A data quality analysis method for a quantum communication data transmission process

Abstract

The application relates to the technical field of data transmission, in particular to a data quality analysis method for a quantum communication data transmission process. The method comprises the following steps: acquiring a real-time key negotiation data set, analyzing the real-time key negotiation data set, and determining a real-time negotiation error rate; comparing the real-time negotiation error rate with a protocol error rate safety threshold value, judging whether an interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism needs to be activated according to a comparison result; if the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism needs to be activated, carrying out trap filtering and key fragment multiplexing and splicing processing on survivor bits in a plurality of key negotiation processes according to the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism, and determining and outputting a resilience reconstruction key. According to the application, both communication parties can still efficiently negotiate a safe key under continuous high-intensity communication interference of a third party, the robustness and availability of quantum key distribution services are improved, and the quantum communication quality is improved.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of data transmission, and in particular to a data quality analysis method for a quantum communication data transmission process. BACKGROUND

[0002] Quantum key distribution technology is a technology for securely distributing shared keys between communication parties by using quantum mechanics principles (uncertainty, non-clonability), and its core value lies in detecting the behavior of the attacker, and its security is based on physical laws rather than mathematical problems, providing secure keys for efficient data encryption in communication processes.

[0003] However, when the existing quantum key distribution technology faces high-intensity interference from an attacker who does not aim to steal the key but simply interferes with the key distribution communication, the key distribution efficiency may rapidly decrease or even the key distribution communication may be interrupted, making it difficult to maintain efficient key distribution communication between the sender and the receiver, reducing service availability, and significantly reducing overall communication quality. SUMMARY

[0004] The present application provides a data quality analysis method for a quantum communication data transmission process to solve the above technical problems.

[0005] In a first aspect, the present application provides a data quality analysis method for a quantum communication data transmission process, the method comprising:

[0006] obtaining a real-time key negotiation data set, analyzing the real-time key negotiation data set, and determining a real-time negotiation bit error rate;

[0007] comparing the real-time negotiation bit error rate with a protocol bit error rate safety threshold, and determining whether to activate an interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism according to the comparison result;

[0008] If the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism needs to be activated, then according to the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism, the surviving bits in a plurality of key negotiation processes are subjected to trap filtering and key fragment multiplexing and splicing processing, and a resilience reconstruction key is determined and output.

[0009] By the scheme, the real-time error rate in the quantum key distribution process is tracked, which is used as a judgment basis, an interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism is introduced, a three-recombination key reconstruction mechanism of real-time error rate analysis, resilience activation decision and trap filtering reconstruction is used, a resilience reconstruction key is obtained, and both communication parties can still efficiently negotiate a secure key under continuous high-intensity communication interference of a third party, the robustness of the quantum key distribution service is improved, the quantum key distribution service still maintains high availability when facing high-intensity interference of an attack party which does not aim to steal the key but aims to purely interfere with the key distribution communication, and the quality of quantum communication is improved.

[0010] Optionally, the analysis of the real-time key negotiation data set to determine the real-time negotiation error rate comprises:

[0011] The real-time key negotiation data set comprises a unified index data set, a sender base vector sequence, a receiver base vector sequence, and a negotiation sampling number;

[0012] According to the unified index data set, the sender base vector sequence and the receiver base vector sequence are subjected to base vector consistency matching analysis, the corresponding indexes in the case of base vector consistency are recorded, and a base vector consistency index set is constructed;

[0013] According to the negotiation sampling number, indexes in the base vector consistency index set are randomly extracted in a corresponding number to determine a sampling index set;

[0014] According to the sampling index set, the bit values corresponding to each index in the sampling index set are disclosed and compared through a preset classical authentication channel to determine the number of error bits;

[0015] The ratio of the number of error bits to the negotiation sampling number is taken as the real-time negotiation error rate.

[0016] Through the scheme, the base vector consistent data subset is screened out based on the base vector consistency index set, and the number of error bits is quickly quantified through random sampling to evaluate the size of error bits, and the real-time negotiation error rate is obtained. Compared with the traditional scheme, the error evaluation is advanced to the middle of the negotiation, which saves the key time window for activating the subsequent key reconstruction mechanism, and only a small number of sampling bits (not all) are disclosed and compared, which greatly reduces the load of the classical channel, and reduces the risk and scale of data leakage.

[0017] Optionally, the real-time negotiation error rate is compared with a protocol error rate safety threshold, and according to the comparison result, it is judged whether the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism needs to be activated, comprising:

[0018] The protocol error rate security threshold is a protocol security threshold corresponding to a QBER value (Quantum Bit Error Rate) defined in a quantum key distribution protocol currently used by the two communication parties;

[0019] The real-time negotiation error rate is compared with the protocol error rate security threshold, and if the real-time negotiation error rate is less than the protocol error rate security threshold, a classical QKD mechanism (Quantum Key Distribution) is used.

[0020] If the real-time negotiation error rate is greater than the protocol error rate security threshold, the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism is activated.

[0021] Through the scheme, the real-time negotiation error rate is used as the switching reference, and when the real-time negotiation error rate is higher than the corresponding protocol error rate security threshold, the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism is introduced to guarantee the availability of the key generation service under high-intensity interference on the basis of the classical QKD mechanism, forming a dual-path response embodied by the "classical QKD + interference-driven resilience reconstruction", so that the high availability of the key generation service based on quantum communication can be well guaranteed under both low negotiation error rate and high negotiation error rate.

[0022] Optionally, the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism comprises:

[0023] According to the sampling index set, a number of basis vectors corresponding to the sampling index set are removed from the sender basis vector sequence and the receiver basis vector sequence to determine a pre-screening basis vector set;

[0024] The pre-screening basis vector set is analyzed to screen bit data with the same bit value and consistent basis vectors in the sender basis vector sequence and the receiver basis vector sequence to form a real-time surviving bit data set;

[0025] Based on a quantum bit trap detection strategy, bit trap filtering processing is performed on the real-time surviving bit data set to determine a dynamic effective key fragment data set and a bit trap proportion distribution information set;

[0026] Based on the trap proportion distribution information set and the bit trap proportion distribution information set, a hierarchical security amplification strategy is executed according to the corresponding bit trap proportion in the determination process of each effective key fragment in the effective key fragment data set to determine a compressed dynamic key fragment data set;

[0027] Based on a limited multiplexing strategy, a number of key fragments are multiplexed and spliced according to the compressed dynamic key fragment data set to generate the resilience reconstruction key.

[0028] By the scheme, the real-time surviving bit data set is obtained by screening according to the sampling index set, combined with the qubit trap detection strategy, the hierarchical secret amplification strategy and the limited multiplexing strategy, forming an interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism for guaranteeing the key agreement efficiency and key security under high intensity interference, so that the key agreement process based on quantum communication can still derive a safe key when facing attacks aimed at interrupting communication.

[0029] Optionally, the qubit trap detection strategy comprises:

[0030] Based on the real-time agreement error rate, the dynamic pulse proportion of the decoy state pulse in the total sending pulse is determined according to the decoy state injection strategy, and the corresponding proportion of the decoy state pulse is generated according to the dynamic pulse proportion, to construct a decoy state pulse data set;

[0031] According to the decoy state pulse data set, the accurate arrival time stamp of all successful detection pulses is counted to construct a pulse timestamp distribution data set;

[0032] According to the decoy state pulse data set, the detection rate difference between the theoretical detection rate and the actual detection rate of the decoy state pulse is quantified;

[0033] Based on the timestamp correlation analysis strategy, the high-risk trap pulse information and the high-risk trap proportion of the current agreement process are determined by analyzing the pulse timestamp distribution data set according to the detection rate difference;

[0034] According to the high-risk trap pulse information, the bit data under the corresponding index in the real-time surviving bit data set is removed, and the remaining bit data is taken as the effective key fragment of the current agreement process;

[0035] The effective key fragment and the high-risk trap proportion of each agreement process are integrated to construct the dynamic effective key fragment data set and the bit trap proportion distribution information set, respectively.

