Security infrastructure; associated computer program process and product.

A Darknet network-based security infrastructure hides services using client and server agents with a controller, addressing vulnerabilities by ensuring secure, authorized access and maintaining service anonymity and integrity.

FR3136075B1Active Publication Date: 2024-11-29CHIMERE
View PDF 0 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
FR2022005225
Authority / Receiving Office
FR · FR
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-05-31
Publication Date
2024-11-29
Estimated Expiration
2042-05-31

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing computer network security solutions fail to effectively protect services exposed on the Internet from vulnerabilities, leading to a third of information system compromises due to exploited service weaknesses.

Method used

A security infrastructure using a Darknet network overlay to hide services, with client and server agents and a controller managing configuration files and authentication, ensuring only authorized access through a Zero-Trust Network Access (ZTNA) model.

Benefits of technology

The solution effectively eliminates service exposure points, maintaining service anonymity and integrity while ensuring secure, authorized access, adhering to the ZTNA model.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure 00000020_0000
    Figure 00000020_0000
  • Figure 00000021_0000
    Figure 00000021_0000
  • Figure 00000022_0000
    Figure 00000022_0000
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

Security infrastructure; method and associated computer program product(s). This infrastructure for securing the internet connection between a client (10) and a server (24), the server providing a service (23), is a Darknet infrastructure comprising: a Darknet network (43); a client agent (41) run by the client (10) and storing a client configuration file (T); a server agent (42) run on the server (24) and storing a server configuration file (F); and a controller (44), comprising a database (B) storing configuration information, the controller being accessible through the Darknet network (43) by the client agent (41), respectively by the server agent (42), to receive client, respectively server configuration information, allowing the updating of the client, respectively server configuration file. Figure for the abstract: Figure 1
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Title of the invention: Security infrastructure; method and product associated computer program.

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of computer network security.

[0002] The Internet has been largely based on the TCP / IP model since its inception. According to this In this model, the services made available to users on the internet are "exposed" to the whole world. Examples of services include a web application - that is, an application that can be used directly online via a remote browser, a VPN application - that is, an application that establishes a secure communication tunnel, an API application - that is, an application that provides basic functionality to a remote application, etc.

[0003] When a service is exposed, it has no choice but to "subject" to connection requests from clients.

[0004] A service exposed on the internet is most often identifiable by an IPv4 address (4 bytes) and a port (2 bytes).

[0005] It is therefore possible to scan the internet to obtain a map of all exposed services.

[0006] This means that the exposed services are discoverable by attackers. Attackers list the exposed services of a given organization, search for vulnerabilities in these services, and then launch a targeted attack on the service to compromise the information system. It is observed that more than one-third of information system compromises are due to the exploitation of vulnerabilities that affect an internet-exposed service of the compromised computer system.

[0007] Various ways of dealing with this problem have been proposed, such as: the implementation of firewalls that filter connection attempts; in-depth analysis of traffic and blocking of compromise attempts; the deployment of processes for updating exposed services (with the correction of identified vulnerabilities); the reduction of the exposure surface of the information system (by moving a service exposed on the internet into the information system, then making it accessible through a single point of exposure, most often by means of a VPN); the transfer of exposed services to the cloud of a third party, which takes responsibility for them and ensures their protection.

[0008] The object of the present invention is to solve this problem, by proposing an alternative solution to known solutions, which is based on the elimination of exposure points.

[0009] For this purpose, the invention relates to a security infrastructure intended to be deployed in an internet-based architecture comprising a client connected to the internet on one side and an information system server connected to the internet on the other side, the information system providing a service, characterized in that the security infrastructure is a Darknet infrastructure comprising: a Darknet network superimposed on the internet to hide the service; a client agent executed by the client to access the service through the Darknet network, the client agent storing a client configuration file; a server agent executed on the information system server to allow access to the service through the Darknet network, the server agent storing a server configuration file;and, a controller, comprising a database storing configuration information, the controller being accessible through the Darknet network by the client agent, respectively by the server agent, to receive client configuration information, respectively server, enabling the updating of the client configuration file, respectively server, the client configuration information comprising at least one address on the Darknet network enabling the client to access the service when the client is actually entitled to access the service, and the server configuration information comprising at least identification information enabling the client to authenticate itself to the server in order to access the service.

[0010] According to particular embodiments, the infrastructure comprises one or more of the following characteristics, taken individually or in all technically possible combinations:

[0011] - an agent, either the client agent or the server agent, stores a token allowing a first connection, via the Darknet network, to the controller in order to receive authentication data in return, the agent then establishes a connection with the controller using the authentication data.

