Removable computer for aircraft
Patent Information
- Application Number
- DE602022007389
- Authority / Receiving Office
- DE · DE
- Patent Type
- Patents
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2021-07-13
- Filing Date
- 2022-06-24
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-06
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-06-24
AI Technical Summary
Current aircraft computer systems face challenges in ensuring the security and reliability of data communication between avionics and non-avionics equipment, particularly in preventing data injection errors and unauthorized data transmission, while also being subject to costly and time-consuming certification processes for updates and modifications.
A computer system comprising a base part installed in the aircraft, certified at TC or STC level, and a removable server part certified at OA level, with a bidirectional data bus and pairing mechanism to authenticate and filter data exchanges, allowing secure and scalable data transmission and updates.
The solution enhances security by ensuring only authenticated data is exchanged between avionics and non-avionics equipment, reduces development and certification costs for updates, and prevents unintentional or malicious data injection, while maintaining reliable communication.
Description
Domaine technique :
[0001] The invention relates to the technical field of avionics and air operations in general, and relates more particularly to the management, acquisition, dissemination and synchronization of data relating to a civil or military aircraft.
[0002] This data can be of several types: avionics data (in English) flight data ), which are aircraft-specific parameters for flight data recorders, and computer-generated aircraft parameters such as inertial positioning references (in English Inertial Reference data ) or flight management system data (in English Flight Management System data , or FMS data ), ... ; maintenance data, for example entries in the technical logbook (in English aircraft technical logbook entries ), downloadable software in the field (in English field loadable software ), avionics databases (in English avionics databases ), on-board computer faults and alarms (in English aircraft computer failures & warnings ), ...; operational flight data: for example flight records (in English flight folders ), operational statuses, fuel quantities, flight plans, ... Technique antérieure :
[0003] An aircraft is a means of transport capable of operating within the Earth's atmosphere, such as an airplane, a helicopter, or a drone. The aircraft processes a large amount of digital data, whether or not intended to be transmitted and / or modified by equipment external to the aircraft, such as avionics data, maintenance data, and the operational flight data described above.
[0004] In order to be able to communicate with third-party equipment, whether external to the aircraft (e.g. maintenance servers, flight data recorders) or internal (e.g. electronic cockpit organizers, better known as Electronic Flight Bag or EFB, used by flight crews to consult operational flight data), aircraft have computers that perform avionics data processing and gateway functions between aircraft equipment and third-party equipment. These computers can have different types of connectivity, wired or not, for example Bluetooth, WiFi (English acronym for Wireless Fidelity ), 4G (for fourth generation mobile telephone standard), satellite link (satcom), etc. They can act as an access point on board the aircraft, for example WiFi, so that the flight crew has access to avionics data, and / or so that passengers have a communications link allowing them to access the internet network.
[0005] Aircraft systems are reliable (or guaranteed reliability) systems whose failures can have variable consequences. A failure can be characterized by the loss of the considered function or by the production of erroneous data, with or without error detection. Depending on the criticality level of the feared consequences, the probability of occurrence of errors must be kept below an acceptability threshold. Thus, the more critical the consequence, the lower the acceptable probability of occurrence. For example, in aeronautics, a catastrophic event (which could lead to multiple deaths) must have a probability of occurrence of less than 10 -9< per flight hour, while a major incident (which could lead to a reduction in safety margins and operational capabilities, discomfort or minor injuries) must have a probability of occurrence of less than 10 -5< per flight hour.The architecture of the avionics system and the design of each aircraft component must guarantee this probability of occurrence. This implies guarantees of failure rates for each piece of equipment (physical failures), developments according to strict standards guaranteeing the reliability of applications (for example DO-178, etc.) and sufficient levels of verification (functional and structural coverage of tests) of the software. These requirements impose a significant design and verification effort, and impose a limitation in the complexity of the processing implemented.
[0006] Conversely, some systems may be deemed to have tolerable, non-critical, or even non-significant operational impact. These are generally unreliable systems, or systems with unguaranteed reliability. The requirements on the architecture, physical components, or software processing are therefore lower, which allows for the implementation of more complex processing, at the cost of reduced development and verification effort compared to a reliable system.
