Electronic component authentication method, terminal, and electronic component

Abstract

The present application provides an electronic component authentication method, terminal, and electronic component. The method includes: upon detecting that the electronic component is connected for the first time, the terminal obtains a digital certificate from the electronic component; verifies the digital certificate; upon successful verification of the digital certificate, sends a first credential to the electronic component, the first credential including an encrypted second credential; upon detecting that the electronic component is connected again, obtains a second credential from the electronic component, the second credential being obtained based on the first credential; and authenticates the electronic component based on the second credential. Compared to authenticating a digital certificate, the authentication process for the second credential is significantly simplified, shortens authentication time, improves authentication efficiency, and enables rapid authentication of the electronic component and enabling the electronic component upon successful authentication.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of electronic component control and management, and more specifically, to an electronic component authentication method, a terminal, and an electronic component. Background Art

[0002] Electronic components offer significant economic benefits during repair and maintenance. However, during repairs, there is a risk of substituting inferior components for genuine ones. For example, replacing genuine electronic components with competitors' or inferior products can compromise their performance.

[0003] Currently, a known technology uses digital certificates pre-installed during the chip manufacturing process to authenticate electronic components. Specifically, upon detecting the connection of an electronic component, the terminal first authenticates the component's digital certificate. Only after successful authentication does the component's functions and services become enabled. Furthermore, each time the component is activated, the digital certificate must be authenticated. However, digital certificate authentication is a complex and time-consuming process.

[0004] For example, a car can authenticate its electronic components with digital certificates. However, if each electronic component needs to wait for a time-consuming authentication process when starting up, the car will start very slowly, making it impossible to authenticate the electronic components when the car starts up. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The present application provides an electronic component authentication method, a terminal, and an electronic component, in order to simplify the electronic component authentication process so that the electronic component can be quickly authenticated when the terminal is started.

[0006] In a first aspect, this application provides a method for authenticating electronic components. This method can be executed by a terminal, or by a component deployed in the terminal (such as a chip, chip system, etc.). This application is not limited to this. The following is merely an example, describing the method provided in the first aspect using a terminal as the execution subject.

[0007] Exemplarily, the method includes: when detecting that the electronic component is connected for the first time, obtaining a digital certificate from the electronic component; verifying the digital certificate; when the verification of the digital certificate is successful, sending a first credential to the electronic component, the first credential including an encrypted second credential; when detecting that the above-mentioned electronic component is connected again, obtaining a second credential from the electronic component, the second credential being obtained based on the first credential; and authenticating the electronic component based on the above-mentioned second credential.

[0008] Based on the above technical solution, after the electronic component is first connected and authenticated, the terminal can issue a first credential to the electronic component, allowing the electronic component to obtain a second credential based on the first credential. When the electronic component is connected again, it does not need to authenticate the electronic component with the digital certificate again. Instead, it authenticates the second credential instead. Compared to authentication based on digital certificates, the authentication process for the second credential is greatly simplified, shortening authentication time and improving authentication efficiency. Therefore, the electronic component can quickly complete authentication when the terminal is started.

[0009] In combination with the first aspect, in some possible implementations of the first aspect, the first credential is obtained based on the encryption of an identity identifier and a first key, the identity identifier is used to identify the identity of the electronic component, and the first key is used to encrypt the identity identifier; the second credential includes an encrypted identity identifier obtained by encrypting the identity identifier based on the first key.

[0010] If the terminal successfully verifies the digital certificate, the first credential sent to the electronic component may be an encrypted identity and a first key. This allows the electronic component to encrypt the identity using the first key to obtain an encrypted identity, thereby generating a second credential for authentication using the identity upon re-access. In other words, in one possible implementation, the second credential may include an encrypted identity, allowing the terminal to authenticate the electronic component upon detecting re-access. Compared to digital certificate authentication, identity authentication significantly simplifies the process, thereby shortening authentication time and improving authentication efficiency.

