Method for managing the lifecycle of a system-on-a-chip, and corresponding system-on-a-chip

The system on a chip with a life cycle management device provides secure, dynamic functionality management, addressing the limitations of conventional systems by enabling flexible activation/deactivation and ownership transfer without external authority intervention.

FR3149399A1Active Publication Date: 2024-12-06STMICROELECTRONICS INT NV
View PDF 4 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
FR2023005441
Authority / Receiving Office
FR · FR
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-05-31
Publication Date
2024-12-06
Estimated Expiration
2043-05-31

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Conventional systems on a chip lack the ability to dynamically activate or deactivate functionalities during the product's lifespan without external regulatory authority intervention, compromising security and flexibility in managing rights, traceability, and adaptability.

Method used

A system on a chip with a life cycle management device that allows dynamic activation or deactivation of functionalities through a secure memory-based configuration command, utilizing a directory and certificates to manage access and ownership rights, ensuring security and flexibility.

Benefits of technology

Enables secure, dynamic management of functionalities throughout the chip's lifecycle, enhancing traceability, adaptive rental, protection against piracy, and flexible ownership transfer.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure 00000000_0000_ABST
    Figure 00000000_0000_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

The Lifecycle Management System (LCMS) process for a system-on-a-chip (SoC) with features (IPS) includes multi-actor ownership management (MUOS) that lists feature owners in a directory, and includes the allocation of rights to a feature (IPS) during the SoC lifecycle, based on a configuration command (CmdConfig) that includes an identification of said feature, an identification of a property or access right for the feature, and a signature of the feature owner (SignST>, SignUser>). Figure for the abstract: Fig 1
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Title of the invention: Method for managing the life cycle of a system on chip, and corresponding system on chip

[0001] Embodiments and implementations relate to the management of the life cycle of a system-on-chip, in particular the management of functionalities of the system-on-chip during the lifetime of the product (the product being for example the system-on-chip or an object incorporating the system-on-chip).

[0002] There is a demand to benefit from services that can be dynamically activated during the lifetime of the product, such as in the context of rental for end users, in the context of a guarantee of security in the use of functionalities, in the context of traceability of uses, in the context of a simplification of the initial configuration procedure of the original manufacturer of the product, and / or even in the context of active recycling of systems on chip.

[0003] Conventional solutions are typically not suited to these needs, because they do not allow in particular a dynamic configuration of rights holders during the lifetime of the product, while ensuring security against piracy or improper access.

[0004] Indeed, conventionally, functionalities of systems on chip can be activated or not by a configuration at the end of the production line, typically by means of writing in a single-programmable memory, that is to say a non-volatile memory that can only be written once by the manufacturer of the circuit.

[0005] Other conventional systems may provide for activation or deactivation of functionalities during the life of a product, but requiring action from a trusted authority external to the system, such as for example in a client-server operation providing additional online functionalities to the system (client) by the external trusted authority (server).

[0006] Thus, there is a need to propose systems-on-chip capable of activating and deactivating functionalities dynamically during the product life cycle, for example depending on the owner of the product, without action from an external and centralized trusted authority, and advantageously in a reversible manner without time limit. Furthermore, it is desirable that the security of the dynamic activation / deactivation process is guaranteed and tends towards inviolability.

[0007] The implementation and embodiment modes defined below are proposed in these respects, and allow a system on chip to benefit from dynamic management of activation or deactivation of functionalities (for example by management of access rights to these features) throughout the life cycle of the system-on-chip, not just during production of the integrated circuit.

[0008] Thus, said implementation and embodiment modes defined below, by allowing dynamic configurations and reconfigurations of the system on chip, can offer: an improvement in the traceability of the chips; an implementation of adaptive rental (“smart renting” in English); a means of protecting against overproduction and counterfeiting; a secure provision (or “provisioning” according to a commonly used anglicism) of “new” functionalities to a product; a possibility of multi-ownership; a possibility of transfer of ownership and licenses of the functionalities; a means of proving ownership of the system.

[0009] According to one aspect, there is provided a method for managing the life cycle of a system-on-chip having functionalities, comprising multi-actor ownership management listing owners of the functionalities in a directory, and comprising allocation of the rights of a functionality during the life cycle of the system-on-chip, according to a configuration command comprising an identification of said functionality, an identification of an ownership or access right of the functionality, and a signature of the owner of this functionality.

[0010] According to one embodiment, said directory is contained in a programming script recorded in a secure memory, and said configuration command is communicated in a modified version of said script, the method comprising an execution of the script in order to carry out said allocation of the rights of the identified functionality.

[0011] According to one embodiment, said directory is contained in a single-program memory, and said configuration command is communicated in a certificate comprising a data chain and recorded in a secure memory, the method comprising an interpretation of the certificate in order to carry out said allocation of the rights of the identified functionality.

