A dual prevention system for power plants

Abstract

A power plant double prevention system is divided into equipment inherent risk and operation activity risk by risk grading; the equipment inherent risk is applied to the equipment without operation normally and the equipment information in the risk control list is read in real time through the five-color diagram, the latest risk level of the area division is inquired, when there is operation, the area risk is re-divided according to the operation activity, operation task and the number of people; the risk grading is set periodically, after expiration, the risk grading control plan and task list are automatically generated, and the task list is associated with the risk grading control list. The double safety prevention protection of the equipment inherent risk and the operation activity risk can conveniently convert the risk assessment when there is no task and when the task is performed, so that the accuracy of the risk assessment is ensured, and the safety production is ensured.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of power plant safety protection, specifically a dual prevention system for power plants. Background Technology

[0002] Currently, production safety is of paramount importance in the operation of power plants, especially thermal power plants. However, most current safety monitoring systems only monitor and prevent accidents during the operation of tasks. Applying the same standards to safety monitoring when tasks are not being performed may lead to other safety hazards. Therefore, a system that takes into account risk assessment and safety prevention during both the operation of tasks and the absence of tasks is needed. Summary of the Invention

[0003] This invention provides a dual prevention system for power plants to address the deficiencies in existing technologies.

[0004] This invention is achieved through the following technical solution: A dual-prevention system for power plants classifies risks into inherent equipment risks and operational activity risks. The inherent equipment risk is applied when equipment is not in operation, and the system uses a five-color map to read equipment information from the risk control list in real time, querying the latest risk level for its location. When operations occur, the risk in that area is reclassified according to operational activity risks based on the work activities, tasks, and number of personnel. The risk classification is periodically scheduled, and upon expiration, it automatically triggers the generation of a risk classification control plan and task list, with the task list linked to the risk classification control plan.

[0005] As described above, in a dual prevention system for power plants, equipment risks are defined as hazard sources. Risks are classified, and when assessing equipment risks, the degree of danger of the equipment and corresponding countermeasures are evaluated based on different hazard sources. Risks are managed in different levels, and the level is determined by the probability of the risk occurring and the possible loss, thereby determining the corresponding risk level. The calculation formula is: Risk level R = L × S, where R represents the risk level, L represents the probability of the hazard event occurring, and S represents the possible loss caused by the hazard event.

[0006] The specific scoring criteria for the probability (L) of an accident in the power plant dual prevention system described above are as follows: Score content 5 No preventive, monitoring, protective, or control measures were taken on-site, or the occurrence of the hazard could not be detected, or such accidents or incidents occurred frequently under normal circumstances. 4 The hazard is not easily detected, there is no monitoring system on site, no monitoring has been conducted, or there are control measures on site, but the control measures are not effectively implemented or are improper, or the hazard occurs or is expected to occur. 3 There were no protective measures, or the operating procedures were not strictly followed, or the hazard was easily detectable, or it had been monitored before, or a similar accident or incident had occurred in the past. 2 The hazards can be detected in a timely manner once they occur, and are monitored regularly, or there are on-site prevention and control measures that can be effectively implemented, or there have been occasional accidents or incidents in the past. 1 With sufficient and effective prevention, control, monitoring, and protection measures in place, or with employees having a high level of safety and health awareness and strictly adhering to operating procedures, accidents or incidents are highly unlikely to occur. By conducting a detailed classification and assessment of the likelihood of an accident occurring, the accuracy of the probability assessment can be ensured.

[0007] The specific scoring criteria for the severity (S) of the event consequences in the power plant dual prevention system described above are as follows: Score Laws, regulations and other requirements casualties direct economic losses Work stoppage Corporate Image 5 Violation of laws, regulations and standards One or more people died More than 5 million yuan The entire plant experienced a power outage and external heating was interrupted. National, industry, and provincial impact 4 Potential violations of regulations and standards One or more people seriously injured More than 1 million yuan Unit non-stop, limited external heat supply Regional impact 3 Compliance with the safety policies, systems, and regulations of the parent company or industry. One or more people with minor injuries More than 100,000 yuan Unit output limited, main auxiliary equipment shut down Company and surrounding impact 2 Does not comply with the company's safety operating procedures and regulations Attempt by one or more persons More than 10,000 yuan The impact was minimal, and work almost never stopped. company 1 Fully compatible No abnormalities No loss No work stoppage No damage By conducting a detailed classification and assessment of the severity of the event's consequences, the accuracy of the severity assessment can be ensured.