[0011] In combination with the first aspect, in some possible implementations of the first aspect, the electronic component is authenticated based on the second credential, including: using the first key to decrypt the encrypted identity to obtain the identity; authenticating the electronic component based on the decrypted identity and the locally stored identity; and enabling the electronic component if the authentication of the electronic component is successful; or prohibiting the electronic component from being enabled if the authentication of the electronic component fails.

[0012] When the electronic component is connected to the terminal again, the terminal uses the first key to decrypt the encrypted identity, and then compares the identity with the local one. If the authentication is successful, the electronic component is enabled; otherwise, the electronic component is prohibited from being enabled. This simplifies the authentication process, shortens the authentication time, and allows the electronic component to complete the authentication quickly. If the authentication is successful, the electronic component is enabled.

[0013] Optionally, the identity identifier includes a token or a certificate serial number (SN) of a digital certificate.

[0014] Optionally, the token includes a decentralized identity (DID) and a certificate SN of a digital certificate.

[0015] In combination with the first aspect, in some possible implementations of the first aspect, the identity identifier includes a token. When the electronic component is successfully authenticated, the token is updated to obtain an updated token, which is used to authenticate the electronic component the next time it is accessed; the updated token is encrypted using a first key to obtain an encrypted updated token; and the encrypted updated token is sent to the electronic component.

[0016] When the electronic component is authenticated successfully, the token is updated and encrypted. By continuously updating the token, the risk of token leakage is reduced and security is improved.

[0017] In combination with the first aspect, in some possible implementations of the first aspect, the method is applied to a terminal, the first key corresponds to the terminal, and the first keys allocated to different electronic components of the same terminal are the same first key.

[0018] It is understandable that if each electronic component corresponds to a first key, the terminal needs to store a large number of first keys, while if the same terminal allocates the same first key to different electronic components, only one first key needs to be stored, thus saving storage space.

[0019] In combination with the first aspect, in some possible implementations of the first aspect, the method is applied to a terminal, the first key corresponds to an electronic component, and the first keys assigned to different electronic components by the same terminal are different first keys.

[0020] When the storage space is large, different first keys can be assigned to different electronic components, that is, each electronic component corresponds to a first key. The first key corresponding to one electronic component cannot encrypt or decrypt the identity of another electronic component, thereby improving security.

[0021] In combination with the first aspect, in some possible implementations of the first aspect, when the verification of the digital certificate is successful, a first credential is sent to the electronic component, including: when the verification of the digital certificate is successful, negotiating a session key (SK) with the electronic component, where the SK is used for encryption and decryption of data transmission; based on the SK, encrypting the identity identifier and the first key assigned to the electronic component to obtain the first credential; and sending the first credential to the electronic component.

[0022] When an electronic component is connected to a terminal for the first time, the terminal uses the SK agreed upon with the electronic component to encrypt the identity identifier and the first key if the digital certificate is successfully authenticated, obtains a first credential, and sends it to the electronic component so that the electronic component can obtain a second credential based on the first credential. The electronic component can use the second credential for authentication the next time it is connected, thereby simplifying the authentication process when the electronic component is connected again, shortening the authentication time, and improving the authentication efficiency.

[0023] In combination with the first aspect, in some possible implementations of the first aspect, the digital certificate is verified, including: determining whether the digital certificate of the electronic component is revoked based on the certificate serial number of the revoked digital certificate; and when the digital certificate of the electronic component is revoked, the terminal determines that the verification of the digital certificate of the electronic component has failed; wherein the certificate serial number of the revoked digital certificate comes from a public key infrastructure (PKI) server, and the revoked digital certificate is determined based on the verification results of multiple logs including the log of the electronic component, each of the multiple logs includes the certificate serial number of a digital certificate and the usage time of the certificate serial number.

