Product management system

Abstract

To provide a product management system, a product device, a product management method, and a non-transitory computer readable medium capable of verifying authenticity of the product device in a supply chain.SOLUTION: The product management system includes an issuing unit, an authentication unit, a data registration unit, and an output unit. When receiving a certificate issuance request from the product device, the issuance unit generates a public key certificate including a public key, a U (Unique) ID of the product device, and a signature of a certificate authority, and stores a secret key in a hardware security module (HSM) of the product device. When receiving an authentication request from the product equipment, the authentication unit verifies the public key certificate, and verifies whether or not the authentication data is signed with the private key by using the public key in the public key certificate. When a use start request is received from the successfully authenticated product device, the output part reads the product history data registered in association with the UID included in the public key certificate of the product device from the storage, and outputs output information related to the product history data.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 1

Description

[Technical Field]

[0001] The present disclosure relates to a product management system, a product device, a product management method, and a non-transitory computer-readable medium. [Background technology]

[0002] In recent years, security risks have been increasing in supply chains for manufacturing, inspection, logistics, etc. due to the falsification of inspection data of product devices, the substitution of product devices, etc. For example, Patent Document 1 discloses a method of calculating a hash value based on item data attached to a delivery item and node identification data of a trader, and attaching the hash value as item data to a shipping item to be shipped to another trader. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]

[0003] [Patent Document 1] International Publication No. 2021 / 002226 Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0004] However, the method described in the above-mentioned Patent Document 1 has a problem in that if a shipped item is switched or spoofed before the item data is attached, it is difficult to verify these events.

[0005] In view of the above-mentioned problems, an object of the present disclosure is to provide a product management system, a product device, a product management method, and a non-transitory computer-readable medium that can verify the authenticity of product devices in a supply chain. [Means for solving the problem]

[0006] A product management system according to one aspect of the present disclosure includes: an issuing means for generating a public key certificate including a public key of the product device, a UID that is information that uniquely identifies the product device, and a signature of a certificate authority when a certificate issuance request is received from a product device having a hardware security module (HSM), and for causing the HSM to set a private key that is paired with the public key of the product device; When an authentication request including a public key certificate and authentication data with a signature of the product device is received from the product device, verifying the public key certificate included in the certification request using a CA public key that is paired with the CA private key used by the certification authority for signing; verifying whether the authentication data is signed with a private key that is paired with the public key, using the public key in the public key certificate included in the authentication request; an authentication means for determining that authentication has been successful when verification of the public key certificate included in the authentication request and verification of the signature attached to the authentication data are successful; a data registration means for registering product history data of the product device in association with the UID of the product device; an output means for, when receiving a start-of-use request from the product device that has been successfully authenticated, reading out product history data registered in association with the UID by using at least a UID included in the public key certificate of the product device, and outputting output information relating to the product history data; Equipped with.

[0007] A product device according to one aspect of the present disclosure includes: When a public key certificate including a public key and a UID is received from the product management system, a private key that is paired with the public key is set in the HSM, and the public key certificate is stored in storage; When started, the authentication data is signed using the private key set in the HSM, and an authentication request including the public key certificate stored in the storage and the signed authentication data is sent to the product management system.

[0008] A product management method according to one aspect of the present disclosure includes: When a certificate issuance request is received from a product device having an HSM, a public key certificate is generated that includes the public key of the product device, a UID that is information that uniquely identifies the product device, and a signature of a certificate authority, and a private key that is paired with the public key of the product device is set in the HSM; When an authentication request including a public key certificate and authentication data with a signature of the product device is received from the product device, verifying the public key certificate included in the certification request using a CA public key that is paired with the CA private key used by the certification authority for signing; verifying whether the authentication data is signed with a private key that is paired with the public key, using the public key in the public key certificate included in the authentication request; determining that the authentication has been successful if the verification of the public key certificate included in the authentication request and the verification of the signature attached to the authentication data are successful; Registering product history data of the product device in association with the UID of the product device; When a start-of-use request is received from a product device that has been successfully authenticated, the product history data registered in association with the UID is read using at least the UID included in the public key certificate of the product device, and output information regarding the product history data.

[0009] A non-transitory computer-readable medium according to one aspect of the present disclosure stores a program. The program has a function of, when receiving a certificate issuance request from a product device having an HSM, generating a public key certificate including the public key of the product device, a UID that is information that uniquely identifies the product device, and a signature of a certificate authority, and setting a private key that is a pair with the public key of the product device in the HSM; When an authentication request including a public key certificate and authentication data with a signature of the product device is received from the product device, verifying the public key certificate included in the certification request using a CA public key that is paired with the CA private key used by the certification authority for signing; verifying whether the authentication data is signed with a private key that is paired with the public key, using the public key in the public key certificate included in the authentication request; a function of determining that authentication has been successful when verification of the public key certificate included in the authentication request and verification of the signature attached to the authentication data are successful; A function of registering product history data of the product device in association with the UID of the product device; a function of, when receiving a start-of-use request from the product device that has been successfully authenticated, reading out product history data that has been registered in association with the UID by using at least the UID included in the public key certificate of the product device, and outputting output information related to the product history data; is realized by a computer. [Effects of the Invention]

[0010] The present disclosure provides a product management system, a product device, a product management method, and a non-transitory computer-readable medium that can verify the authenticity of product devices in a supply chain. [Brief explanation of the drawings]

[0011] [Figure 1] 1 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a system according to a first embodiment. [Figure 2] 1 is a flowchart showing a flow of product management according to the first embodiment. [Figure 3] 1 is a flowchart showing a flow of product management according to the first embodiment. [Figure 4] FIG. 10 is a block diagram showing the configuration of a system according to a second embodiment. [Figure 5] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a supply chain. [Figure 6] FIG. 10 is a block diagram showing the configuration of a product management system according to a second embodiment. [Figure 7] FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating data recorded in a data store. [Figure 8] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a data structure of a data store. [Figure 9] FIG. 10 is a block diagram showing the configuration of a product device according to a second embodiment. [Figure 10] FIG. 10 is a block diagram showing the configuration of an SCM device according to a second embodiment. [Figure 11] FIG. 10 is a sequence diagram showing an example of a flow of issuing a certificate for a product device in a manufacturing process according to the second embodiment. [Figure 12] FIG. 10 is a sequence diagram showing an example of a flow of product management in an inspection process according to the second embodiment. [Figure 13] 10 is a flowchart showing an example of a flow of client certificate verification according to the second embodiment. [Figure 14] FIG. 10 is a sequence diagram showing an example of a flow of issuing a certificate of an SCM device according to the second embodiment. [Figure 15] FIG. 10 is a sequence diagram showing an example of a flow of product management in a process after packaging according to the second embodiment. [Figure 16] FIG. 10 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the flow of data verification in the on-site procurement process according to the second embodiment. [Figure 17] FIG. 10 is a diagram illustrating an example of the data structure of a data store including manufacturing history data related to maintenance and disposal. [Figure 18] FIG. 10 is a block diagram showing the configuration of a product management system according to a third embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0012] <Preliminary review by the inventor> In recent years, there has been an increase in security risks in the supply chain due to the falsification of product history data, such as inspection data for product equipment, and the substitution of product equipment.For the procurement of product equipment in fields that require a particularly high level of security, procurement security guidelines such as NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) SP800 have been established, and this trend is imminent in Japan as well.