[0007] Thus, communications equipment on board an aircraft is subject to regulatory constraints that vary depending on its type. Avionics pilot equipment installed on board the aircraft must be certified by the aviation regulator, which issues a type certificate (in English Type Certificate ), or TC. Optional avionics equipment installed on board the aircraft must be certified by the aviation regulator which issues a supplemental type certificate (in English Supplemental Type Certificate ), or STC. Optional non-avionics equipment not installed on board the aircraft must only be approved by the aviation regulator, which issues an operational approval (in English Operational Approval ), or OA.
[0008] Computers that provide the link between internal aircraft data and third-party equipment are of course subject to these certification or approval rules. Since these are equipment installed on board aircraft and have access to potentially critical avionics data, state-of-the-art computers must be subject to a type certificate (TC). Their development is then subject to complex developments (quality assurance) and their update is long and costly.
[0009] To address this issue, the applicant filed European patent application EP 3,546,888 A1 in which it describes an aircraft computer composed of two parts: a base part, in English Dock , connected to the avionics system, to various in-flight connectivity systems and having a docking support. As this is equipment installed in the aircraft, it must be certified at TC or STC level, a server part, in English Server , configured to be installed and coupled to the base part by the docking bracket. The server has processing and storage resources, as well as various connectivity systems to third-party equipment. As it is a portable system not installed in the aircraft and not critical, it only needs to be certified to the OA level.
[0010] The advantage of such a two-part computer structure is that the server part can be modified or updated at a conventional cost and development time. Indeed, since it is not permanently installed in the aircraft, it does not have to be certified at TC or STC level. The server part organizes communications with third-party equipment and comprises the "intelligence" of the computer, it is the part most likely to need to be updated. Conversely, the base part installed in the aircraft must be certified at TC or STC level. However, the software functions it performs are much less likely to need to be updated than those of the server part.
[0011] In order to prevent any accidental or malicious data injection into certified systems and to ensure protection against cyber risks, the two-part computer described in the state of the art has a unidirectional link for receiving data from the avionics part. This unidirectional link prevents data from being injected into the avionics part of the aircraft by the equipment to which the server part is connected or by a server part modified for malicious purposes, in order to guarantee the security of the aircraft's critical systems. The counterpart is that controlled data injections into the avionics part are impossible.
[0012] This solution has other flaws: it is not protected against unintentional server inversions, a server part being able to be installed on a different base part of the aircraft for which it is intended, which could cause confusion about the avionics data received, it is not protected against the introduction of modified server parts with the aim of illegitimately transmitting avionics data, and therefore does not protect the confidentiality of aircraft data.
[0013] The aircraft computer according to the invention aims to respond to all of these problems by securing the link between the two parts. H
[0014] US 2018 / 366008 A1 discloses various modalities for regulating and / or integrating avionics systems with non-avionics systems. An avionics system is generally associated with a lower physical failure rate and higher logical verification than a non-avionics system. Résumé de l'invention :
[0015] To this end, the present invention describes an aircraft computer configured to connect at least one non-avionics type equipment with at least one avionics type equipment on board the aircraft, according to claim 1. The computer comprises: a base part configured to be installed in a fixed manner in the aircraft, said base part: ∘ being configured to be connected to said at least one piece of avionics equipment, ∘ comprising a docking support, a server part configured to be installed in a removable manner on the docking support of the base part, the base part and the server part then being configured to exchange data and signals through a connector, the server part being configured to be connected with said at least one piece of non-avionics equipment through at least one communications link.
[0016] In the computer according to the invention, the base part is connected with said at least one avionics-type equipment by at least one bidirectional data bus. It is configured to implement a pairing mechanism with the server part, and to authorize or prohibit the transmission of data in at least one direction between the server part and said at least one avionics-type equipment depending on the state of said pairing mechanism.
[0017] Advantageously, the base part is the subject of a type certificate (TC) or a supplementary type certificate (STC), and the removable part is the subject of an operational approval (OA).
[0018] According to one embodiment, the base part and / or the server part are configured to implement functions for analyzing and filtering the data transmitted by said at least one avionics-type device to said at least one non-avionics-type device.
[0019] According to a complementary embodiment, the base part and / or the server part are configured to implement functions for analyzing and filtering the data transmitted to said at least one avionics-type device by said at least one non-avionics-type device.
[0020] According to one embodiment, the server part comprises calculation means making it possible to implement the pairing mechanism.
[0021] Advantageously, the base portion is configured to provide one or more power links to the server portion.
[0022] Advantageously, the base part comprises means for cutting one or more of the communication links of the server part.
