High-speed blockchain payment methods and systems

The hybrid blockchain payment method employs VRF-generated randomized IDs, Pedersen commitments, and encrypted balances to achieve fast, private, and censorship-resistant transactions, overcoming the limitations of existing systems by ensuring minimal collateral and robust security.

JP7947688B2Active Publication Date: 2026-11-11NEC CORP
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2023552336
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2021-11-11
Filing Date
2022-09-27
Publication Date
2026-11-11
Estimated Expiration
2042-09-27

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Current blockchain payment systems face challenges in achieving fast, private, and censorship-resistant transactions while minimizing collateral requirements and trust assumptions, with existing solutions either compromising on speed, privacy, or security.

Method used

A hybrid approach using verifiable random functions (VRF) to generate randomized payment IDs, Pedersen commitments to obscure service provider identities, and BLS signatures for aggregated approvals, combined with encrypted balances and smart contracts to manage user and collateral accounts, ensuring fast, private, and censorship-resistant transactions.

Benefits of technology

The solution enables high-speed, confidential, and anonymous payments with minimal user collateral, resisting censorship and maintaining strong security guarantees without additional trust assumptions, addressing the limitations of existing systems.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Patent Text Reader

Abstract

A method for high-speed blockchain payments is disclosed, where the payment involves a transfer of funds from a user's (110) account to a private collateral account of a service provider (120). According to an embodiment, the method includes the steps of receiving, by the service provider (120), a private intention to pay from the user (110), where the private intention to pay includes a payment index, a random payment ID, and an address of the private collateral account of the service provider (120); modifying, by the service provider (120), the intention to pay by replacing the address of the collateral account of the service provider (120) with a commitment and providing the modified intention to pay to a majority of state keepers (130) of the blockchain (140); and updating, by the service provider (120), the state of the blockchain (140). The method includes the steps of: receiving payment authorizations from the state keeper (130), each payment authorization including a modified payment intent signed with the private key of the respective state keeper (130); evaluating the received payment authorizations, by the service provider (120), aggregating the successfully evaluated payment authorizations, and sending the aggregation result to the user (110); receiving, by the service provider (120), a final transaction created by the user (110) after verifying the aggregation result, verifying that the user (110) has correctly constructed the final transaction according to a given protocol, and accepting the payment if the verification of the final transaction is successful.
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Description

[Technical Field]

[0001] This invention relates to a method, system, and computer-readable medium for high-speed blockchain payments. [Background technology]

[0002] Digital currencies implemented as permissionless blockchains, such as Ethereum, offer a fundamentally different alternative to traditional payment systems. One of the most striking differences is the absence, or minimal presence, of a centralized entity that manages the balances or payments of all user accounts. Instead, each transaction is validated by a large, decentralized system in which anyone can participate. This provides a strong guarantee that no entity can censor payments.

[0003] However, such systems are impractical in scenarios such as retail or online payments. In particular, they have long latency and lack on-chain privacy, which prevents them from being used for everyday small payments. Means exist to address these shortcomings. The most notable technique is to leverage smart contracts, which provide additional functionality. In addition to standard blockchain payments, two types of such systems relevant to retail payments can be identified: those that offer short latency and those that offer on-chain privacy.

[0004] Several techniques exist to address latency issues through smart contracts. Payment channels allow users to establish relationships with a single service provider. However, they require separate fixed collateral for each such relationship, which is impractical. Payment hubs connect users to multiple service providers, but the fixed collateral is large and therefore cannot scale to a larger number of registered users. Sidechains allow payments to be quickly approved by a smaller set of verification entities, but they introduce additional trust assumptions and high communication complexity. On the one hand, the Snappy payment system (for reference, see V. Mavroudis, K. Wust, A. Dhar, K. Kostiainen, and S. Capkun: "Snappy: Fast On-Chain Payments with Practical Collaterals," 27th Annual Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium 2020, February 23-26, 2020, San Diego, California, USA, https: / / www.ndss-symposium.org / wp-content / uploads / 2020 / 02 / 24049-paper.pdf) uses small amounts of user collateral, but violates the strong censorship resistance guarantee of permissionless blockchains.

[0005] On the other hand, the Zether payment system (for reference, see B. Bunz, S. Agrawal, M. Zamani, and D. Boneh: "Zether: Towards Privacy in a Smart Contract World," July 2020, pp. 423-443, https: / / crypto.stanford.edu / ~buenz / papers / zether.pdf) addresses on-chain privacy by providing confidential and anonymous transactions. While this offers far stronger security and privacy guarantees than standard blockchain transactions, its payments are slow because the system does not provide any mechanism to address latency issues.

[0006] Most systems are found to offer only very specific additional features while often violating other characteristics. No current prior art system offers (a) fast payments, (b) resistance to censorship, (c) low collateral, (d) on-chain privacy, and (e) no additional trust assumptions. [Prior art documents] [Non-patent literature]

[0007] [Non-Patent Document 1] V. Mavroudis, K. Wust, A. Dhar, K. Kostiainen, and S. Capkun: "Snappy: Fast On-Chain Payments with Practical Collaterals," 27th Annual Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium 2020, February 23-26, 2020, San Diego, California, USA. https: / / www.ndss-symposium.org / wp-content / uploads / 2020 / 02 / 24049-paper.pdf [Non-Patent Document 2] B. Bunz, S. Agrawal, M. Zamani, and D. Boneh: "Zether: Towards Privacy in a Smart Contract World", July 2020, pages 423~443, https: / / crypto.stanford.edu / ~buenz / papers / zether.pdf [Non-licensed Document 3] S. Goldberg, L. Reyzin, D. Papadopoulos, およびJ. Vcelak, "Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs)", Internet Engineering Task Force, Internet-Draft draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-09, May 2021, in progress [オンライン]. Possible use: https: / / datatracker.ietf.org / doc / html / draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-09 [Non-licensed Document 4] TP Pedersen, "Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable secret sharing", in Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '91, 1992, pages 129~140 [Non-licensed Document 5] D. Boneh, B. Lynn, H. Shacham, "Short signatures from the Weil pairing", in Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2001, 2001, pages 514~532 [Non-licensed Document 6] T. Ristenpart and S. Yilek, “The power of proofs-of-possession: Securing multiparty signatures against rogue-key attacks,” in Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2007, M. Naor, Ed. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007, pp. 228–245. [Non-Patent Document 7] B. Bunz, J. Bootle, D. Boneh, A. Poelstra, P. Wuille, and G. Maxwell, “Bulletproofs: Short proofs for confidential transactions and more,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017 / 1066, 2017, https: / / eprint.iacr.org / 2017 / 1066 [Overview of the project] [Problems that the invention aims to solve]

[0008] Therefore, an object of the present invention is to improve and further develop methods and systems for high-speed blockchain payments so that at least some of the aforementioned drawbacks are mitigated or overcome. [Means for solving the problem]

[0009] According to the present invention, the aforementioned objective is achieved by a computer implementation method for high-speed blockchain payments, wherein the payment involves the transfer of funds from a user's account to a service provider's private collateral account, and the method includes the steps of: the service provider receiving a private payment intent from a user, the private payment intent including a payment index, a random payment ID, and the address of the service provider's private collateral account; the service provider modifying the payment intent by replacing the address of the service provider's collateral account with a commitment and providing the modified payment intent to a majority of blockchain statekeepers; the service provider receiving payment confirmations from the blockchain statekeepers, each payment confirmation including a modified payment intent signed using the private key of the respective statekeeper; the service provider evaluating the received payment confirmations, aggregating the payment confirmations that have been successfully evaluated, and sending the aggregated results to the user; and the service provider receiving the final transaction created by the user after verifying the aggregated results, verifying that the user has correctly constructed the final transaction according to a given protocol, and accepting the payment if the verification of the final transaction is successful.

[0010] Furthermore, the above-mentioned objectives are achieved by a system for high-speed blockchain payments, as defined by the independent claims, and by a non-temporary processor-readable medium.

[0011] Embodiments of the present invention provide a blockchain payment method and system, which takes a hybrid approach that provides both fast and private payments with practical collateral, along with robust security guarantees that include censorship resistance and do not involve additional trust assumptions.

