Portable eSIM Internet of Things card activation method and system

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of telecommunication service, and particularly discloses a portable eSIM (embedded subscriber identity module) internet-of-things card activation method and a portable eSIM internet-of-things card activation system. The system comprises an offline voucher generation module, a secure near field communication module, a local strategy execution module and an activation state synchronization module, an encrypted activation voucher is generated in advance, the voucher is transmitted in an offline environment through secure near field communication, eSIM configuration and network parameter setting are completed locally on equipment, and offline activation of the equipment is achieved. According to the invention, the dependence on the real-time Internet is eliminated, and the deployment capability in a remote or emergency scene and the security of the activation process are improved.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The application belongs to the technical field of telecommunication services, and particularly relates to a portable eSIM Internet of Things card activation method and system. BACKGROUND

[0002] As the core technology for modern Internet of Things devices to realize cellular network connection, the embedded Subscriber Identity Module (eSIM) technology replaces the physical SIM card through software configuration, providing greater design flexibility and supply chain management efficiency for device manufacturers. Among them, the remote configuration and activation of eSIM is the key link to realize the "over-the-air access" of the device, which is directly related to the large-scale deployment and operation and maintenance cost of the Internet of Things device.

[0003] In the prior art, the activation process of eSIM usually relies on stable and high-speed Internet connection between the device and the operator server. This process requires the device to access the operator's configuration server in real time to download and install the corresponding user configuration file. However, this strong dependency constitutes a significant technical bottleneck in actual application scenarios.

[0004] The activation mechanism of the prior art is completely ineffective in environments where Internet connection is unavailable or unstable, such as in remote areas, underground facilities or disaster emergency communication scenarios. The device will not be able to complete the activation due to the inability to establish a connection with the cloud server, which seriously restricts the deployment and application of Internet of Things devices in these critical areas. At the same time, the transmission of configuration files in the entire activation process is completely exposed to the public Internet, facing the security risks of malicious theft, man-in-the-middle attacks or data tampering, lacking effective protection of data transmission integrity and confidentiality. Therefore, how to realize a safe and reliable eSIM Internet of Things card activation mechanism in harsh environments without reliable Internet access has become a technical problem to be solved in the field. SUMMARY

[0005] The purpose of the present application is to provide a portable eSIM Internet of Things card activation method and system to solve the technical contradiction between the strong dependence of existing eSIM activation technology on stable Internet connection and the failure of the activation process in harsh environments without reliable Internet access and the security risks.

[0006] To achieve the above purpose, the technical solution adopted by the present application is a portable eSIM Internet of Things card activation system. The system includes an offline credential generation module, a secure near field communication module, a local policy execution module and an activation state synchronization module.

[0007] The offline credential generation module is used to generate encrypted activation credentials containing device unique identifier, target operator information and preset usage policy for the Internet of Things device to be activated in a secure environment with Internet connection.

[0008] The secure near-field communication module is integrated into the portable activation terminal to establish a physical near-field communication link with IoT devices based on asymmetric encryption authentication in environments without internet connectivity, and to perform secure transmission of encrypted activation credentials.

[0009] The local policy enforcement module is deployed on the IoT device to receive and decrypt the encrypted activation credential from the secure near-field communication module, verify its integrity and legitimacy, and load the eSIM configuration file and set the network access parameters locally on the device according to the preset usage policy embedded in the credential, ultimately realizing the local activation of the device.

[0010] The activation status synchronization module is used to automatically encrypt and upload the activation status and device identification information of IoT devices to the operator's central management server when the devices subsequently obtain an internet connection, thus completing the cloud archiving of activation records.

[0011] Furthermore, the offline credential generation module operates as follows. First, the module receives a device registration request and policy configuration instructions from the operator's configuration server. Then, using the private key corresponding to the operator's digital certificate, the module digitally signs the policy dataset containing the device's unique identifier, the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) seed, the target network access point name, and preset traffic limits and validity periods, generating the original policy data packet.

[0012] Next, the module uses a symmetric key derived from the device's unique identifier to encrypt the original policy data packet, forming the final encrypted activation credential. This encrypted activation credential is then securely distributed to a designated portable activation terminal for storage.

[0013] Furthermore, the secure near-field communication module is specifically configured as follows. This module includes a communication link establishment unit and a secure data exchange unit. The communication link establishment unit is responsible for initializing the near-field communication connection when the portable activation terminal and the IoT device approach each other to the effective communication range.

