Server for generating and managing secured video data object including de-identified video from video containing personal information and method for operation thereof

A server-based system enforces lawful entrustment, encrypts, and securely disposes de-identified images, addressing legality, authenticity, and access control issues in image processing.

KR103046693B1Active Publication Date: 2026-11-11KOREA CULTURAL CONTENTS VISUALIZATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
KR1020260111199
Authority / Receiving Office
KR · KR
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-06-18
Publication Date
2026-11-11
Estimated Expiration
2046-06-18

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing image processing technologies fail to ensure the legality of entrustment procedures, authenticity of de-identified images, and secure disposal, leading to unauthorized access and incomplete destruction, especially in cases involving personal information.

Method used

A server-based system that enforces lawful entrustment through a processing key release mechanism, encrypts images with event-specific keys, constructs a hash chain with metadata, and ensures secure disposal by destroying encryption keys.

Benefits of technology

Guarantees lawful processing, authenticates image integrity and origin, controls access at the encryption layer, and verifies complete destruction of de-identified images.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

According to various embodiments, a server for creating and managing a security image data object including a de-identified image from an image containing personal information includes a communication module and a processor, wherein the processor receives an original image and a certificate of entrustment regarding the entrustment of processing of the original image from a user device through the communication module, and if the verification result for the electronic signature of the certificate of entrustment satisfies a predetermined verification condition, releases a processing key corresponding to the de-identification processing, performs de-identification processing on a person object included in the original image through a processing infrastructure activated by the released processing key to create a de-identified image, encrypts the de-identified image with an event-specific data encryption key, wraps the event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key combined with a predetermined viewing policy condition, constructs a hash chain by connecting the hash value of each of the encrypted de-identified image and the behavior metadata corresponding to the de-identified image, and a manifest including entrustment source information identified from the certificate of entrustment, with the hash value of the preceding manifest, and adds a timestamp signature to the hash chain to the security image data object It may be configured to generate, and if a request context corresponding to a viewing request received through the communication module satisfies the viewing policy conditions, provide the decrypted anonymized image by unwrapping the event-specific data encryption key with the wrapping key, and if a predetermined destruction condition is satisfied, destroy the event-specific data encryption key to convert the anonymized image included in the security image data object into an unrecoverable state, and record a destruction log containing key fingerprint information immediately before the destruction of the event-specific data encryption key in the hash chain. Other embodiments are also possible.
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Description

Technology Field

[0001] Various embodiments of the present disclosure relate to creating and managing a security image data object containing a de-identified image from an image containing personal information, and more specifically, to a server and a method of operation that activates de-identification processing based on the verification result of a consignment certificate document regarding the consignment of processing of the original image, encapsulates the de-identified image to provide conditional viewing based on viewing policy conditions, and verifiably discards the de-identified image by destroying the event-specific data encryption key. Background Technology

[0002] With the recent widespread adoption of various video recording devices, such as closed-circuit television (CCTV), vehicle-mounted video recorders, and body-worn cameras, there is an increasing number of cases where footage captured by these devices is utilized as evidence to prove facts in incidents involving school violence, assault, or safety accidents. Since such footage frequently contains identifying elements—such as the faces of minors or third parties who did not consent—along with the data subjects who consented to the processing, de-identification of these identifying elements is required to use the footage as evidence.

[0003] However, although the anonymization of images and their provision must be based on lawful processing entrustment procedures under the Personal Information Protection Act, in the past, procedures regarding the legality of the entrustment, such as entrustment contracts, security commitments, or the consent of data subjects, were managed manually, creating a risk that images could be processed or provided with procedural defects or omissions. In other words, anonymization could be performed regardless of whether the lawful entrustment procedures were completed, leading to a problem where the legality of the processing was not technically guaranteed.

[0004] Furthermore, when disputes regarding the authenticity of de-identified images arose after they were submitted as evidence, there was a problem in verifying whether the images were generated from a legitimate source and whether they had not been arbitrarily edited or manipulated after their creation. Moreover, when the control of access rights to de-identified images relied on application layer access checks, unauthorized access was possible through circumvention; additionally, even after the retention period had expired, it was difficult to prove retrospectively whether the images were actually destroyed and the exact time of destruction; and there was a problem in that complete destruction could not be guaranteed due to the existence of backup or duplicate copies.

[0005] Accordingly, there is a need for a technology that generates de-identified images while technically enforcing the legality of the entrustment of image processing, cryptographically binds the authenticity, source, viewing rights, and disposal history of the de-identified images to verify the integrity and source of the de-identified images without a separate original image, controls the viewing of the de-identified images at the encryption layer, and enables verifiable disposal. Prior art literature

[0006] Korean Patent Publication No. 10-2436602 (Aug. 29, 2022) U.S. Patent Publication No. 12,212,658 (January 28, 2025) The problem to be solved

[0007] Various embodiments of the present disclosure aim to provide a server and a method of operation thereof that enforce the completion of a lawful processing entrustment procedure as a prerequisite for performing de-identification processing by releasing a processing key corresponding to de-identification processing only when the verification result of the electronic signature of a consignment certificate document regarding the consignment of processing of an original image satisfies a predetermined verification condition.

[0008] In addition, another embodiment of the present disclosure aims to provide a server and a method of operation thereof that prevent unauthorized viewing by controlling the viewing of an unidentified image at the encryption layer rather than through authorization checks at the application layer, by encrypting the unidentified image with an event-specific data encryption key and wrapping the event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key combined with viewing policy conditions.

[0009] In addition, another embodiment of the present disclosure aims to provide a server and a method of operation that can verify the integrity, origin, and disposal history of a de-identified image without a separate original image by creating a secure image data object by linking a manifest containing hash values ​​of each de-identified image and behavior metadata and entrusted source information into a hash chain and adding a timestamp signature, and by verifiably disposing of the de-identified image by destroying an event-specific data encryption key. means of solving the problem

[0010] According to various embodiments, a server for creating and managing a security image data object including a de-identified image from an image containing personal information includes a communication module and a processor, wherein the processor receives an original image and a certificate of entrustment regarding the entrustment of processing of the original image from a user device through the communication module, and if the verification result for the electronic signature of the certificate of entrustment satisfies a predetermined verification condition, releases a processing key corresponding to the de-identification processing, performs de-identification processing on a person object included in the original image through a processing infrastructure activated by the released processing key to create a de-identified image, encrypts the de-identified image with an event-specific data encryption key, wraps the event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key combined with a predetermined viewing policy condition, constructs a hash chain by connecting the hash value of each of the encrypted de-identified image and the behavior metadata corresponding to the de-identified image, and a manifest including entrustment source information identified from the certificate of entrustment, with the hash value of the preceding manifest, and adds a timestamp signature to the hash chain to the security image data object It can be configured to generate, and if a request context corresponding to a viewing request received through the communication module satisfies the viewing policy conditions, provide the decrypted anonymized image by unwrapping the event-specific data encryption key with the wrapping key, and if a predetermined destruction condition is satisfied, destroy the event-specific data encryption key to convert the anonymized image included in the security image data object into an unrecoverable state, and record a destruction log containing key fingerprint information immediately before the destruction of the event-specific data encryption key in the hash chain.

[0011] According to various embodiments, a method of operation of a server for creating and managing a security image data object including a de-identified image from an image containing personal information comprises: receiving an original image and a certificate of entrustment regarding the entrustment of processing of the original image from a user device through a communication module of the server, and releasing a processing key corresponding to the de-identification processing when the verification result of the electronic signature of the certificate of entrustment satisfies a predetermined verification condition; generating a de-identified image by performing de-identification processing on a person object included in the original image through a processing infrastructure activated by the released processing key by a processor of the server; encrypting the de-identified image with an event-specific data encryption key by the processor and wrapping the event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key combined with a predetermined viewing policy condition by the processor; constructing a hash chain by the processor by connecting a manifest containing the hash value of each of the encrypted de-identified image and the behavior metadata corresponding to the de-identified image and entrustment source information identified from the certificate of entrustment with the hash value of the preceding manifest, and a timestamp in the hash chain The method may include the operation of creating the security video data object by adding a signature, providing the decrypted anonymized video by unwrapping the event-specific data encryption key with the wrapping key when the request context corresponding to the viewing request received through the communication module satisfies the viewing policy condition, and, by the processor, destroying the event-specific data encryption key when a predetermined destruction condition is satisfied to convert the anonymized video included in the security video data object into an unrecoverable state, and recording a destruction log containing key fingerprint information immediately before the destruction of the event-specific data encryption key in the hash chain. Effects of the invention

[0012] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the processing key is released and access rights to the processing infrastructure are opened only when the verification result of the entrustment certificate satisfies the verification conditions; thus, since de-identification processing cannot be performed unless the lawful processing entrustment procedure is completed, the effect of technically guaranteeing the lawfulness of image processing can be provided.

[0013] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, a de-identified image is encrypted with an event-specific data encryption key and the event-specific data encryption key is wrapped with a wrapping key combined with an access policy condition, and the hash value of the access policy condition is bound as additional authentication data for the wrapping. Therefore, if the access policy condition is changed or bypassed, the event-specific data encryption key cannot be unwrapped, thereby providing the effect of controlling the access of the de-identified image at the encryption layer.

[0014] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the hash values ​​of the de-identified image and behavior metadata and the entrusted source information are bound into a manifest and sealed by a hash chain and a timestamp signature, thereby providing the effect of verifying the integrity and source of the de-identified image using only the security image data object itself without a separate original image.

[0015] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, when a destruction condition is satisfied, the event-specific data encryption key is destroyed, converting the de-identified image to an unrecoverable state, and a destruction log containing key fingerprint information immediately before destruction is recorded in the hash chain, thereby providing the effect that complete destruction is achieved regardless of whether a backup or replica of the de-identified image exists, and the fact and timing of the destruction can be verified retrospectively. Brief explanation of the drawing

[0016] FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of a user device and a server according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating the operation of a server creating and managing a security image data object including a de-identified image from an original image according to various embodiments. FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an embodiment in which a server releases a processing key corresponding to de-identification processing based on the verification result of a consignment certificate document according to various embodiments. FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating the structure of envelope encryption according to various embodiments, in which a server encrypts a de-identified image with an event-specific data encryption key and wraps the event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key combined with a viewing policy condition. FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating an embodiment in which a server links a manifest into a hash chain and adds a timestamp signature to create a secure image data object according to various embodiments. FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating an embodiment in which a server verifiably discards a de-identified image by destroying an event-specific data encryption key according to various embodiments. Specific details for implementing the invention

[0017] Hereinafter, various embodiments of this document are described with reference to the accompanying drawings. The embodiments and the terms used therein are not intended to limit the technology described in this document to specific embodiments and should be understood to include various modifications, equivalents, and / or substitutions of said embodiments. In relation to the description of the drawings, similar reference numerals may be used for similar components. A singular expression may include a plural expression unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. In this document, expressions such as "A or B" or "at least one of A and / or B" may include all possible combinations of items listed together. Expressions such as "first," "second," "first," or "second" may modify said components regardless of order or importance and are used only to distinguish one component from another and do not limit said components. When it is mentioned that a certain (e.g., 1st) component is "(functionally or telecommunicationally) connected" or "connected" to another (e.g., 2nd) component, said certain component may be directly connected to said other component or connected through another component (e.g., 3rd component).

[0018] In this document, "configured to" may be used interchangeably with, depending on the context, for example, hardware- or software-wise, "suitable for," "capable of," "modified to," "made to," "capable of," or "designed to." In some cases, the expression "device configured to" may mean that the device is "capable of" in conjunction with other devices or components. For example, the phrase "processor configured to perform A, B, and C" may mean a dedicated processor for performing the corresponding operations (e.g., an embedded processor), or a general-purpose processor capable of performing the corresponding operations by executing one or more software programs stored in a memory device (e.g., a CPU or application processor).

