Power grid industrial control system security protection method and device based on block chain

Abstract

The invention discloses a power grid industrial control system security protection scheme based on a block chain, and belongs to the field of power grid automation security. Aiming at the problems of high centralized authentication risk, weak physical layer protection and the like of a traditional industrial control system, a trusted execution environment and intelligent contract response system is constructed through fusion of a block chain distributed account book and a hardware security module (HSM). According to the scheme, equipment physical identity binding and vibration monitoring are achieved through an HSM, the consensus efficiency is optimized through an improved PBFT algorithm, instruction legality, parameter compliance and execution logic rationality are dynamically verified in combination with an intelligent contract, a security baseline is generated in real time, and the instruction stream deviation degree is monitored. The method can dynamically balance the security and real-time performance of the instruction, reduce manual intervention, improve the abnormal response efficiency to a second level, is suitable for industrial control systems such as SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) and the like, remarkably improves the protection capability in scenes such as DDoS attack resistance and physical tampering detection, and provides an extensible intelligent protection normal form for power grid security.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of power grid automation control security, in particular to a power grid industrial control system instruction protection technology based on the fusion of a block chain distributed ledger and a hardware security module (HSM), which is suitable for the whole-process trusted verification, abnormal monitoring and physical layer security reinforcement of instructions of a power grid industrial control system such as SCADA (data acquisition and monitoring control). BACKGROUND

[0002] As the core nerve center of the smart grid, the power grid industrial control system such as the data acquisition and monitoring system SCADA and the energy management system EMS undertakes key tasks such as real-time data acquisition, monitoring control and instruction execution in the power production, transmission and distribution links, and its security is directly related to the national energy security and the stable operation of society. With the deepening of the digital transformation of the power grid, the network interconnection degree of the industrial control system is continuously improved, and the traditional instruction verification architecture based on centralized servers exposes significant security shortcomings. The block chain technology provides an innovative path for building a trusted industrial control security protection system due to its characteristics of decentralization, non-tamperability and traceability. The block chain realizes the decentralized storage and consensus verification of data through distributed ledger technology, and its smart contract mechanism can automatically execute preset rules, providing a new paradigm for solving the trusted management of the whole process of industrial control system instructions. The security protection of the current power grid industrial control system faces the following core challenges: first, the centralized authentication mechanism has a single point of failure risk. The initiation, approval and execution of instructions depend on centralized servers. Once subjected to network attacks (such as malicious code injection and identity forgery), it may cause the paralysis of the instruction flow or misoperation, leading to serious consequences such as large-scale power outages. Second, the traditional communication protocol lacks the ability to store evidence of data tamperability. Instructions may be tampered with by man-in-the-middle attacks during transmission, and due to the lack of trusted audit logs, fault tracing and responsibility identification are difficult. Third, the physical layer security protection is weak. Industrial control devices lack hardware-level identity binding means. Attackers can access the system by forging device identifiers or physically tampering with firmware, and existing security measures cannot effectively identify the authenticity and integrity of device identity. In view of the above security challenges, the present application proposes a power grid industrial control system security protection method that fuses a block chain and a hardware security module (HSM). By building a distributed trusted execution environment, the initiation, approval and execution of industrial control instructions are stored on the chain, and the smart contract is used to monitor abnormal instructions in real time and trigger automatic isolation response. At the same time, the HSM realizes the strong binding of the physical identity of the device and the digital identity of the block chain, forming a three-dimensional protection system of "trusted verification of instruction flow-automatic disposal of abnormal behavior-physical layer security reinforcement", which fundamentally improves the resistance of the industrial control system to network attacks, data tampering and physical layer threats, and provides technical support for the safe and stable operation of the smart grid. SUMMARY

[0003] The application focuses on the deficiencies of instruction security, physical layer protection and emergency response capability in the field of power grid industrial control system security protection, and based on the blockchain, a distributed trusted execution environment is constructed, combined with the hardware security module (HSM) to realize the strong binding of the physical identity and digital identity of the industrial control equipment, and the smart contract is used to realize the real-time monitoring and automatic response of abnormal instructions. A power grid industrial control system security protection method and device based on blockchain are proposed.

