Method and system for determining system reliability index in advanced reactor design

Abstract

This application discloses a method and system for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design, comprising: determining the safety objectives of the advanced reactor; establishing a probabilistic safety analysis model to construct a quantitative relationship between the nuclear safety objectives of the advanced reactor and system reliability; and determining the system reliability indicators based on the probabilistic safety analysis model and the safety objectives. This scheme for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design fills a gap in system reliability design during the advanced reactor design process, enabling designers to clearly define reliability indicators to ensure or improve system reliability and guarantee the operational safety of the advanced reactor nuclear power plant in the future.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of nuclear safety analysis technology, and more specifically, to a method and system for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design. Background Technology

[0002] System and equipment reliability is a decisive factor affecting the safe and stable operation of nuclear power plants. Currently, the nuclear power industry's focus on system reliability is mainly concentrated in the operation phase of nuclear power plants, primarily manifested in the equipment reliability management system built based on INPO AP-913, used for reliability management during the operation phase of nuclear power plants.

[0003] Because current focus on reliability is primarily concentrated during the nuclear power plant operation phase, there is a gap in the system reliability design during advanced reactor design. Designers lack clear reliability indicators and effective reliability design methods to ensure or improve system reliability. Furthermore, to meet top-level nuclear safety objectives, advanced reactor designs generally reference mature pressurized water reactor (PWR) design specifications. However, due to the significant differences in technical approaches between various advanced reactors and PWRs, mature PWR design experience is not entirely applicable to advanced reactor types. This results in a lack of focus during the advanced reactor design phase, significantly increasing the cost of advanced reactor design and construction. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In view of the above, this application provides the following technical solution:

[0005] The first aspect of this application provides a method for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design, including:

[0006] Determine the safety objectives for advanced reactors;

[0007] Establish a probabilistic safety analysis model to construct a quantitative relationship between advanced reactor nuclear safety objectives and system reliability;

[0008] Based on the probabilistic security analysis model, the system's reliability indicators are determined in conjunction with the security objectives.

[0009] In one possible implementation, determining the system's reliability indicators based on the probabilistic security analysis model and the security objectives includes:

[0010] Based on the probabilistic safety analysis model, and in conjunction with the safety objectives, the safety margin for each set accident sequence is determined.

[0011] The target frequency of each set accident sequence is determined based on the safety margin of each set accident sequence. The target frequency is the maximum value of the accident frequency that satisfies the safety target or a value that is far from the maximum value with a set adjustment amount.

[0012] The system's reliability index is determined based on the target frequency of each set accident sequence.

[0013] In one possible implementation, determining the target frequency of each predetermined incident sequence based on the safety margin of each predetermined incident sequence includes:

[0014] Based on the principle that the higher the safety margin of a set accident sequence, the higher the target frequency should be assigned to that set accident sequence, the target frequency of each set accident sequence is determined.

[0015] In one possible implementation, determining the safety objectives of an advanced reactor includes:

[0016] Determine the risk metric requirements and frequency versus consequence requirements curves for advanced reactors.

[0017] In one possible implementation, establishing the probabilistic security analysis model includes:

[0018] A probabilistic safety analysis model is constructed based on the optimal design scheme of the advanced reactor.

[0019] One possible implementation also includes:

[0020] Substitute the reliability index into the probabilistic security analysis model to determine whether the reliability index meets the security objective.

[0021] If the requirements are met, the design scheme of the advanced reactor will be adjusted based on the aforementioned reliability indicators;

[0022] If the conditions are not met, adjust the parameters of the probabilistic safety analysis model and / or construct the advanced reactor design scheme on which the probabilistic safety analysis model is based.

[0023] A second aspect of this application provides a system for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design, comprising:

[0024] The target determination module is used to determine the safety targets of advanced reactors;

[0025] The model building module is used to establish probabilistic safety analysis models to construct a quantitative relationship between advanced reactor nuclear safety objectives and system reliability.

[0026] The indicator determination module is used to determine the system's reliability indicators based on the probabilistic security analysis model and the security objectives.

[0027] In one possible implementation, the indicator determination module includes:

[0028] The safety margin determination module is used to determine the safety margin of each set accident sequence based on the probabilistic safety analysis model and the safety objective.

[0029] The frequency determination module is used to determine the target frequency of each set accident sequence based on the safety margin of each set accident sequence. The target frequency is the maximum value of the accident frequency that satisfies the safety target or a value that is far from the maximum value by a set adjustment amount.