[0014] During the connection establishment phase, the unit mandates that the IoT device present its device certificate and verifies it using the root certificate pre-installed in the portable terminal to ensure the legitimacy of the communication object.

[0015] After the communication link is established, the data security exchange unit is responsible for transmitting the encrypted activation credential.

[0016] During transmission, the unit employs a temporary session key negotiation mechanism based on elliptic curve cryptography to establish an end-to-end encrypted channel, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the credential data during transmission.

[0017] Furthermore, the internal working mechanism of the local policy execution module is as follows.

[0018] This module includes a credential verification submodule and a policy loading submodule.

[0019] Upon receiving the encrypted activation credential, the credential verification submodule first decrypts it using the symmetric key stored in the device itself, restoring the original policy data packet.

[0020] Subsequently, the submodule uses the pre-configured device-side operator root certificate public key to verify the digital signature of the original policy data packet to confirm the authenticity of the credential source and that the data has not been tampered with.

[0021] After successful verification, the policy loading submodule parses the original policy data packet and extracts the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) seed, network access point name, and other network parameters.

[0022] This submodule directly calls the device's underlying eSIM configuration file writing interface, writes the parsed parameters into the device's eSIM secure storage area, and configures the device's network stack, enabling the device to search for and register with the specified target cellular network, thereby completing activation in a completely offline state.

[0023] Furthermore, the execution logic of the activation status synchronization module is as follows. This module continuously monitors the network connection status of IoT devices. Once it detects that a device has successfully connected to the Internet, the module immediately initiates the synchronization process. This process first reads the activated configuration information and the device's unique identifier from the device's eSIM secure storage area, and then encrypts this information using the operator's server's public key to form a status report data packet.

[0024] Finally, the module sends the status report data packet to the operator's central management server via the established internet connection. After the server decrypts and verifies the report, it updates the device's activation status in its database, completing the closed-loop management of the entire activation cycle.

[0025] Furthermore, the pre-defined usage strategy in the encrypted activation credential includes time constraints and usage constraints. The time constraint is specifically manifested in the start and end timestamps of the activation credential's validity period. Before performing activation, the local policy execution module will verify whether the current device time is within this validity period.

[0026] Usage constraints are specifically manifested as a preset initial data traffic quota, which is set by the operator's server when generating credentials and is locally counted and monitored by the device's network connection management unit after the device is activated.

[0027] Furthermore, the portable activation terminal employs a physical tamper-proof structure and a self-destruct circuit design. When the terminal casing is illegally opened or physical intrusion is detected, the self-destruct circuit will be automatically triggered, erasing all encrypted activation credentials and sensitive keys stored inside the terminal to ensure physical security.

[0028] Furthermore, the entire system employs a layered key management architecture. The first layer is the root certificate key used to issue device certificates and activation credentials, which is stored offline in the operator's security hardware module. The second layer is a unique terminal identity key for each portable activation terminal, used for two-way authentication during near-field communication. The third layer is a session key generated based on the device's unique identifier, used for data encryption during a single activation process. This system ensures end-to-end security from credential generation to transmission to execution.

[0029] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:

[0030] 1. This invention completely decouples the eSIM activation process from its reliance on a real-time internet connection by introducing offline credential generation and a secure near-field communication mechanism. The system allows for the pre-generation of encrypted activation credentials in a secure environment with network access, and then activation can be performed on-site by staff using portable terminals in environments without network coverage. This significantly expands the deployment capabilities of IoT devices in critical scenarios such as remote areas, underground spaces, and emergency communications, solving the fundamental problem of existing technologies failing completely in such scenarios.

[0031] 2. This invention constructs an end-to-end security protection system from the cloud to the device. The activation credential undergoes digital signing and encryption during generation, and during transmission, it relies on a strongly encrypted near-field communication link and two-way certificate authentication, with rigorous decryption and verification performed at the execution end. This multi-layered security design effectively resists the risk of the activation credential being stolen, tampered with, or subjected to man-in-the-middle attacks during transmission, greatly improving the data security and reliability of the entire activation process.

