One-way safe content distribution and tamper-proof display method and system

Abstract

The invention relates to a one-way secure content distribution and tamper-proof display method and system, and belongs to the field of information security. The method comprises the steps that terminal identity authentication is carried out, an identity label is generated for each terminal, and the identity label comprises a device fingerprint, a root key, a public key, a private key and a digital certificate; by establishing a one-way content pulling mechanism, one-way content pulling between a terminal and a platform is realized; the platform prepares to issue content and performs content integrity protection to obtain root hash, a ciphertext and a digital signature; the platform packs and issues the ciphertext, the root hash, the digital signature and the necessary Merkle hash tree branches to the terminal, and the terminal performs verification and decryption; a closed display environment is created on the terminal, and tamper-proof display is achieved. According to the method, the security and tamper-proof capability of content distribution are systematically improved through fusion of multiple technologies such as hardware feature fingerprints, chaos random pulling, dynamic environment key binding, closed display environment and the like.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of information security technology, specifically relating to a one-way secure content distribution and anti-tampering display method and system. Background Technology

[0002] Currently, in the field of secure content distribution and tamper-proof display, existing technologies mainly rely on traditional digital certificate authentication, static encrypted transmission, and simple sandbox environment isolation. While these methods provide some protection at the basic level, they still have significant shortcomings: First, identity authentication is mostly based on software-generated identifiers, which are easily forged or tampered with; second, content transmission often adopts timed push or fixed pull modes, leaving terminal ports exposed for extended periods, vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks or replay attacks; third, content protection mechanisms are often static and simplistic, with weak binding between keys and content, meaning that a key leak results in complete loss of security; fourth, the display environment lacks deep isolation and dynamic protection, allowing attackers to easily breach defenses through memory debugging, screen capture, and environmental detection. Furthermore, existing solutions do not adequately address the unpredictability of terminal behavior, environmental state binding, and resistance to physical attacks, making them ill-equipped to cope with increasingly complex attack methods. Summary of the Invention

[0003] To address the aforementioned problems in the existing technology, this invention provides a one-way secure content distribution and anti-tampering display method and system.

[0004] The objective of this invention can be achieved through the following technical solutions: A one-way secure content distribution and tamper-proof display method, the implementation of which includes the following steps: Step S1: Perform terminal identity authentication and generate an identity identifier for each terminal. The identity identifier includes the device fingerprint, root key, public and private keys, and digital certificate. Step S2: By establishing a one-way content retrieval mechanism, one-way content retrieval between the terminal and the platform is achieved; Step S3: The platform prepares to distribute content and protects its integrity, obtaining the root hash, ciphertext, and digital signature; Step S4: The platform packages the ciphertext, the root hash, the digital signature, and the necessary Merkle hash tree branches and sends them to the terminal, which then verifies and decrypts them. Step S5: Create a closed display environment on the terminal to achieve tamper-proof display.

[0005] Preferably, the terminal identity authentication in step S1 specifically includes: A set of micro-operations is preset. The terminal repeatedly executes the micro-operations and records the operation time of each micro-operation. Based on the operation time, feature analysis is performed to obtain skewness, kurtosis and quantile difference, which are then combined into a feature value. The feature value of each micro-operation is obtained by analogy. The feature values ​​are concatenated in order and hashed to obtain the device fingerprint of the terminal; The terminal uses the device fingerprint, manufacturing date code, and a random seed written at the time of manufacture to generate the root key, mathematically described as follows: ,in, The root key Derived function for key. For device fingerprint, Encode the manufacturing date. Use a random seed. For splicing operations, For identity key tags; The terminal generates a public-private key pair locally. It keeps the private key and sends the public key and the device fingerprint to the platform. After verifying the terminal information, the platform records the terminal information and issues the digital certificate to the terminal.

