Equipment access method, electronic equipment, storage medium and program product

Abstract

The invention discloses a device access method, an electronic device, a storage medium and a program product. The method comprises the following steps: randomly selecting a first secret value based on a secret value set, generating a first temporary public key according to the first secret value and a generator, encrypting information to be transmitted according to the first temporary public key in combination with an anonymous identity identifier of user equipment, and generating first aggregation information; sending the first aggregation information to an access and mobility management service, so that the access and mobility management service performs legality verification on the first aggregation information; receiving second aggregation information fed back by the access and mobility management service, wherein the second aggregation information is generated after the validity verification of the first aggregation information is passed; and performing signature verification according to the second aggregation information, and if the verification is passed, determining that the user equipment accesses the network successfully, thereby solving the problems of poor security and low efficiency of equipment access, improving the overall throughput and response speed of the network, and enhancing the security and stability of the communication network.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a device access method, electronic device, storage medium, and program product. Background Technology

[0002] In real-world communication applications, attackers exploit vulnerabilities to infiltrate networks or construct fake networks to deceive users, resulting in malicious attacks and tampering with information between devices and the network. Therefore, mutual authentication between devices and the network is essential to generate unique session keys and ensure secure communication thereafter. To guarantee low latency and highly reliable connections, authentication protocols must not only provide robust security protection for wireless communication systems but also employ lightweight handover authentication algorithms to reduce system computational complexity and communication overhead.

[0003] In 5G application scenarios, different types of terminals possess varying computing power, transmission capabilities, and security levels. The existing, fixed 5G authentication process is ill-suited to different types of terminal devices, failing to meet their unique requirements for computing power, transmission capabilities, and security levels. This results in ineffective protection and management when facing the differentiated communication security needs of vertical industries. In scenarios with a large number of connected devices, it is difficult to simultaneously guarantee communication security and data transmission efficiency, and it is impossible to effectively reduce the consumption of computing and signaling resources while ensuring authentication security. Furthermore, there are shortcomings in terminal identity privacy protection, failing to fully consider the risk of identity privacy leakage when terminal devices access the network. This makes information between devices and the network vulnerable to malicious attacks and tampering, threatening the security and stability of the entire communication network. Therefore, how to ensure both communication security and data transmission efficiency while enabling device access remains a problem to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This application provides a device access method, electronic device, storage medium, and program product that enable devices to access the network securely and quickly.

[0005] According to one aspect of this application, a device access method is provided, applied to a user equipment, comprising:

[0006] A first secret value is randomly selected from the set of secret values. A first temporary public key is generated based on the first secret value and the generator. The information to be transmitted is encrypted based on the first temporary public key and the anonymous identity identifier of the user equipment, and a first aggregated information is generated.

[0007] The first aggregated information is sent to the access and mobility management service so that the access and mobility management service can verify the legitimacy of the first aggregated information;

[0008] The system receives second aggregated information from the access and mobility management service, which is generated after the first aggregated information has passed legality verification.

[0009] Signature verification is performed based on the second aggregated information. If the verification passes, it is determined that the user equipment has successfully accessed the network.

[0010] According to another aspect of this application, a device access method is provided, applied to access and mobility management services, comprising:

[0011] Receive the first aggregated information;

[0012] The user's public key and user public parameters of the user device are determined based on the first aggregated information, and the legality of the first aggregated information is verified based on the user's public key and the user public parameters.

[0013] If the verification is successful, a third secret value is randomly selected based on the set of secret values. A second temporary public key is generated based on the third secret value and the generator. A second aggregated information is generated based on the second temporary public key and the area identifier of the access and mobility management service and sent to the user equipment.

[0014] According to another aspect of this application, an electronic device is provided, the electronic device comprising:

[0015] At least one processor, and a memory communicatively connected to said at least one processor;

[0016] The memory stores a computer program that can be executed by the at least one processor, and the computer program is executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to execute the device access method described in any embodiment of this application.

[0017] According to another aspect of this application, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, the computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions for causing a processor to execute and implement the device access method described in any embodiment of this application.

[0018] According to another aspect of this application, a computer program product is provided, the computer program product including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the device access method described in any embodiment of this application.

[0019] The technical solution of this application embodiment randomly selects a first secret value based on a set of secret values, generates a first temporary public key based on the first secret value and a generator, encrypts the information to be transmitted based on the first temporary public key and the anonymous identity identifier of the user equipment, and generates first aggregate information; the first aggregate information is sent to the access and mobility management service so that the access and mobility management service can verify the legitimacy of the first aggregate information; the second aggregate information is received from the access and mobility management service, which is generated after the legitimacy verification of the first aggregate information is passed; signature verification is performed based on the second aggregate information, and if the verification is successful, it is determined that the user equipment has successfully accessed the network. This solves the problems of poor security and low efficiency of device access. The user equipment and the access and mobility management service only need to interact twice to complete the device access, reducing redundant calculations and unnecessary signaling interactions in the authentication process, avoiding signaling congestion, and significantly improving the overall network throughput and response speed. While ensuring security, it optimizes data transmission efficiency; the user equipment uses an anonymous identity identifier to participate in authentication, and attackers cannot trace the real identity of the terminal through intercepted information, which greatly enhances the security and stability of the communication network.

[0020] It should be understood that the description in this section is not intended to identify key or essential features of the embodiments of this application, nor is it intended to limit the scope of this application. Other features of this application will become readily apparent from the following description. Attached Figure Description

[0021] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the accompanying drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0022] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a device access method provided according to Embodiment 1 of this application;

[0023] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of a device access method according to Embodiment 2 of this application;

[0024] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of a device access method according to Embodiment 3 of this application;

[0025] Figure 4 This is a flowchart of a device access method according to Embodiment 4 of this application;

[0026] Figure 5This is a schematic diagram of a device access device according to Embodiment 5 of this application;

[0027] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a device access device according to Embodiment Six of this application;

[0028] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device that implements the device access method of the embodiments of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0029] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present application, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present application, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative effort should fall within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0030] It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," etc., in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this application are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments of this application described herein can be implemented in orders other than those illustrated or described herein. Furthermore, the terms "comprising" and "having," and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion; for example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that comprises a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or apparatus.

[0031] Example 1

[0032] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a device access method provided in Embodiment 1 of this application. This embodiment is applicable to situations where user equipment is connected to a network. The method can be executed by a device access device, which can be implemented in hardware and / or software. This device access device can be applied to user equipment, which can be an electronic device. Figure 1 As shown, the method includes:

[0033] S101. Randomly select a first secret value based on the set of secret values, generate a first temporary public key based on the first secret value and the generator, encrypt the information to be transmitted based on the first temporary public key and the anonymous identity identifier of the user equipment, and generate the first aggregate information.

[0034] In this embodiment, the secret value set can be understood as a set of different numerical values, and the values ​​in this set can be used as secret values ​​for device access authentication; the first secret value v UE This can be understood as a value selected from the set of secret values; the generator is the generator of the elliptic curve group G; the first temporary public key can be understood as a key used to encrypt data; the anonymous identity identifier can be understood as information used to identify the user equipment. In this embodiment, the anonymous identity identifier is not the real identity identifier of the user equipment. The anonymous identity identifier can be generated during the initial registration process. Identifying the user equipment through the anonymous identity identifier can prevent the leakage of user equipment information. The information to be transmitted can be understood as the information that needs to be transmitted; the first aggregated information can be understood as a communication information that includes multiple types of information. In this embodiment, the first aggregated information includes at least the encrypted information to be transmitted.

[0035] Pre-generate a set of secret values From the set of secret values A value is randomly selected as the first secret value v. UE Calculate the first secret value v UE The product of the generator P and the value obtained is used as the first temporary public key V. UE According to the first temporary public key V UE Generate the key used for encryption and determine the anonymous identity ID of the user device. UE According to anonymous identity ID UE The key used for encryption is used to encrypt the information to be transmitted, and the first aggregate information is generated based on the encrypted ciphertext data.

[0036] S102. The first aggregation information is sent to the access and mobility management service so that the access and mobility management service can verify the legitimacy of the first aggregation information.

[0037] The first aggregated information is sent to the access and mobility management service via communication. After receiving the first aggregated information, the access and mobility management service verifies the legality of the first aggregated information.

[0038] S103. Receive the second aggregated information fed back by the access and mobility management service. The second aggregated information is generated after the legality verification of the first aggregated information is passed.

[0039] In this embodiment, the second aggregated information can be understood as a type of aggregated information. After receiving the first aggregated information, the Access and Mobility Management Service verifies its legitimacy. If the verification passes, it generates the second aggregated information and sends it back to the user equipment. If the first aggregated information fails the legitimacy verification, it may not send any information back, or it may send information such as access failure to the user equipment, and so on.

[0040] S104. Perform signature verification based on the second aggregated information. If the verification passes, the user equipment is confirmed to have successfully accessed the network.

[0041] The second aggregated information is signed and verified, parsed, and the information carried within it is determined. The second aggregated information is then verified based on the key generated by the Access and Mobility Management Service during the registration process. If the verification passes, the user equipment is confirmed to have successfully accessed the network; otherwise, the user equipment is confirmed to have failed to access the network.

[0042] This application provides a device access method that solves the problems of poor security and low efficiency in device access. The user equipment and the access and mobility management service only need two interactions to complete the device access, reducing redundant calculations and unnecessary signaling interactions in the authentication process, avoiding signaling congestion, and significantly improving the overall network throughput and response speed. While ensuring security, it optimizes data transmission efficiency. The user equipment uses an anonymous identity to participate in authentication, so attackers cannot trace the true identity of the terminal through intercepted information, which greatly enhances the security and stability of the communication network.

