Bluetooth unlocking control method of vehicle, vehicle controller and vehicle

Abstract

The invention provides a Bluetooth unlocking control method of a vehicle, a vehicle controller and the vehicle, and relates to the field of vehicle unlocking control. The method comprises the steps of determining an actual distance between a target mobile terminal and a vehicle in response to a Bluetooth unlocking instruction for the vehicle; based on the actual distance, determining theoretical Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle; based on the actual distance and the Bluetooth signal strength difference value, whether the Bluetooth unlocking instruction is responded or not is determined, and the Bluetooth signal strength difference value is the difference value between the actual Bluetooth signal strength and the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle. Therefore, through the combination of the actual distance and the Bluetooth signal strength difference value, the anti-interference defect of a single Bluetooth signal strength or Bluetooth ranging scheme is overcome, the judgment precision of the actual distance is improved, the relay attack is effectively intercepted, meanwhile, the convenience of the unlocking operation of a legal user is guaranteed, and the user experience is improved. And the safety and the reliability of vehicle Bluetooth unlocking are improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of vehicle unlocking control, and more specifically, to a Bluetooth unlocking control method for a vehicle, a vehicle controller, and a vehicle. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of smart cars, keyless entry and keyless start, based on Bluetooth and NFC (Near Field Communication), have become standard features in high-end models due to their convenience. However, these vehicle unlocking solutions are vulnerable to relay attacks. An attacker can use two relay devices, one near the user's smart device (such as a mobile phone) and the other near the target vehicle, to intercept and forward unlocking requests and response signals between the target vehicle and the smart device. This can cause the target vehicle to mistakenly believe the user is within a legitimate physical range, thus enabling unauthorized unlocking.

[0003] Currently, existing technologies mainly employ methods such as Bluetooth signal strength index (RSSI, Received Signal Strength Indicator) and Bluetooth round-trip time (RTT) ranging. Among these, RSSI estimates distance based on signal attenuation and is the mainstream defense method in traditional Bluetooth key systems; Bluetooth RTT calculates distance by measuring the round-trip time of the signal, attempting to improve ranging accuracy.

[0004] However, RSSI-based solutions are susceptible to environmental obstruction and electromagnetic interference, resulting in distance estimation errors on the order of several meters, making it difficult to distinguish between legitimate short-range signals and relay signals. Bluetooth RTT ranging accuracy is also susceptible to environmental interference, and its accuracy in practical applications can only reach the meter level, making it unable to effectively prevent relay attacks. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method, vehicle controller, and vehicle provided in this application compensate for the anti-interference shortcomings of a single Bluetooth signal strength or Bluetooth ranging scheme by combining the actual distance with the difference in Bluetooth signal strength. This improves the accuracy of actual distance judgment, effectively intercepts relay attacks, ensures the convenience of unlocking operations for legitimate users, and enhances the security and reliability of vehicle Bluetooth unlocking.

[0006] In a first aspect, a Bluetooth unlocking control method for a vehicle is provided. The method includes: in response to a Bluetooth unlocking command for the vehicle, determining the actual distance between a target mobile terminal and the vehicle, wherein the target mobile terminal is the mobile terminal that sends the Bluetooth unlocking command; determining the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle based on the actual distance; and determining whether to respond to the Bluetooth unlocking command based on the difference between the actual distance and the Bluetooth signal strength, wherein the difference in Bluetooth signal strength is the difference between the actual Bluetooth signal strength and the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle.

[0007] In the above technical solution, upon receiving a Bluetooth unlock command for the vehicle, the actual distance between the target mobile terminal sending the unlock command and the vehicle is first determined to anchor whether the user is within a preset safe distance threshold from a physical location perspective, thus solving the problem of large distance estimation errors in traditional solutions. Then, based on this actual distance and the Bluetooth signal propagation rules, the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle is determined to provide a benchmark for verifying the authenticity of the Bluetooth signal. Finally, based on the actual distance, it is confirmed whether the user is within the preset safe distance threshold, and the difference between the actual Bluetooth signal strength and the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength is used to confirm whether the actual Bluetooth signal strength is within a preset deviation threshold. A comprehensive determination is then made regarding whether to respond to the Bluetooth unlock command. In this process, the actual distance solves the problem of physical legitimacy of whether the user is actually present, while the Bluetooth signal strength difference effectively offsets the impact of environmental obstruction and electromagnetic interference on signal judgment, verifies whether the actual Bluetooth signal matches the current actual distance, and avoids abnormal scenarios of strong Bluetooth signals at long distances caused by relay devices. The two form a dual verification logic, which not only makes up for the anti-interference shortcomings of a single Bluetooth signal strength or Bluetooth ranging solution, but also improves the accuracy of actual distance judgment, effectively intercepts relay attacks, and ensures the convenience of unlocking operations for legitimate users, thereby improving the security and reliability of vehicle Bluetooth unlocking.

[0008] Secondly, a Bluetooth unlocking control device for a vehicle is provided, the device comprising: a first determining module, configured to determine the actual distance between a target mobile terminal and the vehicle in response to a Bluetooth unlocking command for the vehicle, wherein the target mobile terminal is the mobile terminal that sends the Bluetooth unlocking command; a second determining module, configured to determine the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle based on the actual distance; and a third determining module, configured to determine whether to respond to the Bluetooth unlocking command based on the actual distance and the difference in Bluetooth signal strength, wherein the difference in Bluetooth signal strength is the difference between the actual Bluetooth signal strength and the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle.

[0009] Thirdly, a vehicle controller is provided, including a memory and a processor. The memory is used to store executable program code, and the processor is used to call and run the executable program code from the memory, causing the vehicle controller to perform the methods of the first aspect or any possible implementation thereof.

[0010] Fourthly, a vehicle is provided, including a vehicle controller as described in the third aspect.

[0011] The above description is only an overview of the technical solution of this application. In order to better understand the technical means of this application and to implement it in accordance with the contents of the specification, and to make the above and other objects, features and advantages of this application more obvious and understandable, specific embodiments of this application are given below. Attached Figure Description

[0012] Various other advantages and benefits will become apparent to those skilled in the art upon reading the following detailed description of preferred embodiments. The accompanying drawings are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of this application. Furthermore, the same reference numerals denote the same parts throughout the drawings. In the drawings: Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the structure of a vehicle provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a vehicle controller provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 3 A flowchart illustrating a vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 1 ; Figure 4 A flowchart illustrating a vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 2 ; Figure 5 A flowchart illustrating a vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 3 ; Figure 6 A flowchart illustrating a vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 4 ; Figure 7 A flowchart illustrating a vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 5 ; Figure 8 A flowchart illustrating a vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 6 ; Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a Bluetooth unlocking control device for a vehicle provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0013] The technical solutions in this application will be clearly and thoroughly described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the description of the embodiments of this application, unless otherwise stated, " / " means "or," for example, A / B can mean A or B. "And / or" in the text is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, and B existing alone. Furthermore, in the description of the embodiments of this application, "multiple" refers to two or more than two.

