A method and related device for cross-domain trusted mutual recognition of intelligent agents
By sending an identity resolution request to the DNS server and querying the trust status of the DNS server using a blockchain trust anchor contract, the problem of insufficient reflection of the trusted status of the DNS server in cross-trust domains is solved, thereby improving the reliability and accuracy of cross-domain authentication.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611566044.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-10-10
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
In intelligent agent interaction scenarios across trust domains, existing technologies struggle to accurately reflect the current trusted state of DNS servers, resulting in insufficient reliability of cross-domain authentication.
By sending an identity resolution request to the DNS server of the first trusted domain, receiving identity claims and signature information, and combining the trust status information of the DNS server with the blockchain trust anchor contract, the source and current trusted status of the identity claim are determined, thereby determining the cross-domain authentication result of the smart agent.
It improves the reliability of cross-domain authentication, reduces the impact of changes in DNS server trust state on the accuracy of authentication results, and enhances the accuracy and security of cross-domain authentication.
Smart Images

Figure CN123123012A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a method and apparatus for cross-domain trusted mutual recognition of intelligent agents. Background Technology
[0002] With the development of artificial intelligence technology, intelligent agents are increasingly being applied to collaborative scenarios between different organizations and business systems. In cross-organizational collaboration, different intelligent agents typically reside in different trust domains. When an intelligent agent in one trust domain accesses a service in another trust domain, the agent initiating the access needs to be authenticated to determine whether it has a trusted identity.
[0003] The Domain Name System (DNS) enables name resolution between different domains. Related technologies also allow for the verification of DNS responses through digital signatures to confirm their integrity and origin. For example, DNS data can be signed and verified using Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC), or trust relationships between DNS servers can be pre-configured to support the corresponding authentication process.
[0004] However, in cross-trust domain agent interaction scenarios, the trust status of the DNS server itself may change. For example, if the key corresponding to the DNS server is leaked or the trust qualification of the DNS server changes, authentication based solely on the signature information provided by the DNS server may not accurately reflect the current trust status of the DNS server, thus affecting the reliability of cross-domain agent authentication. Summary of the Invention
[0005] To address the aforementioned issues, this application provides a method and related apparatus for cross-domain trusted mutual recognition of intelligent agents. This method can perform cross-domain identity verification based on verifying the source of the intelligent agent's identity claim and combining it with the current trusted state of the corresponding DNS server, thereby improving the reliability of cross-domain identity verification of intelligent agents.
[0006] Based on this, the following technical solution is disclosed in this application: In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide a method for cross-domain trusted mutual recognition of intelligent agents, applied to a second domain name system DNS server in a second trusted domain, the method comprising: Send an identity resolution request for the first agent to the first DNS server of the first trust domain, wherein the first agent belongs to the first trust domain; Receive the identity resolution result returned by the first DNS server, wherein the identity resolution result includes the identity statement of the first intelligent agent and the identity statement signature information corresponding to the identity statement; The identity claim signature information is verified to obtain a source verification result that characterizes whether the identity claim originates from the first DNS server; The trust status information corresponding to the first DNS server in the blockchain trust anchor contract is queried, and the first DNS server is determined to be in a trusted state based on the trust status information. The blockchain trust anchor contract is used to maintain the trust status information corresponding to DNS servers of multiple trust domains. Based on the source verification result and whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state, the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent is determined.
[0007] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide a cross-domain trusted mutual recognition device for intelligent agents, applied to a second domain name system DNS server in a second trusted domain, the device comprising: The sending unit is configured to send an identity resolution request for the first intelligent agent to the first DNS server of the first trust domain, wherein the first intelligent agent belongs to the first trust domain. The receiving unit is configured to receive the identity resolution result returned by the first DNS server, wherein the identity resolution result includes the identity declaration of the first intelligent agent and the identity declaration signature information corresponding to the identity declaration; The verification unit is used to verify the identity claim signature information and obtain a source verification result that characterizes whether the identity claim originates from the first DNS server. The query unit is used to query the trust status information corresponding to the first DNS server in the blockchain trust anchor contract, and determine whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state based on the trust status information. The blockchain trust anchor contract is used to maintain the trust status information corresponding to DNS servers of multiple trust domains. The determining unit is configured to determine the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent based on the source verification result and whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state.
[0008] Thirdly, embodiments of this application provide a computer device, the computer device including a processor and a memory: The memory is used to store computer programs and to transfer the computer programs to the processor; The processor is configured to execute the method described in the first aspect above according to the computer program.
[0009] Fourthly, embodiments of this application provide a computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program for performing the method described in the first aspect above.
[0010] Fifthly, embodiments of this application provide a computer program product including a computer program, which, when run on a computer device, causes the computer device to perform the method described in the first aspect above.
[0011] As can be seen from the above technical solutions, this application has at least the following beneficial effects: This application sends an identity resolution request for a first intelligent agent to a first DNS server in a first trust domain, and receives an identity statement and its signature information returned by the first DNS server. By verifying the identity statement signature information, it can be determined whether the identity statement originates from the first DNS server. Based on this, by querying the trust status information corresponding to the first DNS server in the blockchain trust anchor contract, it can be further determined whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state. Combining the source verification result of the identity statement and the current trusted state of the first DNS server, the cross-domain authentication result of the first intelligent agent is determined. Therefore, the cross-domain authentication process can verify both the source of the identity statement and the current trusted state of the DNS server that issued the identity statement, reducing the possibility that changes in the trust status of the DNS server could affect the accuracy of the authentication result when relying solely on signature validity for verification, thereby improving the reliability of cross-domain authentication for intelligent agents. Attached Figure Description
[0012] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments recorded in this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.
[0013] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating a cross-domain trusted mutual recognition method for intelligent agents provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This application provides a schematic diagram of the overall architecture of an intelligent agent cross-domain trusted mutual recognition system. Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a cross-domain certificate chain and signature verification process provided for an embodiment of this application; Figure 4 A schematic diagram illustrating a trust path recording and auditable mechanism provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a cross-domain trusted mutual recognition device for intelligent agents provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a computer device provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation
[0014] Embodiments of this application will now be described in more detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. While some embodiments of this application are shown in the drawings, it should be understood that this application can be implemented in various forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodiments set forth herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided to provide a more thorough and complete understanding of this application. It should be understood that the drawings and embodiments of this application are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of this application.
[0015] In some cross-domain agent interaction scenarios, agents typically provide identity-related information through the DNS server of their respective trusted domain. For example, when an agent in a first trusted domain accesses a service in a second trusted domain, the second trusted domain can perform identity resolution on the DNS server in the first trusted domain based on the identification information carried by the agent to obtain the agent's corresponding identity information.
