Management device, management method, and management program
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2024528251
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Priority Date
- 2022-06-24
- Filing Date
- 2022-06-24
- Publication Date
- 2025-02-28
- Estimated Expiration
- Not applicable · inactive patent
AI Technical Summary
Conventional Software Bill of Materials (SBoM) formats lack fine-grained access control, making it difficult to manage and verify configuration information across complex supply chains while maintaining confidentiality and integrity, especially when software components from multiple vendors are involved.
A management device and method that generates configuration information using a one-way function to encode identifiers and add electronic signatures, allowing for selective disclosure and verification, ensuring transparency and confidentiality through formats that support signature verification even when some fields are excluded.
Enables smooth signature verification of configuration information while maintaining confidentiality and integrity, allowing for controlled disclosure of sensitive information and ensuring the validity of the supply chain's configuration data.
Abstract
Description
Management device, management method, and management program
[0001] The present invention relates to a management device, a management method, and a management program.
[0002] Security risks in the supply chain are increasing, and it is necessary to ensure transparency of changes in the configuration of the entire supply chain. For example, the use of Software Bill of Materials (SBoM), which lists the software components and dependencies included in a product for license management and vulnerability management, is becoming increasingly popular and is becoming increasingly important.
[0003] Formats such as SPDX, CycloneDX, and SWID have emerged as methods for expressing SBoM. In recent years, product development is often not completed by a single vendor, but is comprised of a supply chain of multiple vendors. As a result, SBoMs contain a mixture of configuration information from multiple vendors. While it is common for all information to be recorded in a single SBoM file, formats such as CycloneDX provide specifications such as Pedigree that reference external SBoM information. Hereafter, SBoM formats will be collectively referred to as configuration information formats.
[0004] Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation and NEC Corporation, “NTT and NEC Develop Technology to Address Supply Chain Security Risks in Information and Communications Infrastructure,” [online], [Retrieved May 27, 2022], Internet <URL: https: / / group.ntt / jp / newsrelease / 2021 / 10 / 27 / 211027b.html>
[0005] Despite the growing demand for this configuration information format, software configuration information is one of the most important secrets held by manufacturing companies, and it is not realistic to disclose all of it to customers.
[0006] For this reason, detailed access control is required, such as disclosing only part of the information to a customer, or disclosing information to a customer but not disclosing it when that customer sells a new product incorporating the product to another company.However, the conventional SBoM format had the problem of not taking into account specifications such as access control.
[0007] A solution to a similar problem is the use of zero-knowledge signatures in Verifiable Credentials, which digitize information such as credentials so that they can be verified by a third party.
[0008] In Verifiable Credentials, a credential issuing organization digitally signs the credential information (electronic file) and then provides the file to the user, who then presents the electronic file to the other party when the user wants to prove the credential. However, even if the credential information contains information that does not need to be presented to the other party, there is a problem in that if the signed file is altered, the signature verification becomes impossible.
[0009] To address this issue, there is a method that uses zero-knowledge proofs (group signatures) to make it possible to verify the signature even if the user excludes some fields. However, this method is not suitable for configuration information formats because it only allows users to choose whether or not to present each field.
[0010] The present invention has been made in view of the above, and has as its object to provide a management device, a management method, and a management program that can realize smooth signature verification of configuration information.
[0011] In order to solve the above-mentioned problems and achieve the object, the management device of the present invention is a management device that manages configuration information of first hardware or first software, and is characterized by having a generation unit that generates configuration information in a format in which data related to the first hardware or first software is added with a first identifier that uniquely indicates the first hardware or first software, a second identifier that is encoded using a one-way function and uniquely identifies other second hardware or second software that constitutes the first hardware or first software, and an electronic signature for the data, and a management unit that manages the configuration information.
[0012] Furthermore, the management device of the present invention is a management device that manages configuration information of first hardware or first software, and is characterized by having a generation unit that generates configuration information in a format in which data relating to the first hardware or the first software is added with a first identifier that uniquely indicates the first hardware or the first software, a second identifier that uniquely identifies another second hardware or the second software that constitutes the first hardware or the first software, a first electronic signature for the entire configuration information, and a second electronic signature generated based on the configuration information in which some items are concealed and the first electronic signature, and a management unit that manages the configuration information.