[0012] According to one embodiment of the present invention, a random payment ID of a user's payment intent is generated by computing a verifiable random function (VRF) hash of the payment index. In this regard, it should be noted that a verifiable random function (VRF) is the public-key version of a keyed cryptographic hash (for reference, see S. Goldberg, L. Reyzin, D. Papadopoulos, and J. Vcelak, "Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs)", Internet Engineering Task Force, Internet-Draft draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-09, May 2021, in progress [online]. Available: https: / / datatracker.ietf.org / doc / html / draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-09). Anyone who possesses the public key pk can verify the correctness of the hash, but only the owner of the private key sk can generate the hash. More precisely, given an input value x, the owner of the private key sk can compute a hash y = VRFhash(sk, x) for the input x. The owner of the private key can also compute the proof of agreement π = VRFprove(sk,x). A key characteristic of VRF is that the hash algorithm is deterministic in the sense that given the same pair of inputs (sk,x), it always produces the same output y. Using the public key and proof, it is possible to verify that the hash has been computed correctly. Given pk, x, and π, the hash is valid if the output of VRFverify(pk,x,π) is valid. Anyone can deterministically obtain the VRF output y from proof π by computing y = VRFproof2hash(π).

[0013] Embodiments of the present invention utilize one or more of the following VRF characteristics. • Trustworthy uniqueness: Assuming the key is generated in a trustworthy manner, i.e., with correct randomness, a computationally restricted adversary cannot find pk, x, two different hash outputs y1 and y2, and two proofs π1 and π2 such that both VRFverify(pk,x,π1) and VRFverify(pk,x,π2) output validly. • Reliable collision resistance: Assuming the keys are generated in a reliable manner, it should be computationally impossible for an adversary to find x1 and x2 with the same hash output, even if they know the secret key. • Perfect pseudo-randomness: An adversarial verifier cannot distinguish between a genuine hash output y and a random hash output without knowing the proof of a genuine hash. The adversarial verifier is always permitted to observe the output hashes and proofs of various selected inputs.

[0014] According to one embodiment of the present invention, a change made by the service provider to the payment intent received from the user is committed to the service provider's collateral account address. m =C(m,r m This includes replacing with ) where m is the address of the service provider's collateral account, and r mis a random blinding coefficient, and C is the commitment function. In general, the goal of cryptographic commitments is to commit a value that remains hidden and to reveal it at a later point in time. Pedersen commitments are one particular variation of such schemes. They provide a commitment that is both completely occult (no computationally unrestricted adversary can learn anything about the original message) and computationally constrained (no computationally restricted adversary can compute two different messages about the same commitment). Furthermore, Pedersen commitments are homomorphic, meaning that two commitments can be combined without requiring knowledge of the original message or the blinding coefficient. Further details on Pedersen commitments are found in TP Pedersen, "Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable secret sharing," in Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '91, 1992, pp. 129–140, incorporated herein by reference.

[0015] According to one embodiment of the present invention, a service provider may evaluate a private payment intent received from a user by verifying the correctness of a zero-knowledge proof calculated by the user to demonstrate that the user's balance is sufficient to make the payment.

[0016] According to one embodiment of the present invention, a service provider may evaluate the private payment intent received from a user by verifying the correctness of a zero-knowledge proof calculated by the user against the user's collateral balance, in order to show that the sum of all pending payments, including current payments, is less than the user's current collateral balance.

[0017] According to one embodiment of the present invention, payment approval from blockchain statekeepers may include a BLS signature calculated by each statekeeper for the modified payment intent using each statekeeper's private key. BLS (Boneh-Lynn-Shacham) digital signatures (for reference, see D. Boneh, B. Lynn, and H. Shacham, "Short signatures from the Weil pairing," in Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2001, 2001, pp. 514-532) are a signature scheme that provides short and secure digital signatures. Furthermore, multiple signatures from different signers σ1, ..., σ n This allows for the aggregation of multiple signatures into a single signature. For simplicity, the user implements the functions Sign(sk,m), Vf(pk,m,σ), AggrSig({σ1,...,σ) respectively, which implement signature creation, verification, and signature / public key aggregation. n}), AggrPk({pk1,...,pk n We can assume that}) is given.

[0018] According to one embodiment of the present invention, when a service provider receives payment authorizations from at least half of the statekeepers, it uses the public key of each statekeeper to verify the statekeeper's signature for the modified payment intent and aggregates the successfully verified signatures to obtain an aggregated authorization signature.

[0019] According to one embodiment of the present invention, a smart contract executed within a blockchain may be used to manage the collateral accounts of a user, a service provider, and the blockchain's statekeeper, respectively, and the smart contract stores a dictionary that maps account addresses to ElGamal homomorphic cryptographic values. A smart contract is software that runs on a blockchain and provides an interface for interacting with data. In other words, a smart contract is a computer program or transaction protocol configured to run and operate automatically on a blockchain. Specifically, a smart contract is a processor-executable program (code) stored on a non-temporary processor-readable medium that, when executed by a processing circuit, causes the processing circuit to perform program functions. The code is available to all members present on the network (i.e., it can be inspected). Those skilled in the art will recognize that a “smart contract” is, for example, a technical aspect of a blockchain network used for automation and not a legal or other means of restricting human activity.

[0020] According to one embodiment of the present invention, a smart contract running on a blockchain, upon receiving a payment, may, in the following action, finalize the payment by transferring funds from the user to the service provider. If successful, the smart contract may store a random payment ID, the committed address of the service provider, the aggregated approval signature, and the quorum of the approving statekeepers in the user's list of finalized transactions.

[0021] According to one embodiment of the present invention, the final transaction of a user in a smart contract may be stipulated to be executed using encrypted payment amounts in the user's and service provider's private accounts.

[0022] According to one embodiment of the present invention, a smart contract executed within a blockchain may be stipulated to be used to process a settlement request initiated by a service provider if the transaction does not appear on the blockchain after a predefined or configurable time.

[0023] According to one embodiment of the present invention, the service provider may stipulate that the user or statekeeper make a settlement request to be refunded through confidential payments from either the user's private collateral account or the respective statekeeper's private collateral account.

[0024] There are several ways to design and further develop the teachings of the present invention in an advantageous manner. For this purpose, on the one hand, refer to the dependent claims, and on the other hand, refer to the following description of preferred embodiments of the invention shown in the figures as an example. In connection with the description of preferred embodiments of the invention with the help of the figures, generally preferred embodiments and further developments of the teachings will be described. [Brief explanation of the drawing]

[0025] [Figure 1] This table shows the Snappy data structure used in the system according to an embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 2] This table shows the Zether functions used in the system according to the embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 3] This table shows the data structure of the transaction format used in a system according to an embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 4] This is a table showing the data structure of a smart contract used in a system according to an embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 5] This is a schematic diagram illustrating the payment process between a user and a service provider according to one embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 6] This figure shows a change in payment intent performed according to one embodiment of the present invention. [Modes for carrying out the invention]

[0026] Figures 1 to 4 are examples of notifications used in embodiments of the present invention, which will be described in detail below.

[0027] Apart from regular blockchain transactions, there are countless other payment systems that reside on top of the blockchain as smart contracts. These systems primarily introduce arbitrary additional functionality to provide specific characteristics not offered by regular blockchain transactions. In current prior art, payment systems can be classified into three main types, mainly related to scenarios such as retail or online stores.

[0028] 1. Standard blockchain payment. For example, in Ethereum, such a transaction only includes the sender, the recipient, the payment amount, and a digital signature created by the sender's account. Once the transaction is mined and finalized on the blockchain, the payment value is transferred from the sender's account to the recipient's account.

[0029] Due to their simplicity, such payments have low fees, but are slow because you have to wait (usually several minutes) for the transaction to be securely finalized on the blockchain. Therefore, such payments are not practical for small, fast payments in everyday use. However, a major advantage over, for example, credit card providers is that these blockchain payments are decentralized and therefore there is no specific entity that could potentially block the transaction.