[0043] Example 2

[0044] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a device access method according to Embodiment 2 of this application. This embodiment is a refinement based on the above embodiments. Figure 2 As shown, the method includes:

[0045] S201. Randomly select a first secret value based on the set of secret values, and generate a first temporary public key based on the first secret value and the generator.

[0046] S202. Generate a confidential key based on the first temporary public key, the area identifier of the access and mobility management service, the first user private key component of the user equipment, and the first service public key component of the access and mobility management service. Encrypt the information to be transmitted based on the confidential key and the anonymous identity identifier of the user equipment to generate ciphertext.

[0047] In this embodiment, the confidentiality key can be understood as a key used to encrypt information. The confidentiality key can be generated using a hash function. The area identifier serves as an anonymous identity identifier for access and mobility management services, preventing the leakage of information related to access and mobility management services. The first service public key component X... M A portion of the public key used for access and mobility management services. The first temporary public key V... UE Regional Identifier ID for Access and Mobility Management Services M The first user private key component x of the user equipmentUE The first service public key component X for access and mobility management services M The hash function is used as input to generate a confidentiality key CK. This confidentiality key CK is then used in conjunction with the anonymous identity ID of the user equipment. UE msg to be transmitted UE Encryption is performed to generate ciphertext C. UE .

[0048] For example, embodiments of this application provide a method for generating a confidentiality key CK and ciphertext C. UE Generation method: CK=h 2,UE =H2(ID) M V UE ,x UE ·X M H2 is a hash function that can be generated and broadcast by the Key Generate Center (KGC) during the registration process. Ciphertext (where msg) UE The message to be transmitted from the UE to the AMF, msg UE (The message is in plaintext, but is hidden after being encrypted with CK). By encrypting the information to be transmitted, the privacy of user devices' messages is protected, and information leakage is avoided.

[0049] For example, the key generation center KGC determines the key based on the master key s ( Let q be the multiplicative group of non-zero integers modulo q, where q is a large prime number and q > 2. k (where k is the safety factor) and the generator P of the elliptic curve group G (based on the finite field F q Elliptic curve E / F on q Let G be an additive cyclic group of order q, and P be a generator of G. Calculate its own public key: P KGC =s·P (“·” represents the dot product operation on an elliptic curve). To meet the requirements of “one-wayness and collision resistance” for subsequent authentication and key generation, H1 to H44 one-way hash functions are defined (for subsequent authentication and key generation). The above parameters are then aggregated into system public parameters, resulting in public parameters params = {q, F...} q E / F q ,G,P,P KGC The parameters are defined in the sequence H1, H2, H3, and H4, and broadcast to the entire network, enabling network elements such as UEs and AMFs to obtain them and providing basic parameter support for subsequent key negotiation and authentication.

[0050] H1: Given a binary string of arbitrary length as input, output a non-zero integer modulo q. H2: Given a binary string of length l (where l is the length of the text message in bits), output a non-zero integer modulo q. H3: Given a binary string of arbitrary length and points in the elliptic curve group G, output a non-zero integer H4 modulo q: Given points in the elliptic curve group G as input, output a non-zero integer modulo q.

[0051] S203. Perform a hash calculation based on the first temporary public key, the ciphertext, and the user's public key of the user equipment to obtain the first hash value.

[0052] Use the first temporary public key V UE ciphertext C UE User equipment public key PK UE The user's public key (PK) is used as input to the hash function to perform hash calculations and obtain the first hash value. UE It consists of two components, namely the first user public key component X. UE Second user public key component Y UE For example, an embodiment of this application provides a first hash value h. 3,UE The calculation method

[0053] h 3,UE =H3(V UE C UE ,X UE ,Y UE ).

[0054] S204. Generate a user equipment signature based on the first secret value, the user equipment's private key, and the first hash value.

[0055] In this embodiment, the user equipment signature can be understood as the signature information of the user equipment, used to verify the legitimacy of the user equipment's identity through access and mobility management services. The user equipment's private key...

[0056] SK UE and the first hash value h 3,UE Multiply, the resulting product and the first secret value v UE The signatures are added together to obtain the user equipment signature. For example, an embodiment of this application provides a user equipment signature s. UE The generation method, s UE =v UE +(x UE +y UE )·h 3,UE , where x UE and y UE For user private key SK UE The two components.

[0057] S205. Generate the first aggregate information based on the anonymous identity identifier, the first temporary public key, the user equipment signature, and the ciphertext.

[0058] Anonymous identity identifier ID UE First temporary public key V UE User equipment signatures UE and ciphertext C UE The information is written into a single message, forming the first aggregated message M, where M = (ID). UE V UE ,s UE C UE The first aggregated information contains the UE's anonymous identity identifier, first temporary public key, user equipment signature and ciphertext, providing complete information for UE authentication for access and mobility management services.

[0059] Among them, the user equipment's public key PK UE User equipment's private key SK UE Anonymous identity ID of user equipment UE Generated during registration.

[0060] User equipment (UE) registers before accessing the network, and access and mobility management services also require prior registration. During the registration process, UE generates its own public key (PK). UE User equipment's private key SK UE Anonymous identity ID of user equipment UE User equipment's public key PK UE and anonymous identity ID UE It can be broadcast to other access network elements in the network.

[0061] S206. The first aggregation information is sent to the access and mobility management service so that the access and mobility management service can verify the legitimacy of the first aggregation information.

[0062] S207. Receive the second aggregated information fed back by the access and mobility management service. The second aggregated information is generated after the legality verification of the first aggregated information is passed.

[0063] S208. Determine the area identifier, second temporary public key, and service signature of the access and mobility management service based on the second aggregated information.

[0064] In this embodiment, the second temporary public key is the key generated by the access and mobility management service; the service signature is the signature information of the access and mobility management service, used for access verification.

[0065] Parse the second aggregated information N to determine the area identifier ID of the access and mobility management services carried in the second aggregated information N.M Second temporary public key V M Service signatures M The second aggregated information N contains the area identifier ID for access and mobility management services. M Second temporary public key V M Service signatures M It provides complete information for user equipment authentication access and mobility management services.

[0066] S209. Determine the service public key and service public parameters for access and mobility management services based on the area identifier.

[0067] In this embodiment, the service common parameter Z M This is a parameter generated by the Access and Mobility Management Service (AMS) for use by the user equipment during the authentication process. Service Public Key (PK) M A public key for the Access and Mobility Management Service. The Access and Mobility Management Service generates a service public key (PK) during the registration process. M Service common parameter Z M It also broadcasts the service public key (PK) for access and mobility management services, which is pre-stored in the user equipment. M Service common parameter Z M User equipment identifies its ID in a defined area. M Then, it queries the pre-stored information to determine the public key (PK) for access and mobility management services. M Service common parameter Z M .

[0068] S210. Perform a hash calculation based on the area identifier, the second temporary public key, and the service public key to obtain the second hash value.

[0069] Region ID M Second temporary public key V M Service public key PK M As input to a hash function, a hash value is calculated using the hash function to obtain a second hash value. For example, an embodiment of this application provides a second hash value h. 3,M The calculation method for h 3,M =H3(ID) M V M ,X M ,Y M ), where the service public key PK M Includes X M and Y M Two public key components.

[0070] S211. Verify the service signature based on the second hash value, the service public key, and the service public parameters.

[0071] The second hash value h is processed according to the set method. 3,M Service public key PK M Service common parameter Z M Perform calculations, determine if the result matches the service signature, and complete the service signature verification. M Verification.

[0072] Among them, the service public key and service public parameters of the access and mobility management service are generated during registration.

[0073] Optionally, the service signature can be verified based on the second hash value, the service public key, and the service public parameters, including steps A1-A3:

[0074] A1. Calculate the product of the service signature and the generator to obtain the first information to be verified.

[0075] In this embodiment, the first information to be verified can be understood as information that needs to be verified. (Calculate service signature s) M The product of the generator P and the product of the generator P is used as the first piece of information to be verified, s. M ·P.

[0076] A2, Based on the first service public key component X in the service public key M Second service public key component Y M Service public parameter Z M The first parameter is determined by the second hash value, and the sum of the first parameter and the second temporary public key is used as the second information to be verified.

[0077] In this embodiment, the first parameter is an intermediate value obtained during the calculation process. The first service public key component X in the service public key is calculated. M Second service public key component Y M Service public parameter Z M The sum, then the sum is combined with the second hash value h. 3,M Multiply by the first parameter to obtain the first parameter, then multiply the first parameter by the second temporary public key V. M The sum is used as the second piece of information to be verified.

[0078] For example, this application provides a method for calculating the second information to be verified, where the second information to be verified is V. M +h 3,M ·(X M +Y M +Z M ).

[0079] A3. If the first and second information to be verified are the same, the verification passes; otherwise, the verification fails.

[0080] The first and second pieces of information to be verified are compared. If they are the same, the verification passes; otherwise, the verification fails. This is the verification equation s. M ·P=V M +h 3,M ·(X M +Y M +Z M If the signature is valid, the signature verification is successful, and the user equipment confirms that its access to the mobility management service is legitimate.

[0081] S212. If the verification passes, the user equipment is confirmed to have successfully accessed the network.

