COMMUNICATION SERVER DEVICE AND ABSENCE ATTACK DETECTION METHOD

A communication server device detects abstention attacks by expecting a response to handshake data within a defined period, effectively blocking malicious access and preventing fraud, enhancing anti-fraud systems' detection capabilities.

JP7594000B2Active Publication Date: 2024-12-03GRABTAXI HOLDINGS PTE LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2022513588
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2019-09-02
Publication Date
2024-12-03
Estimated Expiration
2039-09-02

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing anti-fraud systems fail to detect and mitigate abstention attacks, where malicious actors evade data collection by not participating in communication with the server, leading to undetected fraud and financial loss.

Method used

Implementing a communication server device that sends handshake data to a user device, expecting a response within a defined period, and if none is received, determines an abstention attack, blocking access to services and using a nonce to prevent replay attacks.

Benefits of technology

This approach achieves near 100% detection of abstention attacks, preventing fraud by terminating malicious sessions and reducing false positives through flexible timing adjustments.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A communication server device for determining an absence attack associated with a user communication device, the communication server device transmitting handshake data to the user communication device, monitoring for a defined period of time a handshake response from the user communication device corresponding to the handshake data, and responsive to the defined period of time elapsed without a handshake response corresponding to the handshake data being received by the communication server device, and further responsive to the communication server device determining the existence of an event indicating that the user communication device is in a communication mode with the communication server device, determining that an absence attack exists, and generating termination data in response to the determination of the absence attack to deny the user communication device access to services associated with the communication server device.
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present invention relates generally to the field of communications. One aspect of the present invention relates to a communications server apparatus for determining an absence attack associated with a user communications device. Another aspect of the present invention relates to a method for determining an absence attack associated with a user communications device.

[0002] One aspect of the present invention has particular (but not exclusive) application to determining receipt of a response or payload in a handshake process and / or determining an absence attack in the absence of a proper response / payload upon expiration of a defined period of time. [Background technology]

[0003] Mobile fraud is a major cause of lost revenue for businesses. With mobile apps as the primary consumer interface, organizations need to build solid strategies to combat the fraud generated from this platform.

[0004] As anti-fraud systems are adopted by organizations, "abstention" attacks are on the rise as malicious actors improve their understanding of the systems and their countermeasure skills. Abstention attacks are a way to circumvent the anti-fraud system's controls by not participating in data collection activities related to the anti-fraud system. These can take multiple forms, for example: -An attacker modifies an application in such a way that it stops collecting data. -An attacker modifies an application in such a way that the data dispatch routine is stopped. -An attacker manipulates the communications channel to a server, redirecting or cutting off certain data coming in and out of the channel, causing packets to be lost entirely to the target server.

[0005] While there are variations of this attack on the client side as well, the symptom observed on the server side is no communication from the fraudsters regarding the data collection effort.

[0006] Anti-fraud solutions ignore the absence problem because it is difficult to monitor. Product companies ignore it because it is a complex problem that cannot be solved without control over all components. Typically, the assumption is that the payload to the server will always be sent, and once this barrier is breached, the system does not provide a way to detect or repair this situation. In such cases, the fraudster will continue to communicate with the service and receive normal functionality, despite evading detection. Typical types of fraud include spoofing location information or modifying the service provider's application to select specific options (e.g., services) that suit the individual, such as travel-related services or rides, causing financial loss to the service provider.

[0007] Therefore, it is desirable to solve at least the above problems. Summary of the Invention [Means for solving the problem]

[0008] Aspects of the invention are as defined in the independent claims. Some optional features are defined in the dependent claims.

[0009] Implementations of the techniques disclosed herein may provide significant technical advantages. These may include the communications server device sending handshake data to the user communications device (expecting a handshake response / payload in response, which in normal circumstances corresponds to the handshake data), determining that there is an presence of an presence attack associated with the user communications device if a proper response / payload is not received from the user communications device upon expiration of a defined period of time, and generating termination data that can subsequently block the user communications device from accessing the communications server device or services associated with the communications server device.

[0010] In at least some implementations, the techniques disclosed herein may provide a nonce that is transmitted to a user communication device (e.g., included in handshake data) to avoid replay attacks by preventing old communications or responses from being reused to gain access to the communication server device or its associated services.