[0030] The index determination submodule is used to determine the system's reliability index based on the target frequency of each set accident sequence.

[0031] In one possible implementation, the frequency determination module is used to: determine the target frequency of each set accident sequence based on the principle that the higher the safety margin of the set accident sequence, the greater the target frequency assigned to the set accident sequence.

[0032] In one possible implementation, the model building module is used to: build a probabilistic safety analysis model based on the optimal design of the advanced reactor.

[0033] As can be seen from the above technical solutions, this application discloses a method and system for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design, including: determining the safety objectives of the advanced reactor; establishing a probabilistic safety analysis model to construct a quantitative relationship between the nuclear safety objectives of the advanced reactor and system reliability; and determining the system reliability indicators based on the probabilistic safety analysis model and the safety objectives. The above-mentioned scheme for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design fills the gap in system reliability design during the advanced reactor design process, enabling designers to clearly define reliability indicators to ensure or improve system reliability and guarantee the operational safety of the advanced reactor nuclear power plant in the later stages. Attached Figure Description

[0034] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on the provided drawings without creative effort.

[0035] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design, as disclosed in an embodiment of this application.

[0036] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the determination of system reliability indicators as disclosed in an embodiment of this application;

[0037] Figure 3This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a system for determining system reliability indicators in an advanced reactor design, as disclosed in an embodiment of this application.

[0038] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the index determination module disclosed in the embodiments of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0039] The technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this application, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of this application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0040] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design, as disclosed in an embodiment of this application. See also... Figure 1 As shown, the methods for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design may include:

[0041] Step 101: Determine the safety objectives of the advanced reactor.

[0042] Advanced reactor (or advanced reactor) is a commonly used term in the nuclear energy industry, mainly referring to other advanced reactor types that are different from the current mainstream megawatt-class pressurized water reactors.

[0043] In practice, advanced reactor safety objectives can be determined based on nuclear safety requirements, including but not limited to: determining risk measurement indicators (such as the event sequence frequency of radioactive material release) requirements, and the frequency-consequence curve (FC curve) corresponding to the License Basis Event (LBE).

[0044] Step 102: Establish a probabilistic safety analysis model to construct a quantitative relationship between advanced reactor nuclear safety objectives and system reliability.

[0045] In practice, a Probability Safety Analysis (PSA) model can be established based on one or more initial design schemes of an advanced reactor to evaluate the risk level of one or more initial design schemes, thereby constructing a quantitative relationship between the nuclear safety objectives of the advanced reactor and system reliability indicators.

[0046] The initial design scheme refers to the top-level design scheme of an advanced reactor, also known as the optimal design scheme. This top-level design scheme consists of a series of systems performing different functions. Among them, the systems performing safety functions determine the safety level of the advanced reactor; the higher the system reliability, the higher the safety. The PSA model describes the quantitative relationship between system reliability indicators and the nuclear safety level of an advanced reactor, and can be used to evaluate whether a certain design scheme of an advanced reactor meets nuclear safety objectives.

[0047] Step 103: Based on the probabilistic security analysis model and the security objectives, determine the system's reliability indicators.

[0048] The reliability indicators of a system can be determined based on a probabilistic security analysis model, combining the safety objectives to sequentially determine the safety margin, target frequency, and reliability indicators for each set accident sequence. The specific implementation of determining the system's reliability indicators will be detailed in the embodiments below and will not be elaborated upon here.

[0049] The target frequency is the maximum value of the accident frequency that satisfies the safety objective, or a value that is a predetermined adjustment amount away from the maximum value. An event sequence refers to a series of events (such as system, function, and operator responses) that succeed or fail after an initial event, ultimately mitigating or leading to undesirable consequences (such as radioactive release). In this document, setting an accident sequence can be understood as a sequence of events that leads to undesirable consequences (such as radioactive release).

[0050] In the context of this application, an event sequence refers to the series of responses a nuclear power plant undertakes to mitigate the consequences of an emergency shutdown (i.e., the initiating event) caused by various internal and external factors. These responses may succeed or fail, and their success or failure determines whether the final state of the nuclear power plant is a safe and controllable state or an undesirable radioactive release. The series of events from the emergency shutdown to the final state constitutes an event sequence. If the final state is an undesirable radioactive release, then this event sequence is an accident sequence (the event sequence described herein).