[0030] 2. High-speed blockchain payments. To address the latency issue, there are systems implemented as smart contracts that enable fast payment confirmation. The main idea is that users deposit collateral in the smart contract. This collateral is used to provide a guarantee to the receiving service provider so that they can accept the payment before it is finalized on the blockchain. Several systems exist that use such a mechanism.

[0031] Payment channels allow for the establishment of relationships between specific users and service providers. Such channels enable the creation of multiple transactions without submitting each transaction to the blockchain network. In particular, it's possible to combine hundreds or thousands of transactions into a single blockchain transaction. However, such channels are impractical for retail payments because users would need to set up payment channels individually with each service provider. This results in fixed, high collateral requirements and lacks scalability for users.

[0032] On the other hand, a payment hub allows a user to communicate with several service providers. In this case, the user registers in a single smart contract that connects the user with multiple service providers. During registration, the user is also required to deposit collateral as a guarantee. The main drawback of such a system is that the size of the collateral that the hub operator needs to place increases in proportion to the total number of registered users in the system, and therefore becomes very large. Consequently, such a system cannot be scaled to larger deployment scenarios.

[0033] Sidechains are an alternative that relies on a smaller set of transaction validators. These validators collectively track and approve incoming transactions. However, the main problem with such systems is their trust assumption. In particular, at least two-thirds of the validators must be trusted. Furthermore, these systems typically communicate via the BFT (Byzantine Fault Tolerance) protocol, which is highly complex and therefore costly in terms of latency and computational complexity.

[0034] The Snappy payment system (already described above), which establishes evaluation criteria for embodiments of the present invention, enables rapid approval of payments with small user collateral. This is achieved through a mechanism in which each transaction is approved by a statekeeping entity. The statekeeper acts as an untrusted entity that collectively tracks and approves Snappy transactions. Since it guarantees a fixed transaction fee to most merchants (as opposed to value-based fees from credit card providers, for example), it can be assumed that most merchants also act as statekeepers. Statekeepers are also required to deposit collateral during a one-time registration process.

[0035] The main advantage of Snappy is that user collateral only needs to cover the spending of a specific user, meaning it does not depend on any other factors. Statekeeper collateral, on the other hand, scales according to the total sales within the system. This may be acceptable if the service provider acts as the statekeeper, as they profit from a low, fixed payment fee. These fees are much lower compared to those of credit card providers.

[0036] 3. Private Blockchain Payments. Similarly, on-chain privacy can be achieved through smart contracts. Embodiments of the present invention use the private payment system Zether (already described above) as a benchmark for evaluation. By using the zero-knowledge proof system Σ-Bullets, a custom account is managed to store and transfer encrypted amounts. Thus, confidential (and optionally anonymous) payments are provided on a permissionless blockchain. Such a system has strong security and privacy guarantees, in contrast to standard blockchain payments.

[0037] Each of the payment systems described above offers interesting characteristics. However, they still have notable limitations and drawbacks.

[0038] Vulnerability to censorship. Censorship resistance is one of the primary motivations for using permissionless blockchains for payments. However, in payment hubs, sidechains, and fast payment systems like Snappy, these guarantees are broken. This is because a transaction can only be securely accepted if it receives approval from a majority of statekeeping entities. Statekeeping entities are typically other competing service providers. Since statekeepers receive approval requests with payment intent details in plaintext, they can perform arbitrary censorship against specific service providers or users. This is a real threat in competitive environments such as retail or online stores. Therefore, the security characteristics offered by fast blockchain payment systems that leverage majority approval are weak and do not offer any advantage over other existing systems, such as credit card providers, particularly with respect to censorship.

[0039] Lack of confidentiality and anonymity. Another specific limitation of high-speed payment systems is weak privacy. For example, in Snappy, users register with the system using their main blockchain account. Therefore, every transaction is traceable back to its identity. All data in such a system is publicly available, and therefore anyone can perform profiling of all users. This could be misused, for example, for marketing or political purposes. Such profiling can raise even stronger privacy concerns than, for example, credit card payments.

[0040] Apart from user profiling, current high-speed payment systems also make important business information of service providers publicly available. In particular, the details of all transactions are publicly stored in plain text in the state of smart contracts. Therefore, it is possible to track the transactions of each service provider and thus obtain information about their sales. In competitive scenarios for retail or online businesses, this is a practical drawback of using such systems.

[0041] Security over practicality. Payment systems that do not have the above problems exist. In particular, private payment systems, in contrast to high-speed payment systems, introduce strong security and privacy guarantees. By design, these systems are resistant to any censorship and do not allow any profiling of their user base. However, such systems are not practical in real-world scenarios such as retail and online payments. In particular, such systems do not offer any mechanism to reduce confirmation latency and therefore suffer from the same latency problems as regular blockchain payments.

[0042] In consideration of the foregoing, the systems and methods proposed according to embodiments of the present invention employ a hybrid approach that provides both fast and private payments. According to the embodiments, the proposed payment methods / systems have the further characteristic of being flexible in design and can be deployed in different scenarios depending on whether public, confidential, or anonymous payments are desired. In particular, regardless of whether a public, confidential, or anonymous deployment scenario is selected, the systems are designed to withstand any censorship.

[0043] According to one embodiment of the present invention, the payment method / system accepts payments at high speed, similar to Snappy. That is, this payment method / system provides both payment and settlement protocols, which are designed with particularly strong security and privacy guarantees compared to Snappy. Furthermore, the process is compatible with improved Zether-style private accounts for payments and collateral.

[0044] In contrast to Snappy, the payment method / system according to embodiments of the present invention provides and manages its own (private) account. This allows for easier integration of both private payments and private settlements. Management can be performed by a dedicated smart contract. In addition to Zether-style accounts, the payment method / system according to embodiments of the present invention also introduces a new type of private collateral account. To enable the confidential transfer of settlement requests, these collateral accounts are managed entirely differently from typical Zether-style accounts.

[0045] The exact details of each step in the payment process according to embodiments of the present invention are entirely modified for Zether. In particular, the service provider and user create a new type of payment intent that hides all details and ensures resistance to any censorship from the Statekeeper. In addition, all accounts contain encrypted balances, so the service provider verifies zero-knowledge proofs created by the user to ensure that the private collateral balance is sufficient to cover pending payments. Finally, the finalized transaction in the payment system's smart contract is executed using the encrypted payment amount in the private account. All of these mechanisms provide secure (censorship-resistant), private (confidential and anonymous), and fast payments.

[0046] According to embodiments of the present invention, the settlement process, in contrast to Snappy, can be divided into two distinct functions for billing different entities. In particular, a process for billing users and a process for billing statekeepers may be provided. In both cases, the process is completely redesigned to allow the service provider to be reimbursed through confidential payments from a newly introduced private collateral account.

[0047] All of the aforementioned mechanisms contribute to a new and unique payment system that possesses characteristics not achieved in any conventional system. In conclusion, the solutions according to the embodiments of the present invention result in a system that is fast, censorship-resistant, confidential, anonymous, requires minimal user collateral, and does not require any additional trust assumptions.

[0048] The main technical challenges that need to be overcome in order to build such a new system are as follows:

[0049] censorship: Service providers require majority approval for each payment. In particular, statekeepers must ensure they are not signing any conflicting transactions for a given user. Therefore, service providers require some concept of user identity. In previous designs of the fast payment system (Snappy), the statekeeper approves a payment intent that includes the user's identity, the service provider's identity, and the payment value, all in plaintext. This automatically introduces a link to failure, as statekeepers can intentionally censor certain users or service providers. It is conceivable that if a service provider does not receive signatures from the majority of statekeepers, it cannot securely accept the payment. This is considered a real threat in typical retail payment scenarios where service providers act as statekeepers. A colluding set of service providers (statekeepers) may decide not to process any payments from another conflicting victim service provider. To prevent censorship in decentralized payment systems like Snappy, payment methods / systems according to embodiments of the present invention are designed to satisfy the following three high-level objectives (a.-c.):

[0050] a. Payment-based censorship. The primary goal in mitigating censorship is to conceal the payment price. The main problem is that a malicious statekeeper may be able to infer the recipient's identity based on the payment price. Certain goods are almost uniquely identifiable according to their price. Therefore, a malicious statekeeper may still be able to discriminate against certain service providers in certain cases. Similarly, in certain scenarios, a malicious statekeeper may be able to discriminate against certain users. If a malicious statekeeper can somehow infer what has been purchased, they may be able to prevent a targeted user from buying certain goods. The goal of this mitigation is to prevent a statekeeper from discriminating against a service provider (or user) based on the transaction amount.

