Electric energy meter data transmission method and device, electric energy meter and storage medium

Abstract

The application provides an electric energy meter data transmission method and device, an electric energy meter and a storage medium, and relates to the technical field of electric energy meter information security. The method comprises the following steps: generating a random number by using a quantum random number generator; sending a quantum key negotiation request to a data center by using the random number through a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, wherein the quantum key negotiation request is used for negotiating and obtaining a shared quantum key with the data center, and the shared quantum key is stored in a trusted execution environment (TEE); sending identity authentication information encrypted by using the shared quantum key to the data center, so as to complete mutual identity verification by decrypting the identity authentication information through the data center; and encrypting to-be-transmitted data according to the random number generated by the quantum random number generator and the shared quantum key, and sending the encrypted to-be-transmitted data to the data center. The application can ensure the security of the electric energy meter data reporting process.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of electric energy meter information security, in particular to an electric energy meter data transmission method and device, an electric energy meter and a storage medium. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the development of information technology, traditional electric meters have been gradually replaced by smart electric meters. Smart electric meters have more powerful processing functions and can also measure and upload related power data through a network.

[0003] However, information security problems also arise. The existing electric energy meters generally use relatively basic encryption technology when transmitting data to a data center, which is vulnerable to attacks and data theft. In particular, the power consumption data of some confidential units may be stolen, thereby causing information leakage and other losses to power users. SUMMARY

[0004] The present application aims to overcome the deficiencies in the prior art and provide an electric energy meter data transmission method, device, electric energy meter and storage medium to ensure the security of the electric energy meter data reporting process.

[0005] To achieve the above-mentioned purpose, the technical solutions adopted by the embodiments of the present application are as follows:

[0006] In a first aspect, the embodiments of the present application provide an electric energy meter data transmission method applied to an electric energy meter. The electric energy meter and a data center are connected through quantum optical fibers. The method comprises the following steps:

[0007] generating a random number using a quantum random number generator;

[0008] sending a quantum key negotiation request to the data center using the random number through a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, wherein the quantum key negotiation request is used to negotiate a shared quantum key with the data center, and the shared quantum key is stored in a trusted execution environment (TEE);

[0009] sending identity authentication information encrypted using the shared quantum key to the data center to complete mutual identity verification by decrypting the identity authentication information through the data center;

[0010] encrypting the data to be transmitted using the random number generated by the quantum random number generator and the shared quantum key, and sending the encrypted data to be transmitted to the data center.

[0011] Optionally, after sending the encrypted data to be transmitted to the data center, the method further comprises the following steps:

[0012] In the process of sending the encrypted to-be-transmitted data to the data center, the bit error rate is continuously monitored through the QKD protocol;

[0013] According to the bit error rate analysis, it is determined whether there is data stealing.

[0014] Optionally, after the quantum key distribution QKD protocol is sent to the data center by using the random number, quantum key negotiation request, the method further comprises:

[0015] The shared quantum key is encrypted by calling a physically unclonable function (PUF), and an encrypted quantum key is obtained.

[0016] The encrypted quantum key is stored in the TEE.

[0017] Optionally, the shared quantum key is encrypted by calling the PUF, and the encrypted quantum key is obtained.

[0018] The PUF generates an encryption identifier according to the physical differences of the chip in the electric energy meter.

[0019] The shared quantum key is encrypted by using the encryption identifier, and an encrypted quantum key is obtained.

[0020] Optionally, after the to-be-transmitted data is encrypted by the random number generated by the quantum random number generator and the shared quantum key, and the encrypted to-be-transmitted data is sent to the data center, the method further comprises:

[0021] Receiving security feedback information sent by the data center after the to-be-transmitted data is decrypted, the security feedback information being used to indicate whether the to-be-transmitted data is stolen or tampered with based on the decryption process evaluation of the data center.

[0022] Optionally, a physical detection sensor is arranged in the electric energy meter, and the method further comprises:

[0023] Whether a damage event exists in the hardware structure of the electric energy meter is monitored through the physical detection sensor.

[0024] If a damage event signal fed back by the physical detection sensor or abnormal power consumption data is monitored, an alarm of the alarm of the electric energy meter is triggered and a defense mode is started.

[0025] Optionally, the alarm of the alarm of the electric energy meter is triggered and the defense mode is started, comprising:

[0026] The alarm is triggered to emit a buzzing sound, and alarm information is sent to the data center.

[0027] If there is current data transmission, the data transmission is suspended and the transmission network is cut off.

[0028] In a second aspect, the embodiments of the present application also provide an electric energy meter data transmission device, applied to an electric energy meter, and a data center are connected through quantum optical fibers, the device comprises:

[0029] A random number generation module is configured to generate a random number by using a quantum random number generator;

[0030] A key negotiation module is configured to send a quantum key negotiation request to the data center by using the random number and through a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, the quantum key negotiation request is used to negotiate a shared quantum key with the data center, and the shared quantum key is stored in a trusted execution environment (TEE);

[0031] An identity authentication module is configured to send identity authentication information encrypted by using the shared quantum key to the data center, so as to complete mutual identity authentication by decrypting the identity authentication information through the data center;

[0032] A data transmission module is configured to encrypt to-be-transmitted data according to the random number generated by the quantum random number generator and the shared quantum key, and send the encrypted to-be-transmitted data to the data center.

[0033] Optionally, the device further comprises:

[0034] A monitoring module is configured to continuously monitor a bit error rate through the QKD protocol in the process of sending the encrypted to-be-transmitted data to the data center, and determine whether there is data stealing according to the bit error rate analysis.