[0012] - the infrastructure includes a controller administration console and more using the server agent, the administration console running an agent to access the controller and advantageously the server agent through the Darknet network.

[0013] - the infrastructure is based on a Tor implementation of the Darknet infrastructure.

[0014] - the Darknet network is a private network.

[0015] The invention also relates to a method of connecting to a hidden service implemented in a security infrastructure conforming to the previous infrastructure, consisting of: populating a client configuration file of the client agent and populating a server configuration file of the server agent by connecting to the controller, the client configuration file containing at least one address on the Darknet network of the service, and the server configuration file containing at least one piece of identification information allowing the client to authenticate itself to the server in order to access the service; making the service available on the server agent. Darknet network; establish by the client agent a connection with a node called "rendezvous point" of the Darknet network (43), using the information contained in the client configuration file; request by the client agent access to the service from the Darknet network by declaring the identifier of the "rendezvous point" node; verify by the server agent the identity of the client on which the client agent is running using the identification information contained in the server configuration file; and, in case of positive verification, establish by the server agent a connection with the "rendezvous point" node of the Darknet network; associate the connections on both sides of the "rendezvous point" node to establish communication between the client and the server.

[0016] According to particular embodiments, the process comprises one or more of the following characteristics, taken individually or in all technically possible combinations:

[0017] - the process further consists of: establishing a connection by the server agent with the controller; communicate via the server agent to the controller the address on the Darknet network of the service, said address having been generated by the server agent; establish via the client agent a connection with the controller; communicate via the controller to the client agent the address on the Darknet network of the service to populate the client configuration file.

[0018] - the process further consists of: establishing a connection by the server agent with the controller; communicate via the controller to the server agent the user rights on the service to populate the server configuration file.

[0019] - to establish, by means of an agent, either the client agent or the server agent, a connection with the controller, the process further consists of: receiving from the agent a connection token indicating an address on the controller's Darknet network and an identifier; the agent establishing a connection to the controller using the address on the controller's Darknet network indicated in the token and identifying itself to the controller using the identifier indicated in the token; the controller providing authentication data to the agent in response; and the agent establishing a connection to the controller using the authentication data.

[0020] The invention also relates to a computer program product comprising software instructions which, when executed by a client, a server and a controller of an infrastructure conforming to the previous infrastructure, implement a process conforming to the previous process.

[0021] The invention and its advantages will be better understood upon reading the following detailed description of a particular embodiment, given solely by way of non-limiting example, this description being made with reference to the accompanying drawings in which:

[0022] [Fig.1] Fig.1 is a schematic representation of a preferred embodiment of a security infrastructure according to the invention, deployed to secure a computer architecture using the internet;

[0023] [Fig.2] Fig.2 is a block representation of a first process implemented by the security infrastructure of [Fig.1];

[0024] [Fig. 3] Fig. 3 is a block representation of a second process implemented by the security infrastructure of [Fig.1];

[0025] [Fig.4] Fig.4 is a block representation of a third method implemented by the security infrastructure of [Fig. 1]; and,

[0026] [Fig. 5] Fig. 5 is a block representation of a fourth method implemented by the security infrastructure of [Fig.1].

[0027] DEFINITIONS

[0028] “User”: This is the person who interacts with a computer connected to the network internet, referred to as a "client computer" or "client", to access a service. Unless otherwise stated, the terms client and user will be used interchangeably hereafter.

[0029] “Client application”: this is software executed by a client and required to access a service to function correctly or to offer a particular functionality to the client or user. Unless otherwise stated, the terms client and client application will be used interchangeably hereafter.

[0030] “Service”: This is a functionality made available by the information system of an organization. This service is accessible via a server connected (directly or indirectly via a gateway) to the internet. For example, the service is software run by the server computer. Unless otherwise specified, the terms "service" and "server" will be used interchangeably hereafter.

[0031] “Darknet” or “Darknet”: it is a peer-to-peer computer network, distributed, superimposed (or "overlay" network) on the internet. It uses specific protocols incorporating anonymization functions so that the IP addresses of the actors are not publicly revealed.

[0032] “Darknet infrastructure”: in addition to the Darknet network, the Darknet infrastructure encompasses the software (or agents) run on machines to enable them to use the Darknet network by implementing the appropriate protocols.

