Method and apparatus for performing client credential assertion in wireless communication system

Abstract

The present disclosure relates to a 5th-Generation (5G) communication system or a 6th-Generation (6G) communication system for supporting higher data rates beyond a 4th-Generation (4G) communication system such as Long Term Evolution (LTE). The present disclosure provides techniques for performing authentication and authorization based on client credential assertion in a wireless communication system. A method performed by a network entity for performing client credential assertion (CCA)-based authentication and authorization of the network entity is provided. In one embodiment, a method includes sending, by a network entity, a first service request to a network repository function (NRF), where sending of the first service request includes encrypting, by the network entity, a CCA token using a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), where the KEM is based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism, where the KEM is based on the PQC mechanism. The encrypted CCA token is signed by the network entity using a digital signature to generate a quantum-secure CCA token, where the quantum-secure CCA token is a digitally signed encrypted CCA token and the digital signature is based on a predefined PQC mechanism, and sending, by the network entity, the quantum-secure CCA token to the NRF along with the first service request, where the quantum-secure CCA token is the digitally signed encrypted CCA token and the digital signature is based on a predefined PQC mechanism. And receiving, by the network entity, a service response to the first service request from the NRF.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This disclosure relates to the field of wireless communication networks. More specifically, this disclosure relates to a method and apparatus for performing client credential assertion (CCA) in a wireless communication system. Background Technology

[0002] Given the evolution of wireless communication technologies, these technologies have primarily been developed for human-centric services such as voice calls, multimedia services, and data services. With the commercialization of fifth-generation (5G) communication systems, the number of connected devices is expected to grow exponentially. These will increasingly connect to communication networks. Examples of connected things can include vehicles, robots, drones, home appliances, displays, smart sensors connected to various infrastructures, construction machinery, and factory equipment. Mobile devices are expected to evolve in various form factors, such as augmented reality glasses, virtual reality headsets, and holographic devices. Efforts are underway to develop improved 6G communication systems to provide a wide range of services by connecting hundreds of billions of devices and things in the sixth-generation (6G) era. For these reasons, 6G communication systems are referred to as "super 5G" systems.

[0003] The 6G communication system, expected to be commercialized around 2030, will have a peak data rate of trillions (1000 gigabits) bits per second (bps) and a radio latency of less than 100 microseconds, making it 50 times faster than 5G communication systems and with 1 / 10 of their radio latency.

[0004] To achieve such high data rates and ultra-low latency, 6G communication systems have been considered for implementation in the terahertz (THz) band (e.g., the 95 GHz to 3 THz band). Given that path loss and atmospheric absorption in the terahertz band are more severe than those in the millimeter-wave (mmWave) band introduced in 5G, technologies capable of ensuring signal transmission distance (i.e., coverage) will become even more critical. As a primary technology for ensuring coverage, it is necessary to develop novel waveforms, radio frequency (RF) components, and antennas with better coverage than orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM), beamforming and massive MIMO, full-dimensional MIMO (FD-MIMO), array antennas, and multi-antenna transmission technologies such as massive MIMO. Furthermore, new technologies for improving the coverage of terahertz band signals have been discussed, such as metamaterial-based lenses and antennas, orbital angular momentum (OAM), and reconfigurable smart surfaces (RIS).

[0005] Furthermore, to improve spectrum efficiency and overall network performance, the following technologies have been developed for 6G communication systems: full-duplex technology to enable uplink and downlink transmissions to use the same frequency resources simultaneously; network technologies to utilize satellites, high-altitude platform stations (HAPS), etc., in an integrated manner; improved network architectures to support mobile base stations and achieve network operation optimization and automation; dynamic spectrum sharing technology to avoid conflicts through spectrum usage prediction; the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in wireless communication, improving overall network operation by leveraging AI in the design phase to develop 6G and internalizing end-to-end AI support functions; and next-generation distributed computing technologies to overcome the limitations of user equipment (UE) computing capabilities through ultra-high-performance communication and computing resources accessible on the network, such as mobile edge computing (MEC) and the cloud. In addition, efforts are ongoing to enhance connectivity between devices, optimize networks, promote the software-defined networking of network entities, and increase the openness of wireless communication by designing new protocols for use in 6G communication systems, developing mechanisms for achieving hardware-based secure environments and secure data use, developing technologies for maintaining privacy, and improving network connectivity, software-defined networking of network entities.

[0006] Research and development of 6G communication systems in hyper-connectivity (including human-to-machine (P2M) and machine-to-machine (M2M)) is expected to enable the next hyper-connected experience. Specifically, services such as truly immersive extended reality (XR), high-fidelity mobile holograms, and digital replicas are expected to be available through 6G communication systems. Furthermore, services such as remote surgery, industrial automation, and emergency response for enhanced security and reliability will be provided through 6G communication systems, enabling these technologies to be applied to various fields such as industry, healthcare, automotive, and home appliances.

[0007] The above information is presented as background information only to aid in understanding this disclosure. No determination or assertion is made regarding whether any of the above content can be used as prior art with respect to this disclosure. Summary of the Invention

[0008] Solution to the problem

[0009] The aspects of this disclosure will at least address the aforementioned problems and / or disadvantages, and provide at least the following advantages. Therefore, one aspect of this disclosure is to provide a method and apparatus for performing client credential assertion (CCA) in a wireless communication system.

[0010] Other aspects will be set forth in part in the description which follows, and in part will be apparent from the description, or may be learned by practice of the embodiments presented.

[0011] According to one aspect of this disclosure, a method is provided for performing client credential assertion (CCA)-based authentication and authorization by a network entity. The method includes the network entity sending a first service request to a network repository function (NRF), wherein sending the first service request includes the network entity encrypting a CCA token using a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), wherein the KEM is based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism; the network entity signing the encrypted CCA token with a digital signature to generate a quantum-safe CCA token, wherein the quantum-safe CCA token is a digitally signed encrypted CCA token, and the digital signature is based on the predefined PQC mechanism; the network entity sending the quantum-safe CCA token along with the first service request to the NRF; and the network entity receiving a service response to the first service request from the NRF.

[0012] According to another aspect of this disclosure, a method is provided for accessing a service provided by an NF service producer, performed by a Network Function (NF) service consumer. The method includes: the NF service consumer receiving a quantum-secure access token from a Network Repository Function (NRF), wherein the quantum-secure access token is generated by the NRF and signed using a digital signature based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism; the NF service consumer sending the quantum-secure access token to the NF service producer in an NF service request; and the NF service consumer receiving an NF service response from the NF service producer, wherein the NF service response is based on verification of the quantum-secure access token at the NF service producer using the predefined PQC mechanism.

[0013] According to another aspect of this disclosure, a network entity is provided for performing client credential assertion (CCA)-based authentication and authorization for a network entity. The network entity includes a memory and a processor coupled to the memory and configured to send a first service request to a network repository function (NRF). The processor sends the first service request by encrypting a CCA token using a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), wherein the KEM is based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism, and the encrypted CCA token is digitally signed to generate a quantum-safe CCA token, wherein the quantum-safe CCA token is a digitally signed encrypted CCA token and the digital signature is based on the predefined PQC mechanism. The quantum-safe CCA token is sent to the NRF along with the first service request, and a service response to the first service request is received from the NRF. The service response is determined based on the decryption of the quantum-safe CCA token at the NRF using a decryption technique based on the predefined PQC mechanism.

[0014] According to another aspect of this disclosure, a network entity is provided for accessing services provided by a Network Function (NF) service producer. The network entity includes a memory and a processor, the processor being coupled to the memory and configured to receive a quantum-secure access token from a Network Repository Function (NRF), wherein the quantum-secure access token is generated by the NRF and signed using a digital signature based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism, to send the quantum-secure access token to the NF service producer in an NF service request, and to receive an NF service response from the NF service producer, wherein the NF service response is based on verification of the quantum-secure access token at the NF service producer using the predefined PQC mechanism.

[0015] According to another aspect of this disclosure, one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media are provided, storing one or more computer programs including computer-executable instructions that, when executed individually or jointly by one or more processors of a network entity, cause the network entity to perform operations. The operations include: the network entity sending a first service request to a network repository function (NRF), wherein sending the first service request includes: the network entity encrypting a Client Credential Assertion (CCA) token using a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), wherein the KEM is based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism; the network entity signing the encrypted CCA token using a digital signature to generate a quantum-safe CCA token, wherein the quantum-safe CCA token is a digitally signed encrypted CCA token, and the digital signature is based on a predefined PQC mechanism; the network entity sending the quantum-safe CCA token along with the first service request to the NRF; and the network entity receiving a service response to the first service request from the NRF.