[0019] A user device or electronic device according to various embodiments of the present document may include, for example, at least one of a smartphone, a tablet PC, a desktop PC, a laptop PC, a netbook computer, a workstation, and a server.

[0020] Referring to FIG. 1, a user device (100) and a server (101) in various embodiments are described. The user device (100) may include a communication module (110), a processor (120), a memory (130), and a display (140). In some embodiments, the user device (100) may omit at least one of the components or additionally include other components.

[0021] The communication module (110) can establish communication between, for example, a user device (100) and an external device (e.g., a first external electronic device (102), a second external electronic device (104), or a server (101)). For example, the communication module (110) can communicate with an external device (e.g., a second external electronic device (104) or a server (101)) by connecting to a network (180) via wireless communication or wired communication.

[0022] Wireless communication may include cellular communication using at least one of, for example, LTE, LTE-A (LTE Advance), CDMA (code division multiple access), WCDMA (wideband CDMA), UMTS (universal mobile telecommunications system), WiBro (Wireless Broadband), or GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications). According to one embodiment, wireless communication may include at least one of, for example, WiFi (wireless fidelity), Bluetooth, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), Zigbee, NFC (near field communication), Magnetic Secure Transmission, Radio Frequency (RF), or Body Area Network (BAN). According to one embodiment, wireless communication may include GNSS. GNSS may be, for example, GPS (Global Positioning System), Glonass (Global Navigation Satellite System), Beidou Navigation Satellite System (hereinafter "Beidou"), or Galileo, the European global satellite-based navigation system. Hereinafter, in this document, "GPS" may be used interchangeably with "GNSS". Wired communication may include at least one of, for example, USB (universal serial bus), HDMI (high definition multimedia interface), RS-232 (recommended standard 232), power line communication, or POTS (plain old telephone service).The network (180) may include at least one of a telecommunications network, for example, a computer network (e.g., LAN or WAN), the Internet, or a telephone network.

[0023] The processor (120) may include one or more of a central processing unit, an application processor, or a communication processor (CP). The processor (120) may, for example, perform operations or data processing regarding the control and / or communication of at least one other component of the user device (100).

[0024] The memory (130) may include volatile and / or non-volatile memory. The memory (130) may store, for example, commands or data related to at least one other component of the user device (100).

[0025] The display (140) may include, for example, a liquid crystal display (LCD), a light-emitting diode (LED) display, an organic light-emitting diode (OLED) display, a micro-electromechanical system (MEMS) display, or an electronic paper display. The display (140) may display various content (e.g., text, images, videos, icons, and / or symbols, etc.) to a user, for example. The display (140) may include a touch screen and may receive touch, gesture, proximity, or hovering input using, for example, an electronic pen or a part of the user's body.

[0026] Each of the first and second external electronic devices (102, 104) may be the same or a different type of device as the user device (100). According to various embodiments, all or part of the operations performed on the user device (100) may be performed on one or more other electronic devices (e.g., electronic devices (102, 104), or a server (101). According to one embodiment, when the user device (100) needs to perform a function or service automatically or upon request, the user device (100) may request at least some of the associated functions from another device (e.g., electronic devices (102, 104), or a server (101)) instead of performing the function or service itself or additionally. The other electronic device (e.g., electronic devices (102, 104), or a server (101)) may perform the requested function or additional functions and transmit the result to the user device (100). The user device (100) may provide the requested function or service by processing the received result as is or additionally. For this purpose, for example, cloud computing, distributed computing, or client-server computing technologies may be used.

[0027] The server (101) may include a communication module (111), a processor (121), and a memory (131). In some embodiments, the server (101) may omit at least one of the components or additionally include other components. The communication module (111), the processor (121), and the memory (131) may each perform the same functions as the communication module (110), the processor (120), and the memory (130) within the user device (100).

[0029] FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating the operation of a server (e.g., server (101) of FIG. 1) creating and managing a security image data object including a de-identified image from an original image, according to various embodiments.

[0030] FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an embodiment in which a server (101) releases a processing key corresponding to a de-identification process based on the verification result of a consignment certificate document according to various embodiments.

[0031] FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating the structure of envelope encryption according to various embodiments, in which a server (101) encrypts a de-identified image with an event-specific data encryption key and wraps the event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key combined with a viewing policy condition.

[0032] FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating an embodiment in which a server (101) creates a secure image data object by linking a manifest into a hash chain and adding a timestamp signature according to various embodiments.

[0033] FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating an embodiment in which a server (101) verifiably discards a de-identified image by destroying an event-specific data encryption key according to various embodiments.

[0034] According to various embodiments, the server (101) may operate a system that provides a service for creating and managing a security image data object including a de-identified image from an original image. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may perform activation of de-identification processing based on the verification result of a consignment certificate document, envelope encryption for the de-identified image, creation of a security image data object, conditional viewing based on viewing policy conditions, and verifiable destruction by destroying the event-specific data encryption key.

[0035] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may communicate through a network (e.g., the network (180) of FIG. 1) with a user device (e.g., the user device (100) of FIG. 1), a device of a personal information processor corresponding to a consignor entrusting the processing of the original image (e.g., the first external electronic device (102) of FIG. 1), and a device of an evidence examination agency that views the de-identified image or examines the integrity of the security image data object (e.g., the second external electronic device (104) of FIG. 1). According to one embodiment, the server (101) may receive the original image, consignment certificate document, viewing request, and verification request signal for the security image data object from these devices, and transmit the decrypted de-identified image, verification result, and destruction completion report, etc. to the relevant devices.

[0036] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may include components of the same type as the components of the user device (100) of FIG. 1. According to one embodiment, the components referred to as the user device (100) in the present disclosure may refer to a user account that accesses an application operated by the server (101) through the said user device.

[0038] In operation 201, according to various embodiments, a server (101) (e.g., processor (121) of FIG. 1) receives an original image and a certificate of entrustment regarding the entrustment of processing of the original image from a user device (100) through a communication module (e.g., communication module (111) of FIG. 1), and if the result of verifying the electronic signature of the certificate of entrustment satisfies a predetermined verification condition, a processing key corresponding to the de-identification process can be released.

[0039] As used in this specification, "original image" refers to an image prior to the application of de-identification processing, which includes identifying elements capable of identifying an individual. According to one embodiment, the original image may be an image captured by at least one of a closed-circuit television (CCTV), a vehicle video recording device, or a body-worn camera. According to one embodiment, the original image may include identifying elements capable of identifying an individual, such as the face of a third party who is not the subject of consent or a minor, in addition to the data subject who consented to the processing of the image. However, the original image is not limited to these examples and may correspond to various types of images that contain personal information and require de-identification processing.

[0040] As used in this specification, the term "entrustment certificate document" refers to a document that includes information regarding at least one of an entrustment contract, a security pledge, and the data subject's consent to processing, as data intended to prove the legality of the entrustment of processing of original images. According to one embodiment, the entrustment certificate document may correspond to an entrustment contract, a security pledge, or a data subject's consent form. According to one embodiment, the entrustment certificate document may include information on the entrustment period, a processing purpose code, and a destruction deadline as data fields, and may further include an electronic signature for the entrustment certificate document. However, the entrustment certificate document is not limited to these examples and may correspond to various types of documents proving the legality of the entrustment of processing of original images.

[0041] As used in this specification, "processing infrastructure" refers to a processing resource or processing environment that performs de-identification processing on an original image. According to one embodiment, the processing infrastructure may include at least one of a set of software modules, processing pipelines, or computational resources that perform de-identification processing. According to one embodiment, the processing infrastructure may include at least one of an object processing module for detecting and tracking person objects from the original image, a masking module for performing dynamic masking on identification elements, and a metadata extraction module for extracting behavioral metadata. However, the processing infrastructure is not limited to these examples and may correspond to various types of processing resources or processing environments where de-identification processing is performed on the original image. According to one embodiment, the processing infrastructure may be implemented as an isolated computational environment so that the original image is not leaked externally. For example, the processing infrastructure may be implemented as at least one of a separate processing server, a container, a virtual machine, or a trusted execution environment separated from the server (101). According to one embodiment, original images corresponding to high-risk data are processed only within an isolated processing infrastructure, and after the de-identification process is completed, the original images can be removed from the processing infrastructure. Since the original images are processed only within the isolated processing infrastructure, the exposure of the original images to the outside during the de-identification process can be prevented.

[0042] According to one embodiment, a certificate of entrustment may be generated based on a processing entrustment relationship between a consignor who entrusts the processing of an original image and a trustee who is entrusted with the processing of an original image. As used in this specification, "consignor" refers to an entity that entrusts the processing of an original image as a personal information processor regarding the original image, and "trustee" refers to an entity that receives the processing of the original image from the consignor and performs de-identification processing and the creation and management of security image data objects. According to one embodiment, the consignor may correspond to at least one of a school, an education office, a hospital, a workplace, a management entity of an apartment complex, or other personal information processor holding the original image, and the trustee may correspond to an entity operating a server (101). However, the consignor and the trustee may correspond to various types of entities in a processing entrustment relationship for an image containing personal information.

[0043] According to one embodiment, a consignment certificate document may be generated by a server (101). According to one embodiment, the server (101) may receive consignment request information regarding the consignment of processing from the consignor's user device (100) and generate a consignment certificate document based on the consignment request information. The consignment request information may include, for example, at least one of a consignor identifier, a consignment period, a processing purpose, and a destruction deadline. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may generate a consignment certificate document that includes information regarding at least one of a consignment contract, a security commitment, and the data subject's consent to processing by mapping the consignment request information to a pre-stored format of a consignment certificate document. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may transmit the generated consignment certificate document to the consignor's user device (100) to request the consignor's electronic signature and receive the consignment certificate document with the consignor's electronic signature added.

[0044] According to one embodiment, a consignment certificate document may be generated by performing a conclusion approval process based on an agreement between the consignor and the trustee. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may receive electronic signatures from the consignor's user device (100) and the trustee's device, respectively, and determine that the conclusion approval process of the consignment certificate document is completed by adding both electronic signatures to the consignment certificate document. That is, the consignment certificate document may be generated in the form of a multi-signature including the consignor's electronic signature and the trustee's electronic signature. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may perform a determination of the verification condition of the 201 operation only when the conclusion approval process of the consignment certificate document is completed.

[0045] According to one embodiment, the entrustment certificate document may be generated by the entrustor's user device (100) or an external electronic device used by the entrustor (e.g., the first external electronic device (102) of FIG. 1) and transmitted to a server (101). According to another embodiment, the entrustment certificate document may be composed of a plurality of documents including a first document regarding the entrustment contract, a second document regarding the security commitment, and a third document regarding the data subject's consent to processing, in which case each document may be generated and electronically signed by different entities. For example, the first document regarding the entrustment contract may be electronically signed by the entrustor and the trustee, and the third document regarding the data subject's consent to processing may be electronically signed by the data subject or their legal representative.

[0046] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may add a timestamp issued by a timestamp agency server (e.g., the second external electronic device (104) of FIG. 1) to the entrustment certificate document when the entrustment certificate document is created. By adding a timestamp to the entrustment certificate document, it can be proven that the entrustment certificate document existed at a specific point in time, and in operation 201, it can be determined whether the timestamp is included within a valid interval corresponding to the entrustment period information.