[0004] The security protection of the previous power grid industrial control system relies on the mode of fixed rules and manual intervention, and risk control is realized through preset instruction verification logic and regular security inspection. In the instruction legality verification link, the system performs identity verification based on static user permission list and device address whitelist, and only allows instructions that meet the preset rules to pass through network transmission. In the aspect of abnormal monitoring, the main reliance is on the threshold alarm mechanism configured by manual, and when the device operating parameter exceeds the fixed threshold, the early warning is triggered, but the dynamic analysis ability of the overall characteristics of the instruction flow is lacked. This static protection mode is difficult to adaptively adjust the protection strategy when facing new attack means or system running state changes, resulting in problems such as lag of abnormal response, misjudgment of instruction verification, etc. Especially in the scene of power load fluctuation or device firmware upgrade, the limitation of fixed rules is particularly obvious.

[0005] The power grid industrial control system security protection method based on blockchain proposed by the application constructs a three-dimensional adaptive protection system of "dynamic rule engine + hardware trusted verification + smart contract response". The core is to dynamically adjust the security strategy by monitoring the characteristics of the instruction flow and the physical state of the device in real time, and realize the intelligent protection of the whole life cycle of the industrial control system.

[0006] Specifically, the system first collects the identity of the instruction initiator, the instruction parameters, the device running state and other multi-dimensional data in real time through the blockchain distributed ledger, and uses the hash algorithm and digital signature technology to ensure the data integrity. In the smart contract layer, the preset multi-dimensional verification rule set continuously analyzes the characteristics of the instruction flow, including the legality of the instruction source (such as the validity of the initiator's digital certificate), the compliance of the parameters (such as the operation threshold range), the rationality of the execution logic (such as the conflict detection of mutual exclusive instructions), and calculates the deviation degree of the current system state and the safety baseline, forming the real-time risk assessment result.

[0007] At the level of dynamic response mechanism, the application designs a hierarchical response strategy based on smart contract by drawing on the adaptive adjustment idea in control theory. When the smart contract detects abnormal instruction flow, first, through the proportional adjustment module, the current risk deviation is generated to generate immediate response instructions, such as triggering the isolation mechanism immediately for high-risk instructions; second, through the integral adjustment module, the historical risk data is accumulated to identify systematic security risks, and the severity of the global verification rule is dynamically adjusted; finally, through the differential adjustment module, the risk change trend is analyzed to predict potential attack paths and deploy protection resources in advance. For example, when continuous detection of abnormal fluctuations in parameters from a device is detected, the system not only isolates the device immediately, but also adjusts the verification rule weight of the device based on the historical abnormal frequency, and predicts the possible attack diffusion path, and sends pre-hardening instructions to the associated devices. This multi-dimensional adjustment mechanism enables the system to respond quickly in the early stage of attack, optimize the global strategy in the medium-term stage, and continuously evolve the protection capability in the long-term operation.

[0008] At the dimension of hardware trust verification, the application realizes the deep coupling of device physical identity and digital verification through embedded hardware security module (HSM). The HSM chip is built-in with a unique physical feature identifier and a key generation unit. In the device startup stage, through the remote proof mechanism, a verification request containing the firmware hash value is sent to the blockchain node. After the node receives the request, it compares the pre-stored trusted hash value through the smart contract to confirm that the device has not been physically tampered with. In the instruction execution stage, the HSM monitors the device voltage, temperature, vibration and other physical parameters in real time. When abnormal fluctuations are detected (such as vibration mutation triggered by illegal opening), a security alert is immediately broadcast to the entire network through the smart contract, and the device is automatically switched to the standby device to execute instructions. This collaborative verification mechanism of physical and digital layers enables the system to resist physical attacks that traditional software protection cannot identify, such as firmware tampering and device impersonation.