[0016] Other aspects, advantages, and salient features of this disclosure will become apparent to those skilled in the art from the following detailed description of various embodiments disclosed in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Attached Figure Description

[0017] The above and other features, aspects and advantages of certain embodiments of the present disclosure will become more apparent from the following description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein:

[0018] Figure 1 The representation of the Client Credential Assertion (CCA) protocol according to the 3GPP standard is shown in the relevant technology.

[0019] Figure 2 This illustrates a representation of the OAuth or OAuth 2.0 framework based on relevant technologies;

[0020] Figure 3 This illustrates a problem scenario associated with insecure cryptographic algorithms in the CCA interface, based on relevant technologies.

[0021] Figure 4 The embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. Figure 3 The corresponding solution scenarios for the problem scenarios;

[0022] Figure 5 A flowchart depicting a method for performing CCA-based authentication and authorization of network entities is shown according to embodiments of the present disclosure;

[0023] Figure 6 This illustrates a problem scenario associated with incompatibility between network functions (NF) and service communication proxy (SCP) according to embodiments of this disclosure;

[0024] Figure 7 The embodiments of the present disclosure are shown with Figure 6 The first solution scenario corresponding to the second problem scenario;

[0025] Figure 8 The embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. Figure 6 The second solution scenario corresponding to the problem scenario;

[0026] Figure 9 An example representation of a problem associated with insecure cryptographic algorithms in an OAuth interface, according to embodiments of this disclosure, is shown;

[0027] Figure 10 The embodiments of the present disclosure are shown with Figure 9The corresponding solution scenarios for the problem scenarios;

[0028] Figure 11 A flowchart depicting a method for accessing services provided by an NF service producer, according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, is shown.

[0029] Figure 12 The embodiments of the present disclosure are shown with Figure 9 The corresponding solution scenarios for the problem scenarios;

[0030] Figure 13 A diagram is shown of a system for performing CCA-based authentication and authorization of network entities according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0031] Figure 14 A diagram of a system for accessing services provided by an NF service producer, according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, is shown.

[0032] Figure 15 A block diagram illustrating the configuration of a UE according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown; and

[0033] Figure 16 A block diagram illustrating the configuration of a base station according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0034] Throughout the accompanying drawings, the same reference numerals are used to denote the same elements. Detailed Implementation

[0035] The following description with reference to the accompanying drawings is intended to aid in a full understanding of the various embodiments of this disclosure as defined by the claims and their equivalents. It includes various specific details to aid understanding, but these are merely exemplary. Therefore, those skilled in the art will recognize that various changes and modifications can be made to the various embodiments described herein without departing from the scope and spirit of this disclosure. Furthermore, for clarity and brevity, descriptions of well-known functions and structures may be omitted.

[0036] The terms and words used in the following description and claims are not limited to their literal meaning, but are used by the inventors only to enable a clear and consistent understanding of this disclosure. Therefore, those skilled in the art should understand that the following description of various embodiments of this disclosure is for illustrative purposes only and is not intended to limit the disclosure as defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

[0037] It should be understood that, unless the context clearly specifies otherwise, the singular forms “a,” “an,” and “the” include plural indicators. Thus, for example, a reference to “component surface” includes a reference to one or more such surfaces.

[0038] Throughout this specification, references to "one aspect," "another aspect," or similar language mean that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with an embodiment is included in at least one embodiment of this disclosure. Therefore, the appearance of phrases such as "in an embodiment," "in another embodiment," and similar language throughout this specification may, but not necessarily, refer to the same embodiment.

[0039] The term "comprising" or any other variations thereof is intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process or method that includes a list of steps includes not only those steps but may also include other steps not expressly listed or inherent to such process or method. Similarly, without further limitation, a list of one or more devices, subsystems, elements, structures, or components beginning with "comprising..." does not exclude the presence of other devices or subsystems or elements or structures or components, or additional devices or subsystems or elements or structures or components.

[0040] The phrase “associated with” and its derivatives mean including, being included in, interconnected with, containing, contained within, connected to or connected with, coupled to or coupled with, able to communicate with, cooperate with, interleaved, juxtaposed, proximate, bound to or bound with, having, possessing the properties of, having a relationship to or with, etc. The term “controller” means any device, system, or part thereof that controls at least one operation. Such a controller can be implemented in hardware or a combination of hardware and software and / or firmware. The functionality associated with any particular controller can be centralized or distributed, local or remote. When used with a list of items, the phrase “at least one” means that different combinations of one or more of the listed items can be used, and it may be necessary to use only one item from the list. For example, “at least one of A, B, and C” includes any of the following combinations: A, B, C, A and B, A and C, B and C, and A and B and C.

[0041] This disclosure provides techniques for post-quantum secure authentication protocols for client credential assertion (CCA) and OAuth between various network entities and procedures in wireless communication systems for both fifth-generation (5G) and sixth-generation (6G) networks. This disclosure defines techniques for ensuring that CCA and OAuth protocols are resistant to attacks on quantum machines. Quantum secure encryption algorithms as disclosed herein refer to post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, hybrid algorithms, or any quantum secure homomorphic algorithms. Hybrid algorithms are combinations of conventional cryptographic algorithms and quantum secure encryption algorithms. Post-quantum based encryption algorithms are preferred, as they are securely resistant to quantum attacks and used for their faster key generation mechanisms. Embodiments herein define techniques for introducing such quantum secure encryption algorithms into CCA and OAuth procedures in 6G wireless communication systems. Embodiments herein define a mechanism for replacing conventional algorithms with cipher suites and quantum secure encryption algorithm signatures. Embodiments described herein define a mechanism for resolving incompatibility issues between SCPs in CCA for migration to quantum secure encryption algorithm support. Embodiments herein define rejection processing scenarios resulting from migration to PQC in CCA. The embodiments described herein also define security policy mechanisms to address incompatibility issues by introducing new security mechanisms in capability negotiation between SCP entities. Some embodiments described herein define techniques for resolving incompatibility issues between SCPs in CCA for migration to quantum-safe cryptographic algorithm support. The embodiments described herein define rejection handling scenarios resulting from migration to PQC in CCA. The embodiments described herein also define new security policy mechanisms to address incompatibility issues by introducing new security mechanisms in capability negotiation between SCP entities.

[0042] In recent years, several broadband wireless technologies have been developed to meet the growing number of broadband subscribers by providing better applications and services. For example, second-generation (2G) wireless communication systems were developed to provide voice services while ensuring user mobility. Similarly, third-generation (3G) wireless communication systems were developed to support both voice and data services. Furthermore, fourth-generation (4G) wireless communication systems have been developed to provide high-speed data services. However, fourth-generation (4G) wireless communication systems lack the resources to meet the increasing demand for high-speed data services. This problem is addressed by fifth-generation (5G) wireless communication systems, which offer ultra-reliability and support low-latency applications. A key component of the 3GPP specifications associated with 5G standardization describes Client Credential Assertion (CCA) in 5G. CCA is used by the client to provide client authenticity when communicating via intermediate network nodes. For example, CCA is used by Network Function (NF) service consumers for authentication when communicating with Network Store Functions (NRFs).

[0043] This disclosure provides techniques for performing client-based credential assertion-based authentication and authorization in a wireless communication system. The method includes sending a first service request to a Network Store Function (NRF), wherein sending the first service request includes: encrypting a CCA token using a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM); signing the encrypted CCA token using a digital signature to generate a quantum-safe CCA token, wherein the quantum-safe CCA token is a digitally signed encrypted CCA token; and sending the quantum-safe CCA token along with the first service request. The KEM and digital signature are based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism. The method also includes receiving a service response from the NRF to the first service request.

[0044] It should be understood that the boxes in each flowchart and the combination of flowcharts can be executed by one or more computer programs including instructions. The entirety of one or more computer programs can be stored in a single memory device, or one or more computer programs can be divided into different parts stored in multiple different memory devices.

[0045] Any function or operation described herein can be processed by a processor or a combination of processors. A processor or a combination of processors is a circuit that performs processing and includes, for example, an application processor (AP, such as a central processing unit (CPU)), a communication processor (CP, such as a modem), a graphics processing unit (GPU), a neural processing unit (NPU) (e.g., an artificial intelligence (AI) chip), a Wi-Fi chip, a Bluetooth® chip, a global positioning system (GPS) chip, a near field communication (NFC) chip, a connectivity chip, a sensor controller, a touch controller, a fingerprint sensor controller, a display driver integrated circuit (IC), an audio codec chip, a universal serial bus (USB) controller, a camera controller, an image processing IC, a microprocessor unit (MPU), a system-on-a-chip (SoC), an integrated circuit (IC), and the like.

