Intelligent Terminal Remote Access Control System Based on National Cryptographic Standards

Abstract

This invention relates to the field of IoT keys and remote access control for smart terminals, and particularly to a remote access control system for smart terminals based on national cryptographic standards. The invention utilizes a device authentication module to generate a terminal device fingerprint based on device hardware characteristic parameters; a cloud authentication module to issue a device certificate to the target terminal device based on the terminal device fingerprint; a status awareness module to collect the device status parameters of the target terminal in real time; an anomaly monitoring module to calibrate risk factors based on the device status parameters of the target terminal to determine the remote access method of the target terminal; a layered encryption module to encrypt sensitive data and transaction messages output from the keypad, as well as remote control commands; and a cloud control module to transmit the encrypted control commands to the target terminal for execution. This invention significantly improves the security efficiency and accuracy of remote access for smart terminals.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of Internet of Things (IoT) keys and remote access control for smart terminals, and particularly to a remote access control system for smart terminals based on national cryptographic standards. Background Technology

[0002] With the increasing reliance on smart terminals in highly sensitive scenarios such as finance and healthcare, remote access systems need to address security threats such as device impersonation, data theft, and unauthorized operations. Traditional identity authentication relies on usernames and passwords or single biometric identification, making it vulnerable to brute-force or forgery attacks. Furthermore, traditional encrypted communication is static, employing fixed symmetric keys or asymmetric algorithms, which cannot cope with dynamic threat environments. These shortcomings make existing systems significantly vulnerable to advanced persistent threats, especially in scenarios involving state secrets or user privacy, where compliance and security requirements are difficult to meet simultaneously. There is an urgent need to build a new system that integrates hardware fingerprint binding, real-time device status sensing, and risk factor-driven adaptive key selection mechanisms to achieve a harmonious balance between security, compliance, and operational efficiency.

[0003] Chinese Publication No. CN113572601A discloses a VNC remote secure communication method based on the Chinese national cryptographic standard TLS. This method includes: adapting the TLS protocol to the Chinese national cryptographic algorithm; adapting the VNC protocol to the Chinese national cryptographic algorithm; entering a handshake request phase, determining whether the version number supported by the server is compatible with the version number sent by the client; entering a negotiation phase, determining the security type of the connection between the server and the client; entering a TLS key authentication phase, determining whether the random number sent by the server to the client is consistent with the random number obtained by the server through decryption using the SM2 algorithm; entering an initialization phase, where the client sends ClientInit initialization information to the server, and the server returns ServerInit initialization information; and entering an interaction phase, where the client sends operation commands to the server. This invention improves the level of secure transmission and remote access services by using TLS encryption based on the Chinese national cryptographic standard on top of VNC remote control, ensuring the security of mouse and keyboard operation command transmission and result display during remote control.

[0004] Therefore, it is evident that the existing technology has the following problems:

[0005] Traditional intelligent terminal remote access control systems suffer from problems such as weak terminal device authentication, simplistic encryption strategies, lack of physical security monitoring, and static risk assessment. Summary of the Invention

[0006] To address this, the present invention provides a remote access control system for intelligent terminals based on national cryptographic standards, which overcomes the problems of weak terminal device authentication, single encryption strategy, lack of physical security monitoring, and static risk assessment in existing traditional remote access control systems for intelligent terminals.

[0007] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides a remote access control system for intelligent terminals based on national cryptographic standards, comprising:

[0008] The device authentication module is installed on each target terminal to generate a terminal device fingerprint of the target terminal based on the collected device hardware feature parameters of the target terminal.

[0009] The cloud authentication module is used to receive the fingerprint of the terminal device, establish a database of valid fingerprint certificates for the terminal device, and issue a device certificate to the target terminal device based on the fingerprint of the terminal device, wherein the device certificate is obtained by calculating a first key;

[0010] The status awareness module is connected to both the target terminal and the device authentication module to collect the device status parameters of the target terminal in real time, including the target terminal's geographical location information, network environment information, and device logs.

[0011] An anomaly monitoring module, connected to the state perception module, is used to identify the risk factors of the target terminal based on the target terminal's geographical location information, network environment information, and device logs, and to determine the remote access method of the target terminal based on the risk factors. The remote access method includes controlling the target terminal to power off, deleting the target terminal's device fingerprint, controlling the target terminal to lock, updating the device certificate based on the first key, controlling the target terminal to restart, and controlling the target terminal to update its configuration.

[0012] A layered encryption module, which is connected to the device authentication module and the cloud authentication module, includes a terminal encryption unit for encrypting sensitive data and transaction messages output by the keypad and a remote encryption unit for encrypting remote control commands.

[0013] The cloud control module, connected to the anomaly monitoring module and the layered encryption module, is used to determine the corresponding remote control command based on the remote access method, determine the encryption key for the remote control command according to the risk factor, and transmit the encrypted remote control command to the target terminal for execution. The cloud control module is also used to update the encryption key for data transmission with the target terminal according to the risk factor, including the national cryptographic key.

[0014] Furthermore, the state perception module is also used to acquire vibration information of each target terminal in real time;

[0015] The anomaly monitoring module is also used to determine the frequency of geolocation detection based on the vibration information of a single target terminal, and to calibrate the risk factors of the corresponding target terminal based on the change in geolocation information and vibration information, so as to determine the remote access method based on the risk factors.

[0016] The vibration information includes the vibration acceleration and vibration frequency of the target terminal.