[0013] Until now, users who purchased a product device were unable to confirm that the product device had been manufactured, shipped, and delivered in an authentic state when they first started using it, i.e., when it began operation. As a result, users could be using a product device that had been switched or spoofed.

[0014] Although there have been cases where the authenticity of a product device has been verified within a single process by checking the internal integrity of the product device itself after manufacturing, it has not been possible to guarantee the authenticity of the product device across the entire supply chain.Furthermore, if a problem occurs along the way, such as tampering with product history data or switching or spoofing of a product device, it has not been possible to identify in which section the problem occurred.

[0015] In the following embodiment, a system is provided that allows a user who purchases a product device to verify, after delivery of the product device, that the product device is genuine, that it has been manufactured properly, and that there has been no substitution or impersonation of the product device or tampering with the product history data, at the start of operation.

[0016] <Embodiment 1> First, a first embodiment of the present disclosure will be described. FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the configuration of a system 1 according to the first embodiment. The system 1 is a computer system related to a supply chain of product devices 20. In this specification, the supply chain is a general term for processes including manufacturing, inspection, inventory management, logistics, maintenance and operation, and disposal of the product devices. The system 1 includes the product devices 20 and a product management system 10.

[0017] [Product equipment 20] The product device 20 is a personal computer, tablet, smartphone, or other information device purchased and used by a user. The product device 20 includes a communication unit 21, a hardware security module (HSM) 23, a storage 24, and a control unit 22.

[0018] The communication unit 21 is also referred to as a communication means. The communication unit 21 is a communication interface with the product management system 10.

[0019] The HSM 23 is a module that, when a private key (hereinafter also referred to as a client private key) distributed to the product device 20 is set in the HSM 23, manages the client private key to prevent it from leaking outside the product device 20. The HSM 23 is tamper-resistant. For example, the HSM 23 is a module that has been certified in accordance with standards such as FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard) 140-2, CC (Common Criteria for Information Technology Security), and JCMVP (Japan Cryptographic Module Validation Program).

[0020] Here, there are roughly two modes in which the HSM 23 manages the client private key. In the first mode, the HSM 23 stores the client private key therein. Because the HSM 23 is tamper-resistant, storing the client private key therein can prevent the client private key from leaking outside the HSM 23. In the second mode, the HSM 23 encrypts (wraps) the client private key with a private key unique to the HSM 23 stored therein, and stores the wrapped client private key in the storage 24. Here, too, storing the private key unique to the HSM 23 therein can prevent the private key unique to the HSM 23 from leaking outside the HSM 23. As a result, the wrapped client private key can be decrypted and prevented from leaking outside the product device 20. Either mode may be adopted in the first embodiment.

[0021] The storage 24 is a storage device such as a hard disk drive (HDD) or a solid state drive (SSD), and stores at least a public key certificate.

[0022] The control unit 22 controls the hardware of the product device 20 . The control unit 22 transmits a certificate issuance request to the product device 20 via the communication unit 21. Then, the control unit 22 receives a public key certificate from the product management system 10 via the communication unit 21. The public key certificate includes a public key (hereinafter also referred to as a client public key), a UID (Unique ID) that is information that uniquely identifies the product device 20, and a certificate authority signature. The client public key is a public key that pairs with the client private key. The certificate authority signature is a signature made using a CA private key that is a private key held by the certificate authority, and is a signature that indicates that the public key certificate is guaranteed by the certificate authority. In response to receiving the public key certificate from the product management system 10, the control unit 22 sets the client private key in the HSM 23.

[0023] For example, the control unit 22 receives a client private key and a public key certificate that the product management system 10 has generated for the product device 20 from the product management system 10 via the communication unit 21. The control unit 22 then stores the client private key in the HSM 23 and the public key certificate in the storage 24.

[0024] When the product device 20 is started, the control unit 22 requests connection to the product management system 10. The control unit 22 then signs the authentication data using the client private key set in the HSM 23. The authentication data is data shared with the product management system 10 in a previous sequence, but may be any data that is held in common by the product device 20 and the product management system 10. The control unit 22 then transmits an authentication request including the public key certificate stored in the storage 24 and the authentication data signed by the product device 20 to the product management system 10 via the communication unit 21.

[0025] If the authentication is successful, communication is established between the product device 20 and the product management system 10. Then, if there is product history data that the control unit 22 wants to register in the product management system 10, the control unit 22 transmits the product history data to the product management system 10 via the communication unit 21 after communication is established.

[0026] [Product Management System 10] The product management system 10 is a system including one or more computers that manages product devices 20 in a supply chain. The product management system 10 includes an issuing unit 11, an authenticating unit 12, a data registration unit 13, and an output unit 14.

[0027] The issuing unit 11 is also referred to as issuing means. When the issuing unit 11 receives a certificate issuance request from the product device 20, it generates a client private key and a public key certificate for the product device 20.

[0028] The issuing unit 11 then transmits the client private key to the product device 20, where it is stored in the HSM 23 of the product device 20. The issuing unit 11 also transmits the public key certificate to the product device 20, where it is stored in the storage 24 of the product device 20.

[0029] The issuing unit 11 includes a certification authority and holds a CA certificate including a CA public key. The CA public key is a public key paired with the CA private key used by the certification authority to sign the public key certificate. The CA certificate is a public key certificate corresponding to the CA public key.

[0030] The authentication unit 12 is also referred to as authentication means. When the authentication unit 12 receives an authentication request from the product device 20, which includes a public key certificate and authentication data bearing the signature of the product device 20, the authentication unit 12 performs the following authentication.

[0031] First, the authentication unit 12 obtains the CA certificate from the issuing unit 11 and verifies the public key certificate included in the authentication request using the CA public key included in the CA certificate. For example, if the public key certificate is not guaranteed by the issuing unit 11, the verification of the public key certificate will fail. The verification of the public key certificate will also fail if any part of the public key certificate has been tampered with. For example, if the UID of the public key certificate has been tampered with, the verification of the public key certificate will fail.

[0032] Furthermore, the authentication unit 12 uses the client public key in the public key certificate included in the authentication request to verify whether the authentication data is signed with the client private key that is paired with the client public key. For example, if the product device 20 has been spoofed or switched, the signature verification will fail.

[0033] If the verification of the public key certificate included in the authentication request is successful and the verification of the signature attached to the authentication data is successful, the authentication unit 12 determines that the authentication is successful.