[0033] “Tor implementation” (or “Tor technology”, or “Tor software”) (acronym for "The '.onion' Router"): This is a specific implementation of a Darknet infrastructure. The Tor implementation is a global, decentralized, overlay computer network. It consists of a number of servers, called Darknet nodes, whose list is publicly available. This network allows for the anonymization of the origin of TCP connections. The Tor implementation is composed of free software, which is kept up to date by The Tor Project, whose website (https: / / forum.torproject.net) offers various information and makes software versions available to everyone, is the latest stable version of the Tor implementation, version 0.4.7.7, released on April 27, 2022. It should be noted that the present invention relies on the basic functionalities of the Tor implementation, which are consistent across all versions.

[0034] “.onion” address: According to the Tor implementation, accessing a hidden service requires the user to know its “.onion” address. The “.onion” address allows the negotiation of a “rendezvous point” with the Darknet infrastructure. This rendezvous point is a node in the Darknet network used as an intermediary for the connection between the user and the service. No one can negotiate a rendezvous point with the hidden service without knowing its “.onion” address. The “.onion” address is generated exclusively on the service side. Furthermore, while the client knows the “.onion” address of a service, it is not known to other machines in the Darknet infrastructure (using “blind cryptography” mechanisms, a service can register with the Darknet without having to reveal its “.onion” address).Because they are composed of 56 semi-alphanumeric characters, it is very difficult to crack an "onion" address using a brute-force attack.

[0035] “Anonymity”: according to the current version of the Tor implementation, so as not to Exposing a machine's IP address means the connection between that machine and the rendezvous point isn't direct, but passes through one or more Darknet relay nodes. Therefore, compromising the rendezvous point prevents obtaining the machine's IP address, especially on the service side. Furthermore, Tor technology ensures end-to-end encryption between the machine and the rendezvous point. More precisely, the data transmitted is encrypted as many times as the number of relay nodes it passes through (a technique known as "onion encryption"), thus preventing the compromise of a portion of the path to the rendezvous point from compromising the confidentiality of the transmitted data.

[0036] “Principle of indirection”: this involves establishing an indirect connection between the Depending on the current version of the Tor implementation, the client and server choose a rendezvous point within the Darknet, establish a connection to that rendezvous point, and then communicate the rendezvous point identifier to the service via a Tor-specific mechanism not detailed here. The service verifies the identity of the client attempting to establish a connection. In Tor, this verification is performed using certificates stored locally on the service side. If the client is authorized to establish a connection, the service creates a connection to the rendezvous point chosen by the client. The service thus becomes the last actor to establish the connection. It transitions from a passive component (in TCP / IP, the service accepts a connection from a client) to an active component. active (in a Darknet infrastructure, the service establishes the connection to the rendezvous point). Furthermore, the rendezvous points are never the same because they are chosen randomly by clients within the nodes of the Darknet network.

[0037] GENERAL INFORMATION

[0038] The invention consists of securing an internet-based computer architecture by deploying a suitable Darknet infrastructure, so as to eliminate the points of exposure of the services in order to make them invisible.

[0039] The security infrastructure according to the invention is based on the principle of indirection: sensitive actors in client-server communication use only outgoing flows. These flows converge on the Darknet network. In particular, the server becomes the last actor to decide whether or not to establish a connection with a client. This decision is made based on a number of criteria, including the client's access rights.

[0040] The security infrastructure according to the invention is based on the "ZTNA" model. The "ZTNA" model (for "Zero-Trust Network Access") is a security concept, particularly applicable to computer networks, based on the systematic verification of user rights, considering that it is not possible to trust a user by default. In this way, the compromise of a part of the architecture does not compromise the confidentiality of information exchanged between a client application and a server, nor does it compromise the anonymity of the service or its integrity.

[0041] In the preferred embodiment described in detail below, the security infrastructure implements the Tor implementation of a Darknet infrastructure. However, other implementations of a Darknet infrastructure could just as easily be used, including the I2P ("Invisible Internet Project") implementation.

[0042] ARCHITECTURE

[0043] With reference to [Fig.1], the security infrastructure according to the invention is deployed in an architecture comprising the internet 30, a client 10 connected to the internet 30 on one side, and an information system 20 connected to the internet on the other side.

[0044] The information system 20 comprises a private network 21 connected to the internet via a gateway 22. The information system 20 provides a service 23 to a set of remote users. The service 23 is, for example, executed on a server computer 24. The service 23 is, for example, a web application.

[0045] The client 10 is a computer (such as a personal computer, a mobile phone, etc.) that runs an application 12 which needs access to the service 23 so that the user 1 of the client 10 can fully benefit from the functionality associated with running the application 12. The application 12 is, for example, a browser Internet.