[0014] Hereinafter, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as implying or suggesting relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of that feature.

[0015] Before elaborating on the technical solution, the technical terms used in this application will be explained to facilitate subsequent understanding.

[0016] The vehicle is equipped with a UWB base station and a Bluetooth module. The UWB base station is installed in a distributed manner, such as one at the front door and one at the rear door, for a total of two base stations. Through the coordinated ranging of the two base stations, the key areas around the vehicle can be fully covered, ensuring centimeter-level positioning accuracy for the target mobile terminal and providing hardware support for physical distance verification.

[0017] The Bluetooth module uses the AES-256 high-strength encryption algorithm to block the risk of data eavesdropping and tampering at the communication link level, while limiting the communication range to within 10 meters. This satisfies the user's need for convenient unlocking at close range, while avoiding the security risks of long-distance signals being intercepted by relay devices, providing a secure and controllable communication channel for identity authentication and signal strength collection.

[0018] The user end is a mobile terminal equipped with support for UWB and Bluetooth.

[0019] The Bluetooth unlocking control method for a vehicle, the vehicle controller, and the vehicle according to embodiments of this application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and through multiple examples.

[0020] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a vehicle provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 1 As shown, the vehicle 100 may be composed of at least a vehicle controller 110.

[0021] Optionally, Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a vehicle controller provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 2As shown, the vehicle controller 110 may include a processor 111 and a memory 112.

[0022] The memory 112 stores machine-executable instructions that can be executed by the processor 111. When the vehicle controller 110 is running, these machine-executable instructions are executed. The processor 111 and the memory 112 communicate via a bus. The processor 111 can execute these machine-executable instructions to implement the vehicle's Bluetooth unlocking control method.

[0023] The memory 112, processor 111, and various bus components are electrically connected directly or indirectly to enable data transmission or interaction. For example, these components can be electrically connected to each other via one or more communication buses or signal lines. The mobile storage device includes at least one software function module that can be stored in the memory 112 in the form of software or firmware or embedded in the operating system (OS) of the vehicle controller. The processor 111 is used to execute executable modules stored in the memory 112, such as the software function modules and computer programs included in the vehicle's Bluetooth unlocking control method using mobile storage media.

[0024] The memory 112 may be, but is not limited to, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), etc.

[0025] The vehicle controller 110 can be selected according to actual conditions; for example, it can be selected as a whole vehicle controller. Furthermore, the vehicle controller 110 has software capable of executing Bluetooth unlocking control methods for the vehicle.

[0026] The Bluetooth unlocking control method for a vehicle provided in this application embodiment can be executed by the processor in the vehicle controller 110. The Bluetooth unlocking control method for a vehicle provided in this application embodiment will be explained further below. Figure 3 A flowchart illustrating a vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 1 .like Figure 3 As shown, the method may include: S210, in response to a Bluetooth unlock command for the vehicle, determines the actual distance between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle.

[0027] The target mobile terminal is the mobile terminal that sends the Bluetooth unlock command. This can be selected based on the actual situation; for example, the target mobile terminal can be a mainstream smartphone or a smart key.

[0028] In one possible implementation, the Bluetooth unlock command is essentially a user-initiated unlock request. However, Bluetooth communication can only exchange identity information between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle; it cannot identify whether the Bluetooth signal corresponding to the unlock command is transmitted while the user is actually present, or whether it is generated by an attacker through a long-distance relay device. If the actual distance between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle is not verified promptly after receiving the unlock command, and the unlock operation is executed directly, the user will be completely exposed to the risk of a relay attack where the Bluetooth signal is legitimate but the user is not present. Initiating the actual distance determination process immediately upon triggering the unlock command not only supplements the physical location verification dimension of Bluetooth unlocking with actual distance data, quickly determining whether the user is truly within the vehicle's preset safe distance threshold, thus blocking the relay attack path at its source, but also provides a basis for subsequent decisions such as whether to allow unlocking or whether further verification is required. This ensures that the unlock operation not only passes identity authentication but also has physical spatial legitimacy, ultimately achieving a closed loop of security verification upon triggering the Bluetooth unlock command, effectively balancing the security of Bluetooth unlocking with user convenience. The preset safe distance threshold can be selected according to actual circumstances.

[0029] It should be noted that the actual distance between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle is obtained based on actual UWB (Ultra-Wideband) measurements. UWB technology provides centimeter-level distance measurement, effectively preventing relay attacks.

[0030] S220. Based on the actual distance, determine the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle.

[0031] In one possible implementation, since Bluetooth signals attenuate regularly during spatial propagation due to path loss, environmental scattering, and other factors, and this attenuation relationship can be accurately described by theoretical methods such as the logarithmic distance path loss model, the theoretical strength of the Bluetooth signal at that actual distance can be derived by combining the known actual distance with basic parameters such as device transmit power, antenna gain, and environmental attenuation coefficient. Furthermore, this theoretical Bluetooth signal strength has clear scene adaptability and repeatability.

[0032] S230 determines whether to respond to the Bluetooth unlock command based on the actual distance and the difference in Bluetooth signal strength.

[0033] Wherein, the Bluetooth signal strength difference DT is the actual Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle. The difference between the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength RSSI and the actual signal strength can be expressed by the following formula (1): DT=| -RSSI|Formula (1) Among them, the Bluetooth signal strength difference DT is generally represented in absolute value form, which can effectively eliminate the interference of positive and negative signs on subsequent data verification logic, ensure the consistency and comparability of Bluetooth signal strength difference DT in security verification scenarios, and provide a calculation basis for subsequent threshold judgment, pattern matching and other processes.

[0034] Among them, the actual Bluetooth signal strength It collects the real-time strength of the Bluetooth signal from the user terminal via the vehicle's Bluetooth module; this actual Bluetooth signal strength... The signal power detected by the vehicle (unit: dBm, negative value, the smaller the absolute value, the stronger the Bluetooth signal).