[0034] The data registration unit 13 is also referred to as data registration means. The data registration unit 13 registers product history data of the product device 20 in a data store (not shown) by linking it to the UID of the product device 20. The product history data is data indicating the product history recorded at each process included in the supply chain of the product device 20. The product history data includes at least one of inspection data, inventory management data, logistics management data, verification data at the start of operation, maintenance data, and disposal data of the product device 20.

[0035] For example, when the data registration unit 13 acquires product history data from a product device 20 that has been successfully authenticated after communication is established, the data registration unit 13 registers the product history data of the product device 20 by linking it to the UID included in the public key certificate of the product device 20.

[0036] The output unit 14 is also referred to as output means. When the output unit 14 receives a request to start using the product device 20 from a successfully authenticated product device 20, the output unit 14 reads out the product history data registered in association with the UID, using at least the UID included in the public key certificate of the product device 20. The output unit 14 then outputs output information related to the read product history data. The output information related to the product history data may be the product history data itself, or may be a report indicating the results of verifying the authenticity of the product device 20 based on the product history data.

[0037] 2 and 3 are flowcharts showing the flow of product management according to the first embodiment. First, the product management system 10 determines whether a certificate issuance request has been received from the product device 20 (S10). If a certificate issuance request has been received (Yes in S10), the issuing unit 11 generates a client private key and a public key certificate for the product device 20 (S11). Specifically, the issuing unit 11 assigns a UID to the product device 20 and generates a pair of client private key and client public key. Then, the issuing unit 11 generates a public key certificate including the client public key, the UID of the product device 20, and a signature made by the certification authority using the CA private key.

[0038] Next, the issuing unit 11 transmits the client private key generated in S11 to the product device 20, and causes it to be set in the HSM 23 of the product device 20 (S12). Then, the product management system 10 ends the process.

[0039] The product management system 10 also determines whether it has received an authentication request from the product device 20, the authentication request including a public key certificate and authentication data signed by the product device 20 (S13). If it has not received an authentication request (No in S13), the product management system 10 ends the process. On the other hand, if it has received an authentication request (Yes in S13), the authentication unit 12 verifies the public key certificate using the CA public key included in the CA certificate (S14). This verifies whether the public key certificate is guaranteed by the certification authority. This also verifies whether the public key certificate has been tampered with.

[0040] Furthermore, the authentication unit 12 verifies the signature attached to the authentication data included in the authentication request using the client public key included in the public key certificate (S15).

[0041] Next, the authentication unit 12 determines whether the verification of the public key certificate in S14 was successful and whether the verification of the signature attached to the authentication data in S15 was successful (S16). If either verification fails, or if both verifications fail (No in S16), the product management system 10 determines that the authentication has failed and returns the process to S10. On the other hand, if both verifications are successful (Yes in S16), the authentication unit 12 determines that the authentication has succeeded (S17).

[0042] Next, if the product management system 10 receives product history data from the successfully authenticated product device 20 (Yes in S18), the data registration unit 13 registers the product history data in the data store, linking it to the UID of the product device 20 (S19). The UID of the product device 20 may be the UID included in the public key certificate. The product management system 10 then terminates the process.

[0043] On the other hand, if the product management system 10 receives a start-of-use request instead of product history data from the successfully authenticated product device 20 (No in S18, Yes in S20), the process proceeds to S21. In S21, the output unit 14 reads out the product history data linked to the UID in the data store using the UID of the product device 20 included in the public key certificate. The output unit 14 then outputs output information related to the product history data (S22). On the other hand, if neither product history data nor a start-of-use request is received (No in S18, No in S20), the product management system 10 ends the process.

[0044] As described above, according to the first embodiment, the client private key of the product device 20 is strictly managed by the HSM 23 of the product device 20 to prevent it from being leaked to the outside. Therefore, it is guaranteed that the client private key will be stored in the same product device 20 from the time the public key certificate is issued until at least the time the product device 20 starts to be used.

[0045] The product management system 10 then verifies the signature attached to the authentication data when the product device 20 starts to be used. This ensures that the product device 20 that has the client private key at the time the public key certificate was issued is a genuine device that has not been spoofed or replaced.

[0046] Furthermore, when starting to use the product device 20, the product management system 10 verifies the public key certificate of the product device 20. This ensures the origin of the public key certificate of the product device 20 and that the contents of the public key certificate, particularly the UID, have not been tampered with.

[0047] Furthermore, the product management system 10 makes it possible to read and trace the product history linked to the UID only for devices whose authenticity is guaranteed and that have an authentic public key certificate when the product device 20 is first used. This makes it possible to widely guarantee the authenticity of the product device 20 throughout the supply chain up to that point when the product device 20 is first used.

[0048] Although the authentication request has been described as including a public key certificate and signed authentication data, these do not have to be included in the authentication request. For example, the product management system 10 may receive the public key certificate and signed authentication data separately from the authentication request. Furthermore, reception of the authentication request may be omitted by considering the public key certificate and signed authentication data as having been received.

[0049] In the first embodiment described above, the product management system 10 generates a pair of client private keys and distributes them to the product device 20. However, the product device 20 may generate the client private key instead of the product management system 10. In this case, the product device 20 may generate a client public key that pairs with the client private key and transmit the client public key to the product management system 10 when requesting certificate issuance. Upon receiving the client public key, the product management system 10 may assign a UID and generate a public key certificate. The product management system 10 may then return the public key certificate to the product device 20 and request that the client private key be set in the HSM 23. With this method, the client private key is not placed on the network, allowing for more secure management of the client private key.

[0050] <Embodiment 2> Next, a second embodiment of the present disclosure will be described. In the second embodiment, a universally unique identifier (UUID) is used as an example of a UID.

[0051] FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing the configuration of a system 1a according to the second embodiment. The system 1a is a specific example of the system 1. The system 1a includes a product device 20a, a product management system 10a, a manufacturing device 31, an inspection device 32, one or more SCM devices 40, and a user terminal 50. The product management system 10a, the manufacturing device 31, and the one or more SCM devices 40 are connected to a network N. The network N is a wired or wireless communication network.

[0052] The product device 20a corresponds to the product device 20 of the first embodiment, and is equipped with a TPM (Trusted Platform Module) as an example of an HSM. The product device 20a is connected to the network N when it is powered on (activated), and is disconnected from the network N when it is powered off (stopped). In the second embodiment, the management mode of the client private key by the TPM of the product device 20a is the first mode described in the first embodiment, but may also be the second mode.

[0053] The product management system 10a corresponds to the product management system 10 of embodiment 1. The manufacturing device 31 is a device that manufactures the product device 20a. The inspection device 32 is a device that inspects the manufactured product device 20a.

[0054] The SCM device 40 is a device that manages the product devices 20 in a supply chain other than manufacturing and inspection. For example, the SCM device 40 is a computer connected to a handheld terminal used in a warehouse or logistics. In the second embodiment, the SCM device 40 is equipped with an HSM, such as a TPM, similar to the product devices 20a. The SCM device 40 stores a client private key generated for the SCM device 40 in the TPM of the SCM device 40. In the second embodiment, the management mode of the client private key by the TPM of the SCM device 40 is the same as the first mode described in the first embodiment, but may also be the same as the second mode.