[0051] b. Service provider identity-based censorship. In a simple design like Snappy, the statekeeper receives the service provider's identity in plaintext. This is to ensure that no one can create a second transaction for a different transaction that conflicts with an approved transaction. Therefore, in such a design, the statekeeper can still see in plaintext who the payment recipient is. Thus, the statekeeper may perform censorship based on the service provider's identity (recall that the statekeeper is usually another competing service provider). Therefore, it is desirable that all service providers be treated equally. More precisely, the goal is to hide the service provider's identity from the statekeeper during the payment approval process. The rationale is that if the statekeeper does not know who the payment recipient (service provider) is, it cannot discriminate against a particular service provider by selectively blocking the payment. It should be noted that a full-scale DoS attack in which the statekeeper does not approve any payments is also possible.

[0052] c. User identity-based censorship. The statekeeper needs to verify whether it has already signed a transaction for a particular user and payment index. In a simple design, as in traditional systems, the payment intent would simply contain the user's identity. Therefore, since the user's address is available in plain text in the payment intent, the statekeeper can discriminate against certain users. This is perhaps the most difficult problem to solve, as the statekeeper needs to know some association with the user's identity.

[0053] privacy: Embodiments of the present invention leverage techniques introduced in private payment systems and combine them with the design of a system like Snappy that supports high-speed payments. In this regard, one of the challenges is to devise a system that provides the same security assurance as a high-speed payment system but does not compromise any privacy assurance provided by a private payment system. The main challenges across private payments and the entire private settlement process are as follows:

[0054] Private payment process. In a simple design, one could devise a payment process similar to the Snappy payment system, for example, with the only difference being that the final step in the smart contract simply triggers a payment in an existing private payment system like Zether. Such a design has several drawbacks. Firstly, Snappy violates the privacy guarantees of private payment systems because it discloses user details. Furthermore, it also violates Snappy's security guarantees. In particular, the service provider needs to check whether the user or statekeeper's collateral is sufficient to cover current and all pending transactions. Since all payments involve encrypted amounts, the payment process needs to provide additional mechanisms to enable such checks.

[0055] Private settlement process. Most problems arise regarding the correct processing of settlement invoices. In particular, the statekeeper needs to verify whether there are conflicting transactions within the system, i.e., whether a particular user has created two different transactions on the same payment index.

[0056] According to embodiments, the present invention provides a payment method / system that supports fast, confidential, and anonymous payments, as well as confidential settlements.

[0057] To address censorship issues, embodiments of the present invention implement at least one of the following: obfuscation of payment values, obfuscation of the service provider's identity, and obfuscation of the user's identity.

[0058] Obfuscation of payment values. One of the inventors' main observations is that the statekeeper does not need to know the amount of each approved payment. Previously, a Snappy transaction was uniquely identified given all four values: the Snappy index, the user's address, the service provider's address, and the payment value. However, it is sufficient to consider a transaction unique if a triplet containing only the payment index, the user's address, and the service provider's address is unique.

[0059] Obfuscation of service provider identity. Furthermore, the Snappy protocol is recognized as being able to prevent censorship of service providers by being modified so that the service provider's address remains hidden from the statekeeper during payment authorization. The main technical challenge is to hide the address so that it remains securely linked to the payment authorization and can be revealed later for settlement if necessary. In this context, embodiments of the present invention leverage the Pedersen commitment, which allows the service provider to blind the address during the payment authorization period and assess the additional costs.

[0060] This idea is that the service provider receives the user's initial payment intent INT c Upon receiving, the service provider uses the address within the payment intent, where r is a randomly blinded value, and the Pedersen commitment c=C(τ m This involves replacing it with r). The statekeeper signs the payment intent, which includes the blinded identity of the service provider. The commitment is opened only when the service provider needs to request payment, in which case an entity acting as an arbitrator verifies it.

[0061] Obfuscation of user identity. According to embodiments of the present invention, censorship is prevented by replacing the user payment intent address with a randomized payment ID (RPID) generated using a random function (VRF) that can be independently verified for each payment.

[0062] More precisely, upon registration, the user may generate a VRF key pair. The VRF public key is registered with the payment system's smart contract along with the user's deposit, and the user holds the private key themselves. For each new payment, the user uses the private key to generate a new RPID as the VRF output, using the current (monotonically increasing) payment index as the VRF input. The user also creates a VRF certificate, which allows the service provider to verify that the RPID was correctly created for the current payment index. The statekeeper approves only one payment per RPID.

[0063] The security and privacy guarantees of such mitigation depend on two properties of VRF. The first property is uniqueness, which ensures that only one correct VRF output (in this case, RPID) can be generated for the same VRF input (in this case, payment index). A malicious user cannot create multiple RPIDs for the same index, and a malicious user cannot duplicate spend, as the statekeeper tracks duplicate spending for each payment index. The second property is pseudo-randomness, which ensures that no RPID can be linked to a user's address or any previous RPID used by the same user. This prevents the statekeeper from censoring payments based on the user's identity.

[0064] To address payment privacy, that is, to provide a strong privacy guarantee during payment, embodiments of the present invention leverage Zether-style transactions to transfer funds confidentially (or possibly anonymously) from a user to a service provider. These payments may be processed in the same manner as Zether (i.e., encrypted payment values ​​are transferred using zero-knowledge proofs). However, according to embodiments, further improvements may be introduced to the payment process to provide a guarantee to the service provider. This consists of an additional zero-knowledge proof from the user and a signature that signs a settlement request which may later be used during settlement to indicate that the collateral is sufficient to cover the payment value.

[0065] Thus, embodiments of the present invention provide a payment method / system that realizes the following aspects. 1. Use a commitment scheme to conceal the payment value and VRF to hide the user's identity. 2. Use a range proof to verify the balance at the time of payment. 3. Combine the above with a payment collateral system to achieve privacy-preserving and censorship-resistant fast payments on the blockchain.

[0066] Embodiments of the present invention utilize two types of accounts: user accounts and collateral accounts. User accounts can be used to freely transfer funds to other user accounts. Collateral accounts, on the other hand, are managed solely by smart contracts and are used when payment requests are made. The main idea is that users deposit collateral with smart contracts. This collateral is used to provide a guarantee to receiving service providers so that they can accept payments before the payments are finalized on the blockchain.

[0067] For both types of accounts, the balance is stored as ciphertext. In this regard, the smart contract may be required to store a dictionary that maps account addresses (i.e., ElGamal public keys) to ElGamal homomorphic encrypted values.

[0068] With respect to user accounts, embodiments of the present invention assume the same model as existing private payment systems such as Zether (disclosed in B. Bunz, S. Agrawal, M. Zamani, and D. Boneh: "Zether: Towards Privacy in a Smart Contract World," July 2020, pp. 423–443, https: / / crypto.stanford.edu / ~buenz / papers / zether.pdf, incorporated herein by reference). In particular, accounts are managed on an epoch basis. The receiving account stores incoming transactions in a pending list and rolls them over to the account balance only at the end of each epoch. This prevents front-running of transactions. Furthermore, embodiments of the present invention may leverage zero-knowledge proofs for the same type of user accounts as described in the Zether reference mentioned above.

[0069] Collateral accounts are similar to user accounts but are managed differently. In particular, transfers, excluding registration and deregistration, can only be triggered internally by smart contracts during settlement. Furthermore, zero-knowledge proof statements differ slightly from those required for user accounts. More specific details are explained below.

[0070] According to the embodiments, in order to use the system according to the present invention, the user should ensure that the following conditions are met. • Own a VRF (Verifiable Random Function) key pair used to create Random Payment IDs (RPIDs). ·Possess an ElGamal key pair for a system user account that holds the primary funds for user payments. ·Possess an ElGamal key pair for a system collateral account used during settlement.

