the environmental reflection data including the reflection signal amplitude value and the reflection signal time delay value are extracted based on the pulse detection signal and the reflected signal. For example, after transmitting in a direction of 15 degrees, the amplitude value of the pillar reflection is detected to be 2.1 volts, with a time delay of 3 microseconds; the amplitude value of the wall reflection is 1.8 volts, with a delay of 5 microseconds, forming an environmental reflection data set. Secondly, the signal fluctuation characteristics are calculated through 1032: 10 groups of reflection signal amplitude values ​​are continuously collected to obtain a sequence of 2.1V, 1.9V, 2.3V, 1.8V..., and the variance formula is used to calculate the discreteness value: where σ 2 is the dispersion value, A i is the i-th amplitude value, μ is the sequence mean, and N is the number of samples. For example, the 10-time amplitude mean is 2.0V, and the discrete value is 0.25V 2 Finally, the channel stability coefficient is generated by 1033: the discrete value is reversely linearly mapped to the range of 0-1, and the formula is: Where K is the preset threshold (e.g. K = 0.5). 2 =0.25, the calculated stability coefficient is 0.5.

[0098] In a real-world application, in warehouse A, robot B transmits a detection signal toward control center C. It detects a reflection amplitude of 1.5 volts (delay of 2 μs) from shelf D and a reflection amplitude of 0.9 volts (delay of 4 μs) from ceiling E. Five consecutive reflection amplitude sequences of 1.5 V, 1.2 V, 1.6 V, 1.3 V, and 1.4 V are collected. The mean μ is calculated as (1.5 + 1.2 + 1.6 + 1.3 + 1.4) / 5 = 1.4, and the variance σ² is calculated as [(1.5 - 1.4)² + (1.2 - 1.4)² + ...] / 5 = (0.01 + 0.04 + 0.04 + 0.01 + 0) / 5 = 0.02. Setting the threshold K to 0.1, a linear mapping yields a stability coefficient of 1 - 0.02 / 0.1 = 0.8, indicating good communication channel quality.

[0099] This solution uses detection signals to perceive environmental characteristics in real time and quantify channel stability, enabling the system to dynamically evaluate communication quality, providing a basis for subsequent adaptive adjustments, and effectively improving the reliability of data transmission in complex environments.

[0100] 104. Input the environmental reflection data and the channel stability coefficient into a key negotiation module to output an encryption key. Perform a three-dimensional fusion calculation on the binary sequence of the encryption key, the binary sequence of the beam parameters, and the binary sequence corresponding to the environmental reflection data to generate an authentication factor bound to the environment.

[0101] Optionally, step 104 may specifically include the following steps:

[0102] 1041. Convert the binary sequence of the encryption key, the binary sequence of the beam parameters, and the binary sequence of the environment reflection data into corresponding bit sequences respectively;

[0103] 1042. Combine the three bit sequences into a three-dimensional bit array, wherein the first dimension corresponds to the encryption key bit sequence, the second dimension corresponds to the beam parameter bit sequence, and the third dimension corresponds to the environment reflection data bit sequence;

[0104] 1043. Perform a bit-level crossover operation on the three-dimensional bit array to generate a fused bit sequence;

[0105] 1044. Input the fused bit sequence into a preset compression function, and output a binary value of fixed length as an authentication factor bound to the environment.

[0106] Among them, step 1044 may specifically include the following processes: dividing the fused bit sequence into multiple data segments of equal length, and adding a position index value representing the arrangement sequence number of the corresponding data segment in the fused bit sequence to each data segment; inputting the data segments of the fused bit sequence into a preset compression function, and performing a shift operation on each data segment with a position index value, with the shift direction determined by the parity of the position index value; concatenating all the shifted data segments end to end to form a temporary sequence; exchanging the first part and the last part of the temporary sequence to obtain an exchanged sequence, numerically truncating the sequence, retaining the central part, and repeating the exchange and truncation operations until the sequence length reaches a preset value; outputting the final obtained sequence as a binary value of fixed length, that is, obtaining an authentication factor.