[0055] The user terminal 50 is a terminal used by a person (user) who uses the product device 20a for operation. For example, the user terminal 50 is a personal computer, a smartphone, or the like.

[0056] FIG. 5 is a diagram showing a schematic diagram of a supply chain. A supply chain can be broadly divided into manufacturing, logistics, and operations. Manufacturing includes four processes: a manufacturing process (P1), an inspection process (P2), a warehouse entry process (P3), and a shipping process (P4). Logistics includes two processes: a collection process (P5) and a collection and delivery process (P6). Operations include a local procurement process (P7) and a subsequent operation process (P8). The product management system 10a collects product history data for each process from the product equipment 20a or SCM equipment 40, and records the product history data by linking it to the UID of the product equipment 20a.

[0057] First, in the manufacturing process (P1), the product device 20a is in an activated state. At this time, the product device 20a receives a client private key generated for the product device 20a from the product management system 10a and stores the client private key in its own TPM.

[0058] Next, in the inspection step (P2), the product device 20a is also in an activated state. First, the product device 20a signs product history data, such as the results of the inspection performed by the inspection device 32, with the client private key stored in its own TPM. Then, the product device 20a accesses the product management system 10a using the UUID included in its own public key certificate as an identifier. The product management system 10a performs authentication, as described below, to confirm that the access is from a genuine device that has the client private key at the time when the product management system 10a issued its public key certificate. If the authentication is successful, the product device 20a associates the product history data with the UID of the product device 20a and registers it in the product management system 10a.

[0059] The product device 20a is then packed, and is in a stopped state during the subsequent warehousing process (P3), warehousing process (P4), collection process (P5), and collection and delivery process (P6). Therefore, the SCM device 40 receives authentication in place of the product device 20a and registers the product history data in the product management system 10a. At this time, the SCM device 40 accesses the product management system 10a and receives authentication using the client private key stored in its own TPM in the same manner as the product device 20a at P2.

[0060] Here, in P2, the UUID of the product device 20a is used to link the product history data to the product device 20a, but in P3 to P6, it is difficult to read the UUID from the product device 20a, which is in a stopped state. Therefore, in P3 to P6, instead of the UUID of the product device 20a, an alternative ID that can identify the UUID of the product device 20a is used for the above linking. The alternative ID may be at least one of the model number, serial number (S / N), and logistics slip number of the product device 20a, or a combination of these.

[0061] The SCM device 40 that has been successfully authenticated registers product history data, such as logistics management data, in the product management system 10a in association with the alternative ID of the product device 20.

[0062] After the product device 20a is delivered to the user, the product device 20a is turned on in the on-site procurement process (P7) at the start of use. The activated product device 20a accesses the product management system 10a and is authenticated, as in P2.

[0063] If authentication is successful, the product management system 10a traces information linked to the UUID or alternative ID of the product device 20a and collects product history data related to manufacturing, inspection processes, warehousing, shipping, and logistics collection and delivery, including equipment verification results from on-site procurement. The product management system 10a then verifies whether all product history data indicates a normal history. A normal history may mean, for example, that the product passed inspection or that various tasks were performed appropriately. If all product history data indicates a normal history, the product device 20a is determined to be a genuine device that has not been subjected to inspection fraud, tampering, substitution, or impersonation throughout the supply chain. The product management system 10a then compiles the verification results into a report and sends it to the user terminal 50.

[0064] 6 is a block diagram showing the configuration of a product management system 10a according to embodiment 2. The product management system 10a includes an API gateway 100, a device management unit 110, a certificate management unit 111, a certificate authority 112, a user management unit 120, a device verification unit 130, a data verification unit 140, a data storage unit 141, a data store 142, and an SCM integration management unit 150. Note that, hereinafter, a device that accesses the product management system 10a will be referred to as a client.

[0065] The API gateway 100 relays communications between clients and other elements of the product management system 10a. For example, the API gateway 100 sends requests received from clients to other elements of the product management system 10a. The API gateway 100 then sends responses received from other elements to the client.

[0066] The device management unit 110, the certificate management unit 111, and the certificate authority 112 correspond to the issuing unit 11 in the first embodiment.

[0067] When the device management unit 110 receives a public key certificate issuance request from a client via the API gateway 100, it assigns a UUID to the client. The public key certificate issuance request corresponds to the certificate issuance request of embodiment 1. The device management unit 110 associates the newly assigned UUID with an alternative ID such as the client's serial number or model number, and registers it in a device database (not shown).

[0068] When the certificate authority 112 receives a request for issuing a public key certificate from a client via the API gateway 100, it generates a client private key and a client public key for the client. The certificate authority 112 then generates a public key certificate including the client public key and a UUID assigned by the device management unit 110, and signs it with a CA private key held by the certificate authority 112. This signature is also referred to as a CA signature. The certificate authority 112 then distributes the generated client private key and public key certificate to the client via the API gateway 100.

[0069] The certificate authority 112 also issues a CA certificate, which includes a CA public key that pairs with the CA private key used in the CA signature.

[0070] The certificate management unit 111 manages the public key certificates distributed to each client.

[0071] The user management unit 120 manages the IDs of devices and people involved in the system 1. For example, the user management unit 120 manages the IDs of people working in each process of manufacturing, logistics, etc. Furthermore, for example, the user management unit 120 manages the product device 20a in association with the user who purchased and operates the product device 20a. Specifically, the user management unit 120 manages the UUID of the product device 20a assigned by the device management unit 110 in association with the address of the user terminal 50.

[0072] The device verification unit 130 corresponds to the authentication unit 12 in the first embodiment. The device verification unit 130 performs authentication when it receives an authentication request from a client. The authentication by the device verification unit 130 includes device verification in addition to client certificate verification, which corresponds to the authentication in the first embodiment. The authentication request includes at least the client's public key certificate, signed authentication data, and the UUID or alternative ID of the product device 20a. In the second embodiment, data shared in a previous sequence between the product management system 10a and the client is used as the authentication data. Note that if the public key certificate included in the authentication request includes the UUID of the product device 20a, the authentication request does not need to separately include the UUID of the product device 20a.

[0073] Client certificate verification is performed to establish a communication path. Client certificate verification consists of the verification of the public key certificate described in the first embodiment and the verification of the signature attached to the authentication data. If the verification of the public key certificate is successful and the verification of the signature attached to the authentication data is successful, the client certificate verification is successful.

[0074] Device verification is a process of verifying whether the UUID included in the public key certificate is a UUID registered in the device database.

[0075] In the second embodiment, the device verification unit 130 determines that authentication is successful if both the client certificate verification and the device verification are successful. On the other hand, the device verification unit 130 determines that authentication is unsuccessful if either or both of the verifications fail. This allows the product management system 10a to confirm that the access is from a genuine device to which the product management system 10a delivered the client private key.