[0012] By "certificate" is meant a certified data chain, for example a signed data chain whose public key is contained in said directory; or for example a signed data chain whose public key is contained in a signed authentication document attached to the data chain, and whose public key (of the authentication document) is contained in said directory. Such an authentication document may for example be governed by the X.509 standard (said authentication document being distinctly called a certificate in the X.509 standard).

[0013] Finally, by “certificate” we will also mean any other equivalent means providing a mechanism for validation (or certification) of the data chain, such as for example a validation within a system of the blockchain type (English term used with no equivalent used in French, literally meaning “chain of blocks”).

[0014] According to one embodiment, if said configuration command includes the identification of an access right, then the management of the property includes an allocation of access authorizations to the identified functionality.

[0015] According to one embodiment, if said configuration command includes the identification of the ownership right of said functionality to an identified actor, then the management of the property includes an allocation to the identified actor of the ownership of the identified functionality.

[0016] According to one embodiment, said property management comprises a verification that said signature of the configuration command authenticates the last known owner in said directory for the identified functionality.

[0017] For example, said ownership management comprises decrypting said configuration command signature with an encryption key of said last known owner.

[0018] According to one embodiment, the system on chip further comprises a system authorizing and prohibiting access to the functionalities, depending on the content of a configuration register, said management of the property comprising programming of the configuration register to allocate said rights of the functionality.

[0019] For example, the system capable of authorizing and prohibiting access to functionalities can be implemented in a system for managing access rights of the system on chip, such as the resource isolation environment described in publication FR 3103586 Al (28 / 05 / 2021) allowing in particular dynamic management of access rights.

[0020] According to one embodiment, the method may comprise an irreversible recording of a content of the configuration register, i.e. at least part of the content of the configuration register, if said configuration command further defines an irreversible nature of said allocation.

[0021] According to one embodiment, said allocation of functionality rights is carried out at startup of the system on chip, in cooperation with said system authorizing and prohibiting access to the functionality, so that all access is prohibited before said allocation.

[0022] According to one embodiment, the method further comprises an always active generation of a timestamp, in which said management of the property comprises a programming at a future time, determined by said timestamp, of said allocation to said actor of the functionality.

[0023] By "always-on generation of a timestamp" is meant an autonomous generation of time information of an order of magnitude of date and time, in the system-on-chip; for example generated by means of an always-on clock circuit active, also called secure timing system (usually "secure timing System" or "secure System time" or "secure RTC" for "secure real time clock" in English).

[0024] According to another aspect, there is also provided a system-on-chip, having functionalities, and comprising a lifecycle management device incorporating a multi-actor ownership management circuit configured to list owners of the functionalities in a directory, and to allocate rights of a functionality during the lifecycle of the system-on-chip, according to a configuration command comprising an identification of said functionality, an identification of an ownership or access right of the functionality, and a signature of the owner of this functionality.

[0025] According to one embodiment, said directory is contained in a programming script recorded in a secure memory, and said configuration command is communicated in a modified version of said script, said property management circuit comprising a control unit configured to execute said script in order to carry out said allocation of the rights of the identified functionality.

[0026] According to one embodiment, said directory is contained in a single-programmable memory, and said configuration command is communicated in a certificate comprising a data chain and recorded in a secure memory, said property management circuit comprising a control unit configured to interpret said certificate in order to carry out said allocation of the rights of the identified functionality.

[0027] According to one embodiment, the property management circuit is configured to allocate access authorizations to the identified functionality, if said configuration command comprises the identification of an access right.

[0028] According to one embodiment, the property management circuit is configured to allocate to the identified actor the ownership of the identified functionality, if said configuration command comprises the identification of the right of ownership of said functionality to an identified actor.

[0029] According to one embodiment, said property management circuit comprises an authentication unit configured to verify that said signature of the configuration command authenticates the last known owner in said directory for the identified functionality.

[0030] According to one embodiment, the system on chip further comprises a system configured to authorize and prohibit access to the functionalities of the system on chip, depending on the content of a configuration register, said property management circuit being configured to program the configuration register in order to allocate said functionality rights.

[0031] According to one embodiment, said configuration register is capable of recording content irreversibly, if said configuration command further defines an irreversible nature of the allocation.

[0032] According to one embodiment, the property management circuit is configured to perform said allocation of functionality rights at startup of the system-on-chip, in cooperation with said system configured to authorize and prohibit access to the functionality of the system-on-chip such that all access is prohibited before said allocation.

[0033] According to one embodiment, the system-on-chip further comprises a secure, always-active timestamping circuit, in which said property management circuit is configured to program at a future time, determined by said timestamping circuit, said allocation of the rights of said functionality.

[0034] Other advantages and characteristics of the invention will appear on examining the detailed description of embodiments and implementations, which are in no way limiting, and the appended drawings in which the figures:

[0035] [Fig.l] ;

[0036] [Fig.2] ;

[0037] [Fig.3] ;

[0038] [Fig.4] ;

[0039] [Fig.5] ;

[0040] [Fig.6] ;

[0041] [Fig.7] ;

[0042] [Fig.8] ;

[0043] [Fig.9] ;

[0044] [Fig. 10] ;

[0045] [Fig. 11];

[0046] [Fig. 12] ;

[0047] [Fig. 13] ;

[0048] [Fig. 14] illustrate embodiments and implementations of the invention.

