Nuclear power station master control room architecture based on DCS (Distributed Control System)

Abstract

The utility model discloses a nuclear power station master control room architecture based on a DCS. The nuclear power station master control room architecture comprises a security-level DCS, a non-security-level DCS and a backup panel. The backup panel is provided with a first security level control display device, the non-security level DCS comprises a work station, and the work station is provided with a second security level control display device, a non-security level control display device and a conventional monitoring instrument; the safety-level DCS comprises an equipment interface cabinet, a safety bus, a data transmission cabinet, a reactor protection cabinet and a safety-level system bus which are in communication connection in sequence; the non-security-level DCS further comprises a field control cabinet and a server. Compared with an onshore nuclear power station master control room in the related technology, the nuclear power station master control room architecture based on the DCS reduces a whole set of diversified driving system equipment, and integrates diversified driving functions into a work station for realization. A man-machine interface of the master control room is simplified, the human factor risk is reduced, meanwhile, the requirement for the building space is lowered, and reference is provided for the design of the master control room arranged in a compact mode.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The utility model relates to the technical field of nuclear power, and in particular to a DCS-based main control room architecture of a nuclear power plant. Background Art

[0002] like Figure 1 As shown in the figure, the main control room is the monitoring center of the nuclear power plant, providing the operator with the human-machine interface and related information equipment required to achieve the reactor operation goals. At present, the main control room of most commercial land-based nuclear power plants is equipped with four workstations (Operator Workp l ace, OWP) with exactly the same configuration. Each workstation is equipped with a non-safety-level control and display device (Non classifi ed Video Disp l ay Unit, NC-VDU), which is used to control non-safety-level field equipment and monitor all information. It is implemented using the NC-DCS platform. Each workstation is equipped with a safety-level control and display device (Safety Video Disp l ay Unit, S-VDU), which is used to monitor safety-level equipment information. It is implemented using the safety-level DCS platform).

[0003] When the non-safety-level DCS platform fails, the operator needs to transfer to the backup panel (Back-up Panel, BUP) for operation. The backup panel is equipped with conventional monitoring instruments, safety-level control display equipment and alarm windows. When the workstation is unavailable, the operator can use the backup panel to bring the reactor to and maintain it in a safe shutdown state.

[0004] In order to cope with the failure of the safety-level DCS platform, a diversified actuator system (DAS) independent of the safety-level DCS is set up in the main control room. The diversified actuator system only retains the minimum range of safety functions that must be possessed after the failure of the safety-level DCS platform, and is implemented using FPGA technology (Field-Programmable Gate Array). The diversified actuator system includes a diversified human-machine interface panel (DHP) and a diversified actuator cabinet (DAC). The diversified human-machine interface panel is equipped with conventional monitoring instruments and non-safety-level control display devices. When the safety-level DCS platform fails, the safety-level control display devices on the workstation / backup panel lose the monitoring function of the safety-level equipment information. At this time, the operator transfers to the diversified human-machine interface panel to bring the reactor to and maintain it in a safe shutdown state.

[0005] In the design of the main control room of onshore nuclear power plants in related technologies, separate consoles and equipment are provided for each depth of defense line, with sufficient diversity and redundancy. However, there are generally too many devices and a generally large space scale, which cannot meet the requirements for the design of main control rooms with very limited building space. Summary of the Invention

[0006] The technical problem to be solved by the present utility model is to provide a DCS-based main control room architecture for nuclear power plants.

[0007] The technical solution adopted by the present utility model to solve its technical problems is to construct a DCS-based main control room architecture for nuclear power plants, including a safety-class DCS, a non-safety-class DCS, and a backup panel; a first safety-class control and display device is provided on the backup panel, the non-safety-class DCS includes workstations, and a second safety-class control and display device, a non-safety-class control and display device, and conventional monitoring instruments are provided on the workstations;

[0008] The safety-class DCS includes an equipment interface cabinet, a safety bus, a data transmission cabinet, a reactor protection cabinet, and a safety-class system bus that are sequentially communicatively connected; the equipment interface cabinet and the reactor protection cabinet are used to communicatively connect with safety-class field devices, and the safety bus is also communicatively connected to the first safety-class control and display device and the second safety-class control and display device; the equipment interface cabinet is communicatively connected to the conventional monitoring instruments;

[0009] The non-safety-class DCS further includes a field control cabinet and a server that are communicatively connected, the field control cabinet is used to communicatively connect with non-safety-class field devices, and the field control cabinet is also communicatively connected to the equipment interface cabinet; the server is communicatively connected to the non-safety-class control and display devices and the conventional monitoring instruments; and the server is communicatively connected to the safety bus and the safety-class system bus respectively.

