Network node, terminal, and communication method

The network connection system using attribute/credential certificates and trust certificates addresses the limitations of conventional 3GPP by enabling secure and reliable network connections for UEs without SIM cards through decentralized identifiers and verifiable credentials, facilitating dynamic trust evaluation.

WO2025169344A1PCT designated stage Publication Date: 2025-08-14NTT DOCOMO INC +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
PCT/JP2024/004105
Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-02-07
Publication Date
2025-08-14

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Conventional 3GPP network registration relies on shared keys between SIM cards, which limits network connections when no prior contract or key sharing exists, and lacks reliable trust verification for UEs without SIM cards, leading to unreliable network connections.

Method used

Implementing a network connection system using attribute/credential certificates and trust certificates, enabling authentication and trust evaluation between UEs and networks through decentralized identifiers (DIDs) and verifiable credentials (VCs), allowing for secure network connections without prior contracts or shared keys.

Benefits of technology

Enables reliable network connections for UEs without SIM cards and supports dynamic trust evaluation, ensuring secure and trustworthy network access even in roaming scenarios.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A network node disclosed herein comprises: a reception unit that, when authentication using an attribute / qualification certificate of a user is successful, receives a trust evaluation request message, including a trust certificate of a terminal or the user, from a specific network node; a control unit that executes a trust evaluation procedure using the trust certificate; and a transmission unit that transmits a trust evaluation result to the specific network node.
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Description

Network node, terminal, and communication method

[0001] The present invention relates to a network node, a terminal, and a communication method in a communication system.

[0002] 3GPP (registered trademark) (3rd Generation Partnership Project) has introduced a wireless communication system called 5G or NR (New Radio) (hereinafter, the wireless communication system will be referred to as "5G" or "NR") in order to achieve a larger system capacity, a higher data transmission speed, and a lower latency in wireless sections. 5G introduces various wireless technologies to meet the requirement of achieving a throughput of 10 Gbps or more while reducing latency in wireless sections to 1 ms or less. Furthermore, 6G, a future communication system, is also being studied.

[0003] Conventional 3GPP network registration is performed based on a contract between a user and the network (network) by using a common key shared in advance between the SIM card installed in the user's UE and the network.

[0004] In recent years, a new approach to identity management has been under consideration, namely the concept of Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI), in which users manage their own identifiers and identities and control who provides them, without relying on centralized identity providers (ID providers), and the technologies to realize this (W3C Decentralized Identifiers (DID), W3C Verifiable Credentials (VC), etc.).

[0005] In the world of SSI, for example, a user can present an attribute / credentials certificate that certifies attribute information and qualification information to a service provider, and the service provider can then make decisions about providing services to the user.

[0006] 3GPP TS 23.502 V18.3.0 (2023-09)W3C Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0, https: / / www.w3.org / TR / did-core / W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model v1.1, https: / / www.w3.org / TR / vc-data-model /

[0007] In 6G and the like, it is expected that even when a UE without a SIM card is used or when a prior contract or a common key is not shared between a user / UE and a network to which the user / UE wants to connect, it will be necessary to perform a network connection based on authentication. In order to realize such a network connection, it is conceivable to perform a network connection based on authentication based on attribute / credential certificates.

[0008] However, in the conventional technology, the network side does not perform highly reliable trust verification for the user / UE, and the UE side does not perform highly reliable trust verification for the network. Therefore, there is a problem that a highly reliable network connection may not be achieved.

[0009] The present invention has been made in view of the above points, and an object of the present invention is to provide a technique for realizing a highly reliable network connection.

[0010] According to the disclosed technology, a network node is provided that includes: a receiving unit that receives a trust evaluation request message including a trust certificate of a terminal or the user from a specific network node when authentication using a user's attribute / credential certificate is successful; a control unit that executes a trust evaluation process using the trust certificate; and a transmitting unit that transmits a trust evaluation result to the specific network node.

[0011] The disclosed technology provides a technology for realizing a highly reliable network connection.

[0012] FIG. 1 is a diagram for explaining an example of a communication system. FIG. 1 is a diagram for explaining an example of a communication system in a roaming environment. FIG. 1 is a diagram for explaining an example of a system configuration of embodiment 1. FIG. 2 is a diagram for explaining processing sequence example 1 in embodiment 1. FIG. 3 is a diagram for explaining the authentication processing of S106 in processing sequence example 1 in embodiment 1. FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining processing sequence example 2 in embodiment 1. FIG. 5 is a diagram for explaining the authentication processing of S107 in processing sequence example 2 in embodiment 1. FIG. 6 is a diagram for explaining a system configuration example of embodiment 2. FIG. 7 is a diagram for explaining trust certificate issuance form 1. FIG. 8 is a diagram for explaining trust certificate issuance form 2. FIG. 9 is a diagram for embodiment 2a. FIG. 10 is a diagram for embodiment 2b. FIG. 11 is a diagram for embodiment 2c. FIG. 12 is a diagram for explaining user / UE trust evaluation processing. FIG. 13 is a diagram for explaining NW trust evaluation processing. FIG. 14 is a diagram for explaining an example of the functional configuration of a network node 100 in an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 15 is a diagram for explaining an example of the functional configuration of a terminal 20 in an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 16 is a diagram for explaining an example of the hardware configuration of the terminal 20 and the network node 100 in an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 17 is a diagram for explaining an example of the configuration of a vehicle 2001 in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0013] Hereinafter, an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. Note that the embodiment described below is an example, and the embodiment to which the present invention is applied is not limited to the following embodiment.

[0014] In operation of the wireless communication system according to the embodiment of the present invention, existing technologies are used as appropriate. The existing technologies include, but are not limited to, the existing LTE or the existing NR.

[0015] In addition, in this specification, unless otherwise clearly indicated from the context, "A / B" means "A or B." Furthermore, "A or B" includes A only, B only, and "A and B."

[0016] In the following, we will first explain an example of the configuration of a 5G core network, which is an example of a network in which attribute / credential certificate-based authentication and trust certificate-based trust verification are performed in this embodiment, and then explain the configuration and operation of this embodiment.

[0017] Fig. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a communication system corresponding to a core network. As shown in Fig. 1, this communication system is composed of a UE (terminal 20) and multiple network nodes. Hereinafter, it is assumed that one network node corresponds to each function, but multiple functions may be realized by one network node, or multiple network nodes may realize one function. Furthermore, the "connection" described below may be a logical connection or a physical connection.

[0018] The (R)AN (Radio) Access Network) 10 is a network node 30 having a radio access function, which may include a base station 10, and is connected to a UE 20, an AMF (Access and Mobility Management Function) 30, and a UPF (User plane function). The AMF 30 is a network node having functions such as terminating the RAN interface, terminating the NAS (Non-Access Stratum), registration management, connection management, reachability management, and mobility management. The UPF is a network node having functions such as a PDU (Protocol Data Unit) session point to the outside that interconnects with a DN (Data Network), packet routing and forwarding, and user plane QoS (Quality of Service) handling. The UPF and DN constitute a network slice.

[0019] The AMF 30 is connected to the UE 20, the (R)AN 10, an SMF (Session Management function), an NSSF (Network Slice Selection Function), an NEF (Network Exposure Function), an NRF (Network Repository Function), an UDM (Unified Data Management), an AUSF (Authentication Server Function), a PCF (Policy Control Function), and an AF (Application Function). The AMF 30, the SMF, the NSSF, the NEF, the NRF, the UDM 40, the AUSF 80, the PCF, and the AF are network nodes connected to each other via interfaces, Namf, Nsmf, Nnssf, Nnef, Nnrf, Nudm, Nausf, Npcf, and Naf, based on their respective services.

[0020] The SMF is a network node having functions such as session management, UE IP (Internet Protocol) address allocation and management, DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) function, ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) proxy, and roaming function. The NEF is a network node having a function of notifying other NFs (Network Functions) of capabilities and events. The NSSF is a network node having functions such as selecting a network slice to which the UE 20 connects, determining the allowed NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information), determining the NSSAI to be set, and determining the AMF set to which the UE 20 connects. The PCF is a network node having a function of controlling network policies. The AF is a network node having a function of controlling application servers. The NRF is a network node having a function of discovering NF instances that provide services. The UDM 40 is a network node that manages subscriber data and authentication data. The UDM 40 is connected to a UDR (User Data Repository) that stores the data.

[0021] 2 is a diagram for explaining an example of a communication system in a roaming environment. As shown in Fig. 2, the network is made up of a UE, which is a terminal 20, and a plurality of network nodes.

[0022] The SEPP is a non-transparent proxy that filters control plane messages between PLMNs (Public Land Mobile Networks). The vSEPP shown in Figure 2 is a SEPP in a visited network, and the hSEPP is a SEPP in a home network.

[0023] As shown in Fig. 2, the UE 20 is in a roaming environment connected to an (R)AN and an AMF 30 in a Visited PLMN (VPLMN). The VPLMN and the Home PLMN (HPLMN) are connected via a vSEPP and an hSEPP. The UE 20 can communicate with the UDM of the HPLMN via the AMF 30 of the VPLMN, for example.

[0024] (Problems and Overview of Embodiments) Conventional 3GPP network registration is performed by using a common key that is shared in advance between a SIM card installed in a user's UE and the network, based on a contract between the user and the network.

[0025] On the other hand, in 6G, the provision of distributed services that combine multiple networks or services managed by different administrators is being considered. In such a configuration, even if a contract or mutual trust relationship (trust) between a user / UE and a network has not been established in advance, or even if a common key has not been shared between a user / UE and a network, it is expected that there will be cases where users will want to use a network on demand based on dynamic mutual trust evaluation.

[0026] Furthermore, in the current roaming mechanism between telecommunications carriers, network connection authentication during roaming in a VPLMN (a visited network that does not have a direct contractual relationship with the user) is performed in the user's original contracted network (HPLMN / Home NW) using a key shared between the SIM card installed in the user's UE and the HPLMN, and the VPLMN trusts the result. However, this configuration makes it impossible to perform roaming authentication in situations where communication between the VPLMN and the HPLMN is interrupted due to a large-scale failure or the like, or when there is no prior connection between the VPLMN and the HPLMN. Furthermore, with the diversification of devices such as wearable devices and IoT devices, there is an increasing need to connect and use devices without SIM cards to networks.

[0027] Meanwhile, in recent years, W3C Decentralized Identifiers (DID), W3C Verifiable Credentials (VC), etc. have been considered as technologies for realizing Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI), a new concept of identity management. In the world of SSI, there are three parties: Holders, such as users who manage / hold their own digital identities; Issuers, who issue attribute / credential certificates (VCs) to users after verifying their attribute information (such as name, age, address, etc.) and qualification information (such as being an employee of a certain company or being a member of a certain service, etc.); and Verifiers, who verify the attributes and qualifications of Holders by requesting and receiving attribute / credential certificates (VCs) necessary for providing services to Holders, and make decisions on providing services.

[0028] It is possible to realize distributed network connection authentication (NW Registration) by using user attributes / credentials realized by the above-mentioned W3C Decentralized Identifiers (DID), W3C Verifiable Credentials (VC), etc. This technology will be described later as a first embodiment.