[0006] Preferably, the establishment of the one-way content fetching mechanism in step S2 specifically involves: A chaotic map is selected, and the platform and the terminal each maintain a chaotic system based on the chaotic map. The initial values ​​of the chaotic systems of the platform and the terminal depend on the root key of the terminal, mathematically described as follows: ,in, and These are the initial values ​​of the chaotic system for the platform and the terminal, respectively. For hash, The root key To obtain The lower 64 bits; The monitoring terminal monitors the iterative evolution process of the chaotic system. When the chaotic value falls within a specific range, it performs connector verification and sends a connection request to the platform. The request content includes the digital certificate, the current timestamp, the current chaotic value, and a random number. Upon receiving the request, the platform performs verification, which includes: the validity of the digital certificate; finding the initial value of the chaotic system based on the terminal ID, calculating the number of iterations that should be performed up to the current timestamp; calculating the expected chaotic value, and confirming whether the absolute value of the difference between the current chaotic value and the expected chaotic value is less than a preset threshold. If the verification is successful, the platform generates a session key, encrypts it with the terminal's public key, and sends it back to the terminal. The terminal decrypts the session key with its own private key to obtain the session key, thus realizing the construction of a one-way content retrieval mechanism.

[0007] Preferably, the content integrity protection in step S3 specifically includes: The platform divides the content to be distributed to the terminal into several blocks and constructs a Merkle hash tree: calculates a hash for each block; if the number of blocks is even, concatenates two adjacent hashes and hashes together; repeats this process until a root hash is obtained; The platform uses the session key of this session, the device fingerprint hash of the terminal, the hour portion of the current time, and the environmental state code of the terminal to derive the content encryption key, mathematically described as follows: ,in, Encryption key for the content, Derived function for key. For session key, For the device fingerprint hash of the terminal, The hour portion of the current time. Encode the terminal's environmental state; The platform uses the content encryption key to encrypt the content, obtains the ciphertext, and generates the digital signature based on the root hash. The data of the digital signature includes the root hash, content expiration time, terminal ID, and environment state code.

[0008] Preferably, the verification and decryption process in step S4 specifically includes: The terminal receives the content packet, verifies the validity of the digital signature using the platform's public key, and calculates the decryption key using the session key it stores, the device fingerprint hash, the hour portion of the current time, and the environmental state code. The ciphertext is decrypted using the decryption key to obtain the plaintext; If decryption is successful, the terminal calculates the root hash of the plaintext and compares it with the received root hash. If they are the same, it means that the content has not been tampered with during transmission. After all the above verifications are passed, the terminal considers the content valid, and content that fails any verification will be discarded.

[0009] Preferably, the creation of the closed display environment in step S5 specifically involves: Environment isolation is achieved through memory isolation, file system isolation, and network isolation. Operational protection is achieved by introducing a chaotic oscillation protection mechanism. Specifically, this mechanism involves: randomizing the address space by randomly changing the base address of the code in memory each time the program starts; randomly inserting useless instructions or changing the order of instructions during program execution to obfuscate the instruction stream; allocating a larger memory region for the content, the size of which is the content size plus the maximum offset; and reading hardware noise sources and using these noise sources for memory offsets, mathematically described as follows: ,in, Let A be the offset, and let A be the base offset. This is the noise impact factor. The noise source is hardware, and P is the maximum offset limit. To round down; the starting point for the display program to be read is changed according to the offset; Anti-debugging and anti-tampering measures are achieved through anti-debugging technology, integrity verification, and environmental monitoring. Content display control is achieved by disabling screenshots, disabling screen recording, embedding watermarks, and controlling display time. When an attack is detected, the program enters response mode.

[0010] A one-way secure content distribution and anti-tampering display system is used to execute the one-way secure content distribution and anti-tampering display method described above, including a terminal authentication module, a one-way content retrieval module, a content integrity protection module, a terminal decryption module, and an anti-tampering display module; The terminal authentication module is used to perform terminal identity authentication and generate an identity identifier for each terminal. The identity identifier includes a device fingerprint, root key, public and private keys, and digital certificate. The one-way content retrieval module is used to realize one-way content retrieval between the terminal and the platform by establishing a one-way content retrieval mechanism; The content integrity protection module is used by the platform to prepare and distribute content and protect its integrity, obtaining the root hash, ciphertext, and digital signature. The terminal decryption module is used by the platform to package and send the ciphertext, the root hash, the digital signature, and the necessary Merkle hash tree branches to the terminal, which then verifies and decrypts them. The anti-tampering display module is used to create a closed display environment on the terminal to achieve anti-tampering display.