[0046] Figure 1 The representation of the CCA protocol according to the 3GPP standard is shown in the relevant technology.

[0047] refer to Figure 1NF service consumer 101 generates a CCA-based token and signs it using a public key. Then, NF service consumer 101 includes the token in a service request message and sends the request to NF service producer / NRF 103. The CCA includes the NF service consumer's NF instance identifier (ID), which the NF service producer can verify against a certificate. CCAs are commonly used for both NF-NRF and NF-NF communication. A CCA is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) web token (JWT) and is encrypted using traditional cryptographic algorithms such as Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (RSA) algorithms, or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithms. The CCA token is signed and protected using a digital signature based on JSON Web Signatures (JWS). Furthermore, a Service Communication Proxy (SCP) is an entity that NFs sometimes use to communicate with other NFs or NRFs. The SCP also verifies the signature of the CCA as well as the NF producer or NRF.

[0048] OAuth 2.0 is an industry-standard protocol for authorization. OAuth 2.0 focuses on simplicity for client developers while providing specific authorization flows for web applications, desktop applications, mobile phones, and living room devices.

[0049] Figure 2 The diagram shows a representation of the OAuth or OAuth 2.0 framework based on the relevant technology.

[0050] refer to Figure 2 The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables third-party applications to gain limited access to Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) services on behalf of a resource server by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource server and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to gain access on its behalf. For example, in operation 202, client 201 sends a request for an access token to OAuth server 203. Then, in operation 204, OAuth server 203 generates an access token and signs it using the public key (such as JSW) of resource server 205. In operation 206, OAuth server 203 shares the access token with client 201. In operation 208, client 201 uses the signed access token to send a resource request to resource server 205 to access services provided by resource server 205. In operation 210, OAuth server 203 uses JWS authentication to validate the access token and verify the resource request.

[0051] In 6G wireless communication systems, quantum computers or machines are widely used, posing a threat to current wireless security systems. A quantum computer is a computer that utilizes quantum mechanical effects. These effects include superposition and entanglement. Superposition allows qubits (quantum bits) to exist simultaneously in several combinations of states, while entanglement further allows connections between individual quantum systems, making them impossible to describe independently. Quantum algorithms exist that use quantum mechanical effects to solve certain cryptographic problems more efficiently than on classical computers. For example, Shor's quantum algorithm for integer factorization runs in polynomial time on a quantum computer. Variants of Shor's algorithm enable quantum computers to compute discrete logarithms over finite fields and elliptic curves in polynomial time. Another quantum algorithm is Grover's algorithm, which provides polynomial acceleration in unstructured searches. The N-bit key of a cryptography is recovered using O(2^N / 2) serial quantum operations in Grover's algorithm, which affects algorithms based on the 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), such as the 128-NR Encryption Algorithm (NEA)2 used in 5G. Therefore, these quantum algorithms render several other public-key cryptosystems insecure, including RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DHE), and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). Furthermore, these algorithms pose a threat to the security of symmetric cryptography and hash algorithms such as the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-256.

[0052] To counter the threat of quantum computing to asymmetric cryptography, it is necessary to adapt quantum-resistant algorithms (also known as post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms) into 3GPP to ensure that CCA and OAuth are protected against quantum attacks.

[0053] Homomorphic encryption algorithms make it possible to perform mathematical operations on encrypted data without decrypting any part of it, and they provide quantum security, helping to protect CCA and OAuth protocols from quantum attacks.

[0054] Therefore, a wireless communication network that includes wireless communication systems beyond 5G and 6G is needed, which can solve the above problems and adapt to quantum-safe algorithms to enhance security.

[0055] about Figures 3 to 14 The disclosed technology will be explained in further detail.

[0056] In the embodiments, the terms "network entity" and "NF service consumer" are used interchangeably throughout the specification and drawings. Furthermore, the terms "PQC" and "PQC mechanism" are used interchangeably throughout the specification and drawings. Additionally, the terms "algorithm" and "mechanism" are used interchangeably throughout the specification and drawings.

[0057] Figure 3This illustrates a problem scenario associated with insecure cryptographic algorithms in the CCA interface, based on relevant technologies.

[0058] Specifically, Figure 3 A sequence flowchart of relevant security and authentication mechanisms in a 5G wireless communication system is shown. These security and authentication mechanisms do not possess quantum security mechanisms in the encryption and authentication of CCA tokens between NF, SCP, and NRF. The sequence flowchart may include several operations outlined below.

[0059] refer to Figure 3In operation 302, NF service consumer 301 sends a service request to SCP 303 using a CCA token. In operation 304, SCP 303 performs a discovery operation to discover NRF 305. The CCA token is based on a Java Web Token (JWT). The CCA token is encrypted using a traditional algorithm for encryption, such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) or RSA as described in RFC 7519, which is not quantum secure. The CCA token is signed using Java Web Signature (JWS) with an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) or RSA, as described in RFC 7515, which is also not quantum secure. Then, in operation 306, SCP 303 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get request to NRF 305 using the CCA token. In operation 308, the NRF (also known as the NF producer) decrypts the CCA token and verifies the signature of the CCA token. The Intermediate Service Communication Agent (SCP) can also verify the authenticity of NF service consumer 301 by verifying the digital signature. In Operation 310, NRF 305 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get response to SCP 303. In Operation 312, SCP 303 sends the service response to NF service consumer 301. The algorithms used to encrypt and sign the acquired CCA are vulnerable to attack. An attacker using a quantum machine can break all these traditional algorithms based on RSA and elliptic curve cryptography. Therefore, an attacker using a quantum machine can crack the encryption and decoding of CCA tokens containing NF instance information, timestamps, expiration times, and NF producer service types, and use them in the future for replay attacks, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. An attacker using a quantum machine can also break these traditional digital signature-based algorithms and perform man-in-the-middle (MITM), impersonation, and spoofing attacks, in which the attacker acts as NF service consumer 301 and requests various services from different NFs. The various services may include private and sensitive information such as various authentication vectors, cryptographic materials, and location information such as cell IDs and physical cell IDs. Therefore, using quantum-safe encryption algorithms to protect CCA tokens in 6G wireless communication systems mitigates this attack.

[0060] Figure 4 The embodiments of the present disclosure are shown with Figure 3 The problem scenarios and corresponding solution scenarios. Specifically, Figure 4A sequence flowchart of a publicly available solution for a quantum-safe algorithm, cryptographic suite, and signature profile used in CCA is shown. Embodiments herein define a mechanism for replacing traditional algorithms with cryptographic suites and integrating quantum-safe cryptographic signatures into the authentication process of CCA encryption and 6G wireless communication systems. The quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms disclosed herein refer to one of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanisms, hybrid PQC mechanisms, and any quantum-safe homomorphic mechanism. Hybrid mechanisms are combinations of traditional cryptographic algorithms and quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms. PQC mechanisms are preferred because they are secure against quantum attacks and have a faster key generation mechanism. Some examples of PQC mechanisms include Kyber, BIKE, Mc-Alliece, etc. An example of a PQC digital signature mechanism is Di-lithium.

[0061] refer to Figure 4 In operation 402, NF service consumer 301 sends a service request to SCP 303 using a quantum-safe CCA token. The CCA token is encrypted using a PQC / hybrid PQC-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and signed using a PQC / hybrid PQC-based digital signature. In operation 404, SCP 303 performs a discovery operation to discover NRF 305. Then, in operation 406, SCP 303 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get request to NRF 305 using a quantum-safe CCA token. In operation 408, NRF 305 decrypts the CCA token and verifies the signature of the CCA token using a PQC / hybrid PQC-based mechanism. In operation 410, NRF 305 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get response to SCP 303. In operation 412, SCP 303 sends a service response to NF service consumer 301. (Reference) Figure 5 This embodiment will be explained further.

[0062] Figure 5 A flowchart depicting a method for performing CCA-based authentication and authorization of network entities, according to embodiments of the present disclosure, is shown. For the sake of brevity, it will be combined with... Figure 4 To explain Figure 5 .

[0063] In this embodiment, the network entity can be Figure 4 NF service consumer 301. Therefore, the same reference numerals have been used to represent network entities.

[0064] refer to Figure 5 In operation 501, method 500 includes sending a first service request to NRF 305. The first service request may correspond to Figure 4 The operation involves a service request at position 402. For example... Figure 4 As shown, network entity (e.g., NF service consumer) 301 sends a first service request with a CCA token. The CCA token is encrypted using a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). In this embodiment, the KEM is based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism. In this embodiment, the predefined PQC mechanism is one of a standard PQC mechanism and a hybrid PQC mechanism. The predefined PQC mechanism is described in detail below. After encrypting the CCA token, network entity (e.g., NF service consumer) 301 generates a quantum-safe CCA token. The generated quantum-safe CCA token is an encrypted CCA token with a digital signature signed using a digital signature. In this embodiment, the digital signature is based on a predefined PQC mechanism.