[0035] Optionally, the device further comprises:

[0036] An encryption module is configured to call a physically unclonable function (PUF) to encrypt the shared quantum key, obtain an encrypted quantum key, and store the encrypted quantum key in the TEE.

[0037] Optionally, the encryption module is specifically configured to call the PUF to generate an encrypted identifier according to physical differences of chips in the electric energy meter, and encrypt the shared quantum key by using the encrypted identifier to obtain the encrypted quantum key.

[0038] Optionally, the device further comprises:

[0039] A feedback information receiving module is configured to receive security feedback information sent by the data center after decrypting and obtaining the to-be-transmitted data, and the security feedback information is used to indicate whether the to-be-transmitted data is stolen or tampered with based on an evaluation of a decryption process by the data center.

[0040] Optionally, the electric energy meter is provided with a physical detection sensor; the device further comprises:

[0041] an alarm module, configured to monitor whether a damage event exists in the hardware structure of the electric energy meter through the physical detection sensor; if a damage event signal fed back by the physical detection sensor is received or abnormal power consumption data is monitored, triggering an alarm of the alarm of the electric energy meter and starting a defense mode.

[0042] Optionally, the alarm module is specifically configured to trigger the alarm to emit a buzzing sound and send alarm information to the data center; if data transmission currently exists, suspending the data transmission and cutting off the transmission network.

[0043] In a third aspect, the embodiments of the present application further provide an electric energy meter, comprising: a metering unit and a quantum encryption unit; the metering unit is in communication connection with the quantum encryption unit, the metering unit is configured to collect power signals and generate to-be-transmitted data, and the quantum encryption unit is in communication connection with a data center through a quantum optical fiber to perform the steps of the electric energy meter data transmission method according to any one of the first aspect, so as to realize data transmission between the electric energy meter and the data center.

[0044] In a fourth aspect, the embodiments of the present application further provide a computer readable storage medium, the storage medium stores a computer program, and the computer program is run by a processor to perform the steps of the electric energy meter data transmission method according to any one of the first aspect.

[0045] The beneficial effects of the present application are:

[0046] The electric energy meter data transmission method, device, electric energy meter and storage medium provided by the present application introduce a quantum random number generator and a quantum key distribution protocol to ensure the unconditional security of the quantum key generated between the electric energy meter and the data center, can actively detect and resist eavesdropping behavior, store the shared quantum key through the trusted execution environment, can guarantee the safe storage and use of the shared quantum key, effectively prevent key leakage, through the identity authentication and data encryption based on the quantum key, realize the strong identity authentication between the electric energy meter and the data center and the integrity and tamper resistance of data transmission, ensure the security of the data uploaded by the electric energy meter to the data center, and are especially suitable for the scene of the smart grid which has very high requirements for data security. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0047] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the following will briefly introduce the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments. It should be understood that the following drawings only show some embodiments of the present application, and therefore should not be regarded as a limitation on the scope. For those skilled in the art, other related drawings can also be obtained without creative labor.

[0048] Figure 1 This is an architecture diagram of an energy meter data transmission system provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0049] Figure 2 A flowchart illustrating the electricity meter data transmission method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 1 ;

[0050] Figure 3 A flowchart illustrating the electricity meter data transmission method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 2 ;

[0051] Figure 4 A flowchart illustrating the electricity meter data transmission method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 3 ;

[0052] Figure 4 A flowchart illustrating the electricity meter data transmission method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 6 ;

[0053] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the electricity meter data transmission device provided in the embodiments of this application;

[0054] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of an electricity meter provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0055] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of this application clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are some embodiments of this application, but not all embodiments.

[0056] Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of this application provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the claimed application, but merely to illustrate selected embodiments of the application. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of this application without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0057] Moreover, the terms "first", "second", and the like in the description and in the claims of the present application are used for distinguishing between similar objects and not necessarily for describing a specific sequential or chronological order. It is to be understood that the use of these terms herein is merely for distinguishing between the similar objects and the use of these terms in the context of the present application is not a representation that a specific order or chronology is intended or must be followed, either implicitly or explicitly. Further, the terms "comprises", "comprising", "includes", "including" and the like are to be construed open-ended, meaning that they allow for the possibility that there are additional steps or elements that are not recited, these steps or elements being understood to be implicitly present in any such process, method, system, product or device. Further, the terms "can" and "may" and the like are used throughout this application in a permissive sense (i.e., having the potential to, being able to, or maybe), not in a mandatory sense (i.e., must). The term "example" is used to provide

[0058] It should be noted that the features of the embodiments of the present application can be combined if there is no conflict.

[0059] In order to better understand the present application, the following first introduces the electric energy meter data transmission system to which the present application is applied.

[0060] Figure 1 The architecture diagram of the electric energy meter data transmission system provided by the embodiments of the present application is shown in Figure 2 The electric energy meter data transmission system includes a plurality of electric energy meters 100 and a data center 200, and the plurality of electric energy meters 100 are in communication connection with the data center 200 through quantum optical fibers.

[0061] In some embodiments, a wavelength division multiplexer is used at both ends of the quantum optical fiber to form a quantum channel and a public channel (classical channel) between the electric energy meter and the data center, the quantum channel is used to transmit photon pulses, and the public channel is used to transmit conventional data.

[0062] The electric energy meter data transmission method provided by the present application is applied to the electric energy meter of the electric energy meter data transmission system, and the specific implementation manner of the electric energy meter data transmission method applied to the electric energy meter will be introduced in combination with the embodiments.