[0009] The technical solution of the present application breaks through the limitations of traditional static protection and realizes innovation in three aspects: first, a dynamic security baseline model based on a block chain is constructed. The traditional system relies on a fixed security threshold set by manual operation, while the present application continuously collects instruction flow characteristic data in a normal operating state by means of a distributed account book, and generates a dynamic security baseline by means of a machine learning algorithm. The baseline is updated in real time with system operating data, and can adapt to changes in power grid load, equipment upgrades and other scenarios, solving the false alarm and missed alarm problems of the fixed threshold in complex operating environments. For example, in the scenario of a power grid with a high penetration rate of new energy, the system can dynamically adjust the instruction verification rules according to the output fluctuation of distributed power sources, ensuring the coordinated execution of new energy access and traditional power grid control instructions. Second, an active defense capability driven by an intelligent contract is realized. The traditional abnormal response relies on manual intervention, while the intelligent contract of the present application can automatically trigger multi-level responses according to the risk assessment results: for pre-warning level abnormalities (such as parameters close to the threshold), automatically record and notify the operation and maintenance personnel; for dangerous level abnormalities (such as illegal instruction injection), immediately isolate the equipment and start traffic cleaning; for attack level abnormalities (such as large-scale instruction forgery), trigger a whole network joint defense, including associated equipment pre-hardening, attack path tracing, etc. This automatic response mechanism shortens the abnormal processing time from minutes in the traditional mode to seconds, significantly improving the emergency disposal capability of the system. Third, a trusted device ecosystem is created through physical-digital collaboration. The traditional device authentication relies on software certificates, which are vulnerable to virus attacks and forgery, while the present application binds the physical characteristics of the HSM chip and the distributed verification of the block chain to construct a trusted system with "hardware identity and decentralized verification process". The digital certificate of each device is bound to the unique physical identifier of the HSM chip, and the certificate update process needs to be verified by the collective verification of the block chain consensus nodes, which fundamentally eliminates the possibility of device identity forgery, and establishes a hardware-level trust root for the power grid industrial control system.

[0010] Compared with the traditional method, the advantages of the present application are reflected in the following four aspects: first, the adaptive capability is improved, through dynamic security baseline and intelligent contract adjustment, the system can automatically optimize the protection strategy according to the operating state of the power grid, reducing the frequency and complexity of manual rule adjustment, especially suitable for modern power grid environments with high penetration of new energy and large load fluctuations. Second, the protection dimension is expanded, through the deep integration of physical layer verification and digital layer protection, the blank in the hardware security layer of the traditional scheme is filled, forming a full-link coverage of the attack chain. Third, the emergency efficiency is innovated, the automatic layered response mechanism of the system realizes the transformation from "passive defense" to "active prediction", and the disposal is completed before the attack has a substantial impact, which can greatly reduce the loss scale of security incidents. Finally, the trusted system is strengthened, as the distributed trust mechanism of the block chain replaces the single-point dependence of the traditional centralized authentication, so even if part of the nodes are attacked, the system can still complete the instruction verification through other nodes, ensuring the continuity and correctness of the key operation.

[0011] In summary, the technical scheme of the present application is not only applicable to the power grid SCADA system, but also can be extended to the industrial control safety protection scene of petroleum and chemical industry, rail transit and other key infrastructures. By constructing a new safety system of "dynamic perception-intelligent decision-making-hardware credibility-collaborative defense", the core safety support is provided for the digital transformation of industrial control systems, and the evolution of key infrastructure protection from "rule-driven" to "data-driven" and "intelligent-driven" is promoted, which has good technical innovation and industrial application value. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0012] Figure 1 The method flowchart of the present application is shown in the figure.

[0013] Figure 2 The technical architecture diagram of the power grid industrial control system safety protection method and device based on blockchain of the present application is shown in the figure.

[0014] Figure 3 The instruction processing flowchart of the present application is shown in the figure.

[0015] The technical architecture of the present application is shown in the figure. Figure 2 As shown in the figure, four-layer modular design is adopted, and the specific functions and connection relationships of each module are as follows:

[0016] ① Application interface layer

[0017] Dispatching system: as the core operation entrance of power grid operation and dispatching, responsible for initiating control instructions (such as device start-stop, parameter adjustment, etc.) to power grid equipment, for example, sending "control and regulate substation equipment voltage to 220V" instruction to blockchain network layer, which is the source of instruction interaction.

[0018] Operation terminal: for daily operation of operation and maintenance personnel, can query device status, manually intervene instruction flow (such as suspend automatic instruction in emergency), bidirectional interaction with blockchain network layer, receive device status feedback and send simple control instruction.

[0019] External supervision interface: connected with power industry supervision platform, uploads power grid industrial control system operation log, instruction execution record and other data according to supervision requirements, obtains supervision data from blockchain network layer and transmits to outside, which is the bridge between system and external supervision.

