Universal specified participant threshold secret sharing method in honesty environment
By specifying a participant threshold for secret sharing, medical data is divided into two sub-secrets and uses additive homomorphism and block secret sharing schemes to solve the eavesdropping threat and access control problems in the medical data sharing process, thus achieving secure data sharing and flexible access.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202510817671.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-06-18
- Publication Date
- 2025-11-11
AI Technical Summary
Medical data is vulnerable to eavesdropping during sharing, and encryption schemes are difficult to effectively protect data security and achieve flexible access control due to limitations in key management and computing power.
By adopting a designated participant threshold secret sharing method, the master secret is divided into two sub-secrets and additive homomorphism and block secret sharing scheme are used to ensure that the designated participant can recover the master secret, thereby achieving fine-grained access control and secure data sharing.
It enables secure sharing of medical data among multiple participants, ensures data privacy protection and prevents leakage, provides flexible access control, and improves data security and the accuracy of access control management.
Smart Images
Figure CN120934744A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of secret sharing, and more particularly to a threshold secret sharing method for designated participants applicable in an honest environment. Background Technology
[0002] In modern healthcare systems, data security is receiving increasing attention, as these systems rely more heavily on electronic medical records and health records to improve diagnostic and treatment efficiency and quality. However, this also exposes healthcare systems to serious security threats, with frequent data breaches and abuse of access rights, severely threatening patient privacy and system security. Therefore, the issue of medical data sharing and access has gradually become a focal point in the industry. Achieving efficient sharing while ensuring data security is not only crucial for improving the quality and efficiency of healthcare services but also fundamental to protecting patient privacy and the reputation of medical institutions. The security of medical data is directly related to patient health and personal privacy. Balancing data sharing and data security has become a critical issue that healthcare systems urgently need to address. Access control is central to solving this problem. Healthcare institutions need to establish more refined access control mechanisms to ensure that employees can only access data relevant to their responsibilities, thereby effectively protecting patient privacy and enabling data sharing to ensure the smooth operation of healthcare services.
[0003] Unencrypted data is vulnerable to eavesdropping during the sharing of medical data. Encryption schemes often face challenges due to limitations in key management and computing power when dealing with massive amounts of data. Summary of the Invention
[0004] The purpose of this invention is to provide a universal method for threshold secret sharing among designated participants in an honest environment.
[0005] The technical solution adopted in this invention is:
[0006] A general method for threshold secret sharing among designated participants in an honest environment includes an initialization phase, a secret distribution phase, and a secret reconstruction phase; specifically, it includes the following steps:
[0007] Initialization phase:
[0008] Step 1: Before sharing the secret, select k participants from all participants as designated participants;
[0009] Step 2: The distributor selects the security parameters required for the (t,n) threshold secret sharing scheme; where the value of k is less than the threshold value t of the secret sharing scheme.
[0010] Secret distribution phase:
[0011] Step 3: The distributor uses the additive homomorphism of the secret sharing scheme to divide the master secret S into two sub-secrets;
[0012] Step 4: The distributor distributes one of the sub-secrets to the designated participant and the other sub-secret to the non-designated participant;
[0013] Secret Reconstruction Phase:
[0014] Step 5: The designated participant and the undesignated participant each recover two sub-secrets according to their respective secret reconstruction algorithms;
[0015] Step 6: The participants in the reconstruction will sum up the two recovered sub-secrets to obtain the reconstructed master secret.
[0016] Furthermore, in step 1, before the secret sharing begins, n participants {P1, p2, ..., P} are selected. n k participants in} As the designated participant; where k takes values in the range 1 ≤ k ≤ t-1, and
[0017] Furthermore, in step 3, the distributor uses an additive secret sharing scheme to divide the master secret S into two fragments, S1 and S2, satisfying S = S1 + S2, where S1 and S2 are positive integers, denoted as sub-secrets.
[0018] Furthermore, step 4 includes the following steps:
[0019] Step 4-1: The distributor executes the secret distribution algorithm of the (k,k) threshold secret sharing scheme, outputs the secret share of sub-secret S1, and sends the secret share to the designated k participants through a secure channel;
[0020] Step 4-2: The distributor executes the secret distribution algorithm of the (tk,nk) threshold secret sharing scheme, outputs the secret share of sub-secret S2, and sends the share to the remaining nk participants through a secure channel;
[0021] Furthermore, step 5 includes the following steps:
[0022] Step 5-1, k specified participants Secret reconstruction algorithm for executing (k,k) threshold secret sharing scheme The sub-secret S1 has been recovered;
[0023] Step 5-2: For the remaining set A of any tk non-specified participants, execute the secret reconstruction algorithm Π of the (kk,nk) threshold secret sharing scheme. Rec (A) = S2 can be used to recover the sub-secret S2.