[0032] 3. This invention achieves complete localization and automation of the activation process through a local policy execution module. After receiving valid credentials, IoT devices can autonomously complete all necessary configuration operations without manual intervention. This not only improves activation efficiency, making it particularly suitable for large-scale device deployments, but also reduces the probability of activation failure due to operational errors. The subsequent activation status synchronization mechanism ensures that the operator's management backend can promptly and accurately grasp the final activation status of the devices, achieving seamless integration between offline activation and cloud management, and guaranteeing consistency in operational management. Attached Figure Description

[0033] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the overall technical architecture of the portable eSIM IoT card activation system proposed in this invention;

[0034] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the core principle framework of the offline credential generation and secure near-field communication mechanism in this invention;

[0035] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the multi-level interaction relationship and data flow of the secure near-field communication module in this invention;

[0036] Figure 4 This is a logical flow diagram of the local policy execution module in this invention;

[0037] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the multi-level interaction between the activation state synchronization module and the hierarchical key management system in this invention. Detailed Implementation

[0038] Please refer to the attached document. Figure 1 This embodiment details a specific implementation of a portable eSIM IoT card activation system. The system aims to address the strong dependence of existing eSIM activation technologies on a stable internet connection, as well as the technical contradiction between activation process failures and security risks in harsh environments without reliable internet access. The core of the system consists of an offline credential generation module, a secure near-field communication module, a local policy execution module, and an activation status synchronization module. These modules work collaboratively to achieve end-to-end offline secure activation.

[0039] The offline credential generation module is deployed in the operator's secure data center, which has high-level physical security and logical isolation measures.

[0040] The module runs on a dedicated hardware security module, ensuring that key materials are never exposed to general computing environments.

[0041] Please refer to the attached document. Figure 2 The operation of the offline credential generation module begins with receiving instructions from the operator's configuration server.

[0042] The operator configuration server is an independent service node responsible for managing the registration information and policy templates of IoT devices.

[0043] When a batch of IoT devices need to be activated and deployed offline, the operations and management personnel submit a device registration request through the configuration server. This request contains a list of unique identifiers for the target devices. The unique identifiers are usually International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMI) codes or unique serial numbers pre-set by the manufacturer.

[0044] At the same time, administrators need to specify policy configuration instructions, which include target operator information, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) seed pool allocation, network access point name, preset initial data traffic quota, and the start and end timestamps of the validity period of the credentials.

[0045] Upon receiving the above information, the offline credential generation module initiates the credential generation process. First, the module retrieves the private key corresponding to the operator's digital certificate from secure storage. This private key is protected by a hardware security module, and any export operation is prohibited.

[0046] The module combines the device's unique identifier, the assigned International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) seed, the target network access point name, the preset traffic limit value, and the validity period start and end timestamps into a structured policy dataset.

[0047] Subsequently, the module uses the operator's private key to perform a digital signature operation on the policy dataset, generating the original policy data packet.

[0048] The digital signature algorithm uses an elliptic curve cryptography-based digital signature algorithm, such as the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm. The signing process is completed inside the hardware security module to ensure that the private key does not leave the security boundary.

[0049] Next, the offline credential generation module enters the encryption phase. Based on the device's unique identifier, the module derives a unique symmetric key through a key derivation function.

[0050] The key derivation function is constructed using a hash-based message authentication code, and its inputs are a unique device identifier and a salt value derived from the operator's master key.

[0051] The derived symmetric key is used to encrypt the original policy data packet.

[0052] The encryption algorithm uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and operates in Galois Counter mode, which provides both confidentiality and integrity guarantees.

[0053] After the encryption operation is completed, the final encryption activation certificate is output.

[0054] The encrypted activation credential is a binary data block whose structure includes encrypted policy data and an initialization vector. Finally, the encrypted activation credential is transmitted to the designated portable activation terminal through a secure data distribution channel.

[0055] The secure distribution channel can be copied using encrypted and authenticated Universal Serial Bus storage devices, or pushed directly to the terminal's protected storage area via a Secure Sockets Layer tunnel through the internal network.

[0056] The portable activation terminal is a key mobile component of this system. The terminal features an industrial-grade rugged design, providing dustproof, waterproof, and shockproof characteristics. It integrates a secure near-field communication module, which is the core component enabling offline interaction. Please refer to the appendix. Figure 3The secure near-field communication module specifically includes a communication link establishment unit and a data secure exchange unit.

[0057] The communication link establishment unit is responsible for initializing the near-field communication connection when the portable activation terminal and the IoT device are close to the effective communication distance, typically within 10cm.