[0017] Furthermore, the remote encryption unit encrypts the control commands based on the third key determined by the risk factor.

[0018] Furthermore, the anomaly monitoring module determines an acceleration threshold based on the maximum value of vibration acceleration in the historical vibration information of the authenticated target terminal, and determines a frequency threshold based on the historical operating vibration frequency of the authenticated target terminal, so as to determine the frequency of the geographical location detection based on the current vibration information of the target terminal, the acceleration threshold, and the frequency threshold.

[0019] Furthermore, the anomaly monitoring module calculates a first coefficient based on the current vibration acceleration of the target terminal and the acceleration threshold, and calculates a second coefficient based on the current vibration frequency of the target terminal and the frequency threshold, so as to calculate the frequency of the geographical location detection based on the first coefficient or the second coefficient.

[0020] Furthermore, the anomaly monitoring module is used to identify the risk factors of the target terminal based on its geographical location information, network environment information, and device logs, including:

[0021] If any of the following conditions exist: abnormal geographical location information, abnormal vibration information, IP switching number exceeds the preset first threshold, or unauthorized access records exist in the device log, the risk factor of the target terminal is identified as the first risk factor.

[0022] If any of the following conditions are met: the number of IP switching exceeds the preset second threshold, the geographical location information is normal but only one type of vibration information is abnormal, or the device log contains login failure records, the risk factor of the target terminal is identified as the second risk factor.

[0023] If the terminal device experiences either lag or requires a security patch update, the risk factor for the target terminal is designated as the third risk factor.

[0024] Furthermore, the anomaly monitoring module determines whether there is an anomaly in the geographical location information by comparing the change in the geographical location information of the target terminal with a change threshold, and determines whether there is an anomaly in the vibration information by comparing the vibration information with a corresponding vibration information threshold. The vibration information anomaly includes all vibration information anomalies and only one type of vibration information anomaly.

[0025] Furthermore, the anomaly monitoring module determines the remote access method of the target terminal based on risk factors, including:

[0026] In the case of the first risk factor, the remote access method is determined to be to power off the target terminal and delete the target terminal device fingerprint;

[0027] In the case of the second risk factor, the remote access method is determined to be locking the target terminal and updating the device certificate based on the first key;

[0028] In the case of the third risk factor, the remote access method is determined to be either controlling the target terminal to restart or controlling the target terminal to update its configuration.

[0029] Furthermore, the layered encryption module employs a three-layer encryption strategy, including:

[0030] The terminal encryption unit uses a first key to encrypt sensitive data output from the keypad.

[0031] The terminal encryption unit uses the second key to encrypt the transaction message;

[0032] The remote encryption unit uses a third key to encrypt remote control commands.

[0033] Furthermore, the anomaly monitoring module is also used to upload the device operation log, abnormal event log, and vibration and geographical location association log to the cloud in real time. The cloud control module is also used to generate an audit report based on the log. The audit report includes an abnormal operation trajectory map and a timeline of high-risk factor events to support terminal administrator queries.

[0034] Compared with existing technologies, the advantages of this invention are that it provides a remote access control system for smart terminals based on national cryptographic standards. Through the collaboration of the device authentication module and the cloud authentication module, a terminal device fingerprint is generated based on hardware feature parameters, and a certificate database is established. This achieves a strong binding between terminal identity and hardware features, significantly improving the uniqueness and anti-counterfeiting capabilities of identity authentication and effectively resisting unauthorized access by counterfeit terminals. The status awareness module collects parameters such as geographical location, network environment, and device logs from multiple dimensions. Combined with the risk factor labeling mechanism of the anomaly monitoring module, the system can accurately identify the terminal's security status, providing a scientific basis for differentiated remote access control. The layered encryption module implements hierarchical encryption for sensitive data, transaction messages, and remote control commands. In conjunction with the cloud control module, it dynamically selects and updates national cryptographic keys based on risk factors, satisfying the security requirements of different data while enhancing the system's anti-attack capabilities through dynamic key adjustment. Through the collaboration of these modules, a full-link security system of "identity authentication - status awareness - risk assessment - encryption control" is constructed, significantly improving the security efficiency and accuracy of remote access for smart terminals.

[0035] In particular, the linkage mechanism between vibration information and geolocation detection significantly improves the system's accuracy in perceiving terminal status and the timeliness of risk assessment. By utilizing built-in accelerometers and gyroscopes to collect vibration acceleration and frequency respectively, the system can comprehensively capture changes in the terminal's physical state, providing multi-dimensional data support for subsequent risk assessment. By dynamically adjusting the geolocation acquisition frequency by comparing real-time vibration parameters with preset thresholds, resource optimization is achieved: increasing the acquisition frequency when vibration is abnormal allows for accurate tracking of terminal location changes, avoiding missed detection of high-risk movements; maintaining a normal frequency when vibration is normal reduces unnecessary power consumption and data transmission. This dynamic frequency adjustment strategy based on vibration information ensures both a sensitive response to abnormal states and maintains system efficiency. Simultaneously, combining geolocation changes with vibration information to jointly calibrate risk factors makes risk assessment more aligned with the actual terminal scenario, avoiding misjudgments that may result from judging a single parameter. This lays a reliable foundation for the accurate selection of remote access methods and effectively enhances the system's ability to respond to security threats such as physical attacks and unauthorized movement.

