Wireless Setup and Security of Continuous Analyte Sensor Systems Deployed in Healthcare Infrastructure - Patent application

The PAKE protocol at the application layer enables secure communication between analyte sensors and display devices, addressing vulnerabilities in healthcare devices by facilitating authenticated pairing without input and output capabilities, thereby enhancing security and privacy.

JP2024543761APending Publication Date: 2024-11-26DEXCOM INC
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2023579319
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2021-11-04
Filing Date
2022-10-21
Publication Date
2024-11-26

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing medical devices, particularly in healthcare facilities, face security, integrity, privacy, and availability issues due to the lack of input and output capabilities, making them vulnerable to cyberattacks and unable to achieve authenticated pairing, which is crucial for stringent security protocols.

Method used

Implementing a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol at the application layer to derive an authentication key for secure communication between analyte sensors and display devices, allowing authenticated pairing without requiring input and output capabilities.

Benefits of technology

Enhances security posture in healthcare facilities by establishing secure wireless connections, protecting against cyber threats and ensuring the integrity and privacy of patient data while maintaining device availability.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

Techniques and protocols are disclosed for facilitating secure wired or wireless communication between a sensor system and one or more other devices deployed in a healthcare facility. In certain embodiments, the techniques and protocols include secure device pairing techniques and protocols for achieving enhanced security, such as those recommended in healthcare facilities. In certain embodiments, a method includes performing, at an application layer of the sensor system, a password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol with a display device to derive an authentication key, performing, at the sensor system, an authenticated pairing protocol with the display device, and after successful authentication, establishing an encrypted connection between the sensor system and the display device, and transmitting analyte data indicative of a measured analyte level from the sensor system to the display device over the encrypted connection.
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] (CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS) This application claims priority to and the benefit of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 63 / 263,560, filed November 4, 2021, which is assigned to the assignee hereof and is expressly incorporated by reference in its entirety herein as if fully set forth below and for all applicable purposes. [Background technology]

[0002] The present application relates generally to medical devices such as analyte sensors, and more particularly to systems, devices, and methods relating to facilitating wired and wireless secure communications between analyte sensors (e.g., continuous glucose monitoring (CGM) devices), wireless devices, and various wired or wireless nodes within a healthcare facility.

[0003] Description of Related Art Diabetes is a metabolic disease linked to the body's production or use of insulin, a hormone that allows the body to use glucose for energy or store it as fat.

[0004] Diabetes mellitus is a disease in which the pancreas cannot make enough insulin (type I or insulin-dependent) and / or insulin is ineffective (type 2 or non-insulin-dependent). In the diabetic state, patients suffer from hyperglycemia, which leads to many physiological abnormalities associated with microvascular deterioration (renal failure, skin ulcers, or bleeding into the vitreous humor of the eye). A hypoglycemic reaction (hypoglycemia) can be induced by inadvertent overdosing of insulin or after normal administration of insulin or glucose-lowering agents accompanied by abnormal exercise or inadequate food intake.

[0005] Traditionally, diabetics carry self-monitoring blood glucose (SMBG) monitors, which can require uncomfortable finger-prick techniques. Due to lack of comfort and convenience, diabetics typically only measure their blood glucose levels two to four times per day. Unfortunately, these time intervals are so far apart that diabetics are likely to be late in receiving alerts about hyperglycemic or hypoglycemic conditions, and may suffer dangerous side effects as a result. In fact, diabetics are unlikely to measure SMBG values ​​in a timely manner, and furthermore, diabetics are not aware of whether their blood glucose levels are rising (higher) or falling (lower) due to limitations of traditional methods.

[0006] For this reason, various non-invasive, transdermal (e.g., transcutaneous), and / or implantable sensors have been developed to continuously detect and / or quantify blood glucose levels. Generally, in diabetes management systems, these sensors wirelessly transmit raw or minimally processed data for subsequent display and / or analysis at one or more remote devices, which may include a display device, a server, or any other type of communication device. The remote device, such as a display device, may then utilize a trusted software application (e.g., approved and / or provided by the sensor manufacturer) that obtains the raw or minimally processed data and provides the user with information about the user's blood glucose level. A diabetes management system using such implantable sensors may provide the user with more up-to-date information, thereby reducing the risk that the user will fail to regulate the user's blood glucose level.

[0007] This Background is provided to introduce a brief context for the Summary and Detailed Description that follow. This Background is not intended to aid in determining the scope of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to be viewed as limiting the claimed subject matter to implementations that solve any or all of the disadvantages or problems presented above. Summary of the Invention [Means for solving the problem]

[0008] Certain embodiments of the present disclosure provide a method for facilitating secure wired or wireless communication between a display device and a sensor system for measuring blood glucose levels. The method generally includes performing, at an application layer of the display device, a password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol with the sensor system to derive an authentication key; performing, at the display device, an authenticated pairing protocol with the sensor system, where performing the authenticated pairing protocol includes receiving, at the display device from the sensor system, an indication of a first input / output (I / O) capability configured for the sensor system, where the sensor system is not configured with the first I / O capability; obtaining, at the application layer of the display device, a passkey derived based on the authentication key; and authenticating the sensor system by verifying that the passkey matches another passkey generated at the sensor system, where the other passkey is derived by the sensor system from performing the PAKE protocol at the application layer of the sensor system; establishing an encrypted connection between the display device and the sensor system after successful authenticating; and receiving, at the display device, analyte data indicative of a measured analyte level from the sensor system over the encrypted connection.

[0009] Certain embodiments of the present disclosure provide a method for facilitating wired or wireless secure communication between a sensor system and a display device for measuring a blood glucose level. The method generally includes: executing, at an application layer of the sensor system, a PAKE protocol with the display device to derive an authentication key; executing, at the sensor system, an authenticated pairing protocol with the display device, where executing the authenticated pairing protocol includes transmitting from the sensor system to the display device an indication of a first input / output (I / O) capability configured for the sensor system, where the sensor system is not configured with the first I / O capability; obtaining a passkey derived at an application layer of the sensor system based on the authentication key; authenticating the sensor system by verifying that the passkey matches another passkey generated at the display device, where the other passkey is derived by the display device from executing the PAKE protocol at the application layer of the display device; establishing an encrypted connection between the sensor system and the display device after successful authentication; and transmitting analyte data indicative of a measured analyte level from the sensor system to the display device over the encrypted connection.

[0010] Certain embodiments of the present disclosure include a sensor system comprising an analyte sensor operable to generate an analyte measurement; and a sensor electronics module, the sensor electronics module comprising a memory including executable instructions; and a processor in data communication with the memory and configured to execute the instructions to cause the sensor system to: (i) at an application layer of the sensor system, execute a password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol with a display device to derive an authentication key; and (ii) at the sensor system, execute an authenticated pairing protocol with the display device, the processor being configured to execute the authenticated pairing protocol to: (1) transmit an indication of a first input / output (I / O) capability from the sensor system to the display device, the sensor system being configured to receive an indication of a first input / output (I / O) capability from the sensor system to the display device, the sensor electronics module ... the display device is not configured with a first I / O capability; (2) obtain a passkey derived based on an authentication key at an application layer of the sensor system; and (3) authenticate the sensor system by verifying that the passkey matches another passkey generated at the display device, the other passkey being derived by the display device from executing a PAKE protocol at an application layer of the display device; (iii) after the authentication is successful, establish an encrypted connection between the sensor system and the display device; and (iv) transmit analyte data indicative of the analyte measurement value from the sensor system to the display device over the encrypted connection. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0011] [Figure 1A] 1 illustrates an exemplary health monitoring and support system implemented within a hospital and / or other care facility (hereinafter "healthcare facility"), according to some embodiments disclosed herein. [Figure 1B]1A shows the analyte sensor system of FIG. 1A along with several display devices 107 according to certain embodiments disclosed herein. [Figure 1C] 1A and 1B are diagrams illustrating the analyte sensor system and display device of FIG. 1A and FIG. 1B in greater detail, according to certain embodiments disclosed herein. [Diagram 2] FIG. 1 is a flow diagram illustrating example operations for establishing a secure wireless connection between devices deployed within a healthcare facility, in accordance with certain embodiments disclosed herein. [Figure 3A-1] 1 provides an example illustration of the operations described in FIG. 2 for onboarding, normal use, and offboarding of a device in a healthcare facility, in accordance with certain embodiments disclosed herein. [Figure 3A-2] 1 provides an example illustration of the operations described in FIG. 2 for onboarding, normal use, and offboarding of a device in a healthcare facility, in accordance with certain embodiments disclosed herein. [Figure 3A-3] 1 provides an example illustration of the operations described in FIG. 2 for onboarding, normal use, and offboarding of a device in a healthcare facility, in accordance with certain embodiments disclosed herein. [Figure 3A-4] 1 provides an example illustration of the operations described in FIG. 2 for onboarding, normal use, and offboarding of a device in a healthcare facility, in accordance with certain embodiments disclosed herein. [Figure 3B] 1 provides an example illustration of the operations described in FIG. 2 for onboarding, normal use, and offboarding of a device in a healthcare facility, in accordance with certain embodiments disclosed herein. [Figure 3C-1] 1 provides an example illustration of the operations described in FIG. 2 for onboarding, normal use, and offboarding of a device in a healthcare facility, in accordance with certain embodiments disclosed herein. [Figure 3C-2]1 provides an example illustration of the operations described in FIG. 2 for onboarding, normal use, and offboarding of a device in a healthcare facility, in accordance with certain embodiments disclosed herein. [Figure 3C-3] 1 provides an example illustration of the operations described in FIG. 2 for onboarding, normal use, and offboarding of a device in a healthcare facility, in accordance with certain embodiments disclosed herein. [Figure 4] FIG. 2 is a call flow diagram illustrating the execution of a particular security protocol for establishing secure wireless communication between an analyte sensor system and a first mobile device according to certain embodiments disclosed herein. [Diagram 5] FIG. 1 is a call flow diagram illustrating the execution of a particular security protocol for establishing secure wireless communication between an analyte sensor system and a second mobile device according to certain embodiments disclosed herein. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0012] Detailed Description of Certain Inventive Embodiments Using a wireless connection between an analyte sensor and one or more remote devices based on certain existing wireless communication protocols may expose the sensor and / or remote device to security, integrity, privacy, and availability issues (e.g., the sensor and / or remote device may become unavailable as a result of a malicious attack, etc.).

[0013] Guidelines from governing entities may therefore require stringent security (e.g., cybersecurity) protocols for medical devices to help eliminate such safety, integrity, privacy, and availability issues. Specifically, the healthcare industry's accelerating adoption of advanced networks, connected devices, and digital records has left modern healthcare facilities highly vulnerable to cyberattacks. Thus, to mitigate threats to the overall healthcare infrastructure and reduce the risk of cyberattacks, stricter security protocols may be recommended for use by devices deployed within hospitals and / or other care facilities (referred to herein as "healthcare facilities") to establish more secure wireless connections between these devices compared to other environments. Strict security requirements in healthcare facilities are recommended to protect patient safety and privacy, as well as to ensure continuity of effective delivery of high-quality care by mitigating disruptions that may adversely affect treatment outcomes.

[0014] In one example, to achieve increased security, devices within a healthcare facility are encouraged to engage in authenticated pairing involving secure exchange of cryptographic keys, and in some cases, in addition to engaging in authenticated pairing, further engage in a key agreement protocol such as one involving Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) (e.g., ). Pairing is the process by which two devices exchange device information for the purpose of establishing a secure link. The protocol used by the devices for such pairing determines the strength of the authentication associated with the pairing, which directly correlates to the level of security achieved by the devices. Thus, devices participating in authenticated pairing with password-authenticated key agreement may achieve a higher level of security. For example, the use of LE Secure Pairing may facilitate protection of communications from passive eavesdropping, regardless of the pairing method used (Passkey Entry, Out Of Band, etc.). Additionally, authenticated pairing may provide protection from man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.