[0082] The user equipment completes two-way authentication with the access and mobility management service and negotiates a consistent confidentiality key CK. This key can then be used for secure communication, ensuring the privacy and integrity of data during transmission and resisting attacks such as eavesdropping and tampering.

[0083] Optionally, the method also includes B1-B2:

[0084] B1. Randomly select the first user private key component x based on the secret value set. UE According to the first user private key component x UE Generate the first user public key component X from the generator P. UE Generate anonymous identity ID for user devices UE The first user's public key component and anonymous identity identifier are sent to the key generation center so that the key generation center can generate the second user's private key component y based on the first user's public key component and anonymous identity identifier. UE Second user public key component Y UE .

[0085] From the set of secret values A value is randomly selected as the first user private key component x. UE Calculate the first user's private key component x UE The product of the generator P and the first user public key component X is used as the first user public key component X. UE X UE =x UE •P. Then, according to the set rules, an anonymous identity identifier (ID) is generated for the user device. UE For example, generating anonymous identity IDs based on some information about the user device itself. UE The first user public key component and anonymous identity identifier are sent to the Key Generation Center (KGC) for subsequent private key requests. The Key Generation Center then uses the received first user public key component X... UE and anonymous identity ID UE Generate the second user private key component y UESecond user public key component Y UE And send it to the user device.

[0086] B2. Receive the second user's private key component y UE Second user public key component Y UE According to the second user public key component Y UE Verify the second user's private key component y UE The validity of the registration is verified. If valid, the user device is confirmed to have completed registration.

[0087] The user equipment receives the second user private key component y from the key generation center. UE Second user public key component Y UE According to the second user public key component Y uE Verify the second user's private key component y UE Whether the key was generated by a legitimate key generation center can be determined by checking the second user's public key component Y. UE Second user private key component y UE Substitute the values ​​into a pre-determined verification formula to perform verification and determine the second user's private key component y. UE The validity of the registration is verified. If valid, the user device is confirmed to have completed registration.

[0088] Optional, second user private key component y UE According to the second secret value r UE Master key s, anonymous identity ID UE First user public key component X UE Second user public key component Y UE Generate; second user public key component Y UE According to the second secret value r UE The generator P is determined; where the second secret value r UE From the set of secret values Randomly selected from the options.

[0089] For example, y UE =r UE +s·h UE h UE =H1(ID) UE ,X UE ,Y UE ), where H1 is a hash function. Y UE =r UE ·P.

[0090] Key Generation Center (KGC) randomly selects the second secret value. Using the second secret value r UE The generator P is used to generate the second user public key component Y of the UE through dot product operations. UE =rUE • P, based on the UE's anonymous identity ID UE X UE And the second user public key component Y generated by KGC UE The hash value h is calculated using the hash function H1. UE =H1(ID) Ue ,X UE ,Y UE By combining the master key s, the second user private key component y of the UE can be derived and calculated. UE =r UE +s·h UE It is then transmitted to the UE via a secure channel.

[0091] In this embodiment of the application, the user private key of the user equipment consists of two parts, one part being called the first user private key component x. UE The other part is called the second user private key component y. UE Among them, the first user private key component x UE The second user private key component y is generated by the user equipment itself. UE Generated by the Key Generation Center (KGC). The user's public key for a user device also consists of two parts, one of which is called the first user public key component X. UE The other part is called the second user public key component Y. UE ; where the first user public key component X UE The second user public key component Y is generated by the user equipment itself. UE Generated by the Key Generation Center (KGC).

[0092] Optionally, verify the second user's private key component based on the second user's public key component, including C1-C4:

[0093] C1. Based on the anonymous identity identifier and the first user's public key component X UE Second user public key component Y UE Perform a hash calculation to obtain the fourth hash value.

[0094] Anonymous identity identifier ID UE First user public key component X UE Second user public key component Y UE As input to the hash function, a fourth hash value is obtained through hash calculation. For example, the fourth hash value h... UE The calculation method can be: h UE =H1(ID) UE ,X UE ,Y UE ).

[0095] C2. Determine the third key P based on the master key s and the generator P.KGC , the third key P KGC Multiply by the fourth hash value, and then multiply the product by the second user public key component Y. UE Add them together to get the third piece of information to be verified.

[0096] In this embodiment, the third information to be verified can be understood as information that needs to be verified. The product of the master key s and the generator P is used as the third key P. KGC That is, P KGC =s·P; The third key P KGC and the fourth hash value h UE Multiply the components and then multiply the product with the second user's public key component Y. UE Adding them together yields the third piece of information to be verified, which is Y. UE +P KGC ·h UE .

[0097] C3. Transfer the second user's private key component y UE The product of the generator P and the generator P is used as the fourth piece of information to be verified.

[0098] In this embodiment, the fourth piece of information to be verified can be understood as information that needs to be verified. The fourth piece of information to be verified is the second user's private key component y. UE The product of the generator P, i.e., y UE ·P.

[0099] C4. If the third and fourth pieces of information to be verified are the same, the second user's private key component is determined to be valid.

[0100] Compare the third and fourth pieces of information to be verified. If they are the same, the second user's private key component is determined to be valid; otherwise, the second user's private key component is determined to be invalid.

[0101] In this embodiment of the application, the user equipment verification satisfies equation y. UE ·P=Y UE +P KGC ·h UE If the equation holds true, it means that the second user's private key component y... UE Generated by a valid KGC (due to P) KGG =s·P, substituting into the right side, we get Y UE +s·P·h UE =r UE ·P+s·h UE ·P=(r UE +s·h UE )·P=

[0102] y UE • P is equal to the left side).

[0103] Optionally, the method may also include steps D1-D4:

[0104] D1. Generate the user's private key for the user device based on the first user private key component and the second user private key component.

[0105] x, the first user private key component UE Second user private key component y UE SK, the user's private key for the user device UE SK UE = <x UE ,y UE >.

[0106] D2. Generate the user's public key for the user device based on the first user public key component and the second user public key component.

[0107] The first user public key component X UE Second user public key component Y UE PK as the user's public key for the user equipment UE PK UE = <X UE ,Y UE >

[0108] D3. Generate user public parameters based on the fourth hash value and the third key.

[0109] In this embodiment, the user public parameter can be understood as a public parameter generated by the user equipment, used for identity verification in the subsequent authentication process. Calculate the fourth hash value h. UE and the third key P KGC The product of these terms will be used as the user-defined common parameter Z. UE Z UE =h UE ·P KGC .

[0110] D4. Broadcast user public key and user public parameters.

[0111] Broadcast the user's public key and public parameters to the entire network for identity verification during the authentication process.

[0112] It should be noted that the product calculated in the embodiments of this application can be a dot product, such as an elliptic curve dot product.

[0113] User equipment uses an anonymous identity ID when connecting. UE Concealing their true identity and using ciphertext C UE Encrypted plaintext message msg UEThis forms a dual privacy protection system of "anonymous identity + encrypted content," blocking the risk of identity and communication content leakage at the source. The system architecture is simplified based on a certificate-free cryptographic mechanism, eliminating the need for traditional certificate management. The core computation uses a low-cost combination of "elliptic curve multiplication + hash operation," eliminating complex bilinear pairing operations and adapting to the differentiated computing capabilities of heterogeneous terminals (such as low-power IoT terminals and high-security industrial terminals). AMF signatures are verified through user equipment. M AMF verifies UE signatures UE A two-way verification process ensures the legitimacy of both parties' identities; it relies on the same input parameter ID. M V UE x UE ·X M The hash function H2 enables the UE and AMF to generate a consistent confidentiality key CK, ensuring communication key synchronization. A centralized + distributed layered architecture is constructed, where the KGC centrally generates and distributes some private keys between the UE and AMF, achieving global key control; the UE and AMF generate session keys through distributed negotiation, preventing key leakage at a single point (such as the KGC or a certain terminal) from affecting the security of the entire communication system.

[0114] Federated learning technology can be further integrated into the access method provided in the embodiments of this application. Under the premise of protecting data privacy, this allows multiple parties such as KGC, UE, and AMF to collaboratively train models for optimizing the authentication process or predicting potential security threats. Furthermore, by combining edge computing technology, some authentication and key negotiation computation tasks can be offloaded to the network edge, reducing the burden on the core network and improving terminal response speed. This is particularly suitable for application scenarios with extremely high real-time requirements, such as vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication in autonomous driving.

[0115] To prevent potential replay attacks targeting anonymous identities, timestamps or random numbers can be added to authentication messages. Each authentication generates a new random factor, rendering replays invalid due to expired timestamps or mismatched random numbers. To address potential man-in-the-middle attacks, a combination of digital signatures and Message Authentication Codes (MACs) is introduced during key negotiation to ensure the reliability and tamper-proof nature of the message source. Simultaneously, the KGC master key and parts of the UE and AMF private keys are periodically updated, increasing the difficulty for attackers to crack the keys.