[0065] Subsequently, in operation 503, method 500 includes receiving a service response to the first service request from NRF 305. (As follows) Figure 4 As shown, a decryption technique is used to decrypt a service request including a quantum-safe CCA token, where the decryption technique is based on a predefined PQC mechanism. A service response is determined based on the decryption, and then received at the network entity. In another embodiment, the network entity (e.g., an NF service consumer) 301 is first authenticated and authorized by verifying the digital signature of the decrypted quantum-safe CCA token. Then, the service response is determined based on the verification of the network entity (e.g., the NF service consumer) 301. In the embodiment, as... Figure 4 As shown, NRF 305 can be communicatively coupled to network entity (e.g., NF service consumer) 301 via first SCP 303-1, where first SCP 303-1 supports the PQC mechanism. Therefore, network entity (e.g., NF service consumer) 301 can be authenticated by verifying the digital signature of the quantum-safe CCA token at first SCP 303-1.

[0066] In embodiments, a KEM based on a hybrid PQC mechanism may include a combination of a quantum-safe cryptographic KEM algorithm and a traditional KEM algorithm (such as ECDH). Similar to hybrid key exchange in Transport Layer Security (TLS), 3GPP may also employ this approach to combine two algorithms to enhance security and support a fallback mechanism should one of the algorithms be compromised in the future. A shared key for one algorithm can be combined with other algorithms to form a new shared key for the hybrid mechanism. These new hybrid protection mechanisms can be added in addition to PQC algorithms. Several examples of KEMs based on a hybrid PQC mechanism are discussed below:

[0067] Example 1: Traditional + PQC KEM Profile. In this hybrid PQC-based KEM, one algorithm can be of the traditional type, such as elliptic curve-based protection scheme identifiers, while another algorithm can be a post-quantum KEM-based scheme identifier. Any combination of the traditional elliptic curve-based scheme and the PQC-based KEM scheme mentioned below can be constructed as follows:

[0068] -ECDH+KYBER,

[0069] -ECDH+BIKE

[0070] -ECDH+ Classic McEliece

[0071] -RSA+KYBER

[0072] Example 2: PQC KEM + PQC KEM brief. In this KEM based on a hybrid PQC mechanism, both KEM algorithms can be post-quantum type, meaning both are scheme identifiers based on post-quantum cryptography KEM, for example:

[0073] -KYBER+BIKE

[0074] -KYBER+HQC

[0075] -KYBER + Classic McEliece

[0076] -BIKE+HQC

[0077] -BIKE + Classic McEliece

[0078] HQC + Classic McEliece

[0079] Similarly, digital signature algorithms based on hybrid PQC mechanisms can include combinations of quantum-safe cryptographic digital signature algorithms with traditional digital signature algorithms such as RSA and ECDSA. Several examples of digital signatures based on hybrid PQC mechanisms are discussed below:

[0080] Example 1: PQC KEM+PQC digital signature profile. In this type of digital signature based on a hybrid PQC mechanism, one algorithm can be a post-quantum type KEM, while the other algorithm can be a scheme identifier based on post-quantum cryptography digital signatures, such as:

[0081] -KYBER+Di-lithium / FALCON / SPHINCS+

[0082] -BIKE+Di-lithium / FALCON / SPHINCS+

[0083] -KYBER+Di-lithium / FALCON / SPHINCS+

[0084] -Classic McEliece+Di-lithium / FALCON / SPHINCS+

[0085] Example 2: Traditional + PQC Digital Signature Profile. In this type of digital signature based on a hybrid PQC mechanism, one algorithm can be of the traditional type, i.e., an elliptic curve-based protection scheme identifier, while other algorithms can be based on post-quantum digital signature scheme identifiers, such as...

[0086] -ECDH+Di-lithium / FALCON / SPHINCS

[0087] -RSA+Di-lithium / FALCON / SPHINCS+

[0088] It should be noted that the above brief only illustrates a few examples of KEM based on a hybrid PQC mechanism and digital signatures based on a hybrid PQC mechanism. Any other combination of traditional algorithms and PQC mechanisms can be used as KEM based on a hybrid PQC mechanism and digital signatures based on a hybrid PQC mechanism.

[0089] In the embodiments, JWE and JWS network profiles based on PQC-based mechanisms and hybrid PQC-based mechanisms should be added to the 3GPP standard. Furthermore, the following modifications are required to incorporate the disclosed embodiments into 3GPP Technical Specification (TS) 33.210:

[0090] a. JWE related brief information:

[0091] i. All entities and functions supporting JWE according to RFC 7516

[47] shall comply with the following limitations and extensions:

[0092] ii. Key exchange should be performed using a PQC-based mechanism, a hybrid mechanism, or a quantum-safe homomorphic algorithm.

[0093] b.JWS related brief information:

[0094] i. All entities and functions supporting JWS according to RFC 7515

[46] shall comply with the following limitations and extensions:

[0095] ii. Digital signatures should be made using PQC-based digital signature algorithms, hybrid digital signature algorithms, or quantum-safe homomorphic digital signature algorithms.

[0096] Furthermore, it is necessary to add TLS network profiles based on PQC-based mechanisms and hybrid PQC-based mechanisms. Additionally, the following modifications are required to incorporate the disclosed embodiments into 3GPP Technical Specification (TS) 33.210:

[0097] 1) The TLS 1.3 cipher suite shall comply with the requirements set forth in Section 9.1 of TLS 1.3 RFC 8446

[66] . In addition, key exchange shall be performed using a PQC-based mechanism, a hybrid mechanism or quantum-safe homomorphic encryption.

[0098] 2) The TLS 1.3 signature scheme should conform to PQC-Digital-Signature_PQC-KEM_sha3843)

[0099] 3) TLS 1.2 cipher suites shall comply with the rules for permitted cipher suites given in TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246

[50] ). Furthermore, TLS 1.2 cipher suites shall comply with TLS_PQC-KEM_PQC-Digital-Signature_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.

[0100] 4) The TLS 1.2 signature scheme should conform to PQC-Digital-Signature_PQC-KEM_sha384

[0101] The disclosed technologies have an impact on 3GPP standards, as shown in Table 1 below:

[0102] Table 1

[0103]

[0104] Value 0xB is reserved for future standardized protection schemes. Values ​​0xC to 0xF are reserved for proprietary protection schemes specified by the home operator.

[0105] In this embodiment, a public profile for each algorithm for KEM and digital signatures can be provided. In this embodiment, such a profile for KYBER is shown in Table 2 below:

[0106] Table 2

[0107]

[0108] In this embodiment, various parameters of KEM and each algorithm in the digital signature can be adjusted according to the security level (1, 3, 5, etc.). In this embodiment, such adjustments for KYBER are shown in Table 3 below:

[0109] Table 3

[0110]

[0111]

[0112] Figure 6 This illustrates a problem scenario associated with incompatibility between Network Functions (NF) and Service Communication Agents (SCP) according to embodiments of this disclosure.

[0113] Due to the increasing prevalence of quantum attacks, a migration to security solutions based on quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms is inevitable. When migrating to quantum-safe algorithms, one SCP can support only quantum-safe algorithms, while another SCP can support traditional cryptographic algorithms. Because currently no communication occurs during security mechanism negotiation between NFs and all intermediate SCPs, digital signature verification fails due to algorithm mismatch. This leads to communication failures between NFs or between NFs and NRFs, which will be referred to... Figure 6 To explain.

[0114] refer to Figure 6 In operation 602, NF service consumer 301 uses a security CCA token to send a service request to SCP 303-1. For example... Figure 6 As shown, SCP 303-1 supports the PQC mechanism. Therefore, the CCA token is encrypted using a PQC / hybrid PQC-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and signed using a PQC / hybrid PQC-based digital signature. In operation 604, SCP 303-1 performs a discovery operation to discover NRF 305. In operation 606, SCP 303-1 verifies the digital signature of the CCA token. Then, in operation 608, SCP 303-1 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get request to SCP 303-2 using the quantum-safe CCA token. In operation 610, because SCP 303-2 does not support the PQC mechanism, the verification of the digital signature of the CCA token fails. In operation 612, SCP 303-2 sends a service denial to SCP 303-1. In operation 614, SCP 303-1 sends a service denial to NF service consumer 301.

[0115] This disclosure is for reference only. Figure 6 The problem discussed offers two solutions.