[0029] The technology according to the first embodiment enables network connection even when a UE without a SIM is used, when a prior contract or common key sharing has not been made between the user / UE and the network to which the user / UE wants to connect, etc. Furthermore, roaming authentication and network connection in a visited network (VPLMN) are possible without making an inquiry to a home network (HPLMN).

[0030] It is expected that the technology according to the first embodiment can partially support the above-mentioned 6G use cases. However, in order to establish mutual trust between a user / UE and a network for safe network use, it is desirable that the network evaluates the identity of the user, etc., using attributes / credentials, etc., and also evaluates the trust of the UE connected to the network on the network side (such as whether security has been violated), and that the user / UE evaluates the trust of the network administrator and network equipment on the user / UE side, and then determines whether to allow or disallow network connection. An embodiment in which a determination of whether to allow or disallow network connection based on trust evaluation is described below as a second embodiment.

[0031] It is possible to combine the first and second embodiments. That is, the technology according to the first embodiment and the technology according to the second embodiment satisfy the conditions that "there is no need to share a common key in advance between the network to which the user / UE wants to connect," "it is also possible to support UEs without SIM cards," and "direct communication is not required between the network to which the user connects (VPLMN) and the user's contracted network (HPLMN)." Based on mutual trust verification between the user / UE and the network administrator / network equipment, it is possible to determine whether or not a UE-network connection can be established. This makes it possible to realize a highly reliable network connection.

[0032] Hereinafter, a description will be given of embodiment 1 and embodiment 2. It is assumed that embodiment 2 is implemented in combination with embodiment 1. However, this is not limitative, and embodiment 1 and embodiment 2 may be implemented independently.

[0033] (Outline of First Embodiment) First, an outline of the first embodiment will be described. In the first embodiment, a NW registration authentication function (authentication function based on attributes / credentials) using attributes / credentials such as VC is added to a 3GPP NW. In the embodiment, two patterns are assumed for this authentication function: one in which it is defined as a new Network Function (NF), and the other in which it extends an existing function such as AUSF.

[0034] The "3GPP NW" may be called a core network defined by 3GPP (registered trademark). In addition, in this embodiment, the "3GPP NW" is taken as the "network" for description, but the technology according to the present invention is applicable to networks not limited to the "3GPP NW."

[0035] In the first embodiment, a specific example of authentication logic using attributes / credentials will be described, but this authentication logic is just an example and the present invention is not limited to this authentication logic.

[0036] In the first embodiment, an IF (C-Plane) related to NW registration using attributes / credentials between a UE and a 3GPP network is added to an existing 3GPP network. Specifically, the following (1) and (2) are described.

[0037] (1) An interface is added to transmit attributes / credentials from the UE to the 3GPP network via C-Plane communication. There are two patterns: one is defined as a new interface, and the other is added as information to be transmitted via a Registration Request.

[0038] (2) An interface is added for notifying the result from the authentication function that performs authentication processing using attributes / credentials to the UE. There are two patterns: one is defined as a new interface, and the other is an extension of an existing interface.

[0039] In addition, in the first embodiment, logic for permitting NW registration and establishing D-Plane communication after successful authentication using attributes / credentials is added.

[0040] Furthermore, in the first embodiment, by utilizing the attribute / certificate information, it is possible to register subscriber information in the UDM so that billing and the like can be performed.

[0041] (First Embodiment: System Configuration Example) FIG. 3 shows an example of a system configuration of the first embodiment. As shown in FIG. 3, the communication system according to the first embodiment includes a UE 20, an (R)AN 10, an authentication function 60 that performs authentication based on attributes / credentials, a UDM / UDR (40), and a VDR (Verifiable Data Registry) 70. Note that the UDM 40 is described as UDM / UDR because it is used together with the UDR. The "authentication function 60" shown here may be a newly defined device (network node) or may be an extension of the function of an existing device (e.g., AUSF). Note that in the description of the first embodiment, the "authentication function 60" is described as a newly defined device (network node).

[0042] The UE 20 includes a network connection function 21. The network connection function 21 executes operations in each sequence described below. The UE 20 may also be referred to as a terminal 20.

[0043] As shown in FIG. 3, the UDM / UDR ( 40 ) includes a network information database (DB) 41 , a certificate information DB 42 , and a policy DB 43 .

[0044] The NW information DB 41 stores a NW identifier, a NW public key, and a NW private key. The certificate information DB 42 stores information on certificates that can be used for NW connection. The policy DB 43 stores an authentication method selection policy. Note that the above NW is a 3GPP NW, and for example, in the case of a "NW identifier" (the same applies to the NW public key and NW private key), it may be an identifier common to multiple network nodes in the 3GPP NW, or it may be an identifier used for a specific network node in the 3GPP NW.

[0045] In the first embodiment, the VDR 70 is arranged outside the 3GPP network. However, the present invention is not limited to a configuration in which the VDR 70 is arranged outside the 3GPP network, and the VDR 70 may be provided within the 3GPP network.

[0046] The VDR 70 is a device that can be realized by a web server, a distributed ledger, etc. The VDR 70 includes a user information DB 71, an issuer information DB 72, a definition information DB 73, and a management information DB 74.

[0047] The user information DB 71 stores user identifiers and user public keys. The issuer information DB 72 stores identifiers of issuers of attribute / credential certificates used for network connection authentication and the public keys of the issuers. The definition information DB 73 stores schemas and definition information of attribute / credential certificates. The management information DB 74 stores management information indicating the validity / invalidation of attribute / credential certificates.

[0048] Below, an example in which the newly defined network node authentication function 60 is used as the "authentication function" will be described as processing sequence example 1, and an example in which AUSF 80 is used as the "authentication function" will be described as processing sequence example 2.

[0049] (Embodiment 1: Processing Sequence Example 1) Processing sequence example 1 in the first embodiment will be described with reference to Fig. 4. Processing sequence example 1 is an example in which a new NF and a new IF are used. The processing is premised on the following:

[0050] A user has a public key / private key pair corresponding to his / her own identifier, and stores his / her own identifier and public key in association with each other in a VDR 70 located in a place accessible by the 3GPP NW.

[0051] A user has attributes / credentials (which can be used for network connection) issued by any entity (such as a company or another user).

[0052] The certificate issuer holds a public key / private key pair corresponding to its own identifier, and stores its own identifier and public key in association with each other in a VDR 70 located in a place accessible to the 3GPP network.

[0053] The certificate issuer stores the format (schema or definition) of the certificate it issues and information for verifying the validity of the certificate in the VDR 70 located in a place accessible to the 3GPP network. The sequence will be described below.

[0054] In S101 (step 101) of FIG. 4, a NW connection process using an attribute / credential certificate is started when a user operates a NW connection application or when the UE 20 is turned on.

[0055] In S102, the UE 20 transmits a NW connection request message to the (R)AN 20 of the 3GPP network, requesting a network connection using attributes / credentials, including a user identifier (e.g., DID) and user attributes / credentials (e.g., VC). A signature (e.g., VP: Verifiable Presentation) generated by the UE 20 using a private key corresponding to the user identifier is added to the network connection request message. Note that the "network connection request message" may also be referred to as a "connection request message." Examples of the "connection request message" include a Registration Request message, which will be described later.

[0056] The NW connection request message includes information used for authentication as well as information similar to the information included in a Registration Request message, which is a message when a NW connection authentication request is made by SUPI / SUCI.

[0057] In S103, (R)AN20 transfers the NW connection request message received from UE20 to AMF30.

[0058] In S104, when the AMF 30 receives a NW connection request message requesting a NW connection using an attribute / credential certificate, the AMF 30 selects, as an authentication request destination, the authentication function 60. In S105, the AMF 30 transmits, to the authentication function 60, an authentication request message including the attribute / credential certificate included in the NW connection request message.

[0059] In S106, the authentication function 60 verifies the received attribute / credential by performing authentication processing using the attribute / credential. This processing corresponds to step 9 of 3GPP TS 23.502 4.2.2.2 Registration Procedure. S106'-1 to S106'-3 will be described later.

[0060] In S107, the authentication function 60 transmits an authentication response including the authentication result (success / failure) to the AMF 30.

[0061] In the subsequent step S108, connection processing (which may also be called registration processing) is executed. Specifically, the NW registration processing is completed by executing the processing from step 10 onwards, which is the procedure after the authentication processing in step 9 in 3GPP TS 23.502 4.2.2.2 Registration Procedure (Figure 4.2.2.2.2-1: Registration procedure).

[0062] The processing performed by the UE 20 after step 10 includes, for example, receiving a Registration Accept and sending a Registration Complete.

[0063] After the authentication in S106 is successful, the following steps S106'-1 to S106'-3 may be optionally executed for billing purposes.

[0064] In S106'-1, the authentication function 60 sends a subscriber information registration request to the UDM / UDR (40). The subscriber information registration request includes information such as the received user identifier, the user's name and address included in the received attribute / credentials certificate, etc. The UDM / UDR (40) registers this information as the user's subscriber information and returns a subscriber information registration response in S106'-3.

[0065] In the above optional form, it is assumed that the message sent in S102 includes, in addition to the attribute / credentials used for the NW connection, another attribute / credentials certificate describing information necessary for billing, etc. Note that when "attribute / credentials certificate" is written, it may be interpreted that the "attribute / credentials certificate" includes, in addition to the attribute / credentials certificate used for the NW connection, another attribute / credentials certificate describing information necessary for billing, etc.

[0066] Next, the authentication process of S106 will be described in detail with reference to FIG. 5. Here, as an example of the authentication / verification process logic, verification of an attribute / credential certificate in the W3C DID / VC / VP format is assumed. Note that in each embodiment, authentication process using an attribute / credential certificate is a process for authenticating a user (or terminal 20) using an attribute / credential certificate.

[0067] When the authentication process using the attribute / credential certificate starts, in S106-1 the authentication function 60 requests the VDR 70 for a public key corresponding to the identifier of the certificate issuer (Issuer) and a public key corresponding to the identifier of the user. In S106-2, the VDR 70 responds with these public keys to the authentication function 60.

[0068] In S106-3, the authentication function 60 verifies the authenticity of the certificate issuer's signature and the user's signature, and verifies that the message has not been tampered with.

[0069] Note that communication between the authentication function 60 in the 3GPP network and the VDR 70 outside the 3GPP network may be via a node (e.g., NEF, SCEF) that mediates communication between the authentication function 60 in the 3GPP network and the VDR 70 outside the 3GPP network.

[0070] Regarding S106-1 to S106-3, in more detail, in S106-1 and S106-2, the authentication function 60 receives as input DID0 (certificate issuer identifier) ​​and DID1 (user identifier) ​​included in the received VP / VC, and uses an arbitrary DID Method to obtain (resolve) the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID0 and the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID1 from the VDR 70. In S106-3, the authentication function 60 verifies that the VP Holder signature and the VC Issuer signature are each signatures made with private keys linked to the corresponding public keys (validity of the signature, no tampering with the message).

