Device, software verification method, and program

By updating firmware with new electronic signatures and storing verification records, the mechanism strengthens software verification in image forming devices, effectively preventing unauthorized software execution and ensuring secure operation.

JP2024167591APending Publication Date: 2024-12-04RICOH CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2023083773
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-05-22
Publication Date
2024-12-04

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing software verification methods are vulnerable to tampering, particularly when devices in the market have firmware with electronic signatures using outdated or insecure signature methods, making it difficult to detect and prevent unauthorized software execution.

Method used

Implement a mechanism in image forming devices to update firmware with new electronic signatures during software updates, storing verification records in non-volatile memory to ensure that only verified, secure signatures are used for execution, thereby preventing tampering.

Benefits of technology

Enhances the ability to detect and prevent software tampering by ensuring that only securely signed firmware is executed, even in devices with mixed signature methods, thus maintaining device integrity and security.

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Abstract

To detect software falsification by a signature method with low vulnerability.SOLUTION: A device where software is installed comprises a software signature verification unit which verifies an electronic signature attached to the software using a signature method which has been recorded with the update of the software and is newer than before the update of the software, and a start processing unit which starts the software when the software signature verification unit successfully verifies the electronic signature.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 11
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present invention relates to an apparatus, a software verification method, and a program. [Background technology]

[0002] Devices such as image forming devices run various types of software. To prevent tampered software from executing unexpected processes, the device detects tampering by verifying the electronic signature attached to the software when the software is started. This makes it possible to prevent software that is not certified by the manufacturer from being run on the device.

[0003] Similar tamper detection is also performed when updating software. A technology for ensuring the integrity and authenticity of files when updating software is known (see, for example, Patent Document 1). Patent Document 1 discloses a technology that has a first function for ensuring the integrity and authenticity of system update information when updating a system, and a second function for ensuring the integrity and authenticity of a startup file executed during system startup, and that updates the system using the first function, and then starts the system using the second function. Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0004] However, in conventional technology, there is a risk that software tampering detection will be performed using a signature method with vulnerabilities. A device may be equipped with multiple pieces of software, and when the device is released to the market, there is a possibility that a digital signature using a signature method with vulnerabilities will be attached to the software. For this reason, the device must be able to verify digital signatures with vulnerabilities as well. However, if verification using a signature method with vulnerabilities is unconditionally permitted, there is a risk that software tampering will be made possible or that tampering detection will become difficult.

[0005] The present invention provides a technology for detecting software tampering using a signature method with low vulnerability. [Means for solving the problem]

[0006] In view of the above problems, the present invention provides a device in which software is installed, comprising a software signature verification unit that verifies an electronic signature attached to the software using a signature method that is newer than the signature method before the software was updated and that is recorded together with the software update, and a startup processing unit that starts the software if the software signature verification unit successfully verifies the electronic signature. Effect of the Invention

[0007] Software tampering can be detected using a signature method with fewer vulnerabilities. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0008] [Figure 1] FIG. 2 is an example of a system configuration diagram of the device system. [Diagram 2] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a hardware configuration of an image forming apparatus. [Diagram 3] FIG. 2 is an example of a functional block diagram illustrating functions that operate at the time of start-up of the image forming apparatus. [Figure 4] FIG. 2 is an example of a functional block diagram illustrating functions that operate when updating firmware in a block form. [Diagram 5] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a signature method used to generate and verify digital signatures. [Figure 6] 11 is a diagram illustrating an example of the structure of firmware information contained in one piece of firmware. FIG. [Figure 7] FIG. 10 is a diagram illustrating an example of a firmware update table. [Figure 8] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a firmware package. [Figure 9] 1 is a diagram illustrating a digital signature and a verification method using the digital signature. [Figure 10]11 is an example of a flowchart for determining whether to execute normal processing or firmware update processing. [Figure 11] FIG. 13 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a process for verifying a digital signature of firmware during normal processing. [Figure 12] FIG. 11 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a firmware update process. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0009] DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS An image forming apparatus and a software verification method performed by the image forming apparatus will be described below with reference to the drawings as an example of an embodiment of the present invention.