[0049] [Fig.l] illustrates an exemplary embodiment of a system on chip SOC, having functionalities, and comprising a life cycle management device LCMS capable of activating or deactivating functionalities dynamically throughout the lifetime of the system on chip SOC.

[0050] The lifetime of the system on chip, which can also be called the life cycle, begins at the end of the production chain, when the integrated circuit is functional and capable of being configured by the manufacturer for a given marketing, then includes the marketing and use of the system on chip, until the product is waste, potentially recycled.

[0051] The functionalities of the system on chip SOC can be implemented by specifically dedicated IPS resources, such as for example an image sensor and a hardware accelerator for image processing or neural processing, and / or by common resources such as a PC microcontroller; RAM, COMM communication interfaces such as "WiFi" (IEEE 802.11 group standards), "4G / 5G / LTE" (FUIT and 3GPP standards), "USB", "I2C", "SPI", etc.; as well as other hardware or software resources.

[0052] We will generally designate any functionality that can be distinctly identified by the reference “IPS”, regardless of the means by which it is obtained.

[0053] Thus, and as will appear in the description below, the ability to dynamically activate or deactivate IPS functionalities is advantageous from this first stage of the life cycle of the SOC system on chip, by allowing a diversification of the possible settings of the same production of the integrated circuit of the SOC system, for example according to different commercial ranges; while facilitating the configuration procedure by the manufacturer and the management of its stock.

[0054] During the lifetime of the system, that is to say during its marketing and use, the ability to dynamically activate or deactivate IPS functionalities can allow the manufacturer or owner of the system on chip SOC to, for example, implement adaptive rental (“smart renting” in English) of certain functionalities, or else make “new” functionalities available to a product, such as in the context of an update.

[0055] The ability to dynamically activate or deactivate functionalities also allows for better management of owners of the system on chip SOC, notably offering possibilities for multi-ownership and transfer of ownership of functionalities, and means of proving ownership.

[0056] Furthermore, at the end of a product's life cycle, the system on chip SOC can be actively recycled, i.e., for example, be reused with a reconfiguration adapted to the second application, again thanks to the ability to dynamically activate or deactivate functionalities.

[0057] The system on chip SOC advantageously comprises a RIF resource isolation system capable of authorizing and prohibiting access to the IPS functionalities of the system on chip SOC. For example, the RIF resource isolation system is part of a resource access management system as described in publication FR 3103586 A1 (28 / 05 / 2021), which is in particular capable of dynamic configurations according to the applications of the system on chip.

[0058] For example, the RIF resource isolation system may be capable of reading the contents of one or more CFGBK configuration registers in order to configure accordingly the authorization or prohibition of access to a given resource by a device. given applicant.

[0059] The configuration register(s) CFGBK may for example belong to the resource isolation system RIF, in which case the lifecycle management device LCMS may be able to write the configuration into the configuration register(s) CFGBK.

[0060] The configuration register(s) CFGBK may, for example, belong to the LCMS lifecycle management device, and be contained in a secure memory SECMEM.

[0061] The LCMS life cycle management device in fact advantageously comprises a secure memory SECMEM, which can contain the configuration register CFGBK mentioned above, as well as configuration command instructions CRTF-CFG / SCRPT making it possible to carry out a dynamic modification, during the lifetime of the system on chip, of the access authorizations to the IPS functionalities.

[0062] In this regard, the LCMS lifecycle management device comprises a MUOS multi-actor ownership management circuit, configured on the one hand to list owners for at least some of said IPS functionalities in a directory; and on the other hand to dynamically allocate rights to an IPS functionality during the lifetime of the system on chip SOC, according to a configuration command, for example via the COMM communication interfaces.

[0063] The configuration command may comprise at least one identification of said IPS functionality, one identification of said actor, and a signature of the owner of this functionality, and may be communicated according to the embodiments described below in relation to Figures 2 to 5 and to Figures 6 to 9.

[0064] Advantageously in terms of security of operations, the MUOS property management circuit is configured to carry out the allocations of the rights of the functionalities at each start-up of the system on chip SOC, and in cooperation with the RIF resource isolation system so that all accesses are prohibited before said allocation.

[0065] In addition, the LCMS lifecycle management device may comprise a secure always-on timestamping circuit STS, so that the MUOS property management circuit can schedule its dynamic allocations of functionality rights, at a future time, determined by said STS timestamping circuit.

[0066] Indeed, the secure, always-active time-stamping circuit STS is advantageously capable of autonomously generating time information of an order of magnitude of date and time, in the system on chip, and is for example usually called “secure timing System” or “secure System time” or “secure RTC” in English.

[0067] We now refer to [Fig.2] to 5, illustrating a first embodiment and implementation relating to said configuration command.