[0051] Those skilled in the art will know that a nuclear power unit has approximately hundreds to thousands of systems, of which dozens to over a hundred are related to safety functions (the exact number depends on the reactor design). This application primarily concerns the design of safety functions and their related systems. Advanced reactor designs select a series of accident scenarios as design baseline accidents. To mitigate these accidents, a series of safety functions are required, which are executed by specific systems. Therefore, a crucial part of advanced reactor design is determining the design baseline accident, the safety functions required to mitigate the accident, and the systems needed to execute these safety functions. The method for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design disclosed in this application facilitates the determination of reliability indicators for advanced reactor systems, providing effective support for the safe operation of the nuclear power unit in the future.

[0052] The scheme for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design disclosed in this embodiment fills the gap in system reliability design during the advanced reactor design process, enabling designers to clearly define reliability indicators to ensure or improve system reliability and guarantee the safety of advanced reactor nuclear power plant operation in the later stage.

[0053] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the determination of system reliability metrics as disclosed in an embodiment of this application. See also... Figure 2 As shown, in one implementation, determining the system's reliability indicators based on the probabilistic security analysis model and the security objectives may include:

[0054] Step 201: Based on the probabilistic safety analysis model and the safety objectives, determine the safety margin for each set accident sequence.

[0055] In practice, the safety margin of a specific accident sequence can be assessed using the PSA model. Based on the frequency of occurrence of a specific accident sequence and the resulting dose consequences of radioactive release, the safety margin of that specific accident sequence is quantitatively evaluated by comparing it with the FC curves described above. In the two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system of the FC curves, the farther the point corresponding to the specific accident sequence is from the FC curve, the higher the safety margin.

[0056] Step 202: Determine the target frequency of each set accident sequence based on the safety margin of each set accident sequence. The target frequency is the maximum value of the accident frequency that satisfies the safety target or a value that is a set adjustment amount away from the maximum value.

[0057] Once the safety margin is determined, a trial allocation of system reliability indicators can be conducted. The system reliability level related to the PSA initiation event and mitigation function determines the frequency of the aforementioned accident sequence. Therefore, the frequency of accident sequence occurrence can be constrained using nuclear safety objectives, and the accident sequence occurrence frequency requirements required by nuclear safety objectives can be trial-allocated to the system reliability indicator requirements.

[0058] One approach to trial allocation is to compare the safety margins of different incident sequences. If a specific incident sequence has a higher safety margin, it is assigned a higher occurrence frequency, thereby giving the system associated with that incident sequence a more lenient reliability requirement. In other words, the target frequency for each specified incident sequence is determined based on the principle that the higher the safety margin of a given incident sequence, the higher the target frequency assigned to that sequence.

[0059] Step 203: Determine the system's reliability index based on the target frequency of each set accident sequence.

[0060] Each incident sequence has a specific occurrence frequency, which can be determined by the annual average occurrence frequency of the initiating event and the failure probability of the systems performing incident mitigation functions in the incident sequence.

[0061] The radioactive release resulting from each accident sequence can be measured by radioactive dose consequences (hereinafter referred to as consequences). These consequences represent the radiation dose (depending on the type and amount of radioactive material) induced on the public surrounding the plant area by the released radioactive material after the accident sequence develops to the final radioactive release. The unit is millisieverts (mSv).

[0062] In a Cartesian coordinate system formed by the frequency and consequences of an accident sequence, each accident sequence corresponds to a point in the coordinate system. The FC curve mentioned earlier is a curve defined in this coordinate system. This curve specifies the limits that the frequency and consequences of all accident sequences should not exceed. Generally, the points corresponding to all accident sequences are located in the lower left of this curve. If a point of an accident sequence is far from the FC curve, it indicates that the frequency and / or consequences of the accident sequence are relatively small, and the risk of the accident sequence is low and the safety margin is high.

[0063] Comparing the locations of points in different accident sequences, there are three possible scenarios:

[0064] 1. If a point in a certain accident sequence breaks through the constraints of the FC curve and is located in the upper right of the FC curve, this indicates that the reactor's top-level design does not meet the safety objectives and design improvements and iterations are needed.

[0065] 2. If a point in an accident sequence is located to the lower left of the FC curve but is close to the FC curve, this indicates that the system corresponding to the sequence is of high risk and sufficient resources should be invested in its design to ensure its reliability.