[0076] If the client certificate verification is successful, communication between the product management system 10a and the client is established. After that, when the device verification unit 130 receives product history data with the client's signature from the successfully authenticated client, the device verification unit 130 provides the signed product history data to the data storage unit 141.

[0077] The data storage unit 141 corresponds to the data registration unit 13 of the first embodiment. The data storage unit 141 associates the product history data provided by the successfully authenticated client with the UUID or alternative ID of the product device 20a and registers (records) it in the data store 142. By treating only the product history data provided by the successfully authenticated client as genuine product history data, it is possible to prevent client spoofing and data falsification.

[0078] The data store 142 corresponds to the data store of the first embodiment. 7 is a diagram for explaining data recorded in the data store 142. Identification information of the product equipment 20a and product history data are recorded in the data store 142. The product history data includes inspection data, inventory management data, logistics management data, and operation data.

[0079] The type of data recorded in the data store 142 varies depending on the process in the supply chain. For example, in manufacturing steps P2 to P4, the data storage unit 141 records any of the identification information of the product equipment 20a in association with the inspection data or inventory management data.

[0080] Examples of the identification information of the product device 20a include S / N, model number, UUID, OS version, and application version. Identification information other than UUID cannot uniquely identify the product device 20a by itself, but can be combined to uniquely identify the product device 20a. This combination becomes an alternative ID. For example, in P3 to P5, where the UUID cannot be obtained after packaging but other identification information can be obtained, the data storage unit 141 records the S / N and model number as the identification information of the product device 20a.

[0081] In addition to the above data, the physical distribution slip number of the physical distribution management data is recorded in P4 at the time of delivery.

[0082] In addition, in the logistics P5 to P6, the data storage unit 141 associates the logistics slip number with the collection data and collection method and records them as logistics management data. In the logistics P5 to P6 where the identification information of the product equipment 20a cannot be acquired, the logistics slip number becomes an alternative ID for identifying the product equipment 20a.

[0083] In addition, in operations P7 to P8, the data storage unit 141 associates any of the identification information of the product device 20a with operation data and records them. The operation data includes on-site inspection data indicating the results of the on-site inspection carried out in P7, the verification results by the data verification unit 140 during the on-site inspection, and data indicating that operation has started.

[0084] 8 is a diagram showing an example of the data structure of data store 142. As an example, data store 142 records time, process name, UUID, alternate ID, type of work history, and work result. As an example, alternate ID1 is the serial number and model number. Also, alternate ID2 is the logistics slip number. The time, process name, type of work history, work result, and verification result are examples of product history data.

[0085] If an alternative ID is recorded not only in the process where a UUID is recorded but also in the process where a UUID is not recorded, it is possible to trace the product history of the product device 20a.

[0086] Returning to FIG. 6, the explanation will be continued. When the data verification unit 140 receives a start-of-use request from a successfully authenticated client, it reads, from the data store 142, the product history data associated with the client's UUID or alternative ID and its signature. The data verification unit 140 then verifies the signature of the product history data using the client public key of the public key certificate. This makes it possible to confirm that the product history data has not been tampered with between the time it was saved and the time it was read. If the data verification unit 140 successfully verifies the signature of the product history data and confirms that the product history data has not been tampered with, it verifies whether the read product history data indicates a normal history. The data verification unit 140 then supplies the read product history data and each verification result to the SCM integration management unit 150 via the API gateway 100.

[0087] The SCM integrated management unit 150 corresponds to the output unit 14 in the first embodiment. The SCM integrated management unit 150 generates and outputs a report showing the verification results. The SCM integrated management unit 150 then transmits the report to the user terminal 50 of the user who operates the product device 20a. This allows the user who purchased the product device 20a to confirm before starting operation that the product device 20a has arrived in a state where the authenticity has been maintained, thereby ensuring that the device used in operation is free from device spoofing or substitution. This also makes it possible to eliminate security incidents caused by using inauthentic devices in operation.

[0088] 9 is a block diagram showing the configuration of a product device 20a according to embodiment 2. The product device 20a includes a communication unit 210, a control unit 220, a storage 230, a TPM 231, and a data acquisition unit 240.

[0089] The communication unit 210 is an example of the communication unit 21 in the first embodiment. The communication unit 210 is a communication interface for connecting to the network N.

[0090] The control unit 220 is an example of the control unit 22 of the first embodiment. The control unit 220 controls the hardware of the product device 20a.

[0091] The storage 230 is an example of the storage 24 in the first embodiment. The TPM 231 is an example of the HSM 23 in the first embodiment, and stores and manages the client private key distributed to the product device 20a. The TPM 231 is mounted on a motherboard or the like. The data acquisition unit 240 acquires data related to the product history. For example, the data acquisition unit 240 acquires sensing data from a sensor. Alternatively, the data acquisition unit 240 accepts input of inspection data from an inspection device. Alternatively, the data acquisition unit 240 acquires inspection data from the inspection device 32. The product history data is generated by the control unit 220 based on the data related to the product history acquired by the data acquisition unit 240.

[0092] 10 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the SCM device 40 according to the second embodiment. The SCM device 40 includes a communication unit 410, a control unit 420, a storage 430, a TPM 431, and a data acquisition unit 440.

[0093] The communication unit 410 is a communication interface for connecting to the network N.

[0094] The control unit 420 controls the hardware of the SCM device 40 .

[0095] The storage 430 is a storage device such as an HDD, an SSD, etc. The storage 430 stores the public key certificates distributed to the SCM device 40.

[0096] The TPM 431 is an example of an HSM that stores and manages the client private key distributed to the SCM device 40. The TPM 431 is tamper-resistant. The TPM 431 is mounted on a motherboard or the like.

[0097] The data acquisition unit 440 acquires data related to product history. For example, the data acquisition unit 440 accepts input of inventory management data or logistics management data from an operator. Alternatively, the data acquisition unit 440 reads data such as a logistics slip number from an IC tag, barcode, or two-dimensional code attached to the packaged product equipment 20a. The product history data is generated by the control unit 420 based on the data related to product history acquired by the data acquisition unit 440.

[0098] 11 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the flow of issuing a certificate for a product device in the manufacturing process (P1) according to embodiment 2. First, the manufacturing apparatus 31 that manufactured the product device 20a transmits a certificate issuance request for the product device 20a to the product management system 10a (S101). At this time, the certificate issuance request includes the serial number and model number of the product device 20a.

[0099] The device management unit 110 receives the certificate issuance request via the API gateway 100 and assigns a UUID to the product device 20a (S102).The device management unit 110 then includes the UUID in the received certificate issuance request and provides it to the certificate authority 112 (S103).

[0100] The certificate authority 112 generates a client private key and a client public key, and generates a public key certificate with the UUID as the CN (Common Name) (S104). The certificate authority 112 affixes a CA signature to the public key certificate using the CA private key. The certificate authority 112 then distributes the client private key and public key certificate to the product device 20a via the certificate management unit 111, the device management unit 110, and the API gateway 100 (S105).