[0008] The specific scoring criteria for risk level determination (R) in the power plant dual prevention system described above are as follows: Risk Value Risk level Risk level color 20-25 Extremely dangerous Particularly significant risks red 15-16 Highly dangerous Major risks orange 9-12 Significant danger Greater risk yellow 4-8 Mild danger General risks blue <4 Slightly dangerous Less risk green By using different colors to mark different risk values, the risk level and risk grade of different areas can be expressed more intuitively.

[0009] As described above, in a dual prevention system for power plants, the work condition hazard assessment (LEC) method uses the product of three factor index values ​​related to system risk to evaluate the level of risk. The calculation formula is: Risk level: D = L × E × C, where L represents the probability of an accident occurring, E represents the frequency of personnel exposure to the hazardous environment, and C represents the possible consequences of an accident.

[0010] The specific scoring criteria for the probability (L) of an accident in the power plant dual prevention system described above are as follows: Score The probability of accidents or incidents occurring 10 Completely predictable 6 It is highly probable; or the hazard may not be detected; or no preventative, monitoring, protective, or control measures are in place on-site; or such accidents, events, or deviations occur frequently under normal circumstances. 3 Possibly, but not frequently; or the hazard is difficult to detect; there is no monitoring system or protective measures on site, and no monitoring has been conducted; or operating procedures have not been strictly followed; or there are control measures on site, but they have not been effectively implemented or the control measures are inadequate; or the hazard occurs as expected. 1 The likelihood is low; it is entirely accidental; or the hazard is easily detectable; there is a monitoring system on site or monitoring has been conducted before; or similar accidents, events, or deviations have occurred in the past; or similar accidents, events, or deviations have occurred under abnormal circumstances. 0.5 It's highly unlikely, but it's conceivable; the possibility is that any harm that occurs can be detected promptly and monitored regularly. 0.2 Highly unlikely; there are sufficient and effective prevention, control, monitoring, and protection measures; or employees have a very high level of safety and hygiene awareness and strictly follow operating procedures. 0.1 It is practically impossible By conducting a detailed classification and assessment of the likelihood of an accident occurring, the accuracy of the probability assessment can be ensured.

[0011] The specific scoring criteria for the frequency (E) of personnel exposure to hazardous environments in the aforementioned dual prevention system for power plants are as follows: Score Frequency of exposure to hazardous environments 10 Continuous exposure 6 Exposure during daily work hours 3 Weekly or occasional exposure 2 monthly exposure 1 Several exposures per year 0.5 Very rare exposure By conducting a detailed classification and assessment of the frequency of human exposure to hazardous environments, the accuracy of the assessment of the frequency of human exposure to hazardous environments can be ensured.

[0012] In the power plant dual prevention system described above, the specific scoring criteria for the consequences (C) of an accident are as follows: Score Laws, regulations and other requirements casualties direct economic losses 100 Serious violation of laws, regulations and standards 10 or more deaths, or 50 or more serious injuries More than 50 million yuan 40 Violation of laws, regulations and standards Three to ten people died, or ten to fifty people were seriously injured. More than 10 million yuan 15 Potential violations of regulations and standards Three people died or fewer than 10 people were seriously injured. More than 1 million yuan 7 Compliance with the safety policies, systems, and regulations of the parent company or industry. serious More than 100,000 yuan 2 Does not comply with the company's safety operating procedures and regulations Major, Disability More than 10,000 yuan 1 Fully compatible Attention Less than 10,000 yuan By conducting a detailed classification and assessment of the consequences of an accident, the accuracy of the assessment of the consequences of the accident can be ensured.

[0013] The specific scoring criteria for the risk magnitude (D) in the power plant dual prevention system described above are as follows: Risk Value level of danger color > 320 Particularly significant risks red 160-320 Major risks orange 70-160 Greater risk yellow 20-70 General risks blue < 20 Less risk Green (white) By using different colors to mark different risk values, the degree of danger in different areas can be expressed more intuitively.

[0014] The advantages of this invention are: by providing dual safety protection against inherent equipment risks and operational activity risks, this invention enables convenient switching between risk assessments during periods of no task and during task execution, thereby ensuring the accuracy of risk assessments and ensuring safe production. Attached Figure Description

[0015] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0016] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the risk five-color diagram of the present invention.