[0020] Relationship with other modules: through "instruction interaction" channel (industrial Ethernet based on TLS encryption protocol), push various instructions to blockchain network layer, and receive device status, instruction execution result and other information feedback from blockchain network layer, which is the interaction entrance of system and external user, supervision side.

[0021] ② Blockchain network layer

[0022] Substation node: deployed in the substation site, collects the running data of the upper control equipment in the substation (such as equipment temperature, voltage and current parameters, etc.), verifies the legality of the instructions issued from the application interface layer (based on the rules of the smart contract layer), feeds back the verification result to the smart contract layer, and stores the device state data on the chain at the same time.

[0023] Device manufacturer node: maintained by the device manufacturer, stores device original identity information, trusted firmware version, security configuration baseline, etc. When a new device is connected or the device instruction verification involves factory parameters, it cooperates with the blockchain network layer to verify whether the instruction meets the device design specifications, such as whether the instruction parameters exceed the rated operating range of the device.

[0024] Grid dispatching center node: as one of the core consensus nodes of the blockchain network, it aggregates data from substation nodes and device manufacturer nodes, participates in the consensus process of instructions (such as reaching a consensus on control instructions among multiple nodes), stores key instructions and device state data across the network, and ensures data consistency and tamper resistance.

[0025] Relationship with other modules: receives instructions from the application interface layer through an industrial-grade optical fiber network, and feeds back instruction verification requirements to the smart contract layer based on the rules of the smart contract layer; receives abnormal responses and rule execution results from the smart contract layer, and feeds back device control results to the application interface layer; interacts with the upper control equipment side for instruction verification and state collection, and is the network carrier for instruction circulation and data consensus storage.

[0026] ③Smart contract layer

[0027] Instruction management contract: defines the full life cycle rules of instructions, including instruction format specifications (such as instructions containing device ID, operation type, parameter range, etc.), instruction circulation process (after receiving from the application interface layer, which nodes need to be verified and consensus), instruction execution conditions (such as meeting the current state of the device, overall load of the power grid, etc.). When the blockchain network layer transmits instructions, perform verification and scheduling according to the rules, and drive the instructions to circulate in the system.

[0028] Abnormal monitoring contract: real-time analysis of device state data and instruction execution data collected by the blockchain network layer, identification of abnormal conditions (such as sudden changes in device parameters, frequent failures of instructions, etc.) through pre-set algorithms (such as abnormal threshold model based on historical running data of the device). Once an anomaly is detected, trigger the abnormal response process, such as sending a device isolation instruction to the blockchain network layer and pushing alarm information to the application interface layer.

[0029] Relationship with other modules: receive instructions, device status, etc. from the blockchain network layer through the blockchain node communication protocol, execute "rule execution" actions according to contract rules, output instruction verification results, abnormal response instructions to the blockchain network layer, and is the core of the system logic rule execution, which determines whether the instruction can be executed and how to handle the exception.

[0030] ④Upper control device side

[0031] Upper control device (such as intelligent switch, voltage regulating transformer, etc.): the execution terminal of the power grid industrial control system, which receives the control instructions verified by the blockchain network layer, executes device operations (such as switch action, power regulation, etc.), and collects its own running state data (such as running temperature, working mode, current parameters, etc.), and returns to the blockchain network layer.

[0032] HSM chip (hardware security module): integrated in the upper control device, which provides hardware-level security protection for the device. It stores the unique identity key of the device, encrypts sensitive data (such as device running parameters, sensitive information in the instruction verification process), participates in hardware-level identity authentication of the instruction (such as verifying the legality of the instruction source, ensuring that the instruction has not been tampered with), and ensures the security of device instruction interaction and data transmission.

[0033] Relationship with other modules: receive legal instructions from the blockchain network layer through the industrial bus (such as PROFINET) and execute; cooperate with the blockchain network layer through the "instruction verification" mechanism, and complete the identity and integrity verification of the instruction using the HSM chip; return the device running data to the blockchain network layer through encrypted wireless transmission (such as LoRaWAN), which is the final executor of the instruction and the source of the state data. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0034] In order for those skilled in the art to better understand the present application, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be described clearly and completely in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, not all. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative labor should be within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0035] The terms "first", "second", "third", and "fourth" and the like in the description and in the claims of the present application and in the accompanying drawings are used for distinguishing between similar elements and not necessarily described in a particular order. Furthermore, the terms "include", "comprise", "have", and any variations thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion. For example, a process, method, system, product, or device that comprises a list of steps or units are not necessarily limited to the listed steps or units, but can optionally include additional steps or units not expressly listed or can also include steps or units inherent to such process, method, system, product, or device.

