A Starflash Wireless Group Secure Communication Method Based on Defense-in-Depth Architecture

By constructing a layered security mechanism at the access and application layers in the StarFlash wireless group control system, the problem of insufficient security protection for application control messages in vehicle-mounted StarFlash wireless communication is solved, and efficient security protection for vehicle control services is achieved.

CN123123891APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17JILIN UNIVERSITY
View PDF 0 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611639401.0
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-10-22
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In group control scenarios, vehicle-mounted star-flash wireless communication suffers from insufficient security protection of application control messages, and a single communication-level security mechanism is insufficient to fully guarantee the security of vehicle control services.

Method used

A secure communication method for StarSpark wireless groups based on a defense-in-depth architecture is constructed. Through a layered security mechanism between the StarSpark communication module and the MCU, including a two-layer secure handshake and communication process at the access layer and the application layer, node identity authentication, session key negotiation and control message protection are performed respectively.

Benefits of technology

It improves the vehicle-mounted Starflash wireless control system's ability to protect against attacks such as unauthorized access, message forgery, and data tampering, reduces computing and communication overhead, and enhances the security and operational efficiency of vehicle control services.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure CN123123891A_ABST
    Figure CN123123891A_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

This invention discloses a secure communication method for StarSpeed ​​wireless groups based on a defense-in-depth architecture, belonging to the field of vehicle-mounted wireless communication and information security technology. The method includes: constructing a first-layer access layer security protection on the StarSpeed ​​communication module side and a second-layer application layer security protection on the MCU side. After the device starts up, the StarSpeed ​​communication module first performs an access layer handshake to complete access layer authentication and session key negotiation, establishing a secure StarSpeed ​​wireless channel; then, the MCU performs application layer authentication and session key negotiation to establish an application-secure session independent of the access layer; the G node and T node enter the secure communication phase; the G node MCU initiates an application layer key update according to trigger conditions. This invention, by constructing a two-layer security protection mechanism, avoids directly equating wireless access trust with control command trust, effectively improving the protection capability of the vehicle-mounted StarSpeed ​​wireless control system against attacks such as unauthorized access, message forgery, and data tampering.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of vehicle-mounted wireless communication and information security technology, specifically to a StarFlash wireless group secure communication method based on a defense-in-depth architecture. Background Technology

[0002] As automotive electronic and electrical architectures evolve towards domain and regional centralization, the number of end-point control nodes, such as seats, doors, and windows, is constantly increasing. Traditional wired bus connections, relying on CAN and LIN, are increasingly facing challenges such as a large number of wiring harnesses, complex layouts, increased vehicle weight, and higher reliability requirements for connectors. StarSpark SLE, with its low latency, high reliability, and flexible networking capabilities, provides a new technological approach for wireless end-point control nodes within the vehicle and for one-to-many group control.

[0003] However, the application of StarScan technology in automotive scenarios is still in the development and verification stage, and the secure communication system for vehicle control services is not yet fully mature. Compared with traditional wired networks, wireless links are more open, and vehicle control data may face security risks such as unauthorized access, message forgery, data tampering, and replay during transmission. Therefore, simply enabling data transmission and reception between StarScan nodes is insufficient to meet the security requirements of automotive control scenarios. It is also necessary to establish corresponding secure communication mechanisms for vehicle wireless control services to protect the identity of communication nodes, session relationships, the integrity of control messages, and message freshness.

[0004] Existing technologies primarily address authentication, key negotiation, and link data protection at the strobe access layer, establishing secure connections between communicating parties through pre-configured keys or temporary session keys. While these methods improve the security of wireless access and data transmission, they mainly focus on the communication link itself. For vehicular group communication scenarios where a master node connects to multiple terminal nodes simultaneously, further solutions are needed for issues such as group node identity verification, establishment of independent session security relationships, generation and verification of security control messages, and updating of security parameters. This is to reduce the impact of forged, tampered, and replayable control messages on vehicle actuators.

[0005] On the other hand, vehicle-mounted StarScan nodes typically consist of a StarScan communication module and an MCU (Microcontroller Unit). The communication module is responsible for wireless connectivity and data transmission and reception, while the MCU handles specific vehicle control operations. If system security relies primarily on a single communication layer, once that layer's security mechanism is attacked or bypassed, abnormal data may still be transmitted to the upper-level control logic. Therefore, an independent application control security verification mechanism needs to be added in addition to communication link security. Summary of the Invention

[0006] This invention aims to address the insufficient security protection of application control messages during vehicle-mounted StarSignal group communication, and the inadequacy of a single communication-level security mechanism to fully guarantee the security of vehicle control services. This invention constructs an application-layer secure communication protocol for StarSignal wireless group control scenarios. Building upon the wireless connection and data transmission completed by the StarSignal communication module, the MCU further verifies the identity of communication nodes, session security relationships, control message integrity, and message freshness. Through the cooperation of different levels of security mechanisms on both the communication module and MCU sides, it provides in-depth security protection for vehicle-mounted StarSignal wireless control communication.

[0007] This invention provides a secure communication method for StarSignal wireless groups based on a defense-in-depth architecture, used in a vehicle-mounted StarSignal wireless group control system. The system includes one StarSignal G node and several StarSignal T nodes. Each node includes at least a StarSignal communication module and an MCU. The StarSignal communication module and the MCU exchange information through a data interface. The method includes the following steps: Step 1: Perform security initialization on the StarFlash communication module and the MCU respectively to form independent access layer security context and application layer security context; Step 2: After the device is started, the StarSpark communication module between nodes performs the access layer handshake process to complete node identity authentication and access layer session key negotiation, generate access layer session key and establish StarSpark wireless security channel; Step 3: After the access layer handshake is successful and the StarSpark wireless security channel is established, the MCUs between nodes transmit handshake messages based on the StarSpark wireless security channel and execute the application layer handshake process; after completing the application layer identity authentication and application layer session key negotiation, an application security session independent of the access layer is established and the corresponding application layer session key is generated. Step 4: After the application security session is established, the G node and the T node enter the secure communication phase. The sending end performs application layer and access layer security protection in sequence, and the receiving end performs access layer and application layer security verification in sequence. The MCU performs communication status verification. The secure communication phase includes two processes: the G node multicasts control messages to multiple T nodes, and each T node unicasts status feedback messages to the G node. Step 5: The G node MCU initiates an application layer key update through the current application security session based on the triggering conditions, re-executes the application layer key negotiation process to generate a new application layer session key, and synchronously updates the group communication security status.