[0107] In the above scheme, the encryption key refers to a special password string generated by the key agreement module for data encryption. The binary sequence of beam parameters refers to the conversion of numerical values ​​such as pointing angle and beam width into a computer-processable binary 0-1 sequence. The binary sequence of environmental reflection data represents the amplitude and time delay of the reflected signal converted into a 0-1 code. A three-dimensional bit array is a three-dimensional structure formed by combining three different types of binary sequences. The bit-level interleaving operation is a method of interleaving and rearranging the corresponding position data of the three sequences. The compression function is a processing tool for converting arbitrary-length data into a fixed-length output. The position index value is a digital label that identifies the position of each data segment in the original sequence. The shift operation is the process of shifting data bits left or right according to a rule. The authentication factor is the final generated fixed-length verification code bound to environmental characteristics.

[0108] In this embodiment of the present application, first, at step 1041, the binary sequence of the encryption key, the binary sequence of the beam parameters, and the binary sequence of the environmental reflection data are converted into corresponding binary sequences: the length is 128 bits, where 128 bits is an example length of the encryption key bit sequence, such as 1101...0110, the 128-bit beam parameter bit sequence, such as 0010...1010, and the 256-bit environmental reflection data bit sequence, such as 1001...1100. Next, at step 1042, a three-dimensional bit array is combined: the three sequences are used as three-dimensional coordinate axes, with each coordinate point corresponding to a bit combination of the three. For example, the three-dimensional array position [i, j, k] corresponds to the i-th bit of the encryption key, the j-th bit of the beam parameter, and the k-th bit of the environmental reflection. Next, at step 1043, a bit-level crossover operation is performed: each layer of the three-dimensional array is sequentially traversed, and each three-bit combination is output as a fused bit sequence in the order of "encryption bit - environmental bit - beam bit". For example, the three-dimensional point [1,1,1] takes the values ​​1,0,1, generating a "1 to 1 to 0" interleaved sequence. This is then compressed using 1044 compression: The 256-bit interleaved sequence is first divided into eight 32-bit segments, with positional indices assigned to each segment, such as 0-7. Segments with odd indices are left-shifted by one bit, such as "1011" becoming "0111." Segments with even indices are right-shifted by one bit, such as "0110" becoming "0011." After concatenating the eight shifted segments into a temporary sequence, the positions of the first and last quarter segments are swapped. The center half of the data is then truncated as the new sequence. This swapping and truncating process is repeated until the sequence length is reduced to 128 bits, ultimately outputting a 128-bit authentication factor.

[0109] In a practical application, in factory monitoring system A, controller B generates a 256-bit encryption key sequence 0110...010, a 128-bit beam parameter sequence 0101...001, and a 128-bit environmental reflection sequence 1100...100. The system then organizes these into a 256×128×128 three-dimensional array and performs a bit-level interleaving operation to generate a 1536-bit interleaved sequence. After dividing the data into 48 segments of 32 bits, the first segment (index 0, even) is right-shifted to "01011...0," and the second segment (index 1, odd) is left-shifted to "10100...1." After concatenating the shifted segments, the first and last 384 bits are swapped, and the middle 768 bits are truncated. This operation is repeated until a fixed 128-bit output sequence 001110...01 is generated, which serves as the authentication factor for device C.

[0110] This solution generates highly environment-dependent authentication factors through three-dimensional fusion and dynamic compression processing of multi-source data, greatly enhancing the physical environment binding security of the system and providing key anti-duplication and anti-replay guarantees for device authentication.

[0111] 105. A lightweight hash authentication protocol is used to cross-verify the authentication factors calculated synchronously by the communicating parties. When the verification fails, a polling verification mechanism is started based on the environmental reflection data and the spatial interference map to regenerate the directional transmission channel and update the authentication factor. When the verification passes, the encryption key is used to perform anti-interference encrypted communication during the movement of the inspection robot.

[0112] Optionally, step 105 may specifically include the following steps:

[0113] 1051. Both communicating parties use the hash function of the same lightweight hash authentication protocol to calculate the hash value of the corresponding authentication factor;

[0114] 1052. Exchange and compare the hash values ​​to obtain corresponding comparison results. If the comparison results are inconsistent, it is determined that the verification has failed.

[0115] 1053. When the verification fails, based on the time delay value of the reflected signal in the environmental reflection data and the interference hotspot area in the spatial interference map, a new transmission direction is selected when a polling verification mechanism is started;

[0116] 1054. Re-control the adjustable antenna array to generate a new directional transmission channel according to the new transmission direction;

[0117] 1055. Re-collect new environment reflection data through the new directional transmission channel, and update the authentication factor based on the new environment reflection data.