[0015] There are several existing protocols for achieving authenticated pairing between peer devices (e.g., a pair of devices involved in pairing). For example, in some cases, an input / output (I / O) based pairing method (e.g., a pairing method that requires output capability for at least one peer device and input capability for the other peer device), such as a passkey entry protocol, may be used to achieve authenticated pairing. In one particular example, the passkey entry protocol utilizes a multi-digit (e.g., six-digit) passkey (sometimes referred to as a passcode or pairing code) that is accessible to both peer devices for authentication. The passkey entry protocol uses a method of gradually disclosing each bit of the passkey until all bits of the passkey are verified. The passkey entry method may be used to prevent and / or detect MITM attacks and also to protect the peer devices from passive eavesdropping.

[0016] Use of an I / O-based pairing method may be based on the I / O capabilities of each of the peer devices. To perform an I / O-based pairing method such as passkey entry pairing, the I / O capabilities of one of the peer devices may need to include at least a display capability (e.g., a monitor, display, light emitting diode (LED) display, etc.), while the I / O capabilities of the other peer device may need to include at least an input capability (e.g., a keyboard, buttons, etc.). For example, to verify each bit of a passkey in a passkey entry pairing method, the passkey must first be passed between the peer devices. The manner in which the passkey is passed from one peer device to the other peer device may vary. A passkey entry pairing method may involve the BLE layer of the peer devices (which refers to the host and controller components of the BLE protocol stack of the peer devices, as described further below) being configured with instructions that enable one peer device to pass a passkey to the other peer device using the I / O capabilities of the peer devices. For example, in some cases, the BLE layer of a first peer device with at least display I / O capabilities causes a random six-digit number to be generated and displayed on the display of the first peer device for entry by a user at the second peer device, where the second peer device has at least input I / O capabilities. The BLE layer of the second peer device then causes a user interface (UI) function (e.g., a pop-up window or dialog) to be generated and displayed at the second peer device. The user then reads the number from the display of the first peer device and enters the number into the UI function at the second peer device (e.g., designed with input capabilities) using a keypad. Thus, at least to utilize an I / O-based pairing method such as passkey entry pairing, at least one of the peer devices needs to have input capabilities and the other device needs output capabilities to pass a passkey for authentication.

[0017] Thus, if one or more of the peer devices does not meet the I / O capability requirement (e.g., does not have input and / or output capabilities), the I / O-based pairing method may not be feasible if a user is expected to read a key from one peer device for authenticated pairing and enter the key into the other peer device. Thus, devices that are not configured with I / O capabilities suffer from the problem of not being able to achieve authenticated pairing using the I / O-based pairing method. As a result of this technical problem, such devices may be vulnerable to active and passive eavesdropping and / or MITM attacks. In a passive attack, a hacker may intercept information exchanged between peer devices and simply monitor the information without modifying it. In an active attack, a hacker attempts to modify the integrity and availability of the intercepted information with the aim of gaining access or greater privileges.

[0018] One or more of the devices deployed in a healthcare facility may be classified as a no-input, no-output device. For example, sensors provided to patients admitted to hospitals and / or nursing homes may not be configured with a display or keyboard capabilities. Thus, the deployment of these devices may not allow meeting recommended security requirements (e.g., due to an inability to achieve at least authenticated pairing) and thus may negatively impact the security posture of the healthcare facility.

[0019] Accordingly, certain embodiments described herein relate to systems and methods that facilitate wired and wireless secure communications between medical devices, including analyte sensors (e.g., continuous glucose monitoring (CGM) devices), wireless devices, and various wired or wireless nodes that may not be configured with I / O capabilities. Establishing a secure wireless connection using the methods described herein may help reduce safety, integrity, privacy, and / or availability issues associated with wireless communications in a healthcare facility, thereby improving the security posture of the healthcare facility.

[0020] In certain embodiments, the establishment of secure wireless communication between an analyte monitoring system and a wireless display device (e.g., a receiver, a cell phone, etc.) in a healthcare facility is provided. Specifically, authenticated pairing to achieve the increased security recommended in healthcare facilities is achieved by using a password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) to generate an authentication key (interchangeably referred to herein as "K-auth") that is used by the peer devices (e.g., the analyte monitoring sensor system and the wireless display device) to derive a passkey to authenticate the connection. Such an implementation obviates the need to have two devices with I / O capabilities to achieve authenticated pairing using a passkey entry pairing method.

[0021] FIG. 1A shows a high-level system architecture diagram illustrating different components of an exemplary healthcare facility implementing a health monitoring and support system 100 (hereinafter "system 100") used to collect, monitor, and / or provide information regarding analyte values ​​associated with analytes present in a user's body. In one example, system 100 may be a diabetes management system used to collect, monitor, and / or provide information regarding blood glucose levels in a user's body at a healthcare facility. In another example, instead of or in addition to diabetes, system 100 may be used to manage another physiological condition or combination of conditions by collecting, monitoring, and / or providing information regarding one or more other analytes in a user's body.

[0022] A user 102 (hereinafter "user") of the system 100 may be a patient admitted to a hospital and / or other care facility who interacts with a health monitoring device of the system 100, such as an analyte sensor system 104 (hereinafter "SS 104"). As shown, the system 100 includes the SS 104, a mobile device 107a running an application 106, a dedicated receiver 107b (referred to herein as "receiver 107b"), a Bluetooth low energy (BLE) hub 108, an optional counterpart system 110 (e.g., a hospital system, a care facility system, or other authorized counterpart system), and an electronic medical record (EMR) 112.

[0023] In certain embodiments, a SS 104 is provided for measuring analytes in a user. By way of overview and example, the SS 104 may be implemented as an encapsulated microcontroller that takes sensor measurements, generates analyte data (e.g., by calculating values ​​for continuous monitoring of one or more analytes), and engages in wireless communication to transmit such data to a remote display device 107, such as a mobile device 107a and / or a receiver 107b, an authorized counterpart system, such as a counterpart system 110, and / or a medical delivery device (e.g., an insulin pump, an infusion pump, etc.).

[0024] In certain embodiments, the SS 104 and the display device 107 and / or the authorized counterpart system are configured to wirelessly communicate using a low-range and / or short-range wireless communication protocol. Furthermore, in certain embodiments, the SS 104 and the authorized counterpart system, such as the counterpart system 110, are configured to wirelessly communicate over a network (e.g., a WiFi network, a BLE network, a wide area network (WAN), the Internet, etc.). Examples of low-range and / or short-range wireless communication protocols include Bluetooth® and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) protocols. In certain embodiments, other short-range wireless communication technologies that may be used may include Near Field Communications (NFC), radio frequency identification (RFID) communication, infrared (IR) communication, and optical communication. In certain embodiments, wireless communication protocols other than the low-range and / or short-range wireless communication protocol, such as Wi-Fi Direct, may be used.

[0025] It is noted that, although certain embodiments assume that the SS 104 is a glucose sensor system, the SS 104 may be operative to monitor one or more additional or alternative analytes. As discussed, the term "analyte" as used herein is a broad term and is given its ordinary and customary meaning to those of skill in the art (and is not limited to any special or customized meaning) and refers to, but is not limited to, a substance or chemical component in the body or a biological sample (e.g., bodily fluids including blood, serum, plasma, interstitial fluid, cerebrospinal fluid, lymphatic fluid, ocular fluid, saliva, oral fluid, urine, excreta, or exudates). Analytes may include naturally occurring substances, man-made substances, metabolites, and / or reaction products. In some embodiments, the analytes for measurement by the sensing regions, devices, and methods are albumin, alkaline phosphatase, alanine transaminase, aspartate aminotransferase, bilirubin, blood urea nitrogen, calcium, CO2, chloride, creatinine, glucose, gamma-glutamyl transpeptidase, hematocrit, lactate, lactate dehydrogenase, magnesium, oxygen, pH, phosphorus, potassium, sodium, total protein, uric acid, metabolic markers, and drugs.

[0026] Other analytes were also analyzed, including acetaminophen, dopamine, ephedrine, terbutaline, ascorbate, uric acid, oxygen, d-amino acid oxidase, plasma amine oxidase, xanthine oxidase, NADPH oxidase, alcohol oxidase, alcohol dehydrogenase, pyruvate dehydrogenase, diols, Ros, NO, bilirubin, cholesterol, triglycerides, gentisic acid, ibuprofen, L-dopa, methyldopa, salicylate, tetracycline, tolazamide, tolbutamide, and acarboxyprothrombin. Contemplated herein are, but are not limited to, acylcarnitines; adenine phosphoribosyltransferase; adenosine deaminase; albumin; alpha-fetoprotein; amino acid profile (arginine (Krebs cycle), histidine / urocanic acid, homocysteine, phenylalanine / tyrosine, tryptophan); andrenostenedione; antipyrine; arabinitol enantiomers; arginase; benzoylecgonine (cocaine); biotinidase; biopterin; c-reactive protein; carnitine; carnosinase; CD 4;ceruloplasmin;chenodeoxycholic acid;chloroquine;cholesterol;cholinesterase;conjugated 1-β-hydroxycholic acid;cortisol;creatine kinase;creatine kinase MM isoenzyme;cyclosporine A;d-penicillamine;deethylchloroquine;dehydroepiandrosterone sulfate;DNA (acetylation polymorphism, alcohol dehydrogenase, α1-antitrypsin, cystic fibrosis, Duchenne / Becker muscular dystrophy, glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase, hemoglobin A, hemoglobin hemoglobin S, hemoglobin C, hemoglobin D, hemoglobin E, hemoglobin F, D-Punjab, beta-thalassemia, hepatitis B virus, HCMV, HIV-1, HTLV-1, Leber's hereditary optic neuropathy, MCAD, RNA, PKU, Plasmodium vivax, sex differentiation, 21-deoxycortisol);desbutylhalofantrine;dihydropteridine reductase;diphtheria / tetanus antitoxin;erythrocyte arginase;erythrocyte protoporphyrin;esterase D;fatty acids / acylglycines;free beta-human chorionic gonadotropin;free erythrocyte porphyrin;free thyroxine (FT4); free tri-iodothyronine (FT3); fumarylacetoacetase; galactose / gal-1-phosphate; galactose-1-phosphate uridyltransferase; gentamicin; glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase; glutathione; glutathione peroxidase; glycocholate; glycosylated hemoglobin; halofantrine; hemoglobin variants; hexosaminidase A; human erythrocyte carbonic anhydrase I; 17-alpha-hydroxyprogesterone; hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase; immunoreactive trypsin; lactate; lead; lipoproteins ((a), B / A-1, beta); lysozyme; mefloquine; netilmicin; phenobarbitone; phenytoin; Phytanic acid / pristanic acid; progesterone; prolactin; prolidase; purine nucleoside phosphorylase; quinine; reverse tri-iodothyronine (rT3); selenium; serum pancreatic lipase; sisomicin; somatomedin C; specific antibodies (adenovirus, antinuclear antibody, anti-zeta antibody, arbovirus, pseudorabies virus, dengue virus, guinea worm, tapeworm, ameba histolytica, enterovirus, giardiasis, Helicobacter pylori, hepatitis B virus, herpes virus, HIV-1, IgE (atopic disease), influenza virus, Leishmania donovani, Leptospira, measles / mumps / rubella, Mycobacterium leprae, Mycoplasma pneumoniae, myoglobin, Onchocerca volvulus, parainfluenza Viruses, malaria parasites, poliovirus, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, respiratory syncytial virus, Rickettsia (tsutsugamushi disease), Schistosoma mansoni, Toxoplasma gondii, Treponema pallidum, Trypanosoma cruzi / langeri, Vesicular stomatitis virus, Wuchereria bancrofti, Yellow fever virus);Specific antigens (Hepatitis B virus, HIV-1);Succinylacetone;Sulfadoxine;Theophylline;Thyrotropin (TSH);Thyroxine (T4);Thyroxine-binding globulin;Trace elements;Transferrin;UDP-galactose-4-epimerase;Urea;Uroporphyrinogen I synthase;Vitamin A;Leukocytes;and zinc protoporphyrin. Salts, sugars, proteins, fats, vitamins, and hormones naturally occurring in blood or interstitial fluids can also constitute analytes in certain embodiments.