[0068] [Fig.2] illustrates the first implementation mode for the lifecycle management method in which the configuration commands are communicated in the form of a SCRPT script, i.e. a human-understandable programming language.

[0069] This is advantageous from the point of view of end users, who can easily configure scripts according to their needs.

[0070] On the one hand, in lifecycle management, owners of the different functionalities are listed within the framework of multi-actor property management.

[0071] Thus, upon completion of the SOC system-on-chip manufacturing, the manufacturer ST is the owner of all the functionalities and has all the rights to all the functionalities.

[0072] The manufacturer ST may therefore, for example, provide that not all functionalities are activated by default. Activation may be done later for commercial reasons, depending, for example, on the range offered or the type of offer.

[0073] The manufacturer ST can thus provide an actor A (for example a buyer) with CRTF information allowing the transfer of ownership of at least one IPS functionality to actor A.

[0074] The CRTF information is signed by the manufacturer, and includes an identification of this or these IPS functionality(ies), an identification of said actor A, for example by communication of a public key of actor A, as well as optionally a validity period of this allocation.

[0075] Actor A can then generate a SCRPT configuration command based on the information communicated by the former transferring owner.

[0076] The SCRPT configuration command includes an identification of a property or access right of the functionality.

[0077] If the configuration command includes the identification of an access right, then the management of the property includes an allocation of access authorizations to the identified functionality.

[0078] Actor A can thus configure the system on chip SOC by choosing an activation or a deactivation of the functionalities of which it has ownership. Actor A can then provide the system on chip SOC in this configuration to another actor B. Actor B, without having knowledge of the key of the owner A and / or of the manufacturer ST, will not be able to generate another configuration command and will not be able to modify the allocation of the rights of the functionalities established by actor A.

[0079] The configuration command generated by actor A may include the identification of the ownership right of said functionality to an actor B, identified in said command, then the management of the property includes an allocation of the property to the identified actor B, that is, a transfer of the property from actor A to actor B.

[0080] In this regard, actor A may also provide actor B with CRTF information enabling the transfer of ownership of at least one ISP functionality from actor A to actor B.

[0081] Here too, the CRTF information is signed by actor A, and includes an identification of said at least one IPS functionality, an identification of said actor B, for example by communication of a public key of actor B, as well as optionally a validity period of this allocation.

[0082] In summary, in the first mode of implementation, said directory is contained in a SCRPT programming script, for example recorded in the secure memory SECMEM. The configuration command is communicated in a modified version of said SCRPT script, by the actor A, B having knowledge of said CRTF information of the transfer of ownership. The configuration command includes in particular the public key of the new owner A (resp. B) and is signed by the former owner ST (resp. A).

[0083] An interpretation of the script is implemented within the framework of the management of the property, for example by a control unit CONT of the management circuit MUOS, in order to practically execute said allocation to the identified actor of the identified functionality.

[0084] [Fig.3] illustrates an example of the first embodiment of the corresponding MUOS property management circuit, i.e. in particular capable of processing configuration commands communicated in the form of a script (programming language understandable by humans).

[0085] The MUOS property management circuit is capable of receiving the configuration command CmdConfig from a user USR, for example via a COMM communication interface present in the system on chip SOC.

[0086] The CmdConfig configuration commands are processed by a QPU authentication unit, in particular capable of managing and storing KMng encryption keys in a KS register, and of authenticating Auth the signature of the CmdConfig configuration command.

[0087] The authentication unit QPU is for example configured to authenticate the origin of the configuration command CmdConfig by verifying that the signature of the configuration command CmdConfig corresponds to a public key, stored in the register KS, of the last known owner for the identified functionality, that is to say the owner listed in said directory at the time of receipt of the command CmdConfig.

[0088] Signature verification can be done by conventional methods of symmetric or asymmetric encryption, possibly combined with a command hash function.

[0089] The signature of the CmdConfig configuration command can be verified and authenticated by obtaining a fingerprint from the hash of the script, by decrypting with the public key of said last known owner, the encrypted fingerprint of the script.

[0090] If the configuration command CmdConfig is authenticated, then the received script SCRPT is recorded in clear text in the secure memory SECMEM; otherwise, the command is rejected. In this regard, reference will be made to Figures 4 and 5 described below.

[0091] Furthermore, the MUOS property management circuit is for example configured to program the configuration register CFGBK, for example in a section of the secure memory SECMEM, in order to communicate the configuration of the allocation of the rights of the functionalities.

[0092] Optionally, the configuration register CFGBK may be capable of recording content irreversibly, for example by a mechanism of the fuse type FUS (see figures 10-14), if said configuration command CmdConfig further defines an irreversible nature of the allocation.

[0093] [Fig.4] illustrates a method 400 of implementing the verification by the authentication unit QPU.

[0094] In an initial state 410, the QPU is in a configuration command waiting state.

[0095] When a configuration command is received, then a verification of the signature that it contains is made in a step 420.