[0101] The product device 20a stores the public key certificate in the storage 230 and stores the client private key in the TPM 231 (S106).

[0102] 12 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the flow of product management in the inspection process (P2) according to embodiment 2. First, the inspection device 32 transmits the inspection data to the production device 20a as product history data (S110).

[0103] Next, the product device 20a signs the product history data using the client private key stored in the TPM 231 (S111). Next, the product device 20a signs authentication data required to establish a communication path using the client private key stored in the TPM 231 (S112). Then, the product device 20a sends an authentication request to the device verification unit 130 via the API gateway 100 (S113). At this time, the authentication request includes the signed authentication data, the public key certificate stored in the storage 230, and the UUID set in the public key certificate. Note that the product device 20a may send this information to the device verification unit 130 separately from the authentication request.

[0104] The device verification unit 130 executes client certificate verification (S114). Details of S114 will be explained in Fig. 13. The device verification unit 130 also executes device verification and verifies whether the UUID is registered in the device database (S115). Here, it is assumed that the client certificate verification is successful and the device verification is also successful.

[0105] If the client certificate verification is successful, communication is established between the product device 20a and the product management system 10a. Then, the product device 20a transmits the signed product history data to the product management system 10a using the established communication path (S116).

[0106] In this example, since the authentication is successful, the data storage unit 141 receives the signed product history data and the UUID of the product device 20a via the API gateway 100 (S117).

[0107] The data storage unit 141 records the signed product history data in the data store 142 in association with the UUID of the product device 20a (S118).

[0108] 13 is a flowchart showing an example of the flow of client certificate verification (S114 in FIG. 12) according to the second embodiment. First, the device verification unit 130 verifies the public key certificate included in the authentication request. Specifically, the device verification unit 130 decrypts the CA signature attached to the public key certificate using the CA public key included in the CA certificate (S1140). The device verification unit 130 then calculates a hash value of the public key certificate and compares the hash value with the data (plain text) decrypted in S1140 (S1141). This makes it possible to confirm that the public key certificate is certified by the certification authority 112 and that the public key certificate has not been tampered with.

[0109] Next, the device verification unit 130 verifies the signature attached to the authentication data included in the authentication request. The device verification unit 130 decrypts the signature attached to the authentication data included in the authentication request using the client public key included in the public key certificate (S1142). The device verification unit 130 then calculates a hash value of the authentication data and compares the hash value with the signature data (plain text) decrypted in S1142 (S1143). This makes it possible to verify whether the authenticating client is the device to which the product management system 10a delivered the client private key.

[0110] The device verification unit 130 then determines whether the verification of the public key certificate in S1141 was successful and whether the verification of the signature in S1143 was successful (S1144). If both verifications are successful (Yes in S1144), the device verification unit 130 determines that the client certificate verification was successful (S1145). On the other hand, if either or both verifications failed, the device verification unit 130 determines that the client certificate verification failed (S1146).

[0111] Note that S112 to S114 in FIG. 12 show some of the typical processes in general client certificate verification for establishing a communication path, but other processes that are generally performed in client certificate verification may be performed within, before, or after S112 to S114.

[0112] 14 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the flow of issuing a certificate by the SCM device 40 according to the second embodiment. This certificate is issued before the product device 20a reaches the process.

[0113] First, the SCM device 40 sends a certificate issuance request for the SCM device 40 to the product management system 10a (S121). At this time, the certificate issuance request includes the serial number and model number of the SCM device 40. Upon receiving the certificate issuance request via the API gateway 100, the product management system 10a executes the same processes as those in S102 to S106 on the SCM device 40 in S122 to S126.

[0114] As a result, the client private key distributed to the SCM device 40 is stored in the TPM 431 of the SCM device 40 , and the public key certificate distributed to the SCM device 40 is stored in the storage 430 of the SCM device 40 .

[0115] FIG. 15 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the flow of product management in a post-packaging process, for example, a warehousing and shipping process (P3 to P4) according to the second embodiment. First, the control unit 420 of the SCM device 40 acquires data related to the product history from the data acquisition unit 440 and generates product history data based on the data (S130). Then, the control unit 420 of the SCM device 40 signs the product history data using the client private key stored in the TPM 431 (S131). Next, the SCM device 40 signs authentication data required to establish a communication path using the client private key stored in the TPM 431 (S132). Then, the SCM device 40 transmits an authentication request to the device verification unit 130 via the API gateway 100 (S133). At this time, the authentication request includes the signed authentication data, the public key certificate stored in the storage 430, and the alternative ID of the product device 20a. In this figure, as an example, the alternative ID of the product device 20a is the S / N and model number of the product device 20a.

[0116] The device verification unit 130 performs client certificate verification (S134), similar to S114. The device verification unit 130 also performs device verification and determines whether the alternative ID is registered in the device database (S135). Here, it is assumed that the client certificate verification is successful, and the device verification is also successful.

[0117] If the client certificate verification is successful, communication is established between the SCM device 40 and the product management system 10a. Then, the product device 20a transmits the signed product history data from the SCM device 40 to the product management system 10a using the established communication path (S136).

[0118] In this example, since the authentication is successful, the data storage unit 141 receives the signed product history data and the alternative ID of the product device 20a via the API gateway 100 (S137).

[0119] The data storage unit 141 records the signed product history data in the data store 142, linking it to the alternative ID of the product device 20a (S138).

[0120] In this way, when the product device 20a is in a stopped state, only the product history data provided by the SCM device 40 that has been successfully verified by the device verification unit 130 is treated as genuine product history data, thereby preventing falsification of product history.

[0121] 16 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the flow of data verification in the on-site procurement step (P7) according to the second embodiment. After the product device 20a is delivered to the user, the product device 20a is turned on at the start of operation to perform on-site procurement (S140). At this time, the product device 20a signs authentication data using the client private key stored in the TPM 231 (S141). The product device 20a then accesses the product management system 10a and transmits an authentication request and a start-of-use request (S142). The authentication request includes the signed authentication data, the public key certificate stored in the storage 230, and the UUID set in the public key certificate.

[0122] The product management system 10a, which receives the certificate issuance request via the API gateway 100, executes the same client certificate verification and device verification as in S114 and S115 in S143 and S144. Here, it is assumed that the client certificate verification and device verification are successful. In this case, the device verification unit 130 determines that the authentication was successful and notifies the SCM integrated management unit 150 of this fact (S145).