[0023] Advantageously, the base portion is configured to be connected to an in-flight connectivity system, and the server portion is configured to access said in-flight connectivity system through the base portion.
[0024] According to one embodiment, the server part is configured to implement a pairing mechanism with at least one non-avionics type equipment, and to authorize or prohibit the transmission of data with said equipment depending on the state of said pairing mechanism. Brève description des figures :
[0025] The invention will be better understood and other characteristics, details and advantages will appear more clearly on reading the following description, given without limitation, and thanks to the appended figures, given by way of example, among which: there figure 1 illustrates the overall technical environment of the invention; figure 2 more precisely represents a device according to an embodiment of the invention and its interactions with avionics and non-avionics equipment; the figure 3 represents the functional architecture of an aircraft computer according to one embodiment of the invention.
[0026] Identical references may be used in different figures when they designate the same or comparable elements. Description détaillée :
[0027] There figure 1 illustrates the overall technical environment of the invention.
[0028] It shows examples of “non-avionics” or “(open) world” type systems (or “equipment”) and “avionics” type equipment (certified by the regulator at TC or STC level).
[0029] Ground-based means (control centers and design offices) 100 are in communication with an aircraft 110 possibly comprising a cockpit or a cockpit 120. Its piloting equipment 121 (called avionics equipment) is generally installed in the cockpit 120 when the aircraft has it. This equipment comprises, for example, one or more on-board computers (means for calculating, memorizing and storing data), including in particular one or more avionics piloting systems, but not only, means for displaying or viewing and entering data, means of communication, as well as (possibly) means of haptic feedback. Other equipment, such as for example an EFB tablet, may be on board the aircraft. The device 122 according to the invention may interact (bilateral communication 123) with the avionics equipment (of category TC) 121.The device according to the invention can also be in communication 124 with external computing resources, accessible via the network (for example cloud computing, in English). Cloud computing 125) or by ground communication links (such as a satellite link or an Air-Ground link, in English Air To Ground or ATG). In particular, calculations can be carried out locally on the device 122 or partially or totally in the calculation means accessible via the network. The on-board equipment 121 is generally certified (TC or STC categories) and regulated while the computing means 125 and connected equipment are generally not (or to a lesser extent, for example by operational approval).
[0030] There figure 2 more precisely represents a device according to an embodiment of the invention and its interactions with avionics and non-avionics equipment.
[0031] The computer 200 which is the subject of the invention comprises a first part 201, called the base part. This part is designed to be installed in a fixed manner in the aircraft, and to be connected via a bidirectional data bus to avionics equipment, such as equipment 210 and 211 delivering flight data and avionics data. It must therefore be subject to TC or STC approval. It can be connected to in-flight communication means 212, such as a satellite link.
[0032] The base part includes calculation means such as a processor, a digital signal processor (better known by the English acronym DSP for Digital Signal Processor ), a microcontroller, or a specialized circuit such as an ASIC (an acronym for Application Spécifie Integrated Circuit ) or an FPGA (English acronym for Field-Programmable Gate Array ), as well as one or more memories. Finally, it includes a support intended to accommodate the second part 202 of the computer, called the server part. It can also have means of connection to a human-machine interface allowing the entry and consultation of flight plan information, piloting data and the configuration of the server part, such as a screen, a mouse, a keyboard, a camera, a memory card reader, a USB port, etc.
[0033] The base portion 201 is connected to a power source of the aircraft, possibly of the avionics type, and may have batteries for operation when the aircraft power is off. In one embodiment, the base portion is configured to power the server portion 202 when it is inserted into the docking support. In another embodiment, the base portion comprises a power divider configured to provide a dual power line to the server portion 202: a first line continuously powering the server portion when it is inserted into the docking support, and a second power line that can be connected or disconnected when the aircraft is in flight so as to suspend or cut off the cellular communications of the server portion to avoid any electromagnetic interference with the onboard certified avionics computers.Finally, the docking station includes an interface for transmitting data and signals between the base part and the server part.
[0034] The server part 202 is removable: it can be manually attached or detached from the base part 201 by any fastening means, advantageously a fastening means not requiring tools such as quarter-turn butterfly screws or retaining spring claws. Advantageously, an anti-theft protection device (protection by security seal, key, code, PIN, fingerprint, etc.) makes it possible to secure the removal of the server part.