[0024] The terminal can determine whether the electronic component's digital certificate has been revoked by comparing the certificate SN of the electronic component's digital certificate with the certificate SN of the revoked digital certificate. If the certificate has been revoked, the terminal fails to verify the electronic component's digital certificate. In other words, the terminal no longer sends the first credential to the electronic component. This effectively prevents digital certificates from being counterfeited, ensuring effective ecological control of electronic components.

[0025] The revoked digital certificate can be determined based on the verification results of multiple logs, including logs of electronic components. Each of the multiple logs includes a digital certificate's certificate serial number and the usage time of the certificate serial number. Specifically, the car cloud can receive multiple logs of multiple electronic components. Based on these multiple logs, the car cloud determines the revoked digital certificate and sends the certificate SN of the revoked digital certificate to the PKI server, which further publishes it to the terminal.

[0026] In combination with the first aspect, in some possible implementations of the first aspect, the revoked digital certificates include: multiple digital certificates having the same certificate serial number and having at least partially overlapping usage times.

[0027] Cheyun checks whether multiple logs contain digital certificates with the same SN. If two digital certificates have the same SN and their usage times overlap, the digital certificate with that SN will be revoked. This prevents certificate counterfeiting and provides effective ecological control for electronic components.

[0028] Optionally, the digital certificate is preset in the electronic component, or the digital certificate is generated by the electronic component based on a digital signature obtained from a PKI server.

[0029] In a second aspect, this application provides a method for authenticating an electronic component. This method can be performed by the electronic component, or by a component deployed in the electronic component (such as a chip, chip system, etc.). This application is not limited to this. The following is merely an example, describing the method provided in the second aspect using the electronic component as the execution subject.

[0030] Exemplarily, when accessing the terminal for the first time, a digital certificate is sent to the terminal; a first credential is received from the terminal, the first credential including an encrypted second credential; when accessing the terminal again, a second credential is sent to the terminal, the second credential being obtained based on the above-mentioned first credential.

[0031] Based on the above technical solution, after the electronic component first connects to the terminal and completes authentication, it can receive the first credential and then obtain the second credential based on the first credential. When the electronic component connects to the terminal again, it does not need to authenticate with the digital certificate again, but instead sends the second credential for authentication. It can be seen that the authentication process for the second credential is significantly simplified compared to authentication based on digital certificates, which can shorten the authentication time. Furthermore, the electronic component's second credential authentication process only requires encryption and decryption, eliminating the need for excessive calculations. This process can be accelerated by hardware, allowing the electronic component to complete authentication quickly.

[0032] In combination with the second aspect, in some possible implementations of the second aspect, the first credential is obtained based on the encryption of an identity identifier and a first key, the identity identifier is used to identify the identity of the electronic component, and the first key is used to encrypt the identity identifier; the second credential includes an encrypted identity identifier obtained by encrypting the identity identifier based on the first key.

[0033] The first credential received by the electronic component can be an encrypted identity and a first key, so that the electronic component can encrypt the identity based on the first key to obtain an encrypted identity, that is, generate a second credential. When the electronic component is connected again, the second credential can be sent to the terminal for authentication. In other words, in one possible implementation, the second credential can include an encrypted identity, so that when the terminal detects that the electronic component has been connected again, it can authenticate the electronic component. Compared with authentication using digital certificates, the authentication process of the identity is greatly simplified, thereby shortening the authentication time and improving the authentication efficiency.

[0034] In combination with the second aspect, in some possible implementation methods of the second aspect, when accessing the terminal again, a second credential is sent to the terminal, including: decrypting the first credential to obtain an identity and a first key; encrypting the identity using the first key to obtain an encrypted identity; and sending the above-mentioned encrypted identity, which is used by the terminal to authenticate electronic components.

[0035] After receiving the first certificate, the electronic component decrypts the first certificate to obtain an identity and a first key, and encrypts the identity with the first key to obtain an encrypted identity, and sends the encrypted identity to the terminal so that the terminal can authenticate the electronic component. The electronic component only needs to perform encryption and decryption, and does not need to perform excessive calculations, which reduces the computing power requirements of the electronic component.