[0013] Furthermore, the management device of the present invention is a management device that manages configuration information of first hardware or first software, and is characterized by having a generation unit that generates configuration information in a format in which data relating to the first hardware or first software is supplemented with a first identifier that uniquely indicates the first hardware or the first software, a second identifier obtained by encoding a second identifier that uniquely identifies another second hardware or second software that constitutes the first hardware or the first software using a one-way function, a first electronic signature for the entire configuration information, and a second electronic signature generated based on the configuration information in which some items are concealed and the first electronic signature, and a management unit that manages the configuration information.
[0014] According to the present invention, smooth signature verification of configuration information can be realized.
[0015] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a basic structure of configuration information. FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating requirements for the format of configuration information. FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating a conventional format of configuration information. FIG. 4 is a diagram schematically illustrating an example of the configuration of a management device according to an embodiment. FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating a format of configuration information generated by a generation unit. FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating a format of configuration information generated by a generation unit. FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating a format of configuration information generated by a generation unit. FIG. 8 is a diagram illustrating a format of configuration information generated by a generation unit. FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating a processing procedure of management processing according to an embodiment. FIG. 10 is a diagram illustrating another example of the format of configuration information generated by a generation unit. FIG. 11 is a diagram illustrating another example of the format of configuration information generated by a generation unit. FIG. 12 is a diagram illustrating another example of the format of configuration information generated by a generation unit. FIG. 13 is a diagram illustrating an example of a computer on which a management device is implemented by executing a program.
[0016] Hereinafter, an embodiment of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings. Note that the present invention is not limited to this embodiment. In addition, in the description of the drawings, the same parts are designated by the same reference numerals.
[0017] [Embodiment] [Basic Structure of Configuration Information] The basic structure of configuration information will be described below. Fig. 1 is a diagram illustrating the basic structure of configuration information.
[0018] As shown in FIG. 1, the configuration information includes a key (first identifier), data, zero or more external keys (second identifiers), and signature information.
[0019] The key is an identifier that uniquely identifies the first hardware or first software corresponding to this configuration information.
[0020] Hereafter, we will assume that our company's product, software A, and software B are separate files. We will assume that all files are provided at the time of provision, or that configuration information can be downloaded by specifying a key via a cloud service or the like.
[0021] The data section includes various information about the software, such as the license, risk assessment information, and operating specifications.
[0022] The foreign key is an identifier that uniquely identifies another second piece of hardware or software that constitutes the first piece of hardware or software. The foreign key is an identifier of the configuration information of another piece of equipment and / or software incorporated into the product (device, software), and constitutes a directed acyclic graph.
[0023] [Requirements] Next, requirements for the format of the configuration information will be described. Fig. 2 is a diagram for explaining the requirements for the format of the configuration information.
[0024] To ensure transparency, confidentiality, and integrity of the supply chain, the format of composition information must meet the following requirements:
[0025] A necessary requirement is that the signature be verifiable (integrity).
[0026] Requirement 1 is that dependency library information can be kept secret. Requirement 1 includes requirements 1-1 and 1-2.
[0027] Requirement 1-1 is that even if the dependency library is kept secret, in other words, even if the link information is not disclosed, the link information is not lost ((1) and (2) in FIG. 2).
[0028] Requirement 1-2 is that the provided configuration information (links) can be kept secret, in other words, that the configuration information of the provided software A and B can be partially kept secret while maintaining the validity of the signature ((3) in Figure 2). For example, this applies when the license prohibits the redistribution of the configuration information.
[0029] Requirement 2 is that it is possible to set a disclosure level for configuration information data (optional). Requirement 2 includes requirements 2-1 and 2-2.
[0030] Requirement 2-1 is that when higher level data is provided later, it must be possible to verify that it is the same software configuration information.