[0008] Furthermore, both the access layer handshake process in step 2 and the application layer handshake process in step 3 include four interactive processes: identity request, peer verification, local verification, and session confirmation. In addition, the access layer and the application layer use the same session key negotiation protocol. The identity request interaction process specifically includes: 1.1 The G node generates a random number (Nonce) for this handshake and reads its own identity identifier (G_ID), session key negotiation count (G_CTR_K_x). It then combines the random number (Nonce), its own identity identifier (G_ID), and session key negotiation count (G_CTR_K_x) to form the handshake initiation frame parameters. 1.2. Node G uses the pre-set long-term shared symmetric key LK_x{G,T} between the two parties to symmetrically encrypt the handshake initiation frame parameters and obtain the encryption key negotiation material Cipher1(Nonce,G_ID,G_CTR_K_x); 1.3 Using the preset authentication key Kauth_x{G,T}, calculate the encryption key negotiation material Cipher1(Nonce,G_ID,G_CTR_K_x) based on the SM3-HMAC algorithm to obtain the message authentication code MAC_G; 1.4 Node G constructs a handshake initiation frame, including the handshake frame header, encryption key negotiation materials, and message authentication code, and sends it to node T.

[0009] The peer verification interaction process specifically includes: 2.1 After receiving the handshake initiation frame, node T first identifies the handshake frame header, determines that the current data is a key negotiation request based on the message type, and enters the corresponding key negotiation processing flow; 2.2. Recalculate the message authentication code using the locally stored authentication key Kauth_x{G,T} on the encrypted material in the received message, and compare it with MAC_G in the request message; if they do not match, the integrity or authenticity verification of the handshake request of node G is considered to have failed, and the handshake is terminated; if they match, continue to execute the subsequent steps. 2.3 Node T uses the long-term symmetric key LK_x{G,T} shared with node G to decrypt the encrypted key negotiation materials, obtaining the handshake random number Nonce, node G's identity identifier G_ID, and node G's current key negotiation count value G_CTR_K_x. Then, node T verifies the validity of the decrypted G_ID according to the node identity information table stored locally, confirming whether the current requesting node belongs to the preset communication object, and compares the count value. If G_ID or the negotiation count value does not match, the current handshake request is rejected; if the verification passes, the key negotiation process continues. 2.4 Node T updates its own session key negotiation counter and, based on the decrypted random number Nonce and the updated counter value Ti_CTR_K_x′, calls the preset key derivation algorithm KDF to generate the temporary session key SK_x{G,T} used for this communication.

[0010] The local verification interaction process specifically includes: 3.1 Node T reads its own identity identifier Ti_ID and combines the random number Nonce, the T node's identity identifier Ti_ID, and the updated count value Ti_CTR_K_x′ to form the response key negotiation material; 3.2 Node T uses the temporary session key SK_x{G,T} generated in step 2.4 to perform symmetric encryption on the response key negotiation material to obtain the response ciphertext Cipher2(Nonce,Ti_ID,Ti_CTR_K_x′); 3.3 Node T uses the pre-set authentication key Kauth_x{G,T} to calculate the message authentication code MAC_T based on the SM3-HMAC algorithm on the ciphertext of the response. 3.4 Node T constructs a key negotiation response frame, including a handshake response frame header, response ciphertext, and message authentication code MAC_T, and sends it to node G.

[0011] The session confirmation interaction process specifically includes: 4.1 After receiving the key negotiation response frame sent by node T, node G first identifies the handshake response frame header, determines that the current message type is a key negotiation response message, and enters the response verification process; 4.2 Node G uses the pre-set authentication key Kauth_x{G,T} to recalculate the message authentication code on the received response ciphertext and compares it with MAC_T in the response message; if the two are inconsistent, it is considered that the integrity or authenticity verification of the response message of Node T has failed and the handshake is terminated; if the verification is consistent, the subsequent steps are continued. 4.3 Node G updates its own session key negotiation counter to synchronize with the counter jointly maintained by node T. Based on the random number Nonce generated during the initial handshake and the updated counter value G_CTR_K_x′, node G calls the same KDF algorithm as node T to generate a temporary session key SK_x{G,T}. 4.4 Node G uses the generated temporary session key SK_x{G,T} to decrypt the ciphertext of Node T's response, obtaining Nonce, Ti_ID, Ti_CTR_K_x′, and verifying whether the random number, Node T's identity, and counting status are consistent with the current handshake process.

[0012] Furthermore, in step 4, node G multicasts control messages to multiple nodes T, specifically including: The G node MCU concatenates the control command cmd with the status information G_CTR_ms of the multicast session counter, and encrypts the concatenated information using the application layer session key SK_app{G,T} negotiated by the application layer to obtain the application layer encrypted message Cipher1(cmd,G_CTR_ms). The G-node MCU uses the preset application layer authentication key Kauth_app{G,T} to perform SM3-HMAC calculation on the application layer encrypted message to obtain the application layer message authentication information MAC1. The G-node MCU generates an application-layer encrypted control message Pack1 (Cipher1, MAC1) and sends it to the G-node Star Flash communication module. The G-node Star Flash communication module uses the access layer session key SK_link{G,T} negotiated by the access layer to perform secondary encryption on Pack1(Cipher1,MAC1) to obtain the access layer encrypted message Cipher2(Pack1). The G-node Star Flash Communication Module uses the preset access layer authentication key Kauth_link{G,T} to perform SM3-HMAC calculation on the access layer encrypted message to obtain the access layer message authentication information MAC2; The G-node StarSpark communication module generates an access layer encrypted message Pack2 (Cipher2, MAC2) and sends it to the T-node via the StarSpark SLE wireless link.