[0063] Figure 1 The flowchart of the electric energy meter data transmission method provided by the embodiments of the present application is shown in Figure 2 As shown in the figure, the method can include: Figure 3

[0064] S301, generating a random number by using a quantum random number generator.

[0065] ​In the embodiment, a quantum random number generator (QRNG) is built in the electric energy meter. The QRNG is a device for generating a true random number by using quantum mechanics principles such as quantum superposition and quantum tunneling. The random number generated by the QRNG has unpredictability and irreproducibility.

[0066] When the metering chip of the electric energy meter needs to report the collected data, the QRNG generates a random number. The generated random number includes a random bit sequence and a random encoding base sequence. The random bit sequence is composed of randomly arranged data 0 and 1. The random encoding base sequence is composed of randomly arranged orthogonal bases and diagonal bases. The orthogonal base controls the horizontal polarization of the photon pulse for data 0 and controls the vertical polarization of the photon pulse for data 1. The diagonal base controls the +45° polarization of the photon pulse for data 0 and controls the -45° polarization of the photon pulse for data 1. The length of the random bit sequence is the same as that of the random encoding base sequence.

[0067] In S302, a quantum key negotiation request is sent to the data center by using the random number and through a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. The quantum key negotiation request is used to negotiate with the data center to obtain a shared quantum key. The shared quantum key is stored in a trusted execution environment (TEE).

[0068] In the embodiment, a quantum transmitter module is integrated in the electric energy meter. The core of the quantum transmitter module is a weak laser source, which is used to generate a photon pulse sequence to be sent. The number of photons in the photon pulse sequence is equal to the number of bits in the random bit sequence.

[0069] The process of quantum key negotiation between the electric energy meter and the data center is actually a process of encoding and decoding a random bit sequence by using a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. The QKD protocol can be, for example, a BB84 protocol or a Q91 protocol. In this embodiment, the BB84 protocol is used to illustrate the process of negotiating a shared quantum key K_shared between the electric energy meter and the data center.

[0070] Specifically, based on the photon pulse generated by the quantum transmitter module, the polarization of each photon in the photon pulse sequence is performed according to each bit data in the random bit sequence and each encoding base in the random encoding base sequence, so that the polarized photon pulse carries the bit data.

[0071] The electric energy meter sends a sequence of randomly polarized photon pulses to the data center through a quantum channel. After receiving the sequence of photon pulses, the data center randomly selects a measurement basis for each photon pulse to form a sequence of random measurement bases, decodes each photon pulse according to each measurement basis in the sequence of random measurement bases. If the measurement basis of each photon pulse is the same as the encoding basis, the correct bit can be decoded from the photon pulse. If the measurement basis of each photon pulse is different from the encoding basis, the decoding result is completely random, which may be 1 or 0.

[0072] For example, the electric energy meter sends a vertical photon (data 1) using a right-angle basis, and the data center decodes the vertical photon using a right-angle basis, so that data 1 can be obtained. If the data center uses a diagonal basis, it may decode 1 or 0.

[0073] After the data center decodes the sequence of photon pulses using the sequence of random measurement bases, a sequence of decoded bits is obtained. Subsequently, the data center sends the sequence of decoded bits to the electric energy meter through a public channel. The electric energy meter compares the sequence of random bits and the sequence of decoded bits bit by bit to determine the positions where the same basis is used, and forms a list of matching basis indexes. The electric energy meter then notifies the data center of the list of matching basis indexes.

[0074] The electric energy meter and the data center each generate a shared quantum key K_shared using the bit data at the positions indicated in the list of matching basis indexes.

[0075] After the electric energy meter and the data center each generate the shared quantum key K_shared, they store the shared quantum key K_shared in their respective trusted execution environments (TEEs) to ensure that the shared quantum key K_shared is not stolen by an operating system or malicious software. The TEE is a secure area isolated based on hardware, which is isolated from the area running the conventional operating system and application program, and has independent resources such as memory, storage, and peripherals, providing a secure execution environment.

[0076] S303, send identity authentication information encrypted using the shared quantum key to the data center to complete identity verification through decryption of the identity authentication information by the data center.

[0077] In the embodiment, the identity authentication information of the electric energy meter can be a device identifier, a digital certificate, a digital signature, etc. of the electric energy meter, and the embodiment does not limit the same. The encryption and decryption module of the electric energy meter uses the shared quantum key K shared and a preset symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt the identity authentication information, generates encrypted identity authentication information, and transmits the encrypted identity authentication information to the data center through a public channel. The data center uses the shared quantum key K shared held by itself to decrypt the encrypted identity authentication information. If the decryption is successful and the decrypted identity authentication information is a legal device registered in the database, it is determined that the identity authentication is passed.

[0078] After the identity authentication is passed, the data center returns an encrypted confirmation response to the electric energy meter. The electric energy meter decrypts the encrypted confirmation response. After the decryption is successful, it is determined that the two-way identity authentication between the data center and the electric energy meter is completed.

[0079] In some embodiments, the data center can send a challenge number to the electric energy meter. The electric energy meter returns the challenge number encrypted by the shared quantum key K shared to the data center. The data center also encrypts the challenge number by the shared quantum key K shared and compares the encrypted result of itself with the encrypted data sent by the electric energy meter. If they are consistent, it is determined that the two-way authentication is passed.

[0080] S304, encrypt the to-be-transmitted data according to the random number generated by the quantum random number generator and the shared quantum key, and send the encrypted to-be-transmitted data to the data center.

[0081] In the embodiment, the to-be-transmitted data can be service data that needs to be reported by the electric energy meter, such as voltage data, current data, power data, electric quantity data, timestamp information, etc.