[0036] In particular, determining acceleration and frequency thresholds using historical vibration data from the terminal provides a scientific and realistic benchmark for dynamically adjusting the geolocation detection frequency, significantly improving the system's accuracy and targeted response to vibration anomalies. Using the maximum vibration acceleration value from the historical vibration information of the authenticated target terminal as the acceleration threshold accurately defines the maximum vibration range that the terminal may experience under safe scenarios such as normal use and reasonable handling, avoiding misjudging vibrations generated by compliant operations as abnormal, while ensuring a sensitive response to severe vibrations exceeding normal ranges, such as violent disassembly or accidental impacts. Determining the frequency threshold based on historical operating vibration frequencies fully adapts to the terminal's daily operating characteristics, capturing abnormal vibrations that deviate from the normal operating frequency range, such as high-frequency vibrations caused by equipment failure, providing a more detailed basis for risk assessment. Determining the geolocation detection frequency based on the comparison between current vibration information and these two types of thresholds allows frequency adjustments to better reflect the terminal's actual state. When vibration approaches or exceeds the threshold, the frequency is increased to closely track location changes; when vibration is within a safe range, the normal frequency is maintained to conserve resources. This threshold setting method based on historical data makes the system's judgment of vibration anomalies more adaptable and personalized, avoiding misjudgments or omissions that may be caused by uniform thresholds. It further optimizes the efficiency and accuracy of geographic location detection, provides a more reliable basis for subsequent risk factor calibration and remote access method selection, and enhances the system's foresight and effectiveness in responding to physical security threats.

[0037] In particular, by introducing a first and second coefficient to dynamically calculate the geolocation detection frequency, the system's response accuracy and resource adaptability to terminal anomalies are significantly improved. Using the ratio of the current vibration acceleration to an acceleration threshold as the first coefficient and the ratio of the current vibration frequency to a frequency threshold as the second coefficient, the abstract degree of vibration anomaly is transformed into quantifiable parameters, providing an intuitive and scientific basis for frequency adjustment. This design takes into account the impact of two vibration parameters on geolocation tracking, making frequency adjustment more closely match the actual anomaly state of the terminal. When acceleration anomalies are prominent, the frequency associated with acceleration is used; when frequency anomalies are more significant, the frequency associated with frequency is used as the benchmark, effectively improving the system's adaptability to complex vibration scenarios. Simultaneously, dynamic adjustment based on the base frequency avoids blind activation of high-frequency monitoring, ensuring tracking accuracy under anomalies while reducing resource consumption under normal conditions, such as power and network bandwidth, achieving a balance between security and operational efficiency.

[0038] In particular, by constructing a composite key system based on national cryptographic algorithms, a balance between security and flexibility in control command encryption is achieved. The three-layered encryption strategy ensures a precise match between risk level and encryption strength, guaranteeing absolute security in high-risk scenarios while avoiding resource waste caused by excessive encryption in medium- and low-risk scenarios. The synergistic effect of multiple encryption mechanisms significantly reduces security risks during the transmission and execution of control commands, enhances the system's security control capabilities for remote control processes, and provides robust encryption protection for remote access by smart terminals.

[0039] In particular, by accurately correlating changes in geographical location with vibration information to identify risk factors, the accuracy and relevance of system risk assessment are significantly improved. Through the risk factor identification mechanism, a precise match between risk levels and actual threats is achieved. When there are drastic changes in location or widespread anomalies in vibration parameters, it corresponds to a high-risk scenario where the terminal may be forcibly moved or subjected to physical attack; when only a single vibration parameter is abnormal and the location is stable, it corresponds to a medium-risk scenario of localized interference, providing a reliable basis for subsequent differentiated security measures. Through refined parameter calculations, reasonable period settings, and grading rules, risk factors can truly reflect the terminal's security status, enhancing the system's ability to predict and handle potential threats.

[0040] In particular, the multi-dimensional, hierarchical risk factor labeling mechanism significantly improves the accuracy and adaptability of risk perception in the intelligent terminal remote access control system. It incorporates key indicators such as changes in geographic location information, vibration data, IP switching frequency, and device logs into the risk assessment system, and sets differentiated judgment criteria for different abnormal scenarios. This ensures both the sensitive detection of serious security threats, such as unauthorized access and multiple overlapping anomalies, and avoids overreaction to minor anomalies, such as fluctuations in a single vibration parameter or a small number of login failures. This hierarchical labeling method allows risk factors to accurately reflect the security status of the terminal, providing a scientific basis for the dynamic adjustment of subsequent security strategies. Simultaneously, by clarifying the anomaly judgment rules within a single cycle, the timeliness and operability of risk assessment are enhanced, effectively solving the problems of misjudgment or omission caused by single indicators and fixed thresholds in traditional risk assessments. This allows the system to maintain accurate control over security risks in complex and ever-changing usage environments, providing a solid foundation for risk early warning for the stable operation of terminals and data security.