[0047] Below, an exemplary scenario regarding the creation of a consignment certificate document is described. According to one embodiment, when A Middle School, the consignor, entrusts the processing of original video footage to secure deliberation materials for a school violence incident, the user device (100) of A Middle School may transmit consignment request information to a server (101) including the consignor identifier "SCHOOL-1001", the consignment period "2026-03-01 to 2026-06-30", the purpose of processing "submission of school violence deliberation materials", and the destruction deadline "2026-07-31". The server (101) corresponding to the trustee may map the consignment request information to a pre-stored form to create a consignment certificate document including a consignment contract, a security pledge, and a data subject consent form, and transmit it to the user device (100) of A Middle School to request an electronic signature from A Middle School. When the electronic signature of A Middle School and the electronic signature of the trustee are added and the approval process for concluding the entrustment certificate document is completed, the server (101) can add a timestamp to the entrustment certificate document to complete the creation of the entrustment certificate document. However, this scenario is merely an example to aid in understanding the present invention and does not limit the scope of the present invention.

[0048] According to one embodiment, the entrustment period information is information indicating the period during which processing of the original video is permitted, and may include the start date and time of entrustment and the end date and time of entrustment. According to one embodiment, the processing purpose code is a code for identifying the processing purpose of the original video, and may include at least one of a code indicating the submission of school violence deliberation materials, a code indicating the submission of evidence for administrative appeal, or a code indicating the submission of evidence for litigation. According to one embodiment, the destruction deadline information may be information indicating the deadline by which the processed original video or de-identified video must be destroyed.

[0049] According to one embodiment, the entrustment certificate document may be composed in one of the formats JSON (JavaScript Object Notation), XML (eXtensible Markup Language), CBOR, or Protobuf. However, it is not limited to these examples, and various data formats that can be easily applied by those skilled in the art may be used. According to one embodiment, the entrustment certificate document may be composed in the form of an electronic document in PDF format with an electronic signature added thereto.

[0050] According to one embodiment, the server (101) establishes a secure channel with transmission section encryption applied between it and the user device (100) and can receive the original video and the entrustment certificate document through the secure channel. The secure channel may be established, for example, according to a Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may receive the original video and the entrustment certificate document as separate messages, or receive the original video and the entrustment certificate document combined into a single container. According to another embodiment, the server (101) may receive the entrustment certificate document first and receive the body data of the original video only when the verification of the entrustment certificate document is completed. In this case, since the body data of the original video is not transmitted to the server (101) before the verification is completed, the risk of exposure of personal information may be further reduced. According to another embodiment, the server (101) may not receive the original video itself, but may receive access information for accessing the storage where the original video is stored and directly read out the original video.

[0051] According to one embodiment, a predetermined verification condition may be defined by the validity of an electronic signature based on the hash value of a consignment certificate document, and whether consignment period information, processing purpose code, and destruction deadline information included in the consignment certificate document are provided. According to one embodiment, the verification condition may include a first condition regarding the validity of the electronic signature and a second condition regarding the provision of essential data fields. According to one embodiment, the first condition may be satisfied when the electronic signature is verified with the public key of a legitimate signer and the hash value of the consignment certificate document matches the hash value of the signature target included in the electronic signature. According to one embodiment, the second condition may be satisfied when the consignment period information, processing purpose code, and destruction deadline information are all included in the consignment certificate document and each data field satisfies a predetermined format. According to one embodiment, the predetermined format may include a condition regarding at least one of the data type, notation rules, allowable range of values, and logical consistency between data fields for each data field.

[0052] According to one embodiment, a predetermined format for consignment period information may include the consignment start time and consignment end time being indicated according to a predetermined time notation rule (e.g., "YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ssZ" format according to ISO 8601), and the consignment end time being temporally later than the consignment start time. For example, a server (101) may determine that the consignment period information satisfies the predetermined format if the consignment start time is indicated as "2026-03-01T09:00:00Z" and the consignment end time is indicated as "2026-06-30T18:00:00Z" and the consignment end time is indicated as "2026-06-30T18:00:00Z" and the consignment end time is later than the consignment start time, and may determine that the consignment period information does not satisfy the predetermined format if the consignment end time is earlier than the consignment start time or does not conform to the time notation rule.

[0053] According to one embodiment, a predetermined format for a processing target code may include the processing target code being represented by an identifier according to a predetermined code system (e.g., a code consisting of uppercase English letters and underscores) and the processing target code being included in a pre-registered list of allowed target codes. For example, the server (101) may determine that the processing target code satisfies the predetermined format if the processing target code is represented as "SVC_REVIEW" and the code is included in the list of allowed target codes, and may determine that the processing target code does not satisfy the predetermined format if the processing target code is an arbitrary undefined string or is not included in the list of allowed target codes.

[0054] According to one embodiment, a predetermined format for destruction deadline information may include the destruction deadline being indicated according to a predetermined date and time notation rule, and the destruction deadline being indicated as a date and time after the consignment termination date and time. For example, the server (101) may determine that the destruction deadline information satisfies the predetermined format if the destruction deadline is indicated as "2026-07-31T23:59:59Z" and is after the consignment termination date and time "2026-06-30T18:00:00Z", and may determine that the destruction deadline information does not satisfy the predetermined format if the destruction deadline precedes the consignment termination date and time.

[0055] According to one embodiment, the predetermined format may further include conditions regarding logical consistency between data fields. For example, the server (101) may determine whether the entrustment start time, entrustment end time, and destruction deadline are arranged in chronological order as entrustment start time, entrustment end time, and destruction deadline, and if they do not conform to that order, determine that the second condition is not satisfied. However, the predetermined format is not limited to this example and may correspond to various types of conditions for verifying the integrity and consistency of each data field.

[0056] According to one embodiment, the server (101) can determine whether each data field satisfies the format requirements by verifying whether the entrustment certificate document conforms to a predetermined schema. For example, the server (101) can collectively verify the existence, data type, and allowable range of values ​​of each data field of the entrustment certificate document based on a JSON schema or an XML schema.

[0057] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may determine that the verification condition is satisfied when both the first condition and the second condition are satisfied.

[0058] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may apply a hash function to the body of the entrusted certificate document to calculate a hash value. The hash function may be, for example, one of SHA-256, SHA-3, or BLAKE2. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may compare the calculated hash value with the signature target hash value included in the digital signature and verify the digital signature with the signer's public key to determine whether the entrusted certificate document has not been altered during transmission and whether the entrusted certificate document has been signed by a legitimate signer. According to one embodiment, the digital signature may be generated according to one of the signature algorithms RSA, ECDSA, or EdDSA. According to one embodiment, when verifying the digital signature, the server (101) may further verify whether the signer's certificate is valid and whether the certificate has not been revoked, and whether the certificate has been revoked may be verified using a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) or an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP).

[0059] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may determine that the first condition is satisfied only when the electronic signatures of all multiple signers are verified, in the case where the electronic signature of the entrustment certificate document is a multiple signature by multiple signers. For example, in the case where both the electronic signature of the entrusting institution and the electronic signature of the trustee are required for a document regarding an entrustment contract, the server (101) may determine that the first condition is satisfied only when both electronic signatures are verified.

[0060] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may further determine whether the timestamp of the entrustment certificate document falls within a valid interval corresponding to the entrustment period information included in the entrustment certificate document. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may determine that the timestamp falls within a valid interval only if the timestamp is after the entrustment start time and before the entrustment end time. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may refuse to release the processing key if the timestamp does not fall within a valid interval. Through this, processing of the original image based on the entrustment certificate document created or submitted at a time outside the entrustment period may be blocked.

[0061] According to one embodiment, if the entrustment certificate document includes consent reference information regarding the data subject's consent to processing, the server (101) may further verify whether the consent reference information matches a previously registered consent record. According to one embodiment, if the consent reference information does not match a previously registered consent record, the server (101) may determine that the verification condition is not satisfied. Additionally, according to one embodiment, the server (101) may further determine whether the processing purpose code is included in a previously registered list of allowed purpose codes, and if the processing purpose code is not included in the list of allowed purpose codes, the server may determine that the verification condition is not satisfied.

[0062] According to one embodiment, the processing key is a key for activating the operation of a processing infrastructure that performs de-identification processing, and can be implemented in various forms. According to one embodiment, the processing key may be a symmetric key or an asymmetric key. For example, the processing key may be a symmetric key of length 128 bits, 192 bits, or 256 bits according to the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm, or at least one of an asymmetric key pair according to RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). However, not limited to these examples, the processing key may correspond to various types of keys for activating the operation of the processing infrastructure or opening access to protected resources.

[0063] According to one embodiment, the processing key may be implemented in the form of an access token that grants access rights to the processing infrastructure. For example, the processing key may be an access token in the form of a JSON Web Token (JWT), and the access token may include a header, a payload, and a signature. According to one embodiment, the payload may include at least one of an identifier of the event to be processed, an identifier of the processing infrastructure, an allowed processing range, and a validity period of the token. The processing infrastructure may verify the signature of the access token and perform de-identification processing within the allowed processing range specified in the payload.

[0064] According to one embodiment, the processing key may be stored in a memory (e.g., memory (131) of FIG. 1) in an encrypted state. According to one embodiment, the processing key may be composed of a data structure including a key identifier, a key material, a key type, and a key validity period, and the key material may not be stored in a plaintext state but may be stored wrapped by a wrapping key. According to one embodiment, at least one of the key wrapping the key material or the release key for decrypting the processing key may be managed by a hardware security module (HSM) or a key management service (KMS).

[0065] According to one embodiment, the processing key may include a plurality of step processing keys, and each step processing key may be distinguished by a key identifier. For example, the processing key may include a first step processing key corresponding to de-identification processing, a second step processing key corresponding to envelope encryption, and a third step processing key corresponding to the creation of a secure image data object. Table 1 below shows an exemplary data structure of the processing key.

[0066] key Example of value key_id PK-2026-0312-001 key_type AES-256 stage DEIDENTIFICATION case_id CASE-77231 wrapped_key 0x9f2a... (Key body wrapped by the wrapping key) valid_until 2026-03-12T18:00:00Z

[0068] According to one embodiment, access rights to the processing infrastructure are opened only when the processing key is released, and may remain closed when the processing key is not released. According to one embodiment, opening access rights to the processing infrastructure may include at least one of allowing the original image to be imported into the processing infrastructure, activating the anonymization processing function of the processing infrastructure, or providing credentials for the processing infrastructure to access the original image. According to one embodiment, if the processing key is implemented in the form of an access token, the processing infrastructure may verify the signature of the access token and perform anonymization processing within the allowed processing range specified in the payload of the access token.

[0069] According to one embodiment, access to the processing infrastructure may be controlled according to Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). For example, the server (101) may allow or restrict access to the processing infrastructure according to a pre-assigned role grade to the processing entity performing the de-identification processing. According to one embodiment, encryption of stored data may be applied to data processed within the processing infrastructure, and encryption of the transmission path may be applied to data transmission between the processing infrastructure and the server (101). However, access control and data protection for the processing infrastructure may be performed in various ways, not limited to these examples.

[0070] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may release a processing key corresponding to the de-identification process only when a verification condition is satisfied. According to one embodiment, the release of the processing key may include at least one of decrypting the processing key stored in the memory (131) in an encrypted state using a release key derived based on the verification result to convert the key body into a usable state, or issuing a processing key in the form of an access token and providing it to the processing infrastructure. That is, since the satisfaction of the verification condition is combined with the decryption or issuance condition of the processing key, if the verification condition is not satisfied, the processing key is not converted into a usable state and thus the de-identification process cannot be performed. According to one embodiment, as the processing key is released, the server (101) may open the access rights of the processing infrastructure to the original image. According to one embodiment, if the processing key includes a plurality of step-by-step processing keys, the server (101) may sequentially release the corresponding step-by-step processing keys when the prerequisite condition of each processing step is satisfied. Since the processing infrastructure does not operate unless the processing key is released, the lawful completion of the entrustment procedure acts as a technical lock on the execution of de-identification processing.