[0123] Next, steps S146 to S150 are performed on the product history data for each process in the supply chain. First, in S146, the SCM integrated management unit 150 requests the data verification unit 140 to acquire the product history data. Then, in S147, for processes in which UUIDs are recorded, the data verification unit 140 reads, from the data store 142, signed product history data registered in association with the UUID. On the other hand, for processes in which UUIDs are not recorded, the data verification unit 140 reads, from the data store 142, signed product history data registered in association with an alternative ID that identifies the UUID. Then, in S148, the data verification unit 140 verifies the authenticity of the product history data using the client public key of the public key certificate. Specifically, the data verification unit 140 verifies whether the product history data has been tampered with by comparing data obtained by decrypting the signature attached to the product history data with the hash value of the product history data. Here, it is assumed that the verification of the authenticity of the product history data was successful. In this case, in S149, the data verification unit 140 verifies whether the read product history data indicates a normal history. For example, if the work results included in the product history data are OK, it is determined that the read product history data indicates a normal history. The data verification unit 140 then supplies the product history data and the verification results of S148 to S149 to the SCM integrated management unit 150 (S150).

[0124] The SCM integrated management unit 150 generates a report showing the verification results (S151), and then transmits the generated report to the user terminal 50 (S152).

[0125] In this way, the second embodiment achieves the same effects as the first embodiment. Furthermore, in the second embodiment, when the product device 20a is in a stopped state, the SCM device 40 registers the product history data on behalf of the product device 20a. The product management system 10a records, as authentic data, only the product history data provided by the SCM device 40 to which the product management system 10a has delivered the client private key in the data store. This makes it possible to prevent data falsification.

[0126] Furthermore, when the product device 20a is in a stopped state, the product management system 10a records the product history data in association with the alternative ID, thereby enabling authentic product history data to be recorded throughout the entire supply chain.

[0127] It has been mentioned that it is possible to confirm whether the product device 20a shipped from the factory has been delivered to the user while maintaining its authenticity. However, since the TPM 231, which has a one-to-one correspondence with the UUID, may be replaced during on-site maintenance, it is also necessary to consider the processes after operation starts, such as maintenance and disposal.

[0128] For example, consider the case where a motherboard (MB) equipped with a TPM 231 is replaced during on-site maintenance. In this case, a maintenance technician replaces the faulty MB equipped with the TPM 231 with a new MB. Specifically, the maintenance technician uses a dedicated tool to cause the product device 20a equipped with the new MB to send a certificate issuance request to the product management system 10a. The product management system 10a generates a new public key certificate and client private key for the product device 20a and delivers them to the product device 20a. As a result, the new TPM 231 stores the new client private key.

[0129] For defective products, the public key certificate must be deleted or revoked. This is to prevent the product management system 10a from being accessed again using the MB of the defective TPM 231. If the product cannot be powered on, only the public key certificate must be revoked. The defective product is then physically destroyed and discarded.

[0130] Product history data for processes after the start of operation, such as maintenance and disposal, may also be recorded in the data store 142 in the same way as for other processes.

[0131] 17 shows an example of the data structure of the data store 142 containing manufacturing history data related to maintenance and disposal. As shown in the record on line 10 of this figure, the TPM 231 was replaced, so the UUID and S / N were changed. Furthermore, as shown in the record on line 14 of this figure, the UUID and public key certificate of the old TPM 231 have been revoked.

[0132] In this way, the product management system 10a can manage product history data even in processes after the start of operation, such as maintenance and disposal.

[0133] <Embodiment 3> Next, a third embodiment of the present disclosure will be described. In the second embodiment, the product management system records product history data in a data store. However, in the third embodiment, the product management system uses a blockchain in addition to the data store to reduce the risk of tampering when product history data is shared among multiple different stakeholders.

[0134] FIG. 18 is a block diagram showing the configuration of a product management system 10b according to the third embodiment. The product management system 10b has basically the same configuration and functions as the product management system 10a of embodiment 2. However, the product management system 10b differs from the product management system 10a in that the product management system 10b includes a data storage unit 141b and a data verification unit 140b instead of the data storage unit 141 and the data verification unit 140, and a blockchain 144.

[0135] The data storage unit 141b registers the product history data and its signature in a data store, similar to the data storage unit 141. At this time, the data storage unit 141b calculates a hash value of the product history data and stores it in the blockchain 144.

[0136] The data verification unit 140b reads out product history data in the same manner as the data verification unit 140. At this time, the data verification unit 140b verifies the block corresponding to the read product history data in the blockchain 144. Specifically, in addition to performing block verification known in blockchain technology, the data verification unit 140b verifies the block by comparing the hash value recorded in the block with the hash value of the product history data. If the data verification unit 140b successfully verifies the normality of the product history data and also successfully verifies the block, it determines that there has been no falsification, tampering, or substitution of the product history data of the product device 20a throughout the supply chain.

[0137] The SCM integrated management unit 150 then generates a report on the various verification results, including the verification results of the blocks, and sends it to the user terminal 50.

[0138] As described above, according to the third embodiment, it is possible to suitably reduce the risk of tampering when product history data is shared among a plurality of different interested parties.

[0139] The present disclosure is not limited to the above-described embodiments, and can be modified as appropriate without departing from the spirit of the present disclosure. For example, in the above-described second and third embodiments, the inspection device 32 is treated as a device separate from the SCM device 40, but the SCM device 40 may also include the inspection device 32.

[0140] In the above-described second and third embodiments, when signed product history data is received from a client whose authentication has been successful, the data storage unit 141 registers the signed product history data in the data store 142. However, the client whose authentication has been successful may be able to register the signed product history data directly in the data store 142 without going through the data storage unit 141.

[0141] In the above-described embodiment, the present disclosure has been described as a hardware configuration, but the present disclosure is not limited to this. Any processing in the present disclosure can also be realized by causing a processor to execute a computer program.

[0142] The program can be stored and supplied to a computer using various types of non-transitory computer-readable media. Non-transitory computer-readable media include various types of tangible storage media. Examples of non-transitory computer-readable media include magnetic recording media (e.g., flexible disks, magnetic tapes, hard disk drives), magneto-optical recording media (e.g., magneto-optical disks), CD-ROMs (Read Only Memory), CD-Rs, CD-R / Ws, and semiconductor memories (e.g., mask ROMs, PROMs (Programmable ROMs), EPROMs (Erasable PROMs), flash ROMs, and RAMs (Random Access Memory)). The program may also be supplied to a computer by various types of transitory computer-readable media. Examples of transitory computer-readable media include electrical signals, optical signals, and electromagnetic waves. The transitory computer-readable media can supply the program to a computer via a wired communication path such as an electric wire or optical fiber, or via a wireless communication path.