[0041] In particular, the dynamic correlation mechanism between risk factors and remote access methods enables precise and efficient security protection measures, significantly improving the system's ability to handle risks of different levels. For the extremely high security threats corresponding to the first risk factor, the ultimate measures of powering down and deleting device fingerprints are employed, enabling rapid elimination of security risks when the terminal faces loss of control, minimizing losses from data leakage or unauthorized control. For the medium risks associated with the second risk factor, a combination of locking the terminal and modifying the key restricts unauthorized operations while updating security credentials, controlling the spread of risk while preserving the possibility of the terminal returning to normal operation, balancing security and business continuity. For the low-risk scenarios corresponding to the third risk factor, mild measures such as restarting or updating configurations are used, resolving the problem while avoiding excessive intervention that could impact terminal usage efficiency. This precise matching model of "risk level - response measures" not only ensures the rational allocation of security resources but also significantly improves the system's automated response speed, effectively solving the problems of single response methods and delayed response in traditional security strategies, providing a flexible and reliable operational framework for the remote security management of smart terminals. Attached Figure Description

[0042] Figure 1 This is a structural block diagram of the intelligent terminal remote access control system based on national cryptographic standards according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0043] Figure 2 A flowchart illustrating the steps of calibrating risk factors based on vibration information in this invention embodiment;

[0044] Figure 3 A logic diagram of how the remote access method of a target terminal is determined based on risk factors in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0045] Figure 4 A logic diagram of the layered encryption strategy in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0046] To make the objectives and advantages of the present invention clearer, the present invention will be further described below with reference to embodiments; it should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely for explaining the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention.

[0047] Preferred embodiments of the present invention will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings. Those skilled in the art should understand that these embodiments are merely illustrative of the technical principles of the present invention and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0048] Please see Figure 1 , Figure 2 , Figure 3 as well as Figure 4 The diagram shows the structural block diagram of the intelligent terminal remote access control system based on national cryptographic standards according to an embodiment of the present invention; the step diagram of calibrating risk factors based on vibration information according to an embodiment of the present invention; the logic diagram of determining the remote access method of the target terminal based on risk factors according to an embodiment of the present invention; and the logic diagram of the layered encryption strategy according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0049] This invention provides a remote access control system for smart terminals based on national cryptographic standards, comprising:

[0050] The device authentication module is installed on each target terminal to generate a terminal device fingerprint of the target terminal based on the collected device hardware feature parameters of the target terminal.

[0051] The cloud authentication module is used to receive the fingerprint of the terminal device, establish a database of valid fingerprint certificates for the terminal device, and issue a device certificate to the target terminal device based on the fingerprint of the terminal device, wherein the device certificate is obtained by calculating a first key;

[0052] The status awareness module is connected to both the target terminal and the device authentication module to collect the device status parameters of the target terminal in real time, including the target terminal's geographical location information, network environment information, and device logs.

[0053] An anomaly monitoring module, connected to the state perception module, is used to identify the risk factors of the target terminal based on the target terminal's geographical location information, network environment information, and device logs, and to determine the remote access method of the target terminal based on the risk factors. The remote access method includes controlling the target terminal to power off, deleting the target terminal's device fingerprint, controlling the target terminal to lock, updating the device certificate based on the first key, controlling the target terminal to restart, and controlling the target terminal to update its configuration.

[0054] A layered encryption module, which is connected to the device authentication module and the cloud authentication module, includes a terminal encryption unit for encrypting sensitive data and transaction messages output by the keypad and a remote encryption unit for encrypting remote control commands.

[0055] The cloud control module, connected to the anomaly monitoring module and the layered encryption module, is used to determine the corresponding remote control command based on the remote access method, determine the encryption key for the remote control command according to the risk factor, and transmit the encrypted remote control command to the target terminal for execution. The cloud control module is also used to update the encryption key for data transmission with the target terminal according to the risk factor, including the national cryptographic key.

[0056] It is understood that the device hardware feature parameters of the target terminal include the motherboard serial number, CPU chip ID, memory ID, etc. In this embodiment, preferably, the device fingerprint value is calculated based on the device hardware feature parameters using the SM3 hash algorithm to generate the terminal device fingerprint of the target terminal.

[0057] In implementation, the cloud authentication module uses a first key (preferably an SM2 private key) to digitally sign the fingerprint of the terminal device, and generates a device certificate based on the digital signature and the public key corresponding to the first key (preferably the public key in the SM2 key); it is understood that the public key is used to decrypt the digital signature in the cloud or other verification services.

[0058] By collaborating with the device authentication module and the cloud authentication module, a terminal device fingerprint is generated based on hardware feature parameters, and a certificate database is established. This achieves a strong binding between terminal identity and hardware features, significantly improving the uniqueness and anti-counterfeiting capabilities of identity authentication and effectively resisting unauthorized access by counterfeit terminals. The status awareness module collects parameters such as geographical location, network environment, and device logs from multiple dimensions. Combined with the risk factor labeling mechanism of the anomaly monitoring module, the system can accurately identify the terminal security status, providing a scientific basis for differentiated remote access control. The layered encryption module implements hierarchical encryption for sensitive data, transaction messages, and remote control commands. In conjunction with the cloud control module, it dynamically selects and updates national cryptographic keys based on risk factors, meeting the security requirements of different data while enhancing the system's anti-attack capabilities through dynamic key adjustments. Through the collaboration of these modules, a full-link security system of "identity authentication - status awareness - risk assessment - encryption control" is constructed, significantly improving the security efficiency and accuracy of remote access to smart terminals.

[0059] Specifically, the state perception module is also used to acquire vibration information of each target terminal in real time;

[0060] The anomaly monitoring module is also used to determine the frequency of geolocation detection based on the vibration information of a single target terminal, and to calibrate the risk factors of the corresponding target terminal based on the change in geolocation information and vibration information, so as to determine the remote access method based on the risk factors.