[0016] In related technologies, DNSSEC can be used to digitally sign and verify DNS response data, thereby verifying the integrity and origin of the DNS response data. DNSSEC employs a hierarchical trust structure built from the root domain, top-level domain, and lower-level domains. While it can confirm that DNS data was issued by the DNS server corresponding to the relevant domain, it is difficult to further confirm whether the corresponding DNS server is still trustworthy, and it is also difficult to establish peer-to-peer trust relationships between DNS servers in different trusted domains based on this hierarchical trust structure. Furthermore, even if it can be confirmed that the identity claim was issued by the corresponding DNS server, it is difficult to further reflect whether that DNS server still has the trusted qualification to claim the identity of the corresponding agent.
[0017] In another implementation, trust relationships between DNS servers can be pre-configured. For example, authentication between servers can be achieved through transaction signatures (TSIG) or shared keys, or a server address whitelist can be configured through forwarders. These trust relationships typically rely on pre-configuration, and the corresponding configurations need to be adjusted synchronously when the server's keys, operating status, or trust eligibility change. Maintaining continuous trust relationships between different servers becomes complex when there are many trusted domains participating in cross-domain collaboration, or when participating entities change.
[0018] In addition, there are also identity authentication mechanisms based on blockchain that register the identity or public key of intelligent agents, such as ERC-8004 and W3C Decentralized Identifier (DID). These mechanisms can utilize trusted data recorded on the blockchain to assist in identity verification. However, when intelligent agents access domains and cross-domains, the identity verification process may be independent of the existing DNS resolution process, requiring additional identity information queries. Some blockchain cross-domain solutions also employ a fixed main chain and sub-chain structure. When new participating entities join or participating nodes are adjusted, the existing system structure may need to be adjusted, limiting its adaptability to dynamically changing scenarios.
[0019] Therefore, in the process of agents interacting across trusted domains, how to improve the ability of cross-domain authentication results to reflect the current trust status of relevant DNS servers while verifying the source of the agent's identity claim is a problem that needs to be solved.
[0020] Based on this, embodiments of this application provide a method and related apparatus for cross-domain trusted mutual recognition of intelligent agents. The method involves sending an identity resolution request for a first intelligent agent to a first DNS server in a first trusted domain, and receiving an identity statement and its signature information returned by the first DNS server. By verifying the identity statement signature information, it can be determined whether the identity statement originates from the first DNS server. Furthermore, by querying the trust status information corresponding to the first DNS server in the blockchain trust anchor contract, it can be further determined whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state. The cross-domain authentication result of the first intelligent agent is determined by combining the source verification result of the identity statement and the current trusted state of the first DNS server. Therefore, the cross-domain authentication process can verify both the source of the identity statement and the current trusted status of the DNS server that issued the identity statement. This reduces the possibility of changes in the trust status of the DNS server affecting the accuracy of the authentication result when only verifying the signature validity, thereby improving the reliability of cross-domain authentication of intelligent agents.
[0021] The cross-domain trusted mutual recognition method for intelligent agents provided in this application can be applied to servers with DNS service capabilities and data processing capabilities. The server can be a standalone physical server, a server cluster consisting of multiple physical servers, or a distributed system. The server can communicate with other servers and blockchain networks via wired or wireless communication methods; this application does not impose any restrictions on this.
[0022] All data collected in this application was collected with the consent and authorization of the data subject (such as user, organization or enterprise), and the collection, use and processing of the relevant data shall comply with the relevant laws, regulations and standards of the relevant countries and regions.
[0023] See Figure 1 This figure is a flowchart illustrating the cross-domain trusted mutual recognition method for intelligent agents provided in an embodiment of this application. For ease of description, the following embodiments use the second DNS server of the second trusted domain as the execution subject. Figure 1 As shown, the cross-domain trusted mutual recognition method for intelligent agents includes S101-S105.
[0024] S101: Send an identity resolution request for the first agent to the first DNS server of the first trust domain.
[0025] Among them, the first intelligent agent belongs to the first trust domain.
[0026] A trust domain is a network domain with a corresponding identity management scope. Different trust domains can correspond to different organizations, business systems, or management entities. The first DNS server is the DNS server corresponding to the first trust domain, and the second DNS server is the DNS server corresponding to the second trust domain. The first DNS server can be used to manage DNS resolution information within the first trust domain and provide identity-related information for agents within the first trust domain.
[0027] For example, the first trusted domain could be acme.com, the second trusted domain could be beta.org, and the first agent could be agent-007.acme.com. When the first agent needs to access a service in the second trusted domain, cross-domain authentication for the first agent can be triggered. At this time, the first DNS server can be determined based on the first trusted domain to which the first agent belongs, and an identity resolution request can be sent to the first DNS server.
[0028] The identity resolution request may carry information used to identify the first intelligent agent. For example, the identity resolution request may carry the domain name identifier of the first intelligent agent, enabling the first DNS server to query the identity information corresponding to the first intelligent agent based on the domain name identifier. In other scenarios, other identification information that can uniquely or accurately identify the first intelligent agent may also be used, and this application embodiment does not impose any restrictions on this.
[0029] S102: Receive the identity resolution result returned by the first DNS server.
[0030] The identity resolution result includes the identity statement of the first agent and the identity statement signature information corresponding to the identity statement.
[0031] An identity claim is used to represent identity-related information of the first intelligent agent. For example, an identity claim may include one or more of the following: the first intelligent agent's identity attributes, public key, capability description, authorization scope, or validity period. In different application scenarios, the information recorded in the identity claim can be configured according to authentication requirements.
[0032] The identity statement signature information corresponds to the identity statement and is used to support the verification of the source of the identity statement. For example, the first DNS server can query the identity information corresponding to the first agent based on the first agent's identifier, form an identity statement based on the queried identity information, and generate identity statement signature information for the identity statement using the signing key corresponding to the first DNS server.
[0033] Taking the aforementioned first intelligent agent, agent-007.acme.com, as an example, after receiving the identity resolution request, the first DNS server can query the identity information corresponding to agent-007.acme.com, form the first intelligent agent's identity statement, and generate identity statement signature information corresponding to the identity statement. Subsequently, the identity statement and identity statement signature information can be combined to form the identity resolution result, and the identity resolution result can be returned to the second DNS server.
[0034] Therefore, the second DNS server can obtain not only the identity information corresponding to the first agent through the identity resolution result, but also the information used to verify the source of the identity claim, so that it can subsequently determine whether the received identity claim really comes from the first DNS server.
[0035] S103: Verify the identity claim signature information to obtain a source verification result that indicates whether the identity claim originates from the first DNS server.
[0036] The source verification result is used to characterize the source relationship between the identity claim and the first DNS server.
[0037] For example, the public key corresponding to the first DNS server can be used to verify the identity claim signature information. If the identity claim signature information is verified successfully, the source verification result indicates that the identity claim originates from the first DNS server. If the identity claim signature information is not verified successfully, the source verification result indicates that the current identity claim has failed the source verification against the first DNS server.
[0038] During the transmission of an identity claim from the first DNS server to the second DNS server, the claim may be affected by transmission anomalies or illegal tampering. By verifying the signature information of the identity claim, it can be determined whether the currently received identity claim matches the signature information generated by the first DNS server, thereby verifying the origin of the identity claim.
