Resource management and optimization method with limited total delay of data transmission based on triple sub-games
By employing a triple subgame resource management approach, the resource allocation and scheduling strategies of base stations are optimized, solving the problem of limited total data transmission latency in multi-user systems and achieving effective management of ultra-low latency in 5G and future 6G networks.
Patent Information
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- CHANGSHU INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
- Filing Date
- 2026-01-30
- Publication Date
- 2026-05-12
Smart Images
Figure CN122028073A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of wireless communication technology, and in particular to a resource management and optimization method based on a triplet game with limited total data transmission delay. Background Technology
[0002] Communication latency refers to the time required for a certain amount of data to travel from transmission to completion, and it is one of the key indicators for measuring the performance of a communication system. With the widespread adoption of mobile internet, the Internet of Things (IoT), and smart terminals, users' demand for real-time communication has increased dramatically, making low latency a core requirement for various applications (such as online games, remote control, and autonomous driving). However, latency in communication networks originates from multiple sources: wireless channel propagation is affected by distance and obstacles, and signal attenuation and multipath effects cause transmission time fluctuations; base station processing capacity is limited, and resource scheduling can easily lead to queuing delays when multiple users access the network concurrently; the core network protocol stack is complex, and data encapsulation and routing forwarding add extra overhead; differences in terminal device performance and network switching processes also exacerbate latency. Furthermore, 5G and future 6G networks place even higher demands on ultra-low latency (such as 1ms), which traditional architectures struggle to meet. Therefore, researching mobile communication latency optimization techniques is of great significance for improving user experience, supporting the development of emerging applications, and promoting the evolution of communication technologies.
[0003] This invention focuses on the resource allocation problem of limited total transmission latency in multi-user systems. The key issue this invention addresses is ensuring that the total data transmission latency for all users (from data generation to successful reception) does not exceed a preset global threshold, through base station resource allocation and scheduling strategies. Simultaneously, how the base station dynamically adjusts the preset maximum total transmission latency for multiple users is also addressed. Adaptive resource allocation schemes to manage latency in different network scenarios are also key issues addressed in this invention. Based on these issues, this invention proposes a resource management and optimization method for data transmission with limited total latency, based on a triple subgame approach. This method sequentially performs a resource subgame targeting the upper limit of the base station's downlink total power, a resource subgame targeting the base station's preset global total data transmission latency threshold, and a resource subgame targeting the base station's system transmission latency idle value to obtain the optimal power and data resources for each user in the original user set. This invention aims to provide a unique solution that physically conforms to real-world application scenarios and can be effectively applied in engineering practice. Summary of the Invention
[0004] This invention discloses a resource management and optimization method based on triplet subgames with limited total data transmission latency. The proposed method includes the following steps:
[0005] Step 1, Parameter Collection: User Set Communication bandwidth of a single user Receiver noise The base station to the Downlink channel gain for individual users The preset global total data transmission delay threshold of the base station The upper limit of the total downlink power of the base station Reference data volume ;
[0006] Step 2: Construct a Stackelberg-based resource subgame to address the upper limit of the total downlink power of the base station;
[0007] Step 3: Construct a resource subgame based on Stackelberg for the preset global total data transmission latency threshold of the base station;
[0008] Step 4: Construct a Stackelberg-based resource subgame for the idle value of the base station system transmission delay.
[0009] Furthermore, the original user set can be obtained by sequentially executing a triple game approach: a resource subgame targeting the upper limit of the base station's total downlink power, a resource subgame targeting the base station's preset global total data transmission delay threshold, and a resource subgame targeting the base station's system transmission delay idle value. The Middle Optimal power and data resources for each user.
[0010] Furthermore, a resource subgame is performed targeting the upper limit of the total downlink power of the base station. In the Stackelberg game model, the original user set... As a follower in the game, the base station acts as the leader. For users, maximizing their own utility function is their objective function. For the base station, maximizing the total cost paid by users to purchase its power resources is their objective function. For users, their own utility function is the difference between the data transmission rate obtained by purchasing the base station's power resources and the cost paid to purchase those power resources.
[0011] By solving the Stackelberg game model, the optimal pricing of unit power resources is obtained;
[0012] Users determine the quantity of power resources to purchase based on the optimal pricing per unit of power resource.
[0013] Furthermore, the aforementioned game-theoretic behavior of followers, with maximizing their own utility function as its objective function, is expressed as:
[0014]
[0015] In the formula, For the communication bandwidth of a single user, For receiver noise, Assigning base stations to a set The first in Data transmission power per user, For base station to the The downlink channel gain for each user and In a resource game problem involving the upper limit of the total downlink power of a base station, the leader is the unit price of the user's power.