[0096] For example, the configuration command is communicated in a message comprising a fingerprint of the content of the command, encrypted by a hashing mechanism, and comprising the signature of the command encrypted by a private key of the sender. The verification of the signature may typically comprise a decryption of the signature with a public key associated with the sender, so that the authentication of the message is done when the decrypted signature is identical to the fingerprint, we will then say that the signature is “valid”.

[0097] If the signature is not valid, then the configuration command is ignored and rejected 430, and the QPU returns to the waiting state 410. An error message may be generated. A record of the rejection may be recorded in a log.

[0098] For example, the signature is not valid if the message communicating the configuration command is not signed by the owner of the identified functionality. The command will also be rejected in a step 454 ([Fig.5]) if an actor orders a modification of a part of the script for which he does not have the appropriate rights.

[0099] If the signature is valid, then the fingerprint of the contents of the confi command guration is decoded in a step 440, for example first decrypted by the corresponding hashing mechanism, so as to obtain the command “in clear”, then interpreted, that is to say decoded and executed according to the language of the intended script.

[0100] If the command requires a modification of the script, then the modifications are made in the script in a script modification procedure 450, in particular capable of taking into account and respecting the rights of the different actors.

[0101] In this regard, reference is made to [Fig.5].

[0102] [Fig.5] illustrates an example method 500 for implementing the procedure for modifying the script 450.

[0103] The procedure for modifying the script 450 includes a comparison 453 between the modified data received 451 and the current script (before modification) 452, loaded from the SECMEM memory.

[0104] Firstly, if the differences identified in comparison 453 include a prohibited deletion of at least one line of script, then the modification command is rejected 454.

[0105] In a second step, the proofs of ownership of the IPS functionalities whose rights are modified are verified in a step 455. For example, it can be verified in this regard that a transfer of ownership of an IPS functionality is signed by the former owner and includes a public key of the new owner. For example, it can be verified that a transfer of usage rights of an IPS functionality is modified by the owner of the IPS functionality.

[0106] The identification of the IPS functionality can be done by an internal identifier of the system on chip SOC, such as a peripheral address or compartmentalization identifier "CID" (see the aforementioned publication).

[0107] In case of property violation, the modification command is rejected 454.

[0108] If the properties are respected and the new rights are valid, then a new script is generated and is saved in the SECMEM memory, during a step 456. It should be noted that the new script does not necessarily replace the old script, which can allow you to benefit from a history of modifications.

[0109] We refer again to [Fig.4].

[0110] At the end of the procedure for modifying the script 450, a response can be generated in a step 460, before returning to the state of waiting for a next command 410.

[0111] If the command includes a request to modify the script, then, if successful, the new modified script is sent in response 460 to the sender.

[0112] If the command includes a request to obtain the script(s), then the current script is sent in response 460, as well as possibly one or more previous scripts before modifications.

[0113] We now refer to Figures 6 to 9, illustrating a second embodiment and implementation for communicating the configuration command.

[0114] [Fig.6] illustrates the second implementation mode for the lifecycle management method in which the configuration commands are communicated in the form of CRTF, CRTF-CFG certificates, i.e. commands coded in a data chain having a pre-established structure, possibly in a human-understandable manner.

[0115] As in the first mode of implementation described above in relation to [Fig.2], the configuration commands CRTF, CRTF-CFG may include an identification of an access right, so as to allocate access authorizations to the identified functionality, or an identification of a property right, so as to allocate the identified functionality to a new owner.

[0116] In this regard, actor A may also provide actor B with the CRTF certificate enabling the transfer of ownership of at least one IPS functionality from actor A to actor B, such that the new owner B is the issuer of the CRTF command, without actor A needing to communicate with the system-on-chip.

[0117] Here too, the CRTF information is signed by actor A, and includes an identification of said at least one IPS functionality, an identification of said actor B, for example by communication of a public key of actor B, as well as optionally a validity period of this allocation.

[0118] In practice, in the second mode of implementation, the owners directory is for example contained in a one-time programming memory PRPOTPM ( [Fig.7]), that is to say for example a memory in which it is possible to add content, but it is impossible to modify the existing content. The configuration command is communicated in a CRTF certificate comprising a data string of the “command word” type, and the CRTF certificate can be recorded in the secure memory SECMEM. The management of the property comprises an interpretation of the CRTF certificate, for example by a control unit CONT, in order to execute said allocation of the rights of the identified functionality IPS, for example by adding a property line in the one-time programming memory PRPOTPM, or by recording access authorizations in the secure memory SECMEM.

[0119] [Fig.7] illustrates an example of the second embodiment of the corresponding MUOS property management circuit, i.e. in particular capable of processing configuration commands communicated in the form of certificates.

[0120] As in the first embodiment described above in relation to [Fig.3], the configuration commands CmdConfig are communicated by a user USR via the COMM interface and are processed by the authentication unit QPU, in particular in terms of authentication Auth and management of the keys KS, KMng.

[0121] Reference is made to Figures 8 and 9 described below concerning the implementation of the verification by the authentication unit QPU.

[0122] [Fig.8] illustrates a method 800 analogous to the method 400 described previously in relation to [Fig.4].