[0035] In one possible implementation, since the actual distance directly reflects the user's physical location, it clarifies whether the user is within the preset safe distance threshold, thus solving the prerequisite problem of whether the user is truly present. If the actual distance exceeds the preset safe distance threshold, even if a Bluetooth unlock command is present, it can be directly determined as an abnormal operation. The Bluetooth signal strength difference is used to verify the authenticity of the match between the Bluetooth signal and the actual distance. In practical applications, there is an inherent correspondence between the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength and the actual distance (e.g., a strong Bluetooth signal corresponds to a short distance, and a weak Bluetooth signal corresponds to a long distance). This Bluetooth signal strength difference can reflect whether the actual Bluetooth signal strength meets the preset safe distance threshold corresponding to the current actual distance. If the Bluetooth signal strength difference exceeds the preset deviation threshold, it indicates that the actual Bluetooth signal may be forwarded by a relay device (e.g., the actual distance is far but the Bluetooth signal strength is abnormally high), which means there is a risk of Bluetooth signal spoofing. When these two factors are combined, the unlock request can only be confirmed as being initiated by a legitimate user if the actual distance is within the preset safe distance threshold (i.e., physically legitimate) and the Bluetooth signal strength difference is within the preset deviation threshold (i.e., the Bluetooth signal is genuine and there is no suspicion of forwarding). In this case, responding to the unlock command can ensure security. If either condition is not met (such as the actual distance exceeding the preset safe distance threshold or the Bluetooth signal strength difference being abnormal), it is judged as an abnormal operation (such as a relay attack or a false trigger), and the unlock command is refused. Thus, through dual verification, it avoids misjudgment caused by relying on only a single parameter (such as only looking at the distance or only looking at the Bluetooth signal) and can accurately identify covert attacks, ensuring the security and rationality of the unlock operation.

[0036] The Bluetooth unlocking control method for vehicles provided in this application, upon receiving a Bluetooth unlocking command for the vehicle, first determines the actual distance between the target mobile terminal sending the unlocking command and the vehicle to anchor whether the user is within a preset safe distance threshold from a physical location perspective, thus solving the problem of large distance estimation errors in traditional solutions. Then, based on this actual distance and the Bluetooth signal propagation law, it determines the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle, providing a benchmark for verifying the authenticity of the Bluetooth signal. Finally, based on the actual distance, it confirms whether the user is within the preset safe distance threshold, and through the difference between the actual Bluetooth signal strength and the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength, it confirms whether the actual Bluetooth signal strength is within a preset deviation threshold, comprehensively determining whether to respond to the Bluetooth unlocking command. In this process, the actual distance solves the problem of physical legitimacy of whether the user is actually present, while the Bluetooth signal strength difference effectively offsets the impact of environmental obstruction and electromagnetic interference on signal judgment, verifies whether the actual Bluetooth signal matches the current actual distance, and avoids abnormal scenarios of strong Bluetooth signals at long distances caused by relay devices. The two form a dual verification logic, which not only makes up for the anti-interference shortcomings of a single Bluetooth signal strength or Bluetooth ranging solution, but also improves the accuracy of actual distance judgment, effectively intercepts relay attacks, and ensures the convenience of unlocking operations for legitimate users, thereby improving the security and reliability of vehicle Bluetooth unlocking.

[0037] Optionally, Figure 4 A flowchart illustrating a vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 2 .like Figure 4 As shown, determining the actual distance between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle in the above method includes: S310. Send a ranging request signal to the target mobile terminal and receive a response signal returned by the target mobile terminal based on the ranging request signal.

[0038] In one possible implementation, a UWB base station is configured in the vehicle, and the corresponding target mobile terminal is also equipped with a UWB module. After Bluetooth authentication is completed on the vehicle side, the UWB ranging process is initiated. The UWB base station actively sends a standardized ranging request signal to the UWB module of the target mobile terminal based on the TWR (Two-Way Ranging) TOF (Time of Flight) ranging protocol. This ranging request signal is a high-frequency wireless signal of the UWB standard, which has the characteristics of anti-interference and stable propagation. After receiving the ranging request signal, the UWB module of the target mobile terminal parses and responds to the ranging request signal according to a preset communication protocol, generates a corresponding response signal, and feeds it back to the UWB base station on the vehicle side, completing the two-way interaction of sending and receiving the ranging signal, laying the foundation for subsequent calculation of signal propagation time. The preset communication protocol can be selected according to the actual situation.

[0039] S320. Determine the round-trip time of the signal based on the sending time of the ranging request signal and the receiving time of the response signal.

[0040] In one possible implementation, the UWB base station on the vehicle side has a built-in high-precision timing module. At the moment the ranging request signal is sent, the current time is recorded (e.g., t1). When the UWB base station on the vehicle side successfully receives the response signal returned by the target mobile terminal, the time is recorded again (e.g., t2). Then the round-trip time of the signal can be confirmed as t2-t1.

[0041] S330. Determine the actual distance between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle based on the signal round-trip time and the preset signal propagation speed.

[0042] Since UWB signals are essentially electromagnetic waves, the preset signal propagation speed is the speed of electromagnetic waves in air, i.e., the speed of light, approximately 3 × 10⁻⁶. 8 m / s.

[0043] In one possible implementation, the actual distance between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle is determined by the following formula (2) based on the signal round-trip time and the preset signal propagation speed.

[0044] Actual distance = (Signal round trip time × Preset signal propagation speed) / 2 Formula (2) Since the signal round-trip time is the total propagation time from the vehicle end to the target mobile terminal and back to the vehicle end, while the actual distance is the length of the one-way propagation path, it needs to be divided by 2.

[0045] The Bluetooth unlocking control method for vehicles provided in this application involves a vehicle-side UWB base station sending a UWB ranging request signal to the UWB module of a target mobile terminal, and simultaneously receiving a UWB response signal from the target mobile terminal based on the ranging request signal. By recording the sending time of the ranging request signal and the receiving time of the response signal, the round-trip time of the signal is calculated. Combined with the preset propagation speed of the UWB signal, which is approximately the speed of light, centimeter-level (measurement accuracy not exceeding ±10cm) real physical distance measurement is achieved. This effectively avoids the accuracy degradation problems caused by environmental obstruction and electromagnetic interference in traditional Bluetooth RTT ranging, providing a highly reliable physical distance basis for subsequent differentiation between legitimate close-range operations and relay attacks.

[0046] Optionally, prior to responding to a Bluetooth unlock command for the vehicle, the method further includes: Establish a Bluetooth communication connection with the target mobile terminal and complete identity authentication based on the Bluetooth communication connection.

