Product anti-disassembly structure and electronic device

Abstract

The utility model provides a kind of product anti-disassembly structure and electronic equipment, product anti-disassembly structure includes conductive ink circuit, signal trigger circuit, protection execution unit and at least one accelerometer;Conductive ink circuit is laid in the inside of product shell, and conductive ink circuit is electrically connected to signal trigger circuit;Accelerometer is installed in the edge position of product mainboard, and is electrically connected with signal trigger circuit;Signal trigger circuit is installed on product mainboard, for when receiving the acceleration signal of accelerometer and the open circuit of conductive ink circuit, output trigger signal to protection execution unit to execute product protection action. By combining MEMS accelerometer with printed electronic technology circuit for financial terminal protection, the mechanism of double verification trigger reduces false alarm rate, thereby providing more secure and reliable anti-disassembly protection function.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This utility model relates to the field of anti-disassembly structures, and more particularly to an anti-disassembly structure for a product and an electronic device. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of the Internet of Things and smart devices, the security and integrity of electronic devices are becoming increasingly important, especially in fields such as financial payment terminals and security monitoring equipment. Tamper protection has become a key technology to ensure the safe operation of equipment and data privacy.

[0003] However, current mainstream traditional tamper protection solutions typically include mechanical microswitches, single-circuit break detection, or pure accelerometer solutions. Mechanical microswitches rely on the opening and closing of the casing for triggering, achieving status detection through physical contact. However, in practical applications, attackers can disable the microswitch before forcibly removing the device casing, thus disabling its tamper protection alarm function. Single-circuit break detection solutions can only monitor the continuity of a single circuit; attackers can easily bypass the detection mechanism using jumper wire techniques, circumventing the tamper protection alarm. While pure accelerometer solutions can sense the device's movement, they are prone to false alarms because they cannot accurately distinguish between vibrations during normal transportation and abnormal actions during malicious disassembly.

[0004] It is evident that existing anti-tampering solutions have a high false alarm rate and are unable to effectively resist "non-destructive shell opening" attacks, thus resulting in vulnerabilities in product security protection. Utility Model Content

[0005] This utility model discloses a product anti-tamper structure and electronic device, which solves the technical problem that the existing anti-tamper schemes have a high false alarm rate and are difficult to effectively resist "non-destructive shell opening" attacks, thus leading to vulnerabilities in product security protection.

[0006] This utility model embodiment provides a product anti-tamper structure, including a conductive ink circuit, a signal triggering circuit, a protective execution unit, and at least one accelerometer;

[0007] The conductive ink circuit is located on the inside of the product casing and is electrically connected to the signal triggering circuit.

[0008] The accelerometer is mounted on the edge of the product's mainboard and is electrically connected to the signal triggering circuit.

[0009] The signal triggering circuit is installed on the product motherboard and is used to output a trigger signal to the protection execution unit to perform product protection actions when the acceleration signal of the accelerometer is received and the conductive ink circuit is open.

[0010] Optionally, the conductive ink circuit includes multiple sets of main conductive ink lines arranged in a grid pattern, with horizontal and vertical cross-layouts.

[0011] Optionally, the main conductive ink line is connected to the signal triggering circuit via conductive contacts or wires.

[0012] Optionally, the conductive ink circuit further includes annular ink lines and radial ink lines;

[0013] The annular ink line surrounds the screw hole position of the product shell and is electrically connected to the main conductive ink line;

[0014] The radial ink lines cover the snap-fit ​​positions of the product casing and are electrically connected to the main conductive ink lines.

[0015] Optionally, it also includes multiple first detection lines embedded within the main conductive ink line for locating the break point of the main conductive ink line.

[0016] Optionally, it also includes multiple second detection lines located at the edge of the product motherboard, the second detection lines being electrically connected to the signal triggering circuit.

[0017] Optionally, a buffer layer is also provided around the conductive ink circuit and the accelerometer.

[0018] Optionally, the protection execution unit is a fuse circuit, used to release the electrical energy in the energy storage capacitor when the trigger signal is received, so as to destroy the data storage circuit on the product motherboard.

[0019] Optionally, the conductive ink circuit includes at least two circuit loops.

[0020] This utility model also provides an electronic device, including a product motherboard and a product casing with the product anti-tamper structure as described in any of the above claims.