[0031] Requirement 2-2 is to increase the confidentiality level of the provided configuration information (data).
[0032] Requirements 1 and 2 are independent requirements.
[0033] [Prior Art] Next, a prior art will be described. Fig. 3 is a diagram for explaining a conventional format of configuration information.
[0034] As shown in Figure 3, in the configuration of the conventional configuration information format, if the foreign key is deleted, the link information to the dependency software itself is lost ((1) in Figure 3), and requirement 1 cannot be met.
[0035] When using general signature technology, if the provided configuration information (links and data) is rewritten, the signature cannot be verified ((2) in Figure 3), and requirements 1 and 2 cannot be met. In this case, using a group signature makes it possible to delete some items, but it does not solve the problem that only the option of presenting or not presenting each item can be selected.
[0036] [Management Apparatus According to the Embodiment] The management apparatus according to the present embodiment generates and manages configuration information that satisfies requirement 1 and / or requirement 2.
[0037] 4 is a diagram illustrating an example of the configuration of a management device according to an embodiment.
[0038] The management device 10 according to the embodiment is realized, for example, by loading a predetermined program into a computer or the like including a ROM (Read Only Memory), a RAM (Random Access Memory), a CPU (Central Processing Unit), etc., and having the CPU execute the predetermined program. The management device 10 also has a communication interface for transmitting and receiving various information to and from other devices connected via a network, etc. The management device 10 is realized by a general-purpose computer such as a workstation or a personal computer. As shown in FIG. 4 , the management device 10 has a generation unit 11, a management unit 12, and a configuration information database (DB) 13 that stores configuration information.
[0039] The generator 11 generates configuration information in a format that satisfies requirement 1 and / or requirement 2, and stores the information in the configuration information DB 13. Figures 5 to 8 are diagrams illustrating the formats of the configuration information generated by the generator 11.
[0040] As shown in FIG. 5, in this embodiment, first, “h (key)” is generated as a secret key by encoding it using a one-way function from the key, and then the key is converted into “h (key) (including h (external key))” and signed in that state, and configuration information formats F1 and F2 are proposed.
[0041] Specifically, the generation unit 11 hashes the “external key” (second identifier) ((1) in Figure 5), and generates configuration information in format F1 that includes the key (first identifier), header, data, “h (external key)” (encoded second identifier), and an electronic signature for the data.
[0042] Here, if "ID" is held, "h(ID)" can be generated, but since it is difficult to generate an ID from "h(ID)" alone, the ID can be concealed by hashing it. Therefore, according to format F1, by hashing the foreign key, it is possible to maintain and conceal link information from the key to the foreign key.
[0043] The generator 11 then generates configuration information in format F2 in which a digital signature for the data is added to the key "h (key)", header, data, and "h (external key)" as configuration information of the reference destination of format F1. That is, the generator 11 generates configuration information in format F2 in which, instead of the key (first identifier), a key obtained by encoding the key using a one-way function is added to the data.
[0044] Therefore, according to format F2, by hashing the key and the foreign key, it is possible to retain and conceal the key before hashing and the link information to the foreign key. Note that hashing is an example of encoding, and encoding other than hashing may be used as long as it can conceal the key or the foreign key.
[0045] For example, as shown in FIG. 6, a case will be described in which configuration information A (KeyA) is linked to configuration information B (KeyB), and configuration information B is linked to configuration information C (KeyC).
[0046] Configuration information A is assigned "h (KeyB)" as an external key. Even if the link from configuration information A to configuration information B is kept secret, if information on configuration information B is obtained later, it is possible to convert "KeyB" to "h (KeyB)" ((1) in FIG. 6). It is possible to confirm that configuration information A is linked to configuration information B' (arrow Y11 in FIG. 6).
[0047] Furthermore, by searching using "h(KeyB)" as the key, it is possible to confirm that configuration information A is linked to configuration information C via configuration information B' while keeping the information in configuration information B secret. Since configuration information B' contains "KeyC" as the foreign key, it is possible to show that configuration information A is linked to configuration information C via configuration information B' (arrows Y11 and Y12 in FIG. 6). For example, when inspecting software for vulnerabilities, it is possible to show that the software is included while keeping the link to the software secret.