[0017] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the periodic operation settings for actual use of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating whether there are any problems with the allocation of query personnel in actual use of the present invention; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the actual operation of the present invention, including risk classification of equipment and submission of work to a summary table; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the approval process for the actual use and operation of this invention, which involves statistically analyzing the risks of various equipment and including them in the risk classification list. Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the actual operation of this invention, which involves querying the listed devices and related areas, and assigning the highest value to classify the device risk level. Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the periodic work setup for hazard identification in this invention; Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the task list for identifying potential hazards in this invention; Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of the hazard identification items set up in this invention; Figure 10 This is a schematic diagram of the hazard investigation plan for the present invention. Figure 11 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the breakdown of the hazard identification plan for this invention; Figure 12 This is a schematic diagram of the hidden danger investigation task of the present invention; Figure 13 This is a schematic diagram summarizing the hidden danger investigation process of this invention; Figure 14This is one of the schematic diagrams illustrating how, after the summary and approval of the hidden danger investigation of this invention is completed, the problems found are generated into a hidden danger investigation ledger to track the closed-loop of problems; Figure 15 This is one of the schematic diagrams illustrating how, after the summary and approval of the hidden danger investigation of this invention is completed, the problems found are generated into a hidden danger investigation ledger to track the closed-loop of problems. Detailed Implementation

[0018] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0019] A dual-prevention system for power plants categorizes risks into inherent equipment risks and operational activity risks. The inherent equipment risks are applied when the equipment is not in operation and are identified using a five-color diagram (e.g., ...). Figure 1 (As shown) The system should read the equipment information in the risk control list in real time, query the latest risk level of its area, and when there is work, the risk of the area should be reclassified according to the work activity, work task, and number of people. The risk classification is set up regularly, and when it expires, it will automatically trigger the generation of risk classification control plan and task list, and the task list is associated with the risk classification control list.

[0020] Preferably, the equipment risk definition in this embodiment involves classifying risks, assessing the degree of danger of the equipment and corresponding countermeasures based on different hazard sources, and managing risks in a graded manner. The risk level is determined by assessing the probability of the risk occurring and the possible loss, and the corresponding risk level is then determined. The calculation formula is: Risk level R = L × S, where R represents the risk level, L represents the probability of the dangerous event occurring, and S represents the possible loss caused by the dangerous event.

[0021] Preferably, the specific scoring criteria for the probability (L) of the accident occurring as described in this embodiment are as follows: Score content 5 No preventive, monitoring, protective, or control measures were taken on-site, or the occurrence of the hazard could not be detected, or such accidents or incidents occurred frequently under normal circumstances. 4 The hazard is not easily detected, there is no monitoring system on site, no monitoring has been conducted, or there are control measures on site, but the control measures are not effectively implemented or are improper, or the hazard occurs or is expected to occur. 3 There were no protective measures, or the operating procedures were not strictly followed, or the hazard was easily detectable, or it had been monitored before, or a similar accident or incident had occurred in the past. 2 The hazards can be detected in a timely manner once they occur, and are monitored regularly, or there are on-site prevention and control measures that can be effectively implemented, or there have been occasional accidents or incidents in the past. 1 With sufficient and effective prevention, control, monitoring, and protection measures in place, or with employees having a high level of safety and health awareness and strictly adhering to operating procedures, accidents or incidents are highly unlikely to occur. By conducting a detailed classification and assessment of the likelihood of an accident occurring, the accuracy of the probability assessment can be ensured.

[0022] Preferably, the specific scoring criteria for the severity (S) of the event consequences described in this embodiment are as follows: Score Laws, regulations and other requirements casualties direct economic losses Work stoppage Corporate Image 5 Violation of laws, regulations and standards One or more people died More than 5 million yuan The entire plant experienced a power outage and external heating was interrupted. National, industry, and provincial impact 4 Potential violations of regulations and standards One or more people seriously injured More than 1 million yuan Unit non-stop, limited external heat supply Regional impact 3 Compliance with the safety policies, systems, and regulations of the parent company or industry. One or more people with minor injuries More than 100,000 yuan Unit output limited, main auxiliary equipment shut down Company and surrounding impact 2 Does not comply with the company's safety operating procedures and regulations Attempt by one or more persons More than 10,000 yuan The impact was minimal, and work almost never stopped. company 1 Fully compatible No abnormalities No loss No work stoppage No damage By conducting a detailed classification and assessment of the severity of the event's consequences, the accuracy of the severity assessment can be ensured.