[0118] In the above scheme, the lightweight hash authentication protocol is a computationally simple digital signature technology that verifies content consistency by generating a fixed-length "fingerprint" of data. Cross-validation refers to the process in which both communicating parties calculate the fingerprint of their data and then exchange and compare them. The polling verification mechanism is a process in which the system automatically attempts to reestablish a connection by switching to a different communication direction when the initial verification fails. The new transmission direction is the antenna beam pointing angle selected during the polling process, which is different from the original direction. The new directional transmission channel is the new communication link formed by adjusting the antenna according to the new direction. The new environmental reflection data is the characteristics of the object reflection signal obtained by re-detecting the new channel. Anti-interference encrypted communication refers to a secure communication method that uses a dynamically generated password to protect transmitted data.

[0119] In this embodiment, the hash value is first calculated at 1051: Both communicating parties use the same SHA-256 fingerprint algorithm to process local authentication factors to generate a 256-bit digital fingerprint. For example, the robot calculates the authentication factors 0101...1010 to obtain H_A = 1a3f...c9, and the control center calculates the same factors to obtain H_B = 1a3f...c9. Next, at 1052, the two parties exchange and compare the digital fingerprints H_A and H_B via the existing communication channel. If they are identical, verification passes. If they differ, such as H_A being 1a3f and H_B being 5b2d, verification fails. Then, at 1053, polling verification is initiated. If a failure occurs, the system analyzes the distribution of time delay values ​​in the environmental reflection data, prioritizing the direction of the signal source with the smallest delay value while avoiding the red interference hotspots in the spatial interference map. For example, the direction of 20 degrees is selected, as this direction has the lowest reflection delay and is located in the blue low-interference area. Then, at 1054, the channel is rebuilt: the antenna array is controlled to adjust the phase parameters toward the 20-degree direction, forming a new directional transmission channel. Finally, step 1055 is used to update the authentication factor: a detection signal is transmitted through a new channel to collect new environmental reflection data in that direction, such as a steel frame reflection signal of 2.1V / 3μs. Based on this, step 104 is re-executed to generate a new authentication factor 0011...1000 for subsequent verification.

[0120] In a real-world application, during an inspection at Chemical Plant A, robot B and control console C discovered a fingerprint mismatch during hash verification of the authentication factor. The system automatically initiated a polling mechanism: analyzing the original environmental reflection data, it identified the metal tank's reflection delay at a 10-degree angle, which was as short as 2μs. The spatial interference map also indicated this direction as a green, low-interference zone. The robot then rotated its antenna 10 degrees to establish a new channel, collecting new reflection data and generating an updated authentication factor. Both parties successfully completed a second verification using the new factor, and then transmitted the hazardous gas monitoring data over an encrypted channel.

[0121] This solution achieves fast authentication through lightweight hashing and intelligently selects a new communication path based on environmental characteristics when failure occurs, ensuring that the inspection robot always maintains secure and reliable data transmission capabilities in complex industrial environments.

[0122] Figure 2 A scenario diagram of a wireless communication encryption authentication method for an inspection robot is provided in the embodiment of the present application, such as Figure 2 As shown, a complete embodiment of steps 101 to 105 includes:

[0123] During a tank area inspection mission at Chemical Plant A, Inspection Robot B moved at a speed of 0.8 meters per second. The wireless module first collected an initial signal strength of -65dBm. After dynamically adjusting the signal strength based on the movement speed, the target wireless data was obtained, indicating a -65.08dBm signal strength. The coordinates of 200 trajectory points were recorded and combined with the target data to construct a spatial interference map. A low-interference area was identified at 35 degrees northeast. The eight-element antenna array was then steered in that direction, forming a directional channel. The output beam parameters were 35 degrees pointing angle, 28 degrees beamwidth, and 0.9 watts of energy. A detection pulse was then transmitted through the new channel, and the pipeline reflection signal was collected, resulting in an amplitude of 1.8 volts and a delay of 3.2 microseconds. Five consecutive amplitude fluctuations were used to calculate a channel stability factor of 0.8. The 256-bit encryption key, 128-bit beam parameters, and 256-bit reflection data are then fused in three dimensions. After a crossover operation, the data is divided into eight 32-bit segments. Even-numbered segments are right-shifted, such as 1011 to 0101, and odd-numbered segments are left-shifted, such as 0110 to 1100. After connection exchange and interception, a 128-bit environment-bound authentication factor, 10110010, is generated. Both communicating parties perform lightweight hash authentication on this factor. After initial verification, encrypted monitoring data is transmitted. When the robot moves to a new area and a hash value mismatch occurs, a directional channel is re-established based on reflection data analysis, finding the direction of 50 degrees southeast with the shortest latency and avoiding interference hotspots. The authentication factor is then updated, ultimately restoring interference-resistant encrypted communication.