[0048] In this way, formats F1 and F2 satisfy requirement 1. Therefore, by employing formats F1 and F2, the generation unit 11 can generate configuration information that allows signature verification without losing link information and has a link structure that allows the key to be made non-disclosed later.
[0049] 5 , the generation unit 11 generates two signatures for the configuration information, a disclosure department signature (second digital signature) and a non-disclosure department signature (first digital signature), and employs a signature scheme in which the two generated signatures are attached to the configuration information.
[0050] The non-disclosure department signature is a signature of the entire configuration information (key, header, data, h (external key)) (arrow Y1 in FIG. 5). The disclosure department signature is generated based on the configuration information (e.g., key, header, external key) in which some items (e.g., the entire data) are concealed, and the disclosure department signature (arrow Y2 in FIG. 5).
[0051] In this way, the generation unit 11 generates two signatures for one piece of configuration information: a disclosed section signature and a non-disclosed section signature. Of these, the disclosed section signature can be verified based on the external key and the disclosed section signature ((2) in Figure 5), and does not necessarily require a data section. Therefore, by adopting formats F1 and F2, the generation unit 11 can also delete the data section of the configuration information later, as shown in format F2.
[0052] For example, even if the key and external key of the generated configuration information (format F0) are replaced with "h(key)" and "h(external key)" that have been anonymized by hashing ((1) in FIG. 7), the generated configuration information (format F0) and the anonymized configuration information (format F2) can be verified with the same signature by verifying the disclosed department names and / or the non-disclosed department names ((2) in FIG. 7). Therefore, both the non-anonymized configuration information (format F0) and the anonymized configuration information (format F2) can be verified with a single signature.
[0053] In this way, formats F1 and F2 satisfy requirement 2. Therefore, by adopting formats F1 and F2, the generation unit 11 can sign one piece of configuration information with two signatures, a disclosure department name and a non-disclosure department name, thereby making it possible to delete the data section later.
[0054] Furthermore, with these formats F1 and F2, it is possible to keep only part of the data confidential and to assign multiple signatures to different levels of confidentiality based on certain rules.
[0055] For example, the generation unit 11 may assign to the configuration information a non-disclosure department name that conceals only some items of data. Furthermore, the generation unit 11 may assign to the configuration information two non-disclosure department names, for example, a non-disclosure department name 1 that conceals all of the data and a non-disclosure department name 2 that conceals some items of the data.
[0056] The management device 10 can set the disclosure level of configuration information data by setting the number of data items to be anonymized for each non-disclosure department name. In other words, the generation unit 11 can anonymize data items in stages by assigning multiple digital signatures generated from each piece of configuration information with items deleted in stages. Furthermore, formats F1 and F2 can be combined with group signatures.
[0057] The generating unit 11 may adopt, as the format of the configuration information, formats F1' and F2' that satisfy requirement 1 and / or format F2' that satisfies requirement 2 (see FIG. 8).
[0058] The format F1' is a format in which the external key of the configuration information is hashed to conceal it, and the format F2' is a format in which the key is hashed to conceal it. The generation unit 11 may also adopt the format F0 that satisfies requirement 2 as the format of the configuration information (see FIG. 7).
[0059] In this way, by adopting formats F1, F1', F2, and F2', the management device 10 can allow other hardware or software to disclose information to other hardware or software that configures it without disclosing the confidential configuration information, and this information can be verified using a pre-generated digital signature.Furthermore, by adopting formats F1 and F2, the management device 10 can set a disclosure level for the configuration information data.
[0060] The management unit 12 manages the configuration information stored in the configuration information DB 13. When the management unit 12 receives a Key or h(Key) as a query key, it obtains the configuration information corresponding to the key from the configuration information DB 13.