[0143] A part or all of the above-described embodiments can be described as, but not limited to, the following supplementary notes. (Appendix 1) an issuing means for generating a public key certificate including a public key of the product device, a UID that is information that uniquely identifies the product device, and a signature of a certificate authority when a certificate issuance request is received from a product device having a hardware security module (HSM), and for causing the HSM to set a private key that is paired with the public key of the product device; When an authentication request including a public key certificate and authentication data with a signature of the product device is received from the product device, verifying the public key certificate included in the certification request using a CA public key that is paired with the CA private key used by the certification authority for signing; verifying whether the authentication data is signed with a private key that is paired with the public key, using the public key in the public key certificate included in the authentication request; If the verification of the public key certificate included in the authentication request is successful and the verification of the signature attached to the authentication data is successful, it is determined that the authentication is successful. authentication means; a data registration means for registering product history data of the product device in association with the UID of the product device; an output means for, when receiving a start-of-use request from the product device that has been successfully authenticated, reading out product history data that has been registered in association with the UID by using at least a UID included in the public key certificate of the product device, and outputting output information related to the product history data; A product management system comprising: (Appendix 2) The registered product history data includes at least one of inspection data, inventory management data, logistics management data, verification data at the start of operation, maintenance data, and disposal data of the product equipment. 1. The product management system described in Appendix 1. (Appendix 3) The output means outputs the result of verifying whether the read product history data indicates a normal history as the output information. 1. A product management system as described in Appendix 1 or 2. (Appendix 4) When the data registration means receives product history data from the product device that has been successfully authenticated, the data registration means registers the product history data in association with the UID of the product device. 4. The product management system of any one of claims 1 to 3. (Appendix 5) When the issuing means receives a certificate issuance request from an SCM device related to the supply chain of a product device, the issuing means generates a public key certificate including at least a public key of the SCM device, and causes a private key that is paired with the public key of the SCM device to be set in an HSM of the SCM device; When the authentication means receives an authentication request from the SCM device, the authentication request includes a public key certificate and authentication data with a signature of the SCM device attached thereto, verifying the public key certificate included in the certification request using the CA public key; verifying whether the authentication data is signed with a private key that is paired with the public key, using the public key in the public key certificate included in the authentication request; If the verification of the public key certificate included in the authentication request is successful and the verification of the signature attached to the authentication data is successful, it is determined that the authentication is successful. 5. The product management system of any one of appendices 1 to 4. (Appendix 6) When the data registration means receives at least one alternative ID capable of identifying the UID of the product device and product history data of the product device from the SCM device that has been successfully authenticated, the data registration means registers the product history data in association with the at least one alternative ID; When the output means receives a start-of-use request from the product device that has been successfully authenticated, the output means reads out product history data that has been registered in association with the UID of the product device, as well as product history data that has been registered in association with at least one alternative ID that can identify the UID. 1. The product management system described in Appendix 5. (Appendix 7) The at least one alternative ID includes at least one of a model number, a serial number, and a logistics document number of the product equipment, or a combination thereof. The product management system described in Appendix 6. (Appendix 8) When registering product history data, the data registration means stores a hash value of the product history data in a blockchain. 8. The product management system of any one of appendices 1 to 7. (Appendix 9) The output means outputs the result of verifying the block corresponding to the read product history data in the blockchain by including it in the output information. 1. The product management system described in Appendix 8. (Appendix 10) The output means transmits the output information to a terminal used by a user of the product equipment. 10. The product management system of any one of appendices 1 to 9. (Appendix 11) When a public key certificate including a public key and a UID is received from the product management system according to any one of Supplementary Notes 1 to 10, a private key that is paired with the public key is set in the HSM, and the public key certificate is stored in storage; When started, the authentication data is signed using the private key set in the HSM, and an authentication request including the public key certificate stored in the storage and the signed authentication data is transmitted to the product management system. product equipment. (Appendix 12) When a certificate issuance request is received from a product device having a hardware security module (HSM), a public key certificate is generated that includes the public key of the product device, a UID that is information that uniquely identifies the product device, and a signature of a certificate authority, and a private key that is paired with the public key of the product device is set in the HSM; When an authentication request including a public key certificate and authentication data with a signature of the product device is received from the product device, verifying the public key certificate included in the certification request using a CA public key that is paired with the CA private key used by the certification authority for signing; verifying whether the authentication data is signed with a private key that is paired with the public key, using the public key in the public key certificate included in the authentication request; determining that the authentication has been successful if the verification of the public key certificate included in the authentication request and the verification of the signature attached to the authentication data are successful; Registering product history data of the product device in association with the UID of the product device; When a start-of-use request is received from the product device that has been successfully authenticated, the product history data registered in association with the UID is read using at least the UID included in the public key certificate of the product device, and output information related to the product history data. Product management methods. (Appendix 13) a function of generating a public key certificate including a public key of the product device, a UID that is information that uniquely identifies the product device, and a signature of a certificate authority when a certificate issuance request is received from a product device that has a hardware security module (HSM), and setting a private key that is paired with the public key of the product device in the HSM; When an authentication request including a public key certificate and authentication data with a signature of the product device is received from the product device, verifying the public key certificate included in the certification request using a CA public key that is paired with the CA private key used by the certification authority for signing; verifying whether the authentication data is signed with a private key that is paired with the public key, using the public key in the public key certificate included in the authentication request; a function of determining that authentication has been successful when verification of the public key certificate included in the authentication request and verification of the signature attached to the authentication data are successful; A function of registering product history data of the product device in association with the UID of the product device; a function of, when receiving a start-of-use request from the product device that has been successfully authenticated, reading out product history data that has been registered in association with the UID using at least the UID included in the public key certificate of the product device, and outputting output information related to the product history data; A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing a program for causing a computer to realize the above. [Explanation of symbols]

[0144] 1,1a system 10, 10a, 10b Product Management System 11 Publishing Department 12 Authentication Section 13 Data Registration Department 14 Output section 20,20a product equipment 21 Communications Department 22 Control Unit 23 HSM 24 Storage 31 Manufacturing equipment 32 Inspection equipment 40 SCM equipment 50 User terminals 100 API Gateway 120 User Management Department 110 Equipment Management Department 111 Certificate Management Department 112 Certification Authority 130 Equipment Verification Department 140,140b Data Verification Section 141,141b Data storage section 142 Datastores 144 Blockchain 150 SCM Integrated Management Department 210 Communications Department 220 Control Unit 230 Storage 231 TPM 240 Data Acquisition Unit 410 Communications Department 420 Control Unit 430 Storage 431 TPM 440 Data Acquisition Unit N Network

Claims

[Claim 1] an issuing means for generating a public key certificate including a public key of the product device, a UID that is information that uniquely identifies the product device, and a signature of a certificate authority when a certificate issuance request is received from a product device having a hardware security module (HSM), and for causing the HSM to set a private key that is paired with the public key of the product device; When an authentication request including a public key certificate and authentication data with a signature of the product device is received from the product device, verifying the public key certificate included in the certification request using a CA public key that is paired with the CA private key used by the certification authority for signing; verifying whether the authentication data is signed with a private key that is paired with the public key, using the public key in the public key certificate included in the authentication request; If the verification of the public key certificate included in the authentication request is successful and the verification of the signature attached to the authentication data is successful, it is determined that the authentication is successful. authentication means; a data registration means for registering product history data of the product device in association with the UID of the product device; an output means for, when receiving a start-of-use request from the product device that has been successfully authenticated, reading out product history data registered in association with the UID using at least a UID included in the public key certificate of the product device, and outputting output information relating to the product history data; A product management system comprising:

Images