[0071] To register details in the system, it may be specified that a user triggers the registration process by initiating a blockchain transaction that includes the following details. ·Register the corresponding VRF public key with the system. ·Register the collateral account address linked to the VRF public key.

[0072] Finally, at the time of registration, the smart contract of the system may create a new user entry C[c] in its state, which may include the following details (as in the table shown in Figure 4). ·The address corresponding to the user's collateral account. ·A new dictionary D of finalized transactions. ·A new dictionary O of observed transaction hashes. ·A new dictionary T (trace) of past settlement claims. Its first entry is C[c].T[0].idx←⊥ and C[c].T[0].pool c ←c b initialized as follows, where c b is a ciphertext corresponding to the initial balance of the user's collateral account.

[0073] Regarding service provider registration, before using the system, the service provider needs to ensure that the following conditions are met. ·Possess a valid key pair for one primary user account to which payments are transferred. ·Possess a valid key pair for one secondary user account to which settlements are transferred. The service provider received the value vi from each statekeeper. This value is part of the collateral that each statekeeper assigned to the service provider.

[0074] As can be understood by those skilled in the art, if only confidential payments are requested and used, the main user account and secondary user account may be the same.

[0075] To register details within the system, a service provider may trigger the service provider registration process by initiating a blockchain transaction that includes the following details: • Register the address for the secondary user account.

[0076] Finally, upon registration, the system's smart contract creates a new user entry M[m] in its state (as shown in the table in Figure 4), which includes the following: • The address of the secondary user account submitted by the service provider.

[0077] Regarding statekeeper registration, before using the system, the statekeeper must guarantee that the following conditions are met: • Possess a valid BLS (Boneh-Lynn-Shacham) key pair. • Own the ElGamal key pair for the collateral account used during settlement. • A portion of the total collateral should be allocated to each service provider, i.e., a k value should be created for each service provider, and all values ​​should sum up to the total collateral. • Using the ElGamal public key of the collateral account, each value v i ciphertext c i Encrypt it. • Each assigned value v i Send it to the corresponding service provider. • Total of all ciphertexts

[0078]

number

[0079] Zero-knowledge proof π showing that is equal to the total collateral amount reg Create.

[0080] To register details within the system, a statekeeper can trigger the statekeeper registration process by initiating a blockchain transaction that includes the following details: • BLS public key. · (As described in T. Ristenpart and S. Yilek, "The power of proofs-of-possession: Securing multiparty signatures against rogue-key attacks," in Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2007, M. Naor, Ed. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007, pp. 228-245) Proof of knowledge of BLS private keys to prevent rogue-key attacks. • All ciphertexts i ,...,c k • Zero-knowledge proof π reg

[0081] Finally, upon registration, the system's smart contract may perform the following actions (as shown in the table in Figure 4): • Verify proof of knowledge of the BLS private key. • Zero-knowledge proof π reg We will verify this. • Create a new entry S[s] in that state, including the following (according to the table shown in Figure 4): - BLS public key. - Statekeeper collateral account address - A list of k ciphertexts corresponding to the portion allocated to each service provider.

[0082] The most important function in the system is the payment process. This process, which can be triggered by a user-signed transaction, transfers funds confidentially (or anonymously) to a specific service provider. This is the intended use case according to embodiments of the present invention, and generally, this payment process should succeed unless either the user or the statekeeper acts maliciously.

[0083] Next, the exact processes and steps involved in creating and processing high-speed transactions according to embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to Figure 5, which shows method steps 1 to 8. Notation will follow the tables providing a list of transaction details, shown in Figures 1 to 4, and in particular Figure 4.

[0084] 1. Initialize payment As shown in step 1 of Figure 5, user 110 performs the following: • Payment Index i, • Random payment ID RPID=VRFhash(sk vrf i) • Address of the service provider's private collateral account m Includes private payment intent PINT c Create.

[0085] Next, user 110 may create confidential (or optionally anonymous) transaction details.

[0086] Confidential payment. In this case, user 110 has user 110's ElGamal public key y, and service provider 120 has service provider 120's ElGamal public key.

[0087]

number

[0088] , user 110's ElGamal private key x, user 110's user account balance bf The Zether function, namely CreateTransferTx, can be executed with the inputs, and the payment amount v. This method is ciphertext

[0089]

number

[0090] And, zero-knowledge proof π tans (User 110 has sufficient balance,

[0091]

number

[0092] (to show that it is so) and signature σ trans It returns [the specified value].

[0093] Anonymous payment. In the case of anonymous payment, user 110 is an anonymous set that includes both user 110's account and service provider 120's account.

[0094]

number

[0095] And, the index i of user account i for user 110 f and the service provider's user account index i to And, user 110's ElGamal private key x and user 110's user account balance b f Then, taking the payment amount v and the current state of the system's smart contract 150 as input, another Zether function, namely CreateAnonTransferTx, can be executed. This method is a set of ciphertexts.

[0096]

number

[0097] And nonce u and zero-knowledge proof π trans It returns [the specified value].

[0098] In addition, user 110 presents the second zero-knowledge proof π col This can be constructed. This proof is against the balance of the user's private collateral. In particular, it must be shown that the sum of all pending payments, including the current payment, is less than the current private collateral balance of user 110. The current collateral balance can be confirmed in trace C[c]. More formally,

[0099]

number

[0100] We must maintain n, where n is the final index of list C[c].T. Such proofs can be efficiently constructed or verified using Σ-Bullets, demonstrating that they are a hybrid system based on Σ-Protocols combined with Bulletproofs (see, for reference, B. Bunz, J. Bootle, D. Boneh, A. Poelstra, P. Wuille, and G. Maxwell, "Bulletproofs: Short proofs for confidential transactions and more," Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017 / 1066, 2017, https: / / eprint.iacr.org / 2017 / 1066, incorporated herein by reference).

[0101] According to embodiments of the present invention, user 110, • Payment intent PINT c , ·VRF public key pk vrf , VRF proof π vrf =VRFprove(sk vrf i) • Encrypted payment amount, • Zero-knowledge proof π col , • List of pending transactions S c This can be sent to the service provider 120.

[0102] 2 User Reviews As shown in Figure 5, after payment initialization, in step 2, the service provider 120 performs the following checks For each index j ∈ {1, ..., PINTc[i]}, there exists an approved transaction τ' that has index j such that τ ∈ BC[c] or τ ∈ S[c]. Received pk vrf This is registered on the system's smart contract 150. · VRFverify (pk vrf ,i,π vrf )=T, ·VRFproof2hash(π vrf )=RPID, • Details of confidential / anonymous payments, in particular, zero-knowledge proofs π trans and signature σ trans To verify the correctness of, • To ensure that user 110's private collateral is sufficient to cover all pending and current transactions, an additional zero-knowledge proof π is required. col Verify It is possible to do so.

[0103] 3. Obfuscation of service provider addresses According to embodiments of the present invention, service provider 120, in order to conceal its collateral address, pay intent PINT c It may be stipulated that the collateral address may be changed. That is, service provider 120 may change its collateral address to commitment c m =C(m,r m ) is replaced by, where r m This is a random blinding coefficient.

[0104] Next, service provider 120 changed the payment intent PINT c This can be sent (for example, via broadcasting) to the majority of statekeepers 130.

[0105] Payment intent PINT performed by service provider 120 and user 110 c The changes are illustrated in Figure 6.

[0106] 4. Payment Approval According to embodiments of the present invention, each statekeeper 130 may evaluate the payment intent received from the service provider 120 as follows:

[0107] Statekeeper 130 checks its local list to see if it has not yet approved any payments with the same RPID. If a matching RPID is found, Statekeeper 130 aborts the payment and notifies service provider 120 accordingly.

[0108] On the other hand, if the statekeeper 130 has not previously seen the respective RPID values ​​for the same index, the statekeeper 130 approves the payment and sends it back to the service provider 120. According to embodiments of the present invention, payment approval is granted by BLS signature σ i =Sign(PINT c sk sk ) This can be done by calculating [the specified value]. Statekeeper 130 may add the approved RPID value to its local list.