[0021] As can be seen from the above technical solutions, the embodiments of this utility model have the following advantages:

[0022] This invention provides a product anti-tamper structure, comprising a conductive ink circuit, a signal triggering circuit, a protective execution unit, and at least one accelerometer. The conductive ink circuit is disposed on the inner side of the product casing and is electrically connected to the signal triggering circuit. The accelerometer is mounted on the edge of the product's mainboard and is electrically connected to the signal triggering circuit. The signal triggering circuit is mounted on the product's mainboard and, when it receives an acceleration signal from the accelerometer and the conductive ink circuit is open-circuited, outputs a trigger signal to the protective execution unit to execute the product's protective action. By combining a MEMS accelerometer with printed electronics circuitry for financial terminal protection, and employing a dual-verification triggering mechanism to reduce false alarm rates, this invention provides a more secure and reliable anti-tamper protection function. Attached Figure Description

[0023] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this utility model or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of this utility model. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0024] Figure 1 This is a hardware architecture block diagram of a product anti-tamper structure provided in an embodiment of this utility model;

[0025] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the covering structure of a conductive ink circuit provided in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0026] Reference numerals: 1. Conductive ink circuit; 2. Accelerometer; 3. Signal trigger circuit; 4. Protective actuator; 11. Main conductive ink line; 12. Circular ink line; 13. Radial ink line; 21. First detection line; 22. Second detection line. Detailed Implementation

[0027] This utility model discloses a product anti-tamper structure and electronic device to solve the technical problem that existing anti-tamper solutions have a high false alarm rate and are difficult to effectively resist "non-destructive shell opening" attacks, thus leading to vulnerabilities in product security protection.

[0028] Please see Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is a hardware architecture block diagram of a product anti-tamper structure provided in an embodiment of this utility model.

[0029] This application provides a product anti-tamper structure, including a conductive ink circuit 1, a signal triggering circuit 3, a protective execution unit 4, and at least one accelerometer 2;

[0030] The conductive ink circuit 1 is disposed on the inner side of the product casing, and the conductive ink circuit 1 is electrically connected to the signal triggering circuit 3;

[0031] The accelerometer 2 is mounted on the edge of the product motherboard and is electrically connected to the signal triggering circuit 3;

[0032] The signal triggering circuit 3 is installed on the product motherboard and is used to output a trigger signal to the protection execution unit 4 to perform product protection actions when it receives the acceleration signal from the accelerometer 2 and the conductive ink circuit 1 is disconnected.

[0033] In this embodiment, the product refers to financial terminal equipment such as a POS machine, which includes at least a product shell and a product body. The product motherboard is fixedly installed inside the product body, and the product shell is fitted into the product body to form a closed structure. To prevent unauthorized disassembly of the product, a product protection structure is installed inside the product so that when the product is unauthorizedly disassembled, a trigger signal is output to the internal protection execution unit 4 to perform product protection actions.

[0034] The conductive ink circuit 1 is located inside the product casing and is electrically connected to the signal trigger circuit 3. This electrical connection can be achieved through wires, metal springs, or elastic contacts. This circuit structure allows the signal trigger circuit 3 to obtain real-time electrical parameters such as the resistance, capacitance, or current of the conductive ink circuit 1. When the product is illegally disassembled, the physical deformation or separation of the product casing can cause the conductive ink circuit 1 to break or deform, resulting in sudden changes in electrical performance parameters, such as an open circuit.

[0035] Meanwhile, to prevent accidental triggering and damage to the product's mainboard, multiple accelerometers 2 are soldered and installed on the edges of the mainboard, such as the areas where the product casing and main body meet, i.e., screw holes, clips, etc. The accelerometers 2 are electrically connected to a signal trigger circuit 3 to detect low-frequency vibration signals from unauthorized disassembly of the product casing in real time and output these signals to the signal trigger circuit 3. It should be noted that in cases of normal product movement or drops, the accelerometers 2 detect short-term high-speed signals, but there is no continuous vibration or displacement. Disassembly, however, produces continuous low-frequency vibrations (such as from screwdriver operation) or slow displacement; the detected acceleration signals can be used to determine whether disassembly has occurred.

[0036] The signal triggering circuit 3 is installed on the product motherboard and is powered by the power supply set on the product motherboard. When the product is illegally disassembled, the disassembly detection is performed by two-way signal triggering. That is, when the acceleration signal of the accelerometer 2 is received and the conductive ink circuit 1 is detected to be open, a trigger signal is output to the protection execution unit 4 to trigger the protection execution unit 4 to execute the preset product protection action. In this way, the two-way triggering protection method effectively avoids false alarms caused by single-way triggering.