[0013] Furthermore, step 4 also includes: the T node processing and verifying the received multicast control messages, specifically including: The T-node StarSpark communication module uses the preset access layer authentication key Kauth_link{G,T} to perform SM3-HMAC verification on the received access layer message authentication code. If the verification fails, the message is discarded. If the verification succeeds, the access layer session key SK_link{G,T} is used to decrypt the access layer encrypted message Pack2(Cipher2,MAC2), restore the application layer encrypted control message Pack1(Cipher1,MAC1), and send it to the T-node MCU. The T-node MCU uses the preset application layer authentication key Kauth_app{G,T} to perform SM3-HMAC verification on Pack1(Cipher1,MAC1). If the verification fails, the Pack1 is discarded. If the verification succeeds, the Pack1 is decrypted using the application layer session key SK_app{G,T} to obtain the control command cmd and the status information G_CTR_ms of the multicast session counter from the G-node. The T-node MCU compares the status information of the multicast session counter from the G-node with the multicast count status currently maintained by the T-node. If the freshness requirement is met, the local multicast counter is updated and control commands are executed; otherwise, the message is discarded.

[0014] Compared with the prior art, the present invention discloses the following technical effects: To address the issue that existing StarFlash wireless communication security mechanisms primarily focus on link access authentication, making it difficult to directly meet the security requirements of vehicle control services, this invention designs a lightweight identity authentication and session key negotiation protocol suitable for in-vehicle group control scenarios. The protocol employs a symmetric cryptography mechanism, achieving secure connection establishment between StarFlash communication nodes through node authentication, session security parameter establishment, and shared session key generation. This protocol, while ensuring control communication security, reduces complex cryptographic operations and additional interaction processes, thereby effectively lowering the computational and communication overhead of in-vehicle wireless nodes and improving the protocol's applicability in real-time control scenarios.

[0015] This invention establishes an independent access layer and application layer security protection system between the StarSignal communication module and the vehicle control MCU. This mechanism includes a two-layer secure handshake and a two-layer secure communication process. The access layer is responsible for establishing a secure wireless link connection, while the application layer is responsible for establishing secure sessions for vehicle control services and protecting control messages. Each layer maintains independent security parameters and session states. Through the collaborative operation of this two-layer security mechanism, the assumption that trusted wireless access is directly equivalent to trusted control commands is avoided, thus improving the in-vehicle StarSignal wireless control system's ability to protect against attacks such as unauthorized access, message forgery, and data tampering.

[0016] This invention addresses the issue of differing computing capabilities between the StarSignal communication module and the vehicle-mounted MCU by designing differentiated security mechanisms based on the hardware resource characteristics of different nodes. Specifically, the access layer, constrained by the StarSignal communication module's resources, employs a lightweight security processing approach to avoid introducing additional state maintenance overhead. The application layer leverages the MCU's strong computing power to introduce communication state management and security verification mechanisms, achieving refined protection for vehicle control services. Through a reasonable match between hardware resources and security functions, the security and operational efficiency of the vehicle-mounted StarSignal control system are improved while ensuring real-time wireless communication.

[0017] This invention also proposes a dynamic key update mechanism suitable for vehicle-mounted Starflash wireless control systems. The G-node MCU proactively initiates application-layer session key updates based on a preset period, communication topology changes, or security requirements, and completes new key negotiation through existing secure communication channels. This update mechanism ensures stable operation of the access layer wireless link while enabling dynamic updates of application security sessions, effectively reducing the security risks associated with long-term key use. Attached Figure Description

[0018] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0019] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the Starflash wireless group secure communication method based on a defense-in-depth architecture provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a diagram illustrating the architecture of a vehicle-mounted Star Flash wireless group control system provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 3 A handshake process architecture diagram provided for embodiments of the present invention; Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating the process architecture of a G node multicasting control messages to all T nodes and each T node unicasting control messages to the G node, as provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0020] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0021] This invention provides a secure communication method for Starflash wireless groups based on a defense-in-depth architecture, such as... Figure 1 As shown, this is used for an in-vehicle StarScan wireless group control system. The system includes one StarScan G node and several StarScan T nodes. Each node includes at least a StarScan communication module and an MCU. The StarScan communication module and the MCU exchange information via a data interface (see reference). Figure 2 ).

[0022] The StarShine communication module is used to establish StarShine SLE wireless connections, perform access layer authentication, establish link security parameters, and transmit and receive wireless data, forming the first layer of security protection. The MCU is used to perform application layer authentication, application session establishment, security control message generation, and security verification, forming the second layer of security protection. The vehicle-mounted StarShine wireless group control system adopts a layered security architecture, establishing independent security processing modules in both the StarShine communication module and the MCU to achieve layered protection for wireless communication link security and vehicle control service security.

[0023] The StarSpark wireless group secure communication method specifically includes the following steps: Step 1: The access layer and application layer adopt a homogeneous symmetric authentication and session key negotiation protocol. Before performing authentication and session key negotiation, the StarSpark communication module and MCU need to complete security initialization respectively. However, the long-term symmetric key, authentication key, session key negotiation counter and the finally generated session key used by the two layers are independent of each other, forming the access layer security context and the application layer security context respectively.

[0024] The security initialization steps specifically include: Long-term symmetric key initialization: The same access layer long-term symmetric key LK_link{G,T} is pre-set in the G-node StarScan communication module and all T-node StarScan communication modules in the group; the same application layer long-term symmetric key LK_app{G,T} is pre-set in the G-node MCU and all T-node MCUs; these long-term symmetric keys are used to protect the confidentiality of sensitive parameters during the handshake process at the corresponding layer. The long-term symmetric keys between different security layers are independent of each other.