[0058] The near-field communication protocol follows international standards and operates at a frequency of 13.56MHz. When the terminal and the device are physically close, the communication link establishment unit first sends a query command.

[0059] Upon receiving a query, the near-field communication interface of the IoT device responds and displays its device certificate.

[0060] The device certificate is a digital certificate pre-installed during the device manufacturing stage and issued by the operator's certificate authority. It contains the device's public key and unique identifier.

[0061] The portable activation terminal has a pre-installed carrier root certificate. Upon receiving the device certificate, the communication link establishment unit immediately uses the public key of the root certificate to verify the signature validity of the device certificate and checks whether the certificate is valid and has not been revoked. This two-way authentication process is mandatory; the communication link will only be established if the device certificate verification is successful. If verification fails, for example, due to an invalid certificate or an untrusted device identity, the terminal will immediately terminate the connection attempt and log a security event.

[0062] After the communication link is successfully established and two-way authentication is passed, the data security exchange unit begins operation. This unit is responsible for the secure transmission of encrypted activation credentials. Before transmission, the data security exchange unit initiates a temporary session key negotiation mechanism based on elliptic curve cryptography.

[0063] Specifically, the portable terminal and the IoT device each generate a temporary elliptic curve key pair, typically using a prime 256-bit elliptic curve. Both parties exchange their public keys via a near-field communication link, and then independently calculate a shared secret value using their own temporary private key and the other party's temporary public key through the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. This shared secret value is then input into a key derivation function to generate a set of symmetric temporary session keys used for encryption and message authentication in this communication.

[0064] Using a temporary session key, the secure data exchange unit establishes an end-to-end encrypted channel. The encryption algorithm also employs the Galois Counter mode of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The encrypted activation credential is encapsulated in an application-layer protocol data unit (ADG), which includes a frame header, encrypted credential data, and a message authentication code. The message authentication code is used by the receiver to verify that the data has not been tampered with during transmission. The encapsulated data is then sent to the IoT device via a near-field communication (NFC) link. The entire transmission process is completed within milliseconds, ensuring both high efficiency and security of the interaction.

[0065] The local policy enforcement module deployed on the IoT device is the ultimate executor of the activation command. Please refer to the appendix. Figure 4 The local policy execution module comprises a credential verification submodule and a policy loading submodule. When the device receives data via the secure near-field communication module, the credential verification submodule is activated first. This submodule uses a symmetric key pre-configured during the device manufacturing phase—the same as the derived key from the offline credential generation module—to decrypt the received encrypted activation credential. The decryption process first uses the same key derivation function to recalculate the symmetric decryption key based on the device's stored unique identifier and the same salt value. Then, using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Galois Counter Mode algorithm, combined with the received initialization vector, the encrypted data is decrypted to reconstruct the original policy data packet.

[0066] After successful decryption, the credential verification submodule enters the verification phase. This submodule uses the operator's root certificate public key, pre-stored in the device's secure storage area, to verify the digital signature of the original policy data packet. The verification algorithm corresponds to the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm used during signing. The verification process calculates the hash value of the original policy data packet, decrypts the attached digital signature using the operator's public key, and compares whether the two are consistent.

[0067] If the signature verification is successful, it proves that the credential was indeed generated by a legitimate operator and that the data is complete and intact. In addition, the credential verification submodule also checks the validity of the credential, specifically whether the device's current time is within the range of the credential's embedded start and end timestamps. If the current time is earlier than the start time or later than the end time, the activation process will be aborted.

[0068] After successful credential verification, the policy loading submodule begins execution. This submodule parses the verified raw policy data packet, extracting key configuration parameters, primarily including the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) seed, network access point name, authentication type, and possible access control class identifiers. The policy loading submodule directly calls the eSIM configuration file management application programming interface (API) at the device operating system level.

[0069] This interface provides access to the device's internal eSIM secure element. The submodule writes the extracted International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) seed into a blank configuration file area of ​​the eSIM secure element and sets the configuration file to enabled. Simultaneously, the policy loading submodule configures the device's network stack, writing information such as the network access point name and authentication parameters into the modem's non-volatile memory.

[0070] After these steps are completed, the device will automatically restart its cellular modem. Once restarted, the modem will search for and attempt to register with the specified target cellular network based on the newly configured eSIM profile. Successful network registration signifies that the device has completed local activation while completely offline.