[0011] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: (1) By using device fingerprints based on hardware micro-operation timing features, the uniqueness and unforgeability of terminal identity are realized, which greatly improves the reliability of identity authentication.

[0012] (2) By using the chaotic system to generate unpredictable content retrieval timing, the security risks of always-open ports in the traditional push mode are effectively avoided, and the attack surface is significantly reduced.

[0013] (3) By dynamically binding the content encryption key with the device fingerprint, timestamp and environmental status, a high-strength content protection with one-time encryption and one-environment encryption is achieved to prevent content leakage or illegal use.

[0014] (4) By introducing memory isolation, file system isolation, network isolation and chaotic oscillation protection mechanisms, a highly closed display environment with anti-debugging and anti-tampering capabilities is constructed to ensure that the content is displayed securely only in a controlled environment. Attached Figure Description

[0015] To facilitate understanding by those skilled in the art, the present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0016] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of a one-way secure content distribution and anti-tampering display method according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0017] To better understand the invention, various aspects of the invention will be described in more detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that these detailed descriptions are merely illustrative of exemplary embodiments of the invention and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention in any way. Throughout the specification, the expression "and / or" includes any and all combinations of one or more of the associated listed items. As used herein, the terms "approximately," "about," and similar terms are used as expressions of approximation, not as expressions of degree, and are intended to describe inherent deviations in measured or calculated values ​​that will be recognized by those skilled in the art. Furthermore, the order in which the steps are described in this invention does not necessarily indicate the order in which these steps occur in actual operation, unless otherwise expressly defined or deduced from the context.

[0018] It should also be understood that expressions such as "comprising," "including," "having," "containing," and / or "comprising" are open-ended rather than closed-ended expressions in this specification, indicating the presence of the stated features, elements, and / or components, but not excluding the presence of one or more other features, elements, components, and / or combinations thereof. Furthermore, when expressions such as "at least one of..." appear after a list of listed features, they modify the entire list of features, not just individual elements in the list. Additionally, when describing embodiments of the invention, the word "may" is used to mean "one or more embodiments of the invention." And the term "exemplary" is intended to refer to examples or illustrations.

[0019] Unless otherwise specified, all terms used herein (including engineering and technical terms) shall have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention pertains. It should also be understood that, unless expressly stated herein, terms defined in common dictionaries shall be interpreted as having the meaning consistent with their meaning in the context of the relevant art, and not in an idealized or overly formalized sense.

[0020] It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the embodiments and features described in this invention can be combined with each other. The invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0021] Example 1: Please see Figure 1 A one-way secure content distribution and tamper-proof display method, comprising: Step S1: Perform terminal identity authentication and generate a unique and unforgeable identity identifier for each terminal. The identity identifier includes the device fingerprint, root key, public and private keys, and digital certificate. Step S2: By establishing a one-way content retrieval mechanism, one-way content retrieval between the terminal and the platform can be realized. Traditional content push is initiated by the platform and sent to the terminal. This requires the terminal to keep its receiving port open, which makes it vulnerable to attacks. However, by having the terminal actively retrieve the content and the retrieval time is not fixed, this shortcoming can be effectively overcome. Step S3: The platform prepares to distribute content and protects its integrity by obtaining the root hash, ciphertext, and digital signature to ensure that the content obtained by the terminal does indeed come from the platform and has not been tampered with, and that the content can only be used by the terminal at a specific time. Step S4: The platform packages the ciphertext, the root hash, the digital signature, and the necessary Merkle hash tree branches (used for terminal verification of specific blocks) and sends them to the terminal, which then verifies and decrypts them. Step S5: Create a closed display environment on the terminal to prevent tampering and ensure that the obtained content can only be displayed and cannot be copied, tampered with or leaked.