[0082] The electric energy meter calls QRNG to generate a new random number at this time, ensuring that even if the same data is encrypted, the ciphertext generated each time is not the same, preventing replay attacks.

[0083] The metering unit of the electric energy meter sends the to-be-transmitted data to the TEE. In the TEE, the to-be-transmitted data is encrypted using a new random number, a shared quantum key K shared, and a preset quantum encryption method. The data packet is sent to the data center, and the data packet includes the new random number and the encrypted to-be-transmitted data.

[0084] After receiving the data packet, the data center decrypts the encrypted to-be-transmitted data according to the new random number and the shared quantum key K shared, and obtains the to-be-transmitted data.

[0085] In some embodiments, in order to improve the security of data transmission, a new random number can be used to encrypt the to-be-transmitted data, to generate encrypted to-be-transmitted data, the shared quantum key K shared can be used to encrypt the new random number, to generate an encrypted random number, and the encrypted random number and the encrypted to-be-transmitted data are included in the data packet. After the data center receives the data packet, the encrypted random number is first decrypted using the shared quantum key K shared to obtain the new random number, and the encrypted to-be-transmitted data is decrypted using the new random number to obtain the to-be-transmitted data. In this way, the to-be-transmitted data can be prevented from being stolen due to the leakage of the random number in the transmission process.

[0086] The electric energy meter data transmission method provided in the above embodiments introduces a quantum random number generator and a quantum key distribution protocol, ensures the unconditional security of the quantum key generated between the electric energy meter and the data center, can actively detect and resist eavesdropping behavior, stores the shared quantum key in a trusted execution environment, can guarantee the secure storage and use of the shared quantum key, effectively prevents key leakage, realizes strong identity authentication between the electric energy meter and the data center, and the integrity and tamper resistance of data transmission through identity authentication and data encryption based on the quantum key, ensures the security of data uploaded by the electric energy meter to the data center, and is particularly suitable for scenarios of the smart grid that have very high requirements for data security.

[0087] In a possible implementation manner, Figure 2 The flowchart of the electric energy meter data transmission method provided in the embodiments of the present application is shown in Figure 3 As shown in Figure 4 After the above S304, the method can further include:

[0088] S401, in the process of sending the encrypted to-be-transmitted data to the data center, continuously monitor the bit error rate through the QKD protocol.

[0089] S402, determine whether there is data theft according to the bit error rate analysis.

[0090] In the present embodiment, in order to avoid the to-be-transmitted data being stolen, it is essentially necessary to ensure that the shared quantum key K shared is not stolen. Since the shared quantum key K shared has a life cycle in the data transmission process, that is, the shared quantum key K shared between the electric energy meter and the data center will be updated periodically, therefore, an attacker will usually monitor the quantum channel for a long time to collect as many keys as possible. In order to avoid this situation, a test signal of a quantum state can be periodically sent in the quantum channel during the transmission of the encrypted to-be-transmitted data between the electric energy meter and the data center through the public channel.

[0091] The meter and the data center compare the encoding bases used by the meter and the data center to send the test signals and the measurement bases used by the meter and the data center to decode the test signals, and screen out bits using the same base.

[0092] The meter and the data center extract a preset proportion of bit data from the batch of monitoring bits, determine the amount of data in which the bit data at the same position is inconsistent, and calculate a quantum bit error rate (QBER) according to the ratio of the amount of data in which the bit data is inconsistent to the amount of data of the preset proportion of bit data. If the QBER is greater than a preset error rate threshold, it means that there may be an attacker in the quantum channel at present, that is, the data to be transmitted is at risk of being eavesdropped, and it is necessary to immediately stop data transmission and negotiate a new quantum key, and further trigger an audit log to record a security event for subsequent backtracking of possibly leaked data.

[0093] The meter data transmission method provided in the above embodiment changes security protection from static defense to dynamic defense by continuously monitoring the bit error rate during data transmission, implements detection of possible eavesdropping behavior during data transmission, and immediately triggers an alarm and takes measures once the bit error rate is detected to be high, thereby greatly improving the security during data transmission.

[0094] In a possible implementation manner, Figure 3 The meter data transmission method provided in the above embodiment provides a flowchart Figure 4 As shown in the above S302, after the quantum key negotiation request is sent to the data center by using the random number through the quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, the method can further include the following steps. Figure 5

[0095] S501, calling a physically unclonable function (PUF) to encrypt the shared quantum key, to obtain an encrypted quantum key.

[0096] S502, storing the encrypted quantum key in a trusted execution environment (TEE).

[0097] In this embodiment, the physically unclonable function (PUF) is a hardware security technology that uses uncontrollable microscopic physical differences existing in a semiconductor manufacturing process as a “fingerprint”. According to the hardware resources of the meter chip, a PUF circuit suitable for the meter chip is selected, and the selected PUF circuit is embedded in the integrated circuit of the master control chip of the meter, adjacent to the encryption and decryption module and the like, to reduce signal interference.

[0098] ​In some embodiments, the initial value (0 or 1) of each memory cell of the static random access memory (SRAM) is determined by the microscopic difference of the transistor threshold value when the power is turned on, so the PUF circuit can directly reuse the SRAM of the master chip of the electric energy meter, and a binary sequence is formed according to the initial state difference of the SRAM.