[0027] The analyte may be naturally present in a biological fluid, e.g., a metabolite, hormone, antigen, antibody, etc. Alternatively, the analyte may be introduced into the body, e.g., a contrast agent for imaging, a radioisotope, a chemical agent, a fluorocarbon-based synthetic blood, or a drug or pharmaceutical composition, including, but not limited to, insulin; ethanol; cannabis (marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinol, hashish); inhalants (nitrous oxide, amyl nitrite, butyl nitrite, chlorohydrocarbons, hydrocarbons); cocaine (crack cocaine); stimulants (amphetamine, methamphetamine, ritalin, silurt, preludine, didrex, prestate, borane, sandrex, pregin); antidepressants (barbiturates, methamphetamine ... tranquilizers such as tacron, valium, librium, miltown, serax, equanil, tranxine, etc.); hallucinogens (phencyclidine, lysergic acid, mescaline, peyote, psilocybin); narcotics (heroin, codeine, morphine, opium, meperidine, percocet, percodan, tasionex, fentanyl, darvon, talwin, lomotil); synthetic narcotics (fentanyl, meperidine, amphetamine, methamphetamine, and analogs of phencyclidine, e.g., ecstasy); anabolic steroids; and nicotine. Metabolites of drugs and pharmaceutical compositions are also contemplated analytes. Analytes such as neurochemicals and other chemicals produced in the body, such as, for example, ascorbic acid, uric acid, dopamine, noradrenaline, 3-methoxytyramine (3MT), 3,4-dihydroxyphenylacetic Acid (DOPAC), homovanillic acid (HVA), 5-hydroxytryptamine (5HT), histamine, Advanced Glycation End Products (AGEs), and 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (FHIAA), can also be analyzed.

[0028] 1A , a mobile device in communication with SS 104 may be configured to display (and / or alert) displayable sensor information that may be transmitted by SS 104 (e.g., in a customized data package transmitted to the display device based on respective preferences). In certain embodiments, a display device 107 in communication with SS 104 may include a custom or proprietary display device, such as receiver 107b, which may be an embedded device specifically designed to display a particular type of displayable sensor information associated with analyte data received from SS 104 (e.g., in certain embodiments, numbers and / or arrows, etc.).

[0029] In one particular embodiment, the display device 107 in communication with the SS 104 may include a mobile device 107a based on Android, iOS, or another operating system (OS). The mobile device 107a may be any type of computing device capable of executing an application, such as the application 106. The application 106 is a mobile health application configured to receive and analyze analyte measurements from the SS 104. In particular, the application 106 collects, processes, and displays information about the user, including the user's analyte measurements, and provides alerts, alarms, and / or decision support based on the user's analyte measurements.

[0030] 1A shows the SS 104 in communication with both the receiver 107b and the mobile device 107a. In some embodiments, the SS 104 is in communication with the receiver 107b and not with the mobile device 107a, and vice versa. In certain embodiments, the mobile device 107a running the application 106 may be an alternative to using the receiver 107b for healthcare facilities that may provide a compatible mobile device 107a and / or may prefer the flexibility of the mobile device 107a.

[0031] The display device 107, including the mobile device 107a and the receiver 107b, may be described in more detail with respect to FIG. 1B.

[0032] As previously mentioned, in certain embodiments, the SS 104 may engage in wireless communication with one or more authorized counterpart systems, such as the counterpart system 110 shown in FIG. 1A, to transmit analyte data to such authorized counterpart systems. An authorized counterpart system may be a system that is granted access to the SS 104 for a particular purpose or action. The counterpart system 110 may include an information technology (IT) infrastructure for an authorized counterpart, which is comprised of hardware and software components including facilities, data centers, servers, enterprise application software solutions, and the like. Thus, the counterpart system 110 may include an IT infrastructure for a hospital and / or other care facility, including at least software components present within the IT infrastructure that are configured to receive information from the SS 104.

[0033] 2 and 3A, to establish a connection with the SS 104 so that the counterpart system 110 may receive information from the SS 104, the counterpart system 110 may first receive an identification (ID) of the SS 104 (e.g., a transmitter ID of the SS 104) through a router (e.g., a BLE / Wi-Fi router) such as a BLE hub 108. The BLE hub 108 enables one or more devices (e.g., computers, personal devices, SS 104) in the healthcare facility to communicate with the counterpart system 110 using multiple connectivity options. The BLE hub 108 may be compatible with the connectivity protocol of the healthcare facility.

[0034] In one particular embodiment, the counterpart system 110 integrates a particular set of information system standards, such as health level 7 (HL7) health information system (HIS) standards. HL7 provides a framework (and associated standards) for the exchange, integration, sharing, and retrieval of electronic health information. These standards define how information is packaged and communicated from one party or device to another, and set out the language, structure, and data types required for seamless integration between systems and devices.

[0035] In one particular embodiment, the counterpart system 110 is connected to an electronic medical record (EMR) system, such as an EMR system 112. The EMR system 112 is a software platform that enables electronic entry, storage, and maintenance of digital medical data. EMR systems are generally used throughout healthcare facilities to document clinical information about patients over time. EMR systems organize and present the data in a manner that assists clinicians, for example, in interpreting health conditions and providing ongoing care, scheduling, billing, and follow-up. Data contained in the EMR system may be used to generate reports for clinical care and / or disease management.

[0036] As mentioned above, achieving enhanced security for a healthcare facility can be technically challenging. For example, stringent security protocols may require authenticated pairing of each of the devices described above, as well as any software applications running on the devices. However, methods for achieving such authenticated pairing may not be feasible for some medical devices, including the SS 104. Accordingly, aspects of the present disclosure provide systems and methods for establishing secure wireless communications between one or more devices and the SS 104, which are described in more detail below.

[0037] Figure 1B shows an example of the SS 104 of Figure 1A along with several display devices 107, according to certain embodiments disclosed herein. In the example of Figure 1B, the SS 104 is a blood glucose monitoring system. However, as discussed above, the SS 104 may be configured to measure any other analyte or combination of analytes.

[0038] In certain embodiments, the SS 104 includes a sensor electronics module 138 and an analyte sensor 140 associated with the sensor electronics module 138. In certain embodiments, the sensor electronics module 138 includes electronic circuitry associated with measuring and processing the analyte sensor data or information, including algorithms associated with processing and / or calibrating the analyte sensor data / information. The analyte sensor electronics module 138 may be physically / mechanically connected to the analyte sensor 140 and may be integral with (i.e., non-removably attached to) or removably attached to the analyte sensor 140.

[0039] The sensor electronics module 138 may also be electrically coupled to the analyte sensor 140 such that the components may be electromechanically coupled to one another (e.g., (a) prior to insertion into the patient's body or (b) during insertion into the patient's body). The sensor electronics module 138 may include hardware, firmware, and / or software that enables measurement and / or estimation of a level of an analyte in a user via the analyte sensor 140 (e.g., which may be / may include a glucose sensor). For example, the sensor electronics module 138 may include one or more potentiostats, a power supply for providing power to the analyte sensor 140, other components useful for signal processing and data storage, and a telemetry module for transmitting data from the sensor electronics module to one or more display devices 107. The electronics may be mounted on a printed circuit board (PCB) or platform within the SS 104, and may take a variety of forms. For example, the electronics may take the form of an integrated circuit (IC), such as an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), a microcontroller, a processor, and / or a state machine.

[0040] The sensor electronics module 138 may include sensor electronics configured to process sensor information, such as sensor data, and generate transformed sensor data and displayable sensor information. Examples of systems and methods for processing analyte data are described in more detail herein and in U.S. Pat. Nos. 7,310,544 and 6,931,327, as well as U.S. Patent Publication Nos. 2005 / 0043598, 2007 / 0032706, 2007 / 0016381, 2008 / 0033254, 2005 / 0203360, 2005 / 0154271, 2005 / 0192557, 2006 / 0222566, 2007 / 0203966, and 2007 / 0208245, all of which are incorporated by reference in their entireties.

[0041] The analyte sensor 140 is configured to measure a concentration or level of an analyte in a user. In some embodiments, the analyte sensor 140 includes a continuous glucose sensor, such as a subcutaneous, transcutaneous (e.g., transdermal), or intravascular device. In some embodiments, the analyte sensor 140 can analyze multiple intermittent blood samples. The analyte sensor 140 can use any glucose measurement method, such as enzymatic, chemical, physical, electrochemical, spectrophotometric, polarimetric, calorimetric, iontophoretic, radiometric, immunochemical, etc. Additional details regarding continuous glucose sensors are provided in U.S. Patent Application No. 13 / 827,577, paragraphs

[0072] -

[0076] . U.S. Patent Application No. 13 / 827,577, paragraphs

[0072] -

[0076] are incorporated herein by reference.

[0042] The SS 104 may be communicatively coupled to several display devices 107, such as mobile devices 107a, 107c, and 107d (individually referred to as mobile device 107a and collectively referred to as mobile device 107a) and receiver 107b. It should be noted that the mobile device 107 in FIG. 1A may be any one of the mobile devices 107a, 107c, or 107d. In other words, any one of the mobile devices 107a, 107c, or 107d may be configured to execute the application 106. The SS 104 may be communicatively coupled to the mobile devices 107a, 107b, 107c, and / or 107d.

[0043] The display device 107 (e.g., mobile device 107a and / or receiver 107b) may be configured to display (and / or provide alerts and / or alarms based on) displayable sensor information that may be transmitted by the sensor electronics module 138 (e.g., in customized data packages transmitted to the display device 107 based on respective preferences). Each of the mobile devices 107a, 107c, and / or 107d may include a display, such as touchscreen display 109a, 109c, and / or 109d, respectively, for displaying the sensor information and / or analyte data to a user and / or for accepting input from a user. The receiver 107b may similarly have a touchscreen display 109b. For example, a graphical user interface (GUI) may be presented to the user for such purposes.

[0044] In certain embodiments, display device(s) 107 may include other types of user interfaces, such as a voice user interface, instead of or in addition to a touch screen display, for communicating sensor information to a user of the display device and / or accepting user input. In certain embodiments, one, some, or all of display devices 107 may be configured to display or otherwise communicate sensor information as communicated from sensor electronics module 138 (e.g., in data packages sent to the respective display device 107) without any additional anticipated processing required for calibration and / or real-time display of sensor data.

[0045] As referred to herein, the receiver 107b may be a custom or proprietary device. In some cases, the receiver 107b may be cleared for an inpatient hospital and / or nursing facility. The receiver 107b may be a reusable display device for use by more than one user, with only one user using the receiver 107b at a time. In certain embodiments, the receiver 107b may be initialized and / or reset by a configuration tool. In particular, the configuration tool may be used to load and / or remove default settings for the healthcare facility, to set or reset thresholds for alerts and / or alarms configured for the receiver 107b, etc.

[0046] In one particular embodiment, one of the mobile devices 107a includes a smartphone, such as mobile phone 107c. In one particular embodiment, one of the mobile devices 107a includes a tablet 107d. In one particular embodiment, one of the mobile devices 107a includes a smartwatch 107a. Each of these mobile devices 107a may be based on Android, iOS, or another OS for executing various software applications, such as application 106.

[0047] In certain embodiments, the sensor electronics module 138 may be configured to transmit the sensor information and / or analyte data to a medical delivery device (e.g., an insulin pump or pen). The medical delivery device (not shown) may be configured to administer a certain dosage of insulin or another medication to a user based on the sensor information and / or analyte data (which may include, for example, a recommended insulin dosage) received from the sensor electronics module 138 and the indications or treatment recommendations received from the mobile device 107a or receiver 107b.