[0022] In this embodiment, the terminal identity authentication specifically includes: S101: A set of micro-operations is preset. The terminal repeatedly executes the micro-operations and records the operation time of each micro-operation. The time will have slight differences. These differences come from the physical characteristics of the hardware, such as the frequency difference of the crystal oscillator, the manufacturing deviation of electronic components, etc., so they are almost impossible to replicate. Based on the operation time, feature analysis is performed to obtain skewness (measures the asymmetry of the time distribution; if most of the time is very short, but some are very long, the distribution will be skewed to the right, and the skewness value is positive) and kurtosis (measures the steepness of the time distribution; if the distribution is relatively concentrated, the kurtosis value is high). The time difference (the time at the 90th percentile minus the time at the 10th percentile, reflecting the range of time fluctuation) is combined with a feature value (a string of fixed length), and so on, to obtain the feature value for each micro-operation; for example, if the terminal executes 20 micro-operations (the time to calculate a complex mathematical function, the time to access different addresses in memory, the time to write a small piece of data to the hard drive, etc.), and each micro-operation is repeated 100 times, the time of each operation is recorded, and for the i-th micro-operation, the time series is obtained and the skewness, kurtosis and quantile difference are analyzed, and combined to form the feature value of the micro-operation; S102: Concatenate the feature values ​​in order and perform hashing to obtain the device fingerprint of the terminal; S103: The terminal uses the device fingerprint, manufacturing date code, and random seed written at the time of manufacture to generate the root key, mathematically described as follows: ,in, The root key It is a key derivation function that can derive multiple subkeys from a master key. For device fingerprint, Encode the manufacturing date. Use a random seed. For splicing operations, This is an identity key label used to distinguish different uses; the salt value and information parameters use default values. S104: The terminal generates a public-private key pair locally. It keeps the private key and sends the public key and the device fingerprint to the platform. After verifying the terminal information, the platform records the terminal information and issues the digital certificate to the terminal.

[0023] In this embodiment, the establishment of the one-way content fetching mechanism is specifically as follows: S201: Choose a simple chaotic mapping, such as the logistic mapping, whose formula is: , This is the current state. For the next state, the value of x is between 0 and 1, and r is a parameter. Chaotic behavior usually occurs between [3.57, 4], and is generally taken as 4. S202: The platform and the terminal each maintain a chaotic system based on the aforementioned chaotic mapping. A chaotic system is a mathematical system that is extremely sensitive to initial conditions; slight differences in initial values ​​can lead to completely different subsequent evolutions. Furthermore, the long-term behavior of a chaotic system is unpredictable. The initial values ​​of the chaotic systems of the platform and the terminal depend on the root key of the terminal, mathematically described as... ,in, and These are the initial values ​​of the chaotic system for the platform and the terminal, respectively. For hash, The root key To obtain The lower 64 bits; S203: Monitor the iterative evolution process of the chaotic system of the terminal. When the chaotic value falls within a specific range, perform connector verification. The terminal sends a connection request to the platform. The request content includes the digital certificate, the current timestamp, the current chaotic value, and a random number (to prevent replay). S204: After receiving the request, the platform performs verification, which includes: the validity of the digital certificate; finding the initial value of the chaotic system based on the terminal ID, calculating the number of iterations that should be performed up to the current timestamp; calculating the expected chaotic value, and confirming whether the absolute value of the difference between the current chaotic value and the expected chaotic value is less than a preset threshold. S205: If the verification is successful, the platform generates a session key, encrypts it with the terminal's public key, and sends it back to the terminal. The terminal decrypts the session key with its own private key to obtain the session key, thus realizing the construction of a one-way content retrieval mechanism. This mechanism ensures that the terminal only actively connects to the platform at random and unpredictable times. At other times, the terminal does not open any ports, which is unpredictable for attackers and greatly reduces the risk of being attacked.