[0039] It should be noted that S103 is primarily used to verify whether the current identity claim originates from the primary DNS server. The fact that the identity claim does indeed originate from the primary DNS server does not automatically mean that the primary DNS server is still in a trusted state at the current moment. For example, the primary DNS server may be in a trusted state when generating the identity claim signature information, but its key security or trustworthiness may have changed before the secondary DNS server performs cross-domain authentication. Therefore, after obtaining the source verification result, the current trustworthiness of the primary DNS server can be further determined.
[0040] S104: Query the trust status information corresponding to the first DNS server in the blockchain trust anchor contract, and determine whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state based on the trust status information.
[0041] Among them, the blockchain trust anchor contract is used to maintain the trust status information of DNS servers corresponding to multiple trust domains.
[0042] A blockchain trust anchor contract is a smart contract deployed on a blockchain used to maintain trust state information for DNS servers across multiple trust domains. By maintaining the trust state information for DNS servers in different trust domains, a queryable trust basis can be provided for DNS servers in different trust domains.
[0043] For example, DNS servers in multiple trusted domains can each possess their own corresponding trust status information. Blockchain trust anchor contracts can record or update this trust status information based on the trustworthiness of the DNS servers. When the trustworthiness of a DNS server changes, its corresponding trust status information can also change accordingly.
[0044] When performing cross-domain authentication, the blockchain trust anchor contract can be queried based on the identifier of the first DNS server to obtain the trust status information corresponding to the first DNS server, and the first DNS server can be judged as being in a trusted state based on the obtained trust status information.
[0045] For example, the identity claim signature information previously generated by the first DNS server could be verified successfully, but the first DNS server subsequently experienced a private key leak, a security incident, or a change in its trust status. In this case, verifying only the identity claim signature information may still yield the result that the identity claim originated from the first DNS server, but this result cannot reflect the current trustworthiness of the first DNS server. By further querying the blockchain trust anchor contract, the current trust status information can be used to reassess whether the first DNS server is currently trustworthy.
[0046] Therefore, verification can be performed from two aspects: the source of the identity statement and the current trust status of the identity statement provider. The source verification result reflects whether the identity statement was provided by the first DNS server, while the trust status information reflects whether the first DNS server remains trustworthy in the current cross-domain authentication process. In this way, even if the historical signature corresponding to the first DNS server can still pass verification, changes in the trust status of the first DNS server can be identified based on the current trust status information, making subsequent cross-domain authentication results more accurately reflect the current trust status.
[0047] S105: Determine the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent based on the source verification result and whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state.
[0048] Cross-domain authentication results are used to characterize the authentication status of the first agent during cross-trust domain interactions.
[0049] For example, if the source verification result indicates that the identity claim originates from the first DNS server, and the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state based on the currently queried trust state information, then the first agent can be determined to have passed cross-domain authentication. If the identity claim fails the source verification against the first DNS server, or if the first DNS server is not currently in a trusted state based on the currently queried trust state information, then the first agent can be determined to have failed cross-domain authentication.
[0050] Taking the aforementioned scenario as an example, the first intelligent agent, agent-007.acme.com, requests access to services in the second trusted domain. The second DNS server obtains the first intelligent agent's identity statement and identity statement signature information from the first DNS server corresponding to acme.com. If the identity statement signature information is verified successfully, and the first DNS server is determined to be in a trusted state based on the currently maintained trust state information in the blockchain trust anchor contract, the cross-domain authentication of the first intelligent agent can be determined to be successful. If the identity statement signature information can be verified successfully, but the first DNS server is no longer trusted based on the current trust state information, then this cross-domain authentication may fail.
[0051] As can be seen from the above technical solution, this application embodiment sends an identity resolution request for the first agent to the first DNS server in the first trust domain, and receives the identity statement and identity statement signature information returned by the first DNS server. By verifying the identity statement signature information, it can be determined whether the identity statement originates from the first DNS server. Based on this, by querying the trust status information corresponding to the first DNS server in the blockchain trust anchor contract, it can be further determined whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state. Combining the source verification result of the identity statement and the current trusted state of the first DNS server, the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent is determined. Thus, the cross-domain authentication process can verify both the source of the identity statement and the current trusted state of the DNS server that issued the identity statement, reducing the possibility that changes in the trust state of the DNS server may affect the accuracy of the authentication result when only verifying the signature validity, thereby improving the reliability of cross-domain authentication of the agent.
[0052] In some cross-domain authentication scenarios, after confirming that the identity claim originates from the first DNS server, it is further possible to verify whether the current identity resolution result is directed to the current second trusted domain, thereby improving the accuracy of the correspondence between identity resolution results across different trusted domains. Based on this, embodiments of this application also provide a method for verifying identity resolution results, as detailed in A1-A2.
[0053] A1: Verify the directed signature information to obtain a verification result that represents whether the identity resolution result corresponds to the second trust domain.
[0054] The identity resolution result also includes directed signature information, which is generated by the first DNS server based on the identity declaration signature information and the identification information of the second trust domain.
[0055] The identification information for the second trust domain is used to identify the second trust domain. For example, the identification information for the second trust domain can be the domain name corresponding to the second trust domain, or it can be other identification information that can distinguish the second trust domain from other trust domains.
[0056] The directed signature information is used to establish a verifiable correspondence between the identity resolution result and the corresponding second trusted domain. For example, after generating the identity claim signature information, the first DNS server can also generate directed signature information based on the identity claim signature information and the identification information of the second trusted domain, and return the directed signature information along with the identity claim and the identity claim signature information. In this way, the directed signature information contains information related to the current second trusted domain, which the second DNS server can use to verify whether the received identity resolution result corresponds to the current second trusted domain.
[0057] Taking the scenario where the first trust domain is acme.com and the second trust domain is beta.org as an example, after the first DNS server corresponding to acme.com forms the identity declaration signature information of the first intelligent agent, it can further combine the identification information corresponding to beta.org to generate targeted signature information. After receiving the identity resolution result, the second DNS server corresponding to beta.org can verify the targeted signature information. If the verification passes, the correspondence verification result can indicate that the current identity resolution result corresponds to beta.org. If the verification fails, the correspondence verification result can indicate that the current identity resolution result fails the correspondence verification with beta.org.
[0058] In one specific implementation of identity resolution, a custom AGENT resource record query can be used to resolve the identity of the first agent. For example, the agent's identity-related information can be carried in the AGENT resource record. In another implementation, existing DNS text resource records, i.e., TXT resource records, can also be used to carry the relevant information. Thus, the appropriate resource record format can be selected according to the actual DNS deployment without changing the cross-domain authentication processing logic described above in this application.
[0059] A2: Determine the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent based on the source verification result, the corresponding relationship verification result, and whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state.