[0016] The aforementioned game leader's behavior, with maximizing its own power sales revenue as its objective function, is expressed as:
[0017]
[0018] st
[0019] In the formula, The upper limit of the total downlink power of the base station; st These are constraints on power resources.
[0020] Furthermore, regarding the subgame for the global total data transmission latency threshold resource preset by the base station, in the Stackelberg game model, the set of users who obtain effective power (power allocated through the game is positive) will be determined through a resource subgame targeting the upper limit of the base station's downlink total power. As a follower in this subgame, the base station acts as the leader. For the user, its objective function is to maximize its own utility function. For the base station, its objective function is to maximize the total cost incurred by the user in purchasing its latency resources. For the user, its own utility function is the difference between the amount of data gained from purchasing the base station's latency resources and the cost incurred in purchasing those latency resources.
[0021] By solving the Stackelberg game model, the optimal pricing of resources per unit latency is obtained;
[0022] Users determine the quantity of latency resources to purchase based on the optimal pricing per unit of latency resource.
[0023] Furthermore, the aforementioned follower game behavior, with its objective function being the maximization of its own utility function, is expressed as:
[0024]
[0025] In the formula, Represents a set The Middle The amount of data obtained per user is The payoff function at that time This is a reference data set (all users have a fixed and known value); The unit price of leader latency resources in a resource game problem involving limited latency of base station data transmission; To obtain downlink transmission power by engaging in a resource subgame targeting the upper limit of the base station's total downlink power. The user's data transmission rate; For set The Middle The amount of data obtained per user is Data transmission latency at that time;
[0026] The game behavior of the game leader, with maximizing its own revenue from selling time-delay resources as its objective function, is expressed as follows:
[0027]
[0028] st
[0029] In the formula, Represents a set The number of users in China; The global total data transmission delay threshold preset for the base station.
[0030] Furthermore, regarding the subgame for idle data transmission delay resources in the base station system, in the Stackelberg game model, the set of users who obtain effective data transmission delay resources (the amount of data allocated through the game is positive) in the subgame for the base station's preset global total data transmission delay threshold resources are defined. As a follower in the game, the base station acts as the leader. For users, the objective function is to maximize their own utility function. For the base station, the objective function is to maximize the total cost paid by users to purchase its idle latency resources. For users, their own utility function is the difference between the amount of data gained from purchasing the base station's idle latency resources and the cost paid to purchase that idle latency.
[0031] By solving the Stackelberg game model, the optimal pricing of idle resources per unit latency is obtained;
[0032] Users determine the amount of data to purchase based on the optimal pricing of idle resources per unit of latency.
[0033] Furthermore, the aforementioned follower game behavior, with its objective function being the maximization of its own utility function, is expressed as:
[0034]
[0035] In the formula, Represents a set The Middle Each user obtained the following amount of data in this subgame. The payoff function at that time This refers to the amount of data already obtained through resource subgames against the preset global total data transmission delay threshold of the base station; The unit price of leader resources in a resource subgame problem involving idle values of transmission delay in a base station system; To perform resource subgame analysis on the preset global total data transmission delay threshold of the base station. The Middle Data transmission rate obtained by each user; For set The Middle The amount of data obtained per user is Data transmission latency at that time;
[0036] The aforementioned game leader's game behavior, with maximizing their own resource sales revenue as the objective function, is expressed as:
[0037]
[0038] st
[0039] In the formula, Represents a set The number of users in China; This refers to the power values obtained by some participating users in the resource subgame for the base station's preset global total data transmission delay threshold, which are released because some users did not obtain effective data transmission delay resources. These power values were obtained in the resource subgame for the upper limit of the base station's downlink total power, and these idle powers are allocated to the set. The idle value of base station transmission delay generated by the user who obtains the data transmission delay resource and has the highest data transmission rate.
[0040] Furthermore, the prerequisite for performing resource subgames on the idle value of base station system transmission delay is that after the resource subgame for the base station's preset global total data transmission delay threshold ends, some users who participated in the game do not obtain effective data transmission delay resources.
[0041] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: This invention discloses a resource management and optimization method based on a triple subgame approach for data transmission with limited total latency. It obtains the optimal power and data resources for each user in the original user set by sequentially performing a resource subgame based on the upper limit of the base station's downlink total power, a resource subgame based on the base station's preset global total data transmission latency threshold, and a resource subgame based on the base station's system transmission latency idle value. This invention aims to provide a unique solution. It physically conforms to real-world application scenarios and can be effectively applied to engineering practice. Attached Figure Description
[0042] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a resource management and optimization method based on triplet game theory with limited total data transmission latency, as proposed in this invention. Detailed Implementation
[0043] Combination Figure 1 As shown, the design of the present invention will be further analyzed and described in detail.