[0071] In S106-4, the authentication function 60 requests information regarding the certificate format and status (such as revocation status) from the VDR 70. In S106-5, the VDR 70 responds with the certificate format and status information. In S106-6, the authentication function 60 verifies the validity of the certificate.

[0072] Regarding S106-4 to S106-6, in more detail, the authentication function 60 acquires the VC schema, definition information, etc. from the VDR 70 and verifies that the VC syntax, etc. is correct. The authentication function 60 also acquires VC validity information / revocation information from the VDR 70 and verifies that the received VC is valid.

[0073] In S106-7, the authentication function 60 requests the UDM / UDR (40) for certificate information that can be used for network connection, and in S106-8, the UDM / UDR (40) responds with the certificate information. In S106-9, the authentication function 60 performs eligibility verification of the certificate. More specifically, the authentication function 60 verifies that the conditions for a VC that can be used for network connection (e.g., that it is a My Number VC and that it contains necessary information (e.g., name, address)) are met. Note that the My Number VC is assumed to be information equivalent to the current My Number that has been converted into VC format.

[0074] If the authentication function 60 determines that all of the above verification results are OK, it determines that the authentication has been successful.

[0075] (Embodiment 1: Processing Sequence Example 2) Next, processing sequence example 2 in embodiment 1 will be described with reference to Fig. 6. Processing sequence example 2 is an example in which an existing NF and an existing IF are extended. In processing sequence example 2, a function for performing authentication based on attributes / credentials is included in the AUSF 80. This function performs the authentication process of S107, which will be described later.

[0076] The UDM 40 holds an authentication method selection function (S105) based on attributes / credentials when selecting an authentication method, and the following information used in the attribute / credentials method.

[0077] NW identifier, and public and private keys associated with the identifier. Certificate information that can be used for NW connection (certificate type, data format, information that should be included in the certificate, etc.). The sequence will be described with reference to FIG. 6 .

[0078] At S101, the UE 20 includes attributes / credentials in a Registration Request message and sends the Registration Request message including the attributes / credentials to the (R)AN 10. At S102, the (R)AN 10 sends the Registration Request message including the attributes / credentials to the AMF / SEAF (30).

[0079] In S103, the AMF / SEAF (30) includes the attributes / credentials in a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message and sends the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message including the attributes / credentials to the AUSF 80 as an authentication request.

[0080] In S104, the AUSF 80 includes the attributes / credentials in a Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request message and sends the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request message including the attributes / credentials to the UDM / ARPF / SIDF (40) as an authentication request.

[0081] In S105, the UDM / ARPF / SIDF (40) performs authentication method selection. Specifically, if the received message does not contain SUPI or SUCI but does contain attributes / credentials, the UDM / ARPF / SIDF (40) selects authentication based on attributes / credentials as the authentication method. Furthermore, if the received message contains both SUPI or SUCI and attributes / credentials, the UDM / ARPF / SIDF (40) selects an authentication method based on a pre-registered authentication method selection policy or a user request.

[0082] In S106, the UDM / ARPF / SIDF (40) includes a string (e.g., Credential Auth) indicating that the attribute / credential authentication method has been selected in the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response message, and sends the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response message including the string to the AUSF 80.

[0083] In S107, the AUSF 80 performs authentication processing using attributes / credentials.

[0084] In S108, the AUSF 80 includes a string indicating that attribute / credential authentication was successful (e.g., Credential Auth Success) in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message, and sends the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message including the string to the AMF / SEAF (30).

[0085] Thereafter, in S109, the processes from step 10 onward of 3GPP TS 23.502 4.2.2.2 Registration Procedure are executed, and the NW Registration process is completed. In the NW Registration process, the SUPI / SUCI-based API and the SUPI / SUCI-based subscriber information registration process are extended so that they can be executed using the user identifier (DID, etc.) included in the attribute / credentials.

[0086] Note that, similar to the case of the Registration Request message, attributes / credentials are also added to the Mobility Registration Update / Periodic Registration Update messages.

[0087] The authentication process of S107 will be described in detail with reference to Fig. 7. Here, as in the processing sequence example 1, the verification of attributes / credentials in the W3C DID / VC / VP format is assumed as an example of the verification process logic. In the following sequence, all communications between the AUSF 80 and the VDR 70 or UDM 40 are performed using new C-Plane messages.

[0088] When the authentication process using the attribute / credential certificate is started, in S107-1, the AUSF 80 requests an identifier corresponding to the identifier of the certificate issuer (Issuer) and a public key corresponding to the identifier of the user from the VDR 70. In S107-2, the VDR 70 responds with these public keys to the AUSF 80.

[0089] In S107-3, the AUSF 80 verifies the authenticity of the certificate issuer's signature and the user's signature, and verifies that the message has not been tampered with.

[0090] Note that communication between the AUSF 80 within the 3GPP network and the VDR 70 outside the 3GPP network may be via a node (e.g., NEF, SCEF) that mediates the communication.

[0091] Regarding S107-1 to S107-3, in more detail, in S107-1 and S107-2, AUSF 80 receives DID0 (certificate issuer identifier) ​​and DID1 (user identifier) ​​included in the received VP / VC as input, and uses an arbitrary DID Method to obtain (resolve) the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID0 and the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID1 from VDR 70. In S107-3, AUSF 80 verifies that the VP Holder signature and VC Issuer signature are signatures made with private keys linked to those public keys (validity of the signatures, no tampering with the messages).

[0092] In S107-4, the AUSF 80 requests information regarding the certificate format and status (such as revocation status) from the VDR 70. In S107-5, the VDR 70 responds with the certificate format and status information. In S107-6, the AUSF 80 verifies the validity of the certificate.

[0093] Regarding S107-4 to S107-6, in more detail, the AUSF 80 acquires the VC schema, definition information, etc. from the VDR 70 and verifies that the VC syntax, etc. is correct. The AUSF 80 also acquires the VC validity information / revocation information from the VDR 70 and verifies that the received VC is valid.

[0094] In S107-7, the AUSF 80 requests the UDM / UDR (40) for certificate information that can be used for network connection, and in S107-8, the UDM / UDR (40) responds with the certificate information. In S107-9, the AUSF 80 performs eligibility verification of the certificate. More specifically, the AUSF 80 verifies that the conditions for a VC that can be used for network connection (e.g., that it is a My Number VC, and that required information (e.g., name, address) is included) are met.

[0095] If the AUSF 80 determines that all of the above verification results are OK, it determines that the authentication has been successful.

[0096] Note that S107-7 to S107-8 may be omitted by including the certificate information acquired in S107-7 to S107-8 in the message of S106 in FIG. 6 and sending it.

[0097] (Effects of First Embodiment) The technology according to the first embodiment enables the terminal 20 to connect to the NW based on authentication based on the user's attributes / credentials.

[0098] (Outline of Embodiment 2) Next, embodiment 2 will be described. It is assumed that embodiment 2 will be implemented in combination with embodiment 1. Functions or network nodes (VDR, etc.) with the same names in embodiment 1 and embodiment 2 may be considered as functions / network nodes of embodiment 2 added to the functions / network nodes of embodiment 1, or as functions / network nodes of embodiment 2 added outside the functions / network nodes of embodiment 1.

[0099] In the second embodiment, a trust evaluation function using trust certificates realized by DID / VC or the like is added to each of the 3GPP network and the UE. Also, a trust certificate issuing system that issues trust certificates for "users, UEs, network administrators, and network equipment" is added. In the second embodiment, two patterns are assumed for the trust evaluation function: one in which it is defined as a new network function (NF), and the other in which the authentication system functions of AUSF or the like are extended.

[0100] The "3GPP NW" may be called a core network defined by 3GPP (registered trademark). In the second embodiment, the "3GPP NW" is used as the "network" for explanation, but the technology according to the present invention is applicable to networks not limited to the "3GPP NW."

[0101] In the second embodiment, a trust evaluation-related interface (C-Plane) using a trust certificate between a UE and a 3GPP network is added to an existing 3GPP network. Specifically, the following (1) and (2) are described.

[0102] (1) An interface for transmitting a trust certificate from a UE to a 3GPP network via C-Plane communication is added. There are two patterns: one is defined as a new interface, and the other is added as transmission information for an existing interface such as a Registration Request.

[0103] (2) An interface for notifying the result from the trust evaluation function to the UE and an interface for sending the NW trust certificate to the UE are added. There are two patterns: one is defined as a new interface, and the other is an extension of an existing interface.

[0104] Furthermore, control of the decision on whether to allow or deny network connection after trust evaluation on the UE side and the network side is added.

[0105] (Embodiment 2: System Configuration Example) An example of a system configuration is shown in Fig. 8. This system configuration example is a common configuration when accessing the HPLMN and when accessing the VPLMN.

[0106] 8 , the communication system according to the system configuration example includes a UE 20, an (R)AN 10, an AMF 30, a trust evaluation function 260, a UDM / UDR (40), a VDR (Verifiable Data Registry) 70, a UE trust certificate issuing system 80, a user trust certificate issuing system 90, a trust certificate management function 210, and a NW trust certificate issuing system 220. Note that the system of the second embodiment may include the authentication function 60 described above separately from the trust evaluation function 260, or the authentication function 60 may be included in the trust evaluation function 260, or the trust evaluation function 260 may be included in the authentication function 60 included in the system of the second embodiment. The "authentication function 60" may be an AUSF.

[0107] The UE 20 includes a trust evaluation function 22, a NW connection function 21, and a trust certificate management function 23. The trust certificate management function 23 is, for example, an ID wallet.

[0108] As shown in FIG. 8, the UDM / UDR ( 40 ) includes a network information DB (database) 41 , a trust certificate DB 42 , and a policy DB 43 .

[0109] The NW information DB 41 stores the NW identifier, the NW public key, the NW private key, etc. The trust certificate DB 42 stores trust certificates. The policy DB 43 stores policy information related to trust certificates. Note that the above NW is a 3GPP NW, and for example, in the case of a "NW identifier" (the same applies to the NW public key and the NW private key), it may be an identifier common to multiple network nodes in the 3GPP NW, or it may be an identifier used for a specific network node in the 3GPP NW.

[0110] In the second embodiment, the VDR 70 is arranged outside the 3GPP network. However, the present invention is not limited to a configuration in which the VDR 70 is arranged outside the 3GPP network, and the VDR 70 may be provided within the 3GPP network.

[0111] The VDR 70 is a device that can be realized by a web server, a distributed ledger, etc. The VDR 70 includes an information DB 71, an issuer information DB 72, a definition information DB 73, and a management information DB 74.

[0112] The information DB 71 stores "identifiers and public key information" of "users / UEs / NW administrators / NW equipment." The issuer information DB 72 stores "identifiers and public key information" of issuers of trust certificates. The definition information DB 73 stores schemas and definition information of trust certificates. The management information DB 74 stores management information indicating the validity / revocation of trust certificates.

[0113] The VDR 70 may be held within the network and provided to a user / UE / trust certificate issuing system or the like via an API or the like provided by the network.