[0036] Reference herein to "an embodiment" means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with an embodiment is included in at least one embodiment of the application. The appearances of the phrase in various places in the specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment, nor are they necessarily mutually exclusive of one another. As will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art, embodiments described herein can be combined with other embodiments.

[0037] As shown in Figure 1 , Figure 2 , the embodiment of the present application provides a power grid industrial control system security protection method and device based on a blockchain, comprising steps S1-S7:

[0038] S1: engineering deployment of hardware system

[0039] The first step is to deploy the core consensus node. The wave NF5466M6 server is selected, which is configured with 4 AMD EPYC7763 processors (2.45 GHz / 64 cores), 1 TB DDR4 memory, 8 4TB NVMe solid state drives and a RAID50 array, and is equipped with dual 25G Ethernet adapters. It is deployed in the equal protection level four computer room of the power grid dispatching center, and the environment temperature is controlled at 22±2℃ and the humidity at 45±5% by using Huawei NetCol8000-C200 precision air conditioner, and is connected to the UPS uninterruptible power supply, so as to meet the high concurrent computing demand and guarantee the operation stability. The edge node selects Advantech UNO-4704G industrial computer, which is configured with Intel Xeon D-1727 processor, 128GB memory, 2TB SSD, and dual redundant power modules. After being installed in the transformer substation control cabinet, it is subjected to wide temperature test for 48 hours under-40℃ to 70℃ environment to verify the data transmission stability and ensure its adaptation to the strong electromagnetic interference scene of the transformer substation. For industrial control equipment, the ABB AC500 series PLC is hardware reinforced. After disassembling the shell, the Feitianzhengxin EP300 HSM chip (complying with GM / T0039-2015 standard) is integrated through the PCIe 3.0 interface, and the communication rate between the chip and the CPU needs to be ≥1Gbps. The STMicroelectronics LSM6DSL six-axis inertial sensor is fixed inside the PLC, which is connected to the IO interface of the PLC through wires, configured with 1kHz sampling frequency, and programmed with sliding average filtering algorithm. The vibration threshold is set to root mean square value >1.5g to trigger the alarm, and the PLC relay output is linked to make the alarm light on and cut off the non-critical loop, realizing physical tamper resistance. The purpose of this step is to build a "core node-edge node-industrial control equipment" three-level hardware architecture to provide a hardware foundation for blockchain operation.

[0040] S2: Network building

[0041] The second step is to build an industrial network three-layer isolation system. The core layer deploys Cisco Nexus 9508 switches, enables IEEE 802.1AR device identity authentication, creates dynamic access control lists (ACLs) through an SDN controller, sets the priority of blockchain consensus traffic (ports 7050-7059) to the highest, and sends 40Gbps traffic to the switch for 1 hour through the iperf tool to verify that the packet loss rate is less than 0.1%, ensuring high-speed transmission of blockchain consensus traffic. The aggregation layer deploys Huawei S7703 switches, enables QinQ technology, and identifies business types (instruction flow = 100, status flow = 200, and operation and maintenance flow = 300) with outer VLAN identifiers and device IDs with inner VLAN identifiers. The maximum bandwidth of each type of business flow is configured to be less than or equal to 10Gbps, and the data between different VLANs is verified to be free of cross-VLAN leakage through a traffic mirroring tool, achieving isolation of different business data flows. The access layer deploys Moxa EDS-408A industrial switches, enables PROFINET protocol, and builds a ring topology (each switch connects two adjacent nodes). A certain section of the line is manually disconnected, and the fault recovery time is recorded after 10 consecutive tests to ensure that the self-healing time is less than or equal to 20ms, and the bandwidth is greater than or equal to 2Gbps, achieving real-time data collection of industrial control devices and sensors. This step aims to achieve physical isolation of the industrial network "core layer (consensus traffic) - aggregation layer (business isolation) - access layer (real-time collection)", ensuring the security, real-time performance, and reliability of data transmission.