[0011] In at least some implementations, the techniques disclosed herein may allow for a buffer against potential network issues, e.g., a slow network connection, by implementing an appropriate time frame or period during which an absence of an appropriate response from the user communications device may be flagged as an absence attack. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0012] The invention will now be described, by way of example only, with reference to the accompanying drawings in which: [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an exemplary communication system including a communication server device. [Figure 2A] FIG. 2A is a schematic block diagram illustrating a communication server device for determining an presence attack associated with a user communication device. [Figure 2B] FIG. 2B is a flow chart illustrating a method performed in a communications server device for determining an presence attack associated with a user communications device. [Figure 3A] FIG. 3A is a schematic diagram showing a benign application flow sequence. [Figure 3B] FIG. 3B is a schematic diagram showing an absence application flow sequence.

[0013] Various embodiments may relate, for example, to apparatus and methodologies for detecting and preventing presence attacks on a distributed mobile anti-fraud network.

[0014] Various embodiments may relate to fraud checking in mobile systems. A fraud detection system may be provided that requires a component on the mobile device (or communication device) that acts like an "agent" to collect data and securely transmit the collected data to a centralized or distributed processing system. The collected data includes, but is not limited to, application checksums to detect if the application (App) used to communicate with the server has been modified, sensor information to check if the device is rooted / jailbroken, and a DeviceID that is created. The agent may be more secure than the App so that it is less susceptible to tampering. The agent may be, for example, a piece of C++ code with protections to protect itself.

[0015] In various embodiments, the mobile system authenticates a user on the system, and access to the system is granted, and the system may record the user's presence in a data store. For fraud checking purposes, separate from the login / authentication process, the fraud detection system initiates a handshake with the user and sends what is effectively a handshake invitation. In a preferred arrangement, the fraud detection system monitors for receipt of a handshake response containing some data from an agent on the user's device. A good user returns a handshake response, and receipt of the response is detected. In a preferred arrangement, the response, or at least the fact that a response was received, is recorded in a data store. Malicious users will typically try to avoid sending a response. If a handshake response is not detected within a certain time frame, the user is identified as a potentially malicious actor and the user's system access is revoked.

[0016] Effectively, the initiation of the handshake may serve to solicit a specific or defined response that the system can expect, preferably along with information or some data from an "agent" on the device. All normal or non-malicious clients (or users) are expected to respond with data from the device (e.g., a checksum to check if the app has not been modified, data to check if the device is rooted / jailbroken, etc.). Malicious actors will attempt to avoid sending a handshake response, so the system can effectively detect any unwillingness on the part of the actor to send a "payload" (e.g., data from the agent) to the system.

[0017] When an absence attack is determined or detected, communications from the malicious actor (via the user communication device) may be terminated, or all sessions (e.g., initiated with one or more (micro)services) from the malicious actor may be terminated or dropped. Effectively, the malicious actor may be kicked out of the system.

[0018] The technique may implement a time-bound handshake process between different systems to detect an absence attack (which is described in more detail below). Once an absence attack is detected, the system may kick out such a malicious or malicious actor (or user) by terminating any active sessions the user has with any microservices. The technique may provide one or more of the following: (i) Addressing previously neglected issues, for example in the area of ​​mobile fraud prevention. (ii) A flexible design that allows fine-tuning of different parameters to allow for the correction of false positives (e.g., due to slow network connections). (iii) A detection rate approaching 100% for the particular problem being addressed. This refers to the situation where a technology or system may return a false positive, as opposed to missing a bad actor or failing to detect a bad user.

[0019] In terms of flexible design, this may include the flexibility to adjust timing parameters and / or perform fraud checks at any stage. For example, a defined period before checking for absence attacks may take into account potential delays in processing and data movement times. Additionally, there may be a check if the actor / user is working on other service(s) but did not send the required security payload in the handshake process, which is a clear indication of an attack and would result in action being taken against the user.