[0046] The security infrastructure (generally referred to as number 40 in [Fig. 1]) comprises:

[0047] - a Darknet network 43;

[0048] - a customer-side agent (or client agent) 41;

[0049] - a service-side agent (or server agent) 42;

[0050] - a controller 44; and, preferably,

[0051] - an administration console 46.

[0052] Security infrastructure 40 is a Darknet infrastructure, conforming to the Tor implementation unless otherwise stated. Darknet Network 43

[0053] The Darknet 43 network is a network composed of a plurality of nodes superimposed on the internet 30. On [Fig.1], nodes have been referenced by the numbers 51 and 52, 61, 62 and 63, and 71 and 72.

[0054] The Darknet 43 network is advantageously deployed across several cloud networks managed by different providers. Thus, in [Fig. 1], the nodes of the Darknet 43 network are represented as belonging to three different cloud networks, 50, 60, and 70 respectively. The providers are advantageously entities different from the organization managing the information system 20 or from the provider supplying this security solution. Distributing the Darknet 43 network across multiple cloud networks ensures sufficient resilience and broad geographical coverage (e.g., global).

[0055] Figure 1 shows schematically the management system 45 of the Darknet network 43. This is only a representation, since the management functions are in fact distributed within the Darknet network 43 itself among the nodes that compose it.

[0056] Advantageously, in the present implementation, the Darknet 43 network is private and not public (as in the Tor implementation). This means that it is not possible to add a node to the Darknet 43 network without authorization. Besides certain security problems that this may cause, adding malicious nodes can lead to performance issues if the bandwidth of the added nodes is not controlled.

[0057] According to the Tor implementation, a candidate node joins the network by declaring itself to high-ranking Darknet nodes, also known as "authority" nodes. To do this, the candidate node provides a router description document (or "Router Descriptor") to the "authority" nodes. The "authority" nodes include the information contained in the A router description document is included in a consensus document during a vote that takes place at regular intervals. The consensus document is a public document regularly produced by the Darknet network that lists all the nodes that comprise it, along with the cryptographic information associated with each of these nodes. The consensus document is notably used by Tor implementation processes to construct paths (also called "circuits" in the Tor implementation) to rendezvous points, as will be described below.

[0058] According to the invention, to prevent the router description document of an unauthorized node from being accepted by the "authority" nodes, an additional certificate is embedded within the valid router description documents. This certificate is signed by a trusted authority, and each "authority" node holds the authority certificate, enabling it to validate the router description document of a candidate node by verifying its signature. The common name of the candidate node's authority certificate specifies the candidate node's public IP address, thus allowing the "authority" nodes to verify the legitimacy of the candidate node requesting integration into the Darknet 43 network. Therefore, the Darknet 43 network has the ability to reject candidate nodes that do not possess a valid certificate signed by the trusted authority.

[0059] In this respect, the Darknet 43 network is an alteration of the Tor implementation as defined by the current version of the standard. Customer Agent 41

[0060] The client agent 41, which installs and runs on a computer, such as the client 10 of user 1, allows access to the services hidden by the security infrastructure 40.

[0061] The client agent 41 stores a client configuration file T.

[0062] The file T contains authentication data for client 10, such as a private key, a public key and a certificate associated with the public key for connecting to the controller 44.

[0063] The T file also stores the ".onion" addresses of the hidden services for which user 1 of client 10 has access rights.

[0064] Advantageously, the T file associates each ".onion" address on the one hand, with an IP address and / or a domain name on the other hand.

[0065] The client agent 41 advantageously stores a token J1 to allow a first connection to the controller 44.

[0066] The customer agent 41 is composed of two processes.

[0067] The first 411 process is a Tor process. It is a local proxy (also called a ".Onion Proxy" - OP) listening on the local loopback interface. This first 411 process Accepts connections via the SOCKS protocol. The first process, 411, redirects data packets from client application 12 to services hidden by the Darknet network 43. The SOCKS protocol is a standard protocol used in the Tor implementation to provide applications running on a machine with a standard way to access the Darknet. In this implementation, instead of configuring applications to use Tor's local SOCKS proxy, the agent handles negotiating a SOCKS connection with the local proxy whenever a connection to a hidden service is needed.

[0068] This first 411 process is similar to the local proxy in the Tor implementation, but is advantageously modified to ensure the creation of direct circuits to a rendezvous point, thereby removing client anonymity. Removing user anonymity allows the administrator of the hidden services to know the users' true IP addresses. Thus, the connection between the client agent 41 and the rendezvous point is direct and does not use any intermediate relay nodes of the Darknet network 43. The hidden services themselves remain anonymous. Lifting client anonymity also increases the performance of the Darknet network by reducing the relay and encryption steps for client-side traffic.