[0047] In one possible implementation, the vehicle is pre-equipped with a Bluetooth module, and the target mobile terminal must be a smartphone or smart key that supports Bluetooth communication. When a user approaches the target vehicle with the target mobile terminal, the vehicle's Bluetooth module actively scans for nearby Bluetooth signals. If the target mobile terminal's Bluetooth module is in a connectable state (e.g., the user has enabled Bluetooth on their phone), both parties automatically complete Bluetooth pairing and establish a connection, requiring no additional user intervention. This achieves seamless and secure unlocking, improving the user experience. The establishment of this Bluetooth communication connection is fundamental for subsequent authentication and data transmission.

[0048] Then, the vehicle and the target mobile terminal exchange authentication information via the established Bluetooth connection. The authentication methods used include at least: digital certificates, dynamic tokens, two-way authentication processes, and / or key negotiation, to ensure that both parties are legitimate entities, i.e., confirming that the vehicle is the target vehicle and the target mobile terminal is an authorized user device. Subsequently, the vehicle sends an unlock request command to the target mobile terminal via the Bluetooth module. After receiving the unlock request command, the target mobile terminal generates a unique encrypted authentication code based on a preset encryption algorithm and sends it back to the vehicle via the Bluetooth link. After receiving the encrypted authentication code, the vehicle decrypts and verifies it. If the verification is successful, the identity authentication is completed, i.e., confirming that the user requesting unlock is an authorized entity; if the verification fails, the subsequent operation is terminated. The preset encryption algorithm can be selected according to the actual situation.

[0049] The Bluetooth unlocking control method for vehicles provided in this application establishes a stable wireless communication connection between the vehicle and the target mobile terminal's Bluetooth module through the vehicle's built-in Bluetooth module, and completes identity authentication based on the Bluetooth communication connection. This achieves rapid establishment of the communication connection and efficient completion of identity authentication, ensuring the security of identity authentication to prevent unauthorized terminal impersonation access, while also being compatible with mainstream target mobile terminals without additional modifications. Furthermore, the entire process requires no manual intervention from the user, thus balancing security and convenience.

[0050] Optionally, the method described above determines whether to respond to the Bluetooth unlock command based on the actual distance and the difference in Bluetooth signal strength, including: If the difference in Bluetooth signal strength is less than a preset deviation threshold, and the actual distance is less than or equal to a preset safe distance threshold, then the Bluetooth unlock command will be responded to.

[0051] If the difference in Bluetooth signal strength is greater than or equal to the preset deviation threshold, or the actual distance is greater than the preset safe distance threshold, then it is determined that the Bluetooth unlock command will not be responded to.

[0052] The preset deviation threshold is the upper limit of environmental interference tolerance determined based on a large number of scenario tests. It ensures that normal environmental fluctuations (such as slight occlusion, electromagnetic noise, etc.) will not trigger misjudgments, while accurately capturing abnormal deviations caused by relay attacks. It can be selected according to the actual situation. For example, the preset deviation threshold can be selected as 3dBm.

[0053] The preset safe distance threshold is the physical distance range within which a user can legally unlock the device, ensuring that unlocking permission is only triggered when the user is close to the target device. It can be dynamically adjusted according to the scenario. For example, the preset safe distance threshold is ≤1.5 meters by default in the smart car scenario and ≤1 meter by default in the smart door lock scenario.

[0054] In one possible implementation, based on the Bluetooth signal strength difference obtained from the above formula (1), it is determined whether the Bluetooth signal strength difference is less than a preset deviation threshold (e.g., 3dBm). If so, it indicates that the actual Bluetooth signal strength is... The actual Bluetooth signal strength (RSSI) shows a high match with the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength based on real-time distance, indicating that the Bluetooth signal propagation conforms to the propagation patterns in real physical space and there are no abnormal situations where relay devices forward signals. If not, i.e., the difference in Bluetooth signal strength is greater than or equal to the preset deviation threshold, it indicates that there is a significant deviation between the actual Bluetooth signal strength and the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength. The Bluetooth signal propagation does not conform to the normal pattern corresponding to the current actual distance, and there is a high probability of the risk of relay devices forwarding signals (such as long-distance signals being amplified by relays and transmitted to the vehicle, causing the actual distance to exceed the safe range but the signal strength to be abnormally high). In this case, it is determined to be an abnormal unlock request, and the Bluetooth unlock command is refused (i.e., no response to the Bluetooth unlock command). Through this preset deviation threshold judgment logic, signal anomalies caused by relay attacks are accurately identified, avoiding the problem of vehicles being mis-locked due to the illegal forwarding of Bluetooth signals, and further strengthening the anti-attack capability and security reliability of the Bluetooth unlocking system.

[0055] Then, it is determined whether the actual distance is less than or equal to the preset safe distance threshold (e.g., 1.5 meters). If so, it means that the user has physically approached the target vehicle and is within the preset safe distance threshold, satisfying the premise of physical location legality for unlocking. If not, that is, the actual distance is greater than the preset safe distance threshold, it means that the user is not within the vehicle's preset safe distance threshold. In this case, even if there is a Bluetooth unlock command, it is likely to be an abnormal scenario where the signal is present but the user is not present due to the long-distance forwarding of the signal by the relay device. If the unlock command is responded to, there will be a direct risk of relay attack. Therefore, it is necessary to refuse to respond to the Bluetooth unlock command (i.e., not respond to the Bluetooth unlock command) to directly block the illegal unlocking path from the perspective of physical location, and at the same time avoid the problem of mis-locking caused by the user's long-distance accidental triggering or malicious signal interference, thus ensuring the physical space security of vehicle unlocking.

[0056] It should be noted that in order to respond to the Bluetooth unlock command, both conditions must be met simultaneously, such as the difference in Bluetooth signal strength being less than a preset deviation threshold and the actual distance being less than or equal to a preset safe distance threshold. However, if you do not want to respond to the Bluetooth unlock command, any one of the conditions must not be met, such as the difference in Bluetooth signal strength being greater than or equal to a preset deviation threshold, or the actual distance being greater than a preset safe distance threshold.