[0044] Step 1: In the network studied in this invention, a single base station and A set of users establishes a downlink wireless data transmission link, and the user set is represented as follows: If the base station uses Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) technology to communicate with users, then in the set The first in The data downlink rate for each user is
[0045]
[0046] in, For the communication bandwidth of a single user, For receiver noise, Assigning base stations to a set The first in Data transmission power per user, For base station to the Downlink channel gain for each user.
[0047] In this invention, each user needs to obtain a certain amount of data from the base station to meet their own service requirements. It should be noted that due to differences in channel gain and allocated power, each user receives a different data transmission rate. Since the transmission delay for each user is the ratio of the data quantity to the data transmission rate of the transmission link, the data transmission delay for each user also differs.
[0048] No. The transmission delay for each user is expressed as
[0049]
[0050] in, For the first The amount of data a user receives from the base station.
[0051] How can we ensure that the total data transmission delay for all users (from the start of data transmission to successful reception) does not exceed a preset global threshold through base station resource allocation and scheduling strategies? This is the key problem that this invention needs to solve. Simultaneously, how the base station can dynamically adjust the preset maximum total transmission delay for multiple users is also a key issue. An adaptive resource allocation scheme to adapt to latency management in different network scenarios is also a key problem that this invention needs to solve.
[0052] However, according to the definition of transmission delay, the transmission delay for each user is directly proportional to the amount of data they generate and inversely proportional to their data transmission rate. Furthermore, the data transmission rate is also related to the base station's power allocation. To adapt the resource allocation scheme for each user to different network scenarios and thus manage delay, it is necessary to address the joint allocation of user power and user service data volume. Since the downlink power of the base station and the total transmission delay of the system are limited, a game-theoretic approach can be used to allocate these two limited resources in multi-user scenarios.
[0053] Based on the above analysis, the optimization problem at the leader (base station) in the resource game problem has two constraints. Therefore, the resource game can be carried out sequentially with respect to the upper limit of the base station's downlink total power and the base station's preset global total data transmission delay threshold.
[0054] Step 2: First, the resource game problem is modeled with respect to the upper limit of the total downlink power of the base station as follows:
[0055] For sets The Middle For each user (the follower in the game), as the purchased base station power increases, their data transmission rate gain also increases, but their cost function also increases. Therefore, for the follower in the game model, the objective is to obtain the highest gain with the lowest cost in the game, i.e., to maximize their own utility function. Thus, the downlink total power game optimization problem is modeled as follows:
[0056]
[0057] in, In a resource game problem involving the upper limit of the total downlink power of a base station, the leader is the unit price of the user's power.
[0058] The leader (base station) sells a limited total downlink power to multiple competing users; therefore, the optimization problem for the leader in the subgame is modeled as follows:
[0059]
[0060] st
[0061] in, The upper limit of the total downlink power of the base station.
[0062] The objective functions of both the followers and the leader constitute the Stackelberg game. By following certain rules and engaging in strategic maneuvering, the two sides can reach the final Stackelberg equilibrium, which represents the optimal pricing of base station power resources. Then, each user participating in the game determines the amount of power resource to purchase based on the optimal price per unit of power resource.
[0063] Step 3: Then, the resource subgame problem is modeled based on the preset global total data transmission delay threshold of the base station as follows:
[0064] For sets (The set of users who obtain effective power in a resource subgame with respect to the upper limit of the total downlink power of the base station) The th For each user, as the amount of data they purchase and send increases, their revenue from data transmission also increases. However, the cost function incurred due to latency also increases. Therefore, the data transmission finite-delay subgame optimization problem is modeled as follows:
[0065]
[0066] in, Represents a set The Middle The amount of data obtained per user is The payoff function at that time For the reference data volume (all users are uniformly given a fixed value and it is known), the logarithmic function is chosen as the main form of the revenue function to reflect the diminishing marginal returns characteristic. The unit price of leader resources in a resource game problem involving limited latency of base station data transmission; The data transmission rate of the user who obtains downlink transmission power in a resource subgame against the upper limit of the base station's total downlink power; For set The Middle The amount of data obtained per user is Data transmission latency at that time.
[0067] It should be noted that the set of users participating in the game may be different in each subgame. You can map and correspond the labels of the current users in the set to the original user labels one by one.