[0037] The protective action of this product can be a fuse self-destruct action or an alarm or other actions.

[0038] Optionally, the conductive ink circuit 1 includes multiple sets of main conductive ink lines 11 arranged in a grid pattern in both horizontal and vertical directions.

[0039] like Figure 2 As shown, the conductive ink circuit 1 consists of multiple sets of main conductive ink lines 11. By using horizontal and vertical intersecting conductive ink lines, a dense grid (with a spacing of about 2-3 mm) is formed. Any breakage at any location will cause a change in the overall circuit resistance, triggering an alarm and achieving the effect of protecting the main circuit.

[0040] Furthermore, the main conductive ink line 11 is connected to the signal triggering circuit 3 via conductive contacts or wires.

[0041] In order for the signal triggering circuit 3 to detect changes in resistance or other electrical signals in a timely manner, the main conductive ink line 11 is connected to the signal triggering circuit 3 through conductive contacts or wires.

[0042] Furthermore, the conductive ink circuit 1 also includes a ring-shaped ink line 12 and a radial ink line 13;

[0043] The annular ink line 12 surrounds the screw hole position of the product shell and is electrically connected to the main conductive ink line 11;

[0044] The radial ink line 13 covers the snap-fit ​​position of the product casing and is electrically connected to the main conductive ink line 11.

[0045] In this embodiment, in addition to the main conductive ink line 11, the conductive ink circuit 1 also includes annular ink lines 12 and radial ink lines 13 located at specific positions to adapt to different locations on the product casing, such as screws and clips. By printing closed annular conductive lines around screw holes or clips, an independent detection loop is formed. When the screw is tightened or the clip is pried open, the annular circuit breaks due to mechanical stress, triggering a change in the circuit's on / off state. Multiple conductive branches radiate outwards from key nodes such as clips or screw holes (similar to wheel spokes). When a single branch is damaged, the other branches can still maintain their detection function, improving fault tolerance and preventing single-point damage from bypassing detection.

[0046] Furthermore, it also includes multiple first detection lines 21 embedded within the main conductive ink line 11, used to locate the break point of the main conductive ink line 11.

[0047] In this embodiment, to facilitate subsequent location of the breakage point in the main conductive ink line 11, multiple first detection lines 21 can be laid out in a serpentine pattern within its limited space. By increasing the line length, the density of detection points per unit area is increased, thereby improving the breakage detection accuracy. Each first detection line 21 is individually electrically connected to the signal trigger circuit 3, and the resistance change of each detection line is used to determine whether the main conductive ink line 11 at the location of the first detection line 21 has broken.

[0048] Optionally, it also includes multiple second detection lines 22 located at the edge of the product motherboard, the second detection lines 22 being electrically connected to the signal triggering circuit 3.

[0049] It can travel along irregular shapes such as screw holes and buckle edges (such as U-shaped and S-shaped paths) and fit three-dimensional curved surfaces (such as cylindrical screw posts).

[0050] Optionally, the accelerometer 2 is a triaxial MEMS accelerometer 2 with a bandwidth greater than or equal to 5kHz.

[0051] The triaxial MEMS accelerometer 2 is an inertial sensor based on Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) technology that can simultaneously measure the linear acceleration of an object along three orthogonal directions: X, Y, and Z.

[0052] In this embodiment, since the prying of screwdrivers and similar actions are low-frequency micro-vibrations, a triaxial MEMS accelerometer 2 with a bandwidth greater than or equal to 5kHz is deployed at the edge of the product's motherboard to detect the presence of vibration signals in order to improve the accuracy and completeness of signal acquisition. When a vibration signal is detected, its corresponding acceleration signal is sent to the signal triggering circuit 3 to change the voltage level of the signal triggering circuit 3 connected to the accelerometer 2.

[0053] Optionally, a buffer layer is also provided around the conductive ink circuit 1 and the accelerometer 2.

[0054] In this embodiment, a buffer layer is added around the conductive ink circuit 1 and the accelerometer 2 to wrap the edges of the accelerometer 2 and the circuit. By setting the buffer layer, the impact energy can be absorbed when the product is dropped, effectively reducing the occurrence of false alarms due to the drop.

[0055] The buffer layer can be made of flexible buffer materials such as silicone or thermoplastic polyurethane elastomer (TPU), and the materials used in the embodiments of this application are not limited.