[0061] For example, as shown in Fig. 4, when the management unit 12 receives "KeyA" as a query key, it acquires configuration information A using "KeyA" as a key. Also, when the management unit 12 receives "h(KeyA)" as a query key, it acquires configuration information A' using "h(KeyA)" as a key. The management unit 12 manages each piece of configuration information so that the configuration information cannot be accessed if the key is unknown.
[0062] If the requester of the configuration information knows "KeyA," it can generate "h(KeyA)" by hashing, and therefore can also obtain information on "h(KeyA)," but the reverse is not possible.
[0063] [Processing Procedure] FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing the processing procedure of the management process according to the embodiment.
[0064] As shown in FIG. 9, in the management device 10, the generation unit 11 performs a generation process of generating configuration information of formats F1, F1', F2, and F2' and storing the generated configuration information in the configuration information DB 13 (step S1).
[0065] The management unit 12 performs a management process (step S2) to manage the configuration information stored in the configuration information DB 13. When the management unit 12 receives "Key" or "h(Key)" as a query key, it retrieves the configuration information corresponding to the key from the configuration information DB 13 and outputs it to the requestor.
[0066] [Effects of the embodiment] The management device 10 according to the embodiment hashes the "external key" and generates configuration information in a format that adds an electronic signature for the data to the key, header, data, and "h (external key)." This makes it possible to verify the validity of the configuration information using the signature and to keep the information secret while maintaining the link structure.
[0067] In addition, the management device 10 generates two signatures for the configuration information, one for the disclosed section and one for the non-disclosed section, and adopts a signature method in which the two generated signatures are attached, thereby making it possible to verify the validity of the configuration information using the signatures and to later classify the data section into levels for deletion and disclosure.
[0068] Therefore, the management device 10 can generate and manage configuration information in a format that can ensure the transparency, confidentiality, and integrity of the supply chain.
[0069] [Variation 1] Fig. 10 is a diagram showing another example of the format of the configuration information generated by the generation unit 11. As shown in Fig. 10, it is also possible to define multiple confidentiality levels by changing the number of hashing operations to one, two, or more than two.
[0070] For example, the generation unit 11 may generate configuration information B1 in which the key is "h (KeyB)" and the foreign key is "KeyC," as illustrated in Fig. 6. It is possible to present that configuration information A is linked to configuration information C via this configuration information B1 (arrows Y21 and Y22 in Fig. 10).
[0071] Furthermore, the generation unit 11 generates configuration information A1 in which "h(KeyA)" obtained by hashing "KeyA" once is used as a key and "h(h(KeyB))" obtained by hashing "KeyB" twice is used as an external key. The generation unit 11 generates configuration information B2 in which "h(h(KeyB))" obtained by hashing "KeyB" twice is used as a key and "h(h(KeyC))" obtained by hashing "KeyC" twice is used as an external key. The generation unit 11 then generates configuration information C2 in which "h(h(KeyC))" obtained by hashing "KeyC" twice is used as a key. In this case, it can be shown that configuration information A1 is linked to configuration information C2 via configuration information B2 (arrows Y23 and Y24 in FIG. 10 ).
[0072] In this way, the confidentiality level of the configuration information can be increased by increasing the number of times the key and / or foreign key is hashed. Therefore, the confidentiality level can be adjusted by adjusting the number of times the key and / or foreign key is hashed. The confidentiality level of the key and / or foreign key (the number of times it is hashed) can be defined by the user or can be defined appropriately according to a specific common specification.
[0073] [Modification 2] FIGS. 11 and 12 are diagrams showing other examples of the format of the configuration information generated by the generating unit 11. In FIG.
[0074] By including license information and procedures (such as a URL) for upgrading to a higher confidentiality level in the configuration information, it becomes possible to later check information with a higher confidentiality level for disclosed information.
[0075] For example, as shown in FIG. 11, configuration information A3 (first configuration information) includes a hashed external key “h (KeyB)” and an upgrade procedure (a method for obtaining second configuration information from third configuration information).