[0010] In some embodiments, the workstations include a nuclear island operator workstation, a conventional island operator workstation, a unit leader workstation, and a safety engineer station. The second safety-class control and display device and the non-safety-class control and display device are provided on the nuclear island operator workstation, the conventional island operator workstation, the unit leader workstation, and the safety engineer station, and the conventional monitoring instruments are provided on the nuclear island operator workstation.

[0011] In some embodiments, the safety-class DCS further includes a first gateway, and the first gateway is communicatively connected to the safety-class system bus;

[0012] The non-safety-class DCS further includes a second gateway, and the second gateway is communicatively connected to the server;

[0013] The first gateway is communicatively connected to the second gateway.

[0014] In some embodiments, the non-safety-level DCS further includes a third gateway, and the third gateway is communicatively connected to the server;

[0015] The safety-level DCS further includes a fourth gateway, and the fourth gateway is communicatively connected to the safety bus;

[0016] The third gateway is communicatively connected to the fourth gateway.

[0017] In some embodiments, the field control cabinet is communicatively connected to the conventional monitoring instrument.

[0018] In some embodiments, the equipment interface cabinet, the reactor protection cabinet, and the field control cabinet all include a controller and an I / O module that are connected to each other.

[0019] In some embodiments, the backup panel is further provided with a post-accident parameter monitoring screen, and the safety-level DCS further includes a fifth gateway, and the fifth gateway is communicatively connected to the safety-level system bus and the post-accident parameter monitoring screen respectively.

[0020] In some embodiments, the backup panel is further provided with an alarm light annunciator, and the alarm light annunciator is connected to the reactor protection cabinet and the field control cabinet.

[0021] In some embodiments, the backup panel is further provided with display instruments;

[0022] The equipment interface cabinet, the reactor protection cabinet, and the field control cabinet are all communicatively connected to the display instruments.

[0023] In some embodiments, the backup panel is further provided with a hard hand operator, and the equipment interface cabinet, the reactor protection cabinet, and the field control cabinet are all communicatively connected to the hard hand operator.

[0024] Implementing the present utility model has the following beneficial effects: Compared with the main control room of a land-based nuclear power plant in the related art, the DCS-based main control room architecture of a nuclear power plant reduces the entire set of diverse drive system devices and integrates the diverse drive functions into the workstation. By changing the DCS architecture and the information data transmission method, the non-safety-level control and display devices on the workstation can directly monitor the safety-level device information within the monitoring range of the diverse drive system. It simplifies the man-machine interface of the main control room, reduces the human factor risk and also reduces the requirement for building space, providing a reference for the design of a compactly arranged main control room. Using the non-safety-level DCS platform to implement the diverse drive system function meets the requirement of maintaining independence from the safety-level DCS platform in the standard. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0025] To more clearly illustrate the technical solution of the present utility model, the present utility model will be further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the following drawings only show some embodiments of the present utility model, and therefore should not be regarded as a limitation of the scope. For those of ordinary skill in the art, without creative efforts, other related drawings can also be obtained based on these drawings. In the drawings:

[0026] Figure 1 is a schematic structural diagram of the main control room architecture of a nuclear power plant in the related art;

[0027] Figure 2 is a schematic structural diagram of the main control room architecture of a nuclear power plant based on DCS in some embodiments of the present utility model;

[0028] Figure 3 is Figure 2 one of the partial detail diagrams of the main control room architecture of a nuclear power plant based on DCS in;

[0029] Figure 4 is Figure 2 the other partial detail diagram of the main control room architecture of a nuclear power plant based on DCS in. Detailed implementation manners

[0030] For a clearer understanding of the technical features, objectives, and effects of the present utility model, the detailed implementation manners of the present utility model will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the following description, it should be understood that the orientation or positional relationships indicated by "front", "rear", "upper", "lower", "left", "right", "longitudinal", "transverse", "vertical", "horizontal", "top", "bottom", "inner", "outer", "head", "tail", etc. are based on the orientation or positional relationships shown in the drawings and are constructed and operated in a specific orientation, only for the convenience of describing the present technical solution, rather than indicating that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation. Therefore, it should not be construed as a limitation of the present utility model.