[0057] The Bluetooth unlocking control method for vehicles provided in this application determines that a Bluetooth unlocking command will only be responded to when the difference in Bluetooth signal strength is less than a preset deviation threshold and the actual distance is less than or equal to a preset safe distance threshold. Conversely, if the difference in Bluetooth signal strength is greater than or equal to the preset deviation threshold, or the actual distance is greater than the preset safe distance threshold, the Bluetooth unlocking command will not be responded to. This dual-dimensional verification logic can effectively eliminate the interference of environmental obstruction and electromagnetic interference on Bluetooth signal strength, and accurately distinguish between legitimate near-range unlocking signals and abnormal signals relayed by relays. It constructs a protective barrier from the dual dimensions of physical distance and Bluetooth signal characteristics, reduces the risk of relay attacks, and avoids the problem of false unlocking rejection in normal scenarios, thereby improving the security and reliability of vehicle unlocking operations.

[0058] Optionally, Figure 5 A flowchart illustrating a vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 3 .like Figure 5 As shown, the above method determines the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle based on the actual distance, including: S410. Determine the baseline theoretical value of Bluetooth signal strength based on the actual distance and the preset path loss baseline model.

[0059] Among them, the preset path loss benchmark model is a mathematical model used to establish the mapping relationship between Bluetooth signal strength and actual propagation distance; it can be selected according to the actual situation. For example, the preset path loss benchmark model can be selected as the RSSI-distance baseline model, which can be expressed by the following formula (3): RSSIbase = A - 10n×log10(D) Formula (3) Where A is the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength RSSI when the actual distance D is 1 meter, which can be obtained through calibration, with a typical value of -45dBm; n is the path loss index, which reflects the attenuation characteristics of the Bluetooth signal in the environment. For example, n is 2.0~2.5 for unobstructed indoor environments; and n is 2.5~3.0 for outdoor environments (such as those with obstructions or multipath propagation). It should be noted that n is used fixedly after calibration to avoid real-time fluctuations that could reduce the accuracy of the preset path loss benchmark model.

[0060] According to the above formula (3), the input parameters of the preset path loss benchmark model may include: actual distance D (the actual distance D is the straight-line distance between the Bluetooth transmitter and receiver, i.e. the straight-line distance between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle), calibration parameter A, and path loss index n; the output parameter is the benchmark theoretical value RSSIbase of the Bluetooth signal strength.

[0061] In one possible implementation, the actual distance D is substituted into the preset path loss baseline model, and the baseline theoretical value RSSIbase of the Bluetooth signal strength is obtained through the above formula (3). This baseline theoretical value RSSIbase is used to characterize the expected value of the Bluetooth signal reception strength in a standard environment. The standard environment is an open environment (such as an open indoor hall or an unobstructed outdoor area) without any obstructions (such as walls or vehicle obstacles) and without electromagnetic interference (such as interference from other wireless devices). This environment is the basic environment for calibrating the preset path loss baseline model to ensure the accuracy of the model parameters.

[0062] S420: The theoretical Bluetooth signal strength is calculated based on the baseline theoretical value and environmental correction parameters.

[0063] The environmental correction parameter S is used to counteract the effects of environmental obstructions (such as walls, vehicle bodies, etc.) and electromagnetic interference (such as other wireless devices) on the Bluetooth signal strength. Its initial value is set to ±5dBm and is dynamically adjusted with each unlock verification.

[0064] In one possible implementation, the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength RSSI is calculated using the following formula (4) based on the baseline theoretical value and environmental correction parameters.

[0065] RSSI = RSSIbase + S (Formula 4) The Bluetooth unlocking control method for vehicles provided in this application first determines the baseline theoretical value of Bluetooth signal strength based on the actual distance and a preset path loss baseline model; then, based on the baseline theoretical value and environmental correction parameters, the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength is calculated to solve the problem that the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength prediction in traditional solutions is easily affected by environmental fluctuations and has a large error.

[0066] Optionally, Figure 6 A flowchart illustrating a vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 4 .like Figure 6 As shown, after determining the Bluetooth unlock command in the above method, the method further includes: S510. Calculate the first deviation between the actual Bluetooth signal strength when responding to the Bluetooth unlock command and the baseline theoretical value.

[0067] In one possible implementation, after the vehicle and the target mobile terminal complete Bluetooth identity authentication and start UWB ranging to obtain the actual distance, the two-factor authentication stage begins. According to formula (3), the baseline theoretical value RSSIbase is first determined based on the actual distance D, and then the actual Bluetooth signal strength is determined. The first deviation Δ from the baseline theoretical value RSSIbase is calculated using the above formula (1). That is, Δ = | -RSSIbase|. This first deviation Δ can be directly used to reflect the actual Bluetooth signal strength. The difference from the preset path loss benchmark model is the core data for subsequent judgment of whether there is environmental interference or relay attack.

[0068] S520. Update the environmental correction parameters based on the first deviation.

[0069] In one possible implementation, the environmental correction parameter is updated according to the first deviation by the following formula (5).

[0070] S=0.8×S_old+0.2×Δ formula (5) Where S_old is the previous environment correction parameter.

[0071] The updated environmental correction parameter S will be stored in real time to the vehicle controller for use in calculating the baseline theoretical value during the next unlock verification. The update algorithm strictly follows the exponentially weighted average logic in the disclosure document: 80% of the environmental correction parameter stored after the previous calibration (denoted as S_old) is weighted and summed with 20% of the first deviation Δ calculated in the current calibration. The result is the current calibrated environmental correction parameter S. For example, if the previous S_old was -2dBm and the current first deviation Δ is 1dBm, then the updated S = (-2dBm × 80%) + (1dBm × 20%) = -1.4dBm. Finally, the updated environmental correction parameter S is stored in the system in real time for the calculation of the baseline theoretical value during the next unlock verification. Through the closed-loop logic of each verification, deviation calculation, and parameter update, the RSSI-distance calibration relationship can dynamically adapt to environmental changes, solving the problem of signal strength and distance correlation distortion caused by environmental interference in traditional RSSI schemes, ensuring the accuracy of the baseline theoretical value, and providing a reliable basis for subsequent relay attack judgment.

[0072] The Bluetooth unlocking control method for vehicles provided in this application first calculates the first deviation between the actual Bluetooth signal strength at the time of determining the response to the Bluetooth unlocking command and the benchmark theoretical value; then, based on the first deviation, it updates the environmental correction parameters to capture the interference of dynamic influencing factors such as environmental obstruction and electromagnetic interference on Bluetooth signal propagation in real time, ensuring the adaptability of the benchmark theoretical value to the actual propagation scenario, thereby improving the anti-interference capability of two-factor authentication, providing data support for accurate identification of relay attacks, and ensuring the accuracy and security of unlocking verification.

[0073] Optionally, Figure 7 A flowchart illustrating a vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 5 .like Figure 7 As shown, the above method also includes: S610: In response to the currently received Bluetooth unlock command, obtain the real-time association information.