[0114] The trust evaluation function 260 may also be configured by adding a trust evaluation processing function to an existing authentication function (for example, AUSF).

[0115] The UE trust certificate issuing system 80 and the user trust certificate issuing system 90 correspond to an Issuer in W3C VC. Furthermore, there may be one or more UE trust certificate issuing systems 80 and one or more user trust certificate issuing systems 90 for each certificate issuing authority.

[0116] The trust certificate management function 210 is, for example, an ID wallet, etc. Furthermore, for the NW trust certificate issuing system 220, there may be one or more issuers / systems of trust certificates for each of the trust evaluation of the NW administrator and the trust evaluation of the NW equipment.

[0117] 8, the network is a 3GPP network, but is not limited to this, and may be any network such as a WLAN or a fixed network.

[0118] In addition, in this system configuration, in the case of roaming authentication and when a user's contracted network (HPLMN) exists, trust evaluation may be performed using a trust evaluation policy on the HPLMN side. In this case, the trust evaluation policy on the HPLMN side may be shared in advance between the HPLMN and VPLMN, or may be stored in a location accessible from the VPLMN side (e.g., a VDR on a public blockchain).

[0119] (Examples of Information Used in Trust Evaluation and Issuers of Trust Certificates) Here, examples of information used in trust evaluation and issuers of trust certificates will be described.

[0120] <In the case of user trust evaluation> Information used for trust evaluation includes government- or local-government-issued identification documents (passport, My Number card, resident registration, etc.), company-issued employee identification, proof of possession of some kind of official qualification (such as a medical license), information proving ability to make payments, etc. (asset information, tax payment certificate, etc.), and proof of service usage history.

[0121] Trust certificates are issued by governments, local governments, financial institutions, telecommunications carriers, companies where users work, certification bodies, and so on.

[0122] <In the case of device trust evaluation> Information used for trust evaluation includes proof that the latest patches have been applied, proof that security measures are enabled, proof that security checks have been conducted by security vendors etc. and that there are no problems, and system logs for hardware and software.

[0123] The issuer of the trust certificate is a device vendor, a security vendor, or the like.

[0124] <Network: In the case of a network administrator trust evaluation> Information used for trust evaluation includes government registration certificates, seal registration certificates, tax payment certificates, certificates of sustainability, SDGs, system certification, etc., and network operation track record (no security breaches for x years, etc.).

[0125] Trust certificates are issued by governments, local governments, various corporate certification / accreditation organizations, etc.

[0126] <Network: Trust evaluation of network equipment> Information used in trust evaluation includes the results of security checks on network equipment (hardware and software), delivery certificates that show that communications have been received correctly, and system logs for hardware and software.

[0127] The issuer of the trust certificate may be a device vendor, a security vendor, a service provider with which the UE communicates, or the like.

[0128] (Examples of Trust Certificate Issuance Forms) Next, examples of trust certificate issuance forms will be described. In the second embodiment, pull type (form 1) and push type (form 2) are assumed.

[0129] An example of pull-type trust certificate issuance will be described with reference to Fig. 9. In S1, a trust certificate management function provided in a UE / NW accesses a service counter at a physical store or the like or a website and submits a trust certificate issuance application to a trust certificate issuing system. More specifically, in S1, the trust certificate management function presents to the trust certificate issuing system the identifiers of the user / UE / NW administrator / NW equipment to be included in the certificate as the subjects of the trust certificate issuance (equivalent to subjects in W3C VC).

[0130] In S2, the trust certificate issuing system issues a trust certificate and registers validity / revocation management information for the newly issued trust certificate in the VDR. If a certificate of the same type has been issued in the past, the system registers the certificate information as having been revoked.

[0131] In S3, the trust certificate issuing system transfers the trust certificate to the trust certificate management function of the UE / NW using a remote communication means such as a network or a short-range communication means such as Bluetooth.

[0132] An example of push-type trust certificate issuance will be described with reference to Fig. 10. Here, it is assumed that the identifiers of the user / UE / NW administrator / NW equipment to be included in the certificate as the subjects of the trust certificate issuance (equivalent to subjects in W3C VC) have been provided in advance to the trust certificate issuing system.

[0133] In S1, the trust certificate issuing system periodically checks the system status of UE / NW equipment, the status of security measures, etc., for the trust certificate management function.

[0134] In S2, the trust certificate issuing system registers validity / revocation management information for the newly issued trust certificate in the VDR. If a certificate of the same type has been issued in the past, the system registers the certificate information as having been revoked.

[0135] In S3, the trust certificate issuance system issues a trust certificate based on the inspection results to the trust certificate management function at any time. The trust certificate issuance process may be performed in advance of the trust evaluation process described below, or may be performed on demand when a trust certificate is required in the trust evaluation process.

[0136] Hereinafter, embodiments 2a to 2c will be described as specific processing examples in embodiment 2.

[0137] (Embodiment 2a) First, embodiment 2a will be described with reference to the sequence diagram shown in Fig. 11. Embodiment 2a is an embodiment in which "the authentication function and the trust evaluation function are separate, and authentication and trust evaluation are performed independently." It is assumed that the authentication function is the authentication function 60 in embodiment 1. The assumptions are as follows:

[0138] A user has a public key / private key pair corresponding to his / her own identifier, and stores his / her own identifier and public key in association with each other in a VDR 70 located in a place accessible by the 3GPP NW.

[0139] A user holds a user trust certificate and a UE trust certificate issued by an arbitrary entity (such as a company or another user), and a network holds a network trust certificate issued by an arbitrary entity.

[0140] The certificate issuer holds a public key / private key pair corresponding to its own identifier, and stores the identifier and public key in association with each other in a VDR 70 located in a location accessible to the user / UE and the 3GPP NW.

[0141] The certificate issuer stores the format (scheme and definition) of the certificate it issues and information for verifying the validity of the certificate in the VDR 70 that exists in a location accessible to the user / UE and the 3GPP NW. The sequence will be described below.

[0142] 11, at any timing such as a user operation, the UE 20 transmits a trust evaluation request message including at least one of a user trust certificate and a UE trust certificate to the (R)AN 10 of the 3GPP NW. Note that in this embodiment, the trust evaluation process is started based on a request from the user / UE, but this is not limitative, and the trust evaluation may be started based on a request from the NW side.

[0143] In S202, the (R)AN 10 forwards the trust evaluation request message to the AMF 30.

[0144] In S203, the AMF 30 sends a trust evaluation request message including the trust certificate to the trust evaluation function 260. In S204, the trust evaluation function 260 executes a trust evaluation process for the user / UE. The trust evaluation process will be described in detail later.

[0145] In S205, the trust evaluation function 260 sends a response including the trust evaluation result (success / failure) to the AMF 30.

[0146] In S206, if the trust evaluation result is successful, the AMF 30 transmits a trust permission message including the NW trust certificate to the (R)AN 10. If the trust evaluation result is unsuccessful, the AMF 30 executes a NW-led NW disconnection process for the UE 20.

[0147] The NW trust certificate includes at least one of a trust certificate of a NW facility and a trust certificate of a NW administrator.

[0148] At S207, the (R)AN 10 transfers a trust authorization message to the UE 20.

[0149] In S208, the UE 20 executes a trust evaluation process for the NW. In S209, if the trust evaluation is successful, the UE 20 transmits a trust evaluation completion message to the (R)AN 10. If the trust evaluation is unsuccessful, the UE 20 initiates a disconnection process from the NW.

[0150] In S210, the (R)AN 10 transfers a trust evaluation completion message to the AMF 30. In S211, the AMF 30 continues providing the network to the user / UE.

[0151] The trust certificate included in the message of S201 is assumed to be in the W3C VC format, for example. The trust certificate includes at least an identifier for uniquely identifying the certificate itself, an identifier of the certificate issuer and a signature using a private key associated with the issuer identifier, an identifier of the subject to which the certificate is issued, and information on the basis of trust evaluation.

[0152] For a message containing a VC that lists a user's identifier (e.g., DID) as information about the subject of the certificate, a message is sent in W3C VP format signed with a private key corresponding to the same user's identifier, and the recipient verifies the signature with the public key based on the private key, making it possible to verify that the subject of the certificate and the sender are the same.

[0153] Similarly, in the case of certificates for UEs and networks, the sending UE or network signs the certificate containing those identifiers as information about the person to whom the certificate is issued with the private key corresponding to each identifier, allowing the receiving party to verify that the person to whom the certificate is issued is the same as the sender.

[0154] According to embodiment 2a, authentication and trust evaluation can be performed independently, which allows flexible processing, such as performing authentication and trust evaluation at any timing.

[0155] (Embodiment 2b) Next, embodiment 2b will be described with reference to the sequence diagram shown in Fig. 12. Embodiment 2b is a form in which "authentication function and trust evaluation function are separate and authentication and trust evaluation are performed in cooperation." The premise of the processing is the same as embodiment 2a.

[0156] In S301, the UE 20 starts a NW connection process when triggered by a user's operation of a NW connection application or by turning on the power of the UE.

[0157] In S302, the UE 20 transmits a network connection request message to the (R)AN 10 of the 3GPP network.

[0158] At this time, the UE 20 may include at least one of a user trust certificate and a UE trust certificate in the NW connection request message. The user trust certificate is signed with a private key corresponding to the user's identifier, and the UE trust certificate is signed with a private key corresponding to the UE's identifier.

[0159] The contents to be included in this message, other than the information used for trust evaluation, are the same as those in the Registration Request message, which is the existing message for requesting network connection authentication.

[0160] The NW connection request message sent in S302 may be an extension of an existing message such as a Registration Request message, or may be a new message.

[0161] In S303, the (R)AN 10 transfers the NW connection request message to the AMF 30, and in S304, the AMF 30 transmits an authentication request to the authentication function 60. In S204, the authentication function 60 executes the authentication process described in embodiment 1. In S306, the authentication function 60 transmits a response message including an authentication result (success / failure) to the AMF 30.

[0162] The information (attributes / certificates, etc.) required for authentication processing by authentication function 60 may be included in the message sent from UE 20 in S302, or may be notified to authentication function 60 in a message separate from the message sent from UE 20 in S302.

[0163] If the trust certificate is not held because the trust certificate is not included in the message in S302, or if the trust certificate is held but the latest certificate is to be reacquired, the processes of S307-1 to S307-4 are executed.

[0164] In S307-1, the AMF 30 transmits a trust certificate request message to the (R)AN 10. This message may be an extension of an existing message such as an Identity Request message, or may be a new message.

[0165] At S307-2, the (R)AN 10 forwards the trust certificate request message to the UE 20.

[0166] In S307-3, the UE 20 transmits a response message including at least one of the user trust certificate and the UE trust certificate to the (R)AN 10. In S307-4, the (R)AN 10 forwards the response message to the AMF 30.

[0167] At S308, the AMF 30 sends a trust evaluation request message including the trust certificate to the trust evaluation function 260.