[0035] The server part 202 may be powered by the dock part, and / or have its own power supply means, such as a battery or batteries. The own power supply means allow the server part to be used when the aircraft is no longer able to power the server through the dock, for example on the ground when the aircraft's engine is off and it is not connected to a parking socket. In one embodiment, the server part 202 is electrically isolated from the aircraft's power source. For this purpose, the dock part 201 may comprise an optocoupler configured to avoid or prevent in particular any overvoltage in the certified avionics circuits.
[0036] Just like the base part, the server part has computing means, such as processor, DSP, microcontroller, FPGA or ASIC, and memory. It also has wired communication means (for example cellular (2G, 3G, 4G, 5G) Wifi, Bluetooth or other) or wireless (Ethernet link, SPI (in English) Serial Peripheral Interface ), ...) to non-avionics devices on board the aircraft, such as the EFB 221 or a server 222 located on the ground allowing data exchanges and operational administration of the server part 202. It can be configured to access the in-flight communication means 212 through the base part.
[0037] It can also have means of connection to a human-machine interface allowing the entry and consultation of avionics data, such as flight plan information, piloting data, as well as the configuration of the server part, such as a screen, a mouse, a keyboard, a camera, a USB port, a memory card reader, etc.
[0038] In one embodiment, the server 202 is configured to determine the in-flight or ground state of the aircraft, and to stop, suspend or cut off all or part of the wireless communications, in particular of the cellular type, in response to this state in order to prevent electromagnetic disturbances. The states can be nuanced (e.g. taxiing, takeoff, landing gear activated, deployed, in progress, etc.) and the consequences also modulated.
[0039] The server part can be seen as the "brain" or management entity that "grafts" itself onto the avionics part without disturbing it or risking corrupting it.
[0040] The base part 201 is configured to implement a pairing mechanism with the server part 202. This pairing mechanism allows the base part to authenticate the server part, and to block any exchange of data between the two parts of the computer, in one direction only or in both directions, when the server part is not identified, so that unidentified equipment cannot disrupt or corrupt the elements of the avionics part, including the base part, and that avionics data cannot be transmitted to third-party equipment illegitimately. This pairing mechanism can be implemented by any means: simple authentication means, such as the transmission of a unique identifier, possibly encrypted between the server part and the base part, or more robust authentication means, implemented for example according to the SSL or IEEE 802.1x standard.
[0041] The two-part computer according to the invention has many advantages over the state of the art. First, the server part only requires operational approval for its installation and use. It is therefore scalable for a much lower cost and development time than equipment with TC or STC certifications. These developments can, for example, consist of the introduction of new hardware components, or updates intended to ensure the compatibility of the computer with new communications standards or to introduce new functionalities.
[0042] The base part is less scalable than the removable server part since it is certified at TC or STC level, but this part is mainly in interface with the avionics equipment, which itself is unlikely to evolve.
[0043] The pairing mechanism implemented between the base part 201 and the server part 202 makes it possible to protect the device against risks linked to the removability of the server part: the risks of involuntary exchanges between the server parts of computers of two different aircraft, which would result in an inconsistency in the data transmitted to the remote monitoring and maintenance equipment, the risks of voluntary exchanges, carried out with the aim of obtaining information on the operation of the aircraft (avionics data, operational data, proprietary data, video streams, etc.).
[0044] Only compatible and authentic servers of the base can receive / transmit data from / to the avionics part of the aircraft, which helps protect the device against server counterfeiting: pairing the base part with an authenticated server part ensures that the avionics data leaving the aircraft are transmitted to a trusted device; pairing the base part with an authenticated server part ensures that the data injected into the avionics part comes from a trusted device, and therefore uses a bidirectional data bus between the base part and the server part, and not a unidirectional bus as in the state of the art. This functionality is particularly important in terms of security due to the critical role that the data injected into the avionics part of the aircraft can have.
[0045] This pairing mechanism makes it possible to operate the connection between the base part of the computer and the avionics components through one or more bidirectional links, which makes it possible to inject data from third-party equipment (EFB 221, ground device 222 or other) onto the avionics part, such as flight plans, database updates, passenger lists, video streams, etc.
[0046] The pairing mechanism of the device according to the invention can be configured to allow several servers to connect to the same base, so that the equipment can be swapped, for example, in the event of a breakdown or maintenance. Conversely, servers can be revoked when they are no longer intended to be used or when they disappear (loss or theft), which protects the avionics part of the aircraft from the risk that an obsolete server part is recovered and modified by a malicious person with the aim of introducing malicious data into the avionics system or recovering avionics data.