[0024] In this embodiment, the content integrity protection specifically refers to: S301: The platform divides the content to be sent to the terminal into several blocks and constructs a Merkle hash tree (the terminal can quickly verify whether a block has been tampered with without downloading the entire tree): calculate the hash for each block; if the number of blocks is even, concatenate two adjacent hashes and hash them together; repeat this process until a root hash is obtained; S302: The platform uses the session key of this session, the terminal's device fingerprint hash, the hour portion of the current time, and the terminal's environment state code (the environment hash recorded by the platform when the terminal was last successfully verified) to derive a content encryption key, mathematically described as follows: ,in, Encryption key for the content, Derived function for key. For session key, For the device fingerprint hash of the terminal, The hour portion of the current time. The environmental state of the terminal is encoded, and the salt value and information parameters use default values; the content encryption key is characterized by the fact that it can only be correctly derived under this terminal, this hour, and this environmental state. S303: The platform uses the content encryption key to encrypt the content, obtains the ciphertext, and generates the digital signature based on the root hash to prove that the content was indeed issued by the platform. The data of the digital signature includes the root hash, content expiration time, terminal ID, and environment state code.

[0025] In this embodiment, the verification and decryption process is specifically as follows: S401: The terminal receives the content packet, verifies the validity of the digital signature using the platform's public key, and calculates the decryption key using the session key it stores, the device fingerprint hash, the hour portion of the current time, and the environment state code (if the terminal environment has not been tampered with, the environment state codes in the two places should be the same). S402: Decrypt the ciphertext using the decryption key to obtain plaintext. If the decryption key matches the content encryption key, the correct content is obtained; otherwise, garbled text is obtained. S403: If decryption is successful, the terminal calculates the root hash of the plaintext and compares it with the received root hash. If they are the same, it means that the content has not been tampered with during transmission. S404: After all the above verifications are passed, the terminal considers the content valid, and the content that fails any verification will be discarded.

[0026] In this embodiment, the creation of the closed display environment specifically involves: S501: Environment isolation is achieved through memory isolation, file system isolation, and network isolation. Memory isolation means that the demonstration program can only use a specified memory area, and other programs cannot access this area; file system isolation means that the demonstration program can only access a specific content storage directory and cannot access other files on the terminal; network isolation means that during the operation of the demonstration program, the terminal disconnects all network connections (except for necessary heartbeat detection). S502: Runtime protection is achieved by introducing a chaotic oscillation protection mechanism (demonstrating that the program's memory layout and code execution order will change randomly, making it difficult for attackers to locate and modify critical code). The chaotic oscillation protection mechanism is specifically as follows: Address space randomization is achieved by randomly changing the base address of the code in memory each time the program is started; During program execution, some useless instructions are randomly inserted or the order of instructions is changed (without affecting the program logic), so that the actual instruction stream is different each time the program runs, thus achieving instruction stream obfuscation; A larger memory region is allocated for the content, with the size of the memory region being the content size plus the maximum offset; the program reads some hardware noise sources (such as CPU fluctuations, nanosecond portions of the current time, etc.) and uses these hardware noise sources for memory offset, mathematically described as follows: ,in, Let A be the offset, and let A be the base offset. This is the noise impact factor (a very small factor to ensure that the offset is not too large). P is the hardware noise source, and P is the maximum offset limit (a prime number, which makes the offset values ​​more evenly distributed). To round down; adjust the starting point of the display program's read operation based on the offset (i.e., actual read address = base address + ...). ); S503: Anti-debugging and anti-tampering are achieved through anti-debugging technology, integrity verification, and environmental monitoring. The anti-debugging technology means that the program checks for the attachment of a debugger. If a debugger is detected, the program will crash or enter an infinite loop. The integrity verification means that the program periodically calculates the hash value of its own code and compares it with the pre-stored hash value. If they are different, it means that the code has been modified, and the program will stop running. The environmental monitoring means that the program monitors the environmental status of the terminal. If an anomaly is detected (such as the sudden installation of new software or changes in hardware configuration), an alarm will be triggered. S504: Content display control is achieved by disabling screenshots, disabling screen recording, embedding watermarks, and controlling display time. S505: When an attack is detected, the program will not stop immediately, otherwise the defense mechanism will be exposed. Instead, it will enter response mode, which gradually reduces the content display quality, such as adding noise or reducing resolution; randomly skipping content segments to make the content incomplete; and sending encrypted alarm signals to the platform.