[0116] This application provides a device access method based on a certificateless cryptography mechanism combined with a bilinear pairing algorithm, which greatly reduces computational complexity. This allows even low-computing-power terminals to easily complete the authentication process without performance limitations due to complex calculations; terminals with high security requirements can obtain comprehensive security protection through the high-strength encryption and authentication mechanisms in the solution, solving the problem that existing technologies cannot simultaneously address the differentiated capabilities of terminals. The two-stage access process of "centralized key distribution + distributed key negotiation" precisely reduces redundant calculations and unnecessary signaling interactions during the authentication process. Taking the access of a large number of sensors in the Industrial Internet as an example, using the method provided in this application for device access, the network side (such as AMF, AUSF) can efficiently process access requests, avoid signaling congestion, and significantly improve the overall network throughput and response speed. While ensuring security, it optimizes data transmission efficiency and significantly reduces resource consumption. The entire terminal access process uses anonymous identity identifiers for authentication, preventing attackers from tracing the terminal's true identity through intercepted information. This greatly enhances the security and stability of the communication network, effectively protects identity privacy, and meets the stringent requirements for user privacy protection in 5G vertical industries such as smart healthcare and finance. By using KGC to uniformly distribute keys and combining a simple and efficient two-way authentication and key consistency verification process between UE and AMF, the system architecture is greatly simplified, system operation and maintenance costs and potential risks are reduced, and the overall reliability and maintainability of the system are improved while ensuring communication security.

[0117] Example 3

[0118] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of a device access method provided in Embodiment 3 of this application. This embodiment is applicable to situations where user equipment is accessed into a network. The method can be executed by a device access device, which can be implemented in hardware and / or software. This device access device can be applied to access and mobility management services, which can be deployed on electronic devices. Figure 3 As shown, the method includes:

[0119] S301, Receive the first aggregation information.

[0120] The Access and Mobility Management Service receives the first aggregation information generated and sent by the user equipment and verifies the access of the user equipment.

[0121] S302. Determine the user's public key and user public parameters of the user equipment based on the first aggregated information, and verify the legality of the first aggregated information based on the user's public key and user public parameters.

[0122] Access and Mobility Management Services (AMMS) pre-store user public keys and common user parameters for different user devices. It parses the first aggregated information to determine the anonymous identity ID of the user device. UE According to anonymous identity ID UE Query the pre-stored user public keys and user public parameters of different user devices to determine the ID. UE The corresponding user public key and user public parameters. Substitute the user public key and user public parameters into the verification formula to verify the legitimacy of the first aggregated information.

[0123] S303. If the verification is successful, a third secret value is randomly selected based on the set of secret values. A second temporary public key is generated based on the third secret value and the generator. A second aggregated information is generated based on the second temporary public key and the area identifier of the access and mobility management service and sent to the user equipment.

[0124] If the verification passes, a second aggregated message is generated and sent to the user device. The generation process for the second aggregated message can be: from the secret value set... A value is randomly selected as the third secret value v. M Calculate the third secret value v M The product of the generator P and the generator P is used as the second temporary public key V. M V M =v M ·P. Based on the second temporary public key V M and the regional identifier ID for access and mobility management services M Perform data signing to generate the second aggregated information.

[0125] This application provides a device access method that solves the problems of poor security and low efficiency in device access. The user device and the access and mobility management service only need to interact twice to complete the device access, reducing redundant calculations and unnecessary signaling interactions in the authentication process, avoiding signaling congestion, and significantly improving the overall network throughput and response speed. While ensuring security, it optimizes data transmission efficiency. The access and mobility management service uses anonymous identity identifiers for authentication, so attackers cannot trace the true identity of the terminal through intercepted information, which greatly enhances the security and stability of the communication network.

[0126] Example 4

[0127] Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating a device access method provided in Embodiment 4 of this application. This embodiment is a refinement based on the above embodiments. Figure 4 As shown, the method includes:

[0128] S401, Receive the first aggregation information.

[0129] Optionally, the first aggregated information M includes: anonymous identity ID. UE First temporary public key V UE User equipment signatures UE and ciphertext C UE .

[0130] S402. Determine the user's public key and user public parameters of the user equipment based on the first aggregated information.

[0131] Optional, user equipment's public key PK UE and user common parameter Z UE Based on anonymous identity ID UE Sure.

[0132] The anonymous identity ID is obtained by parsing the first aggregated information M. UE First temporary public key V UE User equipment signatures UE and ciphertext C UE Based on anonymous identity ID UE Query pre-saved user public key PKs for different user devices UE and user common parameter Z UE Determine ID UE Corresponding user public key PK UE and user common parameter Z UE .

[0133] S403. Verify the user equipment signature based on the first temporary public key, ciphertext, user public key, and user public parameters.

[0134] The first temporary public key V is processed according to the predefined method. UE ciphertext C UE User public key PK UE and user common parameter Z UE Perform calculations and compare the result with the user equipment signature s. UE Whether it matches, complete the signature of the user device. UE Verification.

[0135] Optionally, the user equipment signature is verified based on the first temporary public key, the ciphertext, the user's public key, and the user's public parameters, including E1-E4:

[0136] E1, based on the first temporary public key V UE ciphertext C UE PK with user's public key UE Perform a hash calculation to obtain the fifth hash value.

[0137] Use the first temporary public key V UE ciphertext C UEPK with user's public key UE As input to the hash function, a fifth hash value is obtained through hash calculation. For example, an embodiment of this application provides a fifth hash value h. 3,UE The calculation method for h 3,UE =H3(V UE C UE ,X UE ,Y UE ), where the user's public key PK UE Including the first user public key component X UE Second user public key component Y UE .

[0138] E2, based on the fifth hash value h 3,UE User public key PK UE and user common parameter Z UE Determine the second parameter, and combine the second parameter with the first temporary public key V. UE The sum is the fifth piece of information to be verified.

[0139] In this embodiment, the fifth piece of information to be verified can be understood as information that needs to be verified. The user's public key is PK'd. UE The first user public key component X in UE Second user public key component Y UE and user common parameter Z UE Add them together, and the resulting value is denoted as the second parameter. Then, combine the second parameter with the first temporary public key V. UE The sum of these values ​​serves as the fifth piece of information to be verified. For example, this application provides a formula for calculating the fifth piece of information to be verified: Fifth piece of information to be verified = V UE +h 3,UE ·(X UE +Y UE +Z UE ).

[0140] E3. The product of the user equipment signature and the generator is used as the sixth piece of information to be verified.

[0141] In this embodiment, the sixth piece of information to be verified can be understood as information that needs to be verified. Calculate the user equipment signature s. UE The product of the generator P and the generator P is used as the sixth piece of information to be verified.

[0142] E4. If the fifth and sixth pieces of information to be verified are the same, the user equipment signature verification is confirmed to be successful.

[0143] Compare the fifth and sixth pieces of information to be verified. If they are the same, the user equipment signature verification is confirmed to have passed; if they are different, the user equipment signature verification is confirmed to have failed.

[0144] The Access and Mobility Management Service calculates the fifth hash value h using the hash function H3. 3,UE =H3(V UE C UE ,X UE ,Y UE (Consistent with the calculation logic on the UE side), verification equation s UE ·P=V UE +h 3,UE ·(X Ue +Y UE +Z UE If the signature is valid, the Access and Mobility Management Service confirms that the received ciphertext originated from a legitimate user device.

[0145] S404. If the user equipment signature verification passes, the ciphertext is decrypted based on the area identifier of the access and mobility management service to complete the legality verification.

[0146] If the user equipment signature verification passes, the Access and Mobility Management Service needs to verify the ciphertext C. UE Decryption is performed. The Access and Mobility Management Service determines its own Region Identifier ID. M via regional identifier ID M Generate a key, use the key to decrypt the ciphertext, and complete the legitimacy verification.

[0147] Optionally, the ciphertext can be decrypted based on the region identifier of the Access and Mobility Management Services, including F1-F2:

[0148] F1, based on the area identifier of the Access and Mobility Management Service, the first temporary public key, and the first user public key component X. UE and the first service public key component X M Perform a hash calculation to obtain the confidentiality key CK.

[0149] The regional identifier ID for access and mobility management services M First temporary public key V UE First user public key component X UE and the first service public key component X M The value obtained through hash calculation, used as input to the hash function, is the confidentiality key CK. For example, this application provides a method for calculating the confidentiality key CK: CK = h 2,UE =H2(ID) M V UE ,X UE ·X M ).

[0150] F2. Decrypt the ciphertext based on the confidentiality key.

[0151] Ciphertext C is encrypted using the confidentiality key CK. UE Decryption yields the plaintext information, i.e., the information to be transmitted. AMF decryption of ciphertext yields the plaintext. (C) UE The encrypted part after "||" is XORed with CK, msg UE It is the actual service / signaling content transmitted by the UE to the AMF after being encrypted by the CK. It is used to complete the access authentication process, verify the availability of the encrypted link, carry the UE's access request and drive the AMF to provide services, complete the authentication of the user equipment, and verify the feasibility of the user equipment accessing the network.

[0152] S405. If the verification is successful, a third secret value is randomly selected based on the set of secret values, and a second temporary public key is generated based on the third secret value and the generator.

[0153] S406. Perform a hash calculation based on the second temporary public key, the area identifier of the access and mobility management service, and the service public key of the access and mobility management service to obtain the sixth hash value.

[0154] Use the second temporary public key V M Regional Identifier ID for Access and Mobility Management Services M Public key PK for access and mobility management services M The sixth hash value is obtained by hash calculation using the hash function as input. For example, this application provides a sixth hash value h. 3,M Calculation method: h 3,M =H3(ID) M V M ,X M ,Y M H3 is a hash function, and the service public key PK is... M Including X M and Y M .

[0155] S407. Generate a service signature for the access and mobility management service based on the third secret value, the service private key of the access and mobility management service, the service public parameters, and the sixth hash value.