[0047] Advantageously, the server part can be configured to implement an additional pairing mechanism with the non-avionics equipment to which it is connected, thus ensuring end-to-end authentication of the equipment accessing the avionics data of the aircraft.
[0048] In one embodiment, additional functions for analyzing and filtering the data injected into the avionics system can be implemented by the computer according to the invention. In addition to the pairing mechanism, this filtering makes it possible to increase the security of the device by ensuring that the data injected into the avionics part is correct. It can, for example, consist of verifying the format of the transmitted data (verification of the message formats and transport protocols used, headers, MAC addresses, packet sizes, transmission errors, etc.), verifying the syntax of the exchanged data, verifying whether the injected values are consistent, whether they are signed, etc. The filtering thus acts in the manner of a firewall. Firewall ) in order to protect the avionics components.
[0049] The functions for analyzing and filtering data injected into the avionics part can be implemented in the base part, i.e. as close as possible to the avionics part for a maximum level of security, but in this case are not very scalable. Alternatively, they can be implemented in the server part. They are then easily scalable. Alternatively, the analysis and filtering functions can be distributed between the base part and the server part.
[0050] In one embodiment, analysis and filtering functions are implemented by the base part and / or the server part on the data leaving the avionics system, in order to block the transmission of potentially sensitive data to non-avionics equipment.
[0051] There figure 3 represents the functional architecture of an aircraft computer according to one embodiment of the invention.
[0052] It comprises two parts: a base part 301, intended to be installed in a fixed manner in the aircraft, and a server part 302, intended to be installed in a removable manner on a support for receiving the base part. Once the server part is installed on the base part, the two parts are connected by a connector 303.
[0053] The base portion is powered by an avionics power source 317, extended to the connector 303 in order to power the server portion when the latter is installed on the docking support. Advantageously, the power supply line to the connector 303 can be split to integrate additional functionalities, for example switching off the communications modules of the server portion. Advantageously, the base portion can comprise devices intended to protect the power supply line 317 against overvoltages.
[0054] The base part is connected to one or more avionics type equipment through one or more bidirectional avionics data buses 310, for example an A717 flight data recorder (in English flight data recorder ), or A429 avionics data transmission equipment. The bidirectional aspect of the bus allows avionics data to be retrieved and injected into these equipment.
[0055] The base portion may comprise means 314 enabling it to access a communication link to an in-flight connectivity system, for example a satellite link.
[0056] Advantageously, the base part may comprise a device 311 for interfacing with the avionics data bus(es), in order to route the avionics data over links such as SPI or Ethernet buses. This device may be configured to implement functionalities specific to exchanges with avionics equipment (protocol management of exchanges on the data bus 310, information storage, etc.). It may also be designed to electrically isolate the avionics data links, such as an optocoupler.
[0057] The base part includes calculation means 312 intended to: retrieve or inject avionics data through the bidirectional communication bus(es) 310, implement a pairing mechanism of the server part, and authorize or prohibit the transmission of data between the server part and the avionics communication equipment accessible by the bidirectional communication bus(es) 310, in one direction or the other, depending on the state of this pairing mechanism, i.e. to block transmissions to / from an unauthenticated server part, advantageously, implement mechanisms for analyzing and filtering the data retrieved / injected from / to the avionics type equipment of the aircraft.
[0058] Advantageously, the base part may comprise means 313 for separating the data flows exchanged with the server part, configured to separate the avionics data flows from the other flows, such as for example the data flows of the in-flight connectivity system, so that the security-specific functions implemented by the server part only apply to the avionics type data. This makes it possible not to unnecessarily overload the calculation means 312, and not to penalize the latency of the transmissions made by the server part on the satellite communications link 314.
[0059] The calculation means 312 and 313 are connected to the connector 303.
[0060] Finally, the base part may comprise cut-off means 315 and 316 intended to suspend the wireless communications (4G, 5G, Wifi, Bluetooth, etc.) of the server part depending on the state of the aircraft, the state of the aircraft being obtained either directly from the avionics type equipment (module 315), or by processing the avionics data by the calculation means 312 (module 316). These devices may be configured to activate / block power supply signals of the server part depending on the state of the aircraft, or to transmit dedicated control signals.