[0010] <Firmware update overview> First, public key cryptography is used to generate and verify electronic signatures. Public key cryptography is a method that uses separate keys for encryption and decryption. The strength of public key cryptography is determined by the signature method (encryption key size (key length), encryption algorithm, and digest algorithm). Due to newly discovered vulnerabilities in encryption algorithms and digest algorithms, and improvements in CPU power for brute force attacks, manufacturers of image forming devices must review their signature methods from time to time.

[0011] If the image forming apparatus for which the signature method is to be reviewed is an image forming apparatus under development, a public key cryptosystem using a new signature method is usually adopted for verifying all firmware of the image forming apparatus under development. In contrast, the signature method may be reviewed for an image forming apparatus that has already been released on the market. For a model that has been in operation on the market for a long time, review of the signature method is essential. Reviewing the signature method for a model that has been released on the market means adopting a new signature algorithm or digest algorithm, or increasing the size of the encryption key, and means performing an electronic signature using a signature method for which no vulnerability has been found. In this embodiment, a review of the signature method for an image forming apparatus that has been released on the market will be described.

[0012] Generally, an image forming device is equipped with and runs multiple pieces of firmware. For example, if an image forming device has multiple controllers (such as control boards), the controllers execute the respective firmware. Also, a single controller may be equipped with multiple pieces of firmware. When an image forming device has been released on the market, some of the multiple pieces of firmware may have digital signatures attached using an unrevised (potentially vulnerable) signature method. This can occur when transactions with the company that developed the firmware are lost, or when it is difficult to update all firmware at the same time.

[0013] Therefore, it may be unavoidable that firmware to which electronic signatures based on the pre-revision signature method and firmware to which electronic signatures based on the revised signature method are attached will be mixed in a single image forming apparatus.

[0014] It is assumed that an image forming apparatus contains a mixture of firmware to which electronic signatures based on the signature method before revision and firmware to which electronic signatures based on the signature method after revision are attached, as described below. -Firmware A with a digital signature that is not vulnerable Firmware B with a potentially vulnerable digital signature If the image forming apparatus verifies a non-vulnerable electronic signature for firmware A, it becomes difficult to verify firmware B, and if it verifies a potentially vulnerable electronic signature for firmware B, the firmware may be tampered with. In other words, unconditionally permitting the verification of an electronic signature using a potentially vulnerable signature method for firmware B reduces the effectiveness of the review.

[0015] Therefore, in this embodiment, the image forming apparatus verifies the electronic signature as follows. It is assumed that the image forming apparatus has been released to the market and has been verifying the electronic signature using the signature method before the revision. When the firmware is updated, the image forming apparatus becomes compatible with the new signature method as follows.

[0016] (1) A new digital signature using the revised signature method will be added to the new firmware in addition to the old digital signature using the signature method before the revision that is already attached to the firmware. The old digital signature will remain the same and will be attached to the firmware.

[0017] (2) However, in the case of firmware that is not updated, only the old electronic signature using the signature method before the revision will be attached.

[0018] (3) The image forming device stores in a non-volatile memory, when the firmware is updated, a record of verification using a new electronic signature. If the firmware is not updated, the record of verification using an old electronic signature using the signature method before the revision is stored.

[0019] (4) When the image forming device executes the firmware, if there is a record of verification using the revised signature method in the non-volatile memory, the image forming device verifies the electronic signature created using this signature method, and if there is a record of verification using the signature method before the revision, the image forming device verifies the electronic signature created using this signature method.

[0020] In this way, the image forming device records the verification results indicating which signature method was used for each piece of firmware. When executing firmware, the image forming device can verify each piece of firmware with the latest digital signature by referring to the verification results. This makes it easier for the image forming device to detect firmware tampering.

[0021] The following will supplement the differences between the present embodiment and comparative technologies (not necessarily prior art) that may be compared with it. As described above, it is difficult to replace all firmware at once for an image forming device that has already been released on the market, so it is necessary to allow pre-review and post-review signature methods to coexist in one image forming device. However, as described for firmware B, this means that firmware B, to which a digital signature based on the pre-review signature method is attached, may be tampered with during an update. If the digital signature based on the pre-review signature method is verified even after an update, this leads to a vulnerability in which unauthorized firmware is executed.

[0022] In contrast, in this embodiment, the signature method that was successfully verified when each firmware was updated is stored in non-volatile memory, and a mechanism is created in which, once firmware has been verified with an electronic signature using the revised signature method, verification is not performed using the electronic signature before the revision, making it difficult to execute unauthorized firmware.