[0060] For example, if the source verification result indicates that the identity claim originates from the first DNS server, the correspondence verification result indicates that the identity resolution result corresponds to the second trusted domain, and the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state, then it can be determined that the first agent has passed cross-domain authentication. If any of the above verifications fails, it can be determined that the first agent has failed this cross-domain authentication.
[0061] Building upon identity claim source verification and the current trusted state verification of the first DNS server, a new verification method is added to establish the correspondence between the identity resolution result and the current second trusted domain. This allows the identity resolution results returned by the first DNS server for different target trusted domains to be distinguished. Consequently, the likelihood of identity resolution results generated for other trusted domains being directly used for authentication in the current second trusted domain is reduced, further improving the accuracy and security of cross-domain authentication.
[0062] In some embodiments, the data corresponding to the directed signature information can be further limited to reflect the association between the directed signature information and the identity declaration signature information, the second trust domain, and the timeliness information of the current identity resolution process. Based on this, embodiments of this application provide a specific implementation of the directed signature information, see B1-B2 for details.
[0063] B1: Verify whether the targeted signature information is valid.
[0064] The targeted signature information is obtained by the first DNS server signing the data to be signed. The data to be signed includes the hash value of the identity declaration signature information, the identification information of the second trust domain, the timestamp, and the random number.
[0065] The hash value of the identity claim signature information is calculated based on the identity claim signature information and is used to associate the directed signature information with the corresponding identity claim signature information. Thus, if the identity claim or the identity claim signature information changes, the corresponding data to be signed will also change.
[0066] A timestamp is used to reflect the time information associated with this targeted signature. For example, the timestamp could be the current time when the first DNS server generated the targeted signature.
[0067] Random numbers are used to distinguish different identity resolution processes. For example, the first DNS server can generate a corresponding random number each time it generates directed signature information, so that the data to be signed used in different identity resolution processes is different.
[0068] In one specific implementation, the first DNS server can first generate identity statement signature information for the identity statement of the first intelligent agent, then calculate the hash value of the identity statement signature information, combine the hash value with the identification information of the second trust domain, the current timestamp and the random number to form the data to be signed, and digitally sign the data to be signed to generate targeted signature information.
[0069] For example, if the first trusted domain is acme.com and the second trusted domain is beta.org, the first DNS server can generate data to be signed based on the hash value of the identity claim signature information, beta.org, the current timestamp, and a random number, and then sign the data to be signed. As an example, the digital signature algorithm can be Ed25519, or other algorithms capable of performing digital signatures and signature verification can be used depending on the actual cryptographic algorithm configuration.
[0070] After receiving the directed signature information, the second DNS server can verify its validity using the corresponding signature verification algorithm. By incorporating the hash value of the identity claim signature information into the data to be signed, the directed signature information can be further associated with the source verification information of this identity claim, thus establishing a correspondence between the two levels of signatures.
[0071] B2: Verify whether the identifier information of the second trust field in the data to be signed matches the second trust field, and whether the timestamp is within the preset valid time window.
[0072] For example, the identifier information of the second trust domain in the data to be signed can be compared with the identifier information corresponding to the second trust domain currently performing cross-domain authentication. If they match, it can be determined that the current directed signature information corresponds to the current second trust domain.
[0073] A preset valid time window is used to determine whether the time corresponding to the targeted signature information meets the timeliness requirements of this authentication. For example, the difference between the current time and the timestamp in the data to be signed can be used to determine whether the timestamp is within the preset valid time window. In one example, the preset valid time window can be set to 30 seconds before or after the current time. In other implementations, other valid time window lengths can be set based on network latency, business security requirements, etc.
[0074] For random numbers, already used random numbers can be recorded during the authentication process, and the relationship between the currently received random number and the used random numbers can be used to help identify repeatedly used identity resolution results. For example, if the same random number is found to have been used in a previous identity resolution process, this can be used to further verify the current identity resolution result.
[0075] Therefore, the targeted signature information not only establishes a correspondence with the current second trust domain, but also associates it with the corresponding identity statement signature information and the time information of the current identity resolution process. This can reduce the possibility that historical identity resolution results are used again in the current verification process, while confirming that the received identity resolution results are directed to the current second trust domain, thereby further improving the security of cross-domain authentication.
[0076] In some embodiments, to ensure that DNS servers in different trust domains have a trust basis that can change with the current trust status, the information maintained by the blockchain trust anchor contract and the method for determining the trust status of the first DNS server can be further described. Based on this, embodiments of this application provide a specific implementation for determining whether the first DNS server is currently in a trust state, as detailed in C1-C2.
[0077] C1: Determine whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state based on its current state.
[0078] Among them, the blockchain trust anchor contract is also used to maintain the identification information and public key hash of each of the multiple DNS servers. The trust status information includes the current status of the first DNS server, which includes active, suspended or revoked status.
[0079] The identification information of a DNS server is used to distinguish different DNS servers. For example, the identification information of a DNS server can be the domain name corresponding to the DNS server.
[0080] A public key hash is information obtained by hashing the public key corresponding to a DNS server. By recording the public key hash in the blockchain trust anchor contract, a correspondence can be established between the public key of the DNS server and its on-chain record.
[0081] In one system initialization example, the DNS servers corresponding to each trust domain can generate signature key pairs. For example, an Ed25519 key pair can be generated, and the public key hash corresponding to the public key can be submitted to the blockchain through the registration interface of the blockchain trust anchor contract. The blockchain trust anchor contract can record the DNS server's identification information, public key hash, and registration timestamp, and set the initial current state of the corresponding DNS server to active.
[0082] Multiple DNS servers can form a dynamically maintained DNS server trust federation by registering with a blockchain trust anchor contract. In one example, the blockchain trust anchor contract can maintain a federation member table, recording the identification information, public key hash, registration time, and current state of registered DNS servers. The blockchain trust anchor contract can also record cross-domain trust relationships between different DNS servers, such as the validity period of corresponding trust claims and trust policy hashes. During the registration process, DNS servers can also submit their corresponding trust policies or the hash values corresponding to those policies.
[0083] After registration is complete, the DNS server can also publish information related to the on-chain registration in its own DNS resource records. For example, it can publish the contract address of the blockchain trust anchor contract and the transaction hash of the corresponding registration transaction in the TXT resource record, so that other devices participating in cross-domain authentication can discover the corresponding on-chain record.
[0084] C2: If the current state of the first DNS server is active, determine that the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state; if the current state of the first DNS server is suspended or withdrawn, determine that the first DNS server is currently in an untrusted state.
[0085] For example, when the first DNS server is currently in a normal, trusted state, its chain state can be active. After the second DNS server queries this current state, it can determine that the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state.
[0086] When the primary DNS server needs to be suspended from trust, its current state can be updated to "suspended." When the primary DNS server is no longer suitable as a trusted identity claim provider, its current state can be updated to "revoked." Upon detecting a suspended or revoked state, the secondary DNS server can determine that the primary DNS server is currently in an untrusted state.