[0066] 3. If a point in an accident sequence is located to the lower left of the FC curve and is far from the FC curve, this indicates that the system corresponding to the accident sequence may be over-designed and has a high existing reliability level. The reliability requirements can be appropriately relaxed to free up cost reduction space.

[0067] For example, the PSA model for high-temperature gas-cooled reactors provides 100 accident sequences that need to be considered in the design. The following is a trial allocation case for reliability indicators:

[0068] Accident sequence 1 broke the constraints of the FC curve. This sequence includes the initiating event caused by the failure of system A (frequency of 0.1 times / year), the successful implementation of mitigation by system B, and the final radioactive consequence of 5 mSv. Therefore, the design should take improvement measures to enhance the reliability of system A, or add an additional system C to reduce the radioactive consequences. The reliability indicators of system A or system C should meet the safety objectives.

[0069] Accident sequence 2 has the highest safety margin among all sequences. This sequence includes the initiating event caused by the failure of system D (frequency of 0.001 times / year) and the final radioactive consequence of 1 mSv. According to the technical solution of this patent, the reliability index requirements of system D can be further relaxed to a failure frequency of 0.005 or 0.01 times / year, based on the current reliability level of system D. The specific index requirements are obtained by engineering judgment or comprehensive decision based on safety margin. Furthermore, it is necessary to use the PSA model to verify whether the system reliability index can meet the safety objectives, i.e., the nuclear safety objective verification introduced later.

[0070] Based on the disclosure of the foregoing embodiments, in one implementation, the method for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design may further include: substituting the reliability indicators into the probabilistic safety analysis model to determine whether the reliability indicators meet the safety objectives; if they meet the objectives, adjusting the design scheme of the advanced reactor based on the reliability indicators; if they do not meet the objectives, adjusting the parameters of the probabilistic safety analysis model and / or constructing the design scheme of the advanced reactor on which the probabilistic safety analysis model is based.

[0071] The above process involves verifying nuclear safety objectives. Specifically, based on the determined system reliability indicators, the PSA model and FC curve are substituted to verify whether the advanced reactor's nuclear safety objectives are met. If the system reliability indicators obtained from the preceding steps meet the advanced reactor's nuclear safety objectives, then a reliability assessment and design improvement of the system design scheme are conducted to ensure that the system design scheme meets the determined reliability indicator requirements.

[0072] The previous embodiments only defined the system reliability requirements. However, the actual system design may not meet these requirements. Therefore, a reliability assessment of the system design is still needed. If the reliability is lower than the requirements, the design needs to be improved to ensure that the requirements are met. If the system reliability is much higher than the requirements, it corresponds to accident sequence 2 in the above case, indicating that the system reliability requirements are relatively lenient. The system design can be simplified to reduce costs.

[0073] The scheme for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design described in this embodiment determines system reliability indicators based on top-level nuclear safety objectives. It ensures and improves the reliability of advanced reactor system design schemes through safety margin assessment, nuclear safety objective verification, and design improvements based on system reliability indicators, thereby effectively ensuring that advanced reactor design schemes can meet relevant nuclear safety regulatory requirements.

[0074] Furthermore, the scheme utilizes system reliability metrics during the advanced reactor design process to guide designers in effectively addressing the issue of misalignment. For systems with high safety margins, more lenient reliability metric requirements are assigned, thereby reducing resource investment and lowering the design and construction costs of advanced reactors. In other words, more lenient reliability metrics help reduce system complexity and lower various requirements for system equipment, including materials and testing. For example, if a system requires a reliability metric of 0.999 to perform a specific function, it would need three redundant columns to meet this requirement. If the requirement is relaxed to 0.99, the system might only need two redundant columns, saving one-third of the cost.

[0075] For the foregoing method embodiments, in order to simplify the description, they are all described as a series of actions. However, those skilled in the art should understand that this application is not limited to the described order of actions, because according to this application, some steps can be performed in other orders or simultaneously. Furthermore, those skilled in the art should also understand that the embodiments described in the specification are all preferred embodiments, and the actions and modules involved are not necessarily essential to this application.

[0076] The methods described in the above-disclosed embodiments of this application are detailed in terms of the methods. The methods of this application can be implemented by various forms of apparatus. Therefore, this application also discloses an apparatus. Specific embodiments are given below for detailed description.