[0156] Service private key PK for Computing Access and Mobility Management Services M The first service private key component x M Second service private key component y M And the service public parameter Z M The sum of these is then combined with the sixth hash value h. 3,M Multiply, then multiply the product with the third secret value v M Add them together to get the service signature s MFor example, an embodiment of this application provides a service signature. M The calculation method, s M =v M +(x M +y M +Z M )·h 3,M The service signature generation logic is consistent with the user equipment signature generation logic. The service signature is used by the user equipment to verify the legitimacy of the AMF identity.

[0157] S408. Generate second aggregation information based on the area identifier, the second temporary public key, and the service signature, and send it to the user equipment.

[0158] Region ID M Second temporary public key V M Service signatures M Write it into a message to form the second aggregated message N.

[0159] Among them, the service public key, service private key, regional identifier, and service public parameters are generated during registration.

[0160] Optionally, the method also includes G1-G2:

[0161] G1, randomly select the first service private key component x based on the set of secret values. M According to the first service private key component x M Generate the first service public key component X from the generator P. M Generate the regional identifier ID for access and mobility management services. M The first service public key component and the area identifier are sent to the key generation center so that the key generation center can generate the second service private key component y based on the first service public key component and the area identifier. M Second service public key component Y M .

[0162] From the set of secret values A value is randomly selected from the data as the first service private key component x. M Calculate the first service private key component x M The product of the generator P and the first service public key component X is used as the first service public key component X. M X M =x M •P. Then, according to the set rules, a regional identifier ID for access and mobility management services is generated. M For example, generating a region identifier ID based on some information from the access and mobility management service itself. M The first service public key component X M and regional identifier ID MThe first public key component X is sent to the Key Generation Center (KGC) for subsequent private key requests. M and regional identifier ID M Generate the second service private key component y M Second service public key component Y M And send it to the Access and Mobility Management Service.

[0163] G2, Receive the second service private key component y M Second service public key component Y M According to the second service public key component Y M Verify the second service private key component y M If the validity is confirmed, then the registration for Access and Mobility Management Services is completed.

[0164] The Access and Mobility Management Service receives the second service private key component y from the Key Generation Center. M Second service public key component Y M According to the second service public key component Y M Verify the second service private key component y M Whether the key was generated by a legitimate key generation center can be determined by checking the second service public key component Y. M Second service private key component y M Substitute the values ​​into a pre-determined verification formula to determine the second service private key component y. M If the validity is confirmed, then the registration for Access and Mobility Management Services is completed.

[0165] Optional, second service private key component y M According to the fourth secret value r M Master key s, area identifier ID M First service public key component X M Second service public key component Y M Generate; Second service public key component Y M According to the fourth secret value r M The generator P is determined; where the fourth secret value r M From the set of secret values Randomly selected from the options.

[0166] For example, y M =r M +s·h M h M =H1(ID) M ,X M ,Y M ), where H1 is a hash function.

[0167] Key Generation Center (KGC) randomly selects a fourth secret value. The second service public key component Y of AMF is generated through dot product operations. M =r M • P, AMF-based regional identifier ID M The first service public key component X generated by AMF itself M And the second service public key component Y generated by KGC M The hash value h is calculated using the hash function H1. M =H1(ID) M ,X M ,Y M By combining the master key s, the second user private key component y of the AMF can be derived and calculated. M =r M +s·h M and transmit y through a secure channel M Transmitted to AMF.

[0168] In this embodiment of the application, the service private key for access and mobility management services consists of two parts, one part being called the first service private key component x. M The other part is called the second service private key component y. M Among them, the first service private key component x M The second service private key component y is generated automatically by the Access and Mobility Management Service. M Generated by the Key Generation Center (KGC). The service public key for Access and Mobility Management Services also consists of two parts, one of which is called the first service public key component X. M The other part is called the second service public key component Y. M Among them, the first service public key component X M The second service public key component Y is generated automatically by the access and mobility management service. M Generated by the Key Generation Center (KGC).

[0169] Optionally, the validity of the second service private key component is verified based on the second service public key component, including H1-H4:

[0170] H1, Based on the region identifier ID M First service public key component X M Second service public key component Y M Perform a hash calculation to obtain the seventh hash value.

[0171] Region ID M First service public key component X M Second service public key component Y M The seventh hash value is obtained by hashing the input to the hash function. For example, the seventh hash value h...M The calculation method can be: h M =H1(ID) M ,X M ,Y M ).

[0172] H2. Determine the third key P based on the master key s and the generator P. KGC , the third key P KGC Multiply by the seventh hash value and then multiply the product by the second service public key component Y. M Adding them together, we get the seventh piece of information to be verified.

[0173] In this embodiment, the seventh piece of information to be verified can be understood as information that needs to be verified. The product of the master key s and the generator P is used as the third key P. KGC That is, P KGC =s·P; The third key P KGC and the seventh hash value h M Multiply them, and then multiply the product with the second service public key component Y. M Adding them together, we get the third piece of information to be verified, which is the seventh piece of information to be verified, Y. M +P KGC ·h M .

[0174] H3, transfer the second service private key component y M The product of the generator and the product of the generators is used as the eighth piece of information to be verified.

[0175] In this embodiment, the eighth piece of information to be verified can be understood as information that needs to be verified. The eighth piece of information to be verified is the second service private key component y. M The product of the generator P, i.e., y M ·P.

[0176] H4. If the seventh and eighth pieces of information to be verified are the same, the second service private key component is determined to be valid.

[0177] Compare the seventh and eighth pieces of information to be verified. If they are the same, the second service private key component is determined to be valid; otherwise, the second service private key component is determined to be invalid.

[0178] The access and mobility management service verification in this application embodiment M ·P=Y M +P KGC ·h M Does it hold true? If the equation holds true, it means that y M Generated by a valid KGC.

[0179] Optionally, the method also includes J1-J4:

[0180] J1. Generate the service private key for access and mobility management services based on the first service private key component and the second service private key component.

[0181] x of the first service private key M Second service private key component y M SK serves as the service private key for access and mobility management services. M SK M = <x M ,y M >

[0182] J2. Generate the service public key for access and mobility management services based on the first service public key component and the second service public key component.

[0183] X, the first service public key component M Second service public key component Y M The public key PK of the service for access and mobility management services M PK M = <X M ,Y M >

[0184] J3. Generate service public parameters based on the seventh hash value and the third key.

[0185] Calculate the seventh hash value h M and the third key P KGC The product of these terms will be used as the service common parameter Z. M Z M =h M ·P KGC .

[0186] J4, Broadcast service public key and service public parameters.

[0187] Broadcast the user's public key and public parameters to the entire network for identity verification during the authentication process.

[0188] It should be noted that the product calculated in the embodiments of this application can be a dot product, such as an elliptic curve dot product.

[0189] This application provides a device access method based on a certificateless cryptography mechanism combined with a bilinear pairing algorithm, which greatly reduces computational complexity. This allows even low-computing-power terminals to easily complete the authentication process without performance limitations due to complex calculations; terminals with high security requirements can obtain comprehensive security protection through the high-strength encryption and authentication mechanisms in the solution, solving the problem that existing technologies cannot simultaneously address the differentiated capabilities of terminals. The two-stage access process of "centralized key distribution + distributed key negotiation" precisely reduces redundant calculations and unnecessary signaling interactions during the authentication process. Taking the access of a large number of sensors in the Industrial Internet as an example, using the method provided in this application for device access, the network side (such as AMF, AUSF) can efficiently process access requests, avoid signaling congestion, and significantly improve the overall network throughput and response speed. While ensuring security, it optimizes data transmission efficiency and significantly reduces resource consumption. The entire terminal access process uses anonymous identity identifiers for authentication, preventing attackers from tracing the terminal's true identity through intercepted information. This greatly enhances the security and stability of the communication network, effectively protects identity privacy, and meets the stringent requirements for user privacy protection in 5G vertical industries such as smart healthcare and finance. By using KGC to uniformly distribute keys and combining a simple and efficient two-way authentication and key consistency verification process between UE and AMF, the system architecture is greatly simplified, system operation and maintenance costs and potential risks are reduced, and the overall reliability and maintainability of the system are improved while ensuring communication security.

[0190] For example, this application provides a process for a user equipment (UE) to interact with the Access and Mobility Management Service (AMF) to achieve device access, including the following steps:

[0191] Step 1: UE generates key, ciphertext, and signature

[0192] UE randomly selects secret value Using the secret value v UE The generator P computes the first temporary public key V. UE =v UE •P, combined with AMF's regional identifier ID M First temporary public key V UE and UE private key component x UE With AMF public key component X M The result of the dot product x UE ·X M A confidentiality key is generated using the hash function H2, resulting in the confidentiality key CK = h. 2,UE =H2(ID) M V UE ,x UE ·X M To protect UE message privacy, the UE generates ciphertext. (where msg) UE The plaintext message sent by the UE to the AMF is encrypted using CK and then hidden, while simultaneously calculating the hash value h. 3,UE =H3(V UE C UE ,X UE ,Y UE ), combined with the secret value v UE With UE complete private key component x UE +y UE Generate signature s UE =v UE +(x UE +y UE )·h 3,UE It is used by the AMF to verify the legitimacy of the UE's identity.

[0193] Step 2: The UE sends the first aggregation message M to the AMF.

[0194] The UE will send the first aggregated message M = (ID) UE V UE ,s UE C UE The message is sent to the Authentication Service (AMF) and contains the UE's anonymous identity, first temporary public key, user signature, and ciphertext, providing complete information for the AMF to authenticate the UE.

[0195] Step 3: AMF verifies the UE signature, decrypts it, and generates CK.