[0048] FIG. 1C illustrates in more detail exemplary components of the SS 104 and display device 107 (e.g., mobile device 107a and / or receiver 107b of FIGS. 1A and 1B) according to certain embodiments disclosed herein. As previously mentioned, in certain embodiments, the SS 104 includes an analyte sensor 140 coupled to a sensor electronics module 138. The sensor electronics module 138 includes a sensor measurement circuit 142 coupled to the analyte sensor 140 for processing and managing sensor data. The sensor measurement circuit 142 may also be coupled to a processor 146. In some embodiments, the processor 146 may perform some or all of the functions of the sensor measurement circuit 142 to obtain and process sensor measurements from the analyte sensor 140. The processor 146 may also be coupled to a storage device 148 and a real time clock (RTC) 144 for storing and tracking sensor data. Additionally, the processor 146 may be further coupled to a connection interface 150 including a radio unit or transceiver (TRX) 152 (also referred to herein as a "transmitter") for transmitting sensor data and receiving requests and commands from the remote display device 107. As used herein, the term transceiver generally refers to a device or collection of devices that allows the SS 104 to transmit and receive data (e.g., wirelessly). The SS 104 may further include a storage device 148 and a real-time clock (RTC) 144 for storing and tracking sensor data. It is contemplated that in some embodiments, the sensor measurement circuitry 142 may perform all of the functions of the processor 146 and vice versa.

[0049] The transceiver 152 may be configured with the necessary hardware and wireless communication protocols to enable wireless communication between the SS 104 and other remote devices, such as the display device 107 and / or the counterpart system 110. For example, as described above, the transceiver 152 may be configured with the necessary hardware and communication protocols to establish a Bluetooth or BLE connection with the display device 107. As one skilled in the art will appreciate, in such an example, the necessary hardware may include a Bluetooth or BLE security manager and / or other Bluetooth or BLE related hardware / software modules configured for the Bluetooth or BLE communication standards.

[0050] Further, as shown in FIG. 1C, the display device 107 includes a connection interface 172, a processor 168, a memory 170, a RTC 166, a display 109 for presenting a graphical user interface (GUI), and a storage device 160. A bus (not shown) may be used to interconnect various elements of the display device and transfer data between these elements. The connection interface 172 includes a transceiver (TRX) 174 used to receive sensor data from the SS 104. The transceiver 174 is coupled to other elements of the display device 107 via the connection interface 172 and / or the bus. The transceiver 174 may include multiple transceiver modules capable of operating on different wireless standards. For example, the transceiver 174 may be configured with one or more communication protocols, such as a wireless communication protocol for establishing a wireless communication path with a network and / or a low-range wireless communication protocol (e.g., Bluetooth or BLE) for establishing a wireless communication path with the SS 104.

[0051] In some embodiments, when a standardized communication protocol is used between the display device 107 and the SS 104, commercially available transceiver circuits may be utilized that incorporate processing circuitry for handling low level data communication functions such as managing data encoding, transmission frequency, handshaking protocols, security, etc. In such embodiments, the processor 168 of the display device and / or the processor 146 of the SS 104 need not manage these operations, but may instead manage higher level functions such as providing desired data values ​​for transmission, powering up or down, setting the rate at which messages are transmitted, etc. Instructions and data values ​​for implementing these higher level functions may be provided to the transceiver circuitry via a data bus and transfer protocol established by the manufacturer of the transceivers 174 and 152.

[0052] The processor 168 may include processor sub-modules, including, by way of example, an application processor that interfaces with and / or controls other elements of the display device (e.g., the connection interface 172, the application 106, the display 109, the RTC 166, the memory 170, the storage 160, etc.). In certain embodiments, the processor 168 is configured to perform functions related to device management, such as, for example, a list of available or previously paired devices, information related to network conditions (e.g., link quality, etc.), information related to the timing, type, and / or structure of messaging exchanged between the SS 104 and the display device 107, etc. The processor 168 may further be configured to receive and process user input and analyte data. In certain embodiments, the processor 168 may access stored content from the storage 160 and the memory 170 at the direction of the application 106 and process the stored content for display by the display 109. Additionally, the processor 168 may process the stored content for transmission to the SS 104 via the connection interface 172. Display device 107 may include other peripheral components not shown in detail in FIG. 1C.

[0053] In certain embodiments, memory 170 may include volatile memory, such as random access memory (RAM), for storing data and / or instructions for software programs and applications, such as analyte sensor application 106. Display 109 is configured to present a GUI associated with OS 162 and / or application 106. In various embodiments, a user may interact with application 106 via a corresponding GUI presented on display 109.

[0054] As previously mentioned, application 106 may process and / or present analyte-related data received by display device 107 and present such data via display 109. Additionally, application 106 may be used to interface with SS 104, including obtaining analyte data generated by SS 104, as described in further detail herein.

[0055] The storage device 160 may be a non-volatile storage device for storing software programs, instructions, data, etc. For example, the storage device 160 may store applications 106 that, when executed using the processor 168, may, for example, receive input (e.g., via conventional hard / soft keys or a touch screen, voice detection, or other input mechanisms) and allow a user to interact with the analyte data and related content, such as via a display 109. The storage device 160 may further be used to store at least the volume of analyte data received from the SS 104 for later retrieval and use, for example, to determine trends and trigger alerts.

[0056] As previously mentioned, the SS 104, in certain embodiments, collects analyte data from the analyte sensor 140 and transmits the same or modified versions of the collected data to the display device 107. Data points regarding the analyte value may be collected and transmitted over the life of the analyte sensor 140 (e.g., ranging from 1 to 30 days or more). New measurements may be transmitted frequently enough to adequately monitor the analyte level of a user of the SS 104. In certain embodiments, rather than having the transmitting and receiving circuitry of each of the SS 104 and the display device 107 in continuous communication, the SS 104 and the display device 107 may periodically and / or periodically establish a communication channel between each other. Thus, in such embodiments, the SS 104 may communicate with the display device 107 at predetermined time intervals, for example. The length of the predetermined time interval can be selected to be long enough so that the SS 104 does not consume too much power by transmitting data more frequently than necessary, but frequent enough to provide substantially real-time sensor information (e.g., measured blood glucose or analyte data) to a display device for output to a user (e.g., via the display 109). This time interval can be modified to be any desired length of time. In other embodiments, the transceivers 152 and 174 may communicate continuously. For example, in one particular embodiment, the transceivers 152 and 174 may establish a session or connection between them and continue to communicate together until the connection is lost.

[0057] In order for the display device 107 to interface with the SS 104, a user (e.g., a health care facility staff member) may be instructed by the application 106 to wirelessly connect the display device 107 to the patient's SS 104, which may already be positioned on the patient's body (e.g., by a medical professional such as a nurse, nursing manager, etc.). A wireless communication path 180 between the display device 107 and the SS 104 allows the SS 104 to transmit analyte measurements to the display device 107 and allows the two devices to engage in any of the other interactions described above.

[0058] Several protocols may be used by the display device 107 and the SS 104 to establish a secure connection, thereby reducing safety, integrity, privacy, and availability issues associated with communications in the system 100. Different protocols may be used by the display device 107 and the SS 104 to achieve different levels of security (e.g., having different levels of vulnerability to attacks).

[0059] As previously mentioned, to improve the security posture of a healthcare facility, enhanced security protocols to prevent cyber threats are recommended. Specifically, more stringent security protocols, often requiring authenticated pairing, may be recommended for use by the display device 107 and the SS 104 to establish such connections in a healthcare facility as compared to other environments. Stringent security protocols, often requiring authenticated pairing, may also be recommended for establishing secure connections between the SS 104 and other devices within the healthcare facility.

[0060] In one particular embodiment, the display device 107 is designed with both input and output capabilities, while the SS 104 (and more specifically, the transmitter of the SS 104) is designed with input capabilities, output capabilities, and / or both input and output capabilities so as to be able to perform a passkey entry pairing method to achieve authenticated pairing. For example, as discussed above, the display device 107 and the SS 104 are configured (e.g., at the BLE layer) to engage in a passkey entry pairing method that involves either the display device or the SS 104 generating a random passkey, while the other has input capability for the user to enter a passkey.

[0061] In certain other embodiments, the display device 107 is designed with input and / or output capabilities, while the SS 104 is designed without input and / or output capabilities. As mentioned herein, in certain embodiments, the SS 104 includes an embedded transceiver in the sensor electronics module 138, which may not be designed with a display or keyboard. Thus, in such embodiments, it may not be possible to perform an I / O-based pairing method where a user is expected to read a key from one peer device and enter the key into the other peer device for authenticated pairing. Thus, to establish secure wireless communication between the SS 104 and the display device 107, certain aspects described herein involve various methods for achieving authenticated pairing using a passkey derived at the application layer. For example, in certain aspects, the SS 104 and the display device 107 may achieve authenticated pairing using an application layer passkey derived based on an authentication key (i.e., K-auth) generated at the application layer as a result of the peer device performing a key exchange protocol such as PAKE. In certain embodiments, the application layer passkey may then be passed to the BLE layer (described in more detail below) at each peer device. Once both peer devices possess the same passkey, at the BLE layer the peer devices may proceed and achieve authenticated pairing using the passkey. Thus, by using K-auth to derive the passkey that is passed to the BLE layer of each peer device, the need for I / O capabilities at both peer devices may be avoided.

[0062] PAKE or a similar key exchange protocol is designed to allow two peer devices (e.g., display device 107 and SS 104) to generate or derive a high-entropy authentication key (e.g., K-auth) from a shared low-entropy secret at the application layer. As used herein, the application layer of a peer device refers to an abstraction layer or service that specifies the shared protocols (e.g., communication protocols, identification protocols, authentication protocols, etc.) and interface methods used to communicate with other devices. For example, within the Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) standard reference model, the application layer is the top layer for managing communication between applications on a device. In a BLE-enabled device, the functionality of the BLE protocol stack as defined by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) is divided between three main layers, e.g., application, controller, and host, with each layer designed to perform various different functions. In the BLE protocol stack, the application layer is a direct user interface that defines profiles that provide interoperability between various applications. The other two components of the BLE protocol stack, the controller and the host, are collectively referred to as the BLE layer. The controller component includes the BLE PHY (physical), LL (link layer), and the controller-side Host Controller Interface (HCI). The BLE PHY air interface operates in the same unlicensed 2.4 GHz Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) frequency band as Wi-Fi. The LL performs tasks similar to the medium access control (MAC) layer of the OSI model. The controller-side HCI handles the interface between the host and the controller.

[0063] The host component includes the host-side HCI, Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP), Attribute Protocol (ATT), Generic Attributed Profile (GATT), Security Management Protocol (SMP), and Generic Access Profile (GAP). The host-side HCI handles the interface between the host and the controller. L2CAP encapsulates data from the BLE upper layer into standard BLE packet format for transmission or extracts data from standard BLE LL packets on reception according to the link configuration specified in the ATT and SMP layers. ATT transfers attribute data between the client and server in GATT-based profiles. GATT provides a reference framework for all GATT-based profiles. SMP applies security algorithms to encrypt and decrypt data packets. GAP specifies device roles, modes, and procedures. The application layer communicates directly with the GAP of the host component.

[0064] As discussed, in certain embodiments, two peer devices (e.g., the display device 107 and the SS 104) may be configured at the application layer to engage in a key exchange protocol, such as PAKE, to derive a passkey for authenticating the connection. To authenticate the connection between the two peer devices, the two devices may engage in passkey entry pairing at the BLE layer using the derived passkey. However, for certain display devices 107, including mobile devices 107a, such as smartphones with commercial OS, passing a passkey from the application layer to the BLE layer may be technically challenging. Thus, as discussed in more detail below, certain aspects described herein relate to various methods for passing a passkey derived at the application layer to the BLE layer in the commercial mobile device 107a, such that authenticated pairing may be performed and completed at a later time in the BLE.

[0065] Furthermore, as part of an I / O-based pairing method such as passkey entry pairing, each peer device may be initially required to disclose its I / O capabilities. The I / O capabilities disclosed between the peer devices may then help determine whether an I / O-based pairing method can be used to achieve authenticated pairing. Thus, in a particular embodiment, given that SS 104 has no input or output capabilities, if SS 104 does not report I / O capabilities to display device 107, the peer device may determine that passkey entry pairing may not be a feasible option. For this reason, to ensure that SS 104 and display device 107 proceed with the pairing process, SS 104 may be configured in a particular embodiment to report false I / O capabilities to display device 107 to trigger execution of a passkey entry pairing protocol.