[0023] <Terminology> Software is a term that contrasts with physical hardware and refers to a program installed in a computer. In this embodiment, the term "firmware" is used as an example of software.

[0024] Firmware mainly refers to a program or software for controlling hardware, but is not limited to these and may include applications installed on devices, etc. Examples of firmware that controls hardware include programs that control hardware such as printers, scanners, and fax machines.

[0025] A signature method is a method for creating and verifying an electronic signature. The signature method may refer to one or more of the following: a signature algorithm, a digest algorithm, and a cryptographic key size.

[0026] A digital signature is information that certifies "who" created an electronic document (firmware in this embodiment) and makes it possible to detect whether the electronic document has been tampered with.

[0027] A software update refers to replacing old software with new software in order to add functions, change specifications, resolve defects, etc. Software updates are also called version upgrades.

[0028] Verification of an electronic signature refers to checking the validity of the electronic signature. For example, verification can refer to whether electronic data to which the electronic signature is attached has not been tampered with, whether the electronic certificate is valid, etc.

[0029] <System configuration example> 1 is an example of a system configuration diagram of an equipment system 100. The equipment system 100 includes an information processing system 40 and an image forming apparatus 20 that are communicatively connected via a network N.

[0030] The network N may be a LAN constructed in a facility where the image forming apparatus 20 is installed, a WAN having multiple LANs, the Internet, or the like. It is sufficient that the image forming apparatus 20 and the information processing system 40 can communicate with each other. The network N may be constructed either wired or wirelessly, or may be a combination of wired and wireless. The image forming apparatus 20 may also connect to a public line to communicate with the information processing system 40. A public line is a communication line connecting bases that is physically shared and used by unspecified users. For example, a mobile phone network can be mentioned.

[0031] The information processing system 40 is, for example, one or more information processing devices on the Internet. The information processing system 40 on the network may be called a server. A server is a computer or software that performs the function of providing information and processing results in response to requests from clients. The information processing system 40 may also be compatible with cloud computing. Cloud computing refers to a form of utilization in which resources on a network are utilized without awareness of specific hardware resources.

[0032] The information processing system 40 notifies the image forming apparatus 20 that new firmware is available. In response to this notification, the image forming apparatus 20 downloads the new firmware and updates the firmware. Note that a customer engineer or the like may update the firmware manually. The information processing system 40 may exist on the Internet or on-premise. The information processing system 40 may be called a cloud server, a server system, or the like.

[0033] The image forming device 20 is an example of a device. The image forming device 20 is also called a printer 104 or a printing device. The image forming device 20 may have a copy function, a scanner function, a FAX function, etc. The image forming device 20 may be a multifunction device or an MFP (Multi-function Peripheral / Product / Printer) having multiple functions. The image forming device 20 may also be called an image processing device, a copier, etc.

[0034] In addition, the image forming device 20 is merely one example of a device, and may be, for example, a projector, a HUD (Head Up Display) device, an electronic whiteboard, digital signage, etc. In the case of these devices, the image forming device 20 may output (display, play, etc.) data such as video, documents, and music acquired from the network N.

[0035] In addition, the image forming apparatus 20 is not limited to the printer 104, etc., as long as it executes firmware and is a device equipped with a communication function. The image forming apparatus 20 may be, for example, an industrial machine, an imaging device, a sound collecting device, a medical device, an autonomous mobile robot, a network home appliance, an automobile (Connected Car), a notebook PC (Personal Computer), a mobile phone, a smartphone, a tablet terminal, a game machine, a PDA (Personal Digital Assistant), a digital camera, a wearable PC, or a desktop PC.

[0036] <Hardware configuration example> Fig. 2 shows an example of the hardware configuration of the image forming apparatus 20. The image forming apparatus 20 has a NIC 102 (Network Interface Card), a scanner 103, a printer 104, an operation unit 105, a ROM 106, a RAM 107, and an eMMC (embedded Multi Media Card) 108, all of which are connected to a CPU 101. Note that Fig. 2 shows the main configuration of the image forming apparatus 20, and the image forming apparatus 20 may have hardware blocks other than those shown in the figure.

[0037] The CPU 101 is a control unit that performs overall control of the image forming apparatus 20. The NIC 102 is an interface for performing data communication using a network N. Firmware can be updated either via the network or via a memory card.