[0196] After receiving the information, AMF first determines the ID. UE Query UE's public key PK UE = <X UE ,Y UE >and user common parameter Z UE The hash value h is recalculated using the hash function H3. 3,UE =H3(V UE C UE ,X UE ,Y UE (Consistent with the calculation logic on the UE side), verification equation s UE ·P=V UE +h 3,UE ·(X UE +Y UE +Z UE If the signature is valid, the AMF determines that the received ciphertext originated from a legitimate UE. Subsequently, the AMF uses its stored ID... M UE sends V UE and UE public key component X UE With AMF public key component X MThe dot product result X UE ·X M The key CK = h is calculated using the hash function H2. 2,UE =H2(ID) M V UE ,X UE ·X M Finally, AMF decrypts the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext. (C) UE The encrypted part after "||" is XORed with CK, msg UE It is the actual service / signaling content transmitted by the UE to the AMF after being encrypted by CK. It is used to complete the access authentication process, verify the availability of the encrypted link, carry the UE's access request and drive the AMF to provide services, complete the authentication of the UE, and verify the feasibility of the UE accessing the network.

[0197] Step 4: AMF generates its own second temporary public key and signature;

[0198] AMF randomly selects secret values. Using the secret value v M The generator P computes the second temporary public key V. M =v M • P; Calculate the hash value h using the hash function H3. 3,M =H3(ID) M V M ,X M ,Y M (The input parameters include the AMF's own region identifier, the second temporary public key, and the public key components to ensure the uniqueness of the hash value), combined with the secret value v. M With the complete AMF private key component and service public parameters (x) M +y M +Z M Generate signature s M =v M +(x M +y M +Z M )·h 3,M (Logic is consistent with UE signature generation), used by the UE to verify the legitimacy of the AMF identity.

[0199] Step 5: The AMF sends the second aggregation message to the UE;

[0200] AMF will aggregate the second message N = (ID) M V M ,s M The second aggregated message is sent to the UE and contains the AMF's area identifier, second temporary public key, and service signature, providing complete information for the UE to authenticate the AMF.

[0201] Step 6: UE verifies AMF signature;

[0202] After receiving the second aggregation message N, the UE first determines the ID. M Query AMF public key PK M = <X M ,Y M >and service common parameter Z M The hash value h is recalculated using the hash function H3. 3,M =H3(ID) M V M ,X M ,Y M (Consistent with the AMF side calculation logic), verify equation s M ·P=V M +h 3,M ·(X M +Y M +Z M If the signature verification passes, the UE confirms the AMF's identity as legitimate.

[0203] At this point, the UE and AMF have completed two-way authentication and negotiated a consistent confidentiality key CK. This key can then be used for secure communication, ensuring the privacy and integrity of data during transmission and resisting attacks such as eavesdropping and tampering.

[0204] Example 5

[0205] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a device access device provided in Embodiment 5 of this application. Figure 5 As shown, the device includes: a first aggregated information generation module 51, a first aggregated information sending module 52, a second aggregated information receiving module 53, and a service signature verification module 54.

[0206] The first aggregated information generation module 51 is used to randomly select a first secret value based on the set of secret values, and according to the first secret value v UE Generate the first temporary public key V from the generator P. UE The first aggregated information is generated by encrypting the information to be transmitted based on the first temporary public key and the anonymous identity identifier of the user equipment.

[0207] The first aggregation information sending module 52 is used to send the first aggregation information to the access and mobility management service so that the access and mobility management service can verify the legitimacy of the first aggregation information.

[0208] The second aggregation information receiving module 53 is used to receive the second aggregation information fed back by the access and mobility management service. The second aggregation information is generated after the legality verification of the first aggregation information is passed.

[0209] The service signature verification module 54 is used to perform signature verification based on the second aggregated information. If the verification is successful, it is determined that the user equipment has successfully accessed the network.

[0210] This application provides a device access apparatus that solves the problems of poor security and low efficiency in device access. User equipment and access and mobility management services only need two interactions to complete device access, reducing redundant calculations and unnecessary signaling interactions in the authentication process, avoiding signaling congestion, and significantly improving the overall network throughput and response speed. While ensuring security, it optimizes data transmission efficiency. User equipment uses anonymous identity identifiers to participate in authentication, so attackers cannot trace the true identity of the terminal through intercepted information, which greatly enhances the security and stability of the communication network.

[0211] Optionally, the first aggregated information generation module 51 includes:

[0212] The encryption unit is configured to use the first temporary public key, the area identifier of the access and mobility management service, and the first user private key component x of the user equipment. UE The first service public key component X for access and mobility management services M Generate a confidentiality key, and encrypt the information to be transmitted based on the confidentiality key and the anonymous identity identifier of the user equipment to generate ciphertext;

[0213] The first hash value determination unit is used to perform hash calculation based on the first temporary public key, the ciphertext, and the user's public key of the user equipment to obtain the first hash value.

[0214] The user signature generation unit is used to generate a user equipment signature based on the first secret value vUE, the user equipment's user private key, and the first hash value.

[0215] The first aggregated information generation unit is configured to generate first aggregated information based on the anonymous identity identifier, the first temporary public key, the user equipment signature, and the ciphertext.

[0216] The user's public key, user's private key, and anonymous identity identifier of the user device are generated during registration.

[0217] Optionally, the service signature verification module 54 includes:

[0218] The service signature determination unit is used to determine the area identifier of the access and mobility management service and the second temporary public key V based on the second aggregated information.M Service signature;

[0219] The service public parameter determination unit is used to determine the service public key (PK) of the access and mobility management service based on the area identifier. M Service common parameter Z M ;

[0220] The second hash value determination unit is used to perform hash calculation based on the area identifier, the second temporary public key and the service public key to obtain the second hash value;

[0221] A service signature verification unit is used to verify the service signature based on the second hash value, the service public key, and the service public parameters;

[0222] The service public key and service public parameters of the access and mobility management service are generated during registration.

[0223] Optionally, the service signature verification unit is specifically used for: calculating the product of the service signature and the generator to obtain the first information to be verified; and based on the first service public key component X in the service public key... M Second service public key component Y M The service public parameter Z M The first parameter is determined by the second hash value, and the sum of the first parameter and the second temporary public key is used as the second information to be verified. If the first information to be verified and the second information to be verified are the same, the verification is successful; otherwise, the verification fails.

[0224] Optionally, the device may also include:

[0225] Anonymous identifier generation module, used to randomly select a first user private key component x based on the set of secret values. UE According to the first user private key component x UE Generate the first user public key component X from the generator P. UE Generate anonymous identity ID for user devices UE The first user public key component and the anonymous identity identifier are sent to the key generation center, so that the key generation center can generate a second user private key component y based on the first user public key component and the anonymous identity identifier. UE Second user public key component Y UE ;

[0226] The user key component receiving module is used to receive the second user private key component y. UE Second user public key component Y UE According to the second user public key component Y UE Verify the second user's private key component yUE If the validity of the registration is confirmed, the user equipment is confirmed to have completed registration.

[0227] Optionally, the second user private key component is based on the second secret value r. UE Master key, the anonymous identity identifier, and the first user public key component X UE Second user public key component Y UE generate;

[0228] The second user public key component Y UE Determined based on the second secret value and the generator;

[0229] The second secret value is randomly selected from the set of secret values.

[0230] Optionally, the user key component receiving module includes:

[0231] The fourth hash value calculation unit is used to calculate the hash value based on the anonymous identity identifier and the first user public key component X. UE Second user public key component Y UE Perform a hash calculation to obtain the fourth hash value;

[0232] The third unit for determining information to be verified is used to determine a third key based on the master key and the generator, and to set the third key P... KGC Multiply the hash value by the fourth hash value, and then multiply the product by the second user public key component Y. UE Add them together to get the third piece of information to be verified;

[0233] The fourth unit for determining the information to be verified is used to determine the second user private key component y. UE The product of the generator and the generator is used as the fourth piece of information to be verified;

[0234] The user private key component verification unit is used to determine that the second user private key component is valid if the third information to be verified and the fourth information to be verified are the same.

[0235] Optionally, the device may also include:

[0236] The user private key generation module is used to generate a user private key for the user device based on the first user private key component and the second user private key component.

[0237] The user public key generation module is used to generate a user public key for the user equipment based on the first user public key component and the second user public key component.

[0238] The user public parameter generation module is used to generate user public parameters based on the fourth hash value and the third key.

[0239] The first broadcast module is used to broadcast the user's public key and user public parameters.

[0240] The device access apparatus provided in this application embodiment can execute the device access method provided in any embodiment of this application, and has the corresponding functional modules and beneficial effects of the execution method.

[0241] Example 6

[0242] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a device access apparatus provided in Embodiment Six of this application, applied to access and mobility management services. Figure 6 As shown, the device includes: a first aggregated information receiving module 61, a first aggregated information verification module 62, and a second aggregated information generating module 63.

[0243] The first aggregated information receiving module 61 is used to receive the first aggregated information;

[0244] The first aggregated information verification module 62 is used to determine the user public key and user public parameters of the user device based on the first aggregated information, and to verify the legality of the first aggregated information based on the user public key and the user public parameters.

[0245] The second aggregated information generation module 63 is used to randomly select a third secret value v based on the set of secret values ​​if the verification passes. M According to the third secret value v M Generate a second temporary public key V from generator P. M The system generates second aggregated information based on the second temporary public key and the area identifier of the access and mobility management service, and sends it to the user equipment.