[0074] In one possible implementation, in response to a received Bluetooth unlock command, real-time association information for this successful Bluetooth unlock is obtained. This real-time association information includes at least the following key data: actual distance, theoretical Bluetooth signal strength, actual Bluetooth signal strength, the trigger time of this unlock, and the vehicle's current geographical location. The trigger time of this unlock is used to match the user's historical behavior patterns; the vehicle's current geographical location is used to prevent unauthorized unlocking from other locations.

[0075] S620. Match and analyze the real-time related information with the behavior pattern library to obtain the matching analysis results.

[0076] The behavior pattern library is a dataset based on associated information, which consists of information from successful Bluetooth unlock commands during historical verification processes. Specifically, the behavior pattern library works as follows: whenever a user successfully unlocks the vehicle via Bluetooth, the vehicle controller does not discard the relevant unlock data. Instead, it organizes, deduplicates, and structures the real-time associated information (such as the geographical location of the unlock, the trigger time, the actual distance, the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength, and the actual Bluetooth signal strength) and stores it in the behavior pattern library, gradually forming a dataset covering the user's regular unlocking behaviors.

[0077] In one possible implementation, the behavior pattern library is invoked to perform multi-dimensional matching analysis between the real-time association information collected in the previous step and the historical data stored in the behavior pattern library, in order to determine whether the real-time association information conforms to the user's historical legitimate unlocking behavior patterns.

[0078] For example, the system determines whether the current unlock time falls within the user's historically frequently used unlock time window (e.g., 7-8 AM or 6-7 PM on weekdays), whether the current unlock location falls within the user's historically frequently used unlock area (e.g., home parking lot, company parking lot), whether the actual distance is within the historically valid unlock distance range (e.g., a preset safe distance threshold), and whether the Bluetooth signal strength difference fluctuation matches the signal characteristics of similar historical environments. By calculating the matching degree between real-time correlation information and historical patterns and comparing it with a preset matching threshold (e.g., 80%), the system ultimately outputs a matching analysis result indicating whether the matching degree meets the standard or not. The preset matching threshold can be selected according to the actual situation.

[0079] Among them, a matching degree meeting the standard means that the matching degree is greater than or equal to the preset matching threshold; a matching degree not meeting the standard means that the matching degree is less than the preset matching threshold.

[0080] S630. Based on the matching analysis results, determine whether to trigger a safety response action.

[0081] The security actions include at least one of the following: sending an alarm to the target mobile terminal, performing secondary authentication, and temporarily disabling the vehicle's Bluetooth unlocking function.

[0082] The process includes: sending an alarm to the target mobile terminal, where the vehicle establishes communication with the target mobile terminal via Bluetooth or vehicle networking module, and pushes text, pop-up, or voice alarm information to inform the user of an abnormal unlocking attempt and remind the user to verify whether it is their own operation; performing secondary authentication, where the vehicle controller sends a secondary authentication request to the target mobile terminal, and the authentication method can be digital certificate authentication, dynamic token authentication (such as randomly generated verification code sent to the mobile phone), biometric authentication (such as fingerprint / face authentication on the mobile phone), etc. The unlocking process can only be resumed after the user completes the authentication and passes the authentication; temporarily disabling the vehicle's Bluetooth unlocking function, where the vehicle temporarily closes the Bluetooth unlocking interface and refuses to receive any subsequent Bluetooth unlocking commands, and the disabling time can be preset (such as 30 minutes, 1 hour, etc.). During the disabling period, the user needs to use other secure methods (such as remote unlocking via the vehicle APP, physical key unlocking, etc.) to unblock the disabling.

[0083] It should be noted that the vehicle controller can also select one or more actions to perform in combination based on the risk level of the matching analysis results, ensuring the targetedness and effectiveness of safety protection.

[0084] For example, Table 1 shows the safety response actions corresponding to the risk levels in the matching analysis results.

[0085]

[0086] In one possible implementation, if the matching analysis result shows that the matching degree meets the standard, it means that the current unlocking behavior is consistent with the user's historical legitimate unlocking patterns, and is judged as a normal unlocking request. No security action is triggered, and the subsequent unlocking process is allowed to continue. If the matching analysis result shows that the matching degree does not meet the standard, it means that the current unlocking behavior deviates from the user's usual habits and there are security risks such as relay attacks. The vehicle controller will then immediately initiate a security action decision, determine to trigger the preset security action, and actively intervene to block the risky unlocking behavior.

[0087] The Bluetooth unlocking control method for vehicles provided in this application, in response to a currently received Bluetooth unlocking command, obtains the real-time association information corresponding to this unlocking, and performs matching analysis on the real-time association information with a preset behavior pattern library to obtain the matching analysis result; then, based on the matching analysis result, if the deviation between the real-time association information and the legitimate behavior features in the behavior pattern library exceeds a preset matching threshold, it is determined that there is a risk of relay attack or illegal unlocking, and immediately triggers security measures to accurately identify abnormal scenarios such as relay attacks and illegal theft, thus making up for the security vulnerability of traditional Bluetooth unlocking that relies solely on single authentication, while maximizing the unlocking convenience for legitimate users while ensuring vehicle security, achieving a balance between security and practicality.

[0088] Optionally, Figure 8 A flowchart illustrating a vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 6 .like Figure 8 As shown, the above method also includes: S710. Record related information to form a historical behavior dataset.

[0089] The associated information includes at least one of the following: time, geographical location, actual distance, and actual Bluetooth signal strength. Time is collected in real-time by the vehicle controller's built-in clock module, recording the precise timestamp (e.g., year, month, day, hour, minute, second) of the unlocking operation. Geographical location is obtained collaboratively through two methods: first, the user terminal's (phone / smart key) GPS / BeiDou positioning module collects its own location information and transmits it to the vehicle via an established Bluetooth communication connection; second, the vehicle's own positioning module synchronously collects the vehicle's location. These two methods complement each other to improve positioning accuracy. Actual distance is determined by the vehicle's UWB base station using TWR ranging, calculating the round-trip time of the UWB signal and the speed of light to obtain the real-time physical distance between the user terminal and the vehicle. The vehicle directly records this ranging result. Actual Bluetooth signal strength is the RSSI value of the signal transmitted by the user terminal's Bluetooth module, collected in real-time by the vehicle's Bluetooth module.