[0036] By the scheme, the detection accuracy of trap pulses is significantly improved by dual correlation analysis of decoy state response anomalies and timestamp distribution distortion, avoiding misjudgment of legal pulses, and the decoy state proportion is adaptively adjusted according to the error rate overrun degree, saving resources in low interference and strengthening defense in high interference, improving the system energy efficiency ratio, effectively removing trap pulses injected by the attacker, and ensuring the purity of surviving bits to provide high-quality input for subsequent key fragment multiplexing.

[0037] Optionally, the decoy state injection strategy comprises:

[0038] Two types of light intensity level pulses are set, which are signal state pulses and decoy state pulses;

[0039] The intensity of the signal state pulse is greater than the intensity of the decoy state pulse;

[0040] The signal state pulse and the decoy state pulse are emitted by the same laser pulse emitter;

[0041] The sum of the intensity of the signal state pulse and the intensity of the decoy state pulse is less than the maximum allowable power of the laser pulse emitter;

[0042] In the process of emitting the signal state pulse and the decoy state pulse, a pulse scheduling strategy based on a chaotic sequence is adopted, so that the emission order of the signal state pulse and the decoy state pulse satisfies aperiodic pseudo-random distribution in the time domain, avoiding that an attacker infers the pulse type through timing regularity;

[0043] The ratio of the real-time negotiated error rate to the protocol error rate safety threshold is taken as an error rate overrun ratio, and the proportion of the decoy state pulse in the total pulses is linearly increased according to the error rate overrun ratio to determine the dynamic pulse proportion.

[0044] Through the scheme, the dynamic decoy state proportion mechanism is used to greatly increase the decoy state pulse density in a high error rate scenario, forcing the attack behavior to be more exposed, reducing invalid detection in a low interference scenario, breaking the emission timing regularity through chaotic sequence scheduling, so that the attacker cannot avoid detection, even if high-intensity interference is encountered, the key distribution process can still continue, and service availability is ensured.

[0045] Optionally, the timestamp correlation analysis strategy comprises:

[0046] Based on a classical channel synchronization atomic clock timing reference, the timestamp data in the pulse timestamp distribution data set is uniformly aligned to determine an aligned pulse timestamp data set;

[0047] According to the aligned pulse timestamp data set, the time intervals corresponding to all adjacent successful detection pulses are counted to construct a time interval distribution data set;

[0048] The time interval distribution data set is analyzed, and the corresponding time interval in the time interval distribution data set whose time interval is greater than 3 times the historical average time interval standard deviation is defined as an abnormal interval to construct an abnormal interval distribution data set;

[0049] If the successful detection pulse is in any abnormal interval in the abnormal interval distribution data set, and the two pulses before and after the current successful detection pulse are both successfully detected, the current successful detection pulse is taken as a high-risk trap pulse to construct the high-risk trap pulse information;

[0050] According to the proportion of the high-risk trap pulse in all the successful detection pulses, combined with the difference in the detection rate, the proportion of trap bits is evaluated by composite weighting, and the proportion of the high-risk trap is determined.

[0051] Through the scheme, the time stamp micro anomaly detection mechanism is used to identify the trap pulses carefully disguised by the attacker, overcome the limitations of the traditional intensity detection method, improve the detection accuracy of the trap pulse, reduce the invalid key discard amount by accurately positioning the abnormal pulse, improve the utilization rate of the surviving bits, and support the subsequent efficient reuse and splicing of key fragments.

[0052] Optionally, the layered secure amplification strategy comprises:

[0053] According to the high-risk trap proportion corresponding to each of the effective key fragments, the preset trap ratio-compression ratio mapping information is queried to determine the key compression ratio corresponding to each of the effective key fragments;

[0054] The high-risk trap proportion is positively correlated with the corresponding key compression ratio;

[0055] According to the total length of the bit data corresponding to each of the effective key fragments, a length-extensible hash function is used to perform preliminary uniformization processing on each of the effective key fragments to determine the key uniformization processing result;

[0056] According to the key compression ratio corresponding to each of the effective key fragments, an anti-quantum hash function is used to perform key compression processing on the key uniformization processing result corresponding to each of the effective key fragments to determine the compressed dynamic key fragment dataset.

[0057] Through the scheme, the attack intensity is quantified in real time based on the high-risk trap proportion, and the compression ratio is dynamically adjusted, so that the secure amplification strength is accurately matched with the interference severity. Through layered secure amplification processing, "one-size-fits-all" compression is avoided, more effective bits are retained for low-risk fragments, and high-risk fragments are strengthened for compression. Compared with the traditional fixed compression strategy, the residual security risk in the high-interference scenario is significantly reduced, the number of negotiation interruptions triggered by insufficient key length is reduced by maximizing the use of low-pollution fragments, and the communication link is ensured to provide services in an interference environment.

[0058] Optionally, the limited reuse strategy comprises:

[0059] Key length constraint rule: the total length of the effective key fragments spliced in multiple rounds does not exceed a preset key length threshold;

[0060] Negotiation round constraint rule: according to the service response speed requirement of the communication parties, the maximum negotiation round is set, the round counter is automatically added after the key fragment multiplexing splicing processing in each negotiation round is completed, and when the round counter value is equal to the maximum negotiation round, the current spliced key fragment is taken as the resilience reconstruction key.

[0061] By the scheme, the length and negotiation round of the resilience reconstruction key obtained by splicing the key fragments are constrained by the key length constraint rule and the negotiation round constraint rule, so that a good balance between the key generation efficiency and the key security is achieved, the construction efficiency of the final resilience reconstruction key is basically guaranteed, the key negotiation process is prevented from falling into a dead loop, uncertainty is introduced for the construction time of the resilience reconstruction key, and the security of the resilience reconstruction key is further improved.

[0062] Optionally, the method further comprises:

[0063] Key fragment life cycle management rule:

[0064] After each valid key fragment is generated, a life cycle timer is created and started for the valid key fragment;

[0065] If the valid key fragment is not used within a preset expiration time, the corresponding valid key is automatically discarded.

[0066] Interrupt recovery rule:

[0067] When the communication parties are interrupted due to the interference of the attacker, the completed splicing round and the key length are recorded, and after the link is recovered, the key multiplexing splicing is continued from the nearest valid checkpoint.

[0068] By the scheme, the life cycle of the valid key fragment is constrained by the key fragment life cycle management rule, so that the attacker is prevented from launching a correlation analysis attack on the key fragments by using the life cycle time difference window, and the key generation time after the communication interruption is reduced by using the interrupt recovery rule, so that the key generation service maintains high availability under high-intensity continuous interference. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0069] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application or the prior art, the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments or prior art description will be briefly introduced. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are some embodiments of the present application, and other drawings can be obtained by those skilled in the art without creative labor.

[0070] Figure 1 An application scenario schematic diagram provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0071] Figure 2 A flowchart of a data quality analysis method of a quantum communication data transmission process according to an embodiment of the present application is provided. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0072] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are some but not all of the embodiments of the present application. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by a person of ordinary skill in the art without creative work fall within the protection scope of the present application.

[0073] In addition, the term “and / or” in this document merely describes an association relationship of associated objects, and indicates that there can be three relationships, for example, A and / or B can represent the three cases of A alone, A and B together, and B alone. In addition, the character “ / ” in this document generally represents an “or” relationship between the front and rear associated objects unless otherwise specified.

[0074] The embodiments of the present application will be further described in detail below with reference to the drawings of the specification.