[0069] The second process 412 is specific to the present security infrastructure. It establishes and maintains a connection to the controller 44, relying on the first process 411.

[0070] This second process 412 is designed to connect to the controller 44 to retrieve all or part of the information from the configuration file T.

[0071] When it detects a request generated by application 12, executed on client 10, to a domain name or IP address mentioned in the T file, the second process 412 modifies this request by substituting the address ".onion" associated with this domain name or IP address, and redirects the modified request to the Darknet network and the hidden service, via the first process 411.

[0072] More specifically, the second 412 process intercepts DNS queries from application 12 when these queries include a domain name from the T file. The second process forges a DNS response containing a "fake" IP address associated with that domain name (this "fake" IP address is either specified in the T file or is a default address assigned by the second process). When the second 412 process detects a query destined for this "fake" IP address, it redirects the packet to the local Tor proxy with the corresponding ".onion" address.

[0073] This feature of the second 412 process is not essential to the invention, but it makes the proposed solution easier for the user to use, who does not manipulate ".onion" addresses but IP addresses or domain names, as is their custom when using the internet. But the 412 process itself is essential, in particular for communicating with the controller and receiving information on available services. Server Agent 42

[0074] The server agent 42 is installed and runs on a machine of the information system 20 in order to conceal a specific service of the information system. For example, the server agent 42 is run by the server 24 to conceal the service 23. The server agent 42 then makes the service accessible through the security infrastructure 40.

[0075] Server agent 42 stores a server configuration file F.

[0076] File F contains authentication data for server 24, such as a private key, a public key and a certificate associated with the public key, for connection to controller 44.

[0077] File F also stores the identification information associated with users who can access service 23. This identification information preferably includes authentication data for each client and the access rights associated with that client.

[0078] The server agent 42 stores a J2 token to allow a first connection to the controller 44.

[0079] Server agent 42 consists of two processes.

[0080] The first process 421 is a Tor process. It generates the ".onion" addresses of the services to be hidden and registers them with the Darknet network's management system 45 43 to make them accessible to authorized users via the Darknet [TO BE VERIFIED: the ".onion" addresses are indeed communicated to the Darknet]. To do this, the first process 421 reads the configuration file F containing this information. Just like the client agent 41, this first process 421 executes a local proxy to allow access to the Darknet network 43. This first process 421 conforms to the local proxy according to the Tor implementation.

[0081] The second process 422 is specific to the present invention. It allows an administrator 28 of the information system 20 to communicate with the first process 421 in order to configure the services. Advantageously, the administrator 28 accesses the second process 422 as if it were a hidden service on the Darknet.

[0082] The second process 422 also establishes and maintains a connection with the controller 44 to receive information to update the configuration file F. Controller 44

[0083] Controller 44 is a machine connected to the internet.

[0084] Controller 44 includes a database B. This database contains the information needed to update the client and server configuration files. The database Data B refers, for example, to users, services, and the access rights of those services by users.

[0085] Controller 44 acts as a hidden service by the Darknet network 43.

[0086] The controller 44 is advantageously hosted in an information system different from the information system to be secured and managed by the provider of this security solution.

[0087] Alternatively, it is hosted directly on the information system of the organization that wishes to use this security solution in order to have optimal control over its data.

[0088] Advantageously, there are as many controllers as there are organizations whose information system one seeks to secure, so that the services of these different organizations are not referenced within the same controller. This partitioning between organizations increases security.

[0089] The controller 44 executes a process 441 and two network application type services 442 and 443. These two applications act as services hidden by the Darknet 43 network. They are themselves informed within the controller 44 and are manageable like any other hidden service.

[0090] Process 441 is a Tor process, of the local proxy type. Process 441 generates the two ".onion" addresses of the two services 442 and 443 to make these services accessible to remote agents, clients of the controller's services, through the Darknet 43 network.

[0091] The first application 442 listens on a first port on the local loop to allow agents to connect, authenticate and receive the information they are interested in, such as the ".onion" addresses of the services open to the user for the client agent 41, or the domain names and / or IP addresses for the client agent 41, or the identities of the authorized users for the server agent 42.

[0092] Preferably, the controller 44 is manageable through the second application 443, which is a web application accessible via a second port, distinct from the first port. The security infrastructure administrator 28 knows the address ".onion" allowing him to access the second application 443 of the controller 44 and to manage the users, services and associated access rights, i.e. to update the content of database B. Administration console 46.