[0020] Referring first to FIG. 1, a communication system 100 applicable in various embodiments is illustrated. The communication system 100 includes a communication server device 102, a first user (or client) communication device 104, and a second user (or client) communication device 106. These devices 102, 104, 106 are in or connected to a communication network 108 (e.g., the Internet) via respective communication links 110, 112, 114, which implement, for example, the Internet communication protocol. The communication devices 104, 106 may be capable of communicating via other communication networks, such as a public switched telephone network (PSTN network), including a mobile cellular communication network, which are omitted in FIG. 1 for clarity. It should be understood that one or more other communication devices similar to the devices 104, 106 may be present.

[0021] The communications server device 102 may be for determining presence attacks associated with the user communications devices (eg, 104 and / or 106).

[0022] The communication server device 102 may be a single server as shown diagrammatically in FIG. 1, or the functions performed by the communication server device 102 may be distributed among multiple server components. In the example of FIG. 1, the communication server device 102 may include a number of individual components, including, but not limited to, one or more microprocessors (μP) 116, a memory 118 (e.g., volatile memory such as RAM (random access memory)) for loading executable instructions 120, the executable instructions 120 defining the functions that the server device 102 executes under the control of the processor 116. The communication server device 102 may include an input / output (I / O) module 122 that enables the server device 102 to communicate over the communication network 108. A user interface (UI) 124 is provided for user control and may include one or more computing peripherals, such as, for example, a display monitor, a computer keyboard, etc. The communication server device 102 may also include a database (DB) 126, the purpose of which will be readily apparent from the following discussion.

[0023] The user communication device 104 may include a number of individual components, including, but not limited to, one or more microprocessors (μP) 128, a memory 130 (e.g., volatile memory such as RAM) for loading executable instructions 132, which define the functionality performed by the user communication device 104 under the control of the processor 128. The user communication device 104 also includes an input / output (I / O) module 134 that enables the user communication device 104 to communicate over a communication network 108. A user interface (UI) 136 is provided for user control. If the user communication device 104 is, for example, a smartphone or tablet device, the user interface 136 may have a touch panel display, such as is common in many smartphones and other mobile devices. Alternatively, if the user communication device 104 is, for example, a desktop or laptop computer, the user interface may include one or more computing peripherals, such as, for example, a display monitor, a computer keyboard, etc.

[0024] The user communication device 106 may be, for example, a smartphone or a tablet terminal having the same or similar hardware architecture as the user communication device 104 .

[0025] 2A is a schematic block diagram illustrating a communication server device 202 for determining an presence attack associated with a user communication device, the communication server device 202 comprising a processor 216 and a memory 218, the communication server device 202, under control of the processor 216, executing instructions in the memory 218 to transmit handshake data 238 to the user communication device, monitor for a defined period of time a handshake response from the user communication device corresponding to the handshake data 238, determine that there is an presence of an presence attack in response to the communication server device 202 determining the presence of an event indicating that the user communication device is in a communication mode with the communication server device 202, and generate termination data 239 in response to the determination of the presence of an presence attack for denying the user communication device access to services associated with the communication server device 202. The processor 216 and the memory 218 may be coupled to each other (as represented by line 2179), e.g., physically coupled and / or electrically coupled. The processor 216 may be as described in the context of the processor 116 (FIG. 1), and / or the memory 218 may be as described in the context of the memory 118 (FIG. 1).

[0026] That is, a communication server device 202 may be provided. The communication server device 202 may be configured to detect presence attacks associated with or originating from a user communication device (e.g., 104, 106, FIG. 1). A user of the user communication device may, for example, attempt to gain access to one or more (micro)services associated with or provided by the communication server device 202. The communication server device 202 may transmit handshake data 238 to be received by the user communication device (e.g., the communication server device 202 may transmit the handshake data 238 as part of a handshake process, or the communication server device 202 may initiate a handshake process by transmitting the handshake data 238). The communication server device 202 may then monitor for a prescribed (or predetermined) period of time for a handshake response (e.g., which may be or may include a payload) from the user communication device in response to the handshake data 238. The handshake response may be specific to the handshake data 238. The handshake response may be sent by the user communications device to the communications server device 202 as part of the handshake process.

[0027] In various embodiments, the handshake data 238 may be transmitted to the user communications device in response to the communications server device 202 authenticating a user of the user communications device, or at any time after the authentication process.