[0109] 5. Statekeeper Evaluation If the majority of statekeepers 130 reject their intention to pay, the service provider 120 notifies the user 110 and terminates the payment process.

[0110] If successful, that is, if at least half of the Statekeepers 130 approve the payment intent, the Service Provider 120 will then... Vf(PINT c ,σ i ,pk sk ) Check for success, and if successful, A=AggrSig({σ i ,...,σ n}) It will be summarized as follows.

[0111] In addition to verifying and aggregating signatures, service provider 120 can check that each statekeeper 130 that approved the intent has allocated sufficient collateral to service provider 120. This can be easily done because service provider 120 knows the corresponding portion of each statekeeper 130's collateral in plaintext.

[0112] According to one embodiment of the present invention, service provider 120 has a payment intent PINT c The blinding coefficient r m VRF proof π vrf , and zero-knowledge proof π col These long-term states are also stored in memory. This allows for the possibility of claiming payment later.

[0113] Furthermore, service provider 120 uses aggregated BLS signature A and a blinding coefficient r m This can be sent to user 110.

[0114] 6. Check your commitment According to one embodiment of the present invention, as shown in step 6 in Figure 5, user 110 verifies the aggregated BLS signature A.

[0115] Furthermore, user 110 states that the service provider 120's commitment included in the payment intent is C(m,r m You can check if it is equal to ).

[0116] 7. Transaction Finalization According to one embodiment of the present invention, as shown in step 7 in Figure 5, user 110 performs the following detailed steps: • Destination: System's smart contract address, • Sender: Any blockchain address, • Payment index, ·RPID:RPID, • Committed address c m , • Confidential payments: Payment data

[0117]

number

[0118] , or anonymous payment: payment data

[0119]

number

[0120] ,

[0121]

number

[0122] , π trans , σ trans , • Aggregated BLS signature A, ·Approval quorum q, ·Operation, • Zero-knowledge proof π trans , • User's system signature σ trans , • Skipped index Create a final transaction that includes one or more of the following.

[0123] User 110 said, (σtrans The created transaction (signed through) is sent to the service provider 120. According to one embodiment, user 110 signs the details of the (potential) settlement request, as will be described in more detail below. claim You can send additional messages.

[0124] 8. Acceptance of payment As shown in step 8b in Figure 5, upon receiving the final transaction from user 110, service provider 120 verifies that user 110 has correctly constructed the transaction and correctly signed all details, i.e., that it has followed a predefined payment protocol. They check that the user has not substituted, omitted, or altered any of the values.

[0125] Once user 110's transaction is validated, service provider 120 can securely deliver the goods (to which the funds are intended) to user 110.

[0126] Finally, service provider 120 broadcasts the transaction to blockchain 140.

[0127] 9. Payment logging According to one embodiment of the present invention, upon receiving payment, the system's smart contract 150 finalizes a confidential (or anonymous) payment that transfers funds from user 110 to service provider 120.

[0128] Furthermore, if successful, Smart Contract 150 will include the following details: RPID, • Committed address of the service provider m , • Collected approval signature A, • Quorum q for approval statekeepers This can be stored in the list of user 110's finalized transactions C[c].D[i], where i is the index of the current transaction.

[0129] As will be understood by those skilled in the art, RPID is a group

[0130]

number

[0131] Since it is a member, there are a finite number of them. Therefore, there is a non-zero but very low probability that user 110 will generate an RPID value that already exists. If this occurs, statekeeper 130 can reject the payment intent, and service provider 120 can notify user 110 accordingly. User 110 can restart the payment procedure from the beginning, but in this case, using payment index i+1. According to one embodiment of the present invention, an additional field is added in the final transaction to indicate that one index was skipped due to a collision.

[0132] In a simple implementation of the payment process as described above, the statekeeper 130 will maintain an ever-growing list of already approved RPID values. According to one embodiment of the present invention, the statekeeper 130 may be able to truncate its local list and periodically delete sufficiently old (e.g., older than 24 hours) RPID values ​​in order to reduce its storage requirements. Such truncation is safe to perform because the service provider 120 can detect the reuse of sufficiently old payment index values ​​from the blockchain 140.

[0133] Embodiments of the present invention address the case where a transaction does not appear on blockchain 140 after a reasonable (e.g., predefined or configurable) time. In such a case, it may be stipulated that the service provider 120 can initiate the settlement process. A payment may fail due to a malicious user 110 double-spending its funds or an ambiguous statekeeper signing a conflicting transaction. In both cases, provided that the service provider 120 is following the payment protocol, it may be stipulated that the service provider 120 is entitled to a refund by the system's smart contract 150.

[0134] According to embodiments of the present invention, it may be stipulated that the service provider 120 can claim settlement from either the collateral of the statekeeper 130 or the collateral of the user 110. Both cases are described below, where τ represents the transaction being claimed and τ' represents another authorized transaction that conflicts with τ.

[0135] Invoice the statekeeper If there are conflicting transactions signed by the same statekeeper 130, the service provider 120 can initiate a claim from the ambiguous statekeeper 130's collateral. To initiate a settlement request, the service provider 120 may submit a transaction to the system, and the request will be as follows: • Service provider 120's payment intent c Details, • Payment intent PINT c The aggregated BLS signature A to be signed, • Quorum q of signatories who signed the payment intent, • Blinding coefficient r m , VRF proof π vrf , • Public key corresponding to the secondary account of service provider 120 registered in the system

[0136]

number

[0137] Signature σ is used to sign the details of the payment request. m , • Public key y sk and

[0138]

number

[0139] Two ciphertexts that encrypt the payment amount using

[0140]

number

[0141] (Here, public key y sk This corresponds to the collateral account of the ambiguous statekeeper 130, and public key

[0142]

number

[0143] (This corresponds to the secondary user account of service provider 120), • Address m of the secondary user account for service provider 120, • Ambiguous Statekeeper 130 collateral account address, • List of conflicting transactions

[0144]

number

[0145] (For efficiency,

[0146]

number

[0147] (It can be assumed that this includes the details of τ'), ·c* and

[0148]

number

[0149] A zero-knowledge proof π shows that both encrypt the same value and that the collateral of the ambiguous statekeeper 130 is sufficient to cover the current transaction for which a claim is being made. claim (For efficiency, it is assumed that at most one statekeeper 130 is requested, and therefore the service provider 120 is required to submit only one such zero-knowledge proof for a particular ambiguous statekeeper 130.) It may include one or more of the following.

[0150] According to one embodiment of the present invention, a payment request may be processed as follows: When the smart contract 150 of the payment system receives the above details in a transaction on the blockchain 140, it takes the following actions: • Verify that no settled transactions are yet included in that state. • Verify that the collateral account of service provider 120 is registered in the payment system's smart contract 150. • Verify that the collateral account for the ambiguous statekeeper 130 is registered in the payment system's smart contract 150. • 120 service provider signatures m To verify, • The requested statekeeper 130 has both quorum τ q and τ' q Verify that it is truly contained within. • Each has a quorum τq and τ' q verifies the aggregated BLS signature τ when given A and τ' A , · τ cm =C(m,r m ), verifies the commitment by checking that · VRFverify(C[c].pk vrf ,i,π vrf )=T VRFproof2hash(π vrf )=τ RPID , verifies the correctness of the VRF proof π by checking that vrf , · verifies the correctness of the zero-knowledge proof π based on the (encrypted) portion of the collateral balance that the state keeper 130 has assigned to the service provider 120 claim , · If all checks are successful, the smart contract 150 of the payment system subtracts the encrypted amount c* from the collateral account of the state keeper 130,

[0151] [Formula]

[0152] is added to the secondary user account of the service provider 120 (this may be done in accordance with a normal transfer process), · When the corresponding amount is transferred, the smart contract 150 of the payment system stores the details of the billed transaction in the list C[c].D of finalized transactions of the user 110, · returns normally .