[0024] Specifically, in step 6, the participants in the reconstruction calculate S1 + S2 = S to obtain the master secret of the reconstruction.
[0025] This invention employs the above technical solution, ensuring the participation of all designated participants during the secret reconstruction phase. It utilizes the additive homomorphism of secret sharing schemes and the ideas of block-based secret sharing schemes to realize the characteristics of designated participants. Based on designated participant threshold secret sharing, a secure medical data sharing model is designed. This invention ensures the security of medical data sharing among multiple participants by utilizing designated participant threshold secret sharing technology, while simultaneously addressing the issues of data privacy protection and leakage prevention. Attached Figure Description
[0026] The present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments;
[0027] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the principle architecture of a universal specified participant threshold secret sharing method under an honest environment according to the present invention.
[0028] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram illustrating an application example of the present invention;
[0029] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the process of obtaining patients' electronic medical records in a hospital under an honest environment, according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0030] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of this application clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0031] Unencrypted medical data is vulnerable to eavesdropping during sharing. Encryption schemes often face challenges due to limitations in key management and computational power when dealing with massive amounts of data. Therefore, secret sharing technology has become an effective solution. By dividing data into multiple parts and distributing them to different users, allowing only those users can access their data segments, information-theoretic security can be achieved. To ensure secure sharing of medical data among different users, fine-grained access control mechanisms are needed. This means the system must precisely control different users' access to data based on their permissions, roles, and specific application scenarios. For example, within a hospital, doctors, nurses, and other roles need access to different types and levels of patient information. Therefore, a participant-defined threshold secret sharing method is proposed. This not only improves data security but also provides flexible access control, allowing different types of users to obtain appropriate access permissions according to their actual needs.
[0032] like Figures 1 to 3As shown in the first example, this invention discloses a universally applicable threshold secret sharing method for designated participants in an honest environment. The participant set includes pre-selected designated participants, and the participation of all designated participants in the secret reconstruction phase is a necessary condition for the correct recovery of the secret in this type of secret sharing scheme. Utilizing the additive homomorphism of the secret sharing scheme, the master secret can be divided into two secret fragments. The idea of a block-based secret sharing scheme can divide the participant set into two corresponding subsets: a set of designated participants and a set of ordinary participants. The secret fragments are then distributed using the corresponding threshold secret sharing scheme, sending the secret share to the corresponding participant, thus realizing the characteristic of designated participants.
[0033] The technical solutions provided by the various embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0034] Example 1
[0035] like Figure 2 As shown in the embodiment, an embodiment describes a secure medical data sharing model based on threshold secret sharing with designated participants. Patient A goes to hospital A and is treated by doctor A, generating a new electronic medical record. The steps are as follows:
[0036] Step 1: After seeing patient A, doctor A first uses a specialized card reader to read patient A's medical insurance card, thereby obtaining the patient's medical information and the personal public key stored in the medical insurance card. After successfully obtaining this key information, doctor A begins to diagnose patient A's condition and starts to create and record patient A's electronic medical records.
[0037] Step 2: After diagnosing patient A, doctor A uses patient A's personal public key to encrypt the electronic medical record information generated during this visit.
[0038] Step 3: After Doctor A completes the encryption operation on Patient A's electronic medical record, the doctor needs to sign the patient's electronic medical record to prove its legality.
[0039] Step 4: Hospital node A is responsible for rigorously reviewing the electronic medical records submitted by doctors in each department. After the review process is completed, the hospital will aggregate and encrypt the electronic medical record data, split the encryption key using a specified participant threshold secret sharing scheme to generate several fragments, and store them in the backend database.
[0040] Example 2
[0041] like Figure 3As shown in the example, this embodiment describes the process by which a new hospital accesses a patient's previous medical records when the same patient seeks treatment at another hospital. Patient A continues to hospital B for treatment by doctor X. Hospital B requests access to obtain patient A's previous electronic medical records, and the steps are as follows:
[0042] Step 1: After seeing patient A, doctor X at hospital B, in order to fully understand the patient's medical history, first uses a medical insurance card reader to obtain patient A's personal information and key information. Then, doctor X uses patient A's identification information to query and access their past medical records.