[0093] The administrator 28 accesses the information service 20 and the controller 44 by means of a console 46. The console 46 is a client, similar to the client 10 shown above. It runs an application 12' for administering the information system 20 and the controller 44, which can connect through the Darknet 43 by running a client agent 41' (comprising a first process 411' and a second process 412') using the information grouped in a configuration file T'.

[0094] METHODS Method of connecting to a hidden service

[0095] With reference to [Fig.2], a connection method 100 is implemented to establish a connection (for example, connection 101 of [Fig.1]) between an application of a registered client, such as application 12 of client 10, and a hidden service, such as service 23 of server 24.

[0096] Step 110: When a user 1 seeks to use a hidden service 23, the client agent 41 reads the client configuration file T to extract the ".onion" address of the service it wants to access. It establishes a connection with a Darknet rendezvous point, for example, node 61. To do this, the client agent 41 arbitrarily chooses this node from the list of nodes that make up the Darknet network 43, this list being publicly available, for example, by querying the management system 45. The client agent 41 then establishes a connection with the chosen rendezvous point. In the present implementation, this connection is advantageously direct. That is to say, there is no Darknet network relay node 43 between the client 10 and the chosen rendezvous point, thus allowing the anonymity of client 10 to be broken.

[0097] Step 120: Once the connection to the Darknet is established, the client agent 41 requests access to service 24 and declares its rendezvous point to the management system 45, which then communicates the connection request from client agent 41 and the location of the chosen rendezvous point to the server agent 42 associated with the requested service. This process, specific to the Tor implementation, is not described in further detail here.

[0098] Step 130: upon receiving a connection request to service 23, the server agent 42 verifies the identity of the client 10 by consulting the server configuration file F.

[0099] Step 140: After successful verification of the identity of the client initiating a connection request, the server agent 42 initiates a TCP connection to a first node of the Darknet network, for example node 52. Then the server agent 42 extends the previously established connection by instructing the first relay node 52 of the circuit to establish a TCP connection to a second relay node, chosen by the first relay node, for example node 71. Finally, the server agent 42 extends the connection once more, to the rendezvous point 61. Alternatively, the circuit between the information system 20 and the rendezvous point may have a different number of hops (at least two to mask 1TP of the server 24).

[0100] Step 150: The connections on both sides of the rendezvous point are associated by the rendezvous point to allow the client agent 41 and the server agent 42 to establish a secure tunnel, and to allow application 12 running on client 10 and service 23 running on server 24 to communicate. Client 10 does not know the actual IP address of service 23, while service 23 knows the client's IP address, which is transmitted to it by the rendezvous point.

[0101] It is observed that the service, being the last to establish the connection, chooses whether or not to proceed with establishing the connection to the rendezvous point based on the identity of the user: this is the principle of indirection.

[0102] Method for updating a user's rights and communicating the address of a hidden service

[0103] With reference to [Fig.3], the steps of process 200 are advantageously implemented to populate the client configuration files T and server configuration files F.

[0104] In step 210, the administrator 28 connects to the identity and access controller 44. He adds a client right 10 for user 1 to database B to allow access to the hidden service 23. To do this, the console 46, acting as a client, and the controller 44, acting as a server for a hidden service, perform the steps of the connection process 100 to establish the link 401. Once this connection is established, the second application 443 allows the administrator to access database B.

[0105] In a step 220, the controller 44 communicates the user's identity and rights to the server agent 42. This step is executed, for example, at the request of the server agent 42 when it needs to verify a connection request (step 130 of process 100). Thus, the server agent 42 knows that it can authorize the establishment of a connection to the rendezvous point to respond to a connection request from the client 10. The communication of this information is carried out by means of a connection 301 across the Darknet previously established and maintained between the server agent 42, as the client, and the first application 442 of the controller 44 (circuit 301 in [Fig. 1]).

[0106] In a step 230, the controller 44 communicates the address ".onion" of the service 23 to the client agent 4L. This communication is carried out via a secure tunnel previously established and maintained between the client agent 10 of user 1, as a client, and the first application 442 of the controller, as a hidden service (circuit 201 of [Fig.1]).

[0107] Once it has the ".onion" address of the target service 23, the client 10 can then establish a secure tunnel to that service and the server agent 42 can verify the identity of the client and establish the connection to the rendezvous point in accordance with process 100.

[0108] Method for authenticating a client with a server agent

[0109] In order to ensure that knowledge of a ".onion" address alone is not sufficient to establish a connection with a hidden service, it is provided that... ugously the implementation of the steps of process 300 to allow the authentication of a client 10 by the server agent 42 associated with service 23 (step 130 of process 100).