[0075] The existing quantum key distribution technology is prone to problems of sharp decline in key distribution efficiency or even interruption of key distribution communication when facing high-intensity interference of an attack party not for the purpose of stealing keys but for the purpose of purely interfering with key distribution communication, which leads to difficulty in maintaining efficient key distribution communication between the sending party and the receiving party, causes reduction in service availability, and greatly reduces overall communication quality.

[0076] Based on this, the present application provides a data quality analysis method of a quantum communication data transmission process. The real-time bit error rate in the quantum key distribution process is tracked, which is used as a judgment basis, an interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism is introduced, a three-recombination key reconstruction mechanism of real-time bit error rate analysis, resilience activation decision, and trap filtering reconstruction is used, a resilience reconstruction key is obtained, and both parties of communication can still efficiently negotiate a secure key under continuous high-intensity communication interference of a third party, the robustness of quantum key distribution service is improved, the quantum key distribution service still maintains high service availability when facing high-intensity interference of an attack party not for the purpose of stealing keys but for the purpose of purely interfering with key distribution communication, and the quantum communication quality is further improved.

[0077] Figure 1An application scenario provided by the present application is shown in the figure. In the process of quantum communication key distribution, the method provided by the present application enables the quantum key distribution service to maintain high availability when facing high-intensity interference from an attacker who does not aim to steal the key but aims to purely interfere with the key distribution communication, thereby improving the quality of quantum communication.

[0078] Specifically, the method of the present application is applied to any server mastered by the two parties of communication, which communicates with the quantum communication equipment, obtains and analyzes the real-time key negotiation data set provided by the quantum communication equipment through the server, and tracks the real-time error rate in the process of quantum key distribution, which is used as a basis for judgment. The interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism is introduced, and the three-cascade key reconstruction mechanism of real-time error rate analysis, resilience activation decision and trap filtering reconstruction is used to obtain the resilience reconstruction key. The two parties of communication can still efficiently negotiate a secure key under the continuous high-intensity communication interference of a third party, improve the robustness of the quantum key distribution service, and enable the quantum key distribution service to maintain high availability when facing high-intensity interference from an attacker who does not aim to steal the key but aims to purely interfere with the key distribution communication, thereby improving the quality of quantum communication. The specific implementation mode can refer to the following embodiments.

[0079] Figure 2 A flowchart of a data quality analysis method of a quantum communication data transmission process provided by an embodiment of the present application. The method of the present embodiment can be applied to the server in the above scenario. As shown in the figure, the method comprises: Figure 2

[0080] S201, obtaining a real-time key negotiation data set, analyzing the real-time key negotiation data set, and determining a real-time negotiation error rate.

[0081] The real-time key negotiation data set can be a raw data set of the interaction between the two parties of communication in the process of quantum key distribution (QKD), which is derived from the real-time transmission log of the quantum communication equipment.

[0082] The real-time negotiation error rate can be the quantum bit error rate of the current key negotiation process quantified by sampling comparison.

[0083] ​Specifically, the bottleneck of the existing quantum key distribution technology is that when the attacker implements high-intensity interference (such as photon number splitting attack, strong light blinding attack), there is a case that is not for the purpose of stealing the key, but by injecting noise pulses, tampering with time stamps and other means to destroy the key agreement process. The above attack behavior will cause the following problems: interference pulses are mixed into the legal signal, the base vector comparison error rate far exceeds the protocol security threshold (usually > 11%), causing the error rate to uncontrollably skyrocket, triggering the interruption mechanism of the traditional QKD, resulting in the failure of key distribution; Frequent interruptions force the communication parties to repeatedly restart the negotiation process, and the key generation efficiency decays exponentially, which cannot meet the real-time encryption requirements; The bit data negotiated by the two communication parties is abandoned because the complete key is not established, resulting in low utilization of quantum channel resources. When the existing technology faces the problems caused by the above attacks, channel switching and isolation measures are usually used to rebuild the communication negotiation, which makes the key negotiation efficiency drop sharply, and whether the key negotiation is successful is highly uncertain, which significantly reduces the availability of quantum key distribution services.

[0084] The most direct impact of the attacker's attack for the purpose of interfering communication is the sharp rise of quantum error rate in the quantum key distribution process. Therefore, tracking and evaluating the quantum error rate in the key negotiation process between the two communication parties is the key to determining whether the current communication process is continuously interfered by high-intensity interference. Through quantitative analysis of the real-time key negotiation data set, the ratio between the number of current error bits and the total number of bits, i.e. the real-time negotiation error rate, is obtained, which provides a scientific data basis for subsequent analysis of the key negotiation process under high error rate.

[0085] S202, compare the real-time negotiation error rate with the protocol error rate safety threshold, and determine whether the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism needs to be activated according to the comparison result.

[0086] The protocol error rate safety threshold can be the maximum quantum bit error rate specified in the quantum key distribution protocol adopted by the two communication parties.

[0087] The interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism can be a strategy of reconstructing available keys using surviving bits in different negotiation rounds under high-intensity interference.

[0088] Specifically, due to the influence of quantum bit uncertainty and non-cloning, the attack side cannot achieve 100% pollution rate of quantum bits, which means that even under high-intensity interference, the communication parties can still obtain part of the un-polluted quantum bit data in each key agreement process. When the quantum bit error rate exceeds the corresponding protocol error rate threshold, the existing technology will automatically discard all quantum bit data in the current negotiation and restart the negotiation process, which is the key to the sharp decline in key agreement efficiency under high-intensity interference. The present scheme realizes that under the continuous high-intensity attack of the attack side, the survived quantum bit data in each negotiation process itself has strong unpredictability, which can provide high-level security for the survived bit data and make the survived bit become the core condition of the key. Furthermore, considering the uncertainty of the number of survived quantum bits in each negotiation process, if the survived bit data in a single negotiation is used as the key, there is a risk of too short key length. Therefore, the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism, which activates the core mechanism of "using survived bits to reversely convert high-intensity interference into enhanced key unpredictability resources" and uses the survived bit data obtained in multiple negotiation processes to combine to obtain the final key, can improve the key agreement efficiency of the communication parties under high-intensity interference while ensuring the security of the key, and avoid the sharp decline in negotiation efficiency caused by the "interference discarding" mindset of the existing technology.

[0089] S203, if the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism needs to be activated, the survived bits in several key agreement processes are subjected to trap filtering and key fragment multiplexing and splicing processing according to the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism, and a resilience reconstruction key is determined and output.

[0090] The key agreement process can be a communication process in which the communication parties use quantum key distribution technology to construct a data encryption key.

[0091] The survived bits can be original key bits that remain consistent with the basis vector and are not subjected to sampling public comparison under the interference of the attack side.

[0092] The trap filtering can be a process of identifying and removing high-risk interference pulse associated bits based on a quantum bit trap detection strategy.

[0093] The key fragment multiplexing and splicing processing can be a process of combining effective key fragments of multiple negotiation rounds into a complete key.

[0094] The resilience reconstruction key can be a key recognized by the communication parties obtained through the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism.

[0095] Specifically, in the process of generating a key by the surviving bit data during the interference of the attacker, if the attacker detects the process, the attacker can inject some trap bits in the attack process by using the mechanism, causing some trap bits mastered by the attacker to be mixed in the surviving bits, and thus causing the security of the key to collapse. Therefore, the surviving bits need to be further filtered to identify and remove the trap bits known by the attacker, so as to ensure the security of the surviving bits, and then the filtered surviving bits in multiple negotiation processes are spliced to construct a resilient reconstructed key, so that the communication parties can quickly obtain a secure key under high-intensity interference, and thus improve the security of the data encryption process based on the resilient reconstructed key in subsequent communication between the communication parties.