[0123] In particular, the method 800 comprises an initial state 810 substantially identical to the state 410 of the method 400; a step of signature verification 820 and of a possible rejection 830, substantially identical to the step of 420 and to the rejection 430 of the method 400; a step of command decoding 840 substantially identical to the step of 440 of the method 400; a procedure for modifying the configuration 850 in the event of a request to modify the configuration (in this respect, reference will be made to [Fig. 9]), a response containing the current state of the configuration generated in a step 860 substantially identical to the step of 460 of the method 400.

[0124] Furthermore, a procedure for registering an owner 870 in the PRPOTPM directory, in the event of a request for a change of owner. Indeed, the second embodiment and implementation includes a modification of the owners internally in the directory recorded in the PRPOTPM single-program memory; unlike the first embodiment and implementation where the directory is communicated in each script.

[0125] [Fig.9] illustrates an example method 900 for implementing the procedure of modification of configuration 850.

[0126] The configuration modification procedure 850 includes a verification 854 that the owner having signed the received data 852 (the data string encoding the command) corresponds to the last owner of the identified functionality, according to the contents of the PRPOTPM directory.

[0127] If the signature does not match the last known owner, then there is an ownership violation and the request to modify the control configuration is rejected 856.

[0128] If the signature matches the last known owner, then the received certificate is accepted, and the obsolete parts of the old certificates are discarded in a SECMEM memory writing step 858.

[0129] We now refer to figures 10 to 14 illustrating a practical example of the operations of the MUOS multi-actor property management circuit according to the first embodiment and the second embodiment (the elements belonging exclusively to the second embodiment PRPOTPM, CRTF-CFG, are drawn in broken lines).

[0130] For example, in the first embodiment and implementation, the SCRPT scripts are expressed in two parts: - a header defining the properties, i.e. the directory in which the pro- feature owners are listed, and - a script, or "program code", for configuring the IPS features, which, when executed by the CONT control circuit, determines the configuration of the IPS features of the system on chip SOC.

[0131] The header and the program code contain sequences of instructions, for example usually one instruction per line of the script. Each line of instruction being signed, the control circuit is configured to ensure, at the time of execution, that each instruction respects the rights of the different actors.

[0132] For example, a script template with language suitable for basic configuration commands is expressed below. The sentences noted between / * and * / are comments explaining the function of the corresponding instruction line.

[0133] SCRPT SignST> ST OWN IPN / *actor "ST" is the owner of the feature IPN* / SignST> User OWN IPI, IP2, IP3 / *The actor “User” is the owner of the IPI, IP2, IP3 functionalities* / SignUser> ENABLE IPI, IP3 / *command signed by the actor "User" activating the IPI, IP3 functionalities, i.e. gives the system authorization to access the IPI, IP3 functionalities* / SignUser> FUSE IPI, IP2, IP3 / *command signed by the actor "User" making the configuration of the IPI, IP2, IP3 functionalities irreversible, i.e. IPI, IP3 activated and IP2 not activated* / SignST> ENABLE IPN for 100 tick / *command signed by actor "ST" activating the IPN functionality for a duration of 100 cycles of a "tick" signal* /

[0134] Each instruction line includes: - a “SignST>”, “SignUser>” signature, allowing you to prove that the command is actually added by the owner of the configured functionality; - the command, such as an activation command “ENABLE”, deactivation command “DISABLE”, irreversibility of the configuration “FUSE”, definition of a property “OWN”; - the list of IPS features concerned; - optionally, an activation / deactivation condition can be added, notably a “for N tick” time condition.

[0135] The time condition will trigger an alarm and be executed when the always-on time stamping system sends an event. In other words, the allocation of the functionality rights can be scheduled at a future time.

[0136] For example, in the second embodiment and implementation, the system MUOS for performing configuration has two parts: - the PRPOTPM single-program memory, i.e. the directory in which the owners of the features are listed, and - CRFT-CFG configuration certificates, which determine how the system-on-chip SOC functionalities must be configured for the different actors.

[0137] The certificate being signed, the control circuit CONT capable of executing the configuration in practice, can verify the validity of the certificate.

[0138] Each CRTF certificate may for example have the structure of an instruction line described above, i.e. comprising: - a signature; - the order; - the list of IPS features concerned; - optionally, an activation / deactivation condition.

[0139] [Fig. 10] illustrates the case of a change of owner command for the IPI, IP2, IP3 functionalities.

[0140] In this example, the manufacturer actor “ST” initially holds ownership of all the IPI, IP2, IP3, IPN functionalities and transfers part of them (IP1-3) to a “User” actor.

[0141] In the first embodiment, this is expressed in the script header:

[0142] SCRPT SignST> ST OWN IPN SignST> User OWN IPI, IP2, IP3

[0143] In the second embodiment, this is expressed in the one-time programmable memory:

[0144] PRPOTPM PKst> Obi 111 / *each bit position 1111 corresponds to the IPN, IP3, IP2, IPI functionalities respectively* / PKuser > ObOl 11 / *the actor User is the owner of IP3, IP2, IPI, the old owner "1" of IPN is unchanged* /

[0145] The QPU authentication unit registers a new public key of the actor “User”, noted PKuser.