[0042] S3: Blockchain initialization

[0043] The third step is the initialization of the blockchain alliance chain and the deployment of smart contracts. Docker containers are installed on the core consensus nodes and edge nodes, and the Hyperledger Fabric 2.4 framework is deployed, including three Orderer nodes (core nodes) and five Peer nodes (three core nodes and two edge nodes). The configtxgen tool is used to generate configuration files, define organizations (dispatch center, substation, and device manufacturer), and define node communication ports (orderer = 7050, Peer = 7051). TLS encryption communication is enabled. The consensus algorithm uses an improved PBFT algorithm, and the dynamic weight factor ω i (initial value 0.5) is set in the Peer node configuration file. The weight factor ω i is calculated by the formula ω iThe dynamic adjustment of the consensus timeout time is calculated and written into the consensus configuration file. The smart contract is written based on Chaincode, including instruction management contract and exception monitoring contract (defines an exception score function based on the isolation forest algorithm, and sets the threshold to trigger a response when the exception score > 0.9), and the contract is deployed to all Peer nodes through the peer chaincode install command, and the init function is called to initialize the contract state. In terms of data storage, the core node deploys LevelDB (path / blockchain / leveldb) to store instruction hash and block header, ensuring that the write throughput is ≥ 500,000 times / s; CouchDB (path / blockchain / couchdb) is deployed to store device state logs (JSON format), and Snappy compression is enabled (compression ratio ≥ 2:1), and the test query delay is ≤ 50ms. The purpose of this stage is to build an alliance chain environment that supports dynamic consensus and automatic execution of smart contracts, and to achieve high-throughput writing, efficient querying and tamper-proof storage of instruction data.

[0044] S4: Device interaction setting

[0045] In the fourth step of trusted access and instruction interaction configuration of industrial control equipment, the unique UUID of the device is written to the HSM chip through the Feitian Trust Management Tool, an SM2 key pair is generated (the private key d is stored in the chip, and the public key Q=dG is uploaded to the blockchain), 1000 random numbers are continuously generated, and the entropy source rate is verified through NIST SP 800-22 test to be ≥ 20Mbps. Register the device identity in the blockchain network, call the smart contract registerDevice function, input the device UUID, HSM public key Q, and the substation node ID, complete the "device-HSM-node" binding. In the instruction signature and verification process, in the signature generation stage, the SM2 signature interface of the HSM chip is called to generate the signature (r, s) when the scheduling system initiates the instruction; in the signature verification stage, the smart contract verifySignature function is called to verify whether the signature is valid after the blockchain node receives the instruction. In terms of timestamp and data verification configuration, deploy NTPv4 server (core node) to synchronize all device clocks (accuracy ≤ 100μs); Modbus TCP protocol is used for sensor data transmission, and the heartbeat packet contains device ID, timestamp and calculated CRC32 check code. This step aims to realize the hard binding of device identity through HSM chip, combined with SM2 signature, timestamp and CRC check, to ensure the authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation of instructions and data.

[0046] S5: Abnormality detection

[0047] Abnormality detection and dynamic response mechanism configuration phase, 100,000 instruction data (including type, parameter, response time) during normal operation are collected, the model is trained through the isolation forest algorithm, 256 samples are randomly selected to construct a binary tree, the path length is calculated, and the model parameters (tree structure, abnormal threshold 0.9) are written into the abnormality monitoring contract. The smart contract defines three levels of response: the warning level (0.7 < s(x) ≤ 0.9) calls the logWarning function to record logs and notify the operation and maintenance terminal; the dangerous level threshold calls the isolateDevice function to send an isolation instruction (cut off the device control loop) to the transformer node; the attack level (5 consecutive dangerous levels) calls the globalDefense function to trigger network node flow cleaning (IP blacklist update). For device response delay, a PID controller is deployed, and the parameters are tuned by the Ziegler-Nichols method, with the goal of controlling the instruction execution delay within 500ms (99% percentile). The purpose of this step is to realize real-time identification and automated response of abnormal behavior, adapt to power grid load changes through dynamic baseline, optimize response efficiency through PID adjustment, and reduce manual intervention.