[0096] By the scheme, the real-time error rate in the quantum key distribution process is tracked, which is used as a judgment basis to introduce an interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism. The real-time error rate analysis, resilience activation decision, and trap filtering reconstruction are combined to obtain a resilient reconstructed key, so that the communication parties can still efficiently negotiate a secure key under continuous high-intensity communication interference by a third party, improve the robustness of the quantum key distribution service, and make the quantum key distribution service maintain high availability when facing high-intensity interference by an attacker who does not aim to steal the key but aims to purely interfere with the key distribution communication, and thus improve the quality of quantum communication.

[0097] In some embodiments, the real-time key negotiation data set includes a unified index data set, a sender basis vector sequence, a receiver basis vector sequence, and a negotiation sampling number; the sender basis vector sequence and the receiver basis vector sequence are subjected to basis vector consistency matching analysis according to the unified index data set, the corresponding indexes in the case of basis vector consistency are recorded, and a basis vector consistency index set is constructed; the indexes in the basis vector consistency index set are subjected to random extraction of a corresponding number according to the negotiation sampling number, and a sampling index set is determined; the bit values corresponding to each index in the sampling index set are disclosed by a preset classical authentication channel according to the sampling index set, and the number of error bits is determined; and the ratio of the number of error bits to the negotiation sampling number is taken as the real-time negotiation error rate.

[0098] The unified index data set can be a unique position identifier (such as a time slot number) of each quantum bit in the transmission sequence, which is generated by a timing controller of a quantum transmitting end.

[0099] The sender basis vector sequence can be a measurement basis vector (such as an X basis vector or a Z basis vector) randomly selected by the sender for each quantum bit, which is realized by a quantum state modulator.

[0100] The receiver basis vector sequence can be a measurement basis vector randomly selected by the receiver for the received quantum bit, which is generated by a receiver basis vector selector.

[0101] The negotiated sampling quantity can be the quantity of bits agreed by both parties to be disclosed for comparison, determined through a classical channel negotiation (such as a protocol default value of 20% of the total number of bits).

[0102] The basis vector consistency matching analysis can be whether the basis vectors at the same index position in the basis vector sequence of the sending party and the receiving party are consistent (such as both parties selecting X basis vectors, i.e., the basis vectors are consistent).

[0103] The basis vector consistency index set can be a collection of index positions corresponding to basis vector consistent bit pairs.

[0104] The sampling index set can be a subset of a specified number (negotiated sampling quantity) of indexes randomly extracted from the basis vector consistency index set.

[0105] The preset classical authentication channel can be a classical communication channel authenticated by identity and encrypted (such as the TLS protocol), used for secure transmission of sampling bit values.

[0106] The number of error bits can be the number of bits that do not match in the sampling index set.

[0107] The real-time negotiation error rate can be the ratio of the number of error bits to the negotiated sampling quantity, reflecting the degree of interference of the current channel.

[0108] Specifically, the uniform index data set is called to align the timing positions of the basis vector sequences of the communication parties, the indexes are traversed, the basis vector types are compared, if the basis vectors of both parties are the same (such as X basis vectors), the index is added to the basis vector consistency index set, according to the negotiated sampling quantity (such as 100), a quantum random number generator is used to randomly extract the corresponding index from the basis vector consistency index set to generate a sampling index set, the original bit values of each index in the sampling index set are exchanged between the communication parties through the preset classical authentication channel, the number of inconsistent bits is counted as the number of error bits, and the real-time negotiation error rate is quantified (real-time negotiation error rate = number of error bits / negotiated sampling quantity); based on the basis vector consistency index set, a data subset with consistent basis vectors is selected, and the number of error bits is quickly quantified through random sampling to evaluate the size of error bits, and the real-time negotiation error rate is obtained. Compared with the traditional scheme, the error evaluation is advanced to the negotiation period, which saves the key time window for activating the subsequent key reconstruction mechanism, and only a small number of sampling bits (rather than all) are disclosed for comparison, which greatly reduces the load of the classical channel, while reducing the risk and scale of data leakage.

[0109] By the scheme, the data subset with consistent base vectors is screened out based on the base vector consistency index set, and the number of error bits is quickly quantified through random sampling to evaluate the error bit scale, and the real-time negotiation error rate is obtained. Compared with the traditional scheme, the error rate evaluation is advanced to the middle of the negotiation, which saves the key time window for activating the subsequent key reconstruction mechanism, and only a small number of sampled bits (not all) are disclosed for comparison, which greatly reduces the classic channel load, and reduces the risk and scale of data leakage.

[0110] In some embodiments, the protocol error rate safety threshold is a protocol safety threshold corresponding to a QBER value (Quantum Bit Error Rate) specified in a quantum key distribution protocol currently adopted by the two parties of communication; the real-time negotiation error rate is compared with the protocol error rate safety threshold, if the real-time negotiation error rate is less than the protocol error rate safety threshold, a classic QKD mechanism (Quantum Key Distribution) is adopted; if the real-time negotiation error rate is greater than the protocol error rate safety threshold, an interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism is activated.

[0111] The classic QKD mechanism can be a standard quantum key distribution process, including base vector comparison, error code checking, privacy amplification and other basic steps, complying with the corresponding communication standard, realized by the firmware layer of the quantum communication device, enabled when the error rate is lower than the safety threshold, ensuring efficient key generation in low-interference environment.

[0112] Specifically, when the real-time error rate exceeds a fixed threshold (such as 11%), the traditional quantum key distribution scheme directly terminates the negotiation, when facing attacks from attackers with the purpose of paralyzing communication services, a differentiated response strategy is needed to ensure the availability of key generation services, by taking the real-time negotiation error rate as the switching reference, on the basis of the classic QKD mechanism, when the real-time negotiation error rate is higher than the corresponding protocol error rate safety threshold, an interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism is introduced to ensure the availability of key generation services under high-intensity interference, forming a dual-path response embodied by "classic QKD + interference-driven resilience reconstruction", so that the high availability of key generation services based on quantum communication can be well guaranteed under both low negotiation error rate and high negotiation error rate.

[0113] By the scheme, the real-time negotiation error rate is taken as the switching reference, on the basis of the classic QKD mechanism, when the real-time negotiation error rate is higher than the corresponding protocol error rate safety threshold, an interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism is introduced to ensure the availability of key generation services under high-intensity interference, forming a dual-path response embodied by "classic QKD + interference-driven resilience reconstruction", so that the high availability of key generation services based on quantum communication can be well guaranteed under both low negotiation error rate and high negotiation error rate.

[0114] In some embodiments, according to the sampling index set, a number of basis vectors corresponding to the sampling index set are removed from the sender basis vector sequence and the receiver basis vector sequence to determine a pre-screening basis vector set; the pre-screening basis vector set is analyzed to screen bit data with the same bit value and consistent basis vectors in the sender basis vector sequence and the receiver basis vector sequence to form a real-time surviving bit data set; based on a quantum bit trap detection strategy, the real-time surviving bit data set is subjected to bit trap filtering processing to determine a dynamic effective key fragment data set and a bit trap proportion distribution information set; based on the trap proportion distribution information set and the bit trap proportion distribution information set, a hierarchical security amplification strategy is executed according to the corresponding bit trap proportion in the determination process of each effective key fragment in the effective key fragment data set to determine a compressed dynamic key fragment data set; based on a limited multiplexing strategy, a number of key fragments are subjected to multiplexing and splicing processing according to the compressed dynamic key fragment data set to generate a resilient reconstructed key.

[0115] The pre-screening basis vector set can be a remaining basis vector set after the basis vectors corresponding to the sampling index set are removed from the sender and receiver basis vector sequences.