[0028] If a defined period (or a certain period) has passed or elapsed (i.e., expired) without the communication server device 202 receiving a handshake response from the user communication device corresponding to the handshake data 238, and further in response to the communication server device 202 determining the presence (or existence) of an event (e.g., a communication event or a network event) indicating that the user communication device is in a communication mode with the communication server device 202, the communication server device 202 may determine that an absence attack has occurred, following which the communication server device 202 may generate termination data 239 to block the user communication device from accessing services (e.g., microservices) associated with the communication server device 202. Access by the user communication device to one or more or all (micro)services associated with the communication server device 202 may be denied. The termination data 239 may include or indicate an eviction verdict or notice.

[0029] More specifically, if no appropriate response is received by the communication server device 202 from the user communication device corresponding to the handshake data 238 before the expiration of the defined period, the communication server device 202 may determine whether an event may exist indicating that the user communication device is in a communication mode with the communication server device 202, i.e., whether the user communication device may be in communication with the communication server device 202 and whether it is ready to communicate with the communication server device 202. If it is determined that there is such an event, the communication server device 202 may recognize the presence of such an event in combination with the lack of a handshake response corresponding to the handshake data 238 from the user communication device as indicating a malice or absence attack on the part of the user, and therefore proceeds to generate termination data 239 and deny access to services associated with the communication server device.

[0030] The handshake response to the handshake data 238 involves a time factor, thus providing a time-sensitive handshake process.

[0031] It should be understood that the determination that there is an absence attack may be an active step of determining that such an attack is present, or the determination may be a follow-through process as a result or conclusion resulting from a combination of the absence of a handshake response corresponding to handshake data 238 within a defined period of time and the presence of an event.

[0032] Events indicative of the user communication device being in a communication mode with the communication server device 202 may include, but are not limited to, at least one of the following: (i) continued communication between the user communication device and the communication server device 202, for example, in relation to one or more other services associated with (or provided by) the communication server device 202; (ii) the user communication device further attempts to access the communication server device 102 or a service associated therewith, or attempts to communicate with the communication server device 202; (iii) the user communication device placing a call to the gateway of the communication server device 202; (iv) the user communication device checking the network phone; (v) having an open TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) connection. The check for the presence of an open communication / connection may be performed by the server device, and may be triggered by the server when a particular user is known to have been asked to respond to a (handshake) challenge but has not responded, and the same authentication token is sent for a call made to an API.

[0033] As non-limiting examples, there may be no response at all from the user communications device (e.g., if the user avoids sending a response), or the response sent by the user in response to the handshake data 238 may not be the proper or expected response, for example, where the response may include data from the user communications device indicating at least one of the following: (i) that an agent (on the user communications device) for sending the handshake response has been modified or compromised, (ii) that an App (application) used to communicate with the communications server device 202 has been modified or compromised, or (iii) that the user communications device (or its operating system) has been modified or compromised. An "agent" on a user communications device may refer to a set of code or instructions that resides on the user communications device.

[0034] In the context of various embodiments, the communications server device 202 may set a start time for the defined period and / or store (e.g., in one or more data stores) data indicative of the start time. The start time may correspond to a time at which the presence of a user of the user communications device is identified.

[0035] In the context of various embodiments, services or microservices associated with the communications server device 202 may include login, logging, business logic(s), and the like.

[0036] In the context of various embodiments, the sending of handshake data 238 to the user communication device and monitoring of the response may be by a fraud decision network (FDN) of the communication server device 202. The generation of the termination data 239 may be by the FDN.

[0037] In various embodiments, to determine that there is an absence attack, the communication server device 202 may be configured to determine that there is an presence of an presence attack in response to expiration of a defined period during which a handshake response having validation data (corresponding to the handshake data 238) is not received by the communication server device 202, and further in response to the communication server device 202 determining the presence of an event. The validation data may be from an agent on the user communication device. The validation data may include data indicative of a state or condition of the user communication device and / or a state of an application (App) used by a user of the user communication device to communicate with the communication server device 202, for example, whether the App has been modified and / or whether the user communication device has been rooted or jailbroken. Examples of such data may include a checksum to verify whether the App has been modified, data regarding whether the device has been rooted / jailbroken, etc.