[0048] S6: System testing and optimization

[0049] In the 6th step of system testing and performance optimization, functional testing is performed, 1000 legal instructions (switching / regulating / querying) are simulated, signature verification pass rate (100%) and contract state transition correctness (100%) are verified; 200 abnormal instructions (parameter out of limit / fake signature) are simulated, abnormality detection accuracy (≥99%) and response timeliness (≤200ms) are verified. Performance testing uses Hyperledger Caliper, 100 clients send instructions concurrently for 1 hour, records peak TPS (≥8000), average block interval (≤200ms), and consensus delay (99% percentile ≤500ms). In the security test, a DDoS attack of 10Gbps traffic is launched through the LOIC tool to verify the system's traffic cleaning capability (20 million data packets per second, instruction success rate ≥99.9%); physical tampering test is performed by applying 4g acceleration with a vibration table to verify HSM alarm trigger time (≤200ms) and blockchain storage integrity (100%). According to the test results, optimization and adjustment are carried out, if TPS is not up to standard, increase the number of Peer nodes (up to 8); if the delay is too high, adjust the PBFT consensus node weight (core node weight increased to 0.8). This phase aims to verify system function, performance and security through comprehensive testing, optimize bottlenecks to ensure high reliability and high security requirements of power industry control scenarios.

[0050] S7: System operation and upgrade management

[0051] The system operation and upgrade management is finally performed in step 7, the Zabbix monitoring is deployed to monitor the CPU utilization (≤70%), the memory occupation (≤80%) and the HSM temperature (≤60℃) of the core node, and a short message is sent for alarm when the threshold is exceeded. New SM2 key pairs are generated every month through quantum key distribution (BB84 protocol), and the contract updateKey function is called to complete the HSM key rotation (the old key is immediately invalidated). When the business rules change (such as adding new device types), the contract is upgraded through the peer chaincode upgrade command, and the historical version is retained (supporting rollback). According to the IEC 62351-9 standard, a blockchain signature field is added to the application layer of the DNP3.0 protocol; the NERC CIP-007-6 physical security requirements are met (HSM interlocking lock is installed on the equipment cabinet door). The purpose of this step is to ensure the long-term stable operation of the system, and to cope with hardware aging, key leakage and standard updates through regular maintenance and upgrades, thereby extending the system life cycle.

[0052] In summary, the present embodiment constructs a set of logical and advanced power grid industrial control system security protection system through in-depth research and practice in hardware systems, blockchain technology, industrial control interaction, security protection and system testing. The system is significantly superior to traditional solutions in terms of instruction processing efficiency, abnormal response speed, data security protection and other key indicators through precise mathematical modeling, innovative algorithm design and strict engineering implementation. It not only provides reliable protection for industrial control security in the power industry, but also provides a technical paradigm with reference significance for security protection in other critical infrastructure fields, and has important academic value and broad application prospects.