[0116] Figure 7 The embodiments of the present disclosure are shown with Figure 6 The first solution scenario corresponding to the problem scenario. Specifically, Figure 7 A sequence flowchart of a solution using rejection reason codes in CCA according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0117] refer to Figure 7 In operation 702, NF service consumer 301 uses a security CCA token to send a service request to SCP 303-1. For example... Figure 7 As shown, the first SCP 303-1 supports PQC. Therefore, the CCA token is encrypted using a PQC / hybrid PQC-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and signed using a PQC / hybrid PQC-based digital signature. In this embodiment, the CCA token is a quantum-safe CCA token, as referenced... Figure 5As discussed. In operation 704, the first SCP 303-1 performs a discovery operation to discover NRF 305. In operation 706, the first SCP 303-1 verifies the digital signature of the quantum-safe CCA token. Then, in operation 708, the first SCP 303-1 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get request to the second SCP 303-2 using the quantum-safe CCA token. In operation 710, the verification of the digital signature of the CCA token fails because the second SCP 303-2 does not support PQC. In an embodiment, in the event of authentication failure, a denial / error code can be added to the denial-of-service response, where the cause (CAUSE) value indicates the reason for the failure. The error code could indicate an authorization failure at the second SCP 303-2 due to a lack of support for PQC. Therefore, in operation 712, the second SCP 303-2 sends a denial-of-service response to the first SCP 303-1 including an error code (i.e., "Error Code" = PQC not supported). In operation 714, SCP 303-1 sends a service denial code to NF service consumer 301. Based on the error code in the service denial message, NF service consumer 301 can restart the CCA token while maintaining PQC / hybrid KEM as the encryption method, but signing the CCA token using an ECDSA / RSA-based signature. Therefore, in operation 716, NF service consumer 301 sends a second service request using the CCA token, which is encrypted using a predefined PQC-based KEM, but signed with a predefined elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) (e.g., ECDSA / RSA). In operation 718, SCP 303-1 verifies the signature. Then, in operation 720, SCP 303-1 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get request to SCP 303-2 using the modified CCA token. When the CCA token is digitally signed using a conventional algorithm, in operation 722, SCP 303-2 successfully verifies the signature. However, in order to notify NF service consumers 301 that the second SCP 303-2 does not support PQC, a service rejection with a rejection code can be added in 3GPP Technical Specification (TS) 33.501. The service rejection code can be defined as:

[0118] Service_reject_cause=001 (or XXX) indicates "PQC not supported".

[0119] It should be noted that CCA tokens can be used in conjunction with references Figure 5 The similar methods discussed involve encryption and digital signatures.

[0120] Figure 8 The embodiments of the present disclosure are shown with Figure 6 The second solution scenario corresponding to the problem scenario. Specifically, Figure 8 A sequence flowchart of a solution for using cybersecurity policies in a CCA according to an embodiment of this disclosure is shown.

[0121] In embodiments, new cybersecurity policies regarding preferred PQC authentication protection and signature verification mechanisms can be implied at the NF producer, SCP, NF consumer, and NRF. The exchange of security negotiation mechanism capabilities can be used in the CCA for encryption and digital signature verification based on the cybersecurity policy.

[0122] refer to Figure 8 In operation 802, negotiation information is exchanged between the network entity and the NRF. In this embodiment, the network entity may refer to NF service consumer 301, first SCP 303-1, and second SCP 303-2. If NF service consumer 301 and NRF 305 communicate via any SCP, negotiation information is exchanged between NF service consumer 301, SCPs 303-1 and 303-2, and NRF 305, such as... Figure 8 As shown. However, if NF service consumer 301 and NRF 305 do not communicate via any SCP, negotiation information is exchanged between NF service consumer 301 and NRF 305. In an embodiment, the negotiation information indicates one of several security policies used for digitally signing CCA tokens to authenticate and authorize network entities. In an embodiment, the multiple security policies may include a PQC authentication requirement policy, a PQC authentication preference policy, and a PQC authentication unwarranted policy. The PQC authentication requirement policy indicates that the network entity supports only PQC authentication and verification mechanisms. The PQC authentication preference policy indicates that the network entity supports both PQC and traditional authentication and verification mechanisms. The PQC authentication unwarranted policy indicates that the network entity supports traditional authentication and verification mechanisms. Furthermore, even if either the network entity or the NRF does not support PQC by mentioning the PQC security policy as "unwarranted," conventional methods can be used for security key and parameter exchange to avoid subsequent rejection. Additionally, the SCP can forward consumer requests to a compatible SCP that appropriately supports the security mechanism. Early detection of supported security mechanisms can reduce communication latency between NFs or between an NF and an NRF. Based on entity-supported security policies and cryptographic suites, parameters and keys for shared secrets and signature algorithms can be negotiated. Individual bit support for PQC / traditional authentication indicator bits can be supported in other ways when negotiating security policies.

[0123] In operation 804, NF service consumer 301 sends a service request to first SCP 303-1 using a security CCA token after exchanging negotiation information. In this embodiment, the service request refers to... Figure 4The first service request is sent along with a CCA token, which is encrypted using a predefined PQC-based KEM. In this embodiment, the encrypted CCA token is digitally signed based on the exchanged negotiation information. In operation 806, the first SCP 303-1 performs a discovery operation to discover NRF 305. In operation 808, the first SCP 303-1 verifies the digital signature of the CCA token. Then, in operation 810, the first SCP 303-1 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get request to the second SCP 303-2 using the CCA token. In operation 812, the second SCP 303-2 verifies the digital signature of the CCA token. Then, in operation 814, the second SCP 303-2 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get request to NRF 305 using the CCA token. In operation 816, the NRF verifies the digital signature of the CCA token. In operation 818, NRF 305 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get response to the first SCP 303-1. During Operation 820, SCP-1 303-1 sent a service response to NF service consumer 301.

[0124] In an embodiment, the following may be performed to refer to Figure 7 and Figure 8 The disclosed embodiments are incorporated into related technologies, such as 3GPP Technical Specification (TS) 33.501:

[0125] 13.3.8.2 Client Credential Assertions

[0126] a. The CCA should be a JSON Web Token as described in RFC 7519

[44] and protected with a digital signature based on JSON Web Signature (JWS) as described in RFC 7515

[45] .

[0127] b. CCA should include:

[0128] i. The NF instance ID of the NF service consumer (subject);

[0129] ii. Timestamp (iat) and expiration time (exp), and

[0130] iii. The NF type of the intended audience (audience), i.e., the NF type and / or type "NRF" of the NF service producer.

[0131] iv. "Support PQC", this parameter indicates the access token signing method.

[0132] a.0 represents the traditional method.

[0133] b.1 represents the PQC method.

[0134] v.NF service consumers should digitally sign the generated CCA based on their private key, as described in RFC 7515

[45] . The signed CCA should include one of the following fields: an X.509 URL (x5u) referring to the resource of the X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain used to sign the client authentication assertion, or an X.509 certificate chain (x5c) including the X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain used to sign the client authentication assertion.

[0135] vi. Security policy guidelines indicate PQC certification protection as "Required / Preferred / No Guarantee".

[0136] Figure 9 This illustrates a problem scenario associated with insecure cryptographic algorithms in an OAuth interface according to embodiments of this disclosure.

[0137] One issue with security and authentication mechanisms in 5G wireless communication systems is the lack of quantum security in the encryption and authentication of OAuth tokens between NF, SCP, and NRF. NF service consumers request access tokens from the NRF to access NF service producers. NF service consumers can request NRFs via SCP and NRF, such as... Figure 9 As shown.

[0138] refer to Figure 9 In operation 902, NF service consumer 301 sends a service request to SCP 303. In operation 904, SCP 303 performs a discovery operation to discover NRF 305. In operation 906, SCP 303 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get request to NRF 305. NRF 305 generates an access token and signs it using a Java Web Signature (JWS) with ECDSA or RSA, which is not quantum secure as described in RFC 7515. NRF 305 also checks whether NF service consumer 301 is authorized. In operation 908, NRF 305 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get response with an OAuth access token to SCP 303. In operation 910, SCP 303 sends an NF service request with an OAuth access token. In operation 912, NF service producer 307 verifies the integrity of the OAuth access token using JWS (ECDSA). In operation 914, NF service producer 307 sends an NF service response to SCP 303, which is then forwarded to NF service consumer 301 in operation 916.

[0139] However, attackers using quantum machines can compromise these traditional digital signature-based algorithms and execute man-in-the-middle (MITM), impersonation, and spoofing attacks. In these attacks, the attacker acts as an NF consumer, requesting various services from different NFs, including private and sensitive information such as various authentication vectors, cryptographic materials, and location information like cell IDs and physical cell IDs. Therefore, using quantum-secure encryption algorithms to protect OAuth access tokens in 6G wireless communication systems mitigates this type of attack.