[0087] In one revocation example, when the first DNS server experiences a private key leak or other security event affecting trustworthiness, the administrator of the first trust domain can update the current state of the first DNS server from active to revoked through the revocation interface of the blockchain trust anchor contract. The blockchain trust anchor contract can also record the corresponding revocation timestamp and the revocation reason hash. Furthermore, the blockchain trust anchor contract can maintain a revocation list to record the public keys of revoked DNS servers and their corresponding revocation times.
[0088] After the state update, DNS servers participating in subsequent cross-domain authentication can obtain the updated current state when querying on-chain trust state information, thus no longer accepting identity claims provided by the revoked DNS server. As a supplementary implementation, the revoked DNS server can also publish a revocation statement in the TXT resource record to provide corresponding revocation information to lightweight resolution devices that are not directly connected to the blockchain.
[0089] Therefore, the trust status of DNS servers corresponding to different trust domains can be maintained and updated in the form of on-chain states. When the trust status of a DNS server changes, subsequent cross-domain authentication can re-determine whether the DNS server is trustworthy based on the updated current state. This allows the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent to reflect the current trust status of the DNS server and improves the reliability of cross-domain authentication when the trust relationship of DNS servers changes dynamically.
[0090] In some cross-trust domain scenarios, the first trust domain and the second trust domain may also establish trust relationships through other trust domains. In order to verify the trust transfer relationship between multiple trust domains, this application embodiment also provides a cross-domain certificate chain verification method, as detailed in D1-D3.
[0091] D1: Obtain the cross-domain certificate chain between the first trust domain and the second trust domain.
[0092] A cross-domain certificate chain includes at least one cross-domain trust statement. Each cross-domain trust statement includes the identification information of the issuing DNS server, the identification information of the issued DNS server, the validity period, and the issuing party's signature.
[0093] Cross-domain trust claims are used to characterize a trust relationship established between two DNS servers. For example, when a DNS server corresponding to a first trusted domain establishes trust with a DNS server corresponding to a second trusted domain, it can generate a corresponding cross-domain trust claim.
[0094] The issuing DNS server's identification information identifies the DNS server that generated the cross-domain trust claim, while the issued DNS server's identification information identifies the DNS server to which the cross-domain trust claim points. The validity period indicates the timeframe within which the cross-domain trust claim can be used for trust verification. The issuing party's signature verifies whether the cross-domain trust claim was issued by the issuing DNS server.
[0095] For example, when a DNS server corresponding to a first trusted domain needs to establish a cross-domain trust relationship with a DNS server corresponding to a second trusted domain, a cross-domain trust statement can be generated for the DNS server corresponding to the second trusted domain. This cross-domain trust statement may include the identification information, validity period, and issuance timestamp of the issuing DNS server, and is signed with the private key of the issuing DNS server.
[0096] Cross-domain trust claims can be published via DNS resource records. For example, a cross-domain trust claim can be written into the TXT resource record corresponding to the issuing DNS server. Simultaneously, the hash value of the cross-domain trust claim can be calculated and submitted to the cross-domain trust relationship maintained by the blockchain trust anchor contract. The issuing DNS server can also generate a reverse cross-domain trust claim in the same way, thereby establishing a bidirectional cross-domain trust relationship.
[0097] When there is an intermediate trust domain between the first and second trust domains, multiple cross-domain trust claims can form a cross-domain certificate chain. For example, if the second trust domain trusts the third trust domain, and the third trust domain trusts the first trust domain, then the second DNS server can verify the cross-domain trust claims from the second trust domain to the third trust domain and from the third trust domain to the first trust domain, thus gradually passing the trust relationship of the second trust domain to the first trust domain.
[0098] D2: Verify the cross-domain trust claims in the cross-domain certificate chain hop by hop, and verify the cross-domain certificate chain based on the root hash of the cross-domain certificate chain anchored in the blockchain trust anchor contract.
[0099] Hop-by-hop verification is used to verify each cross-domain trust claim sequentially according to the trust transfer order in the cross-domain certificate chain. For example, it can verify the issuer's signature for each cross-domain trust claim and check the correspondence between the issuer's DNS server, the issued party's DNS server, and the validity period.
[0100] The root hash is the hash information used to anchor the root of trust in a cross-domain certificate chain. For example, the root hash of the direct trust anchor corresponding to a cross-domain certificate chain can be calculated and recorded in the blockchain trust anchor contract. After verifying the root of trust in the cross-domain certificate chain hop by hop, the corresponding information can be verified against the root hash anchored in the blockchain trust anchor contract, thereby tracing the trust transfer relationship in the cross-domain certificate chain back to the trust basis on the chain.
[0101] Taking the aforementioned case with a third trust domain as an example, we can sequentially verify the cross-domain trust statement from the second trust domain to the third trust domain and the cross-domain trust statement from the third trust domain to the first trust domain, and then continue to verify whether the root hash corresponding to the cross-domain certificate chain is consistent with the anchoring information in the blockchain trust anchor contract.
[0102] Through the above hop-by-hop verification, the trust relationship between the first trust domain and the second trust domain is not limited to the directly established trust relationship. Even in the presence of intermediate trust domains, the recursive verification of the trust relationship can be completed through multiple cross-domain trust declarations.
[0103] D3: Determine the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent based on the source verification result, whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state, and the verification result of the cross-domain certificate chain.
[0104] For example, if the identity claim source verification is successful, the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state, and the cross-domain certificate chain between the first and second trusted domains is verified, it can be determined that the first agent has passed cross-domain authentication.
[0105] Therefore, in addition to verifying the source of the identity claim and the current trusted state of the first DNS server, it is also possible to verify the trust transfer relationship between the first and second trust domains. The trust relationships of each hop in the cross-domain certificate chain are verified through corresponding signatures and further traced back to the root hash in the blockchain trust anchor contract, enabling the trust relationship between DNS servers to be progressively transferred along multiple trust domains, thereby further improving the credibility of cross-domain authentication in multi-trust domain collaboration scenarios.
[0106] For cross-domain certificate chains, different verification modes can be adopted according to actual identity verification needs. Two examples are provided below.
[0107] Method 1, full-chain verification mode, see E1 for details.
[0108] E1: Verify hop by hop along the cross-domain certificate chain until verification is performed to the root hash anchored in the blockchain trust anchor contract.
[0109] For example, when a cross-domain certificate chain includes multiple cross-domain trust claims, you can start from the current trust relationship to be verified, verify each cross-domain trust claim one by one according to the trust transfer order in the cross-domain certificate chain, until you trace back to the trust root corresponding to the cross-domain certificate chain, and further verify the corresponding root hash.
[0110] The full-chain verification mode can reconfirm the entire trust transfer process by fully tracing the trust relationship in the cross-domain certificate chain, making it suitable for scenarios with high requirements for the completeness of trust verification.
[0111] Method 2, quick verification mode, see F1 for details.
[0112] F1: If a verified node exists in the cross-domain certificate chain, terminate the tracing along the cross-domain certificate chain based on the verified node.