[0146] [Fig. 11] illustrates the case of a configuration command, in which the User actor activates the IPI, IP3 functionalities.

[0147] In the first embodiment, this is expressed in the SCRPT script by the instruction “SignUser> ENABLE IPI, IP3”

[0148] In the second embodiment, this is expressed in the part of the secure memory SECMEM containing the CRTF-CFG configuration certificates:

[0149] SIGN(SKuser, {IPI,0],{IP3,0}) / *an example of expression of the cor- respondent, signed with the secret key SKuser of the actor “User”* /

[0150] This is allowed because the User actor is the owner of the IPI, IP3 functionalities; so the accesses are allocated to the IPI, IP3 functionalities in the CFGBK configuration register “IPI: unlock”, “IP3: unlock”.

[0151] [Fig. 12] illustrates the case of a configuration command, in which the User actor wants to make the current configuration of the IPI, IP2, IP3 functionalities irreversible.

[0152] In the first embodiment, this is expressed in the SCRPT script by the instruction “SignUser> FUSE IPI, IP2, IP3”

[0153] In the second embodiment, this is expressed in the CRTF-CFG configuration certificates:

[0154] SIGN(SKuser, “freeze”, IP: 1,2,3) / *an example expression of the corresponding certificate, signed with the secret key SKuser of the actor “User”* /

[0155] This is allowed because the User actor is the owner of the IPI, IP3 functionalities; so accesses are allocated to the IPI, IP3 functionalities in the configuration register.

[0156] CFGBK IPI: unlock / fused IP2: lock / fused IP3: unlock / fused

[0157] [Fig. 13] illustrates the case of a configuration command, in which the User actor activates the IPI functionality for a limited period, for example one week.

[0158] In the first embodiment, this is expressed in the SCRPT script by the instruction “SignUser> IF t < t+1 week Then enable IPI”.

[0159] In the second embodiment, this is expressed in the CRTF-CFG configuration certificates:

[0160] SIGN(SKuser, {IPI, 0x240C8400}) / *an example expression of the corresponding certificate, signed with the secret key SKuser of the actor "User"* /

[0161] This is allowed because the User actor is the owner of the IPI functionality; so accesses are allocated to the IPI functionality in the configuration register CFGBK "IPI: unlock". In addition, an alarm wake-up time is programmed to one week after the current time t, "Alarm set to t+1 week", in the secure always-on timestamping circuit STS.

[0162] [Fig.14] illustrates the case of [Fig.13], after expiry of the limited duration of activation of the IPI functionality (for example one week later), i.e. at the time when the IPI functionality should no longer be activated.

[0163] At this moment, the alarm is generated and is communicated as an interrupt to the control circuit CONT, so as to generate a reallocation of accesses, henceforth unauthorized, to the IPI functionality in the CFGBK configuration register "IPI:lock".

[0164] There is no longer a planned wake-up in the secure time-stamping circuit always active STS "No alarm set" and the old CRTF-CFG configuration certificates are deleted from the secure memory SECMEM "None".

[0165] Finally, it will be noted that the examples described above in relation to figures 1 to 14, could be realized, entirely or partially, in several possible ways, for example: according to a completely hardware configuration, by a “hard-configured” circuit of the state machine type; according to a hardware configuration but including a hidden processor configured in software; according to a hybrid firmware and hardware configuration of the “secure enclave” type, or according to a completely software configuration, for example in a secure environment of a “TEE” processor (acronym for the English terms “Trusted Execution Environment”).

[0166] Furthermore, regardless of the chosen embodiment, the implementation of the allocations of the rights of the functionalities of the system on chip SOC is advantageously part of the startup process of the SOC system. Furthermore, also advantageously, said implementation of the allocations must be executed to allow access to the protected functionalities, so that otherwise the functionalities are not accessible and only the common part of the system on chip SOC is available.

Claims

Claims

1. A method for lifecycle management (LCMS) of a system-on-chip (SOC) having functionalities (IPS), comprising multi-actor ownership management (MUOS) listing owners of the functionalities in a directory, and comprising allocation of rights of a functionality (IPS) during the lifecycle of the system-on-chip, based on a configuration command (CmdConfig) comprising an identification of said functionality, an identification of an ownership or access right of the functionality, and a signature of the owner of this functionality (SignST>, SignUser>).

2. Method according to claim 1, wherein said directory is contained in a programming script (SCRPT) recorded in a secure memory (SECMEM), and said configuration command (CmdConfig) is communicated in a modified version of said script, the method comprising an execution (CONT) of the script in order to carry out said allocation of the rights of the identified functionality.