[0140] Figure 10 The embodiments of the present disclosure are shown with Figure 9 The problem scenarios and corresponding solution scenarios.

[0141] The embodiments in this paper define a mechanism for replacing traditional algorithms with cipher suites and integrating quantum-safe cryptographic signatures into the OAuth authentication and authorization process of a 6G wireless communication system. The quantum-safe cryptographic algorithm disclosed herein refers to one of post-quantum cryptography algorithms, hybrid algorithms, and any quantum-safe homomorphic algorithms. Hybrid algorithms may refer to references... Figure 5 The same hybrid algorithm is discussed. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, its description is omitted here.

[0142] refer to Figure 10 In operation 1002, NF service consumer 301 sends a service request to NRF 305. In operation 1004, NF service consumer 301 performs a discovery operation to discover NRF 305. In operation 1006, NF service consumer 301 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get request to NRF 305 to obtain a quantum-secure access token, also known as a quantum-secure OAuth access token. NRF 305 generates the quantum-secure access token and signs it using a predefined PQC-based digital signature. NRF 305 also checks whether NF service consumer 301 is authorized. In operation 1008, NRF 305 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get response with the quantum-secure OAuth access token to NF service consumer 301. In operation 1010, NF service consumer 301 sends an NF service request with the quantum-secure OAuth access token to NF service producer 307. In operation 1012, NF service producer 307 verifies the integrity of the OAuth access token using a predefined PQC-based digital signature. In operation 1014, NF service producer 307 sends the NF service response to NF service consumer 301. In operation 1016, NRF 305 sends the service response to NF service consumer 301. (See reference) Figure 11 This embodiment will be explained further.

[0143] Figure 11 A flowchart depicting a method for accessing a service provided by an NF service producer, according to an embodiment of this disclosure, is shown. For the sake of brevity, it will be combined with... Figure 10 To explain Figure 11 .

[0144] refer to Figure 11 In operation 1101, method 1100 may include receiving a quantum-secure access token from NRF 305 at NF service consumer 301. NF service consumer 301 may refer to [reference needed]. Figure 10 The discussed techniques are used to receive quantum-secure access tokens. In an embodiment, the quantum-secure access token is generated at the NRF and signed using a digital signature based on a predefined PQC mechanism. In operation 1103, method 100 may include sending the quantum-secure access token by the NF service consumer 301 to the NF service producer 307 in an NF service request. The NF service consumer 301 can refer to the reference... Figure 10 The discussed technique sends a quantum-secure access token to NF service producer 307. Then, in operation 1105, method 1100 may include receiving an NF service response from NF service producer 307 at NF service consumer 301, wherein the NF service response is based on verification of the quantum-secure access token at NF service producer 307 using a predefined PQC mechanism. This step can be referenced. Figure 10 The techniques discussed will be used to implement this.

[0145] In the embodiments, a predefined PQC-based mechanism and reference are used. Figure 5 The same applies to what is being discussed. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, a description of it is omitted here.

[0146] Figure 12 The embodiments of the present disclosure are shown with Figure 9 The problem scenarios and corresponding solution scenarios.

[0147] refer to Figure 12In the embodiments disclosed herein, NF service consumer 301 can communicate with NRF 305 via SCP 303. In operation 1202, NF service consumer 301 sends a service request to SCP 303. In operation 1204, SCP 303 performs a discovery operation to discover NRF 305. In operation 1206, SCP 303 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get request to NRF 305 to obtain a quantum-secure access token, also known as a quantum-secure OAuth access token. NRF 305 generates the quantum-secure access token and signs it using a predefined PQC-based digital signature. NRF 305 also checks whether NF service consumer 301 is authorized. In operation 1208, NRF 305 sends an Nnrf_AccessToken_Get response with the quantum-secure OAuth access token to NF service consumer 301. In operation 1210, SCP 303 sends an NF service request with the quantum-secure OAuth access token to NF service producer 307. In operation 1212, NF service producer 307 uses a predefined PQC-based digital signature to verify the integrity of the OAuth access token. In operation 1214, NF service producer 307 sends an NF service response to SCP 303. In operation 1216, SCP 303 sends a service response to NF service consumer 301.

[0148] The following modifications can be made to incorporate references into relevant technologies such as 3GPP Technical Specification (TS) 33.501. Figure 11 and Figure 12 Disclosed embodiments:

[0149] In embodiments, JWE and JWS network profiles based on PQC-based mechanisms and hybrid PQC-based mechanisms should be added to the 3GPP standard. Furthermore, the following modifications can be made to incorporate the disclosed embodiments into related technologies, such as 3GPP Technical Specification (TS) 33.210:

[0150] a. JWE related brief information:

[0151] i. All entities and functions supporting JWE according to RFC 7516

[47] shall comply with the following limitations and extensions:

[0152] ii. Key exchange should be performed using a PQC-based mechanism, a hybrid mechanism, or a quantum-safe homomorphic algorithm.

[0153] b.JWS related brief information:

[0154] i. All entities and functions supporting JWS according to RFC 7515

[46] shall comply with the following limitations and extensions:

[0155] ii. Digital signatures should be made using PQC-based digital signature algorithms, hybrid digital signature algorithms, or quantum-safe homomorphic digital signature algorithms.

[0156] In addition, as described below, bits indicating security policies and supporting PQC can also be added. In an embodiment, this bit can be added during the negotiation information process between the network entity (e.g., NF service consumer, SCP, etc.) and the NRF.

[0157] -5.4.2.1 Introduction [TS 29.510]

[0158] --The service operation defined for the Nnrf_AccessToken service is an access token request (i.e., Nnrf_AccessToken_Get).

[0159] -5.4.2.2 Obtain (Access Token Request)

[0160] --The OAuth 2.0 access token request included in the body of the HTTP POST request should contain:

[0161] --OAuth2 authorization type set to "client_credentials";

[0162] -- The "scope" parameter indicates the name of the NF service that the NF service consumer is trying to access (i.e., the expected NF service name).

[0163] --The NF instance Id of the NF service consumer requesting an OAuth2.0 access token;

[0164] --The NF type of the NF service consumer, if this is not an access token request for a specific NF service producer;

[0165] --Expected NF type of the NF service producer, if this is not an access token request for a specific NF service producer;

[0166] --Security policy indicates PQC certification protection "Required / Preferred / No Guarantee"

[0167] --Optionally, a "Support PQC" parameter can be added to indicate the access token signing method, where:

[0168] ---0 indicates the traditional method

[0169] ---1 indicates PQC / hybrid method

[0170] Figure 13A diagram is shown of a system for performing CCA-based authentication and authorization of network entities according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. Figure 13 The configuration can be understood as part of the configuration of the network entity. Furthermore, according to another embodiment, the method 500 disclosed above can... Figure 13 This is implemented in the system. In the embodiment, Figure 13 The system corresponds to network entity (e.g., NF service consumer) 301.

[0171] refer to Figure 13 The system 1300 may include at least one processor 1302, communication circuitry 1304 (e.g., a communicator or communication interface), and memory 1306. The communication circuitry 1304 may perform functions for transmitting and receiving signals via a wireless channel.

[0172] As an example, at least one processor 1302 may be a single processing unit or multiple units, all of which may include multiple computing units. At least one processor 1302 may be implemented as one or more microprocessors, microcomputers, microcontrollers, digital signal processors, central processing units, state machines, logic circuits, and / or any device that manipulates signals based on operating instructions. Among other capabilities, at least one processor 1302 is configured to acquire and execute computer-readable instructions and data stored in memory 1306. At least one processor 1302 may include one or more processors. In this case, one or more processors 1302 may be general-purpose processors (such as central processing units (CPUs), application processors (APs), etc.), pure graphics processing units (such as graphics processing units (GPUs), vision processing units (VPUs)), and / or AI-specific processors (such as neural processing units (NPUs)). One or more processors 1302 may control the processing of input data according to predefined operating rules or artificial intelligence (AI) models stored in non-volatile memory and volatile memory (i.e., memory 1306). Predefined operating rules or AI models are provided through training or learning.

[0173] The memory 1306 may include any non-transitory computer-readable medium known in the art, including, for example, volatile memory (such as static random access memory (SRAM) and dynamic random access memory (DRAM)) and / or non-volatile memory (such as read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable ROM, flash memory, hard disk, optical disk and magnetic tape).

[0174] Various embodiments are essentially the same, and system 1300 may include additional components required to achieve the desired functionality of system 1300 in accordance with the requirements of this disclosure.