[0031] It should also be noted that, unless otherwise clearly specified and defined, terms such as "installation", "connection", "linkage", "fixation", "setting" should be understood in a broad sense. For example, it can be a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral one; it can be a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; it can be a direct connection or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium, and it can be the communication inside two components or the interaction relationship between two components. When one component is referred to as being "on" or "under" another component, the component can be "directly" or "indirectly" located above the other component, or there may also be one or more intermediate components. The terms "first", "second", "third", etc. are only for the convenience of describing the present technical solution, and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the quantity of the indicated technical features. Thus, the features defined with "first", "second", "third", etc. can explicitly or implicitly include one or more of such features. For those of ordinary skill in the art, the specific meanings of the above terms in the present utility model can be understood according to specific circumstances.

[0032] In the following description, specific details such as specific system structures and technologies are presented for the purpose of illustration rather than limitation, so as to thoroughly understand the embodiments of the present utility model. However, those skilled in the art should clearly understand that the present utility model can also be implemented in other embodiments without these specific details. In other cases, detailed descriptions of well-known systems, devices, circuits, and methods are omitted to avoid unnecessary details from interfering with the description of the present utility model.

[0033] The following first introduces the terms involved in this application, where:

[0034] DCS: Distributed Control System, a digital control system.

[0035] BUP: Back-up Panel, a backup panel.

[0036] OWP: Operator Workplace, a workstation.

[0037] S-DCS: Safety Distributed Control System, a safety-level DCS.

[0038] NC-DCS: Non classified-DCS, a non-safety-level DCS.

[0039] S-VDU: Safety Video Display Unit, a safety-level control display device.

[0040] NC-VDU: non-classified Video Display Unit, a non-safety-class control display device.

[0041] CIC: Communications Interface Control Cabinet, a device interface cabinet.

[0042] RPC: Reactor Protection Cabinet, a reactor protection cabinet.

[0043] DTC: Data Transfer Cabinet, a data transfer cabinet.

[0044] FCS: Fieldbus Control System, a field control cabinet.

[0045] GW: Gateway, a gateway device.

[0046] See Figures 2 to 4 , this utility model shows an architecture of the main control room of a nuclear power plant based on DCS, which includes a safety-class DCS 10, a non-safety-class DCS 20, and a backup panel 30; a first safety-class control display device 31 is provided on the backup panel 30, the non-safety-class DCS 20 includes a workstation 21, and a second safety-class control display device 22, a non-safety-class control display device 23, and a conventional monitoring instrument 24 are provided on the workstation 21; further, the workstation 21 may include a nuclear island operator workstation 211, a conventional island operator workstation 212, a unit leader workstation 213, and a safety engineer station 214. The second safety-class control display device 22 and the non-safety-class control display device 23 are provided on each of the nuclear island operator workstation 211, the conventional island operator workstation 212, the unit leader workstation 213, and the safety engineer station 214, and the conventional monitoring instrument 24 is also provided on the nuclear island operator workstation 211.

[0047] The safety-class DCS 10 includes a device interface cabinet 11, a safety bus 12, a data transfer cabinet 13, a reactor protection cabinet 14, and a safety-class system bus 15 that are communicatively connected in sequence; the device interface cabinet 11 and the reactor protection cabinet 14 are used to communicatively connect with safety-class field devices 100, the safety bus 12 is also communicatively connected to the first safety-class control display device 31 and the second safety-class control display device 22; the reactor protection cabinet 14 is communicatively connected to the first safety-class control display device 31; the device interface cabinet 11 is communicatively connected to the conventional monitoring instrument 24. The safety-class field devices 100 may include, but are not limited to, safety-class valves, safety-class sensors, etc.