[0038] The scanner 103 is an image reading device included in the image forming apparatus 20, and optically reads an original to generate image data. The printer 104 is a printing unit that forms the image data on paper.

[0039] The operation unit 105 provides a user interface for the user to operate the image forming apparatus 20. The operation unit 105 has several hard keys and a touch panel, and the touch panel accepts operations on the displayed screen. The operation unit 105 also has a slot for inserting a memory card such as an SD card (registered trademark) or a USB memory. Via this slot, the image forming apparatus 20 can rewrite the firmware in the image forming apparatus 20 with firmware stored in the memory card.

[0040] ROM 106 stores a program that is executed during the initial operation of image forming apparatus 20. This program is executed within ROM 106 (or may be executed after being loaded into RAM 107). eMMC 108 stores a program that is started after the initial operation. eMMC 108 is a non-volatile memory that retains information even when the power is off. Various types of firmware are stored in eMMC 108. At the time of startup, the firmware in eMMC 108 is loaded into RAM 107. Note that RAM 107 may be a normal volatile memory such as dynamic RAM.

[0041] <About the function> Next, the start-up functions of the image forming apparatus 20 will be described with reference to Fig. 3. Fig. 3 is a functional block diagram showing functions that operate when the image forming apparatus 20 is started up. Starting up the image forming apparatus 20 refers to turning on the power or returning from a sleep state, etc. The image forming apparatus 20 executes (starts up) firmware when started up.

[0042] The image forming apparatus 20 has a boot processing unit 21 and a software signature verification unit 22. Each of these functional units of the image forming apparatus 20 is a function or means realized by any of the components shown in Fig. 2 operating in response to an instruction from the CPU 101 in accordance with a program loaded from the eMMC 108 or ROM 106 to the RAM 107. These programs may be firmware.

[0043] When the image forming apparatus 20 is started up, the start-up processing unit 21 reads out the firmware stored in the eMMC 108. The start-up processing unit 21 also executes a program for implementing the software signature verification unit 22 stored in the eMMC 108 or the ROM 106. The software signature verification unit 22 determines a signature method based on the verification results stored in a firmware update table, which will be described later, and verifies the electronic signature attached to the firmware. If the verification is successful, the start-up processing unit 21 writes the firmware into the RAM 107 and executes it.

[0044] The eMMC 108 has a firmware storage unit 31, a firmware information storage unit 32, and a firmware update table storage unit 33. The firmware storage unit 31 stores a plurality of firmware. The firmware information storage unit 32 stores firmware information. The firmware information will be described in FIG. 6. The firmware update table storage unit 33 stores a firmware update table. The firmware update table will be described in FIG. 7.

[0045] 4 is a functional block diagram showing functions that operate when updating firmware. Image forming apparatus 20 has software receiving unit 23, software signature verification unit 22, and software update unit 24. Each of these functional units of image forming apparatus 20 is a function or means realized by any of the components shown in FIG. 2 operating according to an instruction from CPU 101 in accordance with a program loaded from eMMC 108 or ROM 106 to RAM 107. These programs may be firmware. Information held by eMMC 108 may be the same as that in FIG. 3.

[0046] The software receiving unit 23 receives a firmware package transmitted from a memory card slot in the operation unit 105 or via the network N. The firmware package will be described with reference to FIG.

[0047] When updating firmware, the software signature verification unit 22 verifies the electronic signature attached to the firmware using a signature method newer than the signature method stored in the firmware update table.

[0048] If the verification is successful, the software update unit 24 stores the firmware received by the software receiving unit 23 in the firmware storage unit 31 of the eMMC 108. If the verification is successful, the software update unit 24 stores the firmware information attached to the new firmware in the firmware information storage unit 32. If the verification is successful, the software update unit 24 stores the verification result in the firmware update table.

[0049] <Signing method> Next, a signature method will be described with reference to Fig. 5. Fig. 5 shows an example of a signature method used for generating and verifying an electronic signature. In Fig. 5, a signature algorithm, a cryptographic key size, and a digest algorithm are associated with a signature ID. One or more of the signature algorithm, the cryptographic key size, and the digest algorithm constitutes the signature method.

[0050] A signature ID is information that uniquely identifies a signature method. An ID is a combination of a name, code, character string, number, etc. that is used to uniquely distinguish a specific object from multiple objects.