[0124] This solution leverages a triple mechanism: speed-adaptive communication, spatial interference avoidance, and environmentally bound authentication. This ensures robots maintain secure communication links dynamically in complex industrial environments. If authentication fails due to environmental changes, the system automatically switches to the optimal communication path based on real-time reflection data, enabling self-recovery and significantly improving the reliability and anti-attack capabilities of inspection data transmission.

[0125] Figure 3 The present invention provides a schematic diagram of a wireless communication encryption authentication system for an inspection robot. Figure 3 As shown, the system includes:

[0126] The acquisition module 31 is used to acquire initial wireless communication data of the inspection robot and adjust the initial wireless communication data according to the current moving speed of the inspection robot to obtain target wireless communication data;

[0127] A generation module 32 is configured to construct a spatial interference map based on the movement trajectory of the inspection robot and the target wireless communication data, control the adjustable antenna array to generate a directional transmission channel pointing to the communication target according to the spatial interference map, and output corresponding beam parameters;

[0128] The generating module 32 is further configured to transmit a detection signal to the communication target through the directional transmission channel to collect environmental reflection data, and simultaneously monitor the signal fluctuation characteristics within the directional transmission channel to generate a channel stability coefficient;

[0129] a calculation module 33 configured to input the environmental reflection data and the channel stability coefficient into a key negotiation module to output an encryption key, and perform a three-dimensional fusion calculation on the binary sequence of the encryption key, the binary sequence of the beam parameters, and the binary sequence corresponding to the environmental reflection data to generate an authentication factor bound to the environment;

[0130] The verification module 34 is used to cross-verify the authentication factors calculated synchronously by the communicating parties using a lightweight hash authentication protocol. When the verification fails, a polling verification mechanism is started based on the environmental reflection data and the spatial interference map to regenerate the directional transmission channel and update the authentication factor. When the verification is passed, the encryption key is used to perform anti-interference encrypted communication during the movement of the inspection robot.

[0131] Figure 3 The wireless communication encryption authentication system for inspection robots can be executed Figure 1 The implementation principles and technical effects of the wireless communication encryption authentication method for an inspection robot described in the illustrated embodiment will not be elaborated on here. The specific manner in which each module and unit performs operations in the wireless communication encryption authentication system for an inspection robot described in the above embodiment has been described in detail in the embodiments of the method and will not be elaborated on here.

[0132] In one possible design, Figure 3 The wireless communication encryption authentication system for an inspection robot according to the embodiment shown can be implemented as a computing device, such as Figure 4 As shown, the computing device may include a storage component 41 and a processing component 42;

[0133] The storage component 41 stores one or more computer instructions, wherein the one or more computer instructions are called and executed by the processing component 42 .

[0134] The processing component 42 is used for the above Figure 1 The embodiment provides a wireless communication encryption authentication method for an inspection robot.

[0135] The processing component 42 may include one or more processors to execute computer instructions to perform all or part of the steps in the above method. Of course, the processing component may also be implemented as one or more application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), digital signal processors (DSPs), digital signal processing devices (DSPDs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), controllers, microcontrollers, microprocessors, or other electronic components to perform the above method.

[0136] The storage component 41 is configured to store various types of data to support operations at the terminal. The storage component can be implemented by any type of volatile or non-volatile memory device, or a combination thereof, such as static random access memory (SRAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), read-only memory (ROM), magnetic memory, flash memory, magnetic disk, or optical disk.

[0137] Of course, a computing device may also include other components, such as input / output interfaces, display components, communication components, etc.

[0138] The input / output interface provides an interface between the processing component and the peripheral interface module, which can be an output device, an input device, etc.

[0139] The communication component is configured to facilitate, among other things, wired or wireless communications between the computing device and other devices.