[0110] This elementary process 300 is illustrated by [Fig.4].

[0111] In step 310, server agent 42 makes service 23 available on the Darknet 43, by generating a ".onion" address for service 23, and registers service 23 with system 45 of the Darknet network 43. This functionality is native to the Tor implementation according to the current version and is not modified here.

[0112] In a step 320, the server agent 42 establishes and maintains a connection 301 across the Darknet 43 with the first application 442 of the access and identity controller 44.

[0113] In step 330, the server agent 42 also communicates to the controller 44 the ".onion" address that it generated for service 23.

[0114] In step 340, the controller 44 communicates to the server agent 42 all the identities of users authorized to establish a connection with the service 23 (this corresponds to step 220 of the process in [Fig. 3]). Whenever a right is modified in database B, the controller 44 notifies the server agent 42.

[0115] In step 350, when the client agent 41 attempts to connect, the server agent 42 verifies that the client 10 is indeed authorized to connect. If so, it establishes a connection to the rendezvous point chosen by the client, following the principle of indirection (step 140 of the process in [Fig. 1]).

[0116] It should be noted that step 330 centralizes the ".onion" addresses of a given organization's services within database B, which is stored by controller 44. Controller 44 thus references the organization's users, services, and access rights. This allows controller 44 to inform clients of the accessible ".onion" addresses of services, as described with reference to [Fig. 5]. In contrast, in the current version of the Tor implementation, ".onion" addresses are considered non-standard information, which service administrators are responsible for communicating to their users. First connection via token

[0117] Since the client agents 41 and server agents 43 need to know the ".onion" address of the first application 442 of the controller 44, they must hold certain initial configuration information, such as a certificate, a key and the ".onion" address of the controller 44.

[0118] To facilitate the deposit of this initial configuration information on the machine on which the agent is executed, the agent can advantageously retrieve this information directly from the controller 44 by implementing the steps of the process 400 of the [Fig.5].

[0119] In step 410, the user (or the administrator of the service to be hidden) receives an initialization token. This token is, for example, composed of the ".onion" address of controller 44 and a unique identifier. This pair of information is, for example, generated by controller 44 at the request of administrator 28. This pair of information is communicated to user 1 (or to the administrator of the service to be hidden) by an alternative means of communication with an appropriate level of security, for example, by the transmission of an encrypted email containing the token.

[0120] In a step 420, using this token, the client agent 41 (respectively the server agent 42) connects to the controller 44. It reads the address ".onion" of the controller 4 indicated by the token, connects to the controller 44 and transmits to the controller 44 the unique identifier indicated by the token.

[0121] In return, in step 430, the controller 44 generates a certificate and a key and transmits this authentication data to the client agent (or the server agent). The token is then "consumed" (invalidated) by the controller 44. A token is valid only for a limited time and can only be used once to ensure security.

[0122] Subsequently, in step 440, using this configuration information stored in file T (or file F, respectively), the client agent 41 (or server agent 42) can establish a new connection with the controller 44 and authenticate itself to the controller 44 using the information from file T (or file F, respectively). Preferably, an agent maintains this connection with the controller.

[0123] In step 450, the client agent 41 retrieves general configuration information such as the ".onion" addresses of the hidden services open to it. It stores this information in the file T. The server agent 42 retrieves general configuration information such as the identification of each user. It stores this information in the file F.

[0124] Finally, in a step 460, the client 10 accesses the desired hidden service using its ".onion" address, negotiating a rendezvous point with the Darknet network, and then establishing a connection with the hidden service via the usual Tor implementation process (implementation of process 100).

[0125] With process 400, the client and server agents know the ".onion" address of controller 44.

[0126] At any time, as soon as a change is made to access rights in database B, the controller 44 indicates this change to the clients concerned: a new ".onion" address is available, that a ".onion" address must be invalidated, a user has the right to access all or part of a hidden service or on the contrary no longer has the right to access all or part of a hidden service.

[0127] ADVANTAGES

[0128] The invention therefore relates to an infrastructure based on a private Darknet network allowing the services to be exposed on the internet.

[0129] The Tor implementation of a Darknet infrastructure is modified, notably to remove user anonymity while preserving the anonymity of hidden services. It is also modified to make the darknet network private, that is, to prevent actors other than the administrator from adding machines to it.

[0130] Client agents advantageously allow users to access hidden services as if they were accessing services exposed on the internet.

[0131] The proposed infrastructure has the following properties:

[0132] - It is technically impossible for anyone with access to a part or to all machines in the infrastructure can establish a connection with hidden services without holding the rights on those machines specified in the organization's management database.