[0025] Authentication key initialization: The access layer authentication key Kauth_link{G,T} is pre-set in the StarScan communication modules of G node and all T nodes in the group, and the application layer authentication key Kauth_app{G,T} is pre-set in the MCU of G node and all T nodes in the group; both layers use the SM3-HMAC algorithm to generate message authentication codes for handshake messages, which are used to verify the integrity of the handshake messages and the authenticity of the sender, respectively. The authentication keys between different security layers are independent of each other.

[0026] Session key negotiation counter initialization: The access layer and application layer are configured with independent session key negotiation counters CTR_K_link{G,T} and CTR_K_app{G,T}, respectively. Within the same security layer, the counters corresponding to nodes G and T have the same initial state and are updated according to preset rules each time a new handshake or session key renegotiation is completed. During the handshake process, the receiver verifies the peer's counter state to determine if the current handshake meets the preset freshness requirements. The access layer counter and application layer counter are maintained and synchronized separately, without cross-layer inheritance. These counters are used to identify the handshake rounds of the access layer and application layer, and participate in the derivation of the corresponding layer's session key.

[0027] Key derivation algorithm initialization: The pre-agreed key derivation algorithm KDF is configured in the StarScan communication module and MCU; the access layer or application layer derives the access layer session key SK_link{G,T} or the application layer session key SK_app{G,T} based on the random number Nonce generated during the corresponding handshake process, the G node ID, and the updated session key negotiation counter CTR_K_link{G,T} or CTR_K_app{G,T}.

[0028] Cryptographic Algorithm Initialization: The access layer and application layer are configured with isomorphic cryptographic algorithm combinations. SM4, ZUC (Zu Chongzhi Algorithm), or other symmetric cryptographic algorithms that meet the requirements of in-vehicle embedded real-time communication are used to protect the confidentiality of sensitive parameters during the handshake process. The SM3-HMAC algorithm is used to complete the integrity and authenticity authentication of the handshake messages. Chinese national cryptographic algorithms are preferred. Both layers use the same type of cryptographic algorithm and handshake process to reduce protocol implementation complexity, but each layer calls its respective security layer's corresponding key parameters and state parameters.

[0029] Secure communication state initialization: The G node and all T node MCUs in the group initialize application layer communication state parameters according to communication service requirements. Specifically, the G node needs to initialize the multicast session counter G_CTR_ms used to send control messages to multiple T nodes, and the unicast communication counter G_CTR_us corresponding to each T node. The T node needs to initialize the multicast session counter T_CTR_ms for receiving from the G node, and the unicast counter T_CTR_us corresponding to each G node.

[0030] Step 2: After the device is started, the StarSpark communication module between nodes performs the access layer handshake process to complete node identity authentication and access layer session key negotiation, generate access layer session key and establish StarSpark wireless security channel; Step 3: After the access layer handshake is successful and the StarSpark wireless security channel is established, the MCUs between nodes transmit handshake messages based on the StarSpark wireless security channel and execute the application layer handshake process; after completing the application layer identity authentication and application layer session key negotiation, an application security session independent of the access layer is established and the corresponding application layer session key is generated.

[0031] The access layer handshake process in step 2 and the application layer handshake process in step 3 both include four interactive processes: identity request, peer verification, local verification, and session confirmation. Furthermore, the access layer and the application layer use the same session key negotiation protocol. (Refer to...) Figure 3 .

[0032] The handshake process is described in detail below using the example of node G initiating a handshake to node T. In this example, the symbol 'x' in the parameters represents either link (access layer) or app (application layer).

[0033] The identity request interaction process specifically includes: 1.1 The G node generates a random number (Nonce) for this handshake and reads its own identity identifier (G_ID), session key negotiation count (G_CTR_K_x). It then combines the random number (Nonce), its own identity identifier (G_ID), and session key negotiation count (G_CTR_K_x) to form the handshake initiation frame parameters. 1.2. Node G uses the pre-set long-term shared symmetric key LK_x{G,T} between the two parties to symmetrically encrypt the handshake initiation frame parameters and obtain the encryption key negotiation material Cipher1(Nonce,G_ID,G_CTR_K_x); 1.3 Using the preset authentication key Kauth_x{G,T}, calculate the encryption key negotiation material Cipher1(Nonce,G_ID,G_CTR_K_x) based on the SM3-HMAC algorithm to obtain the message authentication code MAC_G; 1.4 Node G constructs a handshake initiation frame, including a handshake frame header, encryption key negotiation materials, and message authentication code, and broadcasts the handshake initiation frame to node T.

[0034] The peer verification interaction process specifically includes: 2.1 After receiving the handshake initiation frame, node T first identifies the handshake frame header, determines that the current data is a key negotiation request based on the message type, and enters the corresponding key negotiation processing flow; 2.2 Node T uses the locally stored authentication key Kauth_x{G,T} to recalculate the message authentication code for the encrypted material in the received message and compares it with MAC_G in the request message. If the two do not match, the integrity or authenticity verification of Node G's handshake request is considered to have failed, and the handshake is terminated. If the verification matches, the subsequent steps are executed. 2.3 Node T uses the long-term symmetric key LK_x{G,T} shared with node G to decrypt the encrypted key negotiation materials, obtaining the handshake random number Nonce, node G's identity identifier G_ID, and node G's current key negotiation count value G_CTR_K_x. Then, node T verifies the validity of the decrypted G_ID according to the node identity information table stored locally, confirming whether the current requesting node belongs to the preset communication object, and compares the count value. If G_ID or the negotiation count value does not match, the current handshake request is rejected; if the verification passes, the key negotiation process continues. 2.4 Node T updates its own session key negotiation counter and, based on the decrypted random number Nonce and the updated counter value Ti_CTR_K_x′, calls the preset key derivation algorithm KDF to generate the temporary session key SK_x{G,T} used for this communication.