[0099] In other embodiments, a plurality of ring oscillators (closed loop circuits composed of inverters, which can autonomously oscillate to generate clock signals) with the same structure are integrated in the electric energy meter chip as the PUF circuit (RO UPF). Due to the transistor delay difference in the manufacturing process, the actual oscillation frequency of the oscillators will be different. By comparing the frequency of multiple oscillators, a binary sequence is generated. For example, if the frequency of oscillator A is greater than that of oscillator B, then output 1, otherwise output 0.

[0100] In other embodiments, a symmetric signal path circuit can be designed as a PUF circuit (butterfly UPF). The microscopic differences in wire resistance and transistor switching speed in the two paths are used to determine the time difference of the signal arrival through an arbitrator, output 0 or 1, and a binary sequence F can be generated through multiple tests.

[0101] The electric energy meter chip calls the integrated PUF circuit in the TEE, inputs a preset and fixed challenge value C to the PUF circuit, and the PUF circuit outputs an original response value R based on the unique physical characteristics of its hardware. The original response value R is a binary sequence. Based on the original response value R and the public helper data H generated and stored by the electric energy meter chip before leaving the factory, a symmetric key K_PUF is generated. The symmetric key K_PUF is only temporarily reconstructed inside the TEE when needed, and is never stored in any memory in plaintext form.

[0102] The TEE uses the just reconstructed symmetric key K_PUF to encrypt the shared quantum key K_shared using a symmetric encryption algorithm, generates an encrypted quantum key, and stores the encrypted quantum key in the TEE. Then, the shared quantum key K_shared and the symmetric key K_PUF are cleared to avoid leakage.

[0103] When it is needed to use the shared quantum key K_shared to encrypt the to-be-transmitted data, the challenge value C is input to the PUF circuit again, the PUF circuit generates a new response value R' according to the challenge value C, the symmetric key K_PUF is generated based on the response value R' and the public auxiliary data H, the encrypted quantum key is decrypted by using the symmetric key K_PUF, the shared quantum key K_shared is obtained, and the to-be-transmitted data is encrypted by using the shared quantum key K_shared. After each use, the shared quantum key K_shared and the symmetric key need to be cleared.

[0104] In some embodiments, the above S501 calls the physically unclonable function PUF to encrypt the shared quantum key, and obtains the encrypted quantum key, which can include:

[0105] The PUF is called to generate an encryption identifier according to the physical difference of the chip in the electric energy meter; and the shared quantum key is encrypted by using the encryption identifier, and the encrypted quantum key is obtained.

[0106] In the embodiment, before the electric energy meter is factory-finished, a special device triggers the PUF circuit to work, sends a fixed and public challenge value C to the PUF circuit, collects the original physical difference signal and converts it into a digital sequence as a response value R. Due to the application of the physical structure of the PUF circuit itself, the response value R is unstable and rough. By collecting the UPF circuit multiple times and processing the multiple response values R by using a fuzzy extractor algorithm, the bits that are always stable are selected as a stable and high-entropy encryption key K_PUF. The encryption key K_PUF is used as the "hardware fingerprint" of the electric energy meter. The unstable bits in the multiple response values R are processed for error correction to generate public auxiliary data H. The public auxiliary data H is used as a fault-tolerant template and contains the information needed to correct the rough bits in the response value R. The public auxiliary data H itself does not leak any information about the encryption key K_PUF. Then the encryption key K_PUF is deleted, and the public auxiliary data H is stored in the ordinary flash memory of the electric energy meter.

[0107] When it is needed to encrypt the shared quantum key K_shared, the public auxiliary data is read from the flash memory, the challenge value C is input to the PUF circuit again, the PUF circuit generates a new response value R' according to the challenge value C, the symmetric key K_PUF is generated based on the response value R' and the public auxiliary data H as an encryption identifier, the encrypted quantum key is decrypted by using the symmetric key K_PUF, the shared quantum key K_shared is obtained, and the to-be-transmitted data is encrypted by using the shared quantum key K_shared.

[0108] The power meter data transmission method provided by the above embodiment introduces a PUF to encrypt and store the shared quantum key, strongly binds the security of the quantum key with the unique physical fingerprint of the power meter hardware, ensures the secure storage of the shared quantum key, and even if an attacker disassembles the power meter and reads the memory, the encrypted identifier and the shared quantum key cannot be obtained, effectively eliminating the risk of physically extracting the key, and providing ultimate hardware-level protection for the system.

[0109] In a possible implementation, after the S304 encrypts the to-be-transmitted data according to the random number generated by the quantum random number generator and the shared quantum key, and sends the encrypted to-be-transmitted data to the data center, the method can further include:

[0110] Receiving the security feedback information sent by the data center after the to-be-transmitted data is decrypted and obtained, the security feedback information being used to indicate whether the to-be-transmitted data is stolen or tampered with based on the evaluation of the decryption process.

[0111] In this embodiment, the data center decrypts the encrypted to-be-transmitted data using the shared quantum key K_shared to obtain the to-be-transmitted data of the power meter, and evaluates the decryption process, which can include multi-dimensional evaluation, for example:

[0112] The signature dimension evaluation is used to indicate that if the encrypted to-be-transmitted data includes a data signature, the decryption process can verify whether the digital signature of the to-be-transmitted data is correct.

[0113] The data dimension evaluation is used to indicate that the decrypted to-be-transmitted data is compared with historical data and other power meter data of the same line to detect whether the to-be-transmitted data has an abnormal value that does not conform to the physical law or statistical law.

[0114] The quantum channel dimension evaluation is used to evaluate whether the error bit rate of the quantum channel in the process of transmitting and decrypting the to-be-transmitted data is greater than a preset error rate threshold.