[0116] The real-time surviving bit data set can be a bit data set with the same bit value and consistent basis vectors in the pre-screening basis vector set.

[0117] The quantum bit trap detection strategy can be a defense mechanism for identifying and filtering trap bits (such as fake photons) implanted by an attacker.

[0118] The dynamic effective key fragment data set can be a trusted bit fragment set that is retained after trap detection, and each fragment corresponds to a single negotiation period.

[0119] The bit trap proportion distribution information set can be a data set recording the proportion of trap bits detected in the generation process of each effective key fragment.

[0120] The hierarchical security amplification strategy can be a key security enhancement process that dynamically adjusts the key compression strength according to the trap proportion.

[0121] The compressed dynamic key fragment data set can be a standardized key fragment set after hierarchical security amplification processing.

[0122] The limited multiplexing strategy can be a rule set for splicing key fragments under constraints.

[0123] Specifically, in the high-intensity interference process, the use of multiple negotiation processes to generate key data for encryption requires solving the following core problems: the existence of bit traps in the survival bits, the inability of existing unified security amplification mechanisms to apply to fragmented key security amplification, and the need to balance efficiency and security within the constraint boundary of the multiplexing mechanism. If the real-time negotiation error rate is greater than or equal to the protocol error rate security threshold, it means that the current key negotiation process is subject to high-intensity interference. At this time, the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism is activated, and the following multiple strategies are executed: call the sampling index set to eliminate the corresponding index vectors from the sender and receiver basis vector sequences (the bit values of the corresponding index in the sampling index set have been compared in the public channel, and there is an exposure risk, so the key bit data should not contain this part of the bit data), generate a pre-screening basis vector set containing only unexposed basis vectors; locate all index positions with consistent basis vectors through the pre-screening basis vector set, compare the bit values of the sender and receiver at this position, and retain the bit data with the same value to construct a real-time survival bit data set; activate the quantum bit trap detection strategy to remove the bits corresponding to the trap pulse index from the survival bit data set to obtain a dynamic effective key fragment data set and a bit trap proportion distribution information set; according to the bit trap proportion distribution information set, assign a compression ratio to each key fragment (the higher the trap proportion, the larger the compression ratio), and use the corresponding hash algorithm to label and compress the key fragments to obtain a standardized and compressed dynamic key fragment data set; then call the limited multiplexing strategy to generate a resilience reconstruction key under the constraints of limited rounds and key length.

[0124] Through the scheme, the real-time survival bit data set is obtained by screening according to the sampling index set, combined with the quantum bit trap detection strategy, the hierarchical security amplification strategy, and the limited multiplexing strategy, forming an interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism to ensure the efficiency and security of the key negotiation under high-intensity interference, so that the key negotiation process based on quantum communication can still derive a secure key when facing attacks aimed at interrupting communication.

[0125] In some embodiments, based on the decoy state injection strategy, according to the real-time negotiation error rate, the dynamic pulse proportion of the decoy state pulse in the total sending pulse is determined, and the corresponding proportion of the decoy state pulse is generated according to the dynamic pulse proportion to construct a decoy state pulse dataset; according to the decoy state pulse dataset, the accurate arrival time stamp of all successful detection pulses is counted to construct a pulse timestamp distribution dataset; according to the decoy state pulse dataset, the detection rate difference between the theoretical detection rate and the actual detection rate of the decoy state pulse is quantified; based on the timestamp correlation analysis strategy, according to the detection rate difference, the pulse timestamp distribution dataset is analyzed to determine the high-risk trap pulse information and the high-risk trap proportion of the current negotiation process; according to the high-risk trap pulse information, the bit data under the corresponding index in the real-time surviving bit dataset is removed, and the remaining bit data is taken as the effective key fragment of the current negotiation process; the effective key fragment and the high-risk trap proportion of each negotiation process are integrated to construct a dynamic effective key fragment dataset and a bit trap proportion distribution information set, respectively.

[0126] The decoy state pulse can be an interference pulse signal used to confuse the judgment of the key signal by the attack party.

[0127] The dynamic pulse proportion can be the real-time proportion of the decoy state pulse in the total sending pulse, which is dynamically adjusted according to the over-limit degree of the negotiation error rate.

[0128] The successful detection pulse can be a decoy state pulse successfully detected by the attack party.

[0129] The pulse timestamp distribution dataset can be a set of accurate arrival time stamps of all successful detection pulses, used to analyze the time regularity of pulse transmission.

[0130] The theoretical detection rate can be the expected probability of the decoy state pulse being successfully detected in an ideal environment without attack.

[0131] The actual detection rate can be the statistical probability of the decoy state pulse being successfully detected in actual communication.

[0132] The detection rate difference can be the probability difference between the theoretical detection rate and the actual detection rate.

[0133] The high-risk trap pulse information can be a set of pulse indexes determined to be high probability of being forged or interfered by the attack party.

[0134] The high-risk trap proportion can be the proportion of the number of high-risk trap pulses to the number of all successful detection pulses.

[0135] Specifically, the attacker can forge pulse timestamps or inject delayed pulses, and traditional methods are difficult to distinguish between legitimate pulses and "trap pulses" forged by the attacker; the scheme uses a self-defined decoy state injection strategy, according to the ratio of the real-time negotiated error rate to the security threshold (error rate overrun ratio), linearly improves the proportion of decoy state pulses, records the accurate arrival timestamps of all successful detection pulses, synchronizes the atomic clocks of both parties through the classical channel, aligns the timestamp data to eliminate clock drift errors, and calculates the actual detection rate of decoy state pulses (successful detection number / total number of sending), compares it with the theoretical detection rate (based on channel loss calculation), and calculates the difference between the two as the detection rate difference. The larger the detection rate difference, the greater the current attacker's interference strength, and the detection rate difference is positively correlated with the trap bit proportion (used to improve the accuracy of trap bit scale evaluation), on this basis, further combined with the self-defined timestamp correlation analysis strategy, the high-risk trap pulse information and high-risk trap proportion of the current negotiation process are obtained, and then the bit data corresponding to the high-risk trap pulse is removed from the real-time surviving bit data set, and the remaining bit data is used as the effective key fragment of the current negotiation process, and the high-risk trap proportion is recorded. By integrating the effective key fragments and high-risk trap proportions of each negotiation process, a dynamic effective key fragment dataset and a bit trap proportion distribution information set are constructed.

[0136] Through the scheme, the dual correlation analysis of decoy state response anomaly and timestamp distribution distortion is used to significantly improve the trap pulse detection accuracy, avoid misjudgment of legitimate pulses, adaptively adjust the decoy state proportion according to the error rate overrun degree, save resources in low interference, strengthen defense in high interference, improve the system energy efficiency ratio, effectively remove the trap pulses injected by the attacker, and ensure the purity of the surviving bits, providing high-quality input for subsequent key fragment reuse.

[0137] In some embodiments, two types of light intensity level pulses are set, namely signal state pulses and decoy state pulses; the intensity of the signal state pulse is greater than the intensity of the decoy state pulse; the signal state pulse and the decoy state pulse are emitted by the same laser pulse emitter; the sum of the intensity of the signal state pulse and the intensity of the decoy state pulse is less than the maximum allowed power of the laser pulse emitter; during the emission of the signal state pulse and the decoy state pulse, a pulse scheduling strategy based on a chaotic sequence is used, so that the emission order of the signal state pulse and the decoy state pulse satisfies a non-periodic pseudo-random distribution in the time domain, avoiding the attacker from inferring the pulse type through timing regularity; the ratio of the real-time negotiated error rate to the protocol error rate security threshold is used as the error rate overrun ratio, and the proportion of the decoy state pulse in the total pulse is linearly increased according to the error rate overrun ratio to determine the dynamic pulse proportion.