[0153] billing the user If there are no competing transactions, the service provider 120 may initiate a claim from the collateral of the user 110. To initiate a payment request, the service provider 120 uses the following details, ·Payment intent PINT that the service provider 120 wishes to settle c details of, ·Payment intent PINT c Aggregated BLS signature A that signs on, ·Quorum q of signers that signed the payment intent, ·Blinding factor r m , ·VRF proof π vrf , ·Public key y corresponding to the collateral account of the user 110 c Signature σ that signs the details of the payment request using c , ·Public key corresponding to the secondary account of the service provider 120 registered in the system

[0154]

Math.

[0155] Signature σ that signs the details of the payment request using m , ·Public key y respectively c and

[0156]

Math.

[0157] Two ciphertexts that encrypt the payment amount using

[0158]

Math.

[0159] , ·Address m of the collateral account of the service provider 120, ·List of transactions that were pending during approval

[0160] [Mathematical formula]

[0161] ·c* and

[0162] [Mathematical formula]

[0163] both encrypt the same value, and the collateral of user 110, together with the current transaction being claimed

[0164] [Mathematical formula]

[0165] is sufficient to cover all transactions within, zero-knowledge proof π that indicates col one or more of the above may be used to create the transaction.

[0166] According to one embodiment of the present invention, the payment request may be processed as follows. Upon receiving the above details in the transaction of blockchain 140, the smart contract 150 of the payment system performs the following actions, ·Verify that the settled transaction is not yet included in that state, ·Verify that the collateral account of the service provider 120 is registered in the smart contract 150 of the payment system, ·Verify that the collateral account of the ambiguous state keeper 130 is registered in the smart contract 150 of the payment system, ·The signature σ of the service provider 120 m is verified, ·Verify the signature of user 110 for transaction τ, ·Verify that there is no transaction in that state that conflicts with either τ or a pending transaction is executed. According to the embodiment, this is - The smart contract 150 of the payment system searches the list of finalized transactions, that is, for τ and all

[0167] [Mathematical formula]

[0168] , check C[τ c .D[τ i and

[0169] [Mathematical formula]

[0170] , - The smart contract 150 of the payment system searches the list of observed transactions, that is, for τ and all

[0171] [Mathematical formula]

[0172] , check

[0173] [Mathematical formula]

[0174] , which can occur in the following two steps, ·

[0175] [Mathematical formula]

[0176] Verify the signature of user 110 for each of the transactions in ·Threshold τ q Verify the aggregated BLS signature τ when given A , ·All

[0177] [Mathematical formula]

[0178] For , verify the aggregated BLS signature τ' when the threshold τ' q is given A , ·Verify the commitment by checking that τ cm =C(m,r m ), ·Check that VRFverify(C[c].pk vrf ,i,π vrf )=T and VRFproof2hash(π vrf )=τ RPID , to verify the correctness of the VRF proof π vrf , ·Find the past collateral balance stored in C[c].T[j].pcol c , where j is such that [c].T[j].idx<τ i and VC[c].T[j].idx=⊥

[0179] [Mathematical formula]

[0180] is satisfied, in other words, the entry whose corresponding system index is the index τ of the settled transaction j ​It must satisfy the condition that it is less than the highest index such that no transactions with the same system index idx are included in the set of pending transactions provided by service provider 120. • Zero-knowledge proof π col In other words, the past collateral balance found in the previous step is used for settled transactions,

[0181]

number

[0182] It is sufficient to cover all transactions within it, and

[0183]

number

[0184] Verify that the same value is encrypted, If all checks are successful, the payment system's smart contract 150 will deduct the encrypted amount c* from the statekeeper's collateral account 130.

[0185]

number

[0186] Add this to the secondary user account of service provider 120 (this can be done in accordance with the normal transfer process), • When the corresponding amount is transferred, the smart contract 150 of the payment system will execute the new entry. C[c].T[n+1].idx←τ i and

[0187]

number

[0188] Add the following, where n is the length of list T:

[0189]

number

[0190] This is the updated collateral balance for user 110, The payment system's smart contract 150 stores the details of settled transactions in the user's 110's list of finalized transactions C[c].D. ·lastly,

[0191]

number

[0192] Each pending transaction in C[c].D that has not yet been finalized will be processed in this manner.

[0193]

number

[0194] Regarding this, the payment system smart contract 150 is,

[0195]

number

[0196] Set the following, where H is a collision-resistant hash function (in other words, the smart contract records the hash of the payment intent if the payment intent has not yet been finalized and is only currently observed), • Return to normal Execute this.

[0197] The fast payment methods / systems according to the embodiments disclosed herein offer the advantage of censorship resistance. During approval, the only way the statekeeper can learn additional information about the transaction is by examining the payment intent. In this case, the payment amount is completely removed from the intent, so the statekeeper cannot perform censorship on the payment amount. Furthermore, the Pedersen commitment is completely hidden, and the blinded value is never disclosed to the statekeeper, so the statekeeper cannot know the identity of the service provider. It is found that a dictionary attack against RPID is impossible, as the statekeeper would need to know the VRF certificate, which is never provided to the statekeeper at any point. It is recalled that the service provider has a financial incentive to protect privacy. Thus, the user's identity also remains hidden.

[0198] The high-speed payment methods / systems according to the embodiments disclosed herein offer the additional benefit of guaranteed funds. Once the service provider's intent to pay is acknowledged and the service provider complies with the protocol, the service provider must be guaranteed to receive the funds even if the payment fails. If the payment is successful, this guarantee is naturally satisfied. If the payment fails, and the service provider complies with the protocol, the smart contract of the payment system must indicate that it will always accept the service provider's settlement request.

[0199] In statekeeper settlements, the only difference from traditional designs of high-speed payment systems like Snappy is that the final transaction while billing the statekeeper is performed confidentially. Since a benign service provider creates the correct zero-knowledge proof against the collateral account balance, such transactions are guaranteed to succeed.

[0200] If requested by the user, the zero-knowledge proof π will be provided. colIt must be shown that the proof will always succeed. The main idea here is that if the correct proof fails, the payment system's smart contract needs to find a different past collateral entry. By design, this entry will correspond to transaction τ', which has a lower index and was settled later (after the zero-knowledge proof was created). If τ' was pending while the zero-knowledge proof was being created, the service provider failed because it did not consider this transaction in the proof. On the other hand, if τ' was not pending (i.e., it was finalized), the service provider did not follow the protocol because it should have created a zero-knowledge proof against a more recent collateral balance. In either case, if the proof fails, it is clear that the service provider did not follow the protocol.

[0201] The fast payment methods / systems according to the embodiments disclosed herein offer further advantages of correct settlement. Regarding statekeeper settlement, the payment system's smart contract verifies a zero-knowledge proof demonstrating that the private statekeeper's collateral is sufficient to cover the current transaction and all pending transactions. Thus, given that adversaries cannot fabricate false proofs, it is ensured that the statekeeper's collateral is not overused.

[0202] The discussion regarding correct user settlement is a bit more complex, and we will only describe the general intuition. The main idea is that the user creates a zero-knowledge proof of the current collateral while making the payment. During settlement, the payment system's smart contract backtraces its state to find the corresponding past collateral. If state Sc (see table in Figure 1) is compatible with the transaction (i.e., the service provider has performed its due diligence) and there are no conflicting transactions in the system, then the user's collateral is sufficient to cover the cost. Thus, the payment system's smart contract checks for the absence of conflicting transactions and finds past collateral that is compatible with the information provided by the service provider. The proof of compatibility provides the attached zero-knowledge proof.

[0203] The fast payment methods / systems according to the embodiments disclosed herein offer further advantages of payment privacy. During payment, neither the benign service provider nor the user reveals their identity or the amount to be paid at any point during the payment process. Thus, the same guarantees of confidentiality and anonymity as those in Zether apply to the payment process according to the embodiments of the present invention.

[0204] The fast payment methods / systems provided in the embodiments disclosed herein offer further advantages in settlement privacy. Settlements do not support anonymity. However, they do support confidentiality of collateral for both the user and the statekeeper. For the statekeeper, if all service providers do not disclose all allocated portions of the total collateral amount, the total balance of the statekeeper's collateral remains confidential. If only one service provider keeps its allocation confidential, the exact total amount remains confidential. The only information that can be known from disclosing partial allocations is the lower bound of the statekeeper's collateral. This is due to the fact that the statekeeper does not share the disclosed total with any other party, but only shares a portion to each service provider. Furthermore, all operations on collateral can be performed either through zero-knowledge proofs or encrypted homomorphic operations.