[0071] The activation status synchronization module is responsible for reporting the activation result to the operator's backend after the device gains an internet connection. This module runs continuously as a background service on the device. Please refer to the appendix. Figure 5 The activation status synchronization module continuously monitors the device's network connectivity status, specifically by listening for changes in the device's network interface status and attempting reachability tests with a known internet host. Once the module detects that the device has successfully established an internet connection, for example, through a newly activated cellular network, it immediately initiates the synchronization process.

[0072] The synchronization process first reads the activated configuration file information from the device's eSIM secure storage area, including the final generated International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), the device's unique identifier, and the activation completion timestamp. The activation status synchronization module then encrypts this information using the public key of the operator's central management server.

[0073] The encryption algorithm typically employs asymmetric encryption, such as an integrated encryption scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography or the RSA encryption algorithm. The encrypted data forms a status report packet. Subsequently, the module sends this status report packet to the operator's pre-defined central management server (Uniform Resource Locator) via an established internet connection, such as a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection.

[0074] Upon receiving a status report, the central management server decrypts it using its corresponding private key, verifies the data's authenticity, and updates the device's activation status in its device management database, changing the status from inactive to activated, and recording the activation time and the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) used. This process completes closed-loop management of the entire activation cycle, ensuring that the operator's management backend can promptly and accurately grasp the device's final activation status.

[0075] In addition to time constraints, the usage policy preset in the encrypted activation credential also includes usage constraints. The usage constraints are specifically manifested in the preset initial data traffic quota, which is set by the operator's server when generating the credential.

[0076] After the device is activated, the device's network connectivity management unit, which is usually part of the operating system, performs local traffic counting and monitoring. The network connectivity management unit maintains a local counter that records the total amount of uplink and downlink data generated through the newly activated configuration file.

[0077] When the cumulative data usage approaches or reaches the preset initial traffic quota, the management unit can execute preset policies, such as limiting network access speed or suspending data service, until the device communicates with the operator's server through other means and updates its quota.

[0078] The portable activation terminal is designed with physical security in high regard. It employs a physical tamper-proof structure and a self-destruct circuit. The terminal casing is made of a robust alloy material and sealed with tamper-proof screws. An embedded network of tiny circuit wires forms a physical intrusion detection loop. When the terminal casing is illegally opened or subjected to violent damage resulting in wire breakage, the self-destruct circuit will detect the broken loop.

[0079] The self-destruct circuit is typically connected to the terminal's main control chip and a separate, battery-powered security processor. Once triggered, the security processor immediately sends a strong erase command to the terminal's main storage chip, erasing all encrypted activation credentials, temporary session keys, and terminal identity keys stored internally. Some high-security versions may also include a physical fuse mechanism that directly destroys specific circuitry within the storage chip, ensuring data is unrecoverable. This design ensures that even if the terminal is lost or stolen, sensitive internal information will not be leaked.

[0080] The entire system employs a strict hierarchical key management system; please refer to the appendix. Figure 5 .

[0081] The first layer is the root certificate key used to issue device certificates and activation credentials. This key is the cornerstone of the entire system's trust and is stored offline in the security hardware module of the operator's data center. In extreme cases, it can be set to require multi-factor authentication for access.

[0082] The second layer is a unique terminal identity key pair for each portable activation terminal. This key pair is injected at the factory and is used for two-way authentication with IoT devices during near-field communication to ensure the legitimacy of the communication initiator.

[0083] The third layer consists of a temporary session key generated based on the device's unique identifier. This key has an extremely short lifespan and is used only for data transmission encryption during a single activation process; it is discarded immediately after use. This layered key management system implements the separation of responsibilities and the principle of least privilege for keys, ensuring that each step from credential generation, terminal authentication, data transmission to local execution has independent security guarantees. Even if the key at one layer is compromised, the security of the entire system will not be jeopardized.

[0084] This embodiment, through the detailed module descriptions and interaction processes described above, fully demonstrates a system implementation plan for securely and efficiently activating eSIM IoT cards in offline environments. The system achieves seamless integration of offline activation and cloud management through a combined mechanism of pre-generated encrypted credentials, secure near-field transmission, local verification execution, and post-event state synchronization, greatly expanding the deployment scenarios and security of IoT devices.

[0085] It should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus.