[0066] For example, in a particular embodiment, the SS 104 may be configured to report a fake output / display capability to the mobile device 107a (e.g., a mobile device having a commercial OS), which may cause the mobile device 107a to skip generating a random passkey since the mobile device 107a may be configured (by its BLE configuration) to generate a random passkey when the SS 104 reports input-only capability or no capability. More specifically, instead of disclosing its actual capability (e.g., no I / O capability), the SS 104 may be configured to report to the mobile device 107a that it has an output / display capability. The reporting of the pseudo output / display capability will cause the mobile device 107a to refrain from generating a random passkey for pairing and instead cause the SS 104 to generate a passkey at the application layer. The SS 104 may be programmed to report such a pseudo capability as well as generate an application layer passkey for pairing. The SS 104 and the mobile device 107a may perform an I / O-based pairing method, passing a passkey derived at the application layer, for example, using the methods described herein.

[0067] In a particular embodiment, the SS 104 may be configured to report different fake I / O capabilities when pairing with the mobile device 107a and the receiver 107b, such that if the SS 104 is pairing with both the mobile device 107a and the receiver 107b, the SS 104 may be able to distinguish between the two connections or pairing sessions. Thus, in a particular embodiment, the SS 104 may be configured to report fake input capabilities to the receiver 107b (and, as described above, fake output capabilities to the mobile device 107a). The receiver 107b may be programmed to derive a passkey at the application layer and allow the passkey to be passed to the BLE layer where it is then used for authentication.

[0068] Methods for reporting fake I / O capabilities and passing a passkey to the BLE layer to enable authenticated pairing between peer devices may be described in more detail below with respect to at least FIGS. 4 and 5.

[0069] Specifically, FIG. 2 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary operation for establishing a secure wireless connection between devices deployed in an exemplary healthcare facility. FIGS. 3A-3C provide an exemplary diagram of the operation described in FIG. 2 for onboarding and offboarding of devices in a healthcare facility. FIGS. 4 and 5 are sequence diagrams illustrating communication and exchange of data between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a. More specifically, FIG. 4 relates to the execution of a security protocol for establishing a secure wireless communication between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a having a first OS (e.g., when passing a passkey from the application layer of the mobile device 107a to the BLE layer is not restricted). FIG. 5 relates to the execution of a security protocol for establishing a secure wireless communication between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a having a second OS (e.g., when passing a passkey from the application layer of the mobile device 107a to the BLE layer is restricted).

[0070] On-boarding and off-boarding procedures for devices deployed in a healthcare facility Deploying medical devices, including analyte sensors such as SS 104, receivers 107b and / or wireless display devices 107 such as mobile device 107a, and various wired or wireless nodes in a healthcare facility may involve initial setup and resetting of such devices whenever a new patient is admitted and discharged. For example, such devices may be considered short-term use devices because they are typically intended for continuous use by patients for acute patient care (e.g., continuous use of the device for 60 minutes to 30 days) and are further intended by the device manufacturer to be reused by future patients after appropriate procedures such as cleaning, disinfection, sterilization, and / or information resetting have been performed.

[0071] A streamlined procedure for onboarding and offboarding these devices for each new patient use may be described with respect to FIG. 2 and FIG. 3A-3C. In particular, FIG. 2 is a flow diagram illustrating example operations 200 for onboarding and offboarding devices in a healthcare facility, including establishing a secure wireless connection between such devices, according to certain embodiments disclosed herein. The operations 200 of FIG. 2 may be described in further detail with reference to FIG. 3A-3C. In particular, FIG. 3A-3C provide an example diagram of the operations described in FIG. 2 for onboarding, normal use, and offboarding of devices in a healthcare facility, according to certain embodiments disclosed herein. Although FIG. 2 and FIG. 3A-3C may be described with respect to admission of a patient in a hospital environment, a similar procedure may be used for admission of a patient in any other healthcare facility.

[0072] A patient's inpatient treatment may include three phases: admission period, inpatient period, and discharge period. During the inpatient period, onboarding operations 300A may be performed for execution of certain security protocols to establish secure wireless communication between the device and the SS 104. During the inpatient period, normal use operations 300B of such connected device may be performed for discrete, continuous, and remote collection of one or more analyte measurements, such as glucose measurements of the patient, for inpatient monitoring. Finally, during the discharge process, offboarding operations 300C may be performed to remove health information and other sensitive data stored on the device associated with the discharging patient.

[0073] As shown in FIG. 2, the onboarding operations 300A begin in block 202 by providing an admitted patient with a patient identifier (ID) and preparing prescribed monitoring equipment, including at least a bedside display application. The patient ID may be provided to the patient as a wristband. The patient ID wristband may include a barcode that may be easily scanned using a barcode scanner. The wristband provides important healthcare information about the patient, such as the patient's name, previous conditions, allergies, what type of medication should be administered, medication dosages, etc. The prescribed monitoring equipment may include electrocardiogram (ECG) monitors, temperature monitors, pulse oximeters, capnography monitoring equipment, remote patient monitoring equipment, etc. Preparation of such equipment may include entering patient information into each device (e.g., manually or by scanning a patient ID wristband), downloading one or more applications for use by the patient and / or healthcare professional (HCP), placing the equipment near the patient (e.g., less than 20 feet), etc. In one particular embodiment, when the SS 104 and mobile device 107a are deployed for use by patients in a hospital, a hospital information technology (IT) professional, biomedical technician, or the like may download a mobile health application, such as the application 106 shown in Figure 1A. For example, the hospital IT professional downloads the application 106 from an application store (e.g., App Store) and begins the setup process.

[0074] At block 204, the patient may be provided with the SS 104 for placement on the patient's body. For example, the HCP may prepare a site on the patient's skin for placement of a continuous analyte sensor, such as the continuous analyte sensor 140 of the SS 104. The HCP may then insert the continuous analyte sensor 140 through the patient's skin and attach a transmitter to the continuous analyte sensor 140. Once the SS 104 is attached to the patient's body and activated, at block 206, setup of a secure wireless connection (e.g., a secure BLE connection) between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a may be initiated.

[0075] The setup of secure wireless communication may begin, in certain embodiments, with the mobile device 107a and the SS 104 engaging in some application layer identification and authentication protocol. Specifically, based on instructions provided by the application 106, the mobile device 107a may first attempt to identify the SS 104 from several different SSs potentially in the vicinity. As a result, in certain embodiments, the mobile device 107a and the SS 104 may first engage in an identification protocol, thereby allowing the mobile device 107a to securely identify the correct SS 104 to connect to. In one example, the mobile device 107a may first obtain a transmitter ID (hereinafter referred to as "SSID") associated with the transmitter of the SS 104. For example, in some embodiments, the mobile device 107a may be equipped with a barcode scanner capable of scanning a QR code located on or associated with the SS 104. In some other embodiments, the SSID may be manually entered into the mobile device 107a (e.g., by the patient, HCP, etc.). The QR code may show both the SSID and, in some cases, the pairing code. In other embodiments, one of many other techniques may instead be used to provide the mobile device 107a with access to the SSID.

[0076] Once the mobile device 107a has the SSID, it begins searching for SSs with the same SSID based on a determination that the correct SS to connect to must have the same SSID. At the same time, the SS 104 may be configured to advertise its SSID (e.g., all or a subset of the characters that make up the SSID) or some version thereof (e.g., a hashed or encrypted version) when the SS 104 is activated. Note that in certain embodiments, if the SS 104 is engaged in wireless communication with a display device such as the receiver 107b instead of the mobile device 107a, the SS 104 and the receiver 107b may skip the identification phase. In such an embodiment, the HCP may enter a pairing code associated with the SS 104 into a user interface provided by the receiver 107b to allow the two devices to authenticate each other, as described further below.

[0077] For example, based on instructions provided by the application 106, the mobile device 107a may engage in or initiate a user-centric mutual authentication protocol at the application layer with the SS 104. In one particular embodiment, by engaging in a user-centric mutual authentication protocol, the mobile device 107a and the SS 104 are both configured to generate an authentication key (e.g., K-auth) based on a shared secret (e.g., a pairing code, an SSID, etc.). Examples of user-centric mutual authentication protocols are described in more detail herein and in U.S. Patent Application No. 17 / 308,754, which claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 63 / 021,591, filed May 7, 2020, which are incorporated herein by reference in their entireties.

[0078] The user-centric authentication protocol may include a key exchange algorithm, such as one of a variety of password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) algorithms. A passkey is then derived from the authentication key by both the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a to implement an authenticated pairing protocol at the BLE layer of each device. For example, at the mobile device 107a and the SS 104, the passkey is passed from the application layer to the BLE layer, and then the passkey is used to achieve authenticated pairing with the SS 104. Further details regarding the authenticated pairing process performed between the mobile device 107a and the SS 104 are provided below. Once a connection is established between the mobile device 107a and the SS 104, the HCP may receive a confirmation message indicating that the BLE connection procedure is complete and successful.

[0079] Similar steps for establishing a secure wireless connection (e.g., a secure BLE connection) between the SS 104 and a counterpart system, such as the counterpart system 110 shown in FIG. 1A, may be performed by both the SS 104 and the counterpart system 110. For example, in certain embodiments, the HCP may scan the SSID using a barcode scanner attached to the computing device, as shown in FIG. 3A, or manually enter the SSID into the computing device. The computing device may communicate with the counterpart system 110 through a Wi-Fi router (e.g., shown as the BLE hub 108 in FIG. 1A and as the hospital Wi-Fi router in FIG. 3A). One or more software applications executing on the computing device may transmit the SSID to one or more software components executing in the counterpart system 110 (e.g., as described above with respect to FIG. 1A). In certain other embodiments, a mobile device may be used in place of a computing device. The other system 110 may then relay the received SSID to one or more BLE-enabled routers (e.g., shown as Wi-Fi / BLE router 108 in FIG. 1A and as other Wi-Fi / BLE router in FIG. 3A) located in the patient room. In a particular embodiment, the one or more BLE-enabled routers may use the received SSID to establish an initial connection between the other system 110 and the SS 104. At the end of the operations performed in block 206, the HCP may receive a confirmation message indicating that the BLE connection procedure between the other system 110 and the SS 104 is complete and successful.

[0080] The above-described onboarding operations 300A (eg, operations of blocks 202-208) may be understood with reference to the diagram provided in FIG. 3A.

[0081] 2, normal use operations 300B begin after SS 104 establishes one or more secure connections with one or more entities within the healthcare facility. Specifically, in block 210, the connected devices (e.g., SS 104, mobile device 107a, counterpart system 110, etc.) communicate using an encrypted connection. In certain embodiments, communicating using an encrypted connection may include communicating one or more analyte measurements using an encrypted connection between SS 104 and mobile device 107a and / or counterpart system 110. In certain embodiments, the patient's analyte data may also be passed to an EMR, such as EMR system 112 shown in FIG. 1A, managed by the hospital and / or nursing facility.

[0082] The normal use operations 300B described above, and more specifically, the operations at block 210, may be understood with reference to the diagram provided in FIG. 3B.

[0083] Discharge represents the point at which an inpatient's hospital care ends and ongoing care is transferred to another primary, community, or home environment. Thus, upon completion of the patient's inpatient care, the offboarding operation 300C may begin. The offboarding operation 300C begins in block 212 by the HCP resetting the application 106 to its initial state. Resetting the application 106 may include removing the SSID associated with the transmitter of the SS 104, as well as any information related to the patient from the application 106. In some cases, the application 106 may be wiped from the mobile device 107a. Similarly, in block 214, the HCP removes the SSID and patient information associated with the discharged patient from the counterpart system 110 device. In block 216, the offboarding process is completed by removing the SS 104 from the patient for cleaning, disinfection, and sterilization. Although not shown, in some cases, the offboarding operations 300C include generating a report about the patient before resetting the application to its initial state in block 212.

[0084] The offboarding operations 300C described above (eg, operations of blocks 212-216) may be understood with reference to the diagram provided in FIG. 3C.

[0085] 2 may be repeated each time a new patient is admitted to the hospital to establish a secure connection between devices for continuous monitoring of one or more analytes of the patient. In particular, when on-boarding and off-boarding devices such as display device 107 are used for each new patient, consideration may need to be given to achieving security in the new set-up, data cleaning / sanitization, etc. for each new patient in the hospital environment.