[0068] The leader (base station) sells limited data transmission latency to multiple competing users; therefore, the optimization problem for the leader in the subgame is modeled as follows:
[0069]
[0070] st
[0071] in, Represents a set The number of users in China; The global total data transmission delay threshold preset for the base station.
[0072] The objective functions of both the followers and the leader constitute the Stackelberg game. By following certain rules and engaging in game actions, the two sides can reach the final Stackelberg equilibrium, which represents the optimal pricing of base station resources per unit of latency. Then, each user participating in the game determines the amount of data to purchase based on the optimal pricing per unit of latency resource.
[0073] If in the resource subgame targeting the preset global total data transmission delay threshold of the base station, the set If some users do not receive data transmission latency resources, then the power values obtained by these users in the first subgame are all allocated to the set. The user with the highest data transmission latency resource and the largest data transmission rate will be allocated more idle system transmission latency resources. And let the set of multiple users participating in the resource subgame for the idle value of the base station system transmission delay be determined. This refers to the set of users who obtain effective data transmission delay resources in a resource subgame based on the global total data transmission delay threshold preset for the base station.
[0074] Step 4: Finally, the resource subgame problem is modeled for the idle value of the base station system transmission delay as follows:
[0075] For sets The Middle For each user, as the amount of data they purchase and send increases, their revenue from data transmission also increases. However, the cost function due to latency also increases. Therefore, the subgame optimization problem with finite idle value data transmission is modeled as follows:
[0076]
[0077] in, Represents a set The Middle Each user obtained the following amount of data in this subgame. The payoff function at that time This refers to the amount of data already obtained through resource subgames against the preset global total data transmission delay threshold of the base station; The unit price of leader resources in a resource subgame problem involving idle values of transmission delay in a base station system; To perform resource subgame analysis on the preset global total data transmission delay threshold of the base station. The Middle Data transmission rate obtained by each user; For set The Middle The amount of data obtained per user is Data transmission latency at that time.
[0078] The leader (base station) sells limited data transmission latency idle time to multiple competing users; therefore, the optimization problem for the leader in the subgame is modeled as follows:
[0079]
[0080] st
[0081] The objective functions of both the follower and the leader constitute the Stackelberg game. By following certain rules and engaging in strategic actions, the two sides can reach the final Stackelberg equilibrium, which represents the optimal pricing for the idle time value per unit of base station latency. Then, each user participating in the game determines the amount of data to purchase again based on the optimal pricing per unit of idle time.
[0082] It is worth noting that the set of users participating in the game may be different in each subgame: 1) The set of users engaging in resource game problems related to the upper limit of the total downlink power of the base station is the original set of users. ;2) The set of users who perform resource subgame problem based on the preset global total data transmission delay threshold of the base station is the set 3) The user set for the resource subgame problem involving idle value of base station system transmission delay is set. The labels of the current participants in the game in each set can be mapped one-to-one with the original user labels, ultimately yielding the original user set. The power values and data volume obtained by each user.
Claims
1. A resource management and optimization method based on triplet subgames with limited total data transmission latency, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Step 1, Parameter Collection: User Set Communication bandwidth of a single user Receiver noise The base station to the Downlink channel gain for individual users The preset global total data transmission delay threshold of the base station The upper limit of the total downlink power of the base station Reference data volume ; Step 2: Construct a Stackelberg-based resource subgame to address the upper limit of the total downlink power of the base station; Step 3: Construct a Stackelberg-based resource subgame based on the preset global total data transmission latency threshold of the base station; Step 4: Construct a Stackelberg-based resource subgame for the idle value of the base station system transmission delay.
2. The resource management and optimization method based on triplet subgames with limited total data transmission latency as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The original user set can be obtained by sequentially performing a three-stage game approach: a resource subgame based on the upper limit of the base station's total downlink power, a resource subgame based on the base station's preset global total data transmission delay threshold, and a resource subgame based on the base station's system transmission delay idle value. The Middle Optimal power and data resources for each user.
3. The resource management and optimization method based on triplet subgames with limited total data transmission latency as described in claim 1, characterized in that, A subgame of resources is performed targeting the upper limit of the total downlink power of the base station. In the Stackelberg game model, the original user set... As a follower in the game, the base station acts as the leader. For users, maximizing their own utility function is their objective function. For the base station, maximizing the total cost paid by users to purchase its power resources is their objective function. For users, their own utility function is the difference between the data transmission rate obtained by purchasing the base station's power resources and the cost paid to purchase those power resources. By solving the Stackelberg game model, the optimal pricing of unit power resources is obtained; Users determine the quantity of power resources to purchase based on the optimal pricing per unit of power resource.