[0138] The signal state pulse can be a quantum pulse with high light intensity, used to carry effective key information, and its intensity needs to ensure that the receiving party can stably detect it.

[0139] The laser pulse transmitter can be a core hardware component in a quantum communication device that transmits optical pulses, and needs to support double-intensity pulse output and power adjustment.

[0140] The maximum allowed power can be the maximum optical power threshold at which the laser pulse transmitter can safely operate, and the sum of the intensities of the signal state and the decoy state pulses must be below this value to avoid device abnormalities that cause communication interruptions.

[0141] The pulse scheduling strategy based on chaotic sequences can be a strategy that controls the order of pulse transmission according to unpredictable, aperiodic random number sequences generated by chaotic systems.

[0142] The aperiodic pseudo-random distribution can be a pulse transmission time interval without a fixed rule, and the distribution characteristics conform to pseudo-randomness, making it impossible for attackers to predict pulse types through statistics.

[0143] The error rate overrun ratio can be the multiple of the real-time negotiated error rate exceeding the protocol safety threshold, quantifying the severity of the current interference.

[0144] The linearly increasing process can be a process of dynamically adjusting the decoy state pulse proportion according to the linear proportion relationship between the error rate overrun ratio and the decoy state pulse proportion.

[0145] Specifically, since the interference behavior of the attacker is in dynamic change, if a fixed decoy state proportion is used, it will make it difficult for the bit trap detection mechanism based on the decoy state to cover the dynamic attacks of the attacker, so the decoy state proportion needs to change dynamically with the interference intensity of the attacker, while avoiding the attacker identifying the pulse type by analyzing the transmission rules of the decoy state pulse and the signal state pulse. Set two types of optical intensity level pulses, signal state pulses and decoy state pulses, configure the signal state pulse intensity (such as 1.0 μW) and the decoy state pulse intensity (such as 0.2 μW), ensure that the sum of the two is below the maximum allowed power of the laser pulse transmitter (such as 1.5 μW), preload a chaotic sequence generation algorithm (such as the Lorenz equation) to generate aperiodic random number sequences, map the chaotic sequences to a pulse type decision sequence: emit decoy state when the value is greater than a preset threshold, otherwise emit signal state, schedule pulse transmission time according to the decision sequence to ensure that the interval between adjacent pulses is random and aperiodic; at the same time, calculate the error rate overrun ratio in real time: overrun ratio = (real-time negotiated error rate - protocol safety threshold) / protocol safety threshold, and determine the dynamic pulse proportion according to the linear relationship: decoy state proportion = base proportion + overrun ratio × adjustment coefficient (experimentally fitted).

[0146] By the scheme, the dynamic decoy state proportion mechanism is used to greatly increase the decoy state pulse density in a high error rate scene, force the attack behavior to be more exposed, reduce invalid detection in a low interference scene, break the regularity of transmission timing through chaotic sequence scheduling, so that the attacker cannot evade detection, even if high intensity interference is encountered, the key distribution process can still continue, and the service availability is ensured.

[0147] In some embodiments, based on the classical channel synchronous atomic clock timing reference, the timestamp data in the pulse timestamp distribution data set is uniformly aligned to determine an aligned pulse timestamp data set; according to the aligned pulse timestamp data set, the time intervals corresponding to all adjacent successfully detected pulses are counted to construct a time interval distribution data set; the time interval distribution data set is analyzed, and the corresponding time interval in the time interval distribution data set whose time interval is greater than 3 times the historical average time interval standard deviation is defined as an abnormal interval to construct an abnormal interval distribution data set; if the successfully detected pulse is in any abnormal interval in the abnormal interval distribution data set and both pulses before and after the current successfully detected pulse are successfully detected, the current successfully detected pulse is determined as a high-risk trap pulse to construct high-risk trap pulse information; according to the proportion of the high-risk trap pulse in all successfully detected pulses, combined with the detection rate difference, the trap bit proportion scale is compound weighted evaluated to determine the high-risk trap proportion.

[0148] The classical channel synchronous atomic clock timing reference can be a time reference for time calibration of the atomic clock timing systems of both communication parties through a classical communication channel (non-quantum channel).

[0149] The aligned pulse timestamp data set can be a standardized data set formed by time axis alignment processing of the pulse timestamp data recorded by the sender and the receiver based on the synchronized atomic clock reference.

[0150] The time interval distribution data set can be a set of interval values and their distribution characteristics formed by counting the time intervals (in nanoseconds) between all adjacent successfully detected pulses in the aligned data set.

[0151] The historical average time interval standard deviation can be a quantitative value of the volatility of the pulse time interval in the historical negotiation period.

[0152] The abnormal interval can be an interval in the time interval distribution that exceeds 3 times the standard deviation of the historical average time interval, representing an abnormal period that may exist attack side fake pulse or channel interference.

[0153] The abnormal interval distribution data set can be a data set containing all abnormal interval distribution positions in the current negotiation time axis.

[0154] The high-risk trap pulse can be an isolated pulse located in an abnormal interval and not successfully detected by adjacent pulses before and after, having typical characteristics of an attacker injecting a decoy pulse.

[0155] The trap bit proportion scale can be the proportion of trap bits in all pulse signals.

[0156] The composite weighted evaluation can be a weighted fusion of the proportion of high-risk trap pulses in all successfully detected pulses and the difference in detection rates, quantifying the process of corresponding trap bit proportion scale.

[0157] Specifically, in the detection process of trap bits, the characteristics of the attacker's trap bits are hidden, and the detection difficulty is great. The attacker controls the emission timing of the interference pulse accurately, so that it is the same as the legal pulse in intensity characteristics. Only through the base vector comparison or intensity statistics cannot be detected, the micro anomaly of pulse arrival time needs to be analyzed to identify the trap bits disguised as legal pulses; the reference time signal is transmitted through the classical channel, the atomic clocks of the sender and the receiver are synchronized to the microsecond level, the clock deviation between devices is eliminated, the pulse emission timestamp recorded by the sender and the detection timestamp recorded by the receiver are remapped according to the synchronized time axis, the aligned pulse timestamp data set is generated, the time interval of all adjacent successfully detected pulses in the aligned data set (such as the arrival time difference of pulses n and n+1) is calculated, the average value (μ) and the standard deviation (σ) of the normal time interval are calculated based on the historical communication data, the interval value greater than μ+3σ is marked as an abnormal interval, all successfully detected pulses located in the abnormal interval are traversed, the detection state of the adjacent pulses before and after the current pulse is checked, if the previous pulse and the next pulse of the current pulse are not successfully detected (i.e. isolated pulse), it is marked as a high-risk trap pulse, the proportion of high-risk trap pulses in the total number of successfully detected pulses is calculated as the high-risk trap proportion.

[0158] Through the scheme, the timestamp micro anomaly detection mechanism is used to identify the trap pulses carefully disguised by the attacker, overcome the limitations of traditional intensity detection methods, improve the detection accuracy of trap pulses, reduce the amount of invalid key discarding by accurate positioning of abnormal pulses, improve the utilization rate of surviving bits, and support subsequent efficient reuse and splicing of key fragments.

[0159] In some embodiments, according to a high-risk trap proportion corresponding to each valid key fragment, query preset trap ratio-compression ratio mapping information to determine a key compression ratio corresponding to each valid key fragment; the high-risk trap proportion and the corresponding key compression ratio are positively correlated; according to a total length of bit data corresponding to each valid key fragment, perform preliminary uniformization processing on each valid key fragment respectively by using a length-extensible hash function to determine a key uniformization processing result; according to the key compression ratio corresponding to each valid key fragment, perform key compression processing on the key uniformization processing result corresponding to each valid key fragment respectively by using a quantum-resistant hash function to determine a compressed dynamic key fragment dataset.