[0027] Example 2: A one-way secure content distribution and anti-tampering display system includes a terminal authentication module, a one-way content retrieval module, a content integrity protection module, a terminal decryption module, and an anti-tampering display module; The terminal authentication module is used to perform terminal identity authentication and generate a unique and unforgeable identity identifier for each terminal. The identity identifier includes the device fingerprint, root key, public and private keys and digital certificate. The one-way content retrieval module is used to realize one-way content retrieval between the terminal and the platform by establishing a one-way content retrieval mechanism. Traditional content push is initiated by the platform and sent to the terminal, which requires the terminal to keep its receiving port open, making it vulnerable to attacks. However, by having the terminal actively retrieve content, and with the retrieval time not being fixed, this deficiency can be effectively overcome. The content integrity protection module is used by the platform to prepare and distribute content and protect its integrity. It obtains the root hash, ciphertext, and digital signature to ensure that the content obtained by the terminal does indeed come from the platform and has not been tampered with, and that the content can only be used by the terminal at a specific time. The terminal decryption module is used by the platform to package and send the ciphertext, the root hash, the digital signature, and the necessary Merkle hash tree branches (used by the terminal to verify specific blocks) to the terminal, and the terminal performs verification and decryption. The anti-tampering display module is used to create a closed display environment on the terminal to achieve anti-tampering display and ensure that the obtained content can only be displayed and cannot be copied, tampered with or leaked.

[0028] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention in any way. Although the present invention has been disclosed above with reference to preferred embodiments, it is not intended to limit the present invention. Any person skilled in the art can make some modifications or alterations to the above-disclosed technical content to create equivalent embodiments without departing from the scope of the present invention. Any simple modifications, equivalent changes and alterations made to the above embodiments based on the technical essence of the present invention without departing from the scope of the present invention shall still fall within the scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for one-way secure content distribution and tamper-proof display, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Step S1: Perform terminal identity authentication and generate an identity identifier for each terminal. The identity identifier includes the device fingerprint, root key, public and private keys, and digital certificate. Step S2: By establishing a one-way content retrieval mechanism, one-way content retrieval between the terminal and the platform is achieved; Step S3: The platform prepares to distribute content and protects its integrity, obtaining the root hash, ciphertext, and digital signature; Step S4: The platform packages the ciphertext, the root hash, the digital signature, and the necessary Merkle hash tree branches and sends them to the terminal, which then verifies and decrypts them. Step S5: Create a closed display environment on the terminal to achieve tamper-proof display.

2. The one-way secure content distribution and anti-tampering display method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The terminal identity authentication in step S1 specifically involves: A set of micro-operations is preset. The terminal repeatedly executes the micro-operations and records the operation time of each micro-operation. Based on the operation time, feature analysis is performed to obtain skewness, kurtosis and quantile difference, which are then combined into a feature value. The feature value of each micro-operation is obtained by analogy. The feature values ​​are concatenated in order and hashed to obtain the device fingerprint of the terminal; The terminal uses the device fingerprint, manufacturing date code, and a random seed written at the time of manufacture to generate the root key, mathematically described as follows: ,in, The root key, Derived function for key. For device fingerprint, Coded for manufacturing date, Use a random seed. For splicing operations, For identity key tags; The terminal generates a public-private key pair locally. It keeps the private key and sends the public key and the device fingerprint to the platform. After verifying the terminal information, the platform records the terminal information and issues the digital certificate to the terminal.

3. The one-way secure content distribution and anti-tampering display method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The establishment of the one-way content retrieval mechanism in step S2 is specifically as follows: A chaotic map is selected, and the platform and the terminal each maintain a chaotic system based on the chaotic map. The initial values ​​of the chaotic systems of the platform and the terminal depend on the root key of the terminal, mathematically described as follows: ,in, and These are the initial values ​​of the chaotic system for the platform and the terminal, respectively. For hash, The root key, To obtain The lower 64 bits; The monitoring terminal monitors the iterative evolution process of the chaotic system. When the chaotic value falls within a specific range, it performs connector verification and sends a connection request to the platform. The request content includes the digital certificate, the current timestamp, the current chaotic value, and a random number. Upon receiving the request, the platform performs verification, which includes: the validity of the digital certificate; finding the initial value of the chaotic system based on the terminal ID, calculating the number of iterations that should be performed up to the current timestamp; calculating the expected chaotic value, and confirming whether the absolute value of the difference between the current chaotic value and the expected chaotic value is less than a preset threshold. If the verification is successful, the platform generates a session key, encrypts it with the terminal's public key, and sends it back to the terminal. The terminal decrypts the session key with its own private key to obtain the session key, thus realizing the construction of a one-way content retrieval mechanism.