[0077] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the system structure for determining system reliability indicators in an advanced reactor design, as disclosed in an embodiment of this application. See also... Figure 3 As shown, the system 30 for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design may include:

[0078] The target determination module 301 is used to determine the safety targets of the advanced reactor.

[0079] In practice, advanced reactor safety objectives can be determined based on nuclear safety requirements, including but not limited to: determining risk measurement index requirements, and frequency and consequence requirement curves corresponding to license baseline events.

[0080] Model building module 302 is used to establish a probabilistic safety analysis model to construct a quantitative relationship between advanced reactor nuclear safety objectives and system reliability.

[0081] In practice, a PSA model can be established based on one or more initial design schemes of an advanced reactor to evaluate the risk level of one or more initial design schemes, thereby constructing a quantitative relationship between the nuclear safety objectives of the advanced reactor and the system reliability indicators.

[0082] The indicator determination module 303 is used to determine the system's reliability indicators based on the probabilistic security analysis model and the security objectives.

[0083] The reliability indicators of a system can be determined based on a probabilistic safety analysis model, combining safety objectives to sequentially determine the safety margin, target frequency, and reliability indicators for each set accident sequence. The target frequency is either the maximum accident frequency that satisfies the safety objective or a value that is a predetermined adjustment amount away from the maximum value.

[0084] The scheme for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design disclosed in this embodiment fills the gap in system reliability design during the advanced reactor design process, enabling designers to clearly define reliability indicators to ensure or improve system reliability and guarantee the safety of advanced reactor nuclear power plant operation in the later stage.

[0085] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the index determination module disclosed in the embodiments of this application. See also: Figure 4 As shown. In one implementation, the indicator determination module may include:

[0086] The safety margin determination module 401 is used to determine the safety margin of each set accident sequence based on the probabilistic safety analysis model and in combination with the safety objective.

[0087] The frequency determination module 402 is used to determine the target frequency of each set accident sequence based on the safety margin of each set accident sequence. The target frequency is the maximum value of the accident frequency that satisfies the safety target or a value that is far from the maximum value by a set adjustment amount.

[0088] The index determination submodule 403 is used to determine the system's reliability index based on the target frequency of each set accident sequence.

[0089] In one implementation, the frequency determination module can be used to: determine the target frequency of each set accident sequence based on the principle that the higher the safety margin of the set accident sequence, the greater the target frequency assigned to the set accident sequence.

[0090] In one implementation, the model building module can be specifically used to: build a probabilistic safety analysis model based on the optimal design scheme of the advanced reactor.

[0091] The aforementioned scheme determines system reliability indicators based on top-level nuclear safety objectives and ensures and improves the reliability of advanced reactor system design schemes through safety margin assessment, nuclear safety objective verification, and design improvements based on system reliability indicators. This guarantees that advanced reactor design schemes can meet relevant nuclear safety regulatory requirements. Simultaneously, the scheme utilizes system reliability indicators during the advanced reactor design process to guide designers in effectively addressing defocusing issues. For systems with higher safety margins, more lenient reliability indicator requirements are assigned, thereby reducing resource input during the advanced reactor design process and lowering the design and construction costs.

[0092] The specific implementation of the system reliability index determination system and its various modules in the above-mentioned advanced reactor design, as well as other possible implementations, can be found in the relevant sections of the method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0093] The system for determining system reliability indicators in any of the advanced reactor designs described in the above embodiments includes a processor and a memory. The target determination module, model building module, indicator determination module, safety margin determination module, frequency determination module, and indicator determination sub-module in the above embodiments are all stored as program modules in the memory, and the processor executes the above program modules stored in the memory to realize the corresponding functions.

[0094] The processor contains a kernel, which retrieves the corresponding program modules from memory. One or more kernels can be configured, and the processing of backtracking data can be achieved by adjusting kernel parameters.

[0095] The memory may include non-permanent memory in computer-readable media, such as random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory, such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM, and the memory includes at least one memory chip.

[0096] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is also provided, which can be directly loaded into the internal memory of a computer and contains software code. After being loaded and executed by the computer, the computer program can implement the steps shown in any embodiment of the method for determining system reliability indicators in the advanced reactor design described above.

[0097] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer program product is also provided, which can be directly loaded into the internal memory of a computer and contains software code. After being loaded and executed by the computer, the computer program can implement the steps shown in any embodiment of the method for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design described above.