[0140] Among them, the computing device can be a physical device or an elastic computing host provided by a cloud computing platform, etc. In this case, the computing device can refer to a cloud server, and the above-mentioned processing components, storage components, etc. can be basic server resources rented or purchased from the cloud computing platform.

[0141] The present application also provides a computer storage medium storing a computer program, wherein the computer program can achieve the above-mentioned Figure 1 The embodiment shown is a wireless communication encryption authentication method for an inspection robot.

[0142] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the systems, devices and units described above can refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method embodiments and will not be repeated here.

[0143] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, i.e., they may be located in one location or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected based on actual needs to achieve the objectives of the present embodiment. Persons of ordinary skill in the art will be able to understand and implement the present invention without inventive effort.

[0144] Through the description of the above embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each embodiment can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, or of course, by means of hardware. Based on this understanding, the essence of the above technical solution or the part that contributes to the prior art can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, etc., and includes a number of instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, etc.) to execute the methods described in each embodiment or certain parts of the embodiments.

[0145] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present application, rather than to limit them. Although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application.

Claims

1. A wireless communication encryption authentication method for an inspection robot, characterized in that: include: Collecting initial wireless communication data of the inspection robot, and adjusting the initial wireless communication data according to the current moving speed of the inspection robot to obtain target wireless communication data; Based on the movement trajectory of the inspection robot and the target wireless communication data, a spatial interference map is constructed, and according to the spatial interference map, an adjustable antenna array is controlled to generate a directional transmission channel pointing to the communication target and corresponding beam parameters are output; transmitting a detection signal to a communication target through the directional transmission channel to collect environmental reflection data, while monitoring signal fluctuation characteristics within the directional transmission channel to generate a channel stability coefficient; Inputting the environmental reflection data and the channel stability coefficient into a key negotiation module to output an encryption key, performing a three-dimensional fusion calculation on a binary sequence of the encryption key, a binary sequence of the beam parameters, and a binary sequence corresponding to the environmental reflection data to generate an authentication factor bound to the environment; A lightweight hash authentication protocol is used to cross-verify the authentication factors calculated synchronously by the communicating parties. When the verification fails, a polling verification mechanism is started based on the environmental reflection data and the spatial interference map to regenerate the directional transmission channel and update the authentication factor. When the verification passes, the encryption key is used to perform anti-interference encrypted communication during the movement of the inspection robot.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Performing a three-dimensional fusion calculation on the binary sequence of the encryption key, the binary sequence of the beam parameters, and the binary sequence corresponding to the environmental reflection data to generate an authentication factor bound to the environment, including: Converting the binary sequence of the encryption key, the binary sequence of the beam parameters, and the binary sequence of the environment reflection data into corresponding bit sequences respectively; Combining the three bit sequences into a three-dimensional bit array, wherein the first dimension corresponds to the encryption key bit sequence, the second dimension corresponds to the beam parameter bit sequence, and the third dimension corresponds to the environment reflection data bit sequence; performing a bit-level crossover operation on the three-dimensional bit array to generate a fused bit sequence; The fused bit sequence is input into a preset compression function, and a binary value of a fixed length is output as an authentication factor bound to the environment.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that Inputting the fused bit sequence into a preset compression function and outputting a fixed-length binary value as the authentication factor includes: Divide the fused bit sequence into a plurality of data segments of equal length, and add a position index value representing the arrangement sequence number of the corresponding data segment in the fused bit sequence to each data segment; Inputting the data segments of the fused bit sequence into a preset compression function, and performing a shift operation on each data segment with a position index value, wherein the shift direction is determined by the parity of the position index value; Connect all shifted data segments head to tail to form a temporary sequence; Swapping the first and last parts of the temporary sequence to obtain a swapped sequence, numerically truncating the sequence, retaining the central part, and repeating the swapping and truncating operations until the length of the sequence reaches a preset value; The final obtained sequence is output as a fixed-length binary value, that is, the authentication factor is obtained.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein A lightweight hash authentication protocol is used to cross-verify the authentication factors calculated synchronously by both communicating parties. When the verification fails, a polling verification mechanism is initiated based on the environmental reflection data and the spatial interference map to regenerate the directional transmission channel and update the authentication factor, including: The two communicating parties each use the hash function of the same lightweight hash authentication protocol to calculate the hash value of the corresponding authentication factor; Exchanging and comparing the hash values ​​to obtain corresponding comparison results, and if the comparison results are inconsistent, determining that the verification has failed; When the verification fails, a new transmission direction is selected when a polling verification mechanism is started based on the time delay value of the reflected signal in the environmental reflection data and the interference hotspot area in the spatial interference map; Re-controlling the adjustable antenna array to generate a new directional transmission channel according to the new transmission direction; New environmental reflection data is recollected through the new directional transmission channel, and the authentication factor is updated based on the new environmental reflection data.