[0038] In various embodiments, the handshake data 238 may include a nonce. The term "nonce" may refer to a code, character, number, or value that can be used (only once) for authentication purposes. The nonce may be used in cryptographic communications and may be encrypted by a specific or defined secret key known only to the communications server device 202 (e.g., known only to an FDN forming part of the server device 202). Information corresponding to the nonce may be stored within the communications server device 202 (e.g., within the FDN). The nonce may be transmitted to an agent on the user communications device. The use of the nonce may prevent replay attacks, such that old communications or responses are not reused.

[0039] With the handshake data 238 having a nonce, the verification data (sent with the handshake response) may include a signature or response nonce that corresponds to the nonce sent by the communications server device 202.

[0040] In the context of various embodiments, the defined period of time may be between about 2 minutes and about 10 minutes, e.g., between about 2 minutes and about 8 minutes, between about 2 minutes and about 6 minutes, between about 2 minutes and about 5 minutes, between about 5 minutes and about 10 minutes, between about 5 minutes and about 8 minutes, or between about 3 minutes and about 6 minutes, e.g., about 2 minutes, about 3 minutes, about 5 minutes (preferably), about 6 minutes, about 8 minutes, or about 10 minutes.

[0041] In various embodiments, prior to transmitting the handshake data 238 to the user communications device, the communications server device 202 may be further configured to issue a session token to the user communications device. The session token may function to identify a user or prove authentication. The session token may be issued in response to the communications server device 202 authenticating a user of the user communications device.

[0042] In the context of various embodiments, to authenticate a user of a user communication device, the communication server device 202 may be configured to, in response to receiving (from the user communication device) user data having one or more data fields indicative of the identity of the user, authenticate the user based on the user data. The user data may include a user ID and a password associated with the user.

[0043] The session token may be valid for all (micro)services associated with the communication server device 202 .

[0044] The session token may be issued by an identity provider (IDP) module of the communication server device 202 .

[0045] In the context of various embodiments, the IDP and FDN are sets or pieces of code that run on the communication server device 202. The IDP and FDN may be distinct or separate from one another, or may be included in one module.

[0046] In various embodiments, in response to the generated termination data 239, the communications server device 202 may be further configured to invalidate (or revoke) the session token. In other words, the communications server device 202 may cause the expiration of the session token to block the user communications device from accessing services associated with the communications server device 202. The session token may be invalidated by the IDP module in response to an eviction decision or notice issued by the FDN.

[0047] Prior to transmitting the handshake data 238 to the user communication device, and in response to the communication server device 202 authenticating the user of the user communication device, the communication server device 202 may be further configured to generate data identifying the presence of the user and store the data in one or more data stores (e.g., the data stores may be distributed hash tables) within the communication server device 202. As a non-limiting example, the data may include a defined "key" and a defined value (e.g., a Null value) associated with the key. The one or more data stores or distributed hash table(s) may be part of the FDN.

[0048] The data may include time data indicating the time the user's presence was identified.

[0049] In various embodiments, in response to the handshake response (corresponding to handshake data 238) being received by the communications server device 202 within the defined time period, the communications server device 202 may be further configured to generate access data to enable the user communications device to access services associated with the communications server device 202. The response may include verification data. The verification data may include a signature or a response nonce corresponding to a nonce sent by the communications server device 202 as part of the handshake data 238.

[0050] The communications server device 202 may be further configured to generate second data indicative of receipt of the handshake response by the communications server device 202 and update data stored in one or more data stores with the second data. As a non-limiting example, the second data may include a second defined value (e.g., a non-null value) associated with a defined "key."

[0051] As a non-limiting example, the handshake response may be received any time within a defined period. If the handshake response is received within the defined period, the user may be removed, for example, from the lookup list. At the end of the defined period, any user that has not sent a handshake response may be deemed likely malicious, and after further checks, the user may be addressed, for example, deleted or kicked out.

[0052] In the context of various embodiments, the communications server device 202 may be a single server, or the functions performed by the communications server device 202 may be distributed across multiple server components.

[0053] In the context of various embodiments, an "app" or "application" may be installed on a user communication device and may include processor-executable instructions for execution on the device. As a non-limiting example, a user of the user communication device may attempt to communicate with the communications server device 202 or access a service associated with (or offered by) the communications server device 202 via an App.