[0048] The non - safety - level DCS20 further includes a field control cabinet 25 and a server 26 that are communicatively connected. The field control cabinet 25 is used to communicatively connect with non - safety - level field devices 200, and the field control cabinet 25 is also communicatively connected to the equipment interface cabinet 11; the server 26 is communicatively connected to the non - safety - level control and display device 23 and the conventional monitoring instrument 24; and the server 26 is respectively communicatively connected to the safety bus 12 and the safety - level system bus 15. The non - safety - level field devices 200 can include, but are not limited to, non - safety - level valves, non - safety - level sensors, etc.

[0049] In some embodiments, the safety - level DCS10 further includes a first gateway 16, the first gateway 16 is communicatively connected to the safety - level system bus 15, the non - safety - level DCS20 further includes a second gateway 27, the second gateway 27 is communicatively connected to the server 26, and the first gateway 16 is communicatively connected to the second gateway 27. Among them, the non - safety - level DCS20 may further include a system network and a monitoring network, both the system network and the monitoring network are communicative with the server 26, the system network and the monitoring network can be implemented through a mesh network system, or, the system network and the monitoring network can be implemented by the server 26, and specific limitations are not made here.

[0050] In some embodiments, the non - safety - level DCS20 further includes a third gateway 28, the third gateway 28 is communicatively connected to the server 26; the safety - level DCS10 further includes a fourth gateway 17, the fourth gateway 17 is communicatively connected to the safety bus 12; the third gateway 28 is communicatively connected to the fourth gateway 17. Preferably, the third gateway 28 can communicate with the system network.

[0051] In some embodiments, the equipment interface cabinet 11 is communicatively connected to the conventional monitoring instrument 24, and here the equipment interface cabinet 11 and the conventional monitoring instrument 24 can be directly communicatively connected through a cable.

[0052] In some embodiments, the field control cabinet 25 is communicatively connected to the conventional monitoring instrument 24, and here the field control cabinet 25 and the conventional monitoring instrument 24 can be directly communicatively connected through a cable.

[0053] In some embodiments, the equipment interface cabinet 11, the reactor protection cabinet 14, and the field control cabinet 25 all include a controller and an I / O module that are interconnected. Among them, the I / O modules of the equipment interface cabinet 11, the reactor protection cabinet 14, and the field control cabinet 25 can all be used for cable connection to achieve hard - wiring, so as to facilitate the transmission of monitoring signals and control instructions.

[0054] In some embodiments, the backup panel 30 is further provided with an accident - after parameter monitoring screen 32, and the safety - level DCS10 further includes a fifth gateway 18, and the fifth gateway 18 is respectively communicatively connected to the safety - level system bus 15 and the accident - after parameter monitoring screen 32.

[0055] In some embodiments, the backup panel 30 is further provided with an alarm annunciator 33, and the alarm annunciator 33 is connected to the reactor protection cabinet 14 and the on-site control cabinet 25.

[0056] In some embodiments, the backup panel 30 is further provided with a display instrument 34; the equipment interface cabinet 11, the reactor protection cabinet 14, and the on-site control cabinet 25 are all communicatively connected to the display instrument 34.

[0057] In some embodiments, the backup panel 30 is further provided with a hard hand operator 35, and the equipment interface cabinet 11, the reactor protection cabinet 14, and the on-site control cabinet 25 are all communicatively connected to the hard hand operator 35.

[0058] In this embodiment, the monitoring method of the safety-class information on the workstation 21 is as follows:

[0059] 1. Parameter monitoring (within the monitoring range of the diversity drive system):

[0060] a. Safety-class on-site equipment 100 → Equipment interface cabinet 11 → On-site control cabinet 25 → Server 26 → Non-safety-class control and display equipment 23; or, safety-class on-site equipment 100 → Equipment interface cabinet 11 → On-site control cabinet 25 → System network → Server 26 → Monitoring network → Non-safety-class control and display equipment 23.

[0061] b. Safety-class on-site equipment 100 → Equipment interface cabinet 11 → On-site control cabinet 25 → Conventional monitoring instrument 24;

[0062] c. Safety-class on-site equipment 100 → Equipment interface cabinet 11 → Safety bus 12 → First safety-class control and display equipment 31 and / or second safety-class control and display equipment 22.