[0061] The server part 302 is configured to exchange data with the base part 301 through the connector 303, in particular avionics type data, one or more power supply signals and / or wireless communications control signals. It comprises calculation means 321 associated with a memory and configured to: implement a pairing mechanism in connection with the calculation means 312 of the base part, implement an operating system intended to supervise the operation of the server part, implement applications 322 specific to the processing of avionics data, for example the generation of processing and reporting of avionics data for maintenance purposes, the processing of flight plans, the updating of avionics software, ... establish different communication links to non-avionics type equipment, such as EFBs, smartphones, laptops, ground flight data recorders, maintenance and remote control servers.
[0062] The server part may comprise a Bluetooth communications link 323, a Wi-Fi communications link 324 and / or a cellular communications link 325 (4G, 5G or other type). According to one embodiment, the computing means 321 may be configured to implement a Wi-Fi access point 326 (in English HotSpot ) in order to establish a local network 327 (in English Local Area Network ) in the aircraft, allowing different equipment to connect to the server part. It can also be configured to link the different communication links to the in-flight connectivity system 314 which it accesses through the base part.
[0063] Advantageously, the calculation means 321 of the server part can be configured to implement functions for analyzing and filtering avionics type data injected to / retrieved from the base part.
[0064] Advantageously, the server part can be configured to switch off the different communication links 323, 324 and 325 as a function of control and power supply signals 315 and 316 transmitted by the base part, or as a function of the avionics data processed by the calculation means 321.
[0065] Advantageously, the server part can be configured to implement pairing mechanisms with the non-avionic equipment to which it is connected, and authorize or prohibit the transmission of data with said equipment depending on the state of said pairing mechanism. This makes it possible to ensure the authenticity of all the equipment having access to the avionics data of the aircraft.
[0066] The architecture of the calculator according to the invention shown in the figure 3 is scalable and can be enhanced with other features for avionics data processing and computer connectivity.
[0067] Being removable and disconnectable from the base part, the server part is not subject to high certification levels such as TC and STC levels. The communication standards it implements, the operating system and applications it embeds, and the data analyses and possible filtering it performs can then be updated, possibly remotely, at the cost of conventional cost and development time.
Claims
1. A computer (200) for an aircraft, configured to connect at least one non-avionics equipment (221, 222) to at least one avionics equipment (210, 211) on board the aircraft, said computer comprising: - a dock part (201, 301) configured to be installed fixedly in the aircraft, said dock part: ∘ being configured to be connected to said at least one avionics equipment (210, 211), ∘ comprising a docking station and computing means (312, 313), - a server part (202, 302) configured to be removably installed on the docking station of the dock part, the server part comprising computing means (321), the dock part and the server part then being configured to exchange data and signals through a connector (303), the server part being configured to be connected to said at least one non-avionics equipment (221, 222) through at least one communications link (323, 324, 325, 314), the computer being characterised in that the dock part is connected to said at least one avionics equipment (210, 211) by way of at least one bidirectional data bus (310), and in that: - the computing means of the dock part being configured to implement a pairing mechanism with the computing means of the server part. - the computing means of the dock part are configured to authorise or prevent the transmission of data in at least one direction between the server part and said at least one avionics equipment (210, 211) depending on the state of said pairing mechanism.
2. The computer for an aircraft according to claim 1, wherein the dock part is subject to a type certificate or a supplemental type certificate, and where the removable part is subject to an operational approval.
3. The computer for an aircraft according to any one of claims 1 to 2, wherein the dock part and / or the server part are configured to implement analysing and filtering functions on the data transmitted by said at least one avionics equipment (210, 211) to said at least one non-avionics equipment (221, 222).
4. The computer for an aircraft according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the dock part and / or the server part are configured to implement analysing and filtering functions on the data transmitted to said at least one avionics equipment (210, 211) by said at least one non-avionics equipment (221, 222).
5. The computer for an aircraft according to one of claims 1 to 4, wherein the dock part is configured to provide one or more power supply links (301) to the server part.
6. The computer for an aircraft according to one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the dock part comprises disconnecting means (315, 316) for disconnecting one or more of the communication links (323, 324, 325) of the server part.
7. The computer for an aircraft according to one of claims 1 to 6, wherein the dock part is configured to be connected to an in-flight connectivity system (212, 314), and the server part is configured to access said in-flight connectivity system through the dock part.
8. The computer for an aircraft according to one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the server part is configured to implement a pairing mechanism with at least one non-avionics equipment (221, 222), and to authorise or prevent the transmission of data with said equipment depending on the state of said pairing mechanism.