4. The one-way secure content distribution and anti-tampering display method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The content integrity protection mentioned in step S3 specifically refers to: The platform divides the content to be distributed to the terminal into several blocks and constructs a Merkle hash tree: calculates the hash for each block; if the number of blocks is even, concatenates two adjacent hashes to form a new hash. Repeat this process until a root hash is obtained; The platform uses the session key of this session, the device fingerprint hash of the terminal, the hour portion of the current time, and the environmental state code of the terminal to derive the content encryption key, mathematically described as follows: ,in, Encryption key for content, Derived function for key. For session key, For the device fingerprint hash of the terminal, The hour portion of the current time. Encode the terminal's environmental state; The platform uses the content encryption key to encrypt the content, obtains the ciphertext, and generates the digital signature based on the root hash. The data of the digital signature includes the root hash, content expiration time, terminal ID, and environment state code.

5. The one-way secure content distribution and anti-tampering display method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The verification and decryption process in step S4 is specifically as follows: The terminal receives the content packet, verifies the validity of the digital signature using the platform's public key, and calculates the decryption key using the session key it stores, the device fingerprint hash, the hour portion of the current time, and the environmental state code. The ciphertext is decrypted using the decryption key to obtain the plaintext; If decryption is successful, the terminal calculates the root hash of the plaintext and compares it with the received root hash. If they are the same, it means that the content has not been tampered with during transmission. After all the above verifications are passed, the terminal considers the content valid, and content that fails any verification will be discarded.

6. The one-way secure content distribution and anti-tampering display method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The creation of the closed display environment in step S5 specifically involves: Environment isolation is achieved through memory isolation, file system isolation, and network isolation. Operational protection is achieved by introducing a chaotic oscillation protection mechanism. Specifically, this mechanism involves: randomizing the address space by randomly changing the base address of the code in memory each time the program starts; randomly inserting useless instructions or changing the order of instructions during program execution to obfuscate the instruction stream; allocating a larger memory region for the content, the size of which is the content size plus the maximum offset; and reading hardware noise sources and using these noise sources for memory offsets, mathematically described as follows: ,in, Let A be the offset, and let A be the base offset. This is the noise impact factor. The noise source is hardware, and P is the maximum offset limit. To round down; the starting point for the display program to be read is changed according to the offset; Anti-debugging and anti-tampering measures are achieved through anti-debugging technology, integrity verification, and environmental monitoring. Content display control is achieved by disabling screenshots, disabling screen recording, embedding watermarks, and controlling display time. When an attack is detected, the program enters response mode.

7. A one-way secure content distribution and anti-tampering display system, characterized in that, The system is applied to the one-way secure content distribution and anti-tampering display method as described in any one of claims 1-6, including a terminal authentication module, a one-way content retrieval module, a content integrity protection module, a terminal decryption module, and an anti-tampering display module; The terminal authentication module is used to perform terminal identity authentication and generate an identity identifier for each terminal. The identity identifier includes a device fingerprint, root key, public and private keys, and digital certificate. The one-way content retrieval module is used to realize one-way content retrieval between the terminal and the platform by establishing a one-way content retrieval mechanism; The content integrity protection module is used by the platform to prepare and distribute content and protect its integrity, obtaining the root hash, ciphertext, and digital signature. The terminal decryption module is used by the platform to package and send the ciphertext, the root hash, the digital signature, and the necessary Merkle hash tree branches to the terminal, which then verifies and decrypts them. The anti-tampering display module is used to create a closed display environment on the terminal to achieve anti-tampering display.

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