[0168] In S309, the trust evaluation function 260 executes a trust evaluation process for the user / UE 20. In S310, the trust evaluation function 60 sends a response message including the trust evaluation result (success / failure) to the AMF 30.

[0169] If the trust evaluation is successful, the connection process from S311 onwards is executed, whereas if the trust evaluation is unsuccessful, the NW connection process is aborted.

[0170] In S311, the NW registration process is completed by executing the processes from 3GPP TS 23.502 4.2.2.2 Registration Procedure step 10 onwards. As part of the NW registration process, S311-1 to S311-6 are executed.

[0171] In S311-1, the AMF 30 transmits a trust authorization message including the NW trust certificate to the (R)AN 10. In S211-2, the (R)AN 10 forwards the trust authorization message to the UE 20.

[0172] In S311-3, the UE 20 executes the NW trust evaluation process. In S311-4, if the process is successful, the UE 20 transmits a trust evaluation completion message to the (R)AN 10. If the process is unsuccessful, the UE 20 stops the NW connection process.

[0173] In S311-5, the (R)AN 10 transfers the trust evaluation completion message to the AMF 30. In S311-6, the AMF 30 continues providing the NW to the user / UE 20.

[0174] According to embodiment 2b, authentication and trust evaluation can be performed in conjunction with each other, enabling efficient processing.

[0175] (Embodiment 2c) Next, embodiment 2c will be described with reference to the sequence diagram shown in FIG. 13. Embodiment 2c is an embodiment in which "trust evaluation processing is added to the authentication function and authentication and trust evaluation are performed in cooperation." The premise of the processing is the same as in embodiments 2a and 2b. In embodiment 2a, the authentication function 60 includes a trust evaluation function 260. Note that the trust evaluation function 260 may also include the authentication function 60.

[0176] In S401, the UE 20 starts a network connection process when triggered by a user's operation of a network connection application or by turning on the power of the UE.

[0177] In S402, the UE 20 transmits a NW connection request message including at least one of a user trust certificate and a UE trust certificate to the (R)AN 10 of the 3GPP network.

[0178] The user trust certificate is signed with a private key corresponding to the user's identifier, and the UE trust certificate is signed with a private key corresponding to the UE's identifier. Except for the information used for trust evaluation, the contents to be included in this message are the same as those in the Registration Request message, which is the existing message for a network connection authentication request.

[0179] The NW connection request message sent in S402 may be an extension of an existing message such as a Registration Request message, or may be a new message.

[0180] In S403, the (R)AN 10 transfers the NW connection request message to the AMF 30, and in S404, the AMF 30 transmits an authentication / trust evaluation request message including the trust certificate to the authentication function 60. In S405, the authentication function 60 executes the authentication process of the first embodiment.

[0181] The information (attributes / certificates, etc.) required for authentication processing by authentication function 60 may be included in the message sent from UE 20 in S402, or may be notified to authentication function 60 in a message separate from the message sent from UE 20 in S402.

[0182] At S406 , the authentication function 60 performs a trust evaluation process for the user / UE 20 .

[0183] In S407, the authentication function 60 transmits a response message including the authentication result (success / failure) and the trust evaluation result (success / failure) to the AMF 30. The authentication function 60 may check the authentication result and the trust evaluation result, and if both are successful, may notify the response as success, or otherwise as failure.

[0184] If both the authentication result and the trust evaluation result are successful, the connection process from S408 onwards is executed. If either one fails, the NW connection process is aborted.

[0185] In S408, the NW registration process is completed by executing the processes from 3GPP TS 23.502 4.2.2.2 Registration Procedure step 10 onwards. As part of the NW registration process, S408-1 to S408-6 are executed.

[0186] In S408-1, the AMF 30 sends a trust authorization message including the NW trust certificate to the (R)AN 10. In S408-2, the (R)AN 10 forwards the trust authorization message to the UE 20.

[0187] In S408-3, the UE 20 executes the NW trust evaluation process. In S408-4, if the process is successful, the UE 20 transmits a trust evaluation completion message to the (R)AN 10. If the process is unsuccessful, the UE 20 stops the NW connection process.

[0188] In S408-5, the (R)AN 10 forwards the trust evaluation completion message to the AMF 30. In S408-6, the AMF 30 continues providing the NW to the user / UE 20.

[0189] According to embodiment 2c, authentication and trust evaluation can be performed in conjunction with each other, enabling efficient processing.

[0190] (User / UE Trust Evaluation Process) Next, a specific example of user / UE trust evaluation process in a NW, which is common to embodiments 2a to 2c, will be described with reference to FIG.

[0191] As an example of user / UE trust evaluation logic, we consider the verification of trust certificates in the W3C DID / VC / VP format.

[0192] When the trust evaluation process using a trust certificate is started, in S1, the trust evaluation function 260 / authentication function 60 requests from the VDR 70 a public key corresponding to the identifier of the certificate issuer (issuer), a public key corresponding to the identifier of the user, and a public key corresponding to the identifier of the UE 20. In S2, the VDR 70 responds with these public keys to the trust evaluation function 260 / authentication function 60.

[0193] In S3, the trust evaluation function 260 / authentication function 60 verifies the validity of the certificate issuer's signature, the user's signature, and the UE's signature, and verifies that the message has not been tampered with.

[0194] Note that communication between the trust evaluation function 260 / authentication function 60 in the 3GPP network and the VDR 70 outside the 3GPP network may be via a node (e.g., NEF, SCEF) that mediates communication between the trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230 in the 3GPP network and the VDR 70 outside the 3GPP network.

[0195] Regarding S1 to S3, in more detail, in S1 and S2, the trust evaluation function 260 / authentication function 60 receives as input the DID0 (certificate issuer identifier), DID1 (user identifier), and DID2 (UE 20 identifier) ​​included in the received VP / VC, and resolves the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID0, the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID1, and the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID2 from the VDR 70 using an arbitrary DID Method. In S3, the trust evaluation function 260 / authentication function 60 verifies that the signature of the VP source user, the signature of the VP source UE, and the VC issuer signature are each signatures issued using private keys linked to the corresponding public keys (validity of the signatures, no tampering with the message).

[0196] In S4, the trust evaluation function 260 / authentication function 60 requests information regarding the certificate format and status (such as revocation status) from the VDR 70. In S5, the VDR 70 responds with the certificate format and status information. In S6, the trust evaluation function 260 / authentication function 60 verifies the validity of the certificate.

[0197] Regarding S4 to S6, in more detail, the trust evaluation function 260 / authentication function 60 acquires the VC schema, definition information, etc. from the VDR 70 and verifies that the VC syntax, etc. is correct. The trust evaluation function 260 / authentication function 60 also acquires the VC validity information / revocation information from the VDR 70 and verifies that the received VC is valid.

[0198] In S7, the trust evaluation function 260 / authentication function 60 requests trust evaluation policy information from the UDM / UDR (40), and in S8, the UDM / UDR (40) responds with the trust evaluation policy information. In S9, the trust evaluation function 260 / authentication function 60 performs eligibility verification of the certificate. More specifically, the trust evaluation function 260 / authentication function 60 verifies that the contents of the certificate satisfy the trust evaluation policy in the network.

[0199] An example of a trust evaluation policy in the NW is as follows:

[0200] - In the case of a user's trust evaluation: If the trust certificate is a My Number VC issued by the government, the trust evaluation is successful. - In the case of a UE's trust evaluation: If the trust certificate is a VC that proves that the UE has passed the security check by the security vendor, the trust evaluation is successful. Note that the My Number VC is assumed to be information equivalent to the current My Number converted into VC format.

[0201] If the trust evaluation function 260 / authentication function 60 determines that all of the above verification results are OK, it determines that the trust evaluation is successful.

[0202] The trust evaluation logic is not limited to the above, and a trust evaluation logic other than the above may be used.

[0203] In addition, the trust evaluation form can be either "a form in which the network side considers the trust evaluation of the user or UE to be successful if the certificate issuer includes information that the trust of the user or UE has been evaluated and there are no problems" or "a form in which the network side evaluates whether the user or UE can be trusted by checking the evidence information for trust evaluation included in the certificate (e.g., user asset information, information on whether a medical license is held, UE system information and security logs, etc.) against the network side's trust evaluation policy," but either form can be used.

[0204] If both a user trust certificate and a UE trust certificate are received, trust evaluation can be performed using a combination of both pieces of information, or separately on the user side and the UE side, and if there are no NGs, it can be determined that the trust evaluation is successful.

[0205] Furthermore, regarding the trust evaluation policy when connecting to a VPLMN, the policy on the VPLMN side or the policy on the HPLMN side may be used.

[0206] (NW Trust Evaluation Process) Next, a specific example of NW trust evaluation process in a UE, which is common to embodiments 2a to 2c, will be described with reference to FIG.

[0207] Here, as an example of the NW trust evaluation logic, verification of a trust certificate in the W3C DID / VC / VP format is assumed.

[0208] When trust processing using a trust certificate is started, in S1, the trust evaluation function 22 requests a public key corresponding to the identifier of the certificate issuer (issuer), a public key corresponding to the identifier of the NW administrator, and a public key corresponding to the identifier of the NW equipment from the VDR 70. In S2, the VDR 70 responds with these public keys to the trust evaluation function 22.

[0209] In S3, the trust evaluation function 22 verifies the validity of the signature of the certificate issuer, the signature of the NW administrator, and the signature of the NW equipment, and verifies that the message has not been tampered with.

[0210] Note that communication between the trust evaluation function 22 and the VDR 70 outside the 3GPP network may be via a node (e.g., NEF, SCEF) that mediates communication between the trust evaluation function 22 in the 3GPP network and the VDR 70 outside the 3GPP network.

[0211] Regarding S1 to S3, in more detail, in S1 and S2, the trust evaluation function 22 inputs DID3 (certificate issuer identifier), DID4 (network administrator identifier), and DID5 (network equipment identifier) ​​included in the received VP / VC, and uses an arbitrary DID Method to obtain (resolve) the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID3, the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID4, and the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID5 from the VDR 70. In S3, the trust evaluation function 22 verifies that the signature of the VP source network administrator, the signature of the source network equipment, and the VC issuer signature are each signatures issued by private keys linked to the corresponding public keys (validity of the signature, no tampering of the message).

[0212] In S4, the trust evaluation function 22 requests information about the certificate format and status (such as revocation status) from the VDR 70. In S5, the VDR 70 responds with the certificate format and status information. In S6, the trust evaluation function 22 verifies the validity of the certificate.

[0213] Regarding S4 to S6, in more detail, the trust evaluation function 22 acquires the VC schema, definition information, etc. from the VDR 70 and verifies that the VC syntax, etc. is correct. The trust evaluation function 22 also acquires the VC validity information / revocation information from the VDR 70 and verifies that the received VC is valid.

[0214] In S7, the trust evaluation function 22 requests trust evaluation policy information from the UE database or the like, and in S8, the UE database or the like responds with the trust evaluation policy information. In S9, the trust evaluation function 22 performs eligibility verification of the certificate. More specifically, the trust evaluation function 22 verifies that the contents of the certificate satisfy the trust evaluation policy of the UE 20.