[0035] The on-device verification interaction process specifically includes: 3.1 Node T reads its own identity identifier Ti_ID and combines the random number Nonce, the T node's identity identifier Ti_ID, and the updated count value Ti_CTR_K_x′ to form the response key negotiation material; 3.2 Node T uses the temporary session key SK_x{G,T} generated in step 2.4 to perform symmetric encryption on the response key negotiation material to obtain the response ciphertext Cipher2(Nonce,Ti_ID,Ti_CTR_K_x′); 3.3 Node T uses the pre-set authentication key Kauth_x{G,T} to calculate the message authentication code MAC_T based on the SM3-HMAC algorithm on the ciphertext of the response. 3.4 Node T constructs a key negotiation response frame, including a handshake response frame header, response ciphertext, and message authentication code MAC_T, and sends it to node G to complete node G's reverse authentication of node T's identity.

[0036] The session confirmation interaction process specifically includes: 4.1 After receiving the key negotiation response frame sent by node T, node G first identifies the handshake response frame header, determines that the current message type is a key negotiation response message, and enters the response verification process; 4.2 Node G uses the pre-set authentication key Kauth_x{G,T} to recalculate the message authentication code on the received response ciphertext and compares it with MAC_T in the response message; if the two are inconsistent, it is considered that the integrity or authenticity verification of the response message of Node T has failed and the handshake is terminated; if the verification is consistent, the subsequent steps are continued. 4.3 Node G updates its own session key negotiation counter to synchronize with the counter jointly maintained by node T. Based on the random number Nonce generated during the initial handshake and the updated counter value G_CTR_K_x′, node G calls the same KDF algorithm as node T to generate a temporary session key SK_x{G,T}. Since node G and node T use the same random number input, synchronized counter state, and key derivation rules, they can independently calculate a consistent session key SK_x{G,T}. 4.4 Node G uses the temporary session key SK_x{G,T} generated in step 4.3 to decrypt the ciphertext of Node T's response, obtains Nonce, Ti_ID, Ti_CTR_K_x′, and verifies whether the random number, Node T's identity, and counting status are consistent with the current handshake process.

[0037] Once the above parameters are verified, node G confirms the identity of node T and establishes that two-way identity authentication has been completed between node G and node T.

[0038] Furthermore, after initiating a handshake request, node G must receive responses from all preset nodes T before it can determine that the key negotiation was successful and begin secure communication; otherwise, it will re-initiate the handshake.

[0039] Step 4: After the application security session is established, the G node and T node enter the secure communication phase. The sending end sequentially performs application layer and access layer security protection, while the receiving end sequentially performs access layer and application layer security verification, and the MCU verifies the communication status. The secure communication phase includes two processes: the G node multicasting control messages to multiple T nodes, and each T node unicasting status feedback messages to the G node. Specifically, the application layer utilizes the independent secure session established by the MCU to protect vehicle control services, and the access layer utilizes the secure channel established by the StarFlash communication module to protect the wireless link. (See attached document) Figure 4 The G node multicasts control messages to all T nodes, including the following steps: The G node MCU concatenates the control command cmd with the status information G_CTR_ms of the multicast session counter, and encrypts the concatenated information using the application layer session key SK_app{G,T} negotiated by the application layer to obtain the application layer encrypted message Cipher1(cmd,G_CTR_ms). The G-node MCU uses the preset application layer authentication key Kauth_app{G,T} to perform SM3-HMAC calculation on the application layer encrypted message to obtain the application layer message authentication information MAC1. The G-node MCU generates an application-layer encrypted control message Pack1 (Cipher1, MAC1) and sends it to the G-node Star Flash communication module (access layer). The G-node Star Flash communication module uses the access layer session key SK_link{G,T} negotiated by the access layer to perform secondary encryption on the control message Pack1(Cipher1,MAC1) to obtain the access layer encrypted message Cipher2(Pack1). The G-node Star Flash Communication Module uses the preset access layer authentication key Kauth_link{G,T} to perform SM3-HMAC calculation on the access layer encrypted message to obtain the access layer message authentication information MAC2; The G-node StarSpark communication module generates an access layer encrypted message Pack2 (Cipher2, MAC2) and sends it to the T-node via the StarSpark SLE wireless link.

[0040] The T-node StarSpark communication module uses the preset access layer authentication key Kauth_link{G,T} to perform SM3-HMAC verification on the received access layer message authentication code. If the verification fails, the message is discarded. If the verification succeeds, the access layer session key SK_link{G,T} is used to decrypt the access layer encrypted message Pack2(Cipher2,MAC2), restore the application layer encrypted control message Pack1(Cipher1,MAC1), and send it to the T-node MCU. The T-node MCU uses the preset application layer authentication key Kauth_app{G,T} to perform SM3-HMAC verification on Pack1(Cipher1,MAC1). If the verification fails, the data is discarded. If the verification succeeds, the application layer session key SK_app{G,T} is used to decrypt Pack1(Cipher1,MAC1) to obtain the control command cmd and the status information G_CTR_ms of the multicast session counter from the G node. The T-node MCU compares the status information of the multicast session counter from the G-node with the multicast count status currently maintained by the T-node (for example, determining whether the multicast session counter count is greater than the preset multicast count currently maintained by the T-node). If the freshness requirement is met, the local multicast counter is updated and control commands are executed; otherwise, the message is discarded.

[0041] In this invention, the access layer communication phase does not use a session counter. This is because the StarFlash communication module is primarily responsible for wireless link establishment, link security maintenance, and data transmission and reception, and its computing and storage resources are relatively limited. Simultaneously, it needs to meet the real-time and stability requirements of high-frequency communication in vehicle control scenarios. Therefore, the access layer mainly ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the wireless link through session key encryption and message authentication mechanisms. During high-frequency service communication, it does not additionally maintain the service communication counter state or perform message freshness verification, thereby reducing communication processing overhead. The application layer, located on the vehicle control MCU side, has stronger state management capabilities. It can maintain a communication counter according to the security requirements of vehicle control services and achieve anti-replay protection through message freshness verification.