3. Method according to claim 1, wherein said directory is contained in a one-time programmable memory (PRPOTPM), and said configuration command (CmdConfig) is communicated in a certificate (CRTF-CFG) comprising a data string and recorded in a secure memory (SECMEM), the method comprising an interpretation (CONT) of the certificate in order to carry out said allocation of the rights of the identified functionality.

4. Method according to one of claims 1 to 3, in which, if said configuration command (CmdConfig) comprises the identification of an access right, then the management of the property comprises an allocation of access authorizations to the identified functionality.

5. Method according to one of claims 1 to 4, in which, if said configuration command (CmdConfig) comprises the identification of the right of ownership of said functionality to an identified actor, then the management of the property comprises an allocation to the identified actor of the ownership of the identified functionality.

6. A method according to one of claims 1 to 5, wherein said ownership management comprises verifying that said configuration command signature (CmdConfig) authenticates the last known owner in said directory for the identified functionality.

7. Method according to one of claims 1 to 6, in which the system on chip further comprises a system (RIF) authorizing and prohibiting access to functionalities (IPS), depending on the content of a configuration register (CFGBK), said property management comprising programming of the configuration register (CFGBK) to allocate said functionality rights.

8. Method according to claim 7, comprising an irreversible recording (fused) of a content of the configuration register (CFGBK), if said configuration command further defines an irreversible character of the allocation.

9. Method according to one of claims 7 or 8, wherein said allocation of functionality rights is carried out at the start of the system on chip (SOC), in cooperation with said system (RIF) authorizing and prohibiting access to the functionality, so that all access is prohibited before said allocation.

10. Method according to one of claims 1 to 9, further comprising an always active generation of a timestamp (STS), in which said management of the property comprises a programming at a future time (t+1 week), determined by said timestamp, of said allocation of the rights of the functionality.

11. System on chip (SOC), having functionalities (IPS), and comprising a lifecycle management device (LCMS) incorporating a multi-actor ownership management circuit (MUOS) configured to list owners of the functionalities in a directory, and to allocate rights of a functionality (IPS) during the lifecycle of the system on chip (SOC), according to a configuration command comprising an identification of said functionality (IP1-IPN), an identification of an ownership or access right of the functionality, and a signature of the owner of this functionality (SignST>, SignUser>).

12. System on chip according to claim 11, wherein said directory is contained in a programming script (SCRPT) stored in a secure memory (SECMEM), and said configuration command is communicated in a modified version of said script (SCRPT), said property management circuit (MUOS) comprising a control unit (CONT) configured to execute said script (SCRPT) in order to carry out said allocation of the rights of the identified functionality (IPI, IPN).

13. The system-on-chip of claim 11, wherein said directory is contained in a one-time programmable memory (PRPOTPM), and said configuration command is communicated in a certificate (CRTF) comprising a data string and recorded in a secure memory (SECMEM), said property management circuit (MUOS) comprising a control unit (CONT) configured to interpret said certificate (CRTF) in order to carry out said allocation of the rights of the identified functionality (IPI, IPN).

14. System on chip according to one of claims 11 to 13, wherein the property management circuit (MUOS) is configured to allocate access authorizations to the identified functionality (IPI-IPN), if said configuration command comprises the identification of an access right.

15. System on chip according to one of claims 11 to 14, wherein the property management circuit (MUOS) is configured to allocate to the identified actor (A, B) the property (PRP) of the identified functionality (IPI-IPN), if said configuration command comprises the identification of the right of ownership of said functionality to an identified actor (A, B).

16. System on chip according to one of claims 11 to 15, wherein said ownership management circuit (MUOS) comprises an authentication unit (QPU) configured to verify that said configuration command signature (PKA) authenticates the last known owner (A) in said directory for the identified functionality.

17. System on chip according to one of claims 11 to 16, further comprising a system (RIF) configured to authorize and prohibit access to the functionalities of the system on chip (SOC), according to the content of a configuration register (CFGBK), said property management circuit (MUOS) being configured to program the configuration register (CFGBK) in order to allocate said rights of the functionality.

18. System on chip according to claim 17, wherein said configuration register (CFGBK) is capable of recording a content irreversibly (FUS), if said configuration command further defines an irreversible character of the allocation.

19. System on chip according to one of claims 17 or 18, in which the property management circuit (MUOS) is configured to carry out said allocation of the rights of the functionalities at the start of the system on chip (SOC), in cooperation with said system configured to authorize and prohibit accesses to the functionalities of the system on chip (SOC) so that all access is prohibited before said allocation.

20. System on chip according to one of claims 11 to 19, further comprising a secure always-on timestamping circuit (STS), in which said property management circuit (MUOS) is configured to schedule at a future time (t+1 week), determined by said timestamping circuit (STS), said allocation of the rights of said functionality.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • A method for managing the operation of a system-on-chip, such as a microcontroller, and the corresponding system-on-chip.

    FR3103586A1

  • System and method for managing electronic assets

    US20110010720A1

  • Secure feature and key management in integrated circuits

    US20140044265A1

  • Trusted Key Provisioning Based on Device Specific Secrets

    US20220075863A1