[0133] - It is impossible to determine the public IP addresses of hidden services.

[0134] - The administration console is no longer exposed on the Internet and uses itself the infrastructure for concealment.

[0135] These properties make the infrastructure a ZTNA-compliant infrastructure.

Claims

Claims

1. Security infrastructure intended to be deployed in an architecture based on the internet and comprising a client (10) connected to the internet (30) on one side and a server (24) of an information system (20) connected to the internet on the other side, the information system (20) providing a service (23), characterized in that the security infrastructure is a Darknet infrastructure comprising: - a Darknet network (43) superimposed on the internet (30) to hide the service (23); - a client agent (41) executed by the client (10) to access the service (23) through the Darknet network (43), the client agent storing a client configuration file (T); - a server agent (42) executed on the server (24) of the information system (20) to allow access to the service (23) through the Darknet network (43), the server agent storing a server configuration file (F);and, - a controller (44), acting as a hidden service by the Darknet network and comprising a database (B) storing configuration information, the controller being accessible through the Darknet network (43) by the client agent (41), respectively by the server agent (42), to receive client configuration information, respectively server, allowing the updating of the client configuration file, respectively server, the client configuration information comprising at least one address on the Darknet network allowing the client to access the service (23) when the client actually has the right to access the service, and the server configuration information comprising at least identification information allowing the client to identify itself to the server to be able to access the service (23).;

2. Infrastructure according to claim 1, in which an agent among the client agent and the server agent stores a token (Jl, J2) allowing a first connection, via the Darknet network (23), to the controller (44) in order to receive in return authentication data, the agent then establishing a connection with the controller using the authentication data.

3. Infrastructure according to any one of claims 1 to 2, comprising an administration console (46) of the controller (44) and advantageously of the server agent (42), the administration console executing an agent to access the controller and advantageously the server agent through the Darknet network (43).

4. Infrastructure according to any one of the preceding claims, based on a Tor implementation of the Darknet infrastructure.

5. Infrastructure according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein the Darknet network is a private network.

6. Method for connecting to a hidden service implemented in a security infrastructure according to any one of claims 1 to 5, consisting of: - filling in (230) a client configuration file (T) of the client agent and filling in (220) a server configuration file (F) of the server agent by connection to the controller (44), the client configuration file comprising at least one address on the Darknet network of the service (23), and the server configuration file comprising at least one piece of identification information allowing the client to identify itself to the server in order to be able to access the service (23); - establishing (320) by the server agent (42) a connection with the controller (44), the controller (44) acting as a hidden service by the Darknet network (43); - communicating (330) by the server agent (42) to the controller (44) the address on the Darknet network of the service (23), said address having been generated by the server agent;- establishing by the client agent (41) a connection with the controller (44), the controller (44) acts as a hidden service by the Darknet network (43); - communicating by the controller to the client agent the address on the Darknet network of the service (23) to fill in the client configuration file. - making by the server agent (42) the service available on the Darknet network (43); - establishing (110) by the client agent (41) a connection with a node called a “rendezvous point” of the Darknet network (43), using the information contained in the client configuration file; - requesting (120) by the client agent (41) access to the service (23) from the Darknet network (43) by declaring the identifier of the “rendezvous point” node; - verifying (130) by the server agent (42) the identity of the client (10) on; which is executed the client agent (41) using the identification information contained in the server configuration file; and, in the event of a positive verification, - establish (140) by the server agent (42) a connection with the “rendezvous point” node of the Darknet network (43); - associate (150) the connections on either side of the “rendezvous point” node to establish a communication (101) between the client and the server.

7. Method according to claim 6, in which the method further comprises: - establishing (320) by the server agent (42) a connection with the controller (44); - communicating (340) by the controller to the server agent the rights of the users on the service (23) to fill in the server configuration file.

8. A method according to any one of claims 6 to 7, wherein, for establishing by an agent among the client agent and the server agent a connection with the controller (44), the method further comprises: - receiving (410) by the agent a connection token indicating an address on the Darknet network of the controller and an identifier; - establishing (420) by the agent a connection to the controller using the address on the Darknet network of the controller indicated in the token and identifying itself by the agent to the controller using the identifier indicated in the token; - providing (430) in response by the controller to the agent authentication data; and - establishing (440) by the agent a connection to the controller using the authentication data.

9. A computer program product comprising software instructions which, when executed by a client (10), a server (24) and a controller (44) of an infrastructure according to any one of claims 1 to 5, implement a method according to any one of claims 6 to 8.