[0086] As discussed herein, the SS 104 may pair with the mobile device 107a, the receiver 107b, and / or one or more other wired or wireless devices. Thus, although FIG. 2 and FIG. 3A-3C only show establishing a connection between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a, in some other embodiments, similar steps may be followed to establish a connection between the SS 104 and the receiver 107b, the receiver 107b being deployed within a healthcare facility. However, unlike the mobile device 107a, the receiver 107b may not be able to scan the patient's SSID to establish an initial connection. Thus, in some cases, instead, a barcode scanner connected to a computing device may scan the SSID, and a configuration tool within the computing device may be used to configure the receiver 107b with the SSID (as well as with other configured settings, including, for example, thresholds for triggering alerts for the receiver 107b). In some other cases, the SSID may be entered into the receiver 107b by the HCP (the configuration tool may be used to configure other configured settings). The receiver 107b may follow operations similar to operations 200 to complete the onboarding operations, and more specifically, achieve authenticated pairing with the SS 104.

[0087] Authenticated pairing with non-input / non-output devices Establishing a secure wireless connection between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a, the receiver 107b, and / or one or more other devices in the healthcare facility may involve engaging in identification, authentication, pairing, and / or bonding protocols or methods. The identification protocol may be designed, for example, to enable the mobile device 107a and / or the receiver 107b to effectively identify the SS 104 while reducing the likelihood that an attacker can obtain any information during the identification process that may be useful in impersonating the SS 104, the mobile device 107a, and / or the receiver 107b. The authentication protocol may be designed to enable each of the SS 104, the mobile device 107a, and / or the receiver 107b to verify whether the other peer device is trusted by the device's user and / or root authority. Additionally, the pairing and bonding protocols may be designed to enable the exchange of information between the SS 104, the mobile device 107a, and / or the receiver 107b to establish an encrypted connection for communication.

[0088] In certain embodiments, the SS 104, the mobile device 107a, and / or the receiver 107b may conform to one or more wireless protocols and standards (e.g., Bluetooth, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), ANT protocol, Wi-Fi, Near Field Communication (NFC), etc.). For example, the SS 104, the mobile device 107a, and / or the receiver 107b may be configured with Bluetooth-related hardware and software for communication. As such, the SS 104, the mobile device 107a, and / or the receiver 107b may engage in identification, authentication, pairing, and / or bonding in accordance with the BLE standard.

[0089] As mentioned herein, the BLE standard may require different protocols or methods of pairing for different levels of security defined by BLE. The protocol used by devices for pairing may determine the strength of authentication of the pairing, which directly correlates to the level of security achieved by the devices. To achieve the highest level of security (e.g., security mode 1, level 4 defined by BLE), devices may be required to engage in authenticated pairing at the BLE layer with secure exchange of cryptographic keys, and in some cases to further engage in a key agreement protocol to generate long-term keys (e.g., by using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (EDCH) key agreement for LE Secure Connections). Devices engaging in authenticated pairing with LE Secure protocols may achieve a higher level of security because authenticated pairing facilitates protection of communications from man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, while LE Secure protocols such as those with EDCH facilitate protection of communications from passive eavesdropping.

[0090] Thus, according to certain embodiments described herein, the SS 104, the mobile device 107a, and the receiver 107b may be configured to engage in authenticated pairing using a cryptographic key exchange protocol (and in some cases, further engage in EDCH after authenticated pairing is achieved) to achieve the enhanced security recommended in healthcare facilities. In certain embodiments, the SS 104, the mobile device 107a, and the receiver 107b may be configured to engage in an I / O-based pairing method, such as passkey entry pairing, in accordance with the BLE standard for authenticated pairing. However, if the SS 104 is designed as a non-input / non-output device, the I / O-based method may not be feasible. For example, as mentioned herein, to verify each bit of a passkey using an I / O-based pairing method, such as passkey entry pairing, the passkey must first be passed between the peer devices. Typically, in an I / O-based pairing method, a user sees a randomly generated and displayed passkey on a first device with output / display capabilities and enters the passkey on a second device with input / keyboard capabilities. If one of the devices is not designed with input and output capabilities, it may not be possible to pass a passkey between devices for verification using I / O based pairing.

[0091] Accordingly, embodiments of the present disclosure introduce a method for deriving a passkey at each of the peer devices for verification, thereby eliminating the need for both devices to have I / O capabilities. Specifically, embodiments herein describe systems and methods for achieving authenticated pairing (e.g., recommended to improve security in the healthcare industry) using a passkey derived at the application layer at both devices. In some cases, the passkey derived at the application layer includes a passkey derived from K-auth that is generated as a result of running a PAKE algorithm. Different embodiments may provide different methods for authenticated pairing based on the display device 107 with which the SS 104 is paired. For example, in one particular embodiment, a method is provided for achieving authenticated pairing between the SS 104 and a mobile device 107a having a first OS (e.g., a commercially available OS that is not restricted from passing a passkey from the application layer of the mobile device 107a to the BLE layer). In a particular embodiment, a method is provided for achieving authenticated pairing between the SS 104 and a mobile device 107a having a second OS (e.g., a commercially available OS that is restricted from passing a passkey from an application layer of the mobile device 107a to a BLE layer). In a particular embodiment, a method is provided for achieving authenticated pairing between the SS 104 and a receiver 107b.

[0092] 4 is a call flow diagram 400 illustrating the execution of a security protocol for the establishment of a secure wireless communication between the SS 104 and a mobile device 107a having a first OS, according to certain embodiments disclosed herein. As mentioned, the first OS may be a commercially available OS that is not restricted from passing a passkey from an application layer of the mobile device 107a to a BLE layer. As described in more detail below, the first OS executing on the mobile device 107a may enable information, including a passkey, to be passed from the application layer to the BLE layer using an application programming interface (API) (e.g., a BLE API) provided by the OS to the application layer. Although the call flow diagram 400 illustrates the execution of a security protocol for the establishment of a secure wireless communication between the SS 104 and a mobile device 107a having a first OS, the steps illustrated in the call flow diagram 400 may be similarly followed when establishing a secure wireless communication between the SS 104 and one of a variety of other devices (e.g., a router, a hub, or any other computing device) having a similar or identical OS to the first OS.

[0093] In a particular embodiment, the transmitter of the SS 104 is configured with an SSID and a pairing code. In a particular case, the SSID and pairing code may be indicated (e.g., printed or located) on the SS 104 itself or on its packaging. In a particular embodiment, the pairing code refers to a Bluetooth pairing code that may be used later for authentication between the mobile device 107a and the SS 104, as well as the actual pairing between the two devices. In a particular embodiment, another code or password may be used instead of the pairing code.

[0094] Once the user has obtained the SSID and pairing code, as shown in step 402 of FIG. 4, the user provides the SSID and pairing code as input to a mobile health application, such as application 106, running on the mobile device 107a during a set-up process. Alternatively, the user may use the mobile device 107a, which may include an image scanner, to scan a barcode or QR code located on the SS 104 itself or on its packaging. The barcode or QR code may indicate the SSID as well as the pairing code. In certain other embodiments, one of many other techniques may be used to provide the mobile device 107a with access to the SSID and pairing code.

[0095] Upon receiving the SSID, the mobile device 107a starts scanning for SSs with the same SSID in step 404. At the same time, the SS 104 may be configured to advertise the SSID after the user places the SS 104 on his or her body and activates the transmitter of the SS 104 in step 404. It should be noted that in some cases, the advertised SSID may include a modified or derived version of the SSID.

[0096] The mobile device 107a may then compare the SSID obtained by the mobile device 107a in step 402 (e.g., from a user, through scanning a bar / QR code, etc.) with the SSID advertised by the SS 104 in step 404. If the obtained SSID and the advertised SSID are the same, the mobile device 107a identifies that the SS 104 that advertised the SSID in step 404 is the correct SS to connect to.

[0097] As shown in FIG. 4, once the mobile device 107a identifies the SS 104 as the correct SS to connect to, the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a may be configured to authenticate each other using one or more authentication protocols. For example, the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a may engage in a user-centric mutual authentication protocol. The user-centric mutual authentication protocol allows each of the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a to generate a K-auth based on a shared secret (e.g., a pairing code). In one particular embodiment, the K-auth is an advanced encryption standard (AES) key. If both the mobile device 107a and the SS 104 generate the same K-auth, the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a may conclude that the other possesses the shared secret and is therefore trusted by the user.

[0098] The user-centric authentication protocol may include one of a variety of PAKE algorithms. The distinguishing feature of PAKE is that one device (e.g., SS 104) can authenticate itself to another device (e.g., mobile device 107a) using a password or shared secret (e.g., pairing code), so that unauthorized parties (those who control the communication channel but do not own the password) cannot participate in the method and are constrained as much as possible from brute-force guessing of the password. If an attacker engages in a PAKE protocol with a device, he or she can only make a single guess of the shared secret and further only knows that the guess was incorrect. No other information is leaked.

[0099] One of a variety of PAKE algorithms may be used as part of a user-centric authentication protocol, including Juggling PAKE or J-PAKE, elliptic curve cryptography (EC-J-PAKE), simple password exponential key exchange (SPEKE), common reference string-J-PAKE (CRS-J-PAKE), Augmented Composable Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (AuCPace), BSPEKE (the "B" extension to SPEKE), zero-knowledge PAKE (zkPAKE), client to client PAKE (C2C-PAKE), and encrypted key exchange (EKE).

[0100] In one particular embodiment, the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a generate a K-auth based on executing a PAKE protocol, as shown in step 406 of Figure 4. The mobile device 107a may be configured to execute the PAKE protocol via an application 106 executing on the mobile device 107a. After executing PAKE, both devices possess the same K-auth.

[0101] In a particular embodiment, the K-auth derived during PAKE may be used to generate a passkey at the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a. Generating a passkey based on the K-auth may include creating a passkey that is different from but based on the K-auth (e.g., by hashing or encrypting the K-auth) or using the K-auth itself as a passkey. As described in more detail below, generating a passkey from the K-auth may eliminate the need to have two devices with I / O capabilities to achieve authenticated pairing using an I / O-based pairing method such as a passkey entry pairing method. Thus, in step 408, the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a may generate a passkey at the application layer based on the K-auth. The mobile device 107a may be configured by the application 106 to generate a passkey from the K-auth.

[0102] After generating the passkey in step 410, the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a may begin pairing. Pairing is performed to establish keys that may be used to encrypt the link. Generally, there are three phases for pairing in LE secure connection pairing: phase 1 for pairing feature exchange, phase 2 for key generation method selection and authentication, and phase 3 for long term key (LTK) generation.

[0103] During pairing phase 1, security features including, for example, I / O capabilities, requirements for MITM protection, etc. are exchanged between the devices. Such exchange of security features may occur via pairing request and pairing response packets. Thus, to initiate pairing between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a, in step 410, the mobile device 107a is configured (according to its BLE configuration) to send a pairing request to the SS 104. The pairing request may identify the I / O capabilities of the mobile device 107a as well as an indication of the I / O capabilities that the SS 104 has that the mobile device 107a is requesting. In response to the pairing request from the mobile device 107a, in step 412, the SS 104 may send a pairing response to the mobile device 107a with the security features it supports.

[0104] Although the exemplary embodiment of FIG. 4 shows the mobile device 107a sending a pairing request to the SS 104 in step 410 and the SS 104 responding to the pairing request in step 412, in certain other embodiments, the pairing request may be sent by the SS 104 to the mobile device 107a, and the mobile device 107a may be configured to respond to the pairing request received from the SS 104.

[0105] The combination of features supported between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a may determine which pairing model may be used to generate encryption keys in pairing phase 2. In particular, different pairing models may require different conditions to be met before using the method for pairing. For example, to perform an I / O-based pairing method such as passkey entry pairing, at least one peer device needs to be designed with an input capability to enter a passkey, and the other peer device needs to be designed with a display capability to display the passkey.