[0115] If the digital signature of the to-be-transmitted data is incorrect, the to-be-transmitted data has an abnormal value, or the error bit rate of the quantum channel is greater than the preset error rate threshold, it is determined that the to-be-transmitted data is stolen or tampered with; if the digital signature of the to-be-transmitted data is correct, the to-be-transmitted data has no abnormal value, and the error bit rate of the quantum channel is less than or equal to the preset error rate threshold, it is determined that the to-be-transmitted data is not stolen or tampered with, according to the multi-dimensional evaluation result, the security feedback information is sent to the electric energy meter, after the electric energy meter receives the security feedback information, if the security feedback information indicates that the to-be-transmitted data is normal, the process is ended, the electric energy meter prepares for the next data transmission, if the security feedback information indicates that the to-be-transmitted data is abnormal, the security protocol is triggered, for example, the currently used shared quantum key K_shared is invalidated, a security event log is generated and an alarm is given, a new QKD process is actively initiated, and a secure channel and a shared quantum key K_shared are re-established.

[0116] In some embodiments, the process of S304 encrypting the to-be-transmitted data according to the random number generated by the quantum random number generator and the shared quantum key, and sending the encrypted to-be-transmitted data to the data center, can include:

[0117] The TEE calls the PUF circuit, combines the public auxiliary data H, and reconstructs a stable symmetric key K_PUF in real time through a fuzzy extractor algorithm. The symmetric key K_PUF is used as a seed to generate an asymmetric key pair: a device private key SK_device and a device public key PK_device inside the TEE. After completion, the symmetric key K_PUF is immediately cleared. The device public key PK_device is public and is registered to the data center and bound with the electric energy meter.

[0118] Then, the TEE reads the encrypted quantum key from the secure storage and reconstructs the symmetric key K_PUF again. The encrypted quantum key is decrypted using the symmetric key K_PUF to obtain the shared encryption key K_shared, and then the symmetric key K_PUF is immediately cleared.

[0119] The to-be-transmitted data D is subjected to a hash operation inside the TEE to obtain a data digest Hash(D). The data digest Hash(D) and the new random number form a message M to be signed. The TEE uses the device private key SK_device to perform a digital signature operation on the message M to be signed to generate a digital signature Signature. The to-be-transmitted data D, the digital signature Signature, and the new random number are packaged into a data packet D_final, which is encrypted using the shared quantum key K_shared and sent to the data center.

[0120] The data center first decrypts the encrypted data packet using the shared quantum key K_shared to obtain the to-be-transmitted data D, the digital signature Signature and the new random number, calculates a data digest Hash(D) according to the to-be-transmitted data D, constructs a message M' to be signed according to the data digest Hash(D) and the new random number, and verifies the message M' and the digital signature Signature using the device public key PK_device. If the verification is passed, it is determined that the to-be-transmitted data is not tampered with, the random number is not replaced, and the data is not stolen by an attacker using an incorrect shared quantum key. If the verification is not passed, it is determined that the to-be-transmitted data is tampered with, the random number is replaced, or the data is stolen by an attacker using an incorrect shared quantum key. According to the verification result, the security feedback information is sent to the electric energy meter.

[0121] The electric energy meter data transmission method provided in the above embodiment introduces active security feedback of the data center, constructs an end-to-end security closed loop, so that the electric energy meter can not only perceive potential eavesdropping on the quantum channel, but also confirm the integrity of the encrypted data in the public channel, greatly improving the perception ability of the system to risks such as data tampering and key leakage, and ensuring the security of data transmission.

[0122] In a possible implementation manner, a physical detection sensor is arranged in the electric energy meter, Figure 4 The flowchart of the electric energy meter data transmission method provided in the embodiment of the present application is shown in Figure 5 As shown in the figure, the method can further include: Figure 6

[0123] S601, monitoring whether a destruction event exists in the hardware structure of the electric energy meter through the physical detection sensor.

[0124] S602, if a destruction event signal fed back by the physical detection sensor or abnormal power consumption data is monitored, triggering the alarm of the electric energy meter to alarm and starting the defense mode.

[0125] In the embodiment, the physical detection sensor is integrated in the electric energy meter, and is used to perceive whether the hardware structure of the electric energy meter is physically intruded and destroyed. The physical detection sensor can include, for example, a case opening sensor for detecting whether the case of the electric energy meter is illegally opened, a vibration / impact sensor for detecting whether the electric energy meter is subjected to physical attacks such as drilling and prying, an ambient light sensor for detecting whether light enters in the case where there should be no light, prompting that the case can be opened, and a temperature sensor for detecting whether the ambient temperature of the electric energy meter abnormally changes, indicating that the electric energy meter can be physically attacked by a heat gun or other tools.

[0126] ​The control unit of the electric energy meter analyzes the sensor signal of the physical detection sensor in real time. If the sensor signal is a destruction event signal or the power consumption data is abnormal, the alarm of the electric energy meter is started immediately to alarm, to deter the attacker and attract the attention of the surrounding, and the alarm information is sent to the data center through the communication module. The alarm information can include the device identification of the electric energy meter, the alarm type and the timestamp, etc.

[0127] Starting the defense mode can include, for example, pausing data reporting, key self-destruction, such as destroying shared quantum keys, symmetric keys, identity authentication information, etc. in the TEE, and the like, which are not limited in the embodiment.

[0128] The electric energy meter data transmission method provided by the above embodiment realizes effective response to physical tampering and detection of the device body by setting physical detection sensors, extends the security boundary of electric energy meter data transmission from the network level to the physical level, improves the security level of the electric energy meter, and alarms through the alarm of the electric energy meter and starts the defense mode, effectively deters the attacker through the physical way, and triggers the self-destruction mechanism of the core key, fundamentally eliminating the risk of key leakage through physical means.