[0051] The size of the encryption key is the number of bits in the encryption key. The size of the encryption key is also called the key length. The larger the encryption key size, the more combinations of key types there are, and the longer it takes to decrypt (the stronger the encryption).

[0052] - An encryption algorithm refers to the procedures and rules for encryption processing. The signature algorithm RSA has traditionally been widely used. RSA's vulnerabilities have been addressed by increasing the size of the encryption key (e.g. to address the Year 2010 problem). However, in the future, further increasing the size of the encryption key will affect verification time, so an encryption algorithm that uses elliptic curve encryption called ECDSA is coming into use. ECDSA can achieve the same equivalent security with a smaller key length than RSA.

[0053] The digest algorithm is an algorithm that creates a summary of the firmware. A hash function is known as a digest algorithm. When creating an electronic signature, the electronic signature is not created for the entire firmware, but for a digest (summary) of the firmware. One example of a digest is a hash value. It is difficult to create an electronic signature for the entirety of a large file, so the image forming apparatus 20 generally signs the digest (summary). As vulnerabilities have been pointed out over time, digest algorithms have also been replaced (MD5 → SHA1 → SHA256, etc.).

[0054] <Information contained in firmware> 6 is a diagram showing the structure of firmware information contained in one piece of firmware. One piece of firmware includes a firmware name, an executable program, and a firmware signature. The firmware name may be the name or identification information of the firmware. The executable program is firmware (instructions or code). The data structure in FIG. 6 is common to firmware information related to new firmware and firmware information stored in the firmware information storage unit 32.

[0055] In addition, multiple firmware signatures are attached to one firmware. Firmware signatures are: ·Signature ID Signature Algorithm Name Encryption key size Digest algorithm name Signature value (digital signature) Public Key It has the following attributes.

[0056] A signature ID is identification information that uniquely identifies a combination of signature algorithm name, key length, and digest algorithm name. Signature IDs are assigned in ascending order (for example, starting from 1). A signature ID is assigned each time a firmware signature is added in which the signature algorithm, encryption key size, or digest algorithm has been changed. By sorting the signature IDs from largest to smallest, the order from older firmware signatures to newer firmware signatures can be determined. A signature ID is newness information that indicates how new or old a firmware signature is.

[0057] Although it is possible to verify one firmware using any of a plurality of firmware signatures associated with the firmware, in this embodiment, the image forming apparatus restricts verification using firmware signatures older than the firmware signature recorded in the firmware update table, thereby more firmly preventing firmware tampering.

[0058] As time passes, vulnerabilities are identified in the signature algorithm, encryption key size, or digest algorithm. Therefore, the manufacturer of the image forming device 20 must review the signature algorithm, key length, and digest algorithm that are free of vulnerabilities from time to time. Verifying an electronic signature created with a revised signing method will address new vulnerabilities.

[0059] The public key is a key that pairs with the encryption key that encrypts the electronic signature, and the electronic signature encrypted with the encryption key can only be decrypted with this public key.

[0060] <Firmware Update Table> Fig. 7 shows a schematic diagram of the firmware update table. The firmware update table has firmware signature verification results for each firmware. The firmware signature verification results record the verification results of the electronic signature verified when updating the firmware. The firmware signature verification results have the firmware name and the signature ID. The signature ID indicates the identification information of the signature algorithm used to verify the electronic signature when updating this firmware.

[0061] The firmware update table is stored in a non-volatile memory such as the eMMC 108. The firmware update table is referred to in order to determine which of a plurality of electronic signatures attached to the firmware is to be used for verification before the software signature verification unit 22 executes the firmware. The firmware update table is also referred to in order to restrict the software signature verification unit 22 from verifying the electronic signature with a signature method that is weaker (has a smaller signature ID) than the signature method used for verification in the previous update when updating the firmware.

[0062] <Firmware package> 8 shows a schematic diagram of a firmware package. One firmware package is a bundle of one or more pieces of firmware. The firmware package includes the firmware itself. The firmware package also includes a signature ID, a signature algorithm name, a key length, a digest algorithm, an electronic signature, and a public key. In other words, the firmware package includes firmware information stored in the firmware information storage unit 32.