[0076] In this case, the foreign key "h (KeyB)" of the configuration information A3 is used as the query key, and configuration information B3 (third configuration information) having "h (KeyB)" as the key is obtained (arrow Y31 in FIG. 11).
[0077] In this case, since the upgrade procedure can be obtained from configuration information A3 together with the external key "h (KeyB)," "KeyB" can be obtained by upgrading "h (KeyB)" ((1) in FIG. 11). Then, by using "KeyB" as a key, it becomes possible to obtain configuration information B (second configuration information) with a higher confidentiality level than configuration information B3.
[0078] Furthermore, as shown in FIG. 12, configuration information B4 (third configuration information) that is referred to by configuration information A4 (first configuration information) may include an upgrade procedure.
[0079] In this case, the foreign key "h (KeyB)" of configuration information A4 is used as the query key to obtain configuration information B4, which has "h (KeyB)" as its key (arrow Y41 in FIG. 12). In this case, since the upgrade procedure can be obtained from configuration information B4, "KeyB" can be obtained by upgrading "h (KeyB)" ((1) in FIG. 12). Then, by using "KeyB" as the key, it becomes possible to obtain configuration information B (second configuration information), which has a higher confidentiality level than configuration information B4.
[0080] [System Configuration of the Embodiment] The components of the management device 10 are conceptual functional components and do not necessarily have to be physically configured as shown in the figure. In other words, the specific form of distribution and integration of the functions of the management device 10 is not limited to that shown in the figure, and all or part of the functions can be functionally or physically distributed or integrated in any unit depending on various loads, usage conditions, etc.
[0081] Furthermore, all or any part of the processes performed in the management device 10 may be realized by a CPU, a GPU (Graphics Processing Unit), and a program analyzed and executed by the CPU and GPU. Furthermore, each process performed in the management device 10 may be realized as hardware using wired logic.
[0082] Furthermore, among the processes described in the embodiments, all or part of the processes described as being performed automatically can be performed manually. Alternatively, all or part of the processes described as being performed manually can be performed automatically using a known method. In addition, the processing procedures, control procedures, specific names, and information including various data and parameters described above and illustrated can be changed as appropriate unless otherwise specified.
[0083] 13 is a diagram showing an example of a computer in which the management device 10 is realized by executing a program. The computer 1000 has, for example, a memory 1010 and a CPU 1020. The computer 1000 also has a hard disk drive interface 1030, a disk drive interface 1040, a serial port interface 1050, a video adapter 1060, and a network interface 1070. These components are connected by a bus 1080.
[0084] The memory 1010 includes a ROM 1011 and a RAM 1012. The ROM 1011 stores a boot program such as a BIOS (Basic Input Output System). The hard disk drive interface 1030 is connected to a hard disk drive 1090. The disk drive interface 1040 is connected to a disk drive 1100. A removable storage medium such as a magnetic disk or optical disk is inserted into the disk drive 1100. The serial port interface 1050 is connected to a mouse 1110 and a keyboard 1120, for example. The video adapter 1060 is connected to a display 1130, for example.
[0085] The hard disk drive 1090 stores, for example, an OS (Operating System) 1091, application programs 1092, program modules 1093, and program data 1094. That is, the programs that define the processes of the management device 10 are implemented as program modules 1093 in which code that can be executed by the computer 1000 is written. The program modules 1093 are stored, for example, in the hard disk drive 1090. For example, the program modules 1093 for executing processes similar to those of the functional configuration of the management device 10 are stored in the hard disk drive 1090. The hard disk drive 1090 may be replaced by an SSD (Solid State Drive).
[0086] Furthermore, setting data used in the processing of the above-described embodiment is stored as program data 1094, for example, in memory 1010 or hard disk drive 1090. Then, CPU 1020 reads out program module 1093 or program data 1094 stored in memory 1010 or hard disk drive 1090 into RAM 1012 as necessary and executes them.
[0087] The program module 1093 and program data 1094 may not necessarily be stored in the hard disk drive 1090, but may also be stored in, for example, a removable storage medium and read by the CPU 1020 via the disk drive 1100 or the like. Alternatively, the program module 1093 and program data 1094 may be stored in another computer connected via a network (such as a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN)). The program module 1093 and program data 1094 may then be read by the CPU 1020 from the other computer via the network interface 1070.