[0042] Furthermore, the secure communication protocol for multicast control messages from G nodes to all T nodes also applies to the unicast communication process where T nodes send status feedback messages to G nodes. Unlike the G node multicast control process, T nodes generate feedback information based on their own execution status and maintain an independent unicast communication count state with G nodes. T nodes encapsulate their own identity identifier Ti_ID as an application-layer plaintext identifier field in the feedback message, then encrypt the status feedback information and the unicast communication count state using the application-layer session key SK_app{G,T}, and generate message authentication information based on the application-layer authentication key.

[0043] After receiving the feedback message, node G identifies the corresponding node T based on the plaintext encapsulated Ti_ID information and invokes the corresponding unicast security context to complete message authentication, data decryption, and unicast count status verification. Unicast and multicast use the same secure communication protocol, maintaining corresponding communication count states only based on the communication direction and communication object.

[0044] Step 5: To reduce the security risks associated with the continuous use of long-term keys and improve the long-term operational security of the vehicle-mounted StarSpark wireless group control system, this invention also designs a key update mechanism to periodically or event-triggered update the application layer session key. The key update mechanism is initiated by the G-node MCU as the control node, generating a new application layer session key by re-executing the application layer key negotiation process and synchronously updating the group communication security status.

[0045] The triggering scenarios for the key update mechanism include: When the application layer session key reaches the preset usage period or communication count threshold, the G node MCU actively initiates a key update. When the vehicle communication topology changes, such as when a new T node joins the group or an existing T node leaves the group, the topology adjustment is usually completed during vehicle offline maintenance or system configuration. After the topology adjustment is completed, the G node MCU triggers application layer security state reinitialization based on the updated group membership relationship, and completes the synchronization of the session key negotiation counters of relevant nodes by re-executing the application layer key negotiation process to ensure communication security after the change in group membership relationship; When abnormal communication behavior or changes in security status are detected, the G-node MCU proactively performs key updates to reduce the risk of key leakage.

[0046] During the key update process, the G node MCU sends a key update request to the T nodes in the group through the current application layer secure communication channel. After receiving the update request, each T node completes authentication using the current application layer security parameters and participates in the new key negotiation process according to the update request.

[0047] Furthermore, during the aforementioned key update process, the access layer StarScan communication module remains constantly connected and does not participate in frequent service key updates. It only maintains the existing wireless security channel to carry application layer key update interaction messages. When the access layer security status changes or the wireless link is re-established, the access layer security parameter negotiation is re-executed as needed.

[0048] The G-node MCU and each T-node MCU recalculate the new application-layer session key based on updated random numbers, their respective maintained counter states, and the Key Derivation Algorithm (KDF), and synchronously update the corresponding communication security state. After the key update is completed, subsequent vehicle control messages are protected by the new application-layer session key.

[0049] To illustrate the aforementioned StarSignal wireless group secure communication method in more detail, this invention uses an in-vehicle seat heating and ventilation control scenario as an example. In this embodiment, the in-vehicle wireless control system includes one domain controller and two seat control nodes. The domain controller, acting as a StarSignal G node, is used to manage seat control tasks; the driver's seat controller and the front passenger seat controller, acting as StarSignal T nodes, are used to execute seat heating and ventilation control, as well as status feedback.

[0050] Step 1: Initialize the vehicle-mounted Star Flash wireless group control system.

[0051] The domain controller, driver's seat controller, and passenger seat controller all include a StarFlash communication module and an MCU. During system initialization, the access layer long-term symmetric key, authentication key, and key derivation parameters are pre-set in the StarFlash communication module of each node to establish a StarFlash wireless secure channel; simultaneously, the application layer long-term symmetric key, authentication key, and key derivation parameters are pre-set in the domain controller MCU and the two seat controller MCUs to establish a secure session for vehicle control services.

[0052] In addition, each node is configured with the same cryptographic algorithm, message authentication algorithm, and key negotiation initial state, while the access layer and application layer maintain independent security parameters.

[0053] Step 2: Establish secure communication relationships for the StarSpark wireless group.

[0054] After the vehicle starts, the domain controller first establishes a wireless connection with the driver's seat controller and the front passenger seat controller via the StarFlash communication module. The StarFlash communication modules perform access layer authentication and key negotiation procedures to generate access layer session keys and establish a secure StarFlash wireless channel. Subsequently, the domain controller MCU performs application layer authentication and key negotiation procedures with the two seat controller MCUs respectively, generating application layer session keys and establishing secure application sessions for seat control services.

[0055] Step 3: The domain controller sends commands to control the seat heating and ventilation.

[0056] When a user sets seat functions through the vehicle control interface, the domain controller MCU generates seat control commands based on the user input. For example, if the user sets the driver's seat heating level to level three and the passenger seat ventilation level to level two, the domain controller generates corresponding control information based on the control requirements. Since all seat control nodes belong to the same control group, the domain controller sends control commands to both the driver's seat controller and the passenger seat controller using multicast.

[0057] Step 4: The domain controller performs double-layer security encapsulation and sends control messages.

[0058] The domain controller MCU first securely encapsulates the seat control commands using an application-secure session. After combining the control information with multicast communication status parameters, it encrypts the data using an application-layer session key and generates message authentication information, forming an application-layer secure control message. Subsequently, the application-layer secure control message is sent to the domain controller's StarScan communication module. The StarScan communication module uses an access-layer session key to provide secondary security protection for the message and then transmits it to the driver's seat controller and the front passenger seat controller via the SLE wireless link.

[0059] Step 5: The seat control node receives and executes control commands.

[0060] After receiving the wireless control message, the driver's seat controller and the front passenger seat controller first complete the access layer security verification through the StarFlash communication module and then recover the application layer security control message. Subsequently, the seat controller MCU performs message authentication and communication status verification on the application layer control message. Upon successful verification, the corresponding seat function is executed according to the control command. The driver's seat controller adjusts the seat heating module's operating status according to the control command to regulate the seat temperature; the front passenger seat controller controls the ventilation module's operation according to the control command to regulate the seat ventilation function.