[0061] The vibration information includes the vibration acceleration and vibration frequency of the target terminal.

[0062] In this embodiment, the vibration acceleration of the terminal device is collected by the accelerometer built into the target terminal, and the vibration frequency of the terminal device is collected by the gyroscope built into the target terminal. The frequency for collecting the geographical location detection of the target terminal device is determined by comparing the vibration acceleration of the target terminal device with a preset vibration acceleration threshold and the vibration frequency of the target terminal device with a preset vibration frequency threshold.

[0063] Specifically, the anomaly monitoring module determines an acceleration threshold based on the maximum value of vibration acceleration in the historical vibration information of the authenticated target terminal, and determines a frequency threshold based on the historical operating vibration frequency of the authenticated target terminal, so as to determine the frequency of the geographic location detection based on the current vibration information of the target terminal, the acceleration threshold, and the frequency threshold.

[0064] In this embodiment, the acceleration threshold is pre-determined. Specifically, the maximum vibration acceleration value in the historical vibration information of the authenticated target terminal under safe conditions is extracted by the anomaly monitoring module and used as the acceleration threshold. The reason for setting the acceleration threshold in this way is that the maximum vibration acceleration under safe conditions can reflect the maximum vibration that the terminal may experience under compliant scenarios such as normal use and reasonable handling. Using this as a threshold can effectively distinguish between normal vibration and abnormal vibration, such as vibrations exceeding the normal range caused by violent disassembly or unauthorized movement. This avoids misjudging vibrations generated by normal operation as abnormal and can accurately capture real risk vibrations, providing a reliable basis for subsequent adjustment of the geographic location detection frequency.

[0065] In this embodiment, the vibration frequency threshold is pre-determined. Specifically, the anomaly monitoring module calculates the mean of the historical vibration frequency of the target terminal over the past 30 days after authentication, and also calculates the standard deviation of the historical vibration frequency over the past 30 days. The mean plus twice the standard deviation is determined as the vibration frequency threshold. The reason for setting the vibration frequency threshold in this way is that the mean represents the central tendency of the vibration frequency of the terminal under normal working conditions, while the standard deviation reflects the dispersion of the vibration frequency. According to the normal distribution, approximately 95% of the data falls within the range of the mean plus twice the standard deviation. That is, the vibration frequency threshold covers approximately 95% of the normal data. This setting can effectively define the upper limit of normal vibration frequency. When the vibration frequency collected in real time exceeds the threshold, it is highly likely that the terminal is in an abnormal state, such as being subjected to external impact or abnormal handling. This can accurately trigger the adjustment of the geographic location detection frequency, improving the system's sensitivity and accuracy in judging abnormal states.

[0066] Specifically, the anomaly monitoring module calculates a first coefficient based on the target terminal's current vibration acceleration and the acceleration threshold, and calculates a second coefficient based on the target terminal's current vibration frequency and the frequency threshold.

[0067] The frequency of the geographic location detection is calculated based on either the first or the second coefficient.

[0068] In this embodiment, the anomaly monitoring module determines a first coefficient based on the ratio of the target terminal's current vibration acceleration to the acceleration threshold, and a second coefficient based on the ratio of the target terminal's current vibration frequency to the frequency threshold. The process of calculating the geographic location monitoring frequency based on the first and second coefficients includes: determining the base frequency of geographic location monitoring based on the average geographic location detection frequency of the target terminal over the past 60 days; calculating the sum of the base frequency multiplied by 1 and the first coefficient, and the sum of the base frequency multiplied by 1 and the second coefficient; and taking the maximum value of the two products as the geographic location detection frequency. When either acceleration or frequency exhibits a high degree of anomaly, the geographic location detection frequency needs to be increased to more accurately track changes in the terminal's location. Taking the maximum value ensures that a sufficiently high detection frequency can be triggered when either dimension exhibits a severe anomaly, thereby promptly capturing potential risks and improving the system's response sensitivity to abnormal states. Simultaneously, it considers the impact of both vibration parameters on geographic location detection, making the frequency adjustment more closely match actual anomaly situations.

[0069] Specifically, the anomaly monitoring module is used to identify risk factors of the target terminal based on its geographical location information, network environment information, and device logs, including:

[0070] If any of the following conditions exist: abnormal geographical location information, abnormal vibration information, IP switching number exceeds the preset first threshold, or unauthorized access records exist in the device log, the risk factor of the target terminal is identified as the first risk factor.

[0071] If any of the following conditions are met: the number of IP switching exceeds the preset second threshold, the geographical location information is normal but only one type of vibration information is abnormal, or the device log contains login failure records, the risk factor of the target terminal is identified as the second risk factor.

[0072] If the terminal device experiences either lag or requires a security patch update, the risk factor for the target terminal is designated as the third risk factor.

[0073] Specifically, the anomaly monitoring module determines whether there is an anomaly in the geographical location information by comparing the change in the geographical location information of the target terminal with the change threshold, and determines whether there is an anomaly in the vibration information by comparing the vibration information with the corresponding vibration information threshold. The vibration information anomaly includes all vibration information anomalies and only one type of vibration information anomaly.