[0160] The preset trap ratio-compression ratio mapping information can be a preset pollution ratio-compression intensity correspondence table (such as 20% trap→30% compression).

[0161] The key compression ratio can be a reduction ratio of the key length in the secret amplification process.

[0162] The length-extensible hash function can be a hash algorithm with adjustable output length (such as SHAKE-256), which guarantees bit uniformity.

[0163] The key uniformization processing result can be an intermediate key fragment processed by an extensible hash, which has statistical randomness.

[0164] The quantum-resistant hash function can be a hash algorithm resistant to quantum computing attacks (such as SPHINCS+).

[0165] Specifically, the existing fixed compression ratio secret amplification processing method is difficult to cope with the multiple key fragments with dynamic differences in the present scheme, and is prone to cause over-compression of part of the key fragments, resulting in reduced availability, and is prone to cause insufficient compression of part of the key fragments, resulting in reduced security. The key compression strategy in the present scheme takes the bit trap proportion as the benchmark. The larger the bit trap proportion, the larger the trap bit scale in the current bit data, and the greater the required key compression strength. Conversely, the smaller the compression strength is required. Based on the above principle, the communication parties pre-load a trap proportion-compression ratio mapping table (for example: trap proportion 10% → compression ratio 0.9; proportion 30% → compression ratio 0.7). The mapping table satisfies: the higher the high-risk trap proportion, the lower the key compression ratio (i.e. more thorough compression). For each effective key fragment, a length-extensible hash function (such as SHA-3) is used for processing: input: variable-length key fragment bit stream, output: fixed-length uniformized intermediate data (such as 256-bit digest), eliminating the original fragment length difference, ensuring the standardization of subsequent compression input, and then querying the above mapping table to determine the key compression ratio according to the current fragment high-risk trap proportion, and using a quantum-resistant hash function to perform compression on the uniformized data: according to the compression ratio, a subset of the output digest is intercepted (such as compression ratio 0.8 → intercepting the first 204 bits as the final fragment), and all compressed fragments are integrated to form a compressed dynamic key fragment dataset.

[0166] Through the present scheme, the attack strength is quantified in real time based on the high-risk trap proportion, and the compression ratio is dynamically adjusted, so that the secret amplification strength is accurately matched with the interference severity. Through layered secret amplification processing, "one-size-fits-all" compression is avoided, more effective bits are retained for low-risk fragments, and high-risk fragments are strengthened. Compared with the traditional fixed compression strategy, the residual security risk in the high-interference scenario is significantly reduced. By maximizing the use of low-pollution fragments, the number of negotiation interruptions triggered by insufficient key length is reduced, and the communication link is ensured to provide services in an interference environment.

[0167] In some embodiments, the key length constraint rule is that the total length of the effective key fragments spliced in multiple rounds does not exceed a preset key length threshold; the negotiation round constraint rule is that the maximum negotiation round is set according to the service response speed requirement of the communication parties, the round counter is automatically incremented after completing the key fragment reuse splicing processing in each negotiation round, and when the round counter value is equal to the maximum negotiation round, the current spliced key fragment is used as the resilience reconstruction key.

[0168] The key length constraint rule can be a rule limiting the upper limit of the total bit length of all effective key fragments in a single key splicing process.

[0169] The preset key length threshold can be a single round splicing maximum bit length value allowed in the key length constraint rule.

[0170] The negotiation round constraint rule can be a maximum attempt round rule for limiting key reuse concatenation.

[0171] The service response speed requirement can be a requirement of communication parties for key negotiation response time.

[0172] The maximum negotiation round can be an upper limit of the highest round (such as 3 rounds) allowed for key reuse concatenation.

[0173] The round counter can be an accumulator variable recording the current completed key concatenation round.

[0174] The historical fragment cache can be a data staging area for temporarily storing key fragments to be concatenated.

[0175] Specifically, during the process of continuous high-intensity attack by the attacker, the effective key length obtained each time is different. If the key fragments are allowed to be reused for concatenation indefinitely until the key reaches the requirement, it is easy to cause low key generation efficiency and large service delay. Therefore, the key negotiation round and the key length need to be constrained to achieve a good balance between key generation efficiency and key security. Through the key length constraint rule, the total length of key concatenation under multiple negotiation rounds is constrained. When the key reaches the preset key length threshold, the currently concatenated key is immediately output. At the same time, through the negotiation round constraint rule, the maximum negotiation round is constrained. When the concatenated key cannot reach the preset key length threshold within the corresponding maximum round, the current concatenated key fragment is used as a resilience reconstruction key to improve the key efficiency. According to the service response speed requirement, the maximum negotiation round is set to be in a dynamic change process, avoiding the attacker from mastering the negotiation rule. Through the key length constraint rule and the negotiation round constraint rule, the construction efficiency of the final resilience reconstruction key is basically guaranteed, avoiding the key negotiation process from falling into a dead loop, and introducing uncertainty for the formation time of the resilience reconstruction key, further improving the security of the resilience reconstruction key.

[0176] Through the scheme, the key length constraint rule and the negotiation round constraint rule are used to constrain the length and negotiation round of the resilience reconstruction key obtained by concatenating key fragments, to achieve a good balance between key generation efficiency and key security, so that the construction efficiency of the final resilience reconstruction key is basically guaranteed, avoiding the key negotiation process from falling into a dead loop, and introducing uncertainty for the formation time of the resilience reconstruction key, further improving the security of the resilience reconstruction key.

[0177] In some embodiments, the key fragment life cycle management rule is: after each valid key fragment is generated, a life cycle timer is created and started for it; if the valid key fragment is not used within a preset expiration time threshold, the corresponding valid key is automatically discarded; the interruption recovery rule is: when the communication between the two parties is interrupted due to interference by an attacker, the completed splicing rounds and the key length are recorded, and after the link is recovered, the key reuse splicing is continued from the latest valid checkpoint.

[0178] The life cycle timer can be a countdown timer bound to a single key fragment, which is started from the generation of the fragment.

[0179] The preset expiration time threshold can be a maximum time threshold within which the key fragment is allowed to exist (e.g., 60 seconds).

[0180] The valid checkpoint can be a data snapshot recording the progress of key splicing (e.g., completed rounds, spliced length).

[0181] Specifically, the life cycle management of the key fragment directly affects the security of the key. If the life cycle of the key fragment is not tracked and constrained, an attacker can launch a correlation analysis attack on the key fragment by exploiting the time difference window of the life cycle. After the valid key fragment is processed by the layered security amplification, a dedicated life cycle timer is automatically created and started for the valid key fragment by the QKMS (Quantum Key Management System), with an initial value set as the preset expiration time threshold. The timer independently counts down, and if the fragment is used for splicing within the time threshold, the timer is immediately destroyed. If the timer reaches zero (i.e., it is not used within the time threshold), an automatic discard is triggered: a secure erase algorithm is called to cover the fragment storage area, and the memory and index resources occupied by the fragment are released; when the quantum receiving end detects a communication interruption event (e.g., no photon response for 1 second continuously): the current splicing process is immediately frozen; the completed splicing rounds (e.g., the round counter value) and the spliced key length are written into an encrypted valid checkpoint file; when the quantum channel is restored (e.g., the photon detection is normal): the session layer automatically retrieves the latest valid checkpoint, resumes the splicing site based on the checkpoint data (e.g., continues from the 2nd round, with a remaining splicing length of 3000 bits), and loads the associated key fragments to continue the reuse splicing.

[0182] By this scheme, the life cycle of the valid key fragment is constrained by the key fragment life cycle management rule to avoid an attacker launching a correlation analysis attack on the key fragment by exploiting the time difference window of the life cycle. At the same time, the interruption recovery rule reduces the time consumption of key generation after communication interruption, so that the key generation service maintains high availability under high-intensity continuous interference.