[0175] Figure 14A diagram of a system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0176] refer to Figure 14 System 1400 may correspond to any suitable NF service consumer or SCP discussed throughout this specification. System 1400 may be configured to perform method 1100 as described above. System 1400 may include at least one processor 1402, communication circuitry 1404, and memory 1406.

[0177] The communication circuit 1404 can perform one or more functions for transmitting and receiving signals via a wireless channel. The memory 1406 can be configured to store information / data required by at least one processor 1402 to perform one or more desired functions of the system 1400 in accordance with this disclosure.

[0178] Figure 15 The structure of a user equipment according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0179] refer to Figure 15 User equipment 1500 includes a controller 1502 and a transceiver 1501, wherein the controller 1502 is configured to perform the methods disclosed above for execution by the user equipment, and the transceiver 1501 is configured to transmit and receive channels or signals. Furthermore, user equipment 1500 also includes a memory (not shown). However, the components of user equipment 1500 are not limited thereto. For example, user equipment 1500 may include more or fewer components than those described above. Furthermore, the controller 1502, transceiver 1501, and memory may be implemented as a single chip. Additionally, the controller 1502 may include at least one processor.

[0180] In addition, user equipment 1500 can correspond to Figure 14 The system 1400 is an NF service consumer, and the controller 1502 can correspond to it. Figure 14 At least one processor 1402, and transceiver 1501 may correspond to Figure 14 The communication circuit 1404.

[0181] Transceiver 1501 is collectively referred to as a UE receiver and a UE transmitter, and can transmit signals to or receive signals from a base station or network entity. Signals transmitted to or received from a base station or network entity may include control information and data. Transceiver 1501 may include an RF transmitter for up-converting and amplifying the frequency of the transmitted signal, and an RF receiver for amplifying the frequency of the received signal for low noise and down-conversion. However, this is only an example of transceiver 1501, and the components of transceiver 1501 are not limited to RF transmitters and RF receivers.

[0182] In addition, transceiver 1501 can receive signals and output signals to controller 1502 via a wireless channel, and can also transmit signals output from controller 1502 via a wireless channel.

[0183] The memory can store programs and data required for the operation of user equipment 1500. Furthermore, the memory can store control information or data included in signals received by user equipment 1500. The memory can be a storage medium such as read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), hard disk, CD-ROM, and DVD, or a combination of storage media.

[0184] Controller 1502 can control a series of controllers to cause user equipment 1500 to operate as described above. For example, transceiver 1501 can receive data signals including control signals transmitted by a base station or network entity, and controller 1502 can determine the result of receiving control signals and data signals transmitted by the base station or network entity.

[0185] Figure 16 The structure of a base station according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0186] refer to Figure 16 Base station 1600 includes a controller 1602 and a transceiver 1601, wherein the controller 1602 is configured to perform the methods disclosed above for execution by the base station, and the transceiver 1601 is configured to transmit and receive channels or signals. Furthermore, base station 1600 also includes a memory. Moreover, the components of base station 1600 are not limited thereto. For example, base station 1600 may include more or fewer components than those described above. Furthermore, the controller 1602, transceiver 1601, and memory may be implemented as a single chip. Furthermore, the controller 1602 may include at least one processor.

[0187] In addition, base station 1600 can correspond to Figure 14 The SCP system 1400, controller 1602 can correspond to Figure 14 At least one processor 1402, and transceiver 1601 may correspond to Figure 14 The communication circuit 1404.

[0188] Transceiver 1601 is collectively referred to as a base station receiver and a base station transmitter, and can transmit signals to / receive signals from user equipment or network entities. Signals transmitted to or received from user equipment or network entities may include control information and data. Transceiver 1601 may include an RF transmitter for up-converting and amplifying the frequency of the transmitted signal, and an RF receiver for amplifying the frequency of the received signal for low noise and down-converting. However, this is only an example of transceiver 1601, and the components of transceiver 1601 are not limited to RF transmitters and RF receivers.

[0189] In addition, transceiver 1601 can receive signals and output signals to controller 1602 via a wireless channel, and can also transmit signals output from controller 1602 via a wireless channel.

[0190] The memory can store the programs and data required for the operation of the base station. In addition, the memory can store control information or data included in the signals received by the base station. The memory can be a storage medium such as read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), hard disk, CD-ROM, and DVD, or a combination of storage media.

[0191] The controller 1602 can control a series of processes to make the base station operate as described above. For example, the transceiver 1601 can receive data signals including control signals sent by the user equipment, and the controller 1602 can determine the result of receiving the control signals and data signals sent by the user equipment.

[0192] A method is provided for performing client credential assertion (CCA)-based authentication and authorization for a network entity. The method includes a network entity sending a first service request to a network repository function (NRF), wherein sending the first service request includes: encrypting a CCA token using a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), wherein the KEM is based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism; signing the encrypted CCA token using a digital signature to generate a quantum-safe CCA token, wherein the quantum-safe CCA token is a digitally signed encrypted CCA token, and the digital signature is based on the predefined PQC mechanism; sending the quantum-safe CCA token along with the first service request; and the network entity receiving a service response to the first service request from the NRF.

[0193] In this embodiment, the service response is determined based on the decryption of the quantum-safe CCA token at the NRF using a decryption technique based on a predefined PQC mechanism.

[0194] In this embodiment, the service response is determined based on the verification of the digital signature of the decrypted quantum-safe CCA token, thereby authenticating and authorizing the network entity.

[0195] In the embodiments, the predefined PQC mechanism is one of the PQC mechanism and the hybrid PQC mechanism.

[0196] In one embodiment, the NRF is communicatively coupled to the network entity via a first service communication agent (SCP), wherein the first SCP supports PQC, and wherein the network entity is authenticated by a digital signature of a quantum-safe CCA token verified at the first SCP.

[0197] In an embodiment, the method further includes: a network entity receiving a service denial response associated with an authorization failure at a second SCP via a first service communication proxy SCP, wherein the NRF is communicatively coupled to the network entity via the first SCP; wherein the second SCP does not support PQC; wherein verification of the digital signature of the quantum-safe CCA token fails at the second SCP; wherein the service denial response includes an error code; and wherein the error code indicates an authorization failure due to a lack of support for PQC.

[0198] In one embodiment, the method further includes: upon receiving a service rejection response, sending a second service request, wherein sending the second service request includes: encrypting a CCA token using a predefined PQC-based KEM; signing the encrypted CCA token using a predefined elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)-based digital signature; and sending the digitally signed encrypted CCA token together with the second service request.

[0199] In one embodiment, prior to sending the first service request, the method includes: exchanging negotiation information between a network entity and an NRF, wherein the negotiation information indicates one of a plurality of security policies to be used to digitally sign a CCA token for authentication and authorization of the network entity; and sending the CCA token along with the first service request, wherein the CCA token is encrypted using a predefined PQC-based KEM, and wherein the encrypted CCA token is digitally signed based on the exchanged negotiation information.

[0200] In the embodiments, multiple security policies include a PQC certification requirement policy, a PQC certification preference policy, and a PQC certification no-guarantee policy.

[0201] A method is provided for accessing services provided by a Network Function (NF) service producer. The method includes receiving a quantum-secure access token from a Network Repository Function (NRF) at an NF service consumer, wherein the quantum-secure access token is generated at the NRF and signed using a digital signature based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism; the NF service consumer sending the quantum-secure access token to the NF service producer in an NF service request; and receiving an NF service response from the NF service producer at the NF service consumer, wherein the NF service response is based on verification of the quantum-secure access token at the NF service producer using the predefined PQC mechanism.

[0202] In this embodiment, the receiving and sending steps are performed via a Service Communication Agent (SCP).

[0203] In the embodiments, the predefined PQC mechanism is one of the PQC mechanism and the hybrid PQC mechanism.

[0204] A network entity is provided for performing client credential assertion (CCA)-based authentication and authorization. The network entity includes: a memory; and a processor coupled to the memory and configured to: send a first service request to a network repository function (NRF), wherein the processor sends the first service request by: encrypting a CCA token using a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), wherein the KEM is based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism; signing the encrypted CCA token using a digital signature to generate a quantum-safe CCA token, wherein the quantum-safe CCA token is a digitally signed encrypted CCA token, and the digital signature is based on a predefined PQC mechanism; sending the quantum-safe CCA token along with the first service request; and receiving a service response to the first service request from the NRF, wherein the service response is determined based on decryption of the quantum-safe CCA token at the NRF using a decryption technique based on a predefined PQC mechanism.

[0205] In this embodiment, the service response is determined based on the decryption of the quantum-safe CCA token at the NRF using a decryption technique based on a predefined PQC mechanism.