[0071] According to one embodiment, if the server (101) determines that the verification result of the electronic signature of the entrusted certification document does not satisfy a predetermined verification condition, it may refuse to release the processing key and maintain the access rights of the processing infrastructure to the original image in an unopened state. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may determine that the verification condition is not satisfied if at least one of the following applies: the electronic signature is not verified with the public key of a legitimate signer; the hash value of the entrusted certification document does not match the hash value of the signature target; at least one of the entrustment period information, processing purpose code, and destruction deadline information is not included in the entrusted certification document; or the timestamp is not included within the valid interval. Since the processing infrastructure does not operate unless the processing key is released, the lawful completion of the entrustment procedure acts as a technical locking mechanism for the performance of de-identification processing.

[0072] According to one embodiment, if the release of the processing key is refused, the server (101) may transmit information regarding the reason for refusal to the user device (100) through the communication module (111). According to one embodiment, the information regarding the reason for refusal may indicate at least one of a failure in electronic signature verification, a missing required data field, a violation of the timestamp validity period, or a mismatch in the processing purpose code. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may transmit a message requesting supplementation of the entrustment certificate document along with the information regarding the reason for refusal to the user device (100), and if the user device (100) transmits the supplemented entrustment certificate document again, the server may perform verification again on the supplemented entrustment certificate document. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may record the verification result of the entrustment certificate document and whether the processing key is released as a verification log, and the verification log may include the verification date and time, the hash value of the document to be verified, and the verification result.

[0073] According to one embodiment, with reference to FIG. 3, the server (101) performs a verification condition determination (320) for a consignment certificate document (310), and if the verification condition is satisfied, it opens access rights to the processing infrastructure according to the processing key release (330), and if the verification condition is not satisfied, it keeps the processing infrastructure closed according to the release refusal (340).

[0074] Hereinafter, an exemplary scenario of the operation of 201 is described with reference to FIG. 2. However, such a scenario is merely an example to aid in understanding the present invention and does not limit the scope of the present invention.

[0075] According to one embodiment, it is assumed that a scene suspected of school violence in the school hallway is captured by a closed-circuit television installed at A Middle School, and the captured video is requested as deliberation material by the School Violence Countermeasures Deliberation Committee. In this case, the user device (100) of A Middle School corresponding to the personal information processor may transmit to the server (101) a document proving entrustment that includes the entrustment start time "2026-03-01T09:00:00Z", entrustment end time "2026-06-30T18:00:00Z", processing purpose code "SVC_REVIEW", destruction deadline "2026-07-31T23:59:59Z", and the electronic signature of A Middle School, along with the original video. The server (101) can calculate a hash value by applying a SHA-256 hash function to the body of the entrustment certificate document, verify the electronic signature with the public key of A Middle School, and determine whether the entrustment period information, processing purpose code, and destruction deadline information are all provided, and whether the timestamp is included within the valid period of the entrustment period. If all of the above items are satisfied and the verification conditions are satisfied, the server (101) releases the processing key corresponding to the de-identification processing to open access rights to the processing infrastructure and can proceed to operation 203.

[0076] According to another example, it is assumed that the destruction deadline information is missing from the entrustment certificate of A Middle School. In this case, the server (101) determines that the second condition is not satisfied and decides that the verification condition is not satisfied, refuses to release the processing key to keep the access rights to the processing infrastructure closed, and can transmit information regarding the reason for refusal indicating "missing required data field" to the user device (100) of A Middle School. According to yet another example, if the timestamp attached to the entrustment certificate is recorded as "2026-02-20T09:00:00Z" which is prior to the entrustment start time, the server (101) determines that the timestamp is not included within the valid period and refuses to release the processing key. According to another example, if the entrusted certificate document is forged or altered and the hash value of the entrusted certificate document does not match the hash value of the signature target included in the electronic signature, the server (101) may determine that the first condition is not satisfied and transmit rejection reason information indicating "electronic signature verification failure" to the user device (100).

[0078] In operation 203, according to various embodiments, a server (101) (e.g., processor (121) of FIG. 1) can generate a de-identified image by performing de-identification processing on a person object included in the original image through a processing infrastructure activated by a released processing key.

[0079] As used in this specification, "de-identified image" refers to an image processed to make it difficult to identify identification elements included in the original image. As used in this specification, "person object" refers to an object corresponding to a person displayed in the original image, and "identification element" refers to an element capable of identifying an individual from the person object, and may include at least one of a face, an iris, or other physical characteristics capable of identifying an individual. According to one embodiment, the de-identified image may be an image in which the identification elements of the person object are de-identified, while the outer silhouette of the person object and location information within the frame are preserved. As the outer silhouette of the person object and location information within the frame are preserved, the de-identified image can preserve the context of actions regarding where and how the person object moved and what actions it performed, while processing personal information to make it unidentifiable. However, the de-identified image is not limited to this example and may correspond to various types of images in which the identification elements of the original image are de-identified.

[0080] According to one embodiment, the server (101) can perform de-identification processing through a processing infrastructure activated by a released processing key. According to one embodiment, since the processing infrastructure is not activated when the processing key is not released, the server (101) can perform de-identification processing only when the processing key is released. According to one embodiment, if the processing key is implemented in the form of an access token, the server (101) can perform de-identification processing within the allowed processing range specified in the payload of the access token, whereby the activated processing infrastructure verifies the signature of the access token.

[0081] According to one embodiment, the server (101) can detect person objects from a plurality of frames of an original image. According to one embodiment, the server (101) can detect person objects from each frame using an object detection model and calculate a bounding box or segmentation mask representing the area of ​​the detected person objects. The object detection model may be, for example, a convolutional neural network (CNN)-based object detection model. However, the detection of person objects may be performed by various types of image analysis techniques, not limited to such examples.

[0082] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may assign the same unique identifier (ID) to the same person object across frames. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may track the same person object across multiple frames using an object tracking technique and assign the same unique identifier to the tracked person object. As a consistent unique identifier is assigned to the same person object, de-identification processing can be consistently applied across multiple frames. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may maintain the same unique identifier based on the external features or movement trajectory of the person object even when the person object is temporarily obscured by another object or moves out of the frame and then reappears.

[0083] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may apply dynamic masking that is updated every frame according to the tracking result of the person object to a specific area including the facial region of an object designated as a protected target among the detected person objects. According to one embodiment, dynamic masking refers to masking in which the location and size of the area to which the masking is applied are updated every frame according to the movement of the person object. As dynamic masking is applied, the masking may follow the person object so that identification elements are not exposed even if the person object moves. According to one embodiment, de-identification of identification elements may include at least one of masking, blurring, pixelation, or replacement with a substitute object for the area of ​​the identification element. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may de-identify the facial region of the person object while preserving skeletal information indicating the posture and movement of the person object.

[0084] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may apply different strengths and methods of de-identification processing depending on the type of person object. For example, the server (101) may apply strong de-identification to person objects corresponding to third parties or minors designated as protected subjects, and apply relatively weak de-identification or not apply de-identification to person objects corresponding to parties to the incident. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may determine the strengths and methods of de-identification processing for each person object based on information of parties to the incident or information of protected subjects recorded in the entrustment certificate document.

[0085] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may apply dynamic masking in contrast to the case where static masking is applied. Static masking is a method of applying masking to a fixed area within an image, and there may be a problem in that identification elements outside the masking area are exposed when a person object moves, or unnecessary masking occurs even in areas where the person object is not located. In contrast, dynamic masking according to one embodiment updates the masking area every frame according to the tracking result of the person object, so it is possible to prevent the exposure of identification elements while ensuring that the context of the action is not damaged.

[0086] As used in this specification, "behavioral metadata" refers to structured data that represents the behavioral context of a person object, extracted from an original image and corresponding to a de-identified image. According to one embodiment, the behavioral metadata may include at least one of frame-by-frame movement path coordinates and behavior type for each unique identifier (ID) of the person object.

[0087] According to one embodiment, behavioral metadata is intended to preserve the context of behavior regarding where and how a person object moved and what actions it performed, even when identification elements such as the face of a person object are de-identified and identification becomes difficult. Additionally, the behavioral metadata is intended to have its hash value included in the manifest described below and used to verify the integrity and evidentiary value of the security video data object.

[0088] According to one embodiment, the types of behavior metadata may include at least one of the following. According to one embodiment, the behavior metadata may include movement path coordinates indicating the frame-by-frame location of a person object. According to one embodiment, the behavior metadata may include behavior types (e.g., walking, stopping, approaching, or contacting) classified according to a predetermined classification system for the actions of a person object. According to one embodiment, the behavior metadata may include information regarding spatial relationships or interactions between a plurality of person objects. According to one embodiment, the behavior metadata may include frame identifiers or time information corresponding to each piece of information. According to one embodiment, the behavior metadata may further include skeleton information indicating the pose of a person object. However, not limited to these examples, the behavior metadata may correspond to various types of data indicating the behavioral context of a person object.

[0089] According to one embodiment, behavioral metadata may be utilized for at least one of the following purposes. According to one embodiment, behavioral metadata becomes a component of a security video data object together with an unidentified image, and its hash value is included in a manifest and can be used to verify whether the security video data object has been tampered with. According to one embodiment, behavioral metadata may be processed into an event flow behavior summary document summarizing the flow of events and the actions of person objects, and provided to an evidence examination agency. According to one embodiment, behavioral metadata is encrypted and inserted into a data insertion area set within the unidentified image, so that it can be used to verify whether the unidentified image has been tampered with using only the unidentified image itself, without a separate original image.

[0090] According to one embodiment, the server (101) can extract behavioral metadata from the original image during the process of generating a de-identified image in operation 203. According to one embodiment, the server (101) can extract behavioral metadata by calculating frame-by-frame movement path coordinates for each unique identifier based on the tracking results of the person object, and by analyzing the behavior of the person object to determine the type of behavior. The extracted behavioral metadata is processed together with the de-identified image in operation 205 described later, and in operation 207, its hash value can be included in the manifest and bound as a security image data object.

[0091] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may perform de-identification processing within the processing infrastructure to prevent the original image from being leaked to the outside during the process of performing de-identification processing, and remove the original image from the processing infrastructure after the de-identification processing is completed. According to one embodiment, if an error occurs during the de-identification processing, the server (101) may discard the intermediate data being processed and record the fact of the error as an error log. As the intermediate data is discarded, the exposure of the image that has not been de-identified can be prevented.

[0092] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may record the application history of the de-identification process as a de-identification log. The de-identification log may include, for example, at least one of the number of de-identified person objects, the range of frames to which de-identification was applied, or the applied de-identification technique. As the de-identification log is recorded, the appropriateness of the de-identification process can be reviewed subsequently. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may also perform de-identification processing on the voice data of the original video, and, for example, may modulate features that can identify an individual from the voice or remove the voice of a specific speaker.

[0093] Hereinafter, an exemplary scenario of the operation of 203 is described with reference to FIG. 2. However, such a scenario is merely an example to aid in understanding the present invention and does not limit the scope of the present invention.

[0094] According to one embodiment, it is assumed that in operation 201, the verification condition for the entrustment certificate of A Middle School is satisfied and the processing key is released. The server (101) activates the processing infrastructure based on the released processing key and can detect human objects from multiple frames of the original video of the school hallway. The server (101) assigns unique identifiers "ID_001", "ID_002", and "ID_003" to each of the detected multiple human objects and can maintain the same unique identifier for the same human object across frames. The server (101) can generate a de-identified image by applying dynamic masking that is updated per frame to the facial area of ​​the human object ("ID_003") corresponding to the third party designated as the protected target, while preserving the outer silhouette and location information within the frame of the human object. At this time, the server (101) can apply different levels of de-identification to the human objects ("ID_001", "ID_002") corresponding to the party to the incident based on the information recorded in the entrustment certificate.