[0023] Preferably, the specific scoring criteria for risk level determination (R) described in this embodiment are as follows: Risk Value Risk level Risk level color 20-25 Extremely dangerous Particularly significant risks red 15-16 Highly dangerous Major risks orange 9-12 Significant danger Greater risk yellow 4-8 Mild danger General risks blue <4 Slightly dangerous Less risk green By using different colors to mark different risk values, the risk level and risk grade of different areas can be expressed more intuitively.

[0024] Preferably, the job condition hazard assessment (LEC) method described in this embodiment evaluates the risk level by multiplying the values ​​of three factors related to system risk. The calculation formula is: Risk level: D = L × E × C, where L represents the probability of an accident occurring, E represents the frequency of personnel exposure to the hazardous environment, and C represents the possible consequences of an accident.

[0025] Preferably, the specific scoring criteria for the probability (L) of the accident occurring as described in this embodiment are as follows: Score The probability of accidents or incidents occurring 10 Completely predictable 6 It is highly probable; or the hazard may not be detected; or no preventative, monitoring, protective, or control measures are in place on-site; or such accidents, events, or deviations occur frequently under normal circumstances. 3 Possibly, but not frequently; or the hazard is difficult to detect; there is no monitoring system or protective measures on site, and no monitoring has been conducted; or operating procedures have not been strictly followed; or there are control measures on site, but they have not been effectively implemented or the control measures are inadequate; or the hazard occurs as expected. 1 The likelihood is low; it is entirely accidental; or the hazard is easily detectable; there is a monitoring system on site or monitoring has been conducted before; or similar accidents, events, or deviations have occurred in the past; or similar accidents, events, or deviations have occurred under abnormal circumstances. 0.5 It's highly unlikely, but it's conceivable; the possibility is that any harm that occurs can be detected promptly and monitored regularly. 0.2 Highly unlikely; there are sufficient and effective prevention, control, monitoring, and protection measures; or employees have a very high level of safety and hygiene awareness and strictly follow operating procedures. 0.1 It is practically impossible By conducting a detailed classification and assessment of the likelihood of an accident occurring, the accuracy of the probability assessment can be ensured.

[0026] Preferably, the specific scoring criteria for the frequency (E) of personnel exposure to hazardous environments described in this embodiment are as follows: Score Frequency of exposure to hazardous environments 10 Continuous exposure 6 Exposure during daily work hours 3 Weekly or occasional exposure 2 monthly exposure 1 Several exposures per year 0.5 Very rare exposure By conducting a detailed classification and assessment of the frequency of human exposure to hazardous environments, the accuracy of the assessment of the frequency of human exposure to hazardous environments can be ensured.

[0027] Preferably, the specific scoring criteria for the consequences (C) of the accident described in this embodiment are as follows: Score Laws, regulations and other requirements casualties direct economic losses 100 Serious violation of laws, regulations and standards 10 or more deaths, or 50 or more serious injuries More than 50 million yuan 40 Violation of laws, regulations and standards Three to ten people died, or ten to fifty people were seriously injured. More than 10 million yuan 15 Potential violations of regulations and standards Three people died or fewer than 10 people were seriously injured. More than 1 million yuan 7 Compliance with the safety policies, systems, and regulations of the parent company or industry. serious More than 100,000 yuan 2 Does not comply with the company's safety operating procedures and regulations Major, Disability More than 10,000 yuan 1 Fully compatible Attention Less than 10,000 yuan By conducting a detailed classification and assessment of the consequences of an accident, the accuracy of the assessment of the consequences of the accident can be ensured.

[0028] Preferably, the specific scoring criteria for the risk level (D) described in this embodiment are as follows: Risk Value level of danger color > 320 Particularly significant risks red 160-320 Major risks orange 70-160 Greater risk yellow 20-70 General risks blue < 20 Less risk Green (white) By using different colors to mark different risk values, the degree of danger in different areas can be expressed more intuitively.

[0029] The actual operation of this invention is as follows: Step 1: Regular task settings (e.g.) Figure 2 (as shown) Step Two: The person in charge of the plan receives the plan, checks if there are any issues with personnel allocation, and if not, issues the plan accordingly (e.g., ...). Figure 3 (as shown) Step 3: Upon receiving the relevant task, the responsible person classifies the equipment risks and submits the work to the summary table (e.g., ...). Figure 4 (as shown) Step Four: After all work has been submitted, the project manager will approve it. Once approved, the risks of various equipment will be tallied and added to the risk classification list (e.g., ...). Figure 5 (as shown) Step 5: The visualization dashboard queries the devices in this list and their related areas, taking the highest value to classify the device risk level (e.g., ...). Figure 6 (As shown).