[0113] Verified nodes are used to represent nodes that have completed trusted verification in the cross-domain certificate chain. For example, if a node and its corresponding upstream trust relationship have been verified in a previous cross-domain trust verification process, then that node can be used as a verified node in this cross-domain certificate chain verification process.
[0114] During the hop-by-hop verification process along the cross-domain certificate chain, if a verified node is reached, the verification result of that verified node can be used as a basis to stop tracing back to the trust path before that node.
[0115] For example, a cross-domain certificate chain contains multiple intermediate trust domains. If the node corresponding to one of the intermediate trust domains has already completed trusted verification, then this time we can verify the cross-domain trust statement from the current node to the verified node, and end the tracing after reaching the verified node.
[0116] Therefore, the full-chain verification mode can verify the entire trust path, while the fast verification mode can utilize existing verification results to reduce redundant cross-domain trust claim verifications. In practical applications, the appropriate verification mode can be selected based on security requirements and verification efficiency needs, maintaining the trusted verification capability of the cross-domain certificate chain while reducing the processing overhead caused by repeated verifications in some scenarios.
[0117] After completing the cross-domain authentication of the first intelligent agent, the trust information used in this cross-domain authentication process can also be recorded so that the authentication process can be traced in the event of a subsequent security incident. Based on this, embodiments of this application provide a method for storing trust path records, as detailed in G1-G2.
[0118] G1: Generate the trust path record corresponding to the first agent.
[0119] The trust path record includes the cross-domain resolution link, the hash value of each hop signature information, the timestamp, and the cross-domain authentication result.
[0120] Cross-domain resolution links reflect the resolution relationships between trusted domains or DNS servers involved in this cross-domain authentication process. For example, in the absence of an intermediate trusted domain, cross-domain resolution links can reflect the resolution relationship between the first trusted domain and the second trusted domain. In the presence of an intermediate trusted domain, cross-domain resolution links can also record the corresponding intermediate trusted domain.
[0121] The hash value of each hop signature is used to record the hash result of the corresponding signature information in the cross-domain resolution link, thereby identifying the signature information used in this instance without directly writing the complete signature content to the blockchain. For example, the locally stored complete trust path record can also include the signature information of each hop itself, and calculate the corresponding hash value based on each hop signature information, so as to trace the signature information used in this cross-domain authentication during subsequent auditing.
[0122] The timestamp can be used to record the time when the cross-domain authentication or trust path record was generated. The cross-domain authentication result is used to record whether the first agent was ultimately determined to have passed or failed cross-domain authentication.
[0123] For example, after completing cross-domain authentication for agent-007.acme.com between acme.com and beta.org, the complete parsing chain, the hash value of the corresponding signature information, the timestamp, and the final cross-domain authentication result can be combined to form a trust path record.
[0124] G2: Determine the hash value of the trust path record and submit the hash value of the trust path record to the blockchain trust anchor contract.
[0125] For example, the Secure Hash Algorithm 256 (SHA-256) can be used to calculate the hash value of a trusted path record. Other implementations may also use other hash algorithms capable of generating the corresponding hash values.
[0126] The specific content of the trust path record can be stored locally, while the content submitted to the blockchain trust anchor contract can include the hash value of the trust path record. In one example, the cross-domain authentication result corresponding to this hash value can also be recorded on-chain. Since it is not necessary to write the complete cross-domain resolution content to the blockchain, the public propagation of identity resolution content between different nodes can be reduced.
[0127] When a cross-domain authentication is subsequently audited, it can be traced back based on the on-chain evidence. For example, the hash value of the trust path record within the target time range can be obtained from the evidence storage records of the blockchain trust anchor contract, and then the complete trust path record stored locally can be obtained from the trust domain related to the cross-domain authentication. Subsequently, the hash value of the local trust path record can be recalculated, and the recalculated hash value can be compared with the hash value recorded in the blockchain trust anchor contract.
[0128] If the two are consistent, it can be determined that the locally stored trust path record is consistent with the record previously stored. Furthermore, the cross-domain resolution link, each hop signature information, timestamp, and cross-domain authentication result in the trust path record can be read to trace the current cross-domain authentication process and locate the corresponding trust judgment link.
[0129] Therefore, the hash value of the trust path record stored in the blockchain can be used to verify the integrity of the local complete record, so that the complete parsing content can be retained locally in the corresponding trust domain, while retaining the basis for subsequent auditing of the cross-domain authentication process, thus taking into account both the traceability of the cross-domain authentication process and the protection of identity parsing information.
[0130] See Figure 2 , Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the overall architecture of a cross-domain trusted mutual recognition system for intelligent agents, provided in an embodiment of this application.
[0131] like Figure 2 As shown, the system can include DNS servers corresponding to multiple trust domains, blockchain trust anchor contracts, and cross-domain mutual recognition and verification functions. Taking the first trust domain acme.com and the second trust domain beta.org as examples, the first trust domain corresponds to the first DNS server and can include intelligent agents such as agent-007.acme.com and agent-042.acme.com, while the second trust domain corresponds to the second DNS server and can include intelligent agents such as agent-001.beta.org. Each DNS server can manage the identity-related information of intelligent agents within its respective trust domain.
[0132] Blockchain trust anchor contracts can provide on-chain trust criteria for DNS servers across multiple trust domains. For example, Figure 2 The federated member table shown records the DNS servers participating in cross-domain trust, reflecting the trust relationships established between different DNS servers. The revocation list records information about revoked DNS servers. DNS servers can register public key-related information with the blockchain trust anchor contract. For example, Figure 2The example uses a public key anchored to an on-chain contract. In a practical implementation, the public key hash corresponding to the DNS server can be registered to the blockchain trust anchor contract, so that the public key of the DNS server is associated with the on-chain record, and other DNS servers can query the current trust status of the corresponding DNS server based on the on-chain information.
[0133] Figure 2 The cross-domain mutual recognition and verification function shown can be implemented by a second DNS server. When the first agent initiates a cross-domain request to the second trusted domain, the second DNS server can query the first agent's identity information from the first DNS server, and perform cross-domain identity verification by combining the identity resolution result returned by the first DNS server and the trust information recorded in the blockchain trust anchor contract.
[0134] In some implementations, the system may also include an agent identity resolution client. For example, a second agent or a business system in a second trust domain can act as an agent identity resolution client, triggering a second DNS server to perform cross-domain authentication upon receiving a cross-domain access request from the first agent.
[0135] See Figure 3 , Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a cross-domain certificate chain and signature verification process provided for an embodiment of this application.
[0136] Taking acme.com as the first trusted domain, beta.org as the second trusted domain, and agent-007.acme.com as the first agent, the first agent can initiate a cross-domain request to a service in the second trusted domain. The second DNS server, based on this cross-domain request, sends an identity resolution request for the first agent to the first DNS server, which then returns the identity resolution result based on the identity information corresponding to the first agent.