[0246] This application provides a device access apparatus that solves the problems of poor security and low efficiency in device access. User equipment and access and mobility management services only need two interactions to complete device access, reducing redundant calculations and unnecessary signaling interactions in the authentication process, avoiding signaling congestion, and significantly improving the overall network throughput and response speed. While ensuring security, it optimizes data transmission efficiency. The access and mobility management services use anonymous identity identifiers for authentication, so attackers cannot trace the true identity of the terminal through intercepted information, which greatly enhances the security and stability of the communication network.

[0247] Optionally, the first aggregated information includes: an anonymous identity identifier, a first temporary public key, a user equipment signature, and ciphertext; the user equipment's user public key and user public parameters are determined based on the anonymous identity identifier.

[0248] Optionally, the first aggregated information verification module 62 includes:

[0249] The user signature verification unit is used to verify the signature of the user equipment based on the first temporary public key, the ciphertext, the user public key, and the user public parameters.

[0250] The decryption unit is used to decrypt the ciphertext according to the area identifier of the access and mobility management service if the user equipment signature verification passes, thereby completing the legality verification.

[0251] Optionally, the user signature verification unit is specifically used for: verifying the signature based on the first temporary public key V. UE The ciphertext C UE A hash calculation is performed on the user's public key to obtain a fifth hash value; a second parameter is determined based on the fifth hash value, the user's public key, and the user's public parameters; the sum of the second parameter and the first temporary public key is used as the fifth information to be verified; the product of the user equipment signature and the generator is used as the sixth information to be verified; if the fifth information to be verified and the sixth information to be verified are the same, the user equipment signature verification is determined to be successful.

[0252] Optionally, the decryption unit is specifically used for: decrypting the data based on the area identifier of the access and mobility management service, the first temporary public key, and the first user public key component X. UE and the first service public key component X M Perform a hash calculation to obtain a confidentiality key; decrypt the ciphertext based on the confidentiality key.

[0253] Optionally, the second aggregated information generation module 63 includes:

[0254] The sixth hash value determination unit is used to determine the hash value based on the second temporary public key V. M The sixth hash value is obtained by hashing the region identifier of the access and mobility management service and the public key of the access and mobility management service.

[0255] The service signature generation unit is used to generate a signature based on the third secret value v. M The service private key and service public parameter Z of the access and mobility management service. M The sixth hash value is used to generate the service signature for access and mobility management services. M ;

[0256] The second aggregation information generation unit is configured to generate information based on the region identifier, the second temporary public key, and the service signature. M Generate second aggregated information;

[0257] The service public key, the service private key, the region identifier, and the service public parameters are generated during registration.

[0258] Optionally, the device may also include:

[0259] The region identifier generation module is used to randomly select a first service private key component x based on the set of secret values. M According to the first service private key component x M Generate the first service public key component X from the generator P. M Generate the regional identifier ID for access and mobility management services. M The first service public key component and the region identifier are sent to the key generation center, so that the key generation center can generate a second service private key component y based on the first service public key component and the region identifier. M Second service public key component Y M ;

[0260] The service private key verification module is used to receive the second service private key component y. M Second service public key component Y M According to the second service public key component Y M Verify the second service private key component y M If the validity of the access and mobility management service is confirmed, then the registration is completed.

[0261] Optionally, the second service private key component is based on the fourth secret value r. M Master key, the area identifier, and the first service public key component X M Second service public key component Y M generate;

[0262] The second service public key component Y M Determined based on the fourth secret value and the generator;

[0263] The fourth secret value is randomly selected from the set of secret values.

[0264] Optional, the service private key verification module includes:

[0265] The seventh hash value determination unit is used to determine the hash value based on the region identifier and the first service public key component X. M Second service public key component Y M Perform a hash calculation to obtain the seventh hash value;

[0266] The seventh unit for generating information to be verified is used to determine the third key based on the master key and the generator, and to generate the third key P. KGC Multiply the hash value by the seventh hash value, and then multiply the product by the second service public key component Y. M Adding them together, we get the seventh piece of information to be verified;

[0267] The eighth unit for generating verification information is used to generate the second service private key component y. M The product of the generator and the generator is used as the eighth piece of information to be verified;

[0268] The service private key component verification unit is used to determine that the second service private key component is valid if the seventh information to be verified and the eighth information to be verified are the same.

[0269] Optionally, the device may also include:

[0270] The service private key generation module is used to generate a service private key for access and mobility management services based on the first service private key component and the second service private key component.

[0271] A service public key generation module is used to generate a service public key for access and mobility management services based on the first service public key component and the second service public key component;

[0272] A service public parameter generation module is used to generate service public parameters based on the seventh hash value and the third key;

[0273] The second broadcast module is used to broadcast the service public key and the service public parameters.

[0274] The device access apparatus provided in this application embodiment can execute the device access method provided in any embodiment of this application, and has the corresponding functional modules and beneficial effects of the execution method.

[0275] Example 4

[0276] Figure 7 A schematic diagram of an electronic device 70 that can be used to implement embodiments of this application is shown. The electronic device is intended to represent various forms of digital computers, such as laptop computers, desktop computers, workstations, personal digital assistants, servers, blade servers, mainframe computers, and other suitable computers. The electronic device can also represent various forms of mobile devices, such as personal digital assistants, cellular phones, smartphones, wearable devices (e.g., helmets, glasses, watches, etc.), and other similar computing devices. The components shown herein, their connections and relationships, and their functions are merely illustrative and are not intended to limit the implementation of the application described and / or claimed herein.

[0277] like Figure 7As shown, the electronic device 70 includes at least one processor 71 and a memory, such as a read-only memory (ROM) 72 and a random access memory (RAM) 73, communicatively connected to the at least one processor 71. The memory stores computer programs executable by the at least one processor. The processor 71 can perform various appropriate actions and processes based on the computer program stored in the ROM 72 or loaded from storage unit 78 into the RAM 73. The RAM 73 can also store various programs and data required for the operation of the electronic device 70. The processor 71, ROM 72, and RAM 73 are interconnected via a bus 74. An input / output (I / O) interface 75 is also connected to the bus 74.

[0278] Multiple components in electronic device 70 are connected to I / O interface 75, including: input unit 76, such as keyboard, mouse, etc.; output unit 77, such as various types of monitors, speakers, etc.; storage unit 78, such as disk, optical disk, etc.; and communication unit 79, such as network card, modem, wireless transceiver, etc. Communication unit 79 allows electronic device 70 to exchange information / data with other devices through computer networks such as the Internet and / or various telecommunications networks.

[0279] Processor 71 can be a variety of general-purpose and / or special-purpose processing components with processing and computing capabilities. Some examples of processor 71 include, but are not limited to, a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), various special-purpose artificial intelligence (AI) computing chips, various processors running machine learning model algorithms, a digital signal processor (DSP), and any suitable processor, controller, microcontroller, etc. Processor 71 performs the various methods and processes described above, such as device access methods.

[0280] In some embodiments, the device access method may be implemented as a computer program tangibly contained in a computer-readable storage medium, such as storage unit 78. In some embodiments, part or all of the computer program may be loaded and / or installed on electronic device 70 via ROM 72 and / or communication unit 79. When the computer program is loaded into RAM 73 and executed by processor 71, one or more steps of the device access method described above may be performed. Alternatively, in other embodiments, processor 71 may be configured to perform the device access method by any other suitable means (e.g., by means of firmware).

[0281] Various embodiments of the systems and techniques described above herein can be implemented in digital electronic circuit systems, integrated circuit systems, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), application-specific standard products (ASSPs), systems-on-a-chip (SoCs), payload-programmable logic devices (CPLDs), computer hardware, firmware, software, and / or combinations thereof. These various embodiments may include implementations in one or more computer programs that can be executed and / or interpreted on a programmable system including at least one programmable processor, which may be a dedicated or general-purpose programmable processor, capable of receiving data and instructions from a storage system, at least one input device, and at least one output device, and transmitting data and instructions to the storage system, the at least one input device, and the at least one output device.

[0282] Computer programs used to implement the methods of this application may be written in any combination of one or more programming languages. These computer programs may be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, or other programmable data processing device, such that when executed by the processor, the computer programs cause the functions / operations specified in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams to be performed. The computer programs may be executed entirely on a machine, partially on a machine, or as a standalone software package, partially on a machine and partially on a remote machine, or entirely on a remote machine or server.

[0283] This application provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the device access method described in any embodiment of this application.

[0284] In the context of this application, a computer-readable storage medium can be a tangible medium that may contain or store a computer program for use by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device. A computer-readable storage medium can be, but is not limited to, electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor systems, apparatus, or devices, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. Alternatively, a computer-readable storage medium can be a machine-readable signal medium. More specific examples of machine-readable storage media include electrical connections based on one or more wires, portable computer disks, hard disks, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), optical fiber, portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), optical storage devices, magnetic storage devices, or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

[0285] To provide interaction with a user, the systems and techniques described herein can be implemented on an electronic device having: a display device (e.g., a CRT (cathode ray tube) or LCD (liquid crystal display) monitor) for displaying information to the user; and a keyboard and pointing device (e.g., a mouse or trackball) through which the user provides input to the electronic device. Other types of devices can also be used to provide interaction with the user; for example, feedback provided to the user can be any form of sensory feedback (e.g., visual feedback, auditory feedback, or tactile feedback); and input from the user can be received in any form (including sound input, voice input, or tactile input).