[0095] According to another example, when a person object ("ID_003") is temporarily obscured by another person object and then reappears, the server (101) may maintain the same unique identifier ("ID_003") based on the movement trajectory and external features of the person object and continuously apply dynamic masking to the facial area of ​​the person object that reappears. Through this, the continuity of de-identification can be maintained so that identification elements are not exposed even when the person object is temporarily obscured. The generated de-identified image is encrypted with an event-specific data encryption key in operation 205, and the extracted behavior metadata can be included in a manifest in operation 207 and combined into a secure image data object.

[0097] In operation 205, according to various embodiments, the server (101) (e.g., the processor (121) of FIG. 1) may encrypt the de-identified image with an event-specific data encryption key and wrap the event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key combined with a predetermined viewing policy condition.

[0098] As used in this specification, "incident-specific data encryption key (DEK)" refers to a key for encrypting de-identified images, which is generated individually for each event identifier. As used in this specification, "wrapping key" refers to a key for wrapping the incident-specific data encryption key. As used in this specification, "wrapping" refers to encrypting one key with another key, and "unwrapping" refers to decrypting the wrapped key to restore the original key. A dual-key structure in which a de-identified image is encrypted with the incident-specific data encryption key and the incident-specific data encryption key is wrapped with the wrapping key may be referred to as envelope encryption. According to one embodiment, with reference to FIG. 4, a de-identified image (430) is encrypted with an event-specific data encryption key (420), the event-specific data encryption key (420) is wrapped with a wrapping key (410), and the hash value of a viewing policy condition (440) can be bound to additional authenticated data (AAD) for wrapping. That is, as shown in FIG. 4, a nested structure is formed in which the de-identified image (430) is wrapped by the event-specific data encryption key (420) and the event-specific data encryption key (420) is wrapped again by the wrapping key (410), and when the viewing policy condition (440) is changed, unwrapping may fail due to a mismatch in the additional authenticated data.

[0099] According to one embodiment, the server (101) can generate an event-specific data encryption key for each event identifier. According to one embodiment, the server (101) can generate an event-specific data encryption key using a random number generator, and the event-specific data encryption key may be a symmetric key according to a symmetric key encryption algorithm. For example, the event-specific data encryption key may be a symmetric key of 256 bits in length according to the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm. As individual event-specific data encryption keys are generated for each event identifier, even if the event-specific data encryption key of a specific event is exposed or destroyed, it does not affect the de-identified images of other events, and verifiable destruction at the event unit by the destruction of the event-specific data encryption key is possible in the operation 209 described below.

[0100] According to one embodiment, the server (101) can generate an encrypted de-identified image by encrypting the de-identified image with an event-specific data encryption key. According to one embodiment, the server (101) can encrypt the de-identified image according to an authentication encryption mode. For example, the server (101) can encrypt the de-identified image according to an authentication encryption mode such as Galois / Counter mode (GCM) to generate an authentication tag for integrity verification simultaneously with the encryption. According to one embodiment, the server (101) can generate an initialization vector when encrypting the de-identified image and store it together with the encrypted de-identified image, and the initialization vector can be generated with a different value for each encryption. Since the initialization vector is generated differently for each encryption, the ciphertext can be different each time even if the same event-specific data encryption key is used.

[0101] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may divide the de-identified image into a plurality of segments and individually encrypt each segment with an event-specific data encryption key. As the de-identified image is divided into a plurality of segments and encrypted, the server (101) may decrypt and provide only the segment corresponding to the requested section in response to a viewing request described below, and may support partial viewing without decrypting the entire de-identified image.

[0102] As used in this specification, "viewing policy conditions" refers to a set of conditions for allowing the viewing of a de-identified image. According to one embodiment, the viewing policy conditions may be defined as a combination of at least one of a viewing period, a range of source IP addresses for which viewing is permitted, a user authentication renewal period, whether the processing purpose code matches, and a cumulative viewing limit. According to one embodiment, the viewing period may be information indicating the period for which viewing of the de-identified image is permitted; the range of source IP addresses may be information limiting the network sources for which viewing requests are permitted; the user authentication renewal period may be information indicating the period during which the viewing subject must perform re-authentication; the whether the processing purpose code matches may be a condition indicating whether the purpose of the viewing request matches the processing purpose stated in the consignment certificate; and the cumulative viewing limit may be information indicating the upper limit of the cumulative number of times the de-identified image can be viewed. However, not limited to these examples, viewing policy conditions may correspond to various types of conditions for controlling the viewing of de-identified images.

[0103] [Table 2] below shows the data fields, descriptions, and example values ​​of the viewing policy conditions combined with the wrapping key.

[0104] data fields explanation Example value view_deadline Viewing period 2026-07-31T23:59:59Z allowed_ip_range Range of source IP addresses allowed for viewing 203.0.113.0 / 24 auth_renewal User authentication renewal cycle 24 hours purpose_match Whether the processing purpose code matches SVC_REVIEW max_views Cumulative viewing limit 5

[0106] Referring to [Table 2], according to one embodiment, each data field of the viewing policy condition corresponds to an individual condition for allowing viewing of a de-identified image, and if the corresponding value of the request context described below satisfies the standard value of each data field, the condition may be determined to be satisfied. However, the data fields, descriptions, and example values ​​in [Table 2] are merely examples to aid in understanding the present invention and do not limit the scope of the present invention.

[0107] According to one embodiment, at least some of the viewing policy conditions may be derived from the entrustment certificate document. For example, the viewing period may be set from the entrustment period information or destruction period information of the entrustment certificate document, and the condition regarding whether the processing purpose code matches may be set from the processing purpose code of the entrustment certificate document. As the viewing policy conditions are derived from the entrustment certificate document, consistency between the viewing control and the entrustment procedure can be ensured. According to one embodiment, at least some of the viewing policy conditions may be set or changed at the request of the administrator of the server (101) or the entrustor.

[0108] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may wrap an event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key combined with a predetermined viewing policy condition. According to one embodiment, the wrapping key may include at least one of a key according to an asymmetric key encryption algorithm, or a master key managed by a hardware security module (HSM) or a key management service (KMS). According to one embodiment, the server (101) may generate a wrapped data encryption key by wrapping the event-specific data encryption key according to a key wrapping algorithm (e.g., AES Key Wrap according to RFC 3394). As the event-specific data encryption key is wrapped with the wrapping key, the event-specific data encryption key is not exposed in plaintext unless unwrapping by the wrapping key is performed, and thus, decryption of the encrypted de-identified image is impossible.

[0109] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may bind the hash value of the viewing policy condition as additional authentication data for wrapping the event-specific data encryption key. According to one embodiment, the server (101) serializes the viewing policy condition and applies a hash function to the serialized viewing policy condition to calculate the hash value of the viewing policy condition, and may input the calculated hash value as additional authentication data when wrapping the event-specific data encryption key. The additional authentication data is data that is not subject to encryption but is subject to integrity verification, and may function to cause unwrapping to fail if the additional authentication data does not match the additional authentication data at the time of wrapping when unwrapping.

[0110] According to one embodiment, the server (101) can cause the unwrapping of the event-specific data encryption key to fail because, as the hash value of the viewing policy condition is bound with additional authentication data, if the viewing policy condition is changed, the hash value calculated from the changed viewing policy condition does not match the hash value bound during wrapping. That is, since the viewing policy condition and the event-specific data encryption key are cryptographically bound, if the viewing policy condition is arbitrarily changed or bypassed, the event-specific data encryption key cannot be unwrapped, and thus the decryption of the anonymized image is blocked. Through this, the control of viewing the anonymized image is enforced at the encryption layer rather than through the authorization check of the application layer, thereby preventing unauthorized viewing through bypassing the application layer.

[0111] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may further bind the hash value of the entrusted source information as additional authentication data in addition to the hash value of the viewing policy condition when wrapping the event-specific data encryption key. In this case, since unwrapping fails when the entrusted source information changes, the binding between the event-specific data encryption key and the entrusted source information may be further strengthened. According to one embodiment, when the server (101) applies different viewing policy conditions to multiple viewing subjects, it may wrap the event-specific data encryption key multiple times using a wrapping key corresponding to each viewing subject.

[0112] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may store a wrapped data encryption key and an encrypted de-identified image in memory (e.g., memory (131) of FIG. 1). According to one embodiment, the event-specific data encryption key may not be stored in memory (131) in plaintext, but may be stored in a wrapped state. Since only the wrapped data encryption key is stored in memory (131), the event-specific data encryption key cannot be restored unless the wrapping key is exposed, even if memory (131) is exposed to the outside, thus ensuring the confidentiality of the de-identified image.

[0113] Hereinafter, an exemplary scenario of the operation of 205 is described with reference to FIG. 2. However, such a scenario is merely an example to aid in understanding the present invention and does not limit the scope of the present invention.

[0114] According to one embodiment, assume a case where a de-identified image of the original image of the school hallway is generated in operation 203. The server (101) may generate an event-specific data encryption key of 256 bits in length corresponding to the event identifier "CASE-77231", and encrypt the de-identified image according to Galois / Counter mode to generate an authentication tag together. The server (101) may set viewing policy conditions including a viewing period "2026-07-31T23:59:59Z", a range of source IP addresses allowed to view "203.0.113.0 / 24", a user authentication renewal cycle "24 hours", a processing purpose code "SVC_REVIEW", and a cumulative viewing limit "5 times". The server (101) serializes the viewing policy conditions to calculate the hash value, wraps the event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key managed by a key management service, and can bind the calculated hash value as additional authentication data. The server (101) can store the wrapped data encryption key and the encrypted de-identified image in memory (131).

[0115] According to another example, assume a case where an unauthorized entity attempts to repeatedly view a de-identified video by arbitrarily changing the cumulative viewing limit from "5 times" to "50 times". In this case, since the hash value calculated from the changed viewing policy conditions does not match the hash value bound during wrapping, the unwrapping of the event-specific data encryption key fails, and therefore the encrypted de-identified video cannot be decrypted. According to yet another example, if the School Violence Countermeasures Deliberation Committee and the Administrative Appeals Committee are the respective viewing entities for a single de-identified video, the server (101) can wrap the event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key corresponding to each institution, thereby applying different viewing policy conditions to each institution.

[0117] In operation 207, according to various embodiments, a server (101) (e.g., processor (121) of FIG. 1) may construct a hash chain by concatenating a manifest containing hash values ​​of each of the encrypted de-identified image and the behavior metadata corresponding to the de-identified image and the consignment source information identified from the consignment certificate document with the hash value of the preceding manifest, create a secure image data object by adding a timestamp signature to the hash chain, and provide a decrypted de-identified image by unwrapping the event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key when the request context corresponding to the viewing request received through the communication module (111) satisfies the viewing policy conditions.

[0118] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may calculate a component-specific hash value by applying a hash function (e.g., SHA-256) to each of the encrypted de-identified image and the behavior metadata corresponding to the de-identified image. According to one embodiment, the component-specific hash value is a value representing the integrity of the corresponding component, and since the calculated hash value changes if even a part of the component's data is changed, it can be used to verify whether each component has been tampered with.

[0119] As used in this specification, "manifest" refers to structured data comprising the hash value of each component constituting a security image data object and consignment source information. As used in this specification, "consignment source information" refers to information identified from a consignment certification document and may include at least one of a consignor identifier, an evidence examination agency identifier, a date and time of acquisition, and a destruction deadline.

[0120] [Table 3] below shows an exemplary structure of a manifest.

[0121] Manifest item explanation component_hashes Hash values ​​of each de-identified video and behavior metadata consignor_id Consignor Identifier reviewer_id Evidence Examination Agency Identifier acquired_at Securing time disposal_due Destruction deadline prev_hash Hash value of the previous manifest manifest_sig Digital signature for the manifest timestamp_sig Timestamp signature

[0123] Referring to [Table 3], according to one embodiment, the manifest may include, in addition to the hash values ​​of each component (component_hashes) and consignment source information (consignor_id, reviewer_id, acquired_at, disposal_due), the hash value of the previous manifest (prev_hash), the digital signature of the manifest (manifest_sig), and the timestamp signature (timestamp_sig). According to one embodiment, the manifest may be serialized into one of JSON, CBOR, or XML formats.