[0215] An example of the trust evaluation policy in the UE 20 is as follows:

[0216] - In the case of a trust evaluation of a network administrator: If the trust certificate is a registration certificate VC issued by the government, the trust evaluation is successful. - In the case of a trust evaluation of network equipment: If the trust certificate is a VC that proves that the security check of the network equipment by the security vendor is problem-free, the trust evaluation is successful. The trust evaluation function 22 determines that the trust evaluation is successful if it determines that all of the above verification results are OK.

[0217] The trust evaluation logic is not limited to the above, and a trust evaluation logic other than the above may be used.

[0218] In addition, the trust evaluation form may be either "a form in which the user / UE side considers the trust evaluation of the NW administrator or NW equipment to be successful if the certificate issuer includes information that the trust of the NW administrator or NW equipment has been evaluated and found to be problem-free" or "a form in which the UE side evaluates whether the UE side can trust the evidence information for trust evaluation contained in the certificate (e.g., information contained in the registration certificate, system information and security logs of the NW equipment, etc.) by comparing it with the trust evaluation policy on the UE side," but either form may be used.

[0219] In the second embodiment, the user's attribute / credentials certificate may be the same as the user's trust certificate. If the authentication function 60 is successful in authenticating the user using the user's attribute / credentials certificate, the trust evaluation function 260 (including the case where it is included in the authentication function 60) may verify only the UE's trust certificate out of the UE's trust certificate and the user's trust certificate.

[0220] (Additional Information) When the user / UE 20 needs to obtain information necessary for the trust evaluation of the NW (public key corresponding to the identifier of the issuer / NW administrator / NW equipment on the VDR, certificate schema, revocation information, evaluation policy) before registration with the NW, the following (1) to (4) are considered as possible means for realizing this.

[0221] (1) At the time of processing, the UE 20 uses other available networks to access the VDR and policies for trust evaluation.

[0222] (2) When some network has been used in the past, an evaluation policy or the like is downloaded into the UE 20 (in the case of VDR, synchronized with the VDR node on the UE 20).

[0223] (3) Information necessary for trust evaluation is pre-installed in the UE 20 or a SIM card or the like mounted on the UE 20.

[0224] (4) Access to systems necessary for trust evaluation, such as VDR, via the network is permitted even before network registration.

[0225] (Device Configuration) Next, a functional configuration example of the "trust evaluation function 260, authentication function 60, AMF 30, etc." and the terminal 20 (UE 20) that perform the processes and operations described above will be described. Hereinafter, the network nodes such as the trust evaluation function 260, authentication function 60, AMF 30, etc. will be collectively referred to as the "network node 100."

[0226] <Network Node 100> FIG. 16 is a diagram illustrating an example of the functional configuration of the network node 100. As shown in FIG.

[0227] As shown in Fig. 16, the network node 100 includes a transmitting unit 110, a receiving unit 120, a setting unit 130, and a control unit 140. The functional configuration shown in Fig. 16 is merely an example. The names of the functional divisions and functional units may be any names as long as they can perform the operations according to the embodiment of the present invention.

[0228] The transmitter 110 has a function of generating a signal to be transmitted to the terminal 20 or another network node and transmitting the signal via a wired or wireless connection. The receiver 120 has a function of receiving various signals transmitted from the terminal 20 or another network node and acquiring, for example, information of a higher layer from the received signal. A communication unit including the transmitter 110 and the receiver 120 may be configured.

[0229] The setting unit 130 stores pre-set setting information and various setting information to be transmitted to the terminal 20 in a storage device, and reads out the information from the storage device as needed. The control unit 140 controls the network node 100. The function unit related to signal transmission in the control unit 140 may be included in the transmitting unit 110, and the function unit related to signal reception in the control unit 140 may be included in the receiving unit 120. The transmitting unit 110 and the receiving unit 120 may be called a transmitter and a receiver, respectively.

[0230] <Terminal 20> Fig. 17 is a diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of the terminal 20. As shown in Fig. 17, the terminal 20 has a transmitting unit 310, a receiving unit 320, a setting unit 330, and a control unit 340. The functional configuration shown in Fig. 14 is merely an example. The names of the functional divisions and functional units may be any as long as they can perform the operations related to the embodiment of the present invention.

[0231] The transmitter 310 creates a transmission signal from transmission data and transmits the transmission signal wirelessly. The receiver 320 receives various signals wirelessly and acquires higher layer signals from the received physical layer signals. The receiver 320 also has a function of receiving NR-PSS, NR-SSS, NR-PBCH, DL / UL control signals, reference signals, and the like transmitted from a network node. A communication unit including the transmitter 310 and the receiver 320 may be configured.

[0232] The setting unit 330 stores various setting information received from the network node by the receiving unit 320 in a storage device, and reads it out from the storage device as needed. The setting unit 330 also stores setting information that is set in advance.

[0233] The control unit 340 controls the terminal 20. The functional unit in the control unit 340 related to signal transmission may be included in the transmitting unit 310, and the functional unit in the control unit 340 related to signal reception may be included in the receiving unit 320. The transmitting unit 310 and the receiving unit 320 may be called a transmitter and a receiver, respectively.

[0234] (Hardware Configuration) The block diagrams (FIGS. 16 and 17) used to explain the above embodiments show functional blocks. These functional blocks (components) are realized by any combination of at least one of hardware and software. Furthermore, the method for realizing each functional block is not particularly limited. That is, each functional block may be realized using a single device that is physically or logically coupled, or may be realized using two or more physically or logically separated devices that are directly or indirectly connected (for example, using wires, wirelessly, etc.) and these multiple devices. The functional block may be realized by combining software with the single device or the multiple devices.

[0235] Functions include, but are not limited to, judgment, determination, assessment, calculation, computation, processing, derivation, investigation, search, confirmation, reception, transmission, output, access, resolution, selection, selection, establishment, comparison, assumption, expectation, consideration, broadcasting, notifying, communicating, forwarding, configuring, reconfiguring, allocating, mapping, and assignment. For example, a functional block (component) that performs transmission is called a transmitting unit or transmitter. As mentioned above, there are no particular limitations on how these functions are implemented.

[0236] For example, the network node 100 and the terminal 20 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure may function as a computer that performs processing of the communication method of the present disclosure. Fig. 18 is a diagram illustrating an example of the hardware configuration of the network node 100 and the terminal 20 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The EES 30 and the terminal 20 described above may be physically configured as a computer device including a processor 1001, a storage device 1002, an auxiliary storage device 1003, a communication device 1004, an input device 1005, an output device 1006, a bus 1007, etc.

[0237] In the following description, the term "apparatus" can be read as a circuit, a device, a unit, etc. The hardware configuration of the network node 100 and the terminal 20 may be configured to include one or more of the apparatuses shown in the figure, or may be configured to exclude some of the apparatuses.

[0238] Each function in the network node 100 and the terminal 20 is realized by loading specified software (programs) onto hardware such as the processor 1001, the memory device 1002, etc., so that the processor 1001 performs calculations, controls communication via the communication device 1004, and controls at least one of reading and writing data in the memory device 1002 and the auxiliary memory device 1003.

[0239] The processor 1001 controls the entire computer by running, for example, an operating system. The processor 1001 may be configured as a central processing unit (CPU) including an interface with peripheral devices, a control device, an arithmetic unit, a register, etc. For example, the above-mentioned control unit 140, control unit 340, etc. may be realized by the processor 1001.

[0240] Furthermore, the processor 1001 reads programs (program codes), software modules, data, etc. from at least one of the auxiliary storage device 1003 and the communication device 1004 into the storage device 1002 and executes various processes in accordance with the programs. The programs used are those that cause a computer to execute at least some of the operations described in the above-described embodiments. For example, the control unit 140 of the network node 100 shown in FIG. 16 may be implemented by a control program stored in the storage device 1002 and running on the processor 1001. Furthermore, for example, the control unit 340 of the terminal 20 shown in FIG. 17 may be implemented by a control program stored in the storage device 1002 and running on the processor 1001. While the above-described various processes have been described as being executed by one processor 1001, they may also be executed simultaneously or sequentially by two or more processors 1001. The processor 1001 may be implemented by one or more chips. The programs may also be transmitted from a network via a telecommunications line.

[0241] The storage device 1002 is a computer-readable recording medium and may be configured, for example, by at least one of a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), a random access memory (RAM), etc. The storage device 1002 may also be called a register, a cache, a main memory, etc. The storage device 1002 can store executable programs (program codes), software modules, etc. for implementing a communication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0242] The secondary storage device 1003 is a computer-readable recording medium, and may be, for example, at least one of an optical disk such as a CD-ROM (Compact Disc ROM), a hard disk drive, a flexible disk, a magneto-optical disk (e.g., a compact disk, a digital versatile disk, a Blu-ray (registered trademark) disk), a smart card, a flash memory (e.g., a card, a stick, a key drive), a floppy (registered trademark) disk, a magnetic strip, etc. The above-mentioned storage medium may be, for example, a database, a server, or other appropriate medium including at least one of the storage device 1002 and the secondary storage device 1003.

[0243] The communication device 1004 is hardware (transmission / reception device) for communicating between computers via at least one of a wired network and a wireless network, and is also referred to as, for example, a network device, a network controller, a network card, a communication module, etc. The communication device 1004 may be configured to include a high-frequency switch, a duplexer, a filter, a frequency synthesizer, etc. to realize at least one of frequency division duplex (FDD) and time division duplex (TDD). For example, a transmission / reception antenna, an amplifier unit, a transmission / reception unit, a transmission path interface, etc. may be realized by the communication device 1004. The transmission / reception unit may be implemented as a transmission unit and a reception unit that are physically or logically separated.

[0244] The input device 1005 is an input device (e.g., a keyboard, a mouse, a microphone, a switch, a button, a sensor, etc.) that receives input from the outside. The output device 1006 is an output device (e.g., a display, a speaker, an LED lamp, etc.) that outputs to the outside. Note that the input device 1005 and the output device 1006 may be integrated into one device (e.g., a touch panel).

[0245] Furthermore, each device such as the processor 1001 and the storage device 1002 is connected by a bus 1007 for communicating information. The bus 1007 may be configured using a single bus, or may be configured using different buses between each device.

[0246] Furthermore, the network node 100 and the terminal 20 may be configured to include hardware such as a microprocessor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a programmable logic device (PLD), or a field programmable gate array (FPGA), and some or all of the functional blocks may be realized by the hardware. For example, the processor 1001 may be implemented using at least one of these pieces of hardware.

[0247] 19 shows an example configuration of a vehicle 2001. As shown in FIG. 19 , the vehicle 2001 includes a drive unit 2002, a steering unit 2003, an accelerator pedal 2004, a brake pedal 2005, a shift lever 2006, front wheels 2007, rear wheels 2008, an axle 2009, an electronic control unit 2010, various sensors 2021 to 2029, an information service unit 2012, and a communication module 2013. Each aspect / embodiment described in the present disclosure may be applied to a communication device mounted on the vehicle 2001, and may be applied to the communication module 2013, for example. For example, the network node 100 or the terminal 20 may be included in the communication module 2013.