[0090] In one possible implementation, the vehicle controller automatically triggers a data recording process each time a user completes a Bluetooth unlock operation (or attempts to unlock). The recorded information is then organized according to a preset data format (such as a structured data table), invalid data (such as missing data due to ranging failure or signal interruption) is removed, and the data is stored in the vehicle's local database or a cloud server, thus forming a historical behavior dataset. The preset data format can be selected based on actual needs.

[0091] S720. Based on historical behavior datasets, establish a behavior pattern library.

[0092] In one possible implementation, the vehicle controller first preprocesses the stored historical behavior dataset, which includes at least: data cleaning (such as removing data with ranging error > ±10cm, data with sudden changes in RSSI signal strength without reasonable cause), data classification (such as classifying by time dimension, geographical location dimension, distance dimension, and signal strength dimension respectively), and data filtering (such as retaining legitimate data that the user has successfully unlocked and verified, and removing abnormal data that has been identified as relay attacks).

[0093] Then, based on the preprocessed legitimate historical behavior data, a preset feature extraction algorithm (such as a statistical analysis algorithm) is used to extract regular features of user unlocking behavior. These features include: time features (the time periods during which users typically unlock, such as 7:00-8:00 and 18:00-19:00 on weekdays), geographic location features (locations where users frequently unlock, such as their home address or workplace), distance features (the actual distance range during regular unlocking, such as 0.5-2 meters), and actual Bluetooth signal strength features (the fluctuation range of actual Bluetooth signal strength during legitimate unlocking, such as -45dBm to -60dBm). These extracted regular features are then structured and stored to form a behavior pattern library. This behavior pattern library can serve as a comparison benchmark for subsequent unlocking operations. If the deviation between subsequent unlocking behavior data and the regular features in the pattern library exceeds a preset matching threshold, it is determined to be an abnormal operation, triggering secondary verification or a security alarm. Therefore, establishing the behavior pattern library is a crucial step in implementing the anomaly monitoring function. The preset feature extraction algorithm can be selected according to the actual situation.

[0094] The Bluetooth unlocking control method for vehicles provided in this application forms a historical behavior dataset based on recorded historical correlation information. Then, a behavior pattern library is established based on the historical behavior dataset. By comprehensively collecting multi-dimensional key data in unlocking scenarios, the integrity and scenario relevance of the historical behavior dataset are ensured. This enables the constructed behavior pattern library to accurately extract the legal unlocking behavior characteristics and patterns corresponding to the target mobile terminal. This provides a reliable comparison benchmark for quickly identifying abnormal operations related to relay attacks, effectively improving the vehicle controller's accuracy in identifying covert relay attacks, and further enhancing the security redundancy of the vehicle unlocking process.

[0095] To facilitate understanding of the above-described vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method, this application also provides an embodiment of the vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method: Example 1: Intelligent Car Keyless Entry Vehicle Controller In this vehicle controller, one UWB base station is equipped on each of the front and rear doors. These base stations support ToF-based TWR bidirectional ranging technology. The user terminal uses an Android phone or other system-compatible phone that supports UWB functionality. When a user approaches the vehicle with their terminal, the vehicle first establishes a communication connection with the terminal via Bluetooth, synchronously responding to the Bluetooth unlock command and initiating the UWB ranging process. If the UWB base station measures the actual distance between the terminal and the vehicle to be 1.2 meters (≤ a preset 1.5-meter safety threshold), it determines that the user has physically approached the vehicle, meeting the legality requirement for unlocking. The vehicle controller then automatically executes the unlocking operation, achieving a seamless entry experience and improving user experience. This further illustrates the Bluetooth unlocking control method for vehicles in this application, which utilizes existing Bluetooth mobile phone keys and only requires adding a UWB module to the vehicle, keeping costs under control.

[0096] If an attacker uses a relay device to forward the Bluetooth unlock command, the UWB base station will accurately measure the actual distance between the terminal and the vehicle as 15 meters (far exceeding the safety threshold). At this time, the vehicle controller will determine that it is a relay attack scenario, immediately reject the unlock request and trigger the vehicle alarm. Through the core advantage of UWB centimeter-level ranging, the illegal unlock path is completely blocked from the perspective of physical location.

[0097] Example 2: Smart Door Lock System This smart lock system integrates a UWB communication module into the lock body, allowing users to unlock the door without a key using a UWB-enabled mobile phone. When a user approaches the lock to a preset safe distance (≤1 meter), the lock establishes communication with the phone via the UWB module and initiates TWR distance measurement verification. If the measured distance meets the safety threshold, the lock automatically unlocks without additional operation, balancing convenience and unlocking efficiency. Simultaneously, the smart lock system supports integration with the smart home ecosystem, automatically recording unlocking time, user terminal identification, distance measurement data, and other log information during the unlocking process. If abnormal scenarios such as the actual distance exceeding the preset safety threshold or unauthorized terminal triggering unlocking are detected, a real-time warning notification will be pushed to the user's mobile phone. This not only prevents relay attacks through accurate UWB distance measurement but also further enhances the comprehensiveness and controllability of home security through log tracing and abnormal warning functions.

[0098] Based on the same inventive concept, this application also provides a vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control device. Since the principle of the device in this application is similar to the vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method described above in this application, the implementation of the device can refer to the implementation of the method, and the repeated parts will not be described again.

[0099] Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a Bluetooth unlocking control device for a vehicle provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 9 As shown, the vehicle's Bluetooth unlock control device 800 is used in a parking scenario, and the vehicle's Bluetooth unlock control device 800 may include: The first determining module 801 is used to determine the actual distance between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle in response to the Bluetooth unlock command for the vehicle. The target mobile terminal is the mobile terminal that sent the Bluetooth unlock command. The second determining module 802 is used to determine the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle based on the actual distance. The third determining module 803 is used to determine whether to respond to the Bluetooth unlock command based on the actual distance and the difference in Bluetooth signal strength. The difference in Bluetooth signal strength is the difference between the actual Bluetooth signal strength and the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle.

[0100] In one optional implementation, the first determining module 801 is specifically configured to: send a ranging request signal to the target mobile terminal and receive a response signal returned by the target mobile terminal based on the ranging request signal; determine the signal round-trip time based on the sending time of the ranging request signal and the receiving time of the response signal; and determine the actual distance between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle based on the signal round-trip time and a preset signal propagation speed.

[0101] In one optional implementation, the vehicle's Bluetooth unlocking control device 800 is further configured to: establish a Bluetooth communication connection with the target mobile terminal and complete identity authentication based on the Bluetooth communication connection.