4. The resource sub-game method according to claim 3, which involves performing resource sub-games on the upper limit of the total downlink power of a base station, is characterized in that... The aforementioned game-theoretic behavior of followers, with maximizing their own utility function as its objective function, is expressed as follows: In the formula, For the communication bandwidth of a single user, For receiver noise, Assigning base stations to a set The first in Data transmission power per user, For base station to the The downlink channel gain for each user and In a resource game problem involving the upper limit of the total downlink power of a base station, the leader is the unit price of the user's power. The aforementioned game leader's behavior, with maximizing its own power sales revenue as its objective function, is expressed as: s.t. In the formula, The upper limit of the total downlink power of the base station; st These are constraints on power resources.
5. A resource management and optimization method based on triplet subgames with limited total data transmission latency, as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... In the Stackelberg game model, for the subgame involving the global total data transmission latency threshold resource preset by the base station, the set of users who obtain effective power (power allocated through the game is positive) will be determined through a resource subgame targeting the upper limit of the base station's downlink total power. As a follower in this subgame, the base station acts as the leader. For the user, its objective function is to maximize its own utility function. For the base station, its objective function is to maximize the total cost incurred by the user in purchasing its latency resources. For the user, its own utility function is the difference between the amount of data gained from purchasing the base station's latency resources and the cost incurred in purchasing those latency resources. By solving the Stackelberg game model, the optimal pricing of resources per unit latency is obtained; Users determine the quantity of latency resources to purchase based on the optimal pricing per unit of latency resource.
6. The resource sub-game based on the preset global total data transmission delay threshold of the base station as described in claim 5, characterized in that, The aforementioned follower game behavior, with its objective function being the maximization of its own utility function, is expressed as: In the formula, Represents a set The Middle The amount of data obtained per user is The payoff function at that time This is a reference data set (all users have a fixed and known value); The unit price of leader latency resources in a resource game problem involving limited latency of base station data transmission; To obtain downlink transmission power by engaging in a resource subgame targeting the upper limit of the base station's total downlink power. The user's data transmission rate; For set The Middle The amount of data obtained per user is Data transmission latency at that time; The game behavior of the game leader, with maximizing its own revenue from selling time-delay resources as its objective function, is expressed as follows: s.t. In the formula, Represents a set The number of users in China; The global total data transmission delay threshold preset for the base station.
7. A resource management and optimization method based on triplet subgames with limited total data transmission latency, as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... In the Stackelberg game model, for the subgame involving idle data transmission delay resources in the base station system, the set of users who obtain effective data transmission delay resources (the amount of data allocated through the game is positive) in the subgame targeting the base station's preset global total data transmission delay threshold resource is defined. As a follower in the game, the base station acts as the leader. For users, the objective function is to maximize their own utility function. For the base station, the objective function is to maximize the total cost paid by users to purchase its idle latency resources. For users, their own utility function is the difference between the amount of data gained from purchasing the base station's idle latency resources and the cost paid to purchase that idle latency. By solving the Stackelberg game model, the optimal pricing of idle resources per unit latency is obtained; Users determine the amount of data to purchase based on the optimal pricing of idle resources per unit of latency.
8. The resource sub-game based on the idle value of the base station system transmission delay as described in claim 7, characterized in that, The aforementioned follower game behavior, with its objective function being the maximization of its own utility function, is expressed as: In the formula, Represents a set The Middle Each user obtained the following amount of data in this subgame. The payoff function at that time This refers to the amount of data already obtained through resource subgames against the preset global total data transmission delay threshold of the base station; The unit price of leader resources in a resource subgame problem involving idle values of transmission delay in a base station system; To perform resource subgame analysis on the preset global total data transmission delay threshold of the base station. The Middle Data transmission rate obtained by each user; For set The Middle The amount of data obtained per user is Data transmission latency at that time; The aforementioned game leader's game behavior, with maximizing their own resource sales revenue as the objective function, is expressed as: s.t. In the formula, Represents a set The number of users in China; This refers to the power values obtained by some participating users in the resource subgame for the base station's preset global total data transmission delay threshold, which are released because some users did not obtain effective data transmission delay resources. These power values were obtained in the resource subgame for the upper limit of the base station's downlink total power, and these idle powers are allocated to the set. The idle value of base station transmission delay generated by the user who obtains the data transmission delay resource and has the highest data transmission rate.
9. A resource management and optimization method based on triplet subgames with limited total data transmission latency, as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... The prerequisite for performing resource subgames on idle values of base station system transmission delay is that after the resource subgame for the base station's preset global total data transmission delay threshold ends, some users who participated in the game do not obtain effective data transmission delay resources.