[0206] In this embodiment, the service response is determined based on the verification of the digital signature of the decrypted quantum-safe CCA token, thereby authenticating and authorizing the network entity.

[0207] In the embodiments, the predefined PQC mechanism is one of the PQC mechanism and the hybrid PQC mechanism.

[0208] In one embodiment, the NRF is communicatively coupled to the network entity via a first service communication agent (SCP), wherein the first SCP supports PQC, and wherein the network entity is authenticated by a digital signature of a quantum-safe CCA token verified at the first SCP.

[0209] In an embodiment, the processor is further configured to: receive a service denial response associated with an authorization failure at a second SCP via a first service communication agent SCP, wherein the NRF is communicatively coupled to the network entity via the first SCP; wherein the second SCP does not support PQC; wherein verification of the digital signature of the quantum-safe CCA token fails at the second SCP; wherein the service denial response includes an error code; and wherein the error code indicates an authorization failure due to a lack of support for PQC.

[0210] In an embodiment, upon receiving a service rejection response, the processor is configured to: send a second service request, wherein sending the second service request includes: encrypting a CCA token using a predefined PQC-based KEM; signing the encrypted CCA token using a predefined elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)-based digital signature; and sending the digitally signed encrypted CCA token together with the second service request.

[0211] A network entity is provided for accessing services provided by a Network Function (NF) service producer. The network entity includes: a memory; and a processor coupled to the memory and configured to: receive a quantum-secure access token from a Network Repository Function (NRF), wherein the quantum-secure access token is generated at the NRF and signed using a digital signature based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism; send the quantum-secure access token to the NF service producer in an NF service request; and receive an NF service response from the NF service producer, wherein the NF service response is based on verification of the quantum-secure access token at the NF service producer using the predefined PQC mechanism.

[0212] Therefore, this disclosure provides techniques for post-quantum secure authentication and digital signatures in CCA. Techniques for PQC / hybrid-based encryption and digital signatures of CCA tokens using PQC / hybrid algorithms are also disclosed. These techniques are also disclosed to mitigate problems arising when migrating CCA to the post-quantum era in 6G. Techniques for providing new rejection reason codes and new security policies for CCA are also disclosed. Techniques for quantum-secure signing and verification of OAuth protocols for systems beyond 5G / 6G are also disclosed.

[0213] Therefore, this disclosure offers various advantages. For example, this disclosure provides techniques for ensuring that CCA and OAuth procedures are protected against quantum machine threats. By incorporating a hybrid PQC algorithm as the first mile, the disclosed techniques also facilitate a smooth migration to quantum-secure networks. The disclosed techniques also avoid service loss and delays during interoperability scenarios during this migration.

[0214] Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this disclosure pertains. The systems, methods, and examples provided herein are illustrative only and not limiting.

[0215] The benefits, other advantages, and solutions to problems have been described above with reference to specific embodiments. However, the benefits, advantages, solutions to problems, and any components that may cause any benefit, advantage, or solution to occur or become more apparent should not be construed as key, necessary, or essential features or components of any or all claims.

[0216] It should be understood that the various embodiments of this disclosure described in the claims and specification can be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of hardware and software.

[0217] Any such software may be stored in a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium stores one or more computer programs (software modules), which include computer-executable instructions that, when executed individually or jointly by one or more processors of an electronic device, cause the electronic device to perform the methods of this disclosure.

[0218] Any such software may be stored in the form of volatile or non-volatile memory, such as a storage device like read-only memory (ROM), whether erasable or rewritable, or in the form of memory such as random access memory (RAM), memory chips, devices, or integrated circuits, or stored on an optically or magnetically readable medium, such as an optical disc (CD), a digital versatile disc (DVD), a magnetic disk, or magnetic tape. It should be understood that storage devices and storage media are various embodiments of non-transitory machine-readable storage suitable for storing one or more computer programs including instructions that, when executed, implement various embodiments of this disclosure. Therefore, various embodiments provide a program and a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium for storing such a program, the program including code for implementing the means or methods claimed as any one of the claims of this specification.

[0219] While this disclosure has been shown and described with reference to various embodiments thereof, those skilled in the art will understand that various changes in form and detail may be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of this disclosure as defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A method for performing client credential assertion (CCA)-based authentication and authorization by a network entity, the method comprising: Sending a first service request to the Network Repository Function (NRF), wherein sending the first service request includes: The CCA token is encrypted using a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), where KEM is based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism. Encrypted CCA tokens are signed using digital signatures to generate quantum-safe CCA tokens, where the quantum-safe CCA token is an encrypted CCA token with a digital signature, and the digital signature is based on a predefined PQC mechanism. Send the quantum-safe CCA token along with the first service request to the NRF; and Receive the service response to the first service request from the NRF.

2. The method according to claim 1, in, The service response is determined based on the decryption of the quantum-safe CCA token using decryption technology, and The decryption technology is based on a predefined PQC mechanism.

3. The method according to claim 1, wherein, The service response is determined by verification of the digital signature of the decrypted quantum-safe CCA token, enabling network entities to be authenticated and authorized.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein, The predefined PQC mechanism is one of the PQC mechanism and hybrid PQC mechanism.

5. The method according to claim 1, in, NRF is communicatively coupled to network entities via the First Service Communication Agent (SCP). The first SCP supports PQC, and The network entity is authenticated by verifying the digital signature of the quantum-safe CCA token at the first SCP.

6. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: Received a denial-of-service response associated with authorization failure at the second SCP via the first service communications agent (SCP). In this configuration, the NRF is communicatively coupled to the network entity via the first SCP. The second SCP does not support PQC. The verification of the digital signature of the quantum-safe CCA token failed at the second SCP. The service rejection response includes an error code, and The error code indicates that the authorization failed due to a lack of support for PQC.

7. The method according to claim 6, further comprising: In response to receiving a service rejection response, a second service request is sent, wherein sending the second service request includes: Use KEM to encrypt the CCA token. The encrypted CCA token is signed using a predefined digital signature based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and Send the digitally signed, encrypted CCA token along with the second service request.

8. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: Before sending the first service request, negotiation information is exchanged between the network entity and the NRF. This negotiation information indicates one of several security policies to be used to digitally sign the CCA token for authentication and authorization of the network entity, and that the CCA token will be sent along with the first service request. The CCA token is encrypted using KEM, and The encrypted CCA token is digitally signed based on the negotiated information exchanged.

9. The method according to claim 8, wherein, The multiple security policies include PQC certification requirement policy, PQC certification preference policy, and PQC certification no-guarantee policy.

10. A method performed by a Network Functions (NF) service consumer for accessing a service provided by an NF service producer, the method comprising: Receive a quantum-safe access token from the Network Repository Function (NRF), wherein the quantum-safe access token is generated by the NRF and signed using a digital signature based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism; Send a quantum-safe access token to the NF service producer in the NF service request; and Receive NF service responses from NF service producers, where the NF service responses are based on the verification of quantum-safe access tokens using a predefined PQC mechanism at the NF service producer.

11. The method according to claim 10, wherein, Receiving and sending are performed via the Service Communication Agent (SCP).

12. The method according to claim 10, wherein, The predefined PQC mechanism is one of the PQC mechanism and hybrid PQC mechanism.

13. A network entity for performing client credential assertion (CCA)-based authentication and authorization of a network entity, the network entity comprising: Memory; and The processor, coupled to the memory, is configured as follows: Send a first service request to the Network Storage Function (NRF), wherein the processor sends the first service request by: The CCA token is encrypted using a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), which is based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism. Digital signatures are used to sign encrypted CCA tokens to generate quantum-safe CCA tokens, where the quantum-safe CCA token is an encrypted CCA token with a digital signature, and the digital signature is based on a predefined PQC mechanism; and Send the quantum-safe CCA token along with the first service request to the NRF; and Receive the service response to the first service request from the NRF. The service response is determined based on the decryption of the quantum-safe CCA token using decryption technology, and The decryption technology is based on a predefined PQC mechanism.

14. The network entity according to claim 13, in, The service response is determined based on the decryption of the quantum-safe CCA token using decryption technology, and The decryption technology is based on a predefined PQC mechanism.

15. A network entity for accessing services provided by a Network Functions (NF) service provider, the network entity comprising: Memory; and The processor, coupled to the memory, is configured as follows: Receive a quantum-secure access token from the Network Repository Function (NRF), where the quantum-secure access token is generated by the NRF and signed using a digital signature based on a predefined post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanism. Send a quantum-safe access token to the NF service producer in the NF service request, and Receive NF service responses from NF service producers, where the NF service responses are based on the verification of quantum-safe access tokens using a predefined PQC mechanism at the NF service producer.

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