[0129] In some embodiments, the process of triggering the alarm of the electric energy meter to alarm and starting the defense mode in S602 can include:

[0130] Triggering the alarm to emit a buzzing sound and sending alarm information to the data center; if there is current data transmission, pausing the data transmission and cutting off the transmission network.

[0131] In the embodiment, the TEE sends instructions to the hardware alarm circuit of the electric energy meter to drive the on-board piezoelectric buzzer to emit continuous or pulsed high-decibel buzzing sound, and control the status indicator light (such as red LED high-frequency flashing) to immediately deter the ongoing physical attack behavior through physical sound and light signals, and attract the attention of the on-site maintenance personnel.

[0132] The TEE also immediately sends an alarm information of the highest priority to the security management platform of the data center through the communication module. The alarm information is encrypted and contains at least: the unique device ID of the electric energy meter, the alarm type code (such as "physical intrusion"), the accurate timestamp and the triggered sensor type.

[0133] In addition, the TEE will immediately check whether there is an ongoing data transmission session. If there is, the TEE will send an emergency interrupt instruction to the communication processor to immediately pause all sending and receiving queues of plaintext or ciphertext data to the data center, to prevent any sensitive data from being transmitted in the unsafe state of the device under attack.

[0134] On the basis of suspending data transmission, the TEE will further control the communication module to perform logical network disconnection, forcibly disconnect the connection session with the base station or disable the network interface of the communication module by command, to immediately isolate the threatened electric energy meter, minimize the attack surface, and prevent further attacks on the network that the attacker may launch using the device as a stepping stone.

[0135] The electric energy meter data transmission method provided by the above embodiments effectively deters and reports physical attacks through instant audible and visual alarms and remote alarms; quickly isolates threatened devices by immediately suspending data transmission and cutting off the network, preventing sensitive information leakage and attack spread, and effectively ensuring the security of electric energy meter data transmission.

[0136] On the basis of the above method embodiments, the electric energy meter data transmission device provided by the embodiments of the present application is applied to an electric energy meter, and a communication connection is established between the electric energy meter and a data center through a quantum optical fiber, Figure 6 As shown in the structural diagram of the electric energy meter data transmission device provided by the embodiments of the present application, Figure 7 The device can include:

[0137] The random number generation module 701 is configured to generate a random number using a quantum random number generator.

[0138] The key negotiation module 702 is configured to send a quantum key negotiation request to the data center using the random number through a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, and the quantum key negotiation request is used to negotiate a shared quantum key with the data center, wherein the shared quantum key is stored in a trusted execution environment (TEE).

[0139] The identity authentication module 703 is configured to send identity authentication information encrypted using the shared quantum key to the data center, so as to complete mutual identity verification by decrypting the identity authentication information through the data center.

[0140] The data transmission module 704 is configured to encrypt the to-be-transmitted data according to the random number generated by the quantum random number generator and the shared quantum key, and send the encrypted to-be-transmitted data to the data center.

[0141] Optionally, the device further includes:

[0142] The monitoring module is configured to continuously monitor and obtain a bit error rate through the QKD protocol during the process of sending the encrypted to-be-transmitted data to the data center; and determine whether there is data stealing according to the bit error rate analysis.

[0143] Optionally, the device further includes:

[0144] The encryption module is configured to encrypt the shared quantum key by calling a physically unclonable function (PUF) to obtain an encrypted quantum key, and store the encrypted quantum key in the TEE.

[0145] Optionally, the encryption module is specifically configured to call the PUF to generate an encryption identifier according to physical differences of the chip in the electric energy meter; and encrypt the shared quantum key by using the encryption identifier to obtain an encrypted quantum key.

[0146] Optionally, the apparatus further comprises:

[0147] The feedback information receiving module is configured to receive security feedback information sent by the data center after the data center decrypts the to-be-transmitted data, and the security feedback information is used to indicate whether the to-be-transmitted data is stolen or tampered with based on an evaluation of the decryption process.

[0148] Optionally, a physical detection sensor is arranged in the electric energy meter; and the apparatus further comprises:

[0149] The alarm module is configured to monitor, by using the physical detection sensor, whether a destruction event exists in the hardware structure of the electric energy meter; and if a destruction event signal fed back by the physical detection sensor is received or the power consumption data is monitored to be abnormal, trigger an alarm of the alarm of the electric energy meter and start a defense mode.

[0150] Optionally, the alarm module is specifically configured to trigger the alarm to emit a beeping sound and send alarm information to the data center; and if there is current data transmission, suspend the data transmission and cut off the transmission network.

[0151] The apparatus is configured to execute the method provided in the foregoing embodiments, and has similar implementation principles and technical effects, which will not be repeated here.

[0152] The above modules can be one or more integrated circuits configured to implement the above method, for example, one or more application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), or one or more microprocessors, or one or more field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), etc. For another example, when the above module is implemented in the form of a processing element scheduling program code, the processing element can be a general-purpose processor, for example, a central processing unit (CPU) or other processor that can call program code. For another example, the modules can be integrated together in the form of a system on a chip (SOC).

[0153] Figure 7 A schematic diagram of the electric energy meter provided in the embodiments of the present application is shown in FIG. 1. ​As shown, the electric energy meter 100 can include: a metering unit 101 and a quantum encryption unit 102; the metering unit 101 is in communication connection with the quantum encryption unit 102, the metering unit 101 is used to collect power signals and generate data to be transmitted, and the quantum encryption unit 102 is in communication connection with the data center through quantum optical fiber to perform the above method embodiments, so as to realize data transmission between the electric energy meter and the data center. The specific implementation and technical effects are similar, and will not be repeated here.