[0061] Step 6: The seat control node provides feedback on the execution status.

[0062] After completing their control tasks, the driver's seat controller and the front passenger seat controller each collect their own execution status and generate status feedback information. Since the two seat nodes have independent execution states, each seat controller returns a status feedback message to the domain controller via unicast. During the feedback process, the seat controller MCU securely encapsulates its own node identifier, execution status information, and unicast communication status parameters, and uses the application layer session key for encryption and message authentication. The message is then sent to the domain controller after access layer security protection by the StarFlash communication module.

[0063] Step 7: The domain controller receives and manages the seat status.

[0064] After receiving status feedback messages from the driver's seat controller and the front passenger seat controller, the domain controller identifies the corresponding seat node based on the node identifier in the message and uses the corresponding security context to complete message authentication, data parsing, and communication status verification. Upon successful verification, the domain controller obtains the current heating and ventilation status of the two seats, as well as the execution results, and updates the vehicle seat control status.

[0065] This document uses specific examples to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of the present invention. The descriptions of the above embodiments are only for the purpose of helping to understand the method and core ideas of the present invention. Furthermore, those skilled in the art will recognize that, based on the ideas of the present invention, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. Therefore, the content of this specification should not be construed as a limitation of the present invention.

Claims

1. A secure communication method for StarSignal wireless groups based on a defense-in-depth architecture, used in a vehicle-mounted StarSignal wireless group control system, the system comprising one StarSignal G node and several StarSignal T nodes, each node including at least a StarSignal communication module and an MCU, wherein the StarSignal communication module and the MCU exchange information via a data interface, characterized in that, The method includes the following steps: Step 1: Perform security initialization on the StarFlash communication module and the MCU respectively to form independent access layer security context and application layer security context; Step 2: After the device is started, the StarSpark communication module between nodes performs the access layer handshake process to complete node identity authentication and access layer session key negotiation, generate access layer session key and establish StarSpark wireless security channel; Step 3: After the access layer handshake is successful and the StarSpark wireless security channel is established, the MCUs between nodes execute the application layer handshake process based on the handshake message transmitted through the StarSpark wireless security channel; after completing the application layer identity authentication and application layer session key negotiation, an application security session independent of the access layer is established, and the corresponding application layer session key is generated. Step 4: After the application security session is established, the G node and the T node enter the secure communication phase. The sending end performs application layer and access layer security protection in sequence, and the receiving end performs access layer and application layer security verification in sequence. The MCU performs communication status verification. The secure communication phase includes two processes: the G node multicasts control messages to multiple T nodes, and each T node unicasts status feedback messages to the G node. Step 5: The G node MCU initiates an application layer key update through the current application security session based on the triggering conditions, re-executes the application layer key negotiation process to generate a new application layer session key, and synchronously updates the group communication security status.

2. The Starflash wireless group secure communication method based on a defense-in-depth architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step 1, the StarScan communication module and the MCU are respectively security initialized, specifically including: Long-term symmetric key initialization: The same access layer long-term symmetric key LK_link{G,T} is pre-set in the G-node Star Flash communication module and all T-node Star Flash communication modules in the group; the same application layer long-term symmetric key LK_app{G,T} is pre-set in the G-node MCU and all T-node MCUs. Authentication key initialization: The access layer authentication key Kauth_link{G,T} is preset in the StarSpark communication module of G node and all T nodes in the group, and the application layer authentication key Kauth_app{G,T} is preset in the MCU of G node and all T nodes in the group. Session key negotiation counter initialization: The access layer and application layer are configured with independent session key negotiation counters CTR_K_link{G,T} and CTR_K_app{G,T}, respectively. In the same security layer, the counters of G nodes and all T nodes have the same initial state and are updated according to preset rules each time a new handshake or session key renegotiation is completed. Key derivation algorithm initialization: The pre-agreed key derivation algorithm KDF is configured in the StarScan communication module and MCU; Cryptographic algorithm initialization: The access layer and application layer configure isomorphic combinations of cryptographic algorithms; Secure communication state initialization: The G node and all T node MCUs in the group initialize the application layer communication state parameters according to the communication service requirements.

3. The Starflash wireless group secure communication method based on a defense-in-depth architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that, The access layer handshake process in step 2 and the application layer handshake process in step 3 both include four interactive processes: identity request, peer verification, local verification, and session confirmation. Furthermore, the access layer and the application layer use the same session key negotiation protocol.

4. The Starflash wireless group secure communication method based on a defense-in-depth architecture according to claim 3, characterized in that, The identity request interaction process specifically includes: 1.1 The G node generates a random number (Nonce) for this handshake and reads its own identity identifier (G_ID), session key negotiation count (G_CTR_K_x). It then combines the random number (Nonce), its own identity identifier (G_ID), and session key negotiation count (G_CTR_K_x) to form the handshake initiation frame parameters. 1.

2. Node G uses the long-term shared symmetric key LK_x{G,T} pre-set by both parties to symmetrically encrypt the handshake initiation frame parameters and obtain the encryption key negotiation material Cipher1(Nonce,G_ID,G_CTR_K_x); 1.3 Using the preset authentication key Kauth_x{G,T}, calculate the encryption key negotiation material Cipher1(Nonce,G_ID,G_CTR_K_x) based on the SM3-HMAC algorithm to obtain the message authentication code MAC_G; 1.4 Node G constructs a handshake initiation frame, including the handshake frame header, encryption key negotiation materials, and message authentication code, and sends it to node T.

5. The Starflash wireless group secure communication method based on a defense-in-depth architecture according to claim 4, characterized in that, The peer verification interaction process specifically includes: 2.1 After receiving the handshake initiation frame, node T first identifies the handshake frame header, determines that the current data is a key negotiation request based on the message type, and enters the corresponding key negotiation processing flow; 2.