[0286] The systems and technologies described herein can be implemented in computing systems that include backend components (e.g., as data servers), or computing systems that include middleware components (e.g., application servers), or computing systems that include frontend components (e.g., user computers with graphical user interfaces or web browsers through which users can interact with implementations of the systems and technologies described herein), or any combination of such backend, middleware, or frontend components. The components of the system can be interconnected via digital data communication of any form or medium (e.g., communication networks). Examples of communication networks include local area networks (LANs), wide area networks (WANs), blockchain networks, and the Internet.

[0287] A computing system can include clients and servers. Clients and servers are generally located far apart and typically interact through communication networks. The client-server relationship is created by computer programs running on the respective computers and having a client-server relationship with each other. The server can be a cloud server, also known as a cloud computing server or cloud host, which is a hosting product within the cloud computing service system to address the shortcomings of traditional physical hosts and VPS services, such as high management difficulty and weak business scalability.

[0288] It should be understood that the various forms of processes shown above can be used to rearrange, add, or delete steps. For example, the steps described in this application can be executed in parallel, sequentially, or in different orders, as long as the desired result of the technical solution of this application can be achieved, and this is not limited herein.

[0289] The specific embodiments described above do not constitute a limitation on the scope of protection of this application. Those skilled in the art should understand that various modifications, combinations, sub-combinations, and substitutions can be made according to design requirements and other factors. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, and improvements made within the spirit and principles of this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application.

Claims

1. A device access method, characterized in that, Applied to user equipment, including: A first secret value is randomly selected from the set of secret values. A first temporary public key is generated based on the first secret value and the generator. The information to be transmitted is encrypted based on the first temporary public key and the anonymous identity identifier of the user equipment, and a first aggregated information is generated. The first aggregated information is sent to the access and mobility management service so that the access and mobility management service can verify the legitimacy of the first aggregated information; The system receives second aggregated information from the access and mobility management service, which is generated after the first aggregated information passes the legality verification. Signature verification is performed based on the second aggregated information. If the verification passes, it is determined that the user equipment has successfully accessed the network.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of encrypting the information to be transmitted based on the first temporary public key and the anonymous identity identifier of the user equipment to generate the first aggregated information includes: A confidential key is generated based on the first temporary public key, the area identifier of the access and mobility management service, the first user private key component of the user equipment, and the first service public key component of the access and mobility management service. The information to be transmitted is then encrypted based on the confidential key and the anonymous identity identifier of the user equipment to generate ciphertext. A hash value is obtained by performing a hash calculation based on the first temporary public key, the ciphertext, and the user's public key of the user equipment. Generate a user equipment signature based on the first secret value, the user equipment's private key, and the first hash value; First aggregate information is generated based on the anonymous identity identifier, the first temporary public key, the user equipment signature, and the ciphertext. The user's public key, user's private key, and anonymous identity identifier of the user device are generated during registration.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The signature verification based on the second aggregated information includes: The region identifier, second temporary public key, and service signature for access and mobility management services are determined based on the second aggregated information. The service public key and service public parameters of the access and mobility management service are determined based on the region identifier; A second hash value is obtained by performing a hash calculation based on the region identifier, the second temporary public key, and the service public key; The service signature is verified based on the second hash value, the service public key, and the service public parameters; The service public key and service public parameters of the access and mobility management service are generated during registration.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The verification of the service signature based on the second hash value, the service public key, and the service public parameters includes: Calculate the product of the service signature and the generator to obtain the first information to be verified; The first parameter is determined based on the first and second service public key components in the service public key, the service public parameters, and the second hash value. The sum of the first parameter and the second temporary public key is used as the second information to be verified. If the first information to be verified is the same as the second information to be verified, the verification passes; otherwise, the verification fails.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1-4, characterized in that, Also includes: Based on the set of secret values, a first user private key component is randomly selected. A first user public key component is generated according to the first user private key component and the generator. An anonymous identity identifier of the user device is generated. The first user public key component and the anonymous identity identifier are sent to the key generation center so that the key generation center can generate a second user private key component and a second user public key component according to the first user public key component and the anonymous identity identifier. Receive the second user private key component and the second user public key component, verify the validity of the second user private key component based on the second user public key component, and if valid, confirm that the user equipment has completed registration.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The second user private key component is generated based on the second secret value, the master key, the anonymous identity identifier, the first user public key component, and the second user public key component; The second user public key component is determined based on the second secret value and the generator; The second secret value is randomly selected from the set of secret values.

7. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The step of verifying the second user's private key component based on the second user's public key component includes: A fourth hash value is obtained by performing a hash calculation based on the anonymous identity identifier, the first user public key component, and the second user public key component. The third key is determined based on the master key and the generator. The third key is multiplied by the fourth hash value, and the product is added to the second user public key component to obtain the third information to be verified. The product of the second user private key component and the generator is used as the fourth information to be verified. If the third and fourth verification information are the same, the second user private key component is determined to be valid.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that, Also includes: Generate a user private key for the user device based on the first user private key component and the second user private key component; Generate the user's public key for the user equipment based on the first user public key component and the second user public key component; Generate user public parameters based on the fourth hash value and the third key; Broadcast the user's public key and user public parameters.

9. A device access method, characterized in that, Applied to access and mobility management services, including: Receive the first aggregated information; The user's public key and user public parameters of the user device are determined based on the first aggregated information, and the legality of the first aggregated information is verified based on the user's public key and the user public parameters. If the verification is successful, a third secret value is randomly selected based on the set of secret values. A second temporary public key is generated based on the third secret value and the generator. A second aggregated information is generated based on the second temporary public key and the area identifier of the access and mobility management service and sent to the user equipment.

10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that, The first aggregated information includes: an anonymous identity identifier, a first temporary public key, a user equipment signature, and ciphertext; the user equipment's user public key and user public parameters are determined based on the anonymous identity identifier; Accordingly, the step of verifying the legitimacy of the first aggregated information based on the user's public key and the user's public parameters includes: The user equipment signature is verified based on the first temporary public key, the ciphertext, the user public key, and the user public parameters; If the user equipment signature verification passes, the ciphertext is decrypted based on the area identifier of the access and mobility management service to complete the legality verification.

11. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that, The step of verifying the user equipment signature based on the first temporary public key, the ciphertext, the user public key, and the user public parameters includes: A fifth hash value is obtained by performing a hash calculation based on the first temporary public key, the ciphertext, and the user's public key; The second parameter is determined based on the fifth hash value, the user public key, and the user public parameters, and the sum of the second parameter and the first temporary public key is used as the fifth information to be verified. The product of the user equipment signature and the generator is used as the sixth piece of information to be verified. If the fifth and sixth pieces of information to be verified are the same, the user equipment signature verification is deemed successful.

12. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that, The step of decrypting the ciphertext based on the region identifier of the Access and Mobility Management Service includes: A confidentiality key is obtained by performing a hash calculation based on the region identifier of the access and mobility management service, the first temporary public key, the first user public key component, and the first service public key component; The ciphertext is decrypted using the confidentiality key.

13. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that, The step of generating the second aggregated information based on the second temporary public key and the area identifier of the Access and Mobility Management Service includes: A sixth hash value is obtained by performing a hash calculation based on the second temporary public key, the region identifier of the access and mobility management service, and the service public key of the access and mobility management service; A service signature for the access and mobility management service is generated based on the third secret value, the service private key of the access and mobility management service, the service public parameters, and the sixth hash value. Generate second aggregate information based on the region identifier, the second temporary public key, and the service signature; The service public key, the service private key, the region identifier, and the service public parameters are generated during registration.

14. The method according to any one of claims 9-13, characterized in that, Also includes: A first service private key component is randomly selected based on the set of secret values. A first service public key component is generated based on the first service private key component and the generator. An area identifier for access and mobility management services is generated. The first service public key component and the area identifier are sent to the key generation center so that the key generation center can generate a second service private key component based on the first service public key component and the area identifier. Receive the second service private key component and the second service public key component, verify the validity of the second service private key component based on the second service public key component, and if valid, confirm that the access and mobility management service has completed registration.

15. The method according to claim 14, characterized in that, The second service private key component is generated based on the fourth secret value, the master key, the area identifier, the first service public key component, and the second service public key component; The second service public key component is determined based on the fourth secret value and the generator; The fourth secret value is randomly selected from the set of secret values.

16. The method according to claim 14, characterized in that, The step of verifying the validity of the second service private key component based on the second service public key component includes: A hash value is obtained by performing a hash calculation based on the region identifier, the first service public key component, and the second service public key component; The third key is determined based on the master key and the generator. The third key is multiplied by the seventh hash value, and the product is added to the second service public key component to obtain the seventh information to be verified. The product of the second service private key component and the generator is used as the eighth piece of information to be verified. If the seventh and eighth pieces of information to be verified are the same, the second service private key component is determined to be valid.

17. The method according to claim 16, characterized in that, Also includes: Generate a service private key for access and mobility management services based on the first service private key component and the second service private key component; Generate a service public key for access and mobility management services based on the first service public key component and the second service public key component; Generate service public parameters based on the seventh hash value and the third key; Broadcast the service public key and the service public parameters.

18. An electronic device, characterized in that, The electronic device includes: At least one processor, and a memory communicatively connected to said at least one processor; The memory stores a computer program that can be executed by the at least one processor, which is then executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform the device access method according to any one of claims 1-17.

19. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores computer instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement the device access method according to any one of claims 1-17.

20. A computer program product, characterized in that, The computer program product includes a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the device access method according to any one of claims 1-17.

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