[0063] 2. Parameter monitoring (outside the monitoring range of the diversity drive system):

[0064] a. Safety-class on-site equipment 100 → Equipment interface cabinet 11 → Safety bus 12 → Data transmission cabinet 13 → Safety-class system bus 15 → First gateway 16 → Second gateway 27 → Server 26 → Non-safety-class control and display equipment 23; or, safety-class on-site equipment 100 → Equipment interface cabinet 11 → Safety bus 12 → Data transmission cabinet 13 → Safety-class system bus 15 → First gateway 16 → Second gateway 27 → System network → Server 26 → Monitoring network → Non-safety-class control and display equipment 23.

[0065] b. Safety-class on-site equipment 100 → Reactor protection cabinet 14 → Safety-class system bus 16 → First gateway 16 → Second gateway 27 → System network → Server → Monitoring network → Non-safety-class control and display equipment 23.

[0066] c. Safety-class field device 100 → Device interface cabinet 11 → Safety bus 12 → First safety-class control and display device 31.

[0067] d. Safety-class field device 100 → Reactor protection cabinet 14 → Data transmission cabinet 13 → Safety bus → First safety-class control and display device 31.

[0068] 3. Device control (within the scope of diversified drive system monitoring):

[0069] a. Non-safety-class control and display device 23 → Server 26 → Third gateway 28 → Fourth gateway 17 → Safety bus → Device interface cabinet 11 → Safety-class field device; or, Non-safety-class control and display device 23 → Monitoring network → Server 26 → System network → Third gateway 28 → Fourth gateway 17 → Safety bus 12 → Device interface cabinet 11 → Safety-class field device 100.

[0070] b. Conventional monitoring instrument 24 → Device interface cabinet 11 → Safety-class field device 100.

[0071] c. First safety-class control and display device 31 and / or Second safety-class control and display device 22 → Safety bus 12 → Device interface cabinet 11 → Safety-class field device 100.

[0072] 4. Device control (outside the scope of diversified drive system monitoring):

[0073] a. First safety-class control and display device 31 and / or Second safety-class control and display device 22 → Safety bus 12 → Device interface cabinet 11 → Safety-class field device 100;

[0074] b. First safety-class control and display device 31 and / or Second safety-class control and display device 22 → Safety bus 12 → Data transmission cabinet 13 → Reactor protection cabinet 14 → Safety-class system bus 15 → Data transmission cabinet 13 → Safety bus 12 → Device interface cabinet 11 → Safety-class field device 100.

[0075] From the transmission paths of the above monitoring information, it can be seen that when the safety-class DCS platform fails, the first safety-class control and display device 31 loses the monitoring means for the safety-class device information, but the non-safety-class control and display device 23 can still implement the monitoring function of the safety-class device information within the scope of the diversified drive system monitoring.

[0076] Compared with the main control room of the onshore nuclear power plant in the related art, this application reduces the entire set of diverse drive system devices and integrates the diverse drive function into the workstation. By changing the DCS architecture and the transmission mode of information data, the non-safety-class control and display device 23 on the workstation can directly monitor the safety-class device information within the monitoring range of the diverse drive system.

[0077] This application enables the cancellation of the diverse drive system device in the main control room, simplifies the man-machine interface in the main control room, reduces the human factor risk and also reduces the requirement for building space, providing a reference for the design of the main control room with a compact layout.

[0078] This application uses a non-safety-class DCS platform to implement the diverse drive system function, meeting the requirement of maintaining independence from the safety-class DCS platform in the standard. In this application, when the non-safety-class DCS fails, the operator transfers to the backup panel 30 to perform the monitoring function; when the safety-class DCS platform fails, the operator uses the non-safety-class control and display device 23 on the workstation 21 to perform the diverse drive function, ensuring the integrity of the in-depth defense line in the main control room.

[0079] It can be understood that the above embodiments only express the preferred implementation modes of the present utility model, and the description thereof is relatively specific and detailed, but it should not be construed as a limitation on the scope of the patent of the present utility model; it should be noted that for those of ordinary skill in the art, without departing from the concept of the present utility model, the above technical features can be freely combined, and several deformations and improvements can also be made, all of which belong to the protection scope of the present utility model; therefore, all equivalent transformations and modifications made to the scope of the claims of the present utility model shall fall within the scope covered by the claims of the present utility model.