Claims

1. A blockchain-based security protection method for power grid industrial control systems, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: ① Constructing a blockchain network and deploying smart contracts: Build a blockchain consortium chain containing core nodes and edge nodes. The core nodes are deployed in the power grid dispatch center, and the edge nodes are deployed in substations. Deploy instruction management contracts and anomaly monitoring contracts in the blockchain network. The instruction management contract defines the instruction format specifications, flow process and execution conditions, and the anomaly monitoring contract configures the anomaly detection algorithm and response rules. ② Trusted access configuration for industrial control equipment: Hardware security module (HSM) chips and physical sensors are integrated into industrial control equipment. The HSM chip generates a unique key pair for the equipment, associates the equipment identity information with the public key, and uploads it to the blockchain to complete the registration, thereby binding the physical identity of the equipment with the digital identity on the blockchain; the physical sensors are used to collect the physical parameters of the equipment during operation. ③ Instruction generation and on-chain verification: The scheduling system of the application interface layer initiates control instructions, calls the HSM chip to digitally sign the instructions, and then sends them to the blockchain network layer; after receiving the instructions, the nodes of the blockchain network layer verify the legality of the instruction signature, the compliance of the parameters, and the execution conditions based on the instruction management contract, reach a verification result through the consensus mechanism, and store the instructions and verification results on the chain. ④ Anomaly Detection and Dynamic Response: The anomaly monitoring contract analyzes the device status data and command execution data collected by the blockchain network layer in real time, and combines them with the physical parameters collected by physical sensors to identify abnormal situations through anomaly detection algorithms. When an anomaly is detected, the corresponding response strategy is triggered according to the anomaly level, including logging, device isolation or network-wide defense.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In the steps of building the blockchain network and deploying smart contracts, the core nodes use high-configuration servers to meet the high-concurrency computing requirements; the edge nodes use industrial computers to adapt to the operating environment of substations; and the blockchain network uses an improved PBFT consensus algorithm to dynamically adjust node weights based on the historical consensus accuracy of the nodes.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In the trusted access configuration steps of the industrial control equipment, the HSM chip conforms to the national cryptographic standard and supports the national cryptographic algorithm for key generation and digital signature; the physical sensor includes a six-axis inertial sensor for monitoring the vibration parameters of the equipment. When the vibration parameters exceed the preset threshold, a local alarm is triggered on the equipment and synchronized to the blockchain.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In the instruction generation and on-chain verification steps, the instruction signature and verification adopt the SM2 national cryptographic algorithm; the instruction flow process includes: the scheduling system initiates the instruction → the blockchain network layer node verifies the instruction → consensus is reached → the instruction is sent to the industrial control equipment for execution → the execution result is fed back on the chain.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In the anomaly detection and dynamic response steps, the anomaly detection algorithm adopts the isolated forest algorithm, which calculates the anomaly score of real-time command data by training the command data generation model under normal operating conditions. The anomaly levels include warning level, danger level and attack level, corresponding to different response strategies: at the warning level, logs are recorded and the operation and maintenance terminal is notified; at the danger level, device isolation is triggered; and at the attack level, network-wide node traffic cleaning and associated device pre-hardening are initiated.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, It also includes system operation and maintenance steps: regularly updating the key pairs in the HSM chip through quantum key distribution technology, calling smart contracts to complete the on-chain update of key information; monitoring the status of blockchain network nodes and industrial control equipment, and triggering alarms when hardware parameters exceed thresholds.

7. A blockchain-based security protection device for power grid industrial control systems, characterized in that, include: ① Application Interface Layer: Includes scheduling system, operation terminal and external supervision interface; The scheduling system is used to initiate control commands for industrial control equipment; The operation terminal is used to query equipment status and execute manual intervention commands; the external monitoring interface is used to upload system operation data to the monitoring platform. ② Blockchain network layer: includes substation nodes, equipment manufacturer nodes, and power grid dispatch center nodes; substation nodes are used to collect operating data of industrial control equipment and verify the legality of commands; equipment manufacturer nodes store the original identity information and security configuration baseline of the equipment; The power grid dispatch center node acts as a consensus node, aggregating data and participating in the command consensus process; ③ Smart Contract Layer: This layer includes an instruction management contract and an anomaly monitoring contract. The instruction management contract is used to verify the legality of the instruction source, the compliance of the parameters, and the rationality of the execution logic. The anomaly monitoring contract is used to analyze the device status and instruction execution data in real time, identify anomalies, and trigger response strategies. ④ Upper control equipment side: including industrial control equipment, hardware security module (HSM) chip and physical sensors; industrial control equipment is used to execute verified control commands; HSM chip is used to store device keys and generate digital signatures; physical sensors are used to collect device physical parameters and monitor physical tampering.

8. The apparatus according to claim 7, characterized in that, The blockchain network layer adopts a three-layer isolation architecture of industrial networks. The core layer deploys high-priority switches to ensure consensus traffic transmission; the aggregation layer uses dynamic access control lists to isolate different business data streams; and the access layer uses a ring topology to build an industrial bus to ensure real-time data acquisition from devices.

9. The apparatus according to claim 7, characterized in that, The HSM chip is integrated inside the industrial control equipment and communicates with the CPU of the industrial control equipment through the PCIe interface. It supports encryption calculation and signature verification using national cryptographic algorithms. The physical sensors include a six-axis inertial sensor, which is used to monitor the vibration parameters of the equipment. When the vibration parameters exceed a preset threshold, the equipment alarm is triggered.

10. The apparatus according to claim 7, characterized in that, The smart contract layer's anomaly monitoring contract is configured with a three-level response mechanism: when an alarm-level anomaly occurs, logs are recorded and the operation and maintenance terminal is notified; when a dangerous-level anomaly occurs, a device isolation command is triggered; when an attack-level anomaly occurs, network-wide node traffic cleaning and attack path prediction are initiated, and a pre-hardening command is sent to associated devices.

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