[0086] Although embodiments of the invention have been shown and described, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made to these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, the scope of which is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A portable eSIM IoT card activation system, characterized in that, include: The offline credential generation module is used to generate encrypted activation credentials for IoT devices to be activated in a secure environment with an internet connection. These credentials include the device's unique identifier, target operator information, and preset usage policies. The secure near-field communication module, integrated into the portable activation terminal, is used to establish a physical near-field communication link with IoT devices based on asymmetric encryption authentication in environments without internet connectivity, and to perform secure transmission of encrypted activation credentials. The local policy enforcement module, deployed on the IoT device, is used to receive and decrypt the encrypted activation credential from the secure near-field communication module, verify its integrity and legitimacy, and load the eSIM configuration file and set the network access parameters locally on the device according to the preset usage policy embedded in the credential. The activation status synchronization module is used to automatically encrypt and upload the activation status and device identification information of IoT devices to the operator's central management server when the devices subsequently obtain an internet connection.

2. The portable eSIM IoT card activation system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The operation process of the offline credential generation module includes: receiving device registration requests and policy configuration instructions from the operator configuration server; Using the private key corresponding to the operator's digital certificate, the policy dataset containing the device's unique identifier, International Mobile Subscriber Identity seed, target network access point name, and preset traffic limits and validity period is digitally signed to generate the original policy data packet. The original policy data packet is encrypted using a symmetric key derived from the device's unique identifier to form an encrypted activation credential; the encrypted activation credential is then securely distributed to a designated portable activation terminal for storage.

3. The portable eSIM IoT card activation system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The secure near-field communication module includes a communication link establishment unit and a secure data exchange unit; The communication link establishment unit is responsible for initializing the near-field communication connection when the portable activation terminal and the IoT device are close to the effective communication distance, and forcibly requiring the IoT device to present its device certificate during the connection establishment phase, and using the root certificate pre-installed in the portable terminal for verification. After the communication link is established, the data security exchange unit is responsible for transmitting the encrypted activation credential and establishes an end-to-end encrypted channel by adopting a temporary session key negotiation mechanism based on elliptic curve cryptography.

4. The portable eSIM IoT card activation system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The local policy execution module includes a credential verification submodule and a policy loading submodule; After receiving the encrypted activation credential, the credential verification submodule decrypts it using the symmetric key stored in the device itself, restores the original policy data packet, and verifies the digital signature of the original policy data packet using the preset device-side operator root certificate public key. After successful verification, the policy loading submodule parses the original policy data packet, extracts the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) seed, network access point name, and other network parameters, calls the device's underlying eSIM configuration file writing interface, writes the parsed parameters into the device's eSIM secure storage area, and configures the device's network stack.

5. The portable eSIM IoT card activation system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The execution logic of the activation status synchronization module includes: continuously monitoring the network connection status of IoT devices; Once the device is successfully connected to the Internet, the activated configuration information and the device's unique identifier are read from the device's eSIM secure storage area. This information is encrypted using the operator's server's public key to form a status report data packet; the status report data packet is then sent to the operator's central management server via an established internet connection.

6. The portable eSIM IoT card activation system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The preset usage strategy in the encrypted activation certificate includes time constraints and usage constraints. The time constraint is specifically manifested as the start and end timestamps of the validity period of the activation certificate; The usage constraint is specifically manifested as a preset initial data traffic quota.

7. The portable eSIM IoT card activation system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The portable activation terminal adopts a physical tamper-proof structure and a self-destruct circuit design. When the terminal casing is illegally opened or physical intrusion is detected, the self-destruct circuit is automatically triggered, erasing all encrypted activation credentials and sensitive keys stored inside the terminal.

8. The portable eSIM IoT card activation system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The system adopts a hierarchical key management system; The first layer is the root certificate key used to issue device certificates and activation credentials, which is stored offline in the operator's security hardware module; The second layer is a unique terminal identity key for each portable activation terminal, used for two-way authentication during near-field communication. The third layer is a session key generated based on the device's unique identifier, used for data encryption during a single activation process.

9. A portable eSIM IoT card activation system according to claim 4, characterized in that, The credential verification submodule is also used to verify whether the current device time is within the range of the validity period start and end timestamps embedded in the credential.

10. A method for activating a portable eSIM Internet of Things card, characterized in that, Activation is achieved using the portable eSIM IoT card activation system as described in any one of claims 1-9.

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