[0154] Optionally, the present application also provides a computer readable storage medium, and the storage medium stores a computer program, and the computer program is run by a processor to execute the above method embodiments.

[0155] In several embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and method can be implemented by other manners. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are only schematic, for example, the division of the units is only a logical function division, and actual implementation can have another division manner, for example, a plurality of units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection between the units or components shown or discussed can be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, apparatuses or units, and can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0156] The units described as separate components can or can not be physically separated, and the components shown as units can or can not be physical units, that is, they can be located in one place, or can be distributed on a plurality of network units. According to actual needs, part or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of the embodiment scheme.

[0157] In addition, the functional units in each embodiment of the present application can be integrated in one processing unit, or each unit can be physically present separately, or two or more units can be integrated in one unit. The integrated unit can be realized in the form of hardware or in the form of hardware plus software functional unit.

[0158] The integrated unit in the form of software function unit can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. The software function unit is stored in a storage medium, and includes a plurality of instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) or a processor to execute part of steps of the method described in various embodiments of the present application. The foregoing storage medium includes a U disk, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, and various storage medium capable of storing program codes.

[0159] The above merely describes the specific embodiments of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art can easily think of changes or replacements within the technical scope disclosed in the present application, which should be covered in the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. An electric energy meter data transmission method applied to an electric energy meter, wherein a communication connection is established between the electric energy meter and a data center through a quantum optical fiber, and the method is characterized in that, The method comprises: generating a random number by using a quantum random number generator; sending a quantum key negotiation request to a data center by using the random number through a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, the quantum key negotiation request being used to negotiate a shared quantum key with the data center, wherein the shared quantum key is stored in a trusted execution environment (TEE); sending identity authentication information encrypted by using the shared quantum key to the data center, so as to complete mutual identity authentication by decrypting the identity authentication information by the data center; encrypting to-be-transmitted data according to the random number generated by the quantum random number generator and the shared quantum key, and sending the encrypted to-be-transmitted data to the data center; after the encrypted to-be-transmitted data is sent to the data center, the method further comprises: continuously monitoring a bit error rate through the QKD protocol during the process of sending the encrypted to-be-transmitted data to the data center; determining whether there is data stealing according to the bit error rate analysis; after the quantum key negotiation request is sent to the data center by using the random number through the QKD protocol, the method further comprises: generating an encrypted identifier according to physical differences of chips in the electric energy meter by calling a physically unclonable function (PUF); encrypting the shared quantum key by using the encrypted identifier to obtain an encrypted quantum key; storing the encrypted quantum key in the TEE.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, after the to-be-transmitted data is encrypted according to the random number generated by the quantum random number generator and the shared quantum key, and the encrypted to-be-transmitted data is sent to the data center, the method further comprises: receiving security feedback information sent by the data center after the to-be-transmitted data is decrypted, the security feedback information being used to indicate whether the to-be-transmitted data is stolen or tampered with based on an evaluation of a decryption process by the data center.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein, a physical detection sensor is arranged in the electric energy meter, and the method further comprises: monitoring whether there is a damage event of a hardware structure of the electric energy meter by using the physical detection sensor; if a damage event signal fed back by the physical detection sensor or abnormal power consumption data is monitored, triggering an alarm of the electric energy meter and starting a defense mode.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, the triggering of the alarm of the electric energy meter and the starting of the defense mode comprise: triggering the alarm to emit a beeping sound and sending alarm information to the data center; if there is current data transmission, suspending the data transmission and cutting off a transmission network.

5. An electric energy meter data transmission device applied to an electric energy meter, wherein a communication connection is established between the electric energy meter and a data center through quantum optical fibers. The device comprises: a random number generation module configured to generate a random number by using a quantum random number generator; a key negotiation module configured to send a quantum key negotiation request to a data center by using the random number through a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, the quantum key negotiation request being used to negotiate a shared quantum key with the data center, wherein the shared quantum key is stored in a trusted execution environment (TEE); an identity authentication module configured to send identity authentication information encrypted by using the shared quantum key to the data center, so as to complete mutual identity authentication by decrypting the identity authentication information by the data center; The data transmission module is configured to encrypt the data to be transmitted according to the random number generated by the quantum random number generator and the shared quantum key, and send the encrypted data to be transmitted to the data center. The device further comprises: The monitoring module is configured to continuously monitor the bit error rate through the QKD protocol during the process of sending the encrypted data to be transmitted to the data center, and determine whether data stealing exists according to the bit error rate analysis. The device further comprises: The encryption module is configured to generate an encrypted identifier according to the physical differences of the chips in the electric energy meter by calling a physically unclonable function (PUF), encrypt the shared quantum key by using the encrypted identifier, obtain an encrypted quantum key, and store the encrypted quantum key in the TEE.

6. An electric energy meter, characterized by It comprises: The metering unit and the quantum encryption unit are in communication connection, the metering unit is configured to collect power signals and generate data to be transmitted, and the quantum encryption unit is in communication connection with the data center through a quantum optical fiber to execute the steps of the electric energy meter data transmission method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, and realize data transmission between the electric energy meter and the data center.

7. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The storage medium has a computer program stored thereon, and the computer program is run by the processor to execute the steps of the electric energy meter data transmission method according to any one of claims 1 to 4.

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