[0054] FIG. 2B is a flow chart 240 illustrating a method performed at a communications server device for determining an presence attack associated with a user communications device.

[0055] At 242, handshake data is sent to the user communications device.

[0056] At 244, a handshake response from the user communication device corresponding to the handshake data is monitored for a defined period of time.

[0057] In response to a defined period of time elapses without a handshake response corresponding to the handshake data being received by the communication server device, and further in response to determining the presence of an event indicating that the user communications device is in a communications mode with the communication server device, at 246, it is determined that there is an absence attack, and at 248, in response to the determination of an absence attack, termination data is generated for denying the user communications device access to services associated with the communication server device.

[0058] At 246, an absence attack may be determined to exist in response to a defined period of time elapsed without a handshake response including the verification data being received by the communications server device and in response to determining the presence of the event.

[0059] At 242, the handshake data, including the nonce, may be transmitted to the user communications device.

[0060] In various embodiments, the defined period of time may be between about 2 minutes and about 10 minutes, e.g., between about 2 minutes and about 8 minutes, between about 2 minutes and about 6 minutes, between about 2 minutes and about 5 minutes, between about 5 minutes and about 10 minutes, between about 5 minutes and about 8 minutes, or between about 3 minutes and about 6 minutes, e.g., about 2 minutes, about 3 minutes, about 5 minutes (preferably), about 6 minutes, about 8 minutes, or about 10 minutes.

[0061] At 242, before transmitting the handshake data to the user communications device, the method may further include issuing a session token to the user communications device.

[0062] In response to the generated termination data, the method may further include invalidating the session token.

[0063] At 242, prior to transmitting the handshake data to the user communications device, and in response to authenticating the user of the user communications device, the method may further include generating data to identify a presence of the user and storing the data in one or more data stores within the communications server device.

[0064] The data may include time data indicating the time when the presence of the user was identified.

[0065] In response to the handshake response being received by the communications server device within the defined period of time, access data may be generated to enable the user communications device to access services associated with the communications server device.

[0066] Second data indicative of receipt of the handshake response by the communications server device may be generated, and data stored in the one or more data stores may be updated with the second data.

[0067] It should be understood that the descriptions in the context of the communications server device 202 may correspondingly be applied in relation to the method as described in the context of the flowchart 240 .

[0068] It should be understood that descriptions made in the context of communication server device 102 are equally applicable to communication server device 202 .

[0069] In the context of the various embodiments, user communication devices may include, but are not limited to, smart phones, tablets, handheld / portable communication devices, desktop or laptop computers, terminal computers, and the like.

[0070] Also, a computer program product may be provided having instructions for performing a method for determining an presence attack associated with a user communications device as described herein.

[0071] A computer program may also be provided having instructions for implementing the method for determining an presence attack associated with a user communications device as described herein.

[0072] There may further be provided a non-transitory storage medium storing instructions which, when executed by the processor, cause the processor to perform the method of determining an presence attack associated with a user communications device as described herein.

[0073] Various embodiments or techniques are now described in further detail.

[0074] The techniques disclosed herein may include the implementation of a time-bound handshake process between the following systems or modules: an Identity provider (IDP), a Fraud Decision Network (FDN), and an agent on a user device.

[0075] The IDP may be responsible for the login, so the IDP can act as a gateway.

[0076] FIG. 3A is a schematic diagram 350a illustrating a benign App flow sequence, and FIG. 3B is a schematic diagram 350b illustrating an abstraction App flow sequence.

[0077] First, referring to FIG. 3A, the process begins with a user communication device 352a connecting to a session token issuing IDP 354 (1, corresponding to the directional arrow of the same number (circle) in FIG. 3A). The IDP 354 may authenticate and identify the user (valid authentication leads to the user's identification), issue a session token (2), and record the actor / user's network presence in a distributed hash table 356 (3). The hash table 356 may currently record a key, but may assign a null value for the key-value pair to indicate that the actor is present on the network pending verification. A timestamp of this event may be recorded and tracked for boundary checking.

[0078] The IDP session token or session cookie may be of any type to identify authentication, including in the form of a JSON Web Token (JWT). The token may be required to prove authentication and may be required with every request to the background.