[0098] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on its differences from other embodiments. Similar or identical parts between embodiments can be referred to interchangeably. For the apparatus disclosed in the embodiments, since they correspond to the methods disclosed in the embodiments, the description is relatively simple; relevant parts can be referred to the method section.

[0099] It should also be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes said element.

[0100] The steps of the methods or algorithms described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented directly by hardware, a software module executed by a processor, or a combination of both. The software module can be located in random access memory (RAM), main memory, read-only memory (ROM), electrically programmable ROM, electrically erasable programmable ROM, registers, hard disk, removable disk, CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.

[0101] The above description of the disclosed embodiments enables those skilled in the art to make or use this application. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of this application. Therefore, this application is not to be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A method for determining system reliability metrics in advanced reactor designs, characterized by, include: Determine the safety objectives for advanced reactors; Establish a probabilistic safety analysis model to construct a quantitative relationship between advanced reactor nuclear safety objectives and system reliability; Based on the probabilistic security analysis model, the system's reliability indicators are determined in conjunction with the security objectives.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the system reliability indicator is determined based on a plurality of system reliability indicators, each of the plurality of system reliability indicators being determined based on a plurality of system reliability indicators of a plurality of components of the advanced reactor design. The determination of system reliability indicators based on the probabilistic security analysis model and the security objectives includes: Based on the probabilistic safety analysis model, and in conjunction with the safety objectives, the safety margin for each set accident sequence is determined. The target frequency of each set accident sequence is determined based on the safety margin of each set accident sequence. The target frequency is the maximum value of the accident frequency that satisfies the safety target or a value that is far from the maximum value with a set adjustment amount. The system's reliability index is determined based on the target frequency of each set accident sequence.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the system reliability indicator is determined based on a system reliability indicator of a reference reactor design. The determination of the target frequency of each predetermined incident sequence based on the safety margin of each predetermined incident sequence includes: Based on the principle that the higher the safety margin of a set accident sequence, the higher the target frequency should be assigned to that set accident sequence, the target frequency of each set accident sequence is determined.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the system reliability indicator is determined based on a plurality of system reliability indicators, each of the plurality of system reliability indicators being determined based on a plurality of system reliability indicators of a plurality of components of the advanced reactor design. The determination of safety objectives for advanced reactors includes: Determine the risk metric requirements and frequency versus consequence requirements curves for advanced reactors.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein the system reliability indicator is determined based on a plurality of system reliability indicators, each of the plurality of system reliability indicators being determined based on a plurality of system reliability indicators of a plurality of components of the advanced reactor design. The establishment of the probabilistic security analysis model includes: A probabilistic safety analysis model is constructed based on the optimal design scheme of the advanced reactor.

6. The method for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: Substitute the reliability index into the probabilistic security analysis model to determine whether the reliability index meets the security objective. If the requirements are met, the design scheme of the advanced reactor will be adjusted based on the aforementioned reliability indicators; If the conditions are not met, adjust the parameters of the probabilistic safety analysis model and / or construct the advanced reactor design scheme on which the probabilistic safety analysis model is based.

7. A system for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design, characterized in that, include: The target determination module is used to determine the safety targets of advanced reactors; The model building module is used to establish probabilistic safety analysis models to construct a quantitative relationship between advanced reactor nuclear safety objectives and system reliability. The indicator determination module is used to determine the system's reliability indicators based on the probabilistic security analysis model and the security objectives.

8. The system for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design according to claim 7, characterized in that, The indicator determination module includes: The safety margin determination module is used to determine the safety margin of each set accident sequence based on the probabilistic safety analysis model and the safety objective. The frequency determination module is used to determine the target frequency of each set accident sequence based on the safety margin of each set accident sequence. The target frequency is the maximum value of the accident frequency that satisfies the safety target or a value that is far from the maximum value by a set adjustment amount. The index determination submodule is used to determine the system's reliability index based on the target frequency of each set accident sequence.

9. The system for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design according to claim 8, characterized in that, The frequency determination module is used to: determine the target frequency of each set accident sequence based on the principle that the higher the safety margin of the set accident sequence, the greater the target frequency assigned to the set accident sequence.

10. The system for determining system reliability indicators in advanced reactor design according to claim 7, characterized in that, The model building module is used to: build a probabilistic safety analysis model based on the optimal design scheme of the advanced reactor.

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