[0063] <About electronic signatures> A verification method based on a public key cryptosystem and performed by software signature verification unit 22 will be described with reference to Fig. 9. Fig. 9 is a diagram for explaining an electronic signature and a verification method using the electronic signature. In Fig. 9, it is assumed that firmware instructions and codes are to be authenticated. Note that the attachment of the electronic signature to the firmware is performed in advance in a secure environment (referred to as an electronic signature device).

[0064] (1) The digital signature device calculates a hash value (digest) of the firmware instructions and code.

[0065] (2) The digital signature device encrypts the hash value with a private key 53 that is preset in the digital signature device. The encrypted hash value is called a digital signature 54.

[0066] (3) The digital signature 54 is attached to the firmware 51 to be verified.

[0067] (4) The digital signature device attaches digital certificate 52 of a trusted authentication system to firmware 51. Digital certificate 52 includes public key 52a of image forming device 20 and digital signature 52b of the authentication system. Public key 52a is paired with private key 53, and information encrypted with private key 53 can only be decrypted with public key 52a of the pair. Digital signature 52b of the authentication system is used to certify that digital certificate 52 has been attached by the authentication system.

[0068] The flow of verifying firmware 51 to which thus created digital signature 54 and digital certificate 52 are attached is as follows.

[0069] (5) The software signature verification unit 22 calculates a hash value of the firmware.

[0070] (6) The software signature verification unit 22 decrypts the digital signature 54 attached to the firmware 51 using the public key 52a to return it to the original hash value.

[0071] (7) If the hash value of (5) matches the hash value of (6), the software signature verification unit 22 can determine that the firmware has not been tampered with (verification successful) and that the firmware was issued by the manufacturer, etc., of the image forming device 20.

[0072] <Action or Processing> Next, the operation or processing performed by the image forming apparatus 20 will be described with reference to Fig. 10 to Fig. 12. Fig. 10 is a flow chart for determining whether to execute normal processing or firmware update processing. The processing in Fig. 10 is executed repeatedly, for example, while the image forming apparatus 20 is running.

[0073] First, when the image forming apparatus 20 starts up, the software signature verification unit 22 sets a flag called verupmode to FALSE (S11). verupmode is a flag indicating whether a firmware upgrade is necessary or not, with FALSE indicating that a firmware upgrade is not necessary and TRUE indicating that a firmware upgrade is necessary.

[0074] When the image forming apparatus 20 communicates with the information processing system 40, the information processing system 40 notifies the image forming apparatus 20 that new firmware is available. Alternatively, the availability of new firmware (update) is instructed by a user operation from the operation unit 105 of the image forming apparatus 20. As a result, verupmode=TRUE is set in the RAM 107 of the image forming apparatus 20.

[0075] While verupmode=FALSE (No in S12), the image forming apparatus 20 executes normal processing (S13). In the normal processing, each firmware is verified. Details of the normal processing will be described with reference to FIG. 11. The normal processing is processing that the image forming apparatus 20 normally performs, such as printing, scanning, copying, and sending and receiving faxes. In this way, the image forming apparatus 20 repeats the normal processing while deciding whether or not to start updating the firmware.

[0076] If verupmode=TRUE (Yes in S12), the software signature verification unit 22 proceeds to firmware update (upgrade) processing (S14). Details of the update processing will be described with reference to FIG.

[0077] <<Verification of firmware digital signature during normal processing>> Fig. 11 is a flow chart for explaining the process of verifying the digital signature of the firmware during normal processing. The process in Fig. 11 is a process in which the image forming apparatus 20, which has been started by, for example, being powered on, verifies the digital signature of the firmware and executes the firmware.

[0078] The startup processing unit 21 verifies the digital signatures of all firmware (S21). The term "all firmware" refers to firmware that has already been installed in the image forming apparatus 20, or important firmware that is determined to require verification.

[0079] The start processing unit 21 designates firmware to the software signature verification unit 22 and requests verification of the digital signature of the firmware. The software signature verification unit 22 verifies the digital signature of the firmware using the signature method described in the firmware update table (S22). That is, the software signature verification unit 22 obtains the signature ID associated with the firmware to be started in the firmware update table, and verifies the digital signature attached to the firmware using the signature method specified by this signature ID. As will be described later, the signature ID of the signature method verified when the firmware was updated is set in the firmware update table. Therefore, the signature method used for verification in step S22 is a signature method recorded together with the software update and newer than the signature method before the software update.

[0080] If the verification is successful (Yes in S23), the startup processing unit 21 performs processing to start up the firmware (S24).