[0102] In one optional implementation, the third determining module 803 is specifically configured to: determine to respond to the Bluetooth unlock command if the difference in Bluetooth signal strength is less than a preset deviation threshold and the actual distance is less than or equal to a preset safe distance threshold; and determine not to respond to the Bluetooth unlock command if the difference in Bluetooth signal strength is greater than or equal to the preset deviation threshold or the actual distance is greater than the preset safe distance threshold.

[0103] In one optional implementation, the second determining module 802 is specifically used to: determine a baseline theoretical value of the Bluetooth signal strength based on the actual distance and a preset path loss baseline model; the baseline theoretical value is used to characterize the expected value of the Bluetooth signal reception strength under standard conditions; and calculate the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength based on the baseline theoretical value and environmental correction parameters.

[0104] In one alternative implementation, the vehicle's Bluetooth unlock control device 800 is further configured to: calculate a first deviation between the actual Bluetooth signal strength at the time of determining to respond to the Bluetooth unlock command and a reference theoretical value; and update environmental correction parameters based on the first deviation.

[0105] In one optional implementation, the vehicle's Bluetooth unlock control device 800 is further configured to: in response to a currently received Bluetooth unlock command, acquire real-time association information; perform matching analysis between the real-time association information and a behavior pattern library to obtain a matching analysis result; the behavior pattern library is a data set formed based on the association information, and the association information is information from successful responses to Bluetooth unlock commands during historical verification processes; and determine whether to trigger a security action based on the matching analysis result; the security action includes at least one of: sending an alarm to the target mobile terminal, performing secondary authentication, and temporarily disabling the vehicle's Bluetooth unlock function.

[0106] In one optional implementation, the vehicle's Bluetooth unlocking control device 800 is further configured to: record associated information to form a historical behavior dataset, wherein the associated information includes at least one of time, geographical location, actual distance, and actual Bluetooth signal strength; and establish a behavior pattern library based on the historical behavior dataset.

[0107] It should be noted that for details not disclosed in the vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control device of this application embodiment, please refer to the details disclosed in the vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method of this application embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0108] These modules can be one or more integrated circuits configured to implement the above methods, such as one or more Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), one or more microprocessors, or one or more Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Alternatively, when a module is implemented using processing element scheduler code, the processing element can be a general-purpose processor, such as a Central Processing Unit (CPU) or other processor capable of calling program code. Furthermore, these modules can be integrated together as a system-on-a-chip (SOC).

[0109] Optionally, embodiments of this application also provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the processor performs the steps of the Bluetooth unlocking control method for a vehicle using a mobile storage medium as described in the above embodiments. The specific implementation and technical effects are similar and will not be repeated here.

[0110] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit described above can be implemented in hardware or in the form of hardware plus software functional units.

[0111] Optionally, this embodiment also provides a computer program product that, when run on a computer, causes the computer to perform the aforementioned related steps to implement a vehicle Bluetooth unlocking control method provided in the above embodiment.

[0112] In this embodiment, the device, computer-readable storage medium, computer program product, or chip are all used to execute the corresponding methods provided above. Therefore, the beneficial effects they can achieve can be referred to the beneficial effects in the corresponding methods provided above, and will not be repeated here.

[0113] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art will understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, only the division of the above functional modules is used as an example. In practical applications, the above functions can be assigned to different functional modules as needed, that is, the internal structure of the device can be divided into different functional modules to complete all or part of the functions described above.

[0114] In the embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of modules or units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another apparatus, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between apparatuses or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0115] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A Bluetooth unlocking control method for a vehicle, characterized in that, include: In response to a Bluetooth unlock command for the vehicle, the actual distance between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle is determined, wherein the target mobile terminal is the mobile terminal that sent the Bluetooth unlock command; Based on the actual distance, determine the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle; Based on the actual distance and the difference in Bluetooth signal strength, it is determined whether to respond to the Bluetooth unlock command. The difference in Bluetooth signal strength is the difference between the actual Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle and the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Determining the actual distance between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle includes: Send a ranging request signal to the target mobile terminal and receive a response signal returned by the target mobile terminal based on the ranging request signal; The round-trip time is determined based on the sending time of the ranging request signal and the receiving time of the response signal; The actual distance between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle is determined based on the signal round-trip time and the preset signal propagation speed.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Prior to responding to a Bluetooth unlock command for the vehicle, the method further includes: A Bluetooth communication connection is established with the target mobile terminal, and identity authentication is completed based on the Bluetooth communication connection.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining whether to respond to the Bluetooth unlock command based on the actual distance and the difference in Bluetooth signal strength includes: If the difference in Bluetooth signal strength is less than a preset deviation threshold, and the actual distance is less than or equal to a preset safe distance threshold, then the Bluetooth unlock command is triggered. If the difference in Bluetooth signal strength is greater than or equal to the preset deviation threshold, or if the actual distance is greater than the preset safe distance threshold, then it is determined that the Bluetooth unlock command will not be responded to.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, Determining the theoretical Bluetooth signal strength between the target mobile terminal and the vehicle based on the actual distance includes: Based on the actual distance and the preset path loss benchmark model, a benchmark theoretical value for Bluetooth signal strength is determined; the benchmark theoretical value is used to characterize the expected value of Bluetooth signal reception strength under standard conditions. The theoretical Bluetooth signal strength is calculated based on the baseline theoretical value and environmental correction parameters.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, After determining the response to the Bluetooth unlock command, the method further includes: Calculate the first deviation between the actual Bluetooth signal strength at the time of responding to the Bluetooth unlock command and the baseline theoretical value; The environmental correction parameters are updated based on the first deviation.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: In response to the currently received Bluetooth unlock command, obtain the real-time association information; The real-time correlation information is matched and analyzed with the behavior pattern library to obtain the matching analysis results; the behavior pattern library is a data set formed based on the correlation information, which is the information of successfully responding to the Bluetooth unlock command during the historical verification process; Based on the matching analysis results, it is determined whether to trigger a security action; the security action includes at least one of the following: sending an alarm to the target mobile terminal, performing secondary authentication, and temporarily disabling the vehicle's Bluetooth unlocking function.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The method further includes: Record the associated information to form a historical behavior dataset. The associated information includes at least one of the following: time, geographical location, actual distance, and actual Bluetooth signal strength. A behavior pattern library is established based on the historical behavior dataset.

9. A vehicle controller, characterized in that, The vehicle controller includes: Memory, used to store executable program code; A processor is configured to call and run the executable program code from the memory, causing the vehicle controller to perform the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.

10. A vehicle, characterized in that, Includes the vehicle controller as described in claim 9.

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