[0056] Optionally, the protection execution unit 4 is a fuse circuit, used to release the electrical energy in the energy storage capacitor when the trigger signal is received, so as to destroy the data storage circuit on the product motherboard.

[0057] In this embodiment, the fuse circuit consists of a trigger switch, a fuse wire, and a discharge circuit. A resettable fuse wire (such as PPTC) is connected in series in the discharge circuit. Under normal conditions, it conducts; during discharge, the fuse wire breaks due to overheating, preventing energy from being accidentally released to other circuits. A large-capacity electrolytic capacitor or supercapacitor is also included, pre-charged to a specified voltage. Upon receiving a trigger signal, the fuse circuit rapidly releases the energy from the storage capacitor to the data storage circuit. This high current causes the chip pin pads to detach or the internal silicon layer to melt, thereby protecting user information security.

[0058] Optionally, the conductive ink circuit 1 includes at least two circuit loops.

[0059] In this embodiment, the conductive ink circuit 1 adopts a grid layout or multi-path redundancy design, so that even if there is partial damage, the circuit can still maintain continuity through other paths to avoid false triggering. For example, a dual-circuit design is used in vulnerable areas (corners), so that when the main circuit is disconnected, the backup circuit can still maintain the detection function. By setting two conductive ink circuits 1 as independent detection circuits, which are connected to the signal triggering circuit 3 through a conductive contact, the device is considered to have been successfully disassembled only when both circuits are disconnected.

[0060] During the assembly phase of the anti-tamper structure of this product, a conductive ink circuit 1 can be fabricated on the inner wall of the device using a screen printing process. After curing at 80℃, the resistance value is ≤10Ω. A miniature accelerometer 2 is then soldered to the edge of the motherboard, with the XYZ axes aligned with the length, width, and height of the device, respectively. During the operational phase of the anti-tamper structure, taking a POS machine as an example, when vibration energy >50mg is detected and lasts >200ms, the conductive ink circuit 1 is activated. If the resistance of the conductive ink circuit 1 is >1kΩ, a 12V pulse voltage is sent to the fuse circuit. The PPTC fuse releases the energy from the storage capacitor (100μF / 16V) to the SIM card slot contacts within 2ms, burning out the user data storage area to protect sensitive information. In this embodiment, the detection response time is <300ms, far exceeding the speed of manual disassembly (average >5s). The conductive ink circuit 1 is highly concealed, making it impossible to identify the breakpoint by visual inspection or X-ray, resulting in better protection. The overall hardware cost is low, making it suitable for large-scale commercial use.

[0061] In another example of this application, when the product is dropped, the accelerometer 2 may generate an abnormal signal due to the impact, misinterpreting it as disassembly; the conductive ink circuit 1 may break due to casing deformation or cracking, triggering the anti-tamper protection. Meanwhile, traditional repairs require disassembly, but the anti-tamper mechanism would prevent legitimate repair operations, leading to equipment failure. Therefore, the design can be optimized in the following ways:

[0062] 1) The software algorithm distinguishes between normal drop impacts and disassembly. Drop impacts are short-duration high-acceleration signals (e.g., >20g) without sustained vibration or displacement. Disassembly is characterized by sustained low-frequency vibration (e.g., screwdriver operation) or slow displacement. Upon detecting a drop signal, the trigger threshold is dynamically adjusted to temporarily reduce sensitivity, avoid misjudgments, and further improve detection accuracy.

[0063] 3) Multi-sensor data fusion: Combining data from accelerometers, gyroscopes, and barometers to comprehensively determine the device's status. A drop test is characterized by high acceleration, free fall, and a sudden change in air pressure (effective only outdoors). Disassembly is characterized by low acceleration but continuous vibration and no change in air pressure. Additional sensors can be added to further enhance the tamper resistance accuracy and reliability.

[0064] 2) Modular replacement design: The accelerometer and conductive ink circuit are integrated into a replaceable module. If damaged, the module can be replaced directly to avoid triggering the overall anti-tamper mechanism.