[0081] The started firmware then executes processing according to the firmware (S25).

[0082] The firmware update table records a signature method newer than that used before the firmware update. When the firmware is executed, verification using a firmware signature older than the firmware signature recorded in the firmware update table is restricted, so that tampering with the firmware can be more firmly prevented.

[0083] <<Verification of digital signature when updating firmware>> 12 is a flow chart for explaining the firmware update process. The firmware update is performed if the firmware verification is successful.

[0084] First, the software receiving unit 23 receives a firmware package and stores the new firmware and the electronic signature in the RAM 107 (S31). The firmware package may include multiple pieces of firmware. Therefore, the software receiving unit 23 receives the new software together with multiple signature methods and multiple electronic signatures.

[0085] The software signature verification unit 22 performs the digital signature verification process for each new firmware (S32).

[0086] The software signature verification unit 22 acquires the signature ID from the firmware information associated with the new firmware. The software signature verification unit 22 determines the signature algorithm specified by the signature ID, starting from the newest signature ID (S33). In other words, the software signature verification unit 22 determines the signature method for verifying the electronic signature attached to the new software, starting from the newest signature method (larger signature ID) to the oldest signature method (smaller signature ID).

[0087] Next, the software signature verification unit 22 judges whether it supports the signature method determined in step S33 (S34). That is, since the new signature method requires a new verification method capable of verifying the electronic signature created by this signature method, the software signature verification unit 22 judges whether verification is possible by the signature method determined in step S33. This judgment is possible, for example, by the software signature verification unit 22 holding the corresponding signature ID. Note that the verification algorithm (software signature verification unit 22) that the image forming apparatus 20 can support can also be rewritten as firmware. Since the new software signature verification unit 22 is usually provided together with the new firmware, it is preferable that the new software signature verification unit 22 is installed before the process of FIG. 12 (before the firmware is updated). Therefore, it is assumed that the software signature verification unit 22 supports at least a part of the signature method determined based on the signature ID of the firmware information associated with the new firmware.

[0088] Furthermore, since it is preferable for the image forming apparatus 20 to verify the electronic signature using the newest signature method, the software signature verification unit 22 normally determines that the newest signature ID in the firmware information associated with the new firmware corresponds to the newest signature method. Therefore, if the verification is successful, the newest signature method in the firmware information associated with the new firmware is adopted. In step S39, which will be described later, the signature ID of the newest signature method is stored in the firmware update table storage unit 33.

[0089] If the determination in step S34 is Yes, software signature verification unit 22 determines whether the signature algorithm determined in step S33 is newer than the signature algorithm recorded in the firmware update table (S35). The firmware update table records the signature method used to verify the electronic signature attached to the firmware the previous time the firmware was updated.

[0090] The determination in step S35 enables software signature verification unit 22 not to use a signature method weaker than the signature method used for signature verification during the previous firmware update.

[0091] If the determination in step S35 is No, the process returns to step S33, and software signature verification unit 22 determines the next new signature algorithm. If the determination in step S34 or S35 is No for all signature algorithms associated with the new firmware, the firmware is not updated.

[0092] If the determination in step S35 is Yes, the software signature verification unit 22 verifies the electronic signature attached to the new firmware using the signature method determined in step S33 (S36).

[0093] Only when the verification is successful (Yes in S37), the software update unit 24 writes the firmware stored in the RAM 107 to the eMMC 108 (S38). The software update unit 24 also writes the firmware information to the firmware information storage unit 32. That is, a signature method related to the electronic signature attached to the new firmware is added.

[0094] Furthermore, the software update unit 24 records the successfully verified signature method in the firmware update table in association with the new firmware (S39). As a result, the next time the startup processing unit 21 starts up the new firmware, it can verify the electronic signature using this new signature method. Furthermore, the next time the firmware is updated, it will be possible to update to firmware that can be verified using a signature method newer than the signature method recorded in the firmware update table this time.

[0095] <Major Effects> In this embodiment, by storing in a non-volatile memory the signature method (signature algorithm or encryption key size) that was successfully verified when updating each piece of firmware, if the firmware has once been verified with a revised electronic signature, verification with the pre-review electronic signature can be prevented. This makes it possible to restrict the execution of unauthorized firmware. When updating firmware, a signature method newer than the signature method recorded in the firmware update table is adopted, so that the software signature verification unit 22 can avoid using a signature method weaker than the signature method used for verification during the previous firmware update. When executing firmware, verification with a firmware signature older than the firmware signature recorded in the firmware update table is restricted, so that tampering with the firmware can be more firmly suppressed.