[0137] Figure 3 The outer signature in the middle can correspond to the aforementioned identity claim signature information, and is used to support the second DNS server in verifying whether the identity claim originates from the first DNS server. Figure 3 The inner signature can correspond to the aforementioned targeted signature information, used to establish a correspondence between the identity resolution result and the current second trust domain. For example, the targeted signature information can be generated based on the hash value of the identity claim signature information, the identifier information of the second trust domain, the timestamp, and a random number.
[0138] After receiving the identity resolution result, the second DNS server can proceed according to... Figure 3The process involves multi-layered verification. Specifically, the source of the identity claim can be verified using the identity claim signature information; the correspondence between the identity resolution result and the second trust domain can be verified using the directed signature information; and the trust status information corresponding to the first DNS server in the blockchain trust anchor contract can be queried to determine whether the first DNS server is currently trustworthy.
[0139] Figure 3 The cross-domain certificate chain verification path shown on the left represents the trust transfer relationship when there is an intermediate trust domain between the first and second trust domains. The second DNS server can verify the cross-domain trust statement hop by hop along the cross-domain certificate chain and further verify the cross-domain certificate chain based on the root hash anchored on the chain.
[0140] If the above verification passes, it can be determined that the first agent has passed cross-domain authentication, and a corresponding trust path record is generated. The second DNS server can also provide the cross-domain authentication result to the second agent or the business system in the second trust domain, and the corresponding service can determine whether to accept the first agent's cross-domain request based on the cross-domain authentication result.
[0141] The specific implementation of each of the aforementioned verification processes can be found in the corresponding embodiments, and will not be repeated here.
[0142] See Figure 4 , Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a trust path recording and auditable mechanism provided in an embodiment of this application.
[0143] like Figure 4 As shown on the left, during the cross-domain agent authentication process, identity claim acquisition, cross-domain trust verification, and corresponding signature verification can be completed sequentially, and a trust path record can be generated based on the information involved in this verification process. The trust path record can include the cross-domain resolution link, signature information for each hop, hash value of the corresponding signature information, timestamp, and cross-domain authentication result.
[0144] After generating a trust path record, its hash value can be calculated and submitted to the blockchain trust anchor contract. The complete trust path record can be stored locally within the corresponding trust domain, eliminating the need to store the complete cross-domain resolution content in the blockchain.
[0145] like Figure 4 As shown on the right, when a security incident occurs or it is necessary to trace a cross-domain authentication, the corresponding trust path record hash value can be obtained from the blockchain trust anchor contract, and the complete trust path record stored locally can be retrieved as needed. By recalculating the hash value of the local record and comparing it with the on-chain hash value, it can be determined whether the local record is consistent with the record at the time of notarization.
[0146] When only the cross-domain authentication result at a specific time needs to be confirmed, confirmation can be made based on the trust path hash recorded on the blockchain and the corresponding result, without needing to read the complete parsing content. When further locating the abnormal link, the complete trust path record stored locally can be read to trace the cross-domain parsing link, the signature information of each hop, the timestamp, and the cross-domain authentication result.
[0147] Therefore, the complete parsed content can be stored locally in the corresponding trust domain, and on-chain hashes can be used to provide a basis for subsequent integrity verification and auditing, thus ensuring both the traceability of the cross-domain authentication process and the protection of identity resolution information.
[0148] See Figure 5 , Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a cross-domain trusted mutual recognition device for intelligent agents provided in an embodiment of this application. The device can be applied to a second Domain Name System (DNS) server in a second trusted domain. The device 500 includes: Sending unit 501 is used to send an identity resolution request for a first intelligent agent to a first DNS server of a first trust domain, wherein the first intelligent agent belongs to the first trust domain. The receiving unit 502 is configured to receive the identity resolution result returned by the first DNS server, wherein the identity resolution result includes the identity declaration of the first intelligent agent and the identity declaration signature information corresponding to the identity declaration; Verification unit 503 is used to verify the identity claim signature information and obtain a source verification result that characterizes whether the identity claim originates from the first DNS server; The query unit 504 is used to query the trust status information corresponding to the first DNS server in the blockchain trust anchor contract, and determine whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state based on the trust status information. The blockchain trust anchor contract is used to maintain the trust status information corresponding to DNS servers of multiple trust domains. The determining unit 505 is used to determine the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent based on the source verification result and whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state.
[0149] Optionally, the identity resolution result further includes directed signature information, which is generated by the first DNS server based on the identity claim signature information and the identifier information of the second trust domain. The device 500 further includes a correspondence verification unit, used for: The targeted signature information is verified to obtain a verification result that characterizes whether the identity resolution result corresponds to the second trust domain; The determining unit 505 is specifically used for: Based on the source verification result, the correspondence verification result, and whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state, the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent is determined.
[0150] Optionally, the directed signature information is obtained by the first DNS server signing the data to be signed. The data to be signed includes the hash value of the identity declaration signature information, the identifier information of the second trust domain, a timestamp, and a random number. The correspondence verification unit is specifically used for: Verify whether the directed signature information is valid, and verify whether the identifier information of the second trust field in the data to be signed matches the second trust field, and whether the timestamp is within a preset valid time window.
[0151] Optionally, the blockchain trust anchor contract is also used to maintain the identification information and public key hashes corresponding to multiple DNS servers. The trust status information includes the current status of the first DNS server, which includes an active state, a suspended state, or a revoked state. The query unit 504 is specifically used for: If the first DNS server is currently in an active state, it is determined that the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state. If the current state of the first DNS server is suspended or canceled, it is determined that the first DNS server is currently in an untrusted state.
[0152] Optionally, the device 500 further includes a hop-by-hop verification unit, used for: Obtain a cross-domain certificate chain between the first trust domain and the second trust domain, wherein the cross-domain certificate chain includes at least one cross-domain trust statement, and each cross-domain trust statement includes the identification information of the issuing party's DNS server, the identification information of the issued party's DNS server, the validity period, and the issuing party's signature; The cross-domain trust claims in the cross-domain certificate chain are verified hop by hop, and the cross-domain certificate chain is verified according to the root hash of the cross-domain certificate chain anchored in the blockchain trust anchor contract. The determining unit 505 is specifically used for: Based on the source verification result, whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state, and the verification result of the cross-domain certificate chain, the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent is determined.
[0153] Optionally, the hop-by-hop verification unit is specifically used for: In the case of adopting the full-chain verification mode, verification is performed hop by hop along the cross-domain certificate chain until the root hash anchored in the blockchain trust anchor contract is verified. In the case of fast verification mode, if a verified node exists in the cross-domain certificate chain, the tracing along the cross-domain certificate chain is terminated based on the verified node.
[0154] Optionally, after determining the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent, the device 500 further includes a path generation unit, used for: Generate a trust path record corresponding to the first intelligent agent, wherein the trust path record includes the cross-domain resolution link, the hash value of each hop signature information, the timestamp, and the cross-domain authentication result; Determine the hash value of the trust path record and submit the hash value of the trust path record to the blockchain trust anchor contract.