[0088] Although the present invention has been described above as an embodiment, the present invention is not limited to the descriptions and drawings that form part of the disclosure of the present invention. In other words, other embodiments, examples, and operational techniques that can be made by those skilled in the art based on the present invention are all included in the scope of the present invention.
[0089] 10 Management device 11 Generation unit 12 Management unit 13 Configuration information database (DB)
Claims
1. A management device that manages configuration information of a first hardware or a first software, a generating unit that generates configuration information in a format in which a first identifier that uniquely identifies the first hardware or the first software, a second identifier obtained by encoding a second identifier that uniquely identifies another second hardware or second software that constitutes the first hardware or the first software using a one-way function, and a digital signature for the data are added to data relating to the first hardware or the first software; A management unit for managing the configuration information; A management device comprising:
2. The management device according to claim 1, characterized in that the generation unit generates configuration information of a format in which, instead of the first identifier, a first identifier obtained by encoding the first identifier using a one-way function is added to the data.
3. The management device described in claim 1, characterized in that the generation unit includes a method for obtaining the second configuration information from third configuration information, which is configuration information referenced by the first configuration information and is concealed based on the second configuration information, in the first configuration information or the third configuration information.
4. A management device that manages configuration information of a first hardware or a first software, a generating unit that generates configuration information in a format in which a first identifier that uniquely identifies the first hardware or the first software, a second identifier that uniquely identifies another second hardware or second software that constitutes the first hardware or the first software, a first electronic signature for the entire configuration information, and a second electronic signature that is generated based on the configuration information in which some items are concealed and the first electronic signature are added to data related to the first hardware or the first software; A management unit for managing the configuration information; A management device comprising:
5. 5. The management device according to claim 4, wherein the generation unit assigns a plurality of electronic signatures generated from each piece of configuration information in which items are deleted in stages.
6. A management device that manages configuration information of a first hardware or a first software, a generating unit that generates configuration information in a format in which a first identifier uniquely identifying the first hardware or the first software, a second identifier obtained by encoding a second identifier uniquely identifying another second hardware or second software constituting the first hardware or the first software using a one-way function, a first electronic signature for the entire configuration information, and a second electronic signature generated based on the configuration information in which some items are concealed and the first electronic signature, are added to data relating to the first hardware or the first software; A management unit for managing the configuration information; A management device comprising:
7. A management method executed by a management device that manages configuration information of a first hardware or a first software, comprising: generating configuration information in a format in which a first identifier uniquely identifying the first hardware or the first software, a second identifier obtained by encoding a second identifier uniquely identifying another second hardware or second software constituting the first hardware or the first software using a one-way function, and a digital signature for the data are added to data relating to the first hardware or the first software; managing the configuration information; A management method comprising the steps of:
8. A management method executed by a management device that manages configuration information of a first hardware or a first software, comprising: generating configuration information in a format in which a first identifier uniquely identifying the first hardware or the first software, a second identifier uniquely identifying another second hardware or second software constituting the first hardware or the first software, a first electronic signature for the entire configuration information, and a second electronic signature generated based on the configuration information in which some items are concealed and the first electronic signature are added to data relating to the first hardware or the first software; managing the configuration information; A management method comprising the steps of:
9. A management method executed by a management device that manages configuration information of a first hardware or a first software, comprising: generating configuration information in a format in which a first identifier uniquely identifying the first hardware or the first software, a second identifier obtained by encoding a second identifier uniquely identifying another second hardware or second software constituting the first hardware or the first software using a one-way function, a first electronic signature for the entire configuration information, and a second electronic signature generated based on the configuration information in which some items have been concealed and the first electronic signature, are added to data relating to the first hardware or the first software; managing the configuration information; A management method comprising the steps of:
10. A management program for causing a computer to function as the management device according to any one of claims 1 to 6.