[0074] In this embodiment, an abnormal change in geographic location information is defined as the change in the geographic location of the target terminal within a single period exceeding a threshold; an abnormal vibration information is defined as the vibration acceleration and vibration frequency within a single period exceeding the corresponding thresholds; the first threshold for the number of IP handovers is set to the maximum value of the number of IP handovers within a single period in the past 60 days; the second threshold for the number of IP handovers is set to 80% of the number of IP handovers within a single period in the past 60 days; and an abnormal vibration information of only one type is defined as either the vibration acceleration exceeding the corresponding threshold or the vibration frequency exceeding the corresponding threshold within a single period.

[0075] In this embodiment, the calculation process of the change in the geographic location information of the target terminal includes: obtaining the geographic location coordinates before the abnormal vibration through the GPS module built into the target terminal device and determining them as the initial coordinates; after the high-frequency monitoring mode is started, the state perception module continuously collects the geographic location coordinates at a high frequency, the abnormal monitoring module selects the geographic location coordinates after each high-frequency monitoring interval in the high-frequency mode and determines them as the current coordinates, and calculates the change in geographic location information between the initial coordinates and the current coordinates in real time based on the spherical distance formula; the single cycle is set to 5 minutes, which is determined based on the statistical analysis of the duration of the terminal's historical abnormal vibrations, which can cover the active period of most abnormal vibrations and avoid frequent misjudgments due to too short a cycle or response delays due to too long a cycle; the threshold for the change in geographic location information is obtained in advance and is the maximum value of the change in geographic location information under safe conditions within the past 60 days.

[0076] By comparing the changes in several geographic location information within a single period with a preset change threshold, if any change exceeds the preset change threshold, it is determined whether there is an anomaly in the geographic location information, and the risk factor corresponding to the target terminal is labeled as the first risk factor (preferably, the first risk factor is assigned a value of 0.9); among several vibration information within a single period, if any vibration acceleration exceeds the acceleration threshold and any vibration frequency exceeds the vibration frequency threshold, it is determined that all vibration information is abnormal, and the risk factor corresponding to the target terminal is labeled as the first risk factor (0.9).

[0077] If all changes within a single period are less than or equal to a preset change threshold, the geographic location information is determined to be normal; and if only the vibration acceleration exceeds the acceleration threshold or only the vibration frequency exceeds the vibration frequency threshold, it is determined to be an anomaly of only one type of vibration information. In the case of normal geographic location information and only one type of vibration information anomaly, the risk factor is designated as the second risk factor (preferably, the second risk factor is assigned a value of 0.7).

[0078] Understandably, using the coordinates before the abnormal vibration as the initial benchmark, combined with real-time coordinate calculations under high-frequency monitoring, can accurately capture the terminal's positional shift trend during vibration, avoiding benchmark deviations caused by determining the initial coordinates only after vibration is triggered. This effectively distinguishes between normal environmental vibration and abnormal movement, ensuring that the benchmark for judging changes aligns with the actual scenario of the terminal's daily safe operation. Adopting the logic of "escalating the risk level for any abnormality within a single cycle," high-risk behaviors can be promptly detected during periods of active vibration. When positional changes exceed limits or vibration acceleration and frequency are abnormal, it indicates the terminal may be under forced movement or physical attack, requiring strict control measures triggered by the high-risk factor (first risk factor). Conversely, when positional changes are normal but only vibration acceleration or frequency is abnormal, it may be due to localized physical interference, corresponding to a medium risk (second risk factor), reflecting a precise match between risk classification and actual threat level. The 5-minute cycle balances real-time performance and anti-interference capabilities, avoiding misjudgments caused by instantaneous fluctuations while enabling rapid response during periods of sustained risk.

[0079] Understandably, the security risks corresponding to the first, second, and third risk factors decrease sequentially. If a terminal device experiences lag or delay, which is merely a device performance issue and a non-malicious abnormal state, or if the terminal device's system requires a security patch update and constitutes a known and manageable potential risk, then the target terminal's risk factor is designated as the third risk factor (preferably, the third risk factor is assigned a value of 0.5).

[0080] Specifically, the anomaly monitoring module determines the remote access method of the target terminal based on risk factors, including:

[0081] In the case of the first risk factor, the remote access method is determined to be to power off the target terminal and delete the target terminal device fingerprint;

[0082] In the case of the second risk factor, the remote access method is determined to be locking the target terminal and updating the device certificate based on the first key;

[0083] In the case of the third risk factor, the remote access method is determined to be either controlling the target terminal to restart or controlling the target terminal to update its configuration.

[0084] It is understandable that controlling the target terminal to power down means cutting off the power supply for data transmission of the target terminal device, so as to ensure that the terminal device no longer transmits data; controlling the target terminal to lock it means prohibiting all user operations and network communication, freezing the device's business functions, and preventing attackers from further operations; updating the device certificate based on the first key is a security process of revoking the old identity and issuing a new identity. The cloud authentication module uses the first key to reissue a brand new device certificate for the terminal, thereby making the previously issued old certificate immediately invalid.

[0085] Specifically, the layered encryption module employs a three-layer encryption strategy, including:

[0086] The terminal encryption unit uses a first key to encrypt sensitive data output from the keypad.

[0087] The terminal encryption unit uses the second key to encrypt the transaction message;

[0088] The remote encryption unit uses a third key to encrypt remote control commands.

[0089] In this embodiment, the terminal encryption unit encrypts the sensitive data output by the keypad according to the first key. The first key is preferably the SM2 public key contained in the device certificate. The sensitive data is asymmetrically encrypted at the source of data generation to ensure that the data can only be decrypted by the designated recipient (cloud) from the time of encryption.