[0079] The IDP session token may be valid for all (micro)services in the backend.

[0080] The Fake Detection Network (FDN) 358 may sense the presence of the actor (4) and in turn issue a cryptographic nonce (5) encrypted by a specific private key known only to the FDN 358. The nonce is transmitted in response to a specific agent on the device 352a. In various embodiments, when the user / actor logs in, the IDP 354 may notify the FDN 358 of the actor's presence. The FDN 358 may store information related to the user and the nonce information.

[0081] If the actor is not malicious, the agent sends this signed nonce back to the server (i.e., FDN 358) along with the response payload (6). This response is recorded in the distributed hash table 356 against the user's identity as the value of the corresponding key (7). The need for a nonce is to avoid replay attacks, where a malicious actor can copy a previous response payload and send the same to the FDN 358. The process then continues, allowing device 352a to access the desired service.

[0082] The nonce may be or may include a message authentication code sent from the FDN 358 to the client device 352a. For a return signed nonce, the same message is expected to be returned from the client 352a to the FDN 358 as part of the payload. This is to ensure that the payload was generated at a specific time and is not "replayed" (e.g., using a previous response or payload).

[0083] The same message is expected to be returned by client 352a to the FDN as part of the payload.

[0084] Although the distributed hash table 356 is shown separate from the FDN 358 , it should be understood that the distributed hash table 356 may be part of the FDN 358 .

[0085] It should be appreciated that one or more distributed hash tables (eg, each similar to distributed hash table 356) may be provided for storing data.

[0086] The IDP 354 and the FDN 358 reside on a communication server device, for example on the same server. The IDP 354 and the FDN 358 are part of the code that runs on the communication server device. The IDP 354 and the FDN 358 may be different modules or may be one module.

[0087] Next, referring to FIG. 3B, (1)-(5) are similar to those in FIG. 3A, and therefore the description thereof will be omitted. If the agent on the user communication device 352b is changed (e.g., changed to stop sending responses or payloads), or if the actor / user tries to avoid sending payloads, if there is no response from the absence App (6), the FDN 358 waits until the timer 359 expires (7). The expiration of the timer 359 means that a certain period of time has passed or has passed without a payload being received. As a non-limiting example, there may be a time duration of 5 minutes until the timer 359 expires. The FDN 358 may store the time when the IDP 354 notifies the actor's presence as the criterion or basis for the timer 359.

[0088] All normal or non-malicious clients (or users) are expected to respond with data from the device. Only a malicious actor would not send a response (or payload), and the omission of sending a response would be detected by FDN 358.

[0089] After the expiration of the timer 359, the FDN 358 may then confirm the presence of one or more network events from the actor / user, which may be in the form of confirming a network call or an open TCP connection. Another network event may be where the FDN 358 determines that there are still active connections to other services in the mesh of microservices. This may be done, for example, by looking at an Application Programming Interface Gateway (API G / W), which may act as a gateway to all microservices in the ecosystem. In various embodiments, the API G / W may be a software component that acts like a gateway for all API calls. The presence of calls to the G / W may be indicative of malicious intent after a certain time.

[0090] If an active network event is detected and there is no payload response from the actor, indicated by a null value for the key on the distributed hash table 356 (8), the FDN 358 issues an eviction decision for this particular actor (9). The IDP 354 can then act on the eviction decision and remove the actor from the network by invalidating the current session (valid for all (micro)services in the backend) by revoking (or expiring) the session token (10). As a non-limiting example, the session token has a session validity, which may be checked every time a call is made by the user device 352b. Once the session token is invalidated on the server, the next time the user communicates via the user device 352b, the session is terminated since it is determined that the session token is no longer valid.

[0091] Effectively, an absence attack may be detected when a user or actor does not transmit the required payload, but remains present or available in the system.

[0092] In various embodiments, the total number of logins and the number of payloads received may be tracked. Ideally, these numbers should be equal, but there may be losses due to network issues. However, if the number of payloads received is too low compared to the number of logins, steps may be taken to log out the actor / user.

[0093] As can be seen, the techniques disclosed herein may provide a methodology for addressing or resolving absence attacks in, for example, mobile fraud-resistant networks.