[0096] <Other application examples> The above describes the best mode for carrying out the present invention using examples, but the present invention is not limited to these examples in any way, and various modifications and substitutions can be made within the scope that does not deviate from the gist of the present invention.

[0097] In addition, the configuration examples in Figures 3, 4, etc. are divided according to main functions to make it easier to understand the processing by the image forming apparatus 20. The present invention is not limited by the manner in which the processing units are divided or the names of the processing units. The processing of the image forming apparatus 20 can be divided into more processing units depending on the processing contents. Also, it can be divided so that one processing unit includes more processes.

[0098] Each function of the above-described embodiments can be realized by one or more processing circuits. Here, the term "processing circuit" in this specification includes a processor programmed to execute each function by software, such as a processor implemented by an electronic circuit, and a device such as an ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit), a DSP (digital signal processor), an FPGA (field programmable gate array), or a conventional circuit module designed to execute each function described above. [Explanation of symbols]

[0099] 20 Image forming device 40 Information Processing Systems 100 Equipment Systems [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]

[0100] [Patent Document 1] JP 2021-077971 A

Claims

1. A device on which the software is installed, a software signature verification unit that verifies a digital signature attached to the software by using a signature method that is newer than the signature method before the software update and that is recorded together with the software update; a start-up processing unit that starts the software when the software signature verification unit has successfully verified the electronic signature; Equipment having the above configuration.

2. a storage unit that, when updating the software, stores a signature method updated to a newer signature method than that before the software update in association with the software; The device according to claim 1 , wherein the software signature verification unit verifies the digital signature attached to the software by using the new signature method stored in the storage unit.

3. a software receiving unit that receives new software together with a plurality of signature methods and a plurality of digital signatures that are signed by the plurality of signature methods; a software update unit that stores in the storage unit, in association with the software, a signature method among the plurality of signature methods that is newer than a signature method associated with the software in the storage unit and that has been used by the software signature verification unit to successfully verify an electronic signature attached to the new software, and further updates the old software with the new software; 3. The apparatus of claim 2, comprising:

4. The plurality of signature methods received by the software receiving unit include new and old information of the signature methods, The software update unit is configured to: the signature method is newer than the signature method associated with the software in the storage unit, The software signature verification unit successfully verifies the electronic signature attached to the new software, and 4. The device according to claim 3, further comprising: a most recent signature method stored in said storage unit; and further comprising: updating older software with said new software.

5. The plurality of signature methods received by the software receiving unit include new and old information of the signature methods, the software signature verification unit determines whether the signature methods among the plurality of signature methods are newer than a signature method associated with the software in the storage unit, in order from newest to oldest; verifying an electronic signature attached to the new software using a signature method newer than the signature method; The software update unit includes: the signature method is newer than the signature method associated with the software in the storage unit, 4. The device according to claim 3, wherein the software signature verification unit stores in the storage unit a signature method by which the digital signature attached to the new software has been successfully verified, and further updates the old software with the new software.

6. The software signature verification unit, before the software update unit updates the software, the software signature verification unit is updated to be capable of verifying at least a part of a plurality of electronic signatures attached by the plurality of signature methods received by the software reception unit, The device described in claim 5, wherein the software signature verification unit verifies the electronic signature attached to the new software using a signature method that the software signature verification unit can verify among the multiple signature methods received by the software receiving unit and that is newer than the signature method associated with the software in the memory unit.

7. 7. The device according to claim 4, wherein, of the plurality of signature methods received by the software receiving unit, newer signature methods have less vulnerability.

8. A software verification method performed by a device in which software is installed, comprising: a process of verifying an electronic signature attached to the software using a signature method recorded together with the software update and newer than that before the software update; if the verification of the electronic signature is successful, launching the software; A software verification method.

9. The devices that run the successfully verified software are a software signature verification unit that verifies a digital signature attached to the software by using a signature method that is newer than the signature method before the software update and that is recorded together with the software update; a start-up processing unit that starts the software when the software signature verification unit has successfully verified the electronic signature; A program to function as a

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • JP2021‐077971A