[0090] When a user enters sensitive data such as a PIN code or payment password on the keypad, the encryption chip built into the keypad immediately activates the terminal encryption unit. The terminal encryption unit uses the SM2 public key from the first key to perform asymmetric encryption on the sensitive data. During the encryption process, the sensitive data is first converted to the format required by the SM2 algorithm to generate plaintext data blocks, and then the data blocks are encrypted using the public key to obtain the ciphertext.

[0091] After encryption is complete, the terminal encryption unit generates a header containing an encryption timestamp and data length, which is then concatenated with the ciphertext to form a complete encrypted data packet, which is directly transmitted to the secure storage area inside the terminal to avoid leaving plaintext in memory.

[0092] The terminal encryption unit encrypts the transaction message according to the second key. The second key preferably adopts the SM4 symmetric key, which is dynamically generated and distributed by the cloud control module according to the terminal risk factor. The key length is 256 bits, the validity period is 24 hours, and it is automatically updated at midnight every day.

[0093] After the transaction message is generated (including information such as transaction amount, merchant code, and terminal number), the terminal encryption unit first performs integrity processing on the message, calculates the SM3 hash value, and appends it to the end of the message.

[0094] Subsequently, the terminal encryption unit invokes the second key and encrypts the transaction message containing the hash value using the CBC mode of the SM4 algorithm. Before encryption, a 16-byte initialization vector (Ⅳ) is randomly generated and participates in the encryption operation together with the second key to ensure that the same message yields different encryption results each time.

[0095] The encrypted transaction message consists of ciphertext, N, and message length identifier. It is transmitted to the cloud through the terminal's secure communication channel. After receiving the message, the cloud uses the same second key and N to decrypt it and verifies the SM3 hash value to confirm that the message has not been tampered with.

[0096] Specifically, the remote encryption unit encrypts the control commands based on the third key determined by the risk factor.

[0097] It is understandable that once the remote access method is determined, a remote control command that the target terminal can recognize can be generated based on the specific remote access method, so that the target terminal executes the corresponding remote access method. Since the first risk factor, the second risk factor, and the third risk factor each correspond to different control commands, in essence, each risk factor also corresponds to a different control command.

[0098] In this embodiment, the third key is a composite key system based on Chinese national cryptographic keys, comprising an SM2 asymmetric key (256-bit private key + 512-bit public key), an SM4 symmetric key (divided into a 128-bit fixed key and a 256-bit temporary key), and an SM3 hash key (used as the initial vector and iteration parameters for generating hash values). The SM2 asymmetric key is used for key exchange and digital signatures in high-security scenarios, the SM4 symmetric key is used for data encryption, and the SM3 hash key is used for data integrity verification.

[0099] In this embodiment, the control commands corresponding to the first risk factor are power-off and deleting the terminal device fingerprint. At this time, the remote encryption unit selects the SM2 asymmetric key from the third key for encryption. The specific process is as follows: first, the control commands are symmetrically encrypted using the SM4 256-bit temporary key (encryption mode ECB); then, the encrypted ciphertext is signed using the SM2 private key; simultaneously, the hash value of the ciphertext is calculated using the SM3 hash key; finally, the encrypted ciphertext, the SM2 signature, and the SM3 hash value are transmitted together. This is chosen because SM2 asymmetric encryption offers higher security and can effectively prevent control commands from being tampered with or forged in high-risk scenarios.

[0100] The control command corresponding to the second risk factor controls the target terminal to lock and update the device certificate. The remote encryption unit selects the SM4 256-bit temporary key from the third key for encryption, using CBC encryption mode. The initialization vector is generated from the SM3 hash key, and the SM3 hash value is appended after encryption for integrity verification. The reason for choosing this algorithm is that SM4 symmetric encryption, while ensuring a certain level of security, has high encryption efficiency, which can meet the requirements for control command transmission speed in medium-risk scenarios, and the 256-bit key length provides sufficient security.

[0101] The control commands corresponding to the third risk factor are restart and configuration update. In this case, the 128-bit fixed SM4 key from the third key is selected for encryption in CTR mode. An initial counter value is generated using the SM3 hash key, and only a simple checksum is appended after encryption. This is because the security requirements for control commands in low-risk scenarios are relatively low, and a 128-bit SM4 key is sufficient. Furthermore, the fixed key does not require frequent negotiation, which improves encryption efficiency and reduces system resource consumption.

[0102] Specifically, the cloud control module is also used to update the encryption key for data transmission with the target terminal based on the risk factor, including the national cryptographic key.

[0103] In implementation, the cloud control module generates corresponding control commands based on the risk factors calculated in the current period, so that the target terminal executes the corresponding remote access method. When the risk factors change, the remote access method is adjusted accordingly, thereby causing the first key, second key, and third key in the remote access method executed by the target terminal to be adjusted accordingly, thus updating the encryption keys in the data transmission process with the target terminal.

[0104] Specifically, the anomaly monitoring module is also used to upload the device operation log, abnormal event log, and vibration and geographical location association log to the cloud in real time. The cloud control module is also used to generate an audit report based on the log. The audit report includes an abnormal operation trajectory map and a timeline of high-risk factor events to support terminal administrator queries.

[0105] In this embodiment, the abnormal operation trajectory map is a complete terminal movement route formed by connecting continuously uploaded GPS coordinate points in chronological order when the geographical location information of the device terminal is abnormal; the high-risk factor event timeline is an event sequence of abnormal situations and remote access methods of the device terminal corresponding to the first risk factor and the second risk factor in chronological order.