2. Recalculate the message authentication code using the locally stored authentication key Kauth_x{G,T} on the encrypted material in the received message, and compare it with MAC_G in the request message; if they do not match, the integrity or authenticity verification of the handshake request of node G is considered to have failed, and the handshake is terminated; if they match, continue to execute the subsequent steps. 2.3 Node T uses the long-term symmetric key LK_x{G,T} shared with node G to decrypt the encrypted key negotiation materials, obtaining the handshake random number Nonce, node G's identity identifier G_ID, and node G's current key negotiation count value G_CTR_K_x. Then, node T verifies the validity of the decrypted G_ID according to the node identity information table stored locally, confirming whether the current requesting node belongs to the preset communication object, and compares the count value. If G_ID or the negotiation count value does not match, the current handshake request is rejected; if the verification passes, the key negotiation process continues. 2.4 Node T updates its own session key negotiation counter and, based on the decrypted random number Nonce and the updated counter value Ti_CTR_K_x′, calls the preset key derivation algorithm KDF to generate the temporary session key SK_x{G,T} used for this communication.

6. The Starflash wireless group secure communication method based on a defense-in-depth architecture according to claim 5, characterized in that, The local verification interaction process specifically includes: 3.1 Node T reads its own identity identifier Ti_ID and combines the random number Nonce, the T node's identity identifier Ti_ID, and the updated count value Ti_CTR_K_x′ to form the response key negotiation material; 3.2 Node T uses the temporary session key SK_x{G,T} generated in step 2.4 to perform symmetric encryption on the response key negotiation material to obtain the response ciphertext Cipher2(Nonce,Ti_ID,Ti_CTR_K_x′); 3.3 Node T uses the pre-set authentication key Kauth_x{G,T} to calculate the message authentication code MAC_T based on the SM3-HMAC algorithm on the ciphertext of the response. 3.4 Node T constructs a key negotiation response frame, including a handshake response frame header, response ciphertext, and message authentication code MAC_T, and sends it to node G.

7. The Starflash wireless group secure communication method based on a defense-in-depth architecture according to claim 6, characterized in that, The session confirmation interaction process specifically includes: 4.1 After receiving the key negotiation response frame sent by node T, node G first identifies the handshake response frame header, determines that the current message type is a key negotiation response message, and enters the response verification process; 4.2 Node G uses the pre-set authentication key Kauth_x{G,T} to recalculate the message authentication code on the received response ciphertext and compares it with MAC_T in the response message; if the two are inconsistent, it is considered that the integrity or authenticity verification of the response message of Node T has failed and the handshake is terminated; if the verification is consistent, the subsequent steps are continued. 4.3 Node G updates its own session key negotiation counter to synchronize with the counter jointly maintained by node T. Based on the random number Nonce generated during the initial handshake and the updated counter value G_CTR_K_x′, node G calls the same KDF algorithm as node T to generate a temporary session key SK_x{G,T}. 4.4 Node G uses the generated temporary session key SK_x{G,T} to decrypt the ciphertext of Node T's response, obtaining Nonce, Ti_ID, Ti_CTR_K_x′, and verifying whether the random number, Node T's identity, and counting status are consistent with the current handshake process.

8. The Starflash wireless group secure communication method based on a defense-in-depth architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step 4, node G multicasts control messages to multiple nodes T, specifically including: The G node MCU concatenates the control command cmd with the status information G_CTR_ms of the multicast session counter, and encrypts the concatenated information using the application layer session key SK_app{G,T} negotiated by the application layer to obtain the application layer encrypted message Cipher1(cmd,G_CTR_ms). The G-node MCU uses the preset application layer authentication key Kauth_app{G,T} to perform SM3-HMAC calculation on the application layer encrypted message to obtain the application layer message authentication information MAC1. The G-node MCU generates an application-layer encrypted control message Pack1 (Cipher1, MAC1) and sends it to the G-node Star Flash communication module. The G-node Star Flash communication module uses the access layer session key SK_link{G,T} negotiated by the access layer to perform secondary encryption on Pack1(Cipher1,MAC1) to obtain the access layer encrypted message Cipher2(Pack1). The G-node Star Flash Communication Module uses the preset access layer authentication key Kauth_link{G,T} to perform SM3-HMAC calculation on the access layer encrypted message to obtain the access layer message authentication information MAC2; The G-node StarSpark communication module generates an access layer encrypted message Pack2 (Cipher2, MAC2) and sends it to the T-node via the StarSpark SLE wireless link.

9. The Starflash wireless group secure communication method based on a defense-in-depth architecture according to claim 8, characterized in that, Step 4 further includes: the T node processing and verifying the received multicast control messages, specifically including: The T-node StarSpark communication module uses the preset access layer authentication key Kauth_link{G,T} to perform SM3-HMAC verification on the received access layer message authentication code. If the verification fails, the message is discarded. If the verification succeeds, the access layer session key SK_link{G,T} is used to decrypt the access layer encrypted message Pack2(Cipher2,MAC2), restore the application layer encrypted control message Pack1(Cipher1,MAC1), and send it to the T-node MCU. The T-node MCU uses the preset application layer authentication key Kauth_app{G,T} to perform SM3-HMAC verification on Pack1(Cipher1,MAC1). If the verification fails, the Pack1 is discarded. If the verification succeeds, the Pack1 is decrypted using the application layer session key SK_app{G,T} to obtain the control command cmd and the status information G_CTR_ms of the multicast session counter from the G-node. The T-node MCU compares the status information of the multicast session counter from the G-node with the multicast count status currently maintained by the T-node. If the freshness requirement is met, the local multicast counter is updated and control commands are executed; otherwise, the message is discarded.

10. The Starflash wireless group secure communication method based on a defense-in-depth architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that, The triggering conditions in step 5 include at least one of the following: the application layer session key reaches a preset usage period or communication frequency threshold, the vehicle communication topology changes, and abnormal communication behavior or security status changes are detected.