[0205] Furthermore, user collateral remains completely confidential. Neither the user nor the service provider discloses their identity or payment amount at any point, and all actions against user collateral are performed through zero-knowledge proofs. Thus, it can be concluded that the same privacy guarantees as in Zether apply. As will be understood by those skilled in the art, this is based on the assumption that neither the user nor the service provider publicly discloses payment amounts in plain text. This is a fair assumption, as both parties have an economic incentive to protect each other's privacy.

[0206] Many modifications and other embodiments of the invention described herein will be apparent to those skilled in the art who are interested in the invention and who benefit from the teachings presented in the foregoing description and the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the invention is not limited to the specific embodiments disclosed, and that modifications and other embodiments are intended to be included within the scope of the appended claims. Certain terms are used herein, but they are used in a general and descriptive sense only and not for limiting purposes. [Explanation of symbols]

[0207] 110 users 120 service providers 130 Statekeeper 140 Blockchains 150 Smart Contracts

Claims

1. A computer implementation method for high-speed blockchain payments, wherein the payment involves the transfer of funds from a user's (110) account to a service provider's (120) private collateral account, and the method A step of receiving a private payment intent from the user (110) by the service provider (120), wherein the private payment intent includes a payment index, a random payment ID, and the address of the service provider's (120) private collateral account. A step in which the service provider (120) modifies the payment intent by replacing the address of the service provider (120)'s collateral account with a commitment, and provides the modified payment intent to the majority of the blockchain (140) statekeepers (130), wherein the commitment is cm = C(m, rm), where m is the address of the service provider (120)'s collateral account, rm is a random blinding coefficient, and C is the commitment function. A step by which the service provider (120) receives payment confirmations from statekeepers (130) of the blockchain (140), wherein each payment confirmation includes the modified payment intent signed using the private key of each of the statekeepers (130). The service provider (120) evaluates the received payment authorizations, aggregates the payment authorizations that have been successfully evaluated, and sends the aggregated results to the user (110), The service provider (120) receives the final transaction created by the user (110) after verifying the aggregated results, verifies that the user (110) has correctly constructed the final transaction without substituting, omitting, or changing any of the values ​​in accordance with a given protocol, and if the verification of the final transaction is successful, accepts the payment, wherein the final transaction includes the random payment ID, the committed address of the service provider (120), the aggregated approval signature, and a quorum of the approving statekeeper (130). Computer implementation methods, including those mentioned above.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the random payment ID of the user (110)'s payment intent is generated by computing a verifiable random function VRF hash of the payment index.

3. The method according to claim 1, wherein the step of modifying the payment intent received by the service provider (120) from the user (110) includes the step of replacing the address of the service provider's (120) collateral account with the commitment.

4. The service provider (120) evaluates the private payment intent received from the user (110) by verifying the correctness of a zero-knowledge proof calculated by the user (110) to show that the user's balance is sufficient to make the payment. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, further comprising:

5. The service provider (120) evaluates the private payment intent received from the user (110) by verifying the correctness of a zero-knowledge proof calculated by the user (110) against the user's collateral balance, in order to show that the sum of all pending payments, including the current payment, is less than the user's current collateral balance. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, further comprising:

6. The method according to claim 1, wherein the payment approval from the statekeepers (130) of the blockchain (140) includes a BLS signature calculated by each statekeeper (130) for the modified payment intent using the private key of each statekeeper (130).

7. The method according to claim 1, wherein when the service provider (120) receives payment authorizations from at least half of the statekeepers (130), it uses the public key of each statekeeper (130) to verify the statekeeper's (130) signature of the modified payment intent and aggregates the successfully verified signatures to obtain aggregated authorization signatures.

8. The method according to claim 1, wherein a smart contract (150) executed within the blockchain (140) is used to manage the collateral accounts of the user (110), the service provider (120), and the statekeeper (130) of the blockchain (140), and the smart contract stores a dictionary that maps account addresses to ElGamal homomorphic cryptographic values.

9. When the smart contract (150) executed within the blockchain (140) receives the payment, it performs the following action: The action of finalizing the payment which transfers funds from the user (110) to the service provider (120), If successful, the action involves storing the random payment ID, the committed address of the service provider (120), the aggregated approval signature, and the quorum of the approving statekeeper (130) in the user's (110) list of finalized transactions. The method according to claim 7, wherein the method is performed.

10. The method according to claim 9, wherein the final transaction of the user (110) in the smart contract (150) is executed using encrypted payment amounts in the private accounts of the user (110) and the service provider (120).

11. The method according to claim 1, wherein a smart contract (150) executed within the blockchain (140) is used to process a settlement request initiated by the service provider (120) if no transaction appears on the blockchain (140) after a predefined or configurable time.

12. Steps to instruct the service provider (120) to request a settlement from either the user (110) or the statekeeper (130) so that the payment is made through confidential payment from either the user's (110) private collateral account or the respective statekeeper's (130) private collateral account. The method according to claim 11, further comprising:

13. A system for high-speed blockchain payments, wherein a payment involves the transfer of funds from a user's (110) account to a service provider's (120) private collateral account, and the system An operation to receive a private payment intent from a user (110), wherein the private payment intent includes a payment index, a random payment ID, and the address of the service provider's (120) private collateral account. An operation to modify the payment intent by replacing the address of the collateral account of the service provider (120) with a commitment, and to provide the modified payment intent to the majority of the statekeepers (130) of the blockchain (140), wherein the commitment is cm = C(m, rm), where m is the address of the collateral account of the service provider (120), rm is a random blinding coefficient, and C is the commitment function. An operation to receive payment confirmations from statekeepers (130) of a blockchain (140), wherein each payment confirmation includes the modified payment intent signed using the private key of each of the statekeepers (130), The operation includes evaluating the received payment approvals, aggregating the payment approvals that have been successfully evaluated, and sending the aggregated results to the user (110), After verifying the aggregated results, the final transaction created by the user (110) is received, and the user (110) has correctly constructed the final transaction without substituting, omitting, or changing any of the values ​​in accordance with a given protocol, and if the verification of the final transaction is successful, the payment is accepted, wherein the final transaction includes the random payment ID, the committed address of the service provider (120), the aggregated approval signature, and the quorum of the approving statekeeper (130). A system comprising a processor circuit configured to perform the following actions.

14. A non-temporary processor-readable medium storing processor-executable instructions for executing a method for high-speed blockchain payments, wherein the payment involves the transfer of funds from a user's (110) account to a service provider's (120) private collateral account, and the method is A step of receiving a private payment intent from the user (110) by the service provider (120), wherein the private payment intent includes a payment index, a random payment ID, and the address of the service provider's (120) private collateral account. A step of modifying the payment intent by replacing the address of the collateral account of the service provider (120) with a commitment, and providing the modified payment intent to the majority of statekeepers (130) of the blockchain (140), wherein the commitment is cm = C(m, rm), where m is the address of the collateral account of the service provider (120), rm is a random blinding coefficient, and C is the commitment function. A step by which the service provider (120) receives payment confirmations from statekeepers (130) of the blockchain (140), wherein each payment confirmation includes the modified payment intent signed using the private key of each of the statekeepers (130). The service provider (120) evaluates the received payment authorizations, aggregates the payment authorizations that have been successfully evaluated, and sends the aggregated results to the user (110), The service provider (120) receives the final transaction created by the user (110) after verifying the aggregated results, verifies that the user (110) has correctly constructed the final transaction without substituting, omitting, or changing any of the values ​​in accordance with a given protocol, and if the verification of the final transaction is successful, accepts the payment, wherein the final transaction includes the random payment ID, the committed address of the service provider (120), the aggregated approval signature, and the quorum of the approving statekeeper (130). Non-temporary processor-readable media, including [specific data / information].

Citation Information

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