[0106] The technical solution of the present invention has been described above with reference to the preferred embodiments shown in the accompanying drawings. However, it will be readily understood by those skilled in the art that the scope of protection of the present invention is obviously not limited to these specific embodiments. Without departing from the principles of the present invention, those skilled in the art can make equivalent changes or substitutions to the relevant technical features, and the technical solutions after these changes or substitutions will all fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A remote access control system for intelligent terminals based on national cryptographic standards, characterized in that, include: The device authentication module is installed on each target terminal to generate a terminal device fingerprint of the target terminal based on the collected device hardware feature parameters of the target terminal. The cloud authentication module is used to receive the fingerprint of the terminal device, establish a database of valid fingerprint certificates for the terminal device, and issue a device certificate to the target terminal device based on the fingerprint of the terminal device, wherein the device certificate is obtained by calculating a first key; The status perception module is connected to both the target terminal and the device authentication module. It is used to collect the device status parameters of the target terminal in real time, including the target terminal's geographical location information, network environment information, and device logs. It is also used to acquire the vibration information of each target terminal in real time. An anomaly monitoring module, connected to the state perception module, is used to calibrate the risk factors of the target terminal based on its geographical location information, network environment information, and device logs, and to determine the remote access method of the target terminal based on the risk factors. It is also used to determine the frequency of geographical location detection based on the vibration information of a single target terminal, and to calibrate the risk factors of the corresponding target terminal based on changes in geographical location information and vibration information, and to determine the remote access method based on the risk factors, including: If any of the following conditions exist: abnormal geographical location information, abnormal vibration information, IP switching number exceeds the preset first threshold, or unauthorized access records exist in the device log, the risk factor of the target terminal is identified as the first risk factor. If any of the following conditions are met: the number of IP switching exceeds the preset second threshold, the geographical location information is normal but only one type of vibration information is abnormal, or the device log contains login failure records, the risk factor of the target terminal is identified as the second risk factor. If the terminal device experiences either lag or requires a security patch update, the risk factor for the target terminal is designated as the third risk factor. The method determines whether there is an anomaly in the geographic location information by comparing the change in the geographic location information of the target terminal with the change threshold, and determines whether there is an anomaly in the vibration information by comparing the vibration information with the corresponding vibration information threshold. The vibration information anomaly includes all vibration information anomalies and only one type of vibration information anomaly. Remote access methods include controlling the target terminal to power off, deleting the target terminal device fingerprint, controlling the target terminal to lock, updating the device certificate based on the first key, controlling the target terminal to restart, and controlling the target terminal to update its configuration; In the case of the first risk factor, the remote access method is determined to be to power off the target terminal and delete the target terminal device fingerprint; In the case of the second risk factor, the remote access method is determined to be locking the target terminal and updating the device certificate based on the first key; In the case of the third risk factor, the remote access method is determined to be either controlling the target terminal to restart or controlling the target terminal to update its configuration; The vibration information includes the vibration acceleration and vibration frequency of the target terminal; A layered encryption module, which is connected to the device authentication module and the cloud authentication module, includes a terminal encryption unit for encrypting sensitive data and transaction messages output by the keypad and a remote encryption unit for encrypting remote control commands. The cloud control module, connected to the anomaly monitoring module and the layered encryption module, is used to determine the corresponding remote control command based on the remote access method, determine the encryption key for the remote control command according to the risk factor, and transmit the encrypted remote control command to the target terminal for execution. The cloud control module is also used to update the encryption key for data transmission with the target terminal according to the risk factor, including the national cryptographic key.

2. The intelligent terminal remote access control system based on national cryptographic standards according to claim 1, characterized in that, The remote encryption unit encrypts the control commands based on the third key determined by the risk factor.

3. The intelligent terminal remote access control system based on national cryptographic standards according to claim 2, characterized in that, The anomaly monitoring module determines an acceleration threshold based on the maximum value of vibration acceleration in the historical vibration information of the authenticated target terminal, and determines a frequency threshold based on the historical operating vibration frequency of the authenticated target terminal, so as to determine the frequency of the geographic location detection based on the current vibration information of the target terminal, the acceleration threshold, and the frequency threshold.

4. The intelligent terminal remote access control system based on national cryptographic standards according to claim 3, characterized in that, The anomaly monitoring module calculates a first coefficient based on the current vibration acceleration of the target terminal and the acceleration threshold, and calculates a second coefficient based on the current vibration frequency of the target terminal and the frequency threshold, so as to calculate the frequency of the geographical location detection based on the first coefficient or the second coefficient.

5. The intelligent terminal remote access control system based on national cryptographic standards according to claim 4, characterized in that, The layered encryption module employs a three-layer encryption strategy, including: The terminal encryption unit uses a first key to encrypt sensitive data output from the keypad. The terminal encryption unit uses the second key to encrypt the transaction message; The remote encryption unit uses a third key to encrypt remote control commands.

6. The intelligent terminal remote access control system based on national cryptographic standards according to claim 5, characterized in that, The anomaly monitoring module is also used to upload equipment operation logs, abnormal event logs, and vibration and geographical location association logs to the cloud in real time. The cloud control module is also used to generate an audit report based on the logs. The audit report includes an abnormal operation trajectory map and a timeline of high-risk factor events to support terminal administrator queries.

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