[0043] Step 2: The backend database sends the encrypted medical record key to the distributor of the secret sharing scheme. The distributor then uses a threshold secret sharing scheme with designated participants to split the key and generate corresponding secret shares. These shares are sent to various hospitals in the multi-hospital consortium, where Hospital A is the designated participant.
[0044] Step 3: The encrypted key can only be successfully recovered when the threshold condition is met and Hospital A participates in the reconstruction, and finally Hospital B can successfully obtain the encrypted key.
[0045] Step 4: After obtaining the encryption key, the data is decrypted to obtain the value signed by Doctor A's private key. This value is then used to verify the authenticity of Patient A's electronic medical record data.
[0046] Step 5: After successful verification, Doctor X uses Patient A's personal private key to decrypt the encrypted electronic medical record, obtaining the complete electronic medical record.
[0047] This invention employs the above technical solution, ensuring the participation of all designated participants during the secret reconstruction phase. It utilizes the additive homomorphism of secret sharing schemes and the ideas of block-based secret sharing schemes to realize the characteristics of designated participants. Based on designated participant threshold secret sharing, a secure medical data sharing model is designed. This invention ensures the security of medical data sharing among multiple participants by utilizing designated participant threshold secret sharing technology, while simultaneously addressing the issues of data privacy protection and leakage prevention.
[0048] Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of this application, not all of them. Without conflict, the embodiments and features in the embodiments of this application can be combined with each other. The components of the embodiments of this application described and illustrated herein can generally be arranged and designed in various different configurations. Therefore, the detailed description of the embodiments of this application is not intended to limit the scope of the claimed application, but merely to illustrate selected embodiments of this application. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of this application without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of this application.
Claims
1. A universally applicable threshold secret sharing method for designated participants in an honest environment, characterized in that: It includes the initialization phase, the secret distribution phase, and the secret reconstruction phase; specifically, it includes the following steps: Initialization phase: Step 1: Before sharing the secret, select k participants from all participants as designated participants; Step 2: The distributor selects the security parameters required for the (t,n) threshold secret sharing scheme; where the value of k is less than the threshold value t of the secret sharing scheme. Secret distribution phase: Step 3: The distributor uses an additive secret sharing scheme to divide the master secret S into two sub-secrets; Step 4: The distributor distributes one of the sub-secrets to the designated participant and the other sub-secret to the non-designated participant; Secret Reconstruction Phase: Step 5: The designated participant and the undesignated participant each recover two sub-secrets according to their respective secret reconstruction algorithms; Step 6: The participants in the reconstruction will sum up the two recovered sub-secrets to obtain the reconstructed master secret.
2. The method for sharing a threshold secret with designated participants in an honest environment, as described in claim 1, is characterized in that: In step 1, before the secret sharing begins, n participants {P1, P2, ..., P} are selected. n k participants in} As the designated participant; where k takes values in the range 1 ≤ k ≤ t-1, and t represents the threshold value of the secret sharing scheme.
3. The method for threshold secret sharing by designated participants in an honest environment according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step 3, the distributor uses the additive homomorphism of the secret sharing scheme to divide the master secret S into two fragments S1 and S2, satisfying S = S1 + S2, where S1 and S2 are positive integers, denoted as sub-secrets.
4. The method for threshold secret sharing by designated participants in an honest environment according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step 4 includes the following steps: Step 4-1: The distributor executes the secret distribution algorithm of the (k,k) threshold secret sharing scheme, outputs the secret share of one of the sub-secrets S1, and sends the secret share to the designated k participants through a secure channel; Step 4-2: The distributor executes the secret distribution algorithm of the (tk,nk) threshold secret sharing scheme, outputs the secret share of another sub-secret S2, and sends the share to the remaining nk participants through a secure channel.
5. The method for threshold secret sharing by designated participants in an honest environment according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step 5 includes the following steps: Step 5-1, k specified participants Secret reconstruction algorithm for executing (k,k) threshold secret sharing scheme The sub-secret S1 has been recovered; Step 5-2: For the remaining set A of any tk non-specified participants, execute the secret reconstruction algorithm Π of the (tk,nk) threshold secret sharing scheme. Rec (A) = S2 recovers the sub-secret S2.