[0248] The drive unit 2002 is configured, for example, by an engine, a motor, or a hybrid of an engine and a motor. The steering unit 2003 includes at least a steering wheel (also called a handle) and is configured to steer at least one of the front wheels and the rear wheels based on the operation of the steering wheel operated by the user.

[0249] The electronic control unit 2010 is composed of a microprocessor 2031, a memory (ROM, RAM) 2032, and a communication port (IO port) 2033. Signals are input to the electronic control unit 2010 from various sensors 2021 to 2029 provided in the vehicle 2001. The electronic control unit 2010 may also be called an ECU (Electronic Control Unit).

[0250] The signals from the various sensors 2021 to 2029 include a current signal from a current sensor 2021 that senses the current of the motor, a rotation speed signal of the front and rear wheels obtained by a rotation speed sensor 2022, an air pressure signal of the front and rear wheels obtained by an air pressure sensor 2023, a vehicle speed signal obtained by a vehicle speed sensor 2024, an acceleration signal obtained by an acceleration sensor 2025, an accelerator pedal depression amount signal obtained by an accelerator pedal sensor 2029, a brake pedal depression amount signal obtained by a brake pedal sensor 2026, a shift lever operation signal obtained by a shift lever sensor 2027, and a detection signal for detecting obstacles, vehicles, pedestrians, etc. obtained by an object detection sensor 2028.

[0251] The information service unit 2012 is composed of various devices, such as a car navigation system, an audio system, speakers, a television, and a radio, for providing (outputting) various types of information, such as driving information, traffic information, and entertainment information, and one or more ECUs for controlling these devices. The information service unit 2012 uses information acquired from external devices via the communication module 2013 or the like to provide various types of multimedia information and multimedia services to the occupants of the vehicle 2001. The information service unit 2012 may include input devices (e.g., a keyboard, a mouse, a microphone, a switch, a button, a sensor, a touch panel, etc.) that accept input from the outside, and may also include output devices (e.g., a display, a speaker, an LED lamp, a touch panel, etc.) that output information to the outside.

[0252] The driving assistance system unit 2030 is composed of various devices that provide functions for preventing accidents and reducing the driving burden on the driver, such as millimeter-wave radar, LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging), cameras, positioning locators (e.g., GNSS, etc.), map information (e.g., high-definition (HD) maps, autonomous vehicle (AV) maps, etc.), gyro systems (e.g., IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit), INS (Inertial Navigation System), etc.), AI (Artificial Intelligence) chips, and AI processors, as well as one or more ECUs that control these devices. In addition, the driving assistance system unit 2030 transmits and receives various information via the communication module 2013 to realize the driving assistance function or the autonomous driving function.

[0253] The communication module 2013 can communicate with the microprocessor 2031 and components of the vehicle 2001 via the communication port. For example, the communication module 2013 transmits and receives data via the communication port 2033 to and from the drive unit 2002, steering unit 2003, accelerator pedal 2004, brake pedal 2005, shift lever 2006, front wheels 2007, rear wheels 2008, axle 2009, microprocessor 2031 and memory (ROM, RAM) 2032 in the electronic control unit 2010, and sensors 2021 to 29, which are provided in the vehicle 2001.

[0254] The communication module 2013 is a communication device that can be controlled by the microprocessor 2031 of the electronic control unit 2010 and can communicate with an external device. For example, it transmits and receives various information to and from the external device via wireless communication. The communication module 2013 may be located either inside or outside the electronic control unit 2010. The external device may be, for example, a base station, a terminal, a network node, or the like.

[0255] The communication module 2013 may transmit, via wireless communication, to an external device at least one of signals from the various sensors 2021-2028 input to the electronic control unit 2010, information obtained based on the signals, and information based on input from the outside (user) obtained via the information service unit 2012. The electronic control unit 2010, the various sensors 2021-2028, the information service unit 2012, etc. may be referred to as input units that accept input.

[0256] The communication module 2013 receives various information (traffic information, traffic signal information, vehicle-to-vehicle information, etc.) transmitted from external devices and displays it on an information service unit 2012 provided in the vehicle 2001. The information service unit 2012 may be called an output unit that outputs information (for example, outputs information to a device such as a display or speaker based on the PDSCH (or data / information decoded from the PDSCH) received by the communication module 2013). The communication module 2013 also stores the various information received from external devices in a memory 2032 that can be used by the microprocessor 2031. Based on the information stored in the memory 2032, the microprocessor 2031 may control the drive unit 2002, steering unit 2003, accelerator pedal 2004, brake pedal 2005, shift lever 2006, front wheels 2007, rear wheels 2008, axles 2009, sensors 2021 to 2029, etc. provided in the vehicle 2001.

[0257] Furthermore, when the communication module 2013 includes the network node 100 (or the terminal 20), the communication module 2013 can perform the operations of the network node 100 (or the terminal 20) described above.

[0258] This specification discloses at least the configurations described in the appendices below.

[0259] <Additional Notes> (Additional Item 1) A network node comprising: a receiving unit that receives a trust evaluation request message including a trust certificate of a terminal or the user from a specific network node when authentication using a user's attributes / credentials is successful, a control unit that performs trust evaluation processing using the trust certificate, and a transmitting unit that transmits the trust evaluation result to the specific network node. (Additional Item 2) The network node according to Additional Item 1, wherein the terminal continues connection to the network when trust evaluation for the terminal or the user is successful and trust evaluation for the network in the terminal is successful. (Additional Item 3) A network node comprising: a receiving unit that receives a trust evaluation request message including a trust certificate of a terminal or user from a specific network node that has received a message including the trust certificate of the terminal or user from the terminal, a control unit that performs authentication processing using the user's attributes / credentials and trust evaluation processing using the trust certificate, and a transmitting unit that transmits a response message regarding the authentication result and the trust evaluation result to the specific network node. (Supplementary Item 4) A terminal comprising: a receiving unit that receives a message including a trust certificate of the network from a specific network node when authentication using a user's attributes / credentials and trust evaluation of the terminal or the user are successful on the network side, a control unit that executes trust evaluation processing using the trust certificate, and a sending unit that sends a trust evaluation completion message to the specific network node when the trust evaluation result is successful. (Supplementary Item 5) A communication method executed by a network node, comprising: a step of receiving a trust evaluation request message including a trust certificate of the terminal or the user from a specific network node when authentication using the user's attributes / credentials is successful, a step of executing trust evaluation processing using the trust certificate, and a step of sending the trust evaluation result to the specific network node.(Supplementary Item 6) A communication method executed by a terminal, comprising the steps of: receiving a message including a network trust certificate from a specific network node when authentication using a user's attributes / credentials and trust evaluation for the terminal or the user is successful on the network side; performing a trust evaluation process using the trust certificate; and sending a trust evaluation completion message to the specific network node when the trust evaluation result is successful.

[0260] A highly reliable network connection can be achieved by any of supplementary items 1 to 6. Supplementary item 2 clarifies the conditions for continuing the connection to the network.

[0261] (Supplementary Notes on the Embodiments) Although the embodiments of the present invention have been described above, the disclosed invention is not limited to such embodiments, and those skilled in the art will understand various modifications, alterations, alternatives, and substitutions. While specific numerical examples have been used to facilitate understanding of the invention, unless otherwise specified, these numerical values ​​are merely examples, and any appropriate values ​​may be used. The division of items in the above description is not essential to the present invention; matters described in two or more items may be used in combination as needed, and matters described in one item may apply to matters described in another item (as long as there is no contradiction). Boundaries between functional units or processing units in functional block diagrams do not necessarily correspond to boundaries between physical components. The operations of multiple functional units may be performed physically by a single component, or the operations of a single functional unit may be performed physically by multiple components. The order of processing procedures described in the embodiments may be reversed as long as there is no contradiction. For convenience of processing description, the network node 100 and the terminal 20 have been described using functional block diagrams. However, such devices may be realized by hardware, software, or a combination thereof. The software operated by the processor of the EES 30 in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention and the software operated by the processor of the terminal 20 in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention may each be stored in random access memory (RAM), flash memory, read-only memory (ROM), EPROM, EEPROM, registers, hard disk (HDD), removable disk, CD-ROM, database, server, or any other suitable storage medium.

[0262] Furthermore, the notification of information is not limited to the aspects / embodiments described in the present disclosure, and may be performed using other methods. For example, the notification of information may be performed by physical layer signaling (e.g., Downlink Control Information (DCI), Uplink Control Information (UCI)), higher layer signaling (e.g., Radio Resource Control (RRC) signaling, Medium Access Control (MAC) signaling), broadcast information (Master Information Block (MIB), System Information Block (SIB)), other signals, or a combination thereof. Furthermore, the RRC signaling may be referred to as an RRC message, and may be, for example, an RRC Connection Setup message, an RRC Connection Reconfiguration message, or the like.

[0263] Each aspect / embodiment described in the present disclosure may be implemented using any of the following standards: LTE (Long Term Evolution), LTE-Advanced (LTE-A), SUPER 3G, IMT-Advanced, 4G (4th generation mobile communication system), 5G (5th generation mobile communication system), 6th generation mobile communication system (6G), xth generation mobile communication system (xG) (xG (x is, for example, an integer or a decimal number)), FRA (Future Radio Access), NR (new Radio), New radio access (NX), Future generation radio access (FX), W-CDMA (registered trademark), GSM (registered trademark), CDMA2000, UMB (Ultra Mobile Broadband), IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.17 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.19 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.20 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.21 (Wi-Fi (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.22 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.23 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.24 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.25 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.26 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.27 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.28 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.29 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.30 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.31 (Wi-Fi (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.32 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.33 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.34 ( The present invention may be applied to at least one of systems using 802.20, UWB (Ultra-Wide Band), Bluetooth (registered trademark), or other suitable systems, and next-generation systems that are extended, modified, created, or defined based on these systems. The present invention may also be applied to a combination of multiple systems (e.g., a combination of LTE and / or LTE-A with 5G).

[0264] The order of the procedures, sequences, flowcharts, etc. of each aspect / embodiment described herein may be rearranged unless it is consistent. For example, the methods described in this disclosure present elements of various steps using an example order and are not limited to the particular order presented.

[0265] In this specification, a specific operation described as being performed by the base station 10 ((R)AN 10) may also be performed by its upper node in some cases. In a network consisting of one or more network nodes having a base station 10, it is clear that various operations performed for communication with a terminal 20 may be performed by at least one of the base station 10 and another network node other than the base station 10 (such as, but not limited to, an MME or an S-GW). Although the above example illustrates a case where there is one other network node other than the base station 10, the other network node may be a combination of multiple other network nodes (for example, an MME and an S-GW).

[0266] The information, signals, etc. described in the present disclosure may be output from a higher layer (or a lower layer) to a lower layer (or a higher layer), or may be input / output via multiple network nodes.

[0267] Input and output information may be stored in a specific location (for example, memory) or may be managed using a management table. Input and output information may be overwritten, updated, or added to. Output information may be deleted. Input information may be transmitted to another device.