[0124] According to one embodiment, the server (101) can form a hash chain in which a plurality of manifests are sequentially connected by including the hash value of the immediately preceding manifest in the currently generated manifest. That is, if any manifest is changed, the hash value of that manifest changes, and the hash values ​​of all subsequent connected manifests change sequentially, thereby breaking the continuity of the hash chain. Therefore, the hash chain can be used to detect tampering with security image data objects and their history.

[0125] As used in this specification, "security image data object" refers to a data object that includes a de-identified image, wherein the authenticity, source, viewing rights, and disposal history of the de-identified image are cryptographically bound. According to one embodiment, a server (101) may receive a timestamp signature issued by a timestamp agency server (e.g., the second external electronic device (104) of FIG. 1) through a communication module (111) and create a security image data object by adding the timestamp signature to a hash chain. Since the security image data object combines the de-identified image and its verification and control information into a single unit that is not separated, the integrity and source of the de-identified image can be verified solely by the security image data object itself without a separate original image.

[0126] According to one embodiment, with reference to FIG. 5, a security image data object (510) may include an encrypted de-identified image (520), behavior metadata (530), and a manifest (540). According to one embodiment, the manifest (540) forms a hash chain in which the previous manifest N-1 (550) and the current manifest N (560) are each connected by the hash value (prev_hash) of the previous manifest, and the destruction log (570) is connected to the manifest N (560), and a timestamp signature (580) may be added to the hash chain. That is, as illustrated in FIG. 5, the manifest N-1 (550), the manifest N (560), and the destruction log (570) are sequentially connected by prev_hash, so if any one is changed, the subsequent hash values ​​change sequentially, and the continuity of the hash chain is broken.

[0127] [Table 4] below shows an exemplary data structure of a security video data object.

[0128] key Example of value object_id SVDO-2026-0312-001 case_id CASE-77231 enc_video De-identified images encrypted with event-specific data encryption keys components { video_hash, behavior_meta_hash} consignor_id SCHOOL-1001 reviewer_id REVIEW-COMMITTEE-A acquired_at 2026-03-12T10:20:00Z disposal_due 2026-07-31T23:59:59Z prev_hash 0x9af1c2... manifest_sig 0x3045... timestamp_sig TSA:2026-03-12T10:21:03Z:0x77ab...

[0130] Referring to [Table 4], according to one embodiment, a security video data object may be composed of a single container including an object identifier (object_id), a case identifier (case_id), a de-identified video (enc_video) encrypted with a case-specific data encryption key, hash values ​​of components (components), consignment source information (consignor_id, reviewer_id, acquired_at, disposal_due), hash values ​​of the previous manifest (prev_hash), a digital signature for the manifest (manifest_sig), and a timestamp signature (timestamp_sig). However, the data structure of [Table 4] is merely an example and does not limit the scope of the present invention.

[0131] According to one embodiment, a server (101) may receive a request to view a de-identified image from a device of an evidence examination agency (e.g., a first external electronic device (102) or a second external electronic device (104) of FIG. 1) through a communication module (111). As used herein, "request context" refers to information corresponding to a request to view, and according to one embodiment, may include at least one of a real-time reception time, a request source IP address, a last authentication time, a requester's authority level, a request object code, and a cumulative number of views.

[0132] [Table 5] below shows examples of condition items, operations, and criteria values ​​for determining whether a request context satisfies the viewing policy conditions.

[0133] Condition items calculation Reference value request_time ∈ [Viewing Start, Viewing Period] ~ 2026-07-31T23:59:59Z source_ip ∈ (range of source IP addresses) 203.0.113.0 / 24 last_auth Current time - Last authentication time < Update cycle < 24 hours purpose_code = SVC_REVIEW view_count < 5

[0135] Referring to [Table 5], according to one embodiment, the server (101) determines whether each value of the request context satisfies the standard value of the corresponding condition item according to the operation, and if all condition items are satisfied, it can determine that the request context satisfies the viewing policy condition.

[0136] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may unwrap the event-specific data encryption key with the wrapping key when the request context satisfies the viewing policy condition, decrypt the de-identified image encrypted with the unwrapped event-specific data encryption key, and provide it to the device of the evidence examination agency through the communication module (111). According to one embodiment, if the hash value of the viewing policy condition in operation 205 is bound with additional authentication data, the server (101) may input the hash value calculated from the current viewing policy condition as additional authentication data during unwrapping, and allow unwrapping to succeed only if the input additional authentication data matches the additional authentication data bound during wrapping.

[0137] According to one embodiment, the request context includes a real-time reception time, a request source IP address, and a last authentication time. If at least one of the following conditions is met, the server (101) may refuse to unwrap the event-specific data encryption key and record an access log containing information on the reason for refusal of access and information on the requester's identification in a hash chain. According to one embodiment, the information on the reason for refusal of access may indicate at least one of the following: expiration of the access period, violation of the source IP address range, expiration of the user authentication renewal period, mismatch in the processing purpose code, or exceeding the cumulative access limit. As the access log is recorded in the hash chain, the history of unauthorized access attempts is preserved in an tamper-proof form, enabling subsequent audit tracking.

[0138] According to one embodiment, the server (101) can package a security image data object into a single container file. According to one embodiment, the single container may include an encrypted de-identified image, behavior metadata, a manifest, and a timestamp signature as separate sections, and may include an index in the header of the container that records the offset and size of each section. As it is packaged into a single container, the components of the security image data object can be stored and transmitted without being separated.

[0139] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may perform normalization when serializing the manifest. For example, the server (101) may sort the data fields of the manifest in a predetermined order, unify the whitespace and character encodings, and then calculate a hash value. Since the hash value is calculated after the manifest is normalized, a consistent hash value is calculated for the semantically identical manifest, thereby preventing verification failures caused by differences in serialization methods.

[0140] According to one embodiment, when the server (101) calculates the hash value of the behavior metadata, it may sort the behavior metadata based on the frame identifier and then calculate the hash value. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may divide the behavior metadata into multiple segments and calculate the hash value of each segment, and then include the root hash value of a Merkle tree with the hash value of each segment as a leaf node in the manifest. In this case, the integrity of only a specific segment of the behavior metadata can be efficiently verified.

[0141] According to one embodiment, when adding a timestamp signature, the server (101) transmits the hash value of the latest manifest of the hash chain to a timestamp authority server (e.g., the second external electronic device (104) of FIG. 1) and receives a timestamp token for the hash value from the timestamp authority server and adds it to the hash chain. According to one embodiment, the timestamp token may be a timestamp token according to RFC 3161. According to one embodiment, if the timestamp token is not received from the timestamp authority server, the server (101) may retry a predetermined number of times, and if it is not received even after the retry, it may withhold the creation of the security image data object and notify that fact.

[0142] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may add a timestamp signature for each of the creation time, viewing time, and disposal time of the security video data object. As a timestamp signature is added for each time point, the time at which each stage of the processing lifecycle of the security video data object occurred can be objectively proven.

[0143] According to one embodiment, when the server (101) receives a viewing request, it can verify the identity and authority level of the requester by verifying an authentication token attached to the viewing request. According to one embodiment, the authentication token may be a token issued by an authentication system of an evidence examination institution, and the server (101) can verify the signature and validity period of the authentication token. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may require multi-factor authentication in response to the viewing request, and can determine whether the request context satisfies the viewing policy conditions only when multi-factor authentication is completed.

[0144] According to one embodiment, if the request context satisfies the viewing policy conditions, the server (101) decrypts and provides a de-identified image, and may provide the de-identified image with a watermark indicating viewer identification information and the viewing time. According to one embodiment, the watermark may be an invisible watermark that is not identifiable by the human eye. As the watermark is added to the provided de-identified image, even if the provided de-identified image is leaked externally, the leakage path and the person responsible for the leakage can be traced.

[0145] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may provide a de-identified image through a temporary viewing session. According to one embodiment, the temporary viewing session expires after a predetermined time has elapsed, and the de-identified image is no longer viewed in the expired session. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may provide the de-identified image in a streaming manner, but may control it so that a copy of the de-identified image is not permanently stored on the viewing subject's device.

[0146] According to one embodiment, when segment-by-segment encryption is applied to a de-identified image, the server (101) may decrypt only the segment corresponding to the request section information included in the viewing request using an unwrapped event-by-event data encryption key and provide it. In this case, since the entire de-identified image is not decrypted, the exposure range of the de-identified image may be limited to the requested section.

[0147] According to one embodiment, when the server (101) provides a de-identified image in response to a viewing request, it may record a viewing log including the viewing date and time, the viewing subject, and the viewing scope in a hash chain. As the viewing log is recorded in the hash chain, the history of legitimate viewing is also preserved in an untamper-proof form, so that the viewing status of the de-identified image can be audited afterward. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may aggregate access logs and viewing logs at predetermined intervals to generate viewing statistics and provide the viewing statistics to the client's device (e.g., user device (100) of FIG. 1).

[0148] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may temporarily suspend viewing even if the request context satisfies the viewing policy conditions, if it exceeds a predetermined limit on the number of simultaneous views. As the limit on the number of simultaneous views is applied, it is possible to prevent excessive exposure of the de-identified image by preventing multiple views from occurring simultaneously.

[0149] According to one embodiment, when the server (101) records an access log in a hash chain, it may include at least a portion of the real-time reception time and request context in addition to information on the reason for refusal of access and information on the requester's identification in the access log. According to one embodiment, if the server (101) receives a refusal of access more than a predetermined number of times from the same requester, it may add the requester's identification information to a blocking list for access, and may refuse unwrapping for access requests from requesters included in the blocking list without determining the request context. Through this, repeated unauthorized access attempts can be efficiently blocked.

[0150] Below, additional example scenarios of operation 207 are described with reference to FIG. 2. However, these scenarios are merely examples to aid in understanding the invention and do not limit the scope of the invention.

[0151] According to one embodiment, it is assumed that a member of the School Violence Countermeasures Deliberation Committee wishes to view only a specific section of a de-identified video. The member's device may transmit a viewing request to a server (101) that includes the requested section information "00:03:00 to 00:05:00". If the server (101) determines that the request context satisfies the viewing policy conditions, it may unwrap the event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key, decrypt only the segment corresponding to the requested section, and provide the de-identified video with an invisible watermark indicating the member's identification information and the viewing time through a temporary viewing session. The server (101) may record a viewing log regarding the viewing in a hash chain.

[0152] According to another example, assume a case where the same unauthorized requester repeatedly sends a request to view a de-identified image from a source outside the range of a legitimate source IP address. For each request, the server (101) determines that the request source IP address does not fall within the range of source IP addresses included in the viewing policy conditions, refuses to unwrap the event-specific data encryption key, and records an access log in a hash chain that includes information on the reason for refusal of viewing indicating "violation of source IP address range," the requester identification information, and the real-time reception time. If the refusal of viewing by the requester is repeated more than a predetermined number of times, the server (101) adds the requester's identification information to a viewing blocking list and subsequently refuses to unwrap for the requester's viewing requests without determining the request context.

[0153] According to another example, assume a case where a dispute over the authenticity of a de-identified image arises and an evidence examination agency requests verification of the integrity of the security image data object. The server (101) can recalculate the hash values ​​of the encrypted de-identified image and the behavior metadata of the security image data object, compare them with the hash values ​​included in the manifest, verify the continuity of the hash chain and the timestamp signature, and provide the verification results as a verification report to the device of the evidence examination agency.