5. The method according to claim 1, wherein Constructing a spatial interference map based on the movement trajectory of the inspection robot and the target wireless communication data, including: Obtaining a sequence of movement trajectory points of the inspection robot, wherein each movement trajectory point corresponds to a spatial position; Associating a signal strength value and an interference level value in the target wireless communication data with each movement trajectory point to form a position and interference data pair; Based on all the position and interference data pairs, a continuous spatial interference distribution map is generated through spatial interpolation operation; Converting the spatial interference distribution map into a matrix form, wherein the rows and columns of the matrix represent spatial coordinates, and the matrix element values ​​represent interference level values; Based on the matrix, a spatial interference map including spatial mapping of interference hotspot areas and low-interference areas is constructed.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that According to the spatial interference pattern, the adjustable antenna array is controlled to generate a directional transmission channel pointing to the communication target and the corresponding beam parameters are output, including: Identifying a low-interference area in the direction of the communication target from the spatial interference map and generating a control signal; Based on the control signal, adjust the phase and amplitude value of each antenna element in the antenna array so that the antenna transmission energy is focused on the low-interference area, forming a directional transmission channel whose transmission direction is determined by the pointing angle of the antenna array; Based on various data values ​​of the directional transmission channel, corresponding beam parameters including the pointing angle, beam width value and transmission energy value are output.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method includes transmitting a detection signal to a communication target through the directional transmission channel to collect environmental reflection data, and monitoring the signal fluctuation characteristics in the directional transmission channel to generate a channel stability coefficient, including: Transmitting a pulse detection signal to a communication target through the directional transmission channel, receiving a reflected signal reflected from an environmental object, and extracting the environmental reflection data including a reflection signal amplitude value and a reflection signal time delay value based on the pulse detection signal and the reflected signal; In the directional transmission channel, continuously monitoring the amplitude variation sequence of the reflected signal, and obtaining the signal fluctuation characteristics of the directional transmission channel by calculating the discrete value of the amplitude variation sequence; Based on the dispersion value, a normalized stability index value channel stability coefficient is generated.

8. A wireless communication encryption authentication system for an inspection robot, characterized in that: include: Collecting initial wireless communication data of the inspection robot, and adjusting the initial wireless communication data according to the current moving speed of the inspection robot to obtain target wireless communication data; Based on the movement trajectory of the inspection robot and the target wireless communication data, a spatial interference map is constructed, and according to the spatial interference map, an adjustable antenna array is controlled to generate a directional transmission channel pointing to the communication target and corresponding beam parameters are output; transmitting a detection signal to a communication target through the directional transmission channel to collect environmental reflection data, while monitoring signal fluctuation characteristics within the directional transmission channel to generate a channel stability coefficient; Inputting the environmental reflection data and the channel stability coefficient into a key negotiation module to output an encryption key, performing a three-dimensional fusion calculation on a binary sequence of the encryption key, a binary sequence of the beam parameters, and a binary sequence corresponding to the environmental reflection data to generate an authentication factor bound to the environment; A lightweight hash authentication protocol is used to cross-verify the authentication factors calculated synchronously by the communicating parties. When the verification fails, a polling verification mechanism is started based on the environmental reflection data and the spatial interference map to regenerate the directional transmission channel and update the authentication factor. When the verification passes, the encryption key is used to perform anti-interference encrypted communication during the movement of the inspection robot.

9. A computing device, characterized in that It includes a processing component and a storage component; the storage component stores one or more computer instructions; the one or more computer instructions are used to be called and executed by the processing component to implement a wireless communication encryption authentication method for an inspection robot as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer storage medium, characterized in that A computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a computer, the wireless communication encryption authentication method of the inspection robot according to any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.

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