[0106] Therefore, it is a technical challenge to perform passkey entry pairing for an SS 104 that has neither input nor output capabilities. However, to overcome this technical challenge, aspects described herein provide techniques to avoid such I / O capability requirements. Specifically, according to certain aspects, the SS 104 may be configured to report a false I / O capability in its pairing response sent in step 412 to trigger execution of a passkey entry pairing protocol. For example, in certain embodiments, the SS 104 may be configured to report a false output / display capability to the mobile device 107a, thereby causing the mobile device 107a to skip generating a random passkey, as the peer device may be configured to do (per its BLE configuration) when reporting input-only capability or reporting no capability. More specifically, instead of disclosing its actual capabilities (e.g., no I / O capabilities), the SS 104 may be configured to report to the mobile device 107a in step 412 that the SS 104 has output / display capabilities. As a result, in response, the mobile device 107a does not generate a random six-digit passkey for pairing. Instead, the mobile device 107a is tricked into assuming that the SS 104 is going to generate and display a passkey. Fooling the mobile device 107a in this manner allows a passkey generated at the application layer on the mobile device 107a (e.g., in step 408) to be used by the mobile device 107a to perform a passkey entry pairing protocol, as described further below.

[0107] Phase 2 of the passkey entry pairing protocol, e.g., authentication, may be performed at the BLE layer of each of the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a. Thus, the passkey generated at the application layer of each of the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a in step 408 may need to be communicated to the BLE layer prior to the execution of phase 2 of the passkey entry pairing protocol. The SS 104, being a proprietary system, may be configured by the manufacturer to pass the application layer passkey from the application layer to the BLE layer. However, passing the application layer passkey from the application layer to the BLE layer in a mobile device 107a running a commercial OS may be a technical challenge depending on the type of OS used by the mobile device 107a.

[0108] In some cases, as described with respect to FIG. 4, the mobile device 107a may execute an OS that allows information to be passed from the application layer to the BLE layer using APIs provided by the OS to the application layer. In such cases, the passkey derived from K-auth at the application layer of the mobile device 107a is passed to the BLE layer using APIs exposed to the application layer. In other words, the passkey is sent directly from the application 106 running on the mobile device 107a to the BLE layer. This may be accomplished without user interaction and / or any pop-up dialogs.

[0109] In some other cases, the mobile device 107a is configured with an OS that does not allow the passkey to be passed to the BLE layer. In such cases, to overcome this technical challenge, certain embodiments herein involve techniques for utilizing user interaction to pass the passkey derived from K-auth at the application layer to the BLE layer. Specifically, in certain embodiments, the user of the mobile device 107a may be required to enter the passkey in a popup dialog on the mobile device 107a. This case may be described in more detail below with respect to the call flow diagram 500 of FIG. 5.

[0110] 4 illustrates pairing between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a using an OS that does not restrict passing the passkey from the application layer to the BLE layer, the mobile device 107a may fill in the passkey, in other words, may directly send the passkey to the BLE layer using an API, in step 414. Similarly, in step 414, the SS 104 may be programmed to send the passkey generated in step 408 to the BLE layer of the SS 104.

[0111] In step 416, the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a may engage in an authentication process to verify each bit of the passkey. The authentication process is a method of gradually disclosing each bit of the passkey (e.g., between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a) until all bits of the passkey are verified. Assuming that all bits of the passkey maintained in the SS 104 match all bits of the passkey maintained in the mobile device 107a, the authentication may be considered successful. However, if the passkeys do not match, the pairing is aborted. Generally, such a mismatch indicates that an attacker has eavesdropped on the communication between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a. Alternatively, as described below with respect to the call flow diagram 500 of FIG. 5, if the user is prompted to enter a passkey on the device, a mismatch may indicate that the user has entered an incorrect key in a pop-up dialog. In this case, the mobile device 107a may be configured to indicate to the user that the entered passkey is incorrect. Assuming the passkeys match, the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a may then perform phase 3 of the passkey entry pairing protocol and calculate the LTK in step 416. In one particular embodiment, the LTK is a 128-bit key used to generate contributing session keys for the encrypted connection.

[0112] In one particular embodiment, the session key is any encryption key used to symmetrically encrypt only one communication session between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a. In other words, the session key is a temporary key used only once during one time period to encrypt and decrypt data. In contrast, future communications between the two parties are encrypted with a different session key. Thus, in step 418, the session key can be used to encrypt the connection between the two devices.

[0113] In step 420, the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a engage in bonding. In some embodiments, the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a may store additional information about each other during the bonding process. For example, after encrypting the connection in step 418, the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a bond by exchanging the LTK and storing the LTK for later use. In other words, bonding refers to the creation of persistent security between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a.

[0114] After pairing and bonding, the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a are ready to exchange data over the secure connection. For example, the SS 104 may encrypt data (e.g., at the BLE layer) including analyte measurements associated with the user for transmission to the mobile device 107a in step 422. The mobile device 107a may similarly encrypt data for transmission to the SS 104.

[0115] At a later time (not shown in FIG. 4) after the communication between SS 104 and mobile device 107a is completed, SS 104 and mobile device 107a may disconnect. For example, in a particular embodiment, for power saving purposes, SS 104 may periodically exchange data with mobile device 107a (e.g., by periodically switching between sleep mode and operating mode). For example, in a particular embodiment, SS 104 may "wake up" every few minutes (e.g., 5 minutes) to exchange data with mobile device 107a, but may enter sleep mode during the 5 minute interval. Each time SS 104 "wakes up", SS 104 and mobile device 107a may execute a security protocol to re-establish a secure wireless connection between the two devices. The security protocol to re-establish a secure wireless connection between the two devices may include all or only certain steps of the operations shown in FIG. 4. In some cases, the type of connection between the two devices (e.g., always connected, reconnecting every 5 minute interval, etc.) may determine what protocol is required to re-establish the secure wireless connection.

[0116] Further details regarding the identification, authentication, pairing, and / or bonding described with respect to Figure 4 may be found in various specifications for such technologies (e.g., the Bluetooth specification), which are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety. The specifications may be provided by governing bodies for such technologies.

[0117] It should be noted that some of the steps shown in Figure 4 may be performed in a different order than that shown in Figure 4, or may be performed in parallel or overlapping in time, and thus the reference numbers assigned to the different steps shown in Figure 4 may not be indicative of the order in which they are performed in a particular embodiment.

[0118] As mentioned herein, in some cases, the SS 104 may establish a wireless connection with a mobile device 107a having an OS that restricts passing a passkey from an application layer to a BLE layer (e.g., a mobile device 107a having a different OS (i.e., a second OS) than the mobile device 107a shown in FIG. 4). Accordingly, FIG. 5 is a call flow diagram 500 illustrating the execution of a security protocol for establishing a secure wireless communication between the SS 104 and a mobile device 107a having a second OS (e.g., where passing a passkey from an application layer of the mobile device 107a to a BLE layer is restricted) in accordance with certain embodiments disclosed herein. Although the call flow diagram 500 illustrates the execution of a security protocol for the establishment of a secure wireless communication between the SS 104 and a mobile device 107a having a second OS, the steps illustrated in the call flow diagram 500 may be similarly followed when establishing a secure wireless communication between the SS 104 and one of various other devices (e.g., a router, a hub, or any other computing device) having an OS similar or identical to the second OS.

[0119] Steps 402-412 of FIG. 5 may be similar to steps 402-412 described with respect to FIG. 4. However, in contrast to FIG. 4, after a pairing response (e.g., indicating the transmitter's false display / output capabilities) is sent in step 412 and passkey entry pairing is selected as the method for authentication, the mobile device 107a may be configured to automatically copy the passkey generated in step 408 to the clipboard. The mobile device 107a may be configured to automatically copy the passkey (e.g., a six-digit decimal number) to the clipboard via an application 106 running on the mobile device 107a. As used herein, a clipboard refers to a temporary buffer designed to hold data content for cut-copy-paste operations. When data is moved in the OS environment of the mobile device 107a, the data is stored on the clipboard. Generally, the clipboard content is temporary and resides in the random access memory (RAM) of the mobile device 107a. Although FIG. 5 shows that the passkey is copied to the clipboard in step 524 after the pairing request packet and pairing response packet are sent in steps 410 and 412, respectively, in some cases the passkey is copied to the clipboard before the mobile device 107a sends the pairing request in step 410.

[0120] In step 526, the passkey copied to the mobile device 107a clipboard may be displayed to the user. For example, the passkey may be displayed in the UI of the mobile device 107a for viewing (and in some cases copying by the user). In some cases, in step 528, the user copies the displayed passkey and pastes it into a pop-up dialog or window. In one particular embodiment, the pop-up dialog is generated in response to a user of the mobile device 107a selecting the SS 104 as a device to pair with the mobile device 107a. For example, the user may select the SS 104 from a list of detected Bluetooth devices that may be paired with the mobile device 107a. After selecting the SS 104 from the list of detected devices, a pop-up dialog may be generated for the user to enter the passkey.

[0121] Once the passkey is entered in the popup dialog, the passkey is communicated to the BLE layer. In some other cases, the user may prefer to type the passkey instead of pasting it. Thus, in some cases, in step 528, the user types the passkey displayed in the popup dialog displayed by the mobile device 107a. Thus, the popup dialog may be designed to allow the user to paste the passkey and / or type the passkey. Once the passkey is entered in the popup dialog, the passkey is communicated to the BLE layer. Similar to step 414 of FIG. 4, in step 524 of FIG. 5, the SS 104 is also programmed to send the passkey generated in step 408 to the BLE layer.

[0122] The remaining steps 416-422 in Figure 5 are similar to steps 416-422 in Figure 4 for establishing secure wireless communication between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a. Additionally, similar to Figure 4, the steps shown in Figure 5 may be performed in a different order than that shown in Figure 5, or may be performed in parallel or overlapping in time. Thus, the reference numbers assigned to the different steps shown in Figure 4 may not be indicative of the order in which they are performed in a particular embodiment.

[0123] In certain embodiments where SS 104 is pairing with a unique receiver, such as receiver 107b shown in Figures 1A and 1B, the two devices may also engage in authentication, pairing, and bonding protocols similar to those described above with respect to Figures 4 and 5. However, unlike Figures 4 and 5, when SS 104 is pairing with receiver 107b, SS 104 may be configured to report to receiver 107b that SS 104 has input / keyboard capabilities instead of disclosing its actual capabilities (e.g., no I / O capabilities). Thus, receiver 107b may be prompted to generate a passkey to display to SS 104. However, instead of generating a random passkey to pair with SS 104, receiver 107b may be programmed to derive the passkey from K-auth. The receiver 107b may further be programmed to allow a passkey to be passed to the BLE layer without any API (e.g., unlike FIG. 4 where the passkey is passed to the BLE layer via an API) or without user interaction (e.g., unlike FIG. 5 where the passkey is passed to the BLE layer via user interaction), where the passkey is used for authentication.

[0124] In the case where the SS 104 is pairing with both the mobile device 107a and the receiver 107b simultaneously, the SS 104 may be configured to report different false capabilities when establishing a connection with the mobile device 107a and when establishing a connection with the receiver 107b so that the SS 104 may be able to distinguish between the two connections or pairing processes. Specifically, when two or more devices attempt to pair with the SS 104 simultaneously, there may be no way to separate the interactions between the devices. Thus, different false capabilities for pairing with the mobile device 107a and the receiver 107b are reported by the SS 104 to distinguish between (1) the interaction between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a and (2) the interaction between the SS 104 and the receiver 107b. In certain embodiments, distinguishing between the two types of connections is advantageous to identify devices where the pairing process is not controlled by an application or application layer (e.g., commercial mobile devices, devices running a real-time operating system (RTOS), etc.). It should be noted that a device that is not under control of the pairing process at the application layer may request the transmitter to initiate the pairing process.

[0125] It should be noted that when the transmitter pairs with one or more other devices that do not include their own or built-in receiver (such as the other system 110 shown in FIG. 1A), similar methods described with respect to pairing between the SS 104 and the mobile device 107a above with respect to FIGS. 4 and 5 may be used to establish a secure wireless connection.