[0155] In operation 209, according to various embodiments, the server (101) (e.g., the processor (121) of FIG. 1) may destroy the event-specific data encryption key when a predetermined destruction condition is satisfied, thereby converting the de-identified image contained in the security image data object into an unrecoverable state, and record a destruction log containing key fingerprint information immediately before the destruction of the event-specific data encryption key in the hash chain.

[0156] As used in this specification, "destruction condition" refers to a condition under which the destruction of an unidentified image included in a security image data object must be performed. The destruction condition is intended to ensure that the unidentified image is destroyed in a timely manner upon the achievement of the processing purpose or the expiration of the retention period, thereby preventing the unnecessary retention of high-risk data and ensuring that the destruction obligation under laws and regulations regarding personal information protection is technically fulfilled. According to one embodiment, the destruction condition may be satisfied when the current time exceeds the deadline indicated by the destruction deadline information included in the consignment certificate. According to one embodiment, the destruction condition may be satisfied when a destruction request signal is received from a user device (100) or a device of an evidence examination agency through a communication module (e.g., the communication module (111) of FIG. 1). According to one embodiment, the destruction condition may be satisfied when the cumulative number of views reaches the cumulative number of views limit, or when it is determined that the processing purpose stated in the consignment certificate has been achieved. However, the destruction condition is not limited to these examples and may correspond to various types of conditions requiring the destruction of the unidentified image.

[0157] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may periodically determine whether the destruction conditions are satisfied. For example, the server (101) may determine whether the destruction conditions are satisfied by comparing the destruction deadline information of a security image data object stored in memory (e.g., memory (131) of FIG. 1) at a predetermined period with the current time. According to another embodiment, the server (101) may determine whether the destruction conditions are satisfied based on an event when a destruction request signal is received. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may send a notice of scheduled destruction to a user device (100) or a device of an evidence examination agency at a predetermined time before the destruction conditions are satisfied, so that necessary measures are performed before destruction.

[0158] As used in this specification, "key fingerprint information" refers to information for identifying an event-specific data encryption key, which can verify the identity of the key without exposing the event-specific data encryption key itself. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may generate key fingerprint information by applying a hash function (e.g., SHA-256) to the event-specific data encryption key to be destroyed immediately before destroying the event-specific data encryption key. Since the key fingerprint information is generated as a hash value, the event-specific data encryption key itself cannot be restored from the key fingerprint information; therefore, the key fingerprint information can be used to verify the identity of the destroyed key afterward, but it cannot be used for reconstructing the key.

[0159] According to one embodiment, the server (101) may destroy the event-specific data encryption key when a destruction condition is met. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may destroy the wrapped data encryption key stored in memory (131) and all copies of the event-specific data encryption key existing in plaintext. According to one embodiment, if the event-specific data encryption key or the wrapped key is managed by a hardware security module (HSM) or a key management service (KMS), the server (101) may destroy the key by requesting the hardware security module or the key management service to destroy the key. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may overwrite the memory area where the event-specific data encryption key was stored with data of a predetermined pattern so that the destroyed event-specific data encryption key cannot be restored from memory. According to another embodiment, the server (101) may destroy the wrapping key so that the event-specific data encryption key wrapped with the wrapping key cannot be unwrapped.

[0160] According to one embodiment, as the event-specific data encryption key is destroyed, the encrypted anonymized image contained in the security image data object can no longer be decrypted and is therefore converted to a permanently unrecoverable state. According to one embodiment, since the anonymized image is contained in the security image data object while encrypted with the event-specific data encryption key, the anonymized image becomes undecryptable even without deleting the encrypted anonymized image itself due to the destruction of the event-specific data encryption key. This disposal method may be referred to as crypto-shredding. According to one embodiment, even if a backup or replica of the encrypted anonymized image exists, since no backup or replica can be decrypted once the event-specific data encryption key is destroyed, complete disposal can be achieved regardless of the existence of the backup or replica. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may additionally delete data of encrypted de-identified images to secure storage space after the destruction of the event-specific data encryption key, and in this case, the verifiability of destruction is guaranteed by the destruction of the event-specific data encryption key and the destruction log.

[0161] According to one embodiment, with reference to FIG. 6, an unidentified image (620) encrypted by an event-specific data encryption key (610) before destruction can be decrypted. However, when the event-specific data encryption key is destroyed in accordance with the destruction condition (630), the unidentified image (620) encrypted by DEK destruction (640) is converted to an unrecoverable state, and at this time, key fingerprint information immediately before destruction is calculated and included in the destruction log (650) and recorded in the hash chain. That is, as shown in FIG. 6, the unidentified image (620) encrypted by the destruction of the event-specific data encryption key (610) becomes a state where it cannot be decrypted even without deleting the unidentified image itself.

[0162] As used in this specification, "destruction log" refers to data containing information regarding the destruction of an event-specific data encryption key. According to one embodiment, a server (101) may generate a destruction log containing the destruction time and date of the event-specific data encryption key and key fingerprint information immediately prior to destruction, and may record the generated destruction log in a hash chain. According to one embodiment, in addition to the destruction time and date and key fingerprint information, the destruction log may further include at least one of the identifier of the event to be destroyed, the type of destruction condition that triggered the destruction, and the identifier of the entity that performed the destruction. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may record the destruction log as a block of the hash chain by concatenating it with the hash value of the preceding manifest. As the destruction log is recorded in the hash chain, the fact of destruction and the time of destruction are preserved in an untamper-proof form, so that the security image data object includes the entire history from the creation of the de-identified image to its destruction in a self-verifiable form.

[0163] [Table 6] below shows an exemplary data structure of a destruction log.

[0164] key Example of value log_type DISPOSAL case_id CASE-77231 disposed_at 2026-07-31T23:59:59Z key_fingerprint 0x4d2e... (Hash of the event-specific data encryption key just before destruction) trigger DUE_DATE_REACHED prev_hash 0xbe71c9...

[0166] Referring to [Table 6], according to one embodiment, the destruction log may include a log type (log_type), an identifier for the event to be destroyed (case_id), a time of destruction (disposed_at), key fingerprint information immediately before destruction (key_fingerprint), a type of destruction condition that triggered the destruction (trigger), and a hash value of the previous block (prev_hash). However, the data structure of [Table 6] is merely an example to aid in understanding the present invention and does not limit the scope of the present invention.

[0167] According to one embodiment, when the event-specific data encryption key is destroyed, the server (101) may generate a destruction completion report linked with identification information of a destruction confirmation certificate included in the entrusted certificate and transmit it to the device of the evidence examination agency through the communication module (111). According to one embodiment, the destruction completion report may include at least one of the destruction date and time, key fingerprint information, type of destruction condition, and identification information of the destruction confirmation certificate. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may include the hash value of the destruction log in the destruction completion report so that the destruction completion report is linked with the destruction log recorded in the hash chain. As the destruction completion report is transmitted linked with the identification information of the destruction confirmation certificate, the fact of destruction of the image and the time of destruction can be objectively verified by the evidence examination agency in conjunction with the destruction confirmation certificate in the entrustment procedure. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may transmit the destruction completion report not only to the device of the evidence examination agency but also to the device of the entrustor (e.g., user device (100) of FIG. 1).

[0168] According to one embodiment, when a server (101) receives a verification request signal for a security image data object, it may recalculate the hash values ​​of the de-identified image and the behavior metadata, respectively, compare them with the hash values ​​included in the manifest, and verify the continuity of the hash chain; if they do not match, it may determine that tampering has occurred. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may maintain the manifest and the hash chain even after the event-specific data encryption key has been destroyed. As the manifest and the hash chain are maintained, even if the de-identified image itself cannot be decrypted, the fact that the de-identified image was legally processed and disposed of can be verified retrospectively based on the destruction log recorded in the hash chain. That is, even after disposal, the evidentiary value regarding the legality of the processing and the history of disposal can be preserved.

[0169] According to one embodiment, if a predetermined destruction condition is not satisfied, the server (101) may not destroy the event-specific data encryption key and may maintain the security image data object in a state awaiting destruction. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may continue to store the event-specific data encryption key in a wrapped state in memory (131) while in the state awaiting destruction, and may provide a de-identified image in response to a viewing request that satisfies the viewing policy condition. According to one embodiment, if the server (101) receives a destruction hold request signal from a user device (100) or a device of an evidence examination agency before the destruction condition is satisfied, the server may withhold destruction even if the destruction condition is satisfied, and may record a destruction hold log including the reason for the destruction hold and the hold period in a hash chain. For example, since preservation of evidence may be required when a dispute is ongoing, destruction may be withheld according to the destruction hold request signal. According to one embodiment, the server (101) may re-determine whether the destruction condition is satisfied when the destruction hold period has elapsed or the destruction hold is released.

[0170] Hereinafter, an exemplary scenario of the operation of 209 is described with reference to FIG. 2. However, such a scenario is merely an example to aid in understanding the present invention and does not limit the scope of the present invention.

[0171] According to one embodiment, it is assumed that the destruction deadline "2026-07-31T23:59:59Z" of a security video data object corresponding to the event identifier "CASE-77231" has arrived. The server (101) may determine through periodic determination that the current time has passed the destruction deadline and thus determine that the destruction condition is satisfied. The server (101) may apply a SHA-256 hash function to the event-specific data encryption key to be destroyed to produce key fingerprint information, request the key management service to destroy the corresponding event-specific data encryption key, and destroy the wrapped data encryption key stored in memory (131). As the event-specific data encryption key is destroyed, the encrypted de-identified image contained in the security video data object is converted to an unrecoverable state. The server (101) can generate a destruction log including a log type "DISPOSAL", an event identifier "CASE-77231", a destruction date and time "2026-07-31T23:59:59Z", key fingerprint information, and a destruction condition type "DUE_DATE_REACHED", record it in a hash chain, and generate a destruction completion report linked with identification information of a destruction confirmation certificate included in a consignment certificate, and transmit it to the device of the School Violence Countermeasures Deliberation Committee and the user device (100) of A Middle School.

[0172] According to another example, assume a case where a destruction request signal is received from a user device (100) of A Middle School before the destruction deadline arrives, due to the early achievement of the processing purpose. Upon receiving the destruction request signal, the server (101) determines that the destruction conditions are satisfied, destroys the event-specific data encryption key to convert the de-identified image into an unrecoverable state, and can record the destruction log in the hash chain.

[0173] According to another example, assume a case where the deadline for destruction has arrived but an administrative appeal regarding the case is still ongoing, and a signal requesting a suspension of destruction is received from the device of the evidence examination agency. The server (101) may suspend destruction even though the deadline for destruction has passed, and record a log of suspension of destruction, including the reason for suspension of destruction "continued administrative appeal" and the suspension period, in a hash chain. Subsequently, when the administrative appeal is concluded and the suspension of destruction is lifted, the server (101) may re-determine whether the conditions for destruction are satisfied and destroy the case-specific data encryption key.

[0174] According to another example, assume a case where a dispute arises regarding whether the de-identified image was lawfully disposed of after the event-specific data encryption key has been destroyed, and the evidence examination agency transmits a verification request signal for the security image data object. The server (101) can provide the device of the evidence examination agency with a verification result indicating that the de-identified image was lawfully disposed of at the time of destruction "2026-07-31T23:59:59Z" by verifying the destruction log and manifest recorded in the hash chain, even though the de-identified image cannot be decrypted because the event-specific data encryption key has been destroyed.