[0155] See Figure 6 This application also provides a computer device, which includes a memory 601 and a processor 602. The memory is used to store computer programs and to transfer the computer programs to the processor; The processor is used to execute the method of the above method embodiment according to the computer program.
[0156] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that the computer-readable storage medium is used to store a computer program, the computer program being used to execute the method of the above-described method embodiments.
[0157] This application also provides a computer program product including a computer program, which, when run on a computer device, causes the computer device to perform the method described in the above method embodiments.
[0158] It should be noted that the various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on the differences from other embodiments. Similar or identical parts between embodiments can be referred to interchangeably. For the systems or apparatus disclosed in the embodiments, since they correspond to the methods disclosed in the embodiments, the descriptions are relatively simple, and relevant parts can be referred to the method section.
[0159] The term "comprising" and its variations as used herein are open-ended inclusions, meaning "including but not limited to". The term "based on" means "at least partially based on". The term "one embodiment" means "at least one embodiment"; the term "another embodiment" means "at least one additional embodiment"; the term "some embodiments" means "at least some embodiments". Definitions of other terms will be given in the description below.
[0160] It should be understood that in this application, "at least one (item)" means one or more, and "more than" means two or more. "And / or" is used to describe the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, "A and / or B" can represent three cases: only A exists, only B exists, and both A and B exist simultaneously, where A and B can be singular or plural. The character " / " generally indicates that the preceding and following related objects are in an "or" relationship. "At least one (item) of the following" or similar expressions refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of single or plural items. For example, at least one (item) of a, b, or c can represent: a, b, c, "a and b", "a and c", "b and c", or "a and b and c", where a, b, and c can be single or multiple.
[0161] It should also be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes said element.
[0162] The steps of the methods or algorithms described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented directly by hardware, a software module executed by a processor, or a combination of both. The software module can be located in random access memory (RAM), main memory, read-only memory (ROM), electrically programmable ROM, electrically erasable programmable ROM, registers, hard disk, removable disk, CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.
[0163] The above description of the disclosed embodiments enables those skilled in the art to make or use this application. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of this application. Therefore, this application is not to be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.
Claims
1. A method for cross-domain trusted mutual recognition among intelligent agents, characterized in that, The method, applied to a second Domain Name System (DNS) server in a second trusted domain, includes: Send an identity resolution request for the first agent to the first DNS server of the first trust domain, wherein the first agent belongs to the first trust domain; Receive the identity resolution result returned by the first DNS server, wherein the identity resolution result includes the identity statement of the first intelligent agent and the identity statement signature information corresponding to the identity statement; The identity claim signature information is verified to obtain a source verification result that characterizes whether the identity claim originates from the first DNS server; The trust status information corresponding to the first DNS server in the blockchain trust anchor contract is queried, and the first DNS server is determined to be in a trusted state based on the trust status information. The blockchain trust anchor contract is used to maintain the trust status information corresponding to DNS servers of multiple trust domains. Based on the source verification result and whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state, the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent is determined.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The identity resolution result also includes directed signature information, which is generated by the first DNS server based on the identity claim signature information and the identification information of the second trust domain. The method further includes: The targeted signature information is verified to obtain a verification result that characterizes whether the identity resolution result corresponds to the second trust domain; The step of determining the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent based on the source verification result and whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state includes: Based on the source verification result, the correspondence verification result, and whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state, the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent is determined.
3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The directed signature information is obtained by the first DNS server signing the data to be signed. The data to be signed includes the hash value of the identity declaration signature information, the identifier information of the second trust domain, a timestamp, and a random number. The verification of the directed signature information includes: Verify whether the directed signature information is valid, and verify whether the identifier information of the second trust field in the data to be signed matches the second trust field, and whether the timestamp is within a preset valid time window.
4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The blockchain trust anchor contract is also used to maintain the identification information and public key hashes corresponding to multiple DNS servers. The trust state information includes the current state of the first DNS server, which includes an active state, a suspended state, or a revoked state. Determining whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state based on the trust state information includes: If the first DNS server is currently in an active state, it is determined that the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state. If the current state of the first DNS server is suspended or canceled, it is determined that the first DNS server is currently in an untrusted state.
5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: Obtain a cross-domain certificate chain between the first trust domain and the second trust domain, wherein the cross-domain certificate chain includes at least one cross-domain trust statement, and each cross-domain trust statement includes the identification information of the issuing party's DNS server, the identification information of the issued party's DNS server, the validity period, and the issuing party's signature; The cross-domain trust claims in the cross-domain certificate chain are verified hop by hop, and the cross-domain certificate chain is verified according to the root hash of the cross-domain certificate chain anchored in the blockchain trust anchor contract. Determining the cross-domain authentication result of the first intelligent agent includes: Based on the source verification result, whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state, and the verification result of the cross-domain certificate chain, the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent is determined.
6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The step of verifying the cross-domain trust claims in the cross-domain certificate chain hop-by-hop includes: In the case of adopting the full-chain verification mode, verification is performed hop by hop along the cross-domain certificate chain until the root hash anchored in the blockchain trust anchor contract is verified. In the case of fast verification mode, if a verified node exists in the cross-domain certificate chain, the tracing along the cross-domain certificate chain is terminated based on the verified node.
7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, After determining the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent, the method further includes: Generate a trust path record corresponding to the first intelligent agent, wherein the trust path record includes the cross-domain resolution link, the hash value of each hop signature information, the timestamp, and the cross-domain authentication result; Determine the hash value of the trust path record and submit the hash value of the trust path record to the blockchain trust anchor contract.
8. A cross-domain trusted mutual recognition device for intelligent agents, characterized in that, The apparatus for a second Domain Name System (DNS) server applied to a second trust domain includes: The sending unit is configured to send an identity resolution request for the first intelligent agent to the first DNS server of the first trust domain, wherein the first intelligent agent belongs to the first trust domain. The receiving unit is configured to receive the identity resolution result returned by the first DNS server, wherein the identity resolution result includes the identity declaration of the first intelligent agent and the identity declaration signature information corresponding to the identity declaration; The verification unit is used to verify the identity claim signature information and obtain a source verification result that characterizes whether the identity claim originates from the first DNS server. The query unit is used to query the trust status information corresponding to the first DNS server in the blockchain trust anchor contract, and determine whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state based on the trust status information. The blockchain trust anchor contract is used to maintain the trust status information corresponding to DNS servers of multiple trust domains. The determining unit is configured to determine the cross-domain authentication result of the first agent based on the source verification result and whether the first DNS server is currently in a trusted state.
9. A computer device, characterized in that, The computer device includes a processor and memory: The memory is used to store computer programs and to transfer the computer programs to the processor; The processor is configured to perform the method according to any one of claims 1-7 according to the computer program.
10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium is used to store a computer program for performing the method according to any one of claims 1-7.