[0126] Co-located Application Attacks In certain embodiments, achieving increased security among devices deployed within a healthcare facility may require addressing two vulnerabilities: (1) passive eavesdropping or MITM attacks, and (2) co-located application attacks (e.g., an unauthorized application co-located on a BLE device accessing pairing-protected data from the BLE device). Authenticated pairing, for example, using the methods described above, provides sufficient MITM protection against current vulnerabilities. In some embodiments, a co-located application attack vulnerability may also exist.

[0127] Co-located application attacks may be a concern when the SS 104 pairs with the mobile device 107a but not with the receiver 107b. For example, the receiver 107b may be considered a proprietary receiver on which no additional applications may be installed. Thus, the receiver 107b may not be vulnerable to co-located application attacks when deployed. However, the mobile device 107a may run multiple applications.

[0128] Thus, in a particular embodiment where the SS 104 pairs with the mobile device 107a, in order to minimize vulnerability to co-located application attacks, the mobile device 107a may be configured to apply the principle of least privilege. The Principle of Least Privilege states that a subject should be given only the privileges necessary to complete its task. Thus, the principle of least privilege implemented by the mobile device 107a may limit the privileges of other applications (except for the application 106 described above with respect to FIG. 1A) executing on the mobile device 107a to protect against co-located application attacks (e.g., other applications are given the minimum privileges necessary to perform their functions).

[0129] Each of these non-limiting examples can stand alone or can be combined in various permutations or combinations with one or more of the other examples. The above detailed description includes reference to the accompanying drawings, which form a part of the detailed description. The drawings show, by way of illustration, specific embodiments in which the invention may be practiced. These embodiments are also referred to herein as "examples." Such examples may include elements in addition to those shown or described. However, the inventors also contemplate examples in which only those elements shown or described are provided. Furthermore, the inventors also contemplate examples that use any combination or permutation of those elements (or one or more aspects thereof) shown or described with respect to a particular example (or one or more aspects thereof) or with respect to other examples (or one or more aspects thereof) shown or described herein.

[0130] In the event of a conflict of usage between this document and any document incorporated by reference, the usage in this document takes precedence.

[0131] In this document, the terms "a" or "an" are used to include one or more, as is common in patent documents, regardless of other instances or usages of "at least one" or "one or more." In this document, the term "or" is used to refer to a non-exclusive, such that "A or B" includes "A but not B," "B but not A," "A and B," unless otherwise indicated. In this document, the terms "including" and "in which" are used as the plain English equivalents of the respective terms "comprising" and "wherein." Also, in the following claims, the terms "including" and "comprising" are open-ended, i.e., a system, device, article, composition, formulation, or process that includes elements in addition to those recited after such terms in a claim will still be deemed to be within the scope of that claim. Moreover, in the following claims, the terms "first," "second," and "third," etc., are used merely as labels and are not intended to impose numerical requirements on their objects.

[0132] Geometric terms such as "parallel," "perpendicular," "circular," "square," and the like are not intended to require absolute mathematical precision unless the context indicates otherwise. Instead, such geometric terms allow for variations due to manufacturing or equivalent functions. For example, if an element is described as "circular" or "approximately circular," components that are not exactly round (e.g., those that are slightly elliptical or that are multi-sided polygons) are still encompassed by this description.

[0133] Examples of the methods described herein may be at least partially implemented in a machine or computer. Some examples may include a computer-readable medium or machine-readable medium encoded with instructions operable to configure an electronic device to perform the methods described in the examples above. Implementations of such methods may include code, such as microcode, assembly language code, high-level language code, etc. Such code may include computer-readable instructions for performing various methods. This code may form part of a computer program product. Further, in examples, the code may be tangibly stored on one or more volatile, non-transitory, or non-volatile tangible computer-readable media, such as during execution or at other times. Examples of these tangible computer-readable media may include, but are not limited to, hard disks, removable magnetic disks, removable optical disks (e.g., compact disks and digital video disks), magnetic cassettes, memory cards or sticks, random access memory (RAM), read only memory (ROM), etc.

[0134] The above description is intended to be illustrative, not restrictive. For example, the above examples (or one or more aspects thereof) may be used in combination with each other. Other embodiments may be used, such as those by one of ordinary skill in the art upon reviewing the above description. The Abstract is provided to comply with 37 CFR §1.72(b) to enable the reader to quickly grasp the nature of the technical disclosure. It is submitted with the understanding that it will not be used to interpret or limit the scope or spirit of the claims. Also, in the above Detailed Description, various features may be grouped together to streamline the disclosure. This should not be construed as intending that any unclaimed disclosed feature is essential to any claim. Rather, the subject matter of the invention may lie in less than all features of a particular disclosed embodiment. Thus, the following claims are incorporated into the Detailed Description as examples or embodiments, with each claim standing on its own as a separate embodiment, and it is contemplated that such embodiments can be combined with each other in various combinations or permutations. The scope of the invention should be determined with reference to the appended claims, along with the full scope of equivalents to which such claims are entitled.

Claims

1. 1. A method for facilitating secure communication between a display device and a sensor system for measuring an analyte level, comprising: performing, at an application layer of the display device, a password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol with the sensor system to derive an authentication key; performing, at the display device, an authenticated pairing protocol with the sensor system, the performing of the authenticated pairing protocol comprising: receiving an indication of a first input / output (I / O) capability from the sensor system at the display device, the sensor system not configured with the first I / O capability; obtaining a passkey derived based on the authentication key at the application layer of the display device; authenticating the sensor system by verifying that the passkey matches another passkey generated at the sensor system, the other passkey being derived by the sensor system from executing the PAKE protocol at an application layer of the sensor system; establishing an encrypted connection between the display device and the sensor system after the authenticating is successful; receiving analyte data indicative of a measured analyte level from the sensor system over the encrypted connection at the display device.

2. Establishing the encrypted connection between the display device and the sensor system calculating a long-term key (LTK) used to generate a session key at a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) layer of the display device; establishing, by the display device, an encrypted channel with the sensor system using the session key; and performing a bonding procedure at the display device with the sensor system.

3. and transmitting to the sensor system a request to initiate pairing with the sensor system, the indication of the first I / O capabilities received at the display device being transmitted by the sensor system in response to the request. The method of claim 1.

4. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the display device is a mobile device having a mobile operating system (OS), the first I / O capabilities indicated by the sensor system include an output capability, the sensor system is not configured with the output capability, and the indication of the output capability prompts the mobile device to refrain from generating a random passkey.

5. 5. The method of claim 4, wherein the mobile OS of the mobile device obtains the passkey using a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) application programming interface (API) at a Bluetooth Low Energy layer of the mobile device, the passkey being derived by the mobile device by executing the PAKE protocol at the application layer.

6. obtaining the passkey derived based on the authentication key at the application layer of the display device; displaying the passkey to a user of the mobile device; and and displaying a popup dialog on a user interface of the mobile device to receive the passkey as user input, wherein the mobile device is configured to pass the passkey received as user input at the application layer to a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) layer of the mobile device.

7. The passkey is Copying the passkey displayed on the mobile device and pasting the passkey into the popup dialog; or The method of claim 6 , wherein the user input is received by the user typing the passkey displayed on the mobile device into the popup dialog.

8. 5. The method of claim 4, wherein the mobile device is configured to have a number of applications executing on the mobile device, and further configured with the principle of least privilege to provide only those permissions required to execute applications used to receive the analyte data from the sensor system.

9. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the display device is a receiver, the first I / O capabilities indicated by the sensor system include an input capability, and the sensor system is not configured with the input capability.

10. 10. The method of claim 9, wherein the receiver is configured to obtain, at a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) layer of the receiver, the passkey derived from executing the PAKE protocol at the application layer of the receiver.

11. The method of claim 9 , wherein the receiver is configured to have only one application executing on the receiver for receiving the analyte data.

12. the passkey derived based on the authentication key, includes the authentication key derived from running the PAKE protocol; or 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the authentication key is based on the authentication key derived from running the PAKE protocol.

13. 1. A method for facilitating secure communication between a sensor system for measuring an analyte level and a display device, comprising: performing, at an application layer of the sensor system, a password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol with the display device to derive an authentication key; performing an authenticated pairing protocol with the display device at the sensor system, the performing the authenticated pairing protocol comprising: transmitting an indication of a first input / output (I / O) capability from the sensor system to the display device, the sensor system not being configured with the first I / O capability; obtaining a passkey derived based on the authentication key at the application layer of the sensor system; authenticating the sensor system by verifying that the passkey matches another passkey generated at the display device, the other passkey being derived by the display device from executing the PAKE protocol at an application layer of the display device; establishing an encrypted connection between the sensor system and the display device after the authenticating is successful; transmitting analyte data indicative of the measured analyte level from the sensor system to the display device over the encrypted connection.

14. Establishing the encrypted connection between the display device and the sensor system Calculating a long-term key (LTK) at the sensor system for use in generating a session key; establishing, at the sensor system, an encrypted channel with the display device using the session key; and performing a bonding procedure in the sensor system with the display device.

15. and receiving a request from the display device to initiate pairing with the display device, the indication of the first I / O capabilities transmitted from the sensor system to the display device being transmitted in response to the request. The method of claim 13.

16. 14. The method of claim 13, wherein the display device is a mobile device having a mobile operating system (OS), the first I / O capabilities indicated by the sensor system include an output capability, the sensor system is not configured with the output capability, and the indication of the output capability prompts the mobile device to refrain from generating a random passkey.

17. 14. The method of claim 13, wherein the display device is a receiver, the first I / O capabilities indicated by the sensor system include an input capability, and the sensor system is not configured with the input capability.

18. 14. The method of claim 13, wherein the sensor system is pre-configured to obtain, at a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) layer of the sensor system, the passkey derived from executing the PAKE protocol at the application layer of the sensor system.

19. the passkey derived based on the authentication key, includes the authentication key derived from running the PAKE protocol; or 14. The method of claim 13, wherein the authentication key is based on the authentication key derived from running the PAKE protocol.

20. 1. A sensor system comprising: an analyte sensor operable to generate an analyte measurement; a sensor electronics module, the sensor electronics module comprising: a memory containing executable instructions; a processor in data communication with the memory and configured to execute the instructions to provide the sensor system with: performing a password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol with a display device at an application layer of the sensor system to derive an authentication key; In the sensor system, performing an authenticated pairing protocol with the display device, the processor being configured to perform the authenticated pairing protocol, the processor comprising: transmitting an indication of a first input / output (I / O) capability from the sensor system to the display device, the sensor system not being configured with the first I / O capability; obtaining a passkey derived based on the authentication key at the application layer of the sensor system; authenticating the sensor system by verifying that the passkey matches another passkey generated at the display device, the other passkey being derived by the display device from executing the PAKE protocol at an application layer of the display device; establishing an encrypted connection between the sensor system and the display device after the authenticating is successful; and transmitting analyte data indicative of the analyte measurements from the sensor system to the display device over the encrypted connection.

21. The processor is configured to establish the encrypted connection between the display device and the sensor system, Calculating a long-term key (LTK) at the sensor system, which is used to generate a session key; establishing, at the sensor system, an encrypted channel with the display device using the session key; and The sensor system of claim 20 , further comprising: the sensor system being configured to perform a bonding procedure with the display device.

22. The processor, 21. The sensor system of claim 20, further configured to receive a request from the display device to initiate pairing with the display device, wherein the indication of the first I / O capabilities sent from the sensor system to the display device is sent in response to the request.

23. 21. The sensor system of claim 20, wherein the display device is a mobile device having a mobile operating system (OS), the first I / O capabilities indicated by the sensor system include an output capability, the sensor system is not configured with the output capability, and the indication of the output capability prompts the mobile device to refrain from generating a random passkey.

24. 21. The sensor system of claim 20, wherein the display device is a receiver, the first I / O capabilities indicated by the sensor system include an input capability, and the sensor system is not configured with the input capability.

25. 21. The sensor system of claim 20, wherein the sensor system is pre-configured to obtain, at a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) layer of the sensor system, the passkey derived from executing the PAKE protocol at the application layer of the sensor system.

26. the passkey derived based on the authentication key, The sensor system of claim 20 , including or based on the authentication key derived from executing the PAKE protocol.

Citation Information

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