[0268] In the present disclosure, the determination may be made by a value represented by one bit (0 or 1), by a Boolean value (true or false), or by a comparison of numerical values ​​(e.g., comparison with a predetermined value).

[0269] Software shall be construed broadly to mean instructions, instruction sets, code, code segments, program code, programs, subprograms, software modules, applications, software applications, software packages, routines, subroutines, objects, executable files, threads of execution, procedures, functions, etc., whether referred to as software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardware description language, or otherwise.

[0270] Software, instructions, information, etc. may also be transmitted or received over a transmission medium. For example, if software is transmitted from a website, server, or other remote source using wired technologies (such as coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL)), and / or wireless technologies (such as infrared, microwave), then these wired and / or wireless technologies are included within the definition of transmission media.

[0271] The information, signals, etc. described in this disclosure may be represented using any of a variety of different technologies. For example, data, instructions, commands, information, signals, bits, symbols, chips, etc. that may be referred to throughout the above description may be represented by voltages, currents, electromagnetic waves, magnetic fields or magnetic particles, optical fields or photons, or any combination thereof.

[0272] Note that terms described in this disclosure and terms necessary for understanding this disclosure may be replaced with terms having the same or similar meanings. For example, at least one of a channel and a symbol may be a signal (signaling). Furthermore, a signal may be a message. Furthermore, a component carrier (CC) may be called a carrier frequency, a cell, a frequency carrier, etc.

[0273] As used in this disclosure, the terms "system" and "network" are used interchangeably.

[0274] Furthermore, the information, parameters, etc. described in the present disclosure may be expressed using absolute values, may be expressed using relative values ​​from a predetermined value, or may be expressed using other corresponding information. For example, a radio resource may be indicated by an index.

[0275] The names used for the above-described parameters are not intended to be limiting in any way. Furthermore, the mathematical expressions using these parameters may differ from those explicitly disclosed in this disclosure. The various channels (e.g., PUCCH, PDCCH, etc.) and information elements may be identified by any suitable names, and therefore the various names assigned to these various channels and information elements are not intended to be limiting in any way.

[0276] In the present disclosure, terms such as "base station (BS)," "radio base station," "base station device," "fixed station," "NodeB," "eNodeB (eNB)," "gNodeB (gNB)," "access point," "transmission point," "reception point," "transmission / reception point," "cell," "sector," "cell group," "carrier," and "component carrier" may be used interchangeably. A base station may also be referred to by terms such as a macrocell, a small cell, a femtocell, and a picocell.

[0277] A base station can accommodate one or more (e.g., three) cells. When a base station accommodates multiple cells, the overall coverage area of ​​the base station can be partitioned into multiple smaller areas, and each smaller area can also be provided with communication services by a base station subsystem (e.g., a small indoor base station (RRH: Remote Radio Head)). The terms "cell" or "sector" refer to part or all of the coverage area of ​​a base station and / or base station subsystem that provides communication services within that coverage.

[0278] In the present disclosure, the base station transmitting information to a terminal may be interpreted as the base station instructing the terminal to control or operate based on the information.

[0279] In this disclosure, the terms "Mobile Station (MS)," "user terminal," "User Equipment (UE)," "terminal," and the like may be used interchangeably.

[0280] A mobile station may also be referred to by those skilled in the art as a subscriber station, mobile unit, subscriber unit, wireless unit, remote unit, mobile device, wireless device, wireless communication device, remote device, mobile subscriber station, access terminal, mobile terminal, wireless terminal, remote terminal, handset, user agent, mobile client, client, or some other suitable terminology.

[0281] At least one of the base station and the mobile station (terminal 20) may be referred to as a transmitting device, a receiving device, a communication device, etc. At least one of the base station and the mobile station may be a device mounted on a mobile object, the mobile object itself, etc. The mobile object refers to a movable object, and may move at any speed. Naturally, this also includes cases where the mobile object is stationary. Examples of the mobile object include, but are not limited to, vehicles, transport vehicles, automobiles, motorcycles, bicycles, connected cars, excavators, bulldozers, wheel loaders, dump trucks, forklifts, trains, buses, handcars, rickshaws, ships and other watercraft, airplanes, rockets, satellites, drones (registered trademark), multicopters, quadcopters, balloons, and objects mounted thereon. The mobile object may also be a mobile object that travels autonomously based on an operational command. The mobile object may be a vehicle (e.g., a car, an airplane, etc.), an unmanned mobile object (e.g., a drone, an autonomous vehicle, etc.), or a robot (manned or unmanned). At least one of the base station and the mobile station may be a device that does not necessarily move during communication operations. For example, at least one of the base station and the mobile station may be an IoT (Internet of Things) device such as a sensor.

[0282] Furthermore, a base station in the present disclosure may be read as a user terminal. For example, the aspects / embodiments of the present disclosure may be applied to a configuration in which communication between a base station and a user terminal is replaced with communication between multiple terminals 20 (which may be called, for example, Device-to-Device (D2D) or Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X)). In this case, the terminal 20 may be configured to have the functions of the base station 10 described above. Furthermore, terms such as "uplink" and "downlink" may be read as terms corresponding to terminal-to-terminal communication (for example, "side"). For example, terms such as an uplink channel and a downlink channel may be read as a side channel.

[0283] Similarly, the user terminal in the present disclosure may be read as a base station, in which case the base station may be configured to have the functions of the user terminal described above.

[0284] As used in this disclosure, the terms "determining" and "determining" may encompass a wide variety of actions. "Determining" and "determining" may include, for example, judging, calculating, computing, processing, deriving, investigating, looking up, searching, inquiring (e.g., searching in a table, database, or other data structure), ascertaining, and the like. "Determining" and "determining" may also include receiving (e.g., receiving information), transmitting (e.g., sending information), input, output, accessing (e.g., accessing data in memory), and the like. Furthermore, "judgment" and "decision" can include regarding resolving, selecting, choosing, establishing, comparing, etc. as having been "judged" or "decided." In other words, "judgment" and "decision" can include regarding some action as having been "judged" or "decided." Furthermore, "judgment (decision)" can be interpreted as "assuming," "expecting," "considering," etc.

[0285] The terms "connected," "coupled," or any variation thereof, refer to any direct or indirect connection or coupling between two or more elements, and may include the presence of one or more intermediate elements between two elements that are "connected" or "coupled" to each other. The coupling or connection between elements may be physical, logical, or a combination thereof. For example, "connected" may be read as "access." As used in this disclosure, two elements may be considered to be "connected" or "coupled" to each other using one or more wires, cables, and / or printed electrical connections, as well as electromagnetic energy having wavelengths in the radio frequency range, microwave range, and optical (both visible and invisible) range, as some non-limiting and non-exhaustive examples.

[0286] The reference signal may be abbreviated as RS (Reference Signal) or may be called a pilot depending on the applicable standard.

[0287] As used in this disclosure, the phrase "based on" does not mean "based only on," unless expressly stated otherwise. In other words, the phrase "based on" means both "based only on" and "based at least on."

[0288] As used in this disclosure, any reference to an element using a designation such as "first," "second," etc. does not generally limit the quantity or order of those elements. These designations may be used in this disclosure as a convenient method of distinguishing between two or more elements. Thus, a reference to a first and a second element does not imply that only two elements may be employed or that the first element must in some way precede the second element.

[0289] The "means" in the configuration of each of the above devices may be replaced with "part," "circuit," "device," etc.

[0290] When the terms "include," "including," and variations thereof are used in this disclosure, these terms are intended to be inclusive, similar to the term "comprising." Furthermore, when the term "or" is used in this disclosure, it is not intended to be an exclusive or.

[0291] In this disclosure, where articles are added by translation, such as a, an, and the in English, the disclosure may include that the nouns following these articles are in the plural form.

[0292] In the present disclosure, the term "A and B are different" may mean "A and B are different from each other." The term may also mean "A and B are each different from C." Terms such as "separate" and "coupled" may also be interpreted in the same way as "different."

[0293] The aspects / embodiments described in this disclosure may be used alone, in combination, or switched depending on the implementation. Notification of predetermined information (e.g., notification that "X is true") is not limited to explicit notification, but may be implicit (e.g., not notifying the predetermined information).

[0294] Although the present disclosure has been described in detail above, it is clear to those skilled in the art that the present disclosure is not limited to the embodiments described herein. The present disclosure can be implemented in modified and altered forms without departing from the spirit and scope of the present disclosure as defined by the claims. Therefore, the description of the present disclosure is intended to be illustrative and does not have any limiting meaning on the present disclosure.

[0295] 10 Base station ((R)AN) 20 Terminal (UE) 21 NW connection function 22, 260 Trust evaluation function 30 AMF 40, 240 UDM 41 NW information DB 42 Trust certificate DB 43 Policy DB 60 Authentication function 70 VDR 71 User information DB 72 Issuer information DB 73 Definition information DB 74 Management information DB 80 AUSF 100 Network node 110 Transmission unit 120 Reception unit 130 Setting unit 140 Control unit 310 Transmission unit 320 Reception unit 330 Setting unit 340 Control unit 1001 Processor 1002 Storage device 1003 Auxiliary storage device 1004 Communication device 1005 Input device 1006 Output device

Claims

1. A network node comprising: a receiving unit that receives a trust evaluation request message including a trust certificate of a terminal or the user from a specific network node when authentication using a user's attribute / credentials certificate is successful; a control unit that executes a trust evaluation process using the trust certificate; and a transmitting unit that transmits the trust evaluation result to the specific network node.

2. The network node according to claim 1, wherein if trust evaluation for the terminal or the user is successful and trust evaluation for the network is also successful in the terminal, the terminal continues to connect to the network.

3. A network node comprising: a receiving unit that receives a trust evaluation request message including a trust certificate of a terminal or user from a specific network node that has received a message including the trust certificate from the terminal; a control unit that performs authentication processing using the user's attributes / credentials and trust evaluation processing using the trust certificate; and a transmitting unit that transmits a response message regarding the authentication result and trust evaluation result to the specific network node.

4. A terminal comprising: a receiving unit that receives a message including a network trust certificate from a specific network node when authentication using a user's attributes / credentials and trust evaluation of the terminal or the user is successful on the network side; a control unit that executes trust evaluation processing using the trust certificate; and a transmitting unit that sends a trust evaluation completion message to the specific network node when the trust evaluation result is successful.

5. A communication method executed by a network node, comprising the steps of: receiving a trust evaluation request message including a trust certificate of a terminal or the user from a specific network node when authentication using a user's attributes / credentials is successful; performing a trust evaluation process using the trust certificate; and transmitting a trust evaluation result to the specific network node.

6. A communication method executed by a terminal, comprising the steps of: receiving a message including a network trust certificate from a specific network node when authentication using a user's attributes / credentials and trust evaluation for the terminal or the user is successful on the network side; performing a trust evaluation process using the trust certificate; and sending a trust evaluation completion message to the specific network node when the trust evaluation result is successful.

Citation Information

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