Claims

1. A data quality analysis method for quantum communication data transmission, characterized in that, include: Obtain the real-time key negotiation dataset, analyze the real-time key negotiation dataset, and determine the real-time negotiation bit error rate; The real-time negotiation bit error rate is compared with the protocol bit error rate security threshold. Based on the comparison result, it is determined whether the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism needs to be activated. If it is necessary to activate the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism, then according to the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism, trap filtering and key fragment multiplexing splicing are performed on the surviving bits in several key negotiation processes to determine and output the resilience reconstruction key. The real-time key negotiation dataset includes a unified index dataset, a sender basis vector sequence, a receiver basis vector sequence, and a negotiation sampling quantity; The interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism includes: Based on the sampling index set, several basis vectors corresponding to the sampling index set are removed from the sender basis vector sequence and the receiver basis vector sequence to determine the pre-screened basis vector set; Analyze the pre-screened basis set, and filter the bit data in the sender basis sequence and the receiver basis sequence that have the same basis and the same bit value to form a real-time surviving bit dataset; Based on the quantum bit trap detection strategy, the real-time surviving bit dataset is subjected to bit trap filtering processing to determine the dynamic effective key fragment dataset and the bit trap ratio distribution information set; Based on the trap ratio distribution information set and the bit trap ratio distribution information set, according to the bit trap ratio corresponding to each valid key fragment in the valid key fragment dataset, a hierarchical security amplification strategy is executed to determine the compressed dynamic key fragment dataset. Based on the limited reuse strategy, several key fragments are reused and spliced ​​according to the compressed dynamic key fragment dataset to generate the resilient reconstruction key.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The analysis of the real-time key negotiation dataset to determine the real-time negotiation error rate includes: Based on the unified index dataset, basis vector consistency matching analysis is performed on the sender basis vector sequence and the receiver basis vector sequence, and the corresponding indexes under the basis vector consistency case are recorded to construct a basis vector consistency index set; Based on the negotiated sampling quantity, a corresponding number of indexes are randomly sampled from the basis vector consistency index set to determine the sampling index set; Based on the sampling index set, the number of erroneous bits is determined by publicly comparing the bit value corresponding to each index in the sampling index set through a preset classic authentication channel. The ratio of the number of erroneous bits to the number of negotiated samples is used as the real-time negotiation bit error rate.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The step of comparing the real-time negotiated bit error rate with the protocol bit error rate security threshold, and determining whether to activate the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism based on the comparison result, includes: The protocol error rate security threshold is the protocol security threshold corresponding to the QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) value specified in the quantum key distribution protocol currently used by both communicating parties; The real-time negotiation bit error rate is compared with the protocol bit error rate security threshold. If the real-time negotiation bit error rate is less than the protocol bit error rate security threshold, the classic QKD mechanism (Quantum Key Distribution) is adopted. If the real-time negotiation bit error rate is greater than the protocol bit error rate security threshold, then the interference-driven key resilience reconstruction mechanism is activated.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The quantum bit trap detection strategy includes: Based on the decoy state injection strategy, according to the real-time negotiated bit error rate, the proportion of dynamic pulses that the decoy state pulses need to be in the total transmitted pulses is determined, and according to the proportion of dynamic pulses, the corresponding proportion of the decoy state pulses is generated to construct a decoy state pulse dataset. Based on the decoy state pulse dataset, the precise arrival timestamps of all successfully detected pulses are counted to construct a pulse timestamp distribution dataset; Based on the decoy state pulse dataset, the difference in detection rate between the theoretical detection rate and the actual detection rate of the decoy state pulse is quantified; Based on the timestamp correlation analysis strategy, the pulse timestamp distribution dataset is analyzed according to the detection rate difference to determine the high-risk trap pulse information and the proportion of high-risk traps in the current negotiation process; Based on the high-risk trap pulse information, the bit data under the corresponding index in the real-time surviving bit data set is removed, and the remaining bit data is used as the valid key fragment for the current negotiation process; By integrating the effective key fragments and the proportion of high-risk traps from each negotiation process, the dynamic effective key fragment dataset and the bit trap proportion distribution information set are constructed respectively.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The deceptive injection strategy includes: Two types of pulses with varying light intensity levels are defined: signal state pulses and decoy state pulses. The intensity of the signal state pulse is greater than the intensity of the decoy state pulse; Both the signal state pulse and the decoy state pulse are emitted through the same laser pulse emitter; The sum of the intensity of the signal state pulse and the intensity of the decoy state pulse is less than the maximum allowable power of the laser pulse emitter; During the transmission of the signal state pulse and the decoy state pulse, a pulse scheduling strategy based on chaotic sequences is adopted to ensure that the transmission order of the signal state pulse and the decoy state pulse satisfies an aperiodic pseudo-random distribution in the time domain, thereby preventing attackers from inferring the pulse type through time sequence patterns. The ratio of the real-time negotiated bit error rate to the protocol bit error rate security threshold is used as the bit error rate excess ratio. Based on the bit error rate excess ratio, the proportion of the decoy state pulse in the total pulse is linearly increased to determine the dynamic pulse proportion.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The timestamp association analysis strategy includes: Based on the classic channel-synchronized atomic clock timing reference, the timestamp data in the pulse timestamp distribution dataset is uniformly aligned to determine the aligned pulse timestamp dataset. Based on the aligned pulse timestamp dataset, the time intervals corresponding to all adjacent successful detection pulses are counted to construct a time interval distribution dataset; Analyze the time interval distribution dataset, define the time intervals within the time interval distribution dataset that are greater than 3 times the standard deviation of the historical average time interval as abnormal intervals, and construct an abnormal interval distribution dataset; If the successful detection pulse is located within any of the abnormal intervals in the abnormal interval distribution dataset, and both pulses before and after the current successful detection pulse are successfully detected, then the current successful detection pulse is taken as a high-risk trap pulse, and the high-risk trap pulse information is constructed. Based on the proportion of high-risk trap pulses among all successful detection pulses, and combined with the detection rate difference, a composite weighted evaluation of the trap bit proportion is performed to determine the proportion of high-risk traps.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The layered security amplification strategy includes: Based on the proportion of high-risk traps corresponding to each valid key fragment, query the preset trap ratio-compression ratio mapping information to determine the key compression ratio corresponding to each valid key fragment; The proportion of high-risk traps is positively correlated with the corresponding key compression ratio; Based on the total length of bit data corresponding to each valid key fragment, a length-expandable hash function is used to perform preliminary homogenization processing on each valid key fragment to determine the key homogenization processing result. Based on the key compression ratio corresponding to each valid key fragment, a quantum-resistant hash function is used to perform key compression processing on the key homogenization processing result corresponding to each valid key fragment, thereby determining the compressed dynamic key fragment dataset.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The limited reuse strategy includes: Key length constraint rule: The total length of the effective key fragments spliced ​​together in multiple rounds shall not exceed a preset key length threshold; Negotiation round constraint rules: Based on the service response speed requirements of both communicating parties, a maximum number of negotiation rounds is set. After each round of key fragment multiplexing and splicing processing is completed, the round counter is automatically incremented. When the round counter value is equal to the maximum number of negotiation rounds, the currently spliced ​​key fragment is used as the resilient reconstruction key.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The method further includes: Key fragment lifecycle management rules: After each valid key fragment is generated, a lifecycle timer is created and started for it; If the valid key fragment is not used within the preset expiration period, the corresponding valid key will be automatically discarded. Interruption recovery rules: When communication between the two parties is interrupted due to interference from the attacker, the number of splicing rounds and the key length that have been completed are recorded. After the link is restored, the key reuse splicing is continued from the nearest valid checkpoint.

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