[0094] It will be understood that the present invention has been described by way of example only. Various modifications may be made to the techniques described herein without departing from the spirit and scope of the appended claims. The techniques disclosed comprise techniques that may be provided alone or in combination with one another. Thus, features described with respect to one technique may also be presented in combination with another technique.

Claims

1. A communications server apparatus for determining an presence attack associated with a user communications device, the communications server apparatus comprising a processor and a memory, and configured to execute instructions in the memory under control of the processor; Transmitting handshake data to the user communication device; monitoring for a defined period of time a handshake response from said user communications device corresponding to handshake data including a nonce; in response to the defined period of time elapsed without the handshake response corresponding to the handshake data being received by the communication server device, and in response to the communication server device determining, by the communication server device, the presence of an event indicating that the user communication device is in a communication mode with the communication server device; determining that the absence attack has occurred, and generating termination data in response to determining an presence of an absence attack for denying access of the user communications device to services associated with the communications server device.

2. 2. The communication server device of claim 1, wherein in order to determine that an absence attack exists, the communication server device is configured to determine that an absence attack exists in response to the defined period of time having elapsed without a handshake response including verification data being received by the communication server device, and further in response to the communication server device determining that the event exists.

3. The communication server device according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the defined period is between 2 minutes and 10 minutes.

4. Before transmitting the handshake data to the user communication device, the communication server device is further configured to issue a session token to the user communication device.

4. The communication server device according to any one of claims 1 to 3.

5. The communication server device of claim 4 , wherein in response to the generated termination data, the communication server device is further configured to invalidate the session token.

6. and in response to the communications server device authenticating a user of the user communications device prior to transmitting the handshake data to the user communications device, the communications server device is further configured to: generating data for identifying the presence of said user; 6. A communications server device according to claim 1, further comprising: a data processor configured to store said data in one or more data stores within said communications server device;

7. The communication server device according to claim 6 , wherein the data includes time data indicating a time when the presence of the user was identified.

8. 8. The communication server device of claim 6 or 7, wherein in response to the handshake response being received by the communication server device within the defined period, the communication server device is further configured to generate access data to allow the user communication device to access a service associated with the communication server device.

9. The communication server device according to claim 8, further comprising: generating second data indicating receipt of the handshake response by the communication server device; The communication server device updates data stored in the one or more data stores with the second data.

10. 1. A method executed in a communications server device for determining an presence attack associated with a user communications device, the method comprising, under control of a processor of the communications server device, Transmitting handshake data to the user communication device; monitoring for a defined period of time a handshake response from said user communications device corresponding to handshake data including a nonce; in response to the defined period of time elapsed without the handshake response corresponding to the handshake data being received by the communication server device, and in response to the communication server device determining, by the communication server device, the presence of an event indicating that the user communication device is in a communication mode with the communication server device; determining that the absence attack has occurred, The method includes generating termination data in response to determining an presence of an presence attack to deny access to the user communications device to services associated with the communications server device.

11. 11. The method of claim 10, wherein determining that an absence attack exists comprises determining that an absence attack exists in response to a defined time period elapsed without a handshake response including verification data being received by the communication server device, and further comprising determining that an absence attack exists in response to determining the existence of the event.

12. 12. The communication server device according to claim 10 or 11, wherein the defined period is between 2 minutes and 10 minutes.

13. The method according to any one of claims 10 to 12, wherein before transmitting the handshake data to the user communication device, the method further comprises issuing a session token to the user communication device.

14. The method of claim 13 , in response to the generated termination data, the method further comprising invalidating the session token.

15. In response to authenticating a user of the user communications device prior to transmitting the handshake data to the user communications device, the method further comprises: generating data for identifying the presence of said user; 15. A method according to any one of claims 11 to 14, further comprising storing said data in one or more data stores within said communication server device.

16. The method of claim 15 , wherein the data includes time data indicative of a time at which the presence of the user was identified.

17. 17. The method according to any one of claims 10 to 16, in response to the handshake response being received by the communication server device within the defined period of time, the method further comprising generating access data to allow the user communication device to access services associated with the communication server device.

18. A computer program comprising instructions for carrying out the method according to any one of claims 10 to 17.

19. A non-transitory storage medium storing instructions which, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform the method of any one of claims 10 to 17.

Citation Information

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