Claims

1. A nuclear power plant main control room architecture based on DCS, characterized in that, It includes a safety-class DCS (10), a non-safety-class DCS (20), and a backup panel (30); a first safety-class control and display device (31) is provided on the backup panel (30), the non-safety-class DCS (20) includes a workstation (21), and a second safety-class control and display device (22), a non-safety-class control and display device (23), and a conventional monitoring instrument (24) are provided on the workstation (21); The safety-class DCS (10) includes an equipment interface cabinet (11), a safety bus (12), a data transmission cabinet (13), a reactor protection cabinet (14), and a safety-class system bus (15) that are communicatively connected in sequence; the equipment interface cabinet (11) and the reactor protection cabinet (14) are used to communicatively connect with safety-class field devices (100), and the safety bus (12) is also communicatively connected with the first safety-class control and display device (31) and the second safety-class control and display device (22); the equipment interface cabinet (11) is communicatively connected with the conventional monitoring instrument (24); The non-safety-class DCS (20) further includes a field control cabinet (25) and a server (26) that are communicatively connected, the field control cabinet (25) is used to communicatively connect with non-safety-class field devices (200), and the field control cabinet (25) is also communicatively connected with the equipment interface cabinet (11); the server (26) is communicatively connected with the non-safety-class control and display device (23) and the conventional monitoring instrument (24); and the server (26) is communicatively connected with the safety bus (12) and the safety-class system bus (15) respectively.

2. The DCS-based main control room architecture of a nuclear power plant according to claim 1, characterized in that The workstation (21) includes a nuclear island operator workstation (211), a conventional island operator workstation (212), a unit leader workstation (213), and a safety engineer station (214). The second safety-class control and display device (22) and the non-safety-class control and display device (23) are provided on each of the nuclear island operator workstation (211), the conventional island operator workstation (212), the unit leader workstation (213), and the safety engineer station (214), and the conventional monitoring instrument (24) is provided on the nuclear island operator workstation (211).

3. The DCS-based main control room architecture of a nuclear power plant according to claim 1, wherein The safety-class DCS (10) further includes a first gateway (16), and the first gateway (16) is communicatively connected with the safety-class system bus (15); The non-safety-class DCS (20) further includes a second gateway (27), and the second gateway (27) is communicatively connected with the server (26); The first gateway (16) is communicatively connected with the second gateway (27).

4. The DCS-based main control room architecture of a nuclear power plant according to claim 1, characterized in that, The non-safety-class DCS (20) further includes a third gateway (28), and the third gateway (28) is communicatively connected with the server (26); The safety-class DCS (10) further includes a fourth gateway (17), and the fourth gateway (17) is communicatively connected with the safety bus (12); The third gateway (28) is communicatively connected to the fourth gateway (17).

5. The DCS-based main control room architecture of a nuclear power plant according to claim 1, wherein The on-site control cabinet (25) is communicatively connected to the conventional monitoring instrument (24).

6. The DCS-based main control room architecture of a nuclear power plant according to claim 1, wherein The equipment interface cabinet (11), the reactor protection cabinet (14), and the on-site control cabinet (25) all include a controller and an I / O module that are interconnected.

7. The DCS-based main control room architecture of a nuclear power plant according to claim 1, characterized in that The backup panel (30) is further provided with a post-accident parameter monitoring screen (32), and the safety-class DCS (10) further includes a fifth gateway (18). The fifth gateway (18) is communicatively connected to the safety-class system bus (15) and the post-accident parameter monitoring screen (32) respectively.

8. The DCS-based main control room architecture of a nuclear power plant according to claim 1, characterized in that, The backup panel (30) is further provided with an alarm annunciator (33), and the alarm annunciator (33) is connected to the reactor protection cabinet (14) and the on-site control cabinet (25).

9. The DCS-based main control room architecture of a nuclear power plant according to claim 1, characterized in that, The backup panel (30) is further provided with a display instrument (34); The equipment interface cabinet (11), the reactor protection cabinet (14), and the on-site control cabinet (25) are all communicatively connected to the display instrument (34).

10. The architecture of the main control room of a nuclear power plant based on DCS according to claim 1, characterized in that, The backup panel (30) is further provided with a hard hand operator (35), and the equipment interface cabinet (11), the reactor protection cabinet (14), and the on-site control cabinet (25) are all communicatively connected to the hard hand operator (35).

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