[0176] According to various embodiments, a server for creating and managing a security image data object including a de-identified image from an image containing personal information includes a communication module and a processor, wherein the processor receives an original image and a certificate of entrustment regarding the entrustment of processing of the original image from a user device through the communication module, and if the verification result for the electronic signature of the certificate of entrustment satisfies a predetermined verification condition, releases a processing key corresponding to the de-identification processing, performs de-identification processing on a person object included in the original image through a processing infrastructure activated by the released processing key to create a de-identified image, encrypts the de-identified image with an event-specific data encryption key, wraps the event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key combined with a predetermined viewing policy condition, constructs a hash chain by connecting the hash value of each of the encrypted de-identified image and the behavior metadata corresponding to the de-identified image, and a manifest including entrustment source information identified from the certificate of entrustment, with the hash value of the preceding manifest, and adds a timestamp signature to the hash chain to the security image data object It can be configured to generate, and if a request context corresponding to a viewing request received through the communication module satisfies the viewing policy conditions, provide the decrypted anonymized image by unwrapping the event-specific data encryption key with the wrapping key, and if a predetermined destruction condition is satisfied, destroy the event-specific data encryption key to convert the anonymized image included in the security image data object into an unrecoverable state, and record a destruction log containing key fingerprint information immediately before the destruction of the event-specific data encryption key in the hash chain.

[0177] According to various embodiments, the verification condition is defined by the validity of the electronic signature based on the hash value of the entrustment certificate document, and whether the entrustment period information, processing purpose code, and destruction deadline information included in the entrustment certificate document are provided, and the processor may be configured to refuse to release the processing key when the verification condition is not satisfied, thereby maintaining the access rights of the processing infrastructure to the original image in an unopen state.

[0178] According to various embodiments, the processor may be configured to further determine whether the timestamp of the consignment certificate document falls within a valid interval corresponding to the consignment period information included in the consignment certificate document, and to refuse to release the processing key if the timestamp does not fall within the valid interval.

[0179] According to various embodiments, the viewing policy condition is defined as at least one combination of a viewing period, a range of source IP addresses allowed to view, a renewal cycle of user authentication, whether the processing purpose code matches, and a limit on the number of cumulative views, and the processor may bind the hash value of the viewing policy condition as additional authentication data for wrapping the event-specific data encryption key, so that when the viewing policy condition is changed, the unwrapping of the event-specific data encryption key fails.

[0180] According to various embodiments, the request context includes a real-time reception time, a request source IP address, and a last authentication time, and the processor may be configured to refuse the unwrapping of the event-specific data encryption key and to record an access log including information on the reason for refusal of access and information on the requester identification in the hash chain when at least one of the conditions is met, such that the request source IP address does not fall within the range of source IP addresses included in the viewing policy conditions and that the renewal cycle of user authentication has elapsed since the last authentication time.

[0181] According to various embodiments, the processor may be configured such that when a verification request signal for the security image data object is received, it recalculates the hash values ​​of the anonymized image and the behavior metadata, respectively, compares them with the hash values ​​included in the manifest, verifies the continuity of the hash chain, determines that tampering has occurred if they do not match, and, when the destruction condition is satisfied and the event-specific data encryption key is destroyed, generates a destruction completion report linked with the identification information of the destruction confirmation included in the entrusted certification document and transmits it to the device of the evidence examination agency through the communication module.

[0182] According to various embodiments, a method of operation of a server for creating and managing a security image data object including a de-identified image from an image containing personal information comprises: receiving an original image and a certificate of entrustment regarding the entrustment of processing of the original image from a user device through a communication module of the server, and releasing a processing key corresponding to the de-identification processing when the verification result of the electronic signature of the certificate of entrustment satisfies a predetermined verification condition; generating a de-identified image by performing de-identification processing on a person object included in the original image through a processing infrastructure activated by the released processing key by a processor of the server; encrypting the de-identified image with an event-specific data encryption key by the processor and wrapping the event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key combined with a predetermined viewing policy condition by the processor; constructing a hash chain by the processor by connecting a manifest containing the hash value of each of the encrypted de-identified image and the behavior metadata corresponding to the de-identified image and entrustment source information identified from the certificate of entrustment with the hash value of the preceding manifest, and a timestamp in the hash chain The method may include the operation of creating the security video data object by adding a signature, providing the decrypted anonymized video by unwrapping the event-specific data encryption key with the wrapping key when the request context corresponding to the viewing request received through the communication module satisfies the viewing policy condition, and, by the processor, destroying the event-specific data encryption key when a predetermined destruction condition is satisfied to convert the anonymized video included in the security video data object into an unrecoverable state, and recording a destruction log containing key fingerprint information immediately before the destruction of the event-specific data encryption key in the hash chain.

[0184] As used in this document, the terms “module” or “part” include a unit composed of hardware, software, or firmware, and may be used interchangeably with terms such as logic, logic block, component, or circuit, for example. “Module” or “part” may be a component formed integrally or a minimum unit or part thereof that performs one or more functions. “Module” or “part” may be implemented mechanically or electronically and may include, for example, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) chip, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or programmable logic device known or to be developed that performs certain operations, and may be executed by a processor (120). At least part of the device (e.g., modules or functions thereof) or method (e.g., operations) according to various embodiments may be implemented as instructions stored in a computer-readable storage medium (e.g., memory (130)) in the form of a program module. When the above instruction is executed by a processor (e.g., processor (120)), the processor may perform a function corresponding to the above instruction. Computer-readable recording media may include a hard disk, a floppy disk, a magnetic medium (e.g., magnetic tape), an optical recording medium (e.g., CD-ROM, DVD, magneto-optical medium (e.g., floptical disk), built-in memory, etc. Instructions may include code generated by a compiler or code that can be executed by an interpreter. A module or program module according to various embodiments may include at least one of the aforementioned components, some of which may be omitted, or additionally include other components. Operations performed by a module, program module, or other components according to various embodiments may be executed sequentially, in parallel, iteratively, or heuristically, or at least some operations may be executed in a different order, omitted, or other operations may be added.

[0185] Furthermore, the embodiments disclosed in this document are presented for the purpose of explaining and understanding the disclosed technical content and are not intended to limit the scope of this disclosure. Accordingly, the scope of this disclosure should be interpreted to include all modifications or various other embodiments based on the technical concept of this disclosure.

Claims

Claim 1 A server for creating and managing a security image data object including a de-identified image from an image containing personal information comprises a communication module and a processor, wherein the processor receives an original image and a certificate of entrustment regarding the entrustment of processing of the original image from a user device through the communication module, and if the verification result of the electronic signature of the certificate of entrustment satisfies a predetermined verification condition, releases a processing key corresponding to the de-identification process, detects a person object included in the original image through a processing infrastructure activated by the released processing key, assigns the same unique identifier to the same person object across frames, and performs de-identification processing to generate a de-identified image by applying dynamic masking that is updated every frame according to the tracking result of the person object to a specific area including the facial region of the person object designated as a protected target, while preserving the outer silhouette of the person object and location information within the frame, and encrypts the de-identified image with an event-specific data encryption key, and wraps the event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key combined with a predetermined viewing policy condition, at least a portion of which is derived from the certificate of entrustment, wherein the viewing policy condition is serialized to produce The hash value and the hash value of the entrustment source information identified from the aforementioned entrustment certification document are bound as additional authentication data for the wrapping, so that the unwrapping of the event-specific data encryption key fails when the viewing policy conditions are changed; a hash chain is constructed by connecting the hash value of each of the behavior metadata, including frame-by-frame movement path coordinates and behavior types for each encrypted de-identified image and unique identifier, and the hash value of the manifest containing the entrustment source information with the hash value of the preceding manifest; a timestamp signature is added to the hash chain to create the security image data object; and when the request context corresponding to the viewing request received through the communication module satisfies the viewing policy conditions,A server configured to provide the decrypted anonymized image by unwrapping the event-specific data encryption key with the wrapping key only when the hash value calculated from the current viewing policy conditions is input as the additional authentication data and matches the additional authentication data bound during wrapping, and when a predetermined destruction condition is satisfied, to destroy the event-specific data encryption key to convert the anonymized image included in the security image data object into an unrecoverable state, and to record a destruction log containing key fingerprint information immediately before the destruction of the event-specific data encryption key in the hash chain. Claim 2 In claim 1, the verification condition is defined by the validity of the electronic signature based on the hash value of the entrustment certificate document, and whether the entrustment period information, processing purpose code, and destruction deadline information included in the entrustment certificate document are provided, and the processor is configured to refuse to release the processing key when the verification condition is not satisfied, thereby maintaining the access rights of the processing infrastructure to the original image in an unopened state, a server. Claim 3 In claim 1, the processor further determines whether the timestamp of the entrustment certificate document falls within a valid interval corresponding to the entrustment period information included in the entrustment certificate document, and is configured to refuse the release of the processing key if the timestamp does not fall within the valid interval. Claim 4 In claim 1, the above viewing policy conditions are defined as at least one combination of a viewing period, a range of source IP addresses allowed to view, a renewal cycle of user authentication, whether the processing purpose code matches, and a limit on the number of cumulative views, a server. Claim 5 In claim 4, the request context includes a real-time reception time, a request source IP address, and a last authentication time, and the processor is configured to refuse the unwrapping of the event-specific data encryption key and to record an access log including information on the reason for refusal of viewing and information on the requester identification in the hash chain when at least one of the conditions is met, that the request source IP address does not fall within the range of source IP addresses included in the viewing policy conditions, and that the renewal cycle of user authentication has elapsed since the last authentication time. Claim 6 In claim 1, the processor is configured such that when a verification request signal for the security image data object is received, it recalculates the hash values ​​of the encrypted de-identified image and the behavior metadata, respectively, compares them with the hash values ​​included in the manifest, verifies the continuity of the hash chain, and if they do not match, determines that tampering has occurred; and when the destruction condition is satisfied and the event-specific data encryption key is destroyed, it generates a destruction completion report linked with the identification information of the destruction confirmation included in the entrusted certification document and transmits it to the device of the evidence examination agency through the communication module. Claim 7 A method of operation for a server that creates and manages a security image data object including a de-identified image from an image containing personal information, comprising: receiving an original image and a certificate of entrustment regarding the entrustment of processing of the original image from a user device through a communication module of the server, and releasing a processing key corresponding to de-identification processing when the verification result of the electronic signature of the certificate of entrustment satisfies a predetermined verification condition; detecting a person object included in the original image through a processing infrastructure activated by the released processing key by a processor of the server, assigning the same unique identifier to the same person object across frames, and applying dynamic masking that is updated every frame according to the tracking result of the person object to a specific area including the facial region of the person object designated as a protected target, while performing de-identification processing to generate a de-identified image such that the outer silhouette of the person object and location information within the frame are preserved; encrypting the de-identified image with an event-specific data encryption key by the processor, and wrapping the event-specific data encryption key with a wrapping key combined with a predetermined viewing policy condition, at least a portion of which is derived from the certificate of entrustment, wherein the viewing policy condition An operation to bind the hash value calculated by serialization and the hash value of the entrustment source information identified from the entrustment certification document as additional authentication data for the wrapping, so that the unwrapping of the event-specific data encryption key fails when the viewing policy conditions are changed; and by the processor, to construct a hash chain by connecting the hash value of each of the behavior metadata, including frame-by-frame movement path coordinates and behavior type for each of the encrypted de-identified image and the unique identifier, and the hash value of the entrustment source information in a manifest with the hash value of the preceding manifest, and to create the security image data object by adding a timestamp signature to the hash chain.A method of operation of a server comprising the operation, wherein if a request context corresponding to a viewing request received through the communication module satisfies the viewing policy condition, the hash value calculated from the current viewing policy condition is input as the additional authentication data and matches the additional authentication data bound during wrapping, the event-specific data encryption key is unwrapped with the wrapping key to provide the decrypted anonymized image, and if a predetermined destruction condition is satisfied by the processor, the event-specific data encryption key is destroyed to convert the anonymized image included in the security image data object into an unrecoverable state, and a destruction log including key fingerprint information immediately before the destruction of the event-specific data encryption key is recorded in the hash chain.

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