[0065] By employing the above methods, different solutions can be used depending on the scenario to enhance protection capabilities. For "minor drops / shell cracks," "redundant circuitry + dynamic threshold adjustment + self-healing materials" are used to prevent false triggering and maintain functional continuity. For "severe damage / component failure," "modular replacement + authorized repair channels + data backup" are used to ensure core data security and reduce losses. For "malicious disassembly attempts," "multi-sensor fusion + graded response + mesh-like conductive ink" ensures the anti-tampering mechanism effectively resists attacks. Furthermore, acceleration data can be improved in accuracy through data preprocessing, such as time-domain analysis: calculating the peak-to-peak value (Vpp) within a 100ms time window to improve signal reliability; and frequency-domain analysis: detecting high-frequency harmonics above 5kHz using FFT (characteristic frequencies corresponding to metal tool contact). Adaptive learning algorithms can also be combined to establish a whitelist (such as the inherent frequencies of transport vehicles) using historical vibration data, improving detection efficiency and accuracy.

[0066] This utility model embodiment also provides an electronic device, including a product motherboard and a product casing with a product anti-tamper structure as described in any of the above embodiments.

[0067] The mainboard of this product is fixedly installed inside the product casing, and its position is secured by multiple limiting blocks to prevent the conductive ink circuitry from breaking due to movement of the mainboard. Additionally, the product casing can be covered with a silicone protective layer to reduce false alarms caused by slippage.

[0068] This application provides a product tamper-proof structure and electronic device. The product tamper-proof structure includes a conductive ink circuit, a signal triggering circuit, a protection execution unit, and at least one accelerometer. The conductive ink circuit is disposed on the inner side of the product casing and is electrically connected to the signal triggering circuit. The accelerometer is mounted on the edge of the product's mainboard and is electrically connected to the signal triggering circuit. The signal triggering circuit is mounted on the product's mainboard and is used to output a trigger signal to the protection execution unit to execute the product protection action when it receives an acceleration signal from the accelerometer and the conductive ink circuit is open-circuited. By combining a MEMS accelerometer with printed electronics circuitry for financial terminal protection, and with a dual-verification triggering mechanism reducing the false alarm rate, a more secure and reliable tamper-proof protection function is provided.

[0069] Finally, it should be noted that in this document, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes said element.

[0070] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner. Each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments. The various embodiments can be combined as needed, and the same or similar parts can be referred to each other.

[0071] The above description of the disclosed embodiments enables those skilled in the art to make or use the present invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the present invention. Therefore, the present invention is not to be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A product anti-tamper structure, characterized in that, Includes conductive ink circuitry, signal triggering circuitry, protective actuator, and at least one accelerometer; The conductive ink circuit is located on the inside of the product casing and is electrically connected to the signal triggering circuit. The accelerometer is mounted on the edge of the product's mainboard and is electrically connected to the signal triggering circuit. The signal triggering circuit is installed on the product motherboard and is used to output a trigger signal to the protection execution unit to perform product protection actions when the acceleration signal of the accelerometer is received and the conductive ink circuit is open.

2. The anti-tamper structure of the product according to claim 1, characterized in that, The conductive ink circuit includes multiple sets of main conductive ink lines arranged in a grid pattern, with horizontal and vertical cross-layouts.

3. The anti-tamper structure of the product according to claim 2, characterized in that, The main conductive ink line is connected to the signal triggering circuit via conductive contacts or wires.

4. The anti-tamper structure of the product according to claim 2, characterized in that, The conductive ink circuit also includes ring-shaped ink lines and radial ink lines; The annular ink line surrounds the screw hole position of the product shell and is electrically connected to the main conductive ink line; The radial ink lines cover the snap-fit ​​positions of the product casing and are electrically connected to the main conductive ink lines.

5. The anti-tamper structure of the product according to claim 2, characterized in that, It also includes multiple first detection lines embedded within the main conductive ink line, used to locate the break point of the main conductive ink line.

6. The anti-tamper structure of the product according to claim 1, characterized in that, It also includes multiple second detection lines located at the edge of the product's mainboard, and the second detection lines are electrically connected to the signal triggering circuit.

7. The anti-tamper structure of the product according to claim 1, characterized in that, The conductive ink circuit and the accelerometer are also surrounded by a buffer layer.

8. The anti-tamper structure of the product according to claim 1, characterized in that, The protection execution unit is a fuse circuit, which is used to release the electrical energy in the energy storage capacitor when the trigger signal is received, so as to destroy the data storage circuit on the product motherboard.

9. The anti-tamper structure of the product according to claim 1, characterized in that, The conductive ink circuit includes at least two circuit loops.

10. An electronic device, characterized in that, This includes a product motherboard and a product casing equipped with the product anti-tamper structure as described in any one of claims 1-9.

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