[0030] This invention conducts regular hazard identification and investigation. Hazard identification and investigation is divided into special inspections and non-special inspections. Non-special inspections are conducted regularly, while special inspections are conducted at irregular intervals. The inspection items are combined into the hazard identification and investigation plan when the plan is made by the personnel maintaining the data. After approval, the plan is issued to the person in charge for investigation. After the problems are identified, they are entered into the problem database and a rectification closed loop is implemented.

[0031] The specific procedures for hazard identification are as follows: Step 1: Regular task settings (e.g.) Figure 7 (as shown) Step 2: View the task list (e.g.) Figure 8 (as shown) Step 3: Check the project settings (e.g.) Figure 9 (as shown) Step Four: Hazard Identification Plan (e.g.) Figure 10 (as shown) Step 5: Decompose the investigation plan (e.g.) Figure 11 (as shown) Step Six: Hazard Identification Task (e.g.) Figure 12 (as shown) Step Seven: Summary of Hazard Investigation (e.g.) Figure 13 (as shown) Step 8: After the hazard investigation and approval process is completed, generate a hazard investigation log to track the identified problems in a closed-loop manner (e.g., ...). Figure 14 and Figure 15 (As shown).

[0032] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and not to limit them; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features; and these modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A dual prevention system for power plants, characterized in that: Risk is categorized into inherent equipment risk and operational activity risk. The inherent equipment risk is applied when the equipment is not in operation. The risk management list should be read in real time through a five-color map to query the latest risk level of the area. When there is operation, the risk of the area will be reclassified according to the operational activity, task, and number of personnel. The risk classification is set up periodically. When the deadline is reached, the risk classification management plan and task list will be automatically generated. The task list is associated with the risk classification management plan.

2. The dual prevention system for power plants according to claim 1, characterized in that: The aforementioned equipment risk definition identifies hazard sources, classifies risks, assesses the degree of danger of the equipment and corresponding countermeasures based on different hazard sources when evaluating equipment risks, and manages risks by level. The level is determined by the probability of the risk occurring and the possible loss, and the corresponding risk level is then determined. The calculation formula is: Risk level R = L × S, where R represents the risk level, L represents the probability of the hazardous event occurring, and S represents the possible loss caused by the hazardous event.

3. The dual prevention system for power plants according to claim 2, characterized in that: The specific scoring criteria for the probability (L) of the aforementioned accident occurrence are as follows: By conducting a detailed classification and assessment of the likelihood of an accident occurring, the accuracy of the probability assessment can be ensured.

4. The dual prevention system for power plants according to claim 2, characterized in that: The specific scoring criteria for the severity (S) of the event consequences are as follows: By conducting a detailed classification and assessment of the severity of the event's consequences, the accuracy of the severity assessment can be ensured.

5. The dual prevention system for power plants according to claim 2, characterized in that: The specific scoring criteria for determining the risk level (R) are as follows: By using different colors to mark different risk values, the risk level and risk grade of different areas can be expressed more intuitively.

6. The dual prevention system for power plants according to claim 1, characterized in that: The aforementioned job condition hazard assessment (LEC) method evaluates the level of risk by multiplying the values ​​of three factors related to system risk. The calculation formula is: Risk level: D = L × E × C, where L represents the probability of an accident occurring, E represents the frequency of personnel exposure to the hazardous environment, and C represents the possible consequences of an accident.

7. A dual prevention system for power plants according to claim 6, characterized in that: The specific scoring criteria for the probability (L) of the aforementioned accident occurrence are as follows: By conducting a detailed classification and assessment of the likelihood of an accident occurring, the accuracy of the probability assessment can be ensured.

8. A dual prevention system for power plants according to claim 6, characterized in that: The specific scoring criteria for the frequency (E) of personnel exposure to hazardous environments are as follows: By conducting a detailed classification and assessment of the frequency of human exposure to hazardous environments, the accuracy of the assessment of the frequency of human exposure to hazardous environments can be ensured.

9. A dual prevention system for power plants according to claim 6, characterized in that: The specific scoring criteria for the consequences (C) of the accident are as follows: By conducting a detailed classification and assessment of the consequences of an accident, the accuracy of the assessment of the consequences of the accident can be ensured.

10. A dual prevention system for power plants according to claim 6, characterized in that: The specific scoring criteria for the risk level (D) are as follows: By using different colors to mark different risk values, the degree of danger in different areas can be expressed more intuitively.

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