[0036] In combination with the second aspect, in some possible implementations of the second aspect, decrypting the first credential to obtain an identity and a first key includes: negotiating an SK with the terminal, where the SK is used for encryption and decryption of data transmission; based on the SK, decrypting the first credential to obtain an identity and a first key.

[0037] The electronic component uses the negotiated SK to decrypt the first credential, obtaining the identity and first key, which are then used for authentication when the electronic component re-accesses the authentication platform. Using the negotiated SK to encrypt and decrypt the identity and first key reduces the risk of identity and first key leakage, improving security. Furthermore, when the electronic component re-accesses the platform, only encryption and decryption are required, eliminating the need for excessive computation.

[0038] Optionally, the identity identifier includes a token or a certificate SN of a digital certificate.

[0039] Optionally, the token includes the DID and the certificate SN of the digital certificate.

[0040] In combination with the second aspect, in some possible implementations of the second aspect, the identity identifier includes a token, and the method also includes: receiving an encrypted updated token from the terminal, the encrypted updated token being obtained by encrypting the updated token based on the first key, and the updated token being used by the terminal to authenticate the electronic component the next time the electronic component accesses the terminal; decrypting the encrypted updated token based on the first key to obtain the updated token.

[0041] When the electronic component accesses the terminal again, if the authentication is successful, it receives the encrypted updated token from the terminal and decrypts it using the first key, so that the electronic component can use the updated token for authentication the next time it accesses. Security is improved by continuously updating the token.

[0042] Optionally, the digital certificate is preset in the electronic component, or the digital certificate is generated by the electronic component based on a digital signature obtained from a PKI server.

[0043] In a third aspect, the present application provides a terminal including units for implementing the method in the first aspect and any possible implementation of the first aspect. It should be understood that each unit can implement the corresponding function by executing a computer program.

[0044] Optionally, the terminal is a car. The car includes units for implementing the method in the first aspect and any possible implementation of the first aspect. It should be understood that each unit can implement the corresponding function by executing a computer program.

[0045] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a terminal, comprising a processor, wherein the processor is configured to execute the electronic component authentication method described in the first aspect and any possible implementation manner of the first aspect.

[0046] The terminal may further include a memory for storing instructions and data. The memory is coupled to the processor, and when the processor executes the instructions stored in the memory, the methods described in the above aspects may be implemented. The terminal may further include a communication interface for communicating with other devices. Exemplarily, the communication interface may be a transceiver, circuit, bus, module, or other type of communication interface.

[0047] In a fifth aspect, the present application provides an electronic component, comprising a unit for implementing the method in the second aspect and any possible implementation of the second aspect. It should be understood that each unit can implement the corresponding function by executing a computer program.

[0048] In a sixth aspect, the present application provides an electronic component, comprising a processor, wherein the processor is configured to execute the automotive electronic component authentication method described in the second aspect and any possible implementation of the second aspect.

[0049] The electronic component may further include a memory for storing instructions and data. The memory is coupled to the processor, and when the processor executes the instructions stored in the memory, the methods described in the above aspects may be implemented. The electronic component may further include a communication interface for communicating between the apparatus and other devices. Exemplarily, the communication interface may be a transceiver, circuit, bus, module, or other type of communication interface.

[0050] In a seventh aspect, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium comprising a computer program, which, when executed on a computer, enables the computer to implement the method in the first aspect to the second aspect and any possible implementation manner of the first aspect to the second aspect.

[0051] In an eighth aspect, the present application provides a computer program product, comprising: a computer program (also referred to as code, or instructions), which, when executed, enables a computer to execute the method in any possible implementation of the first aspect to the second aspect and the first aspect to the second aspect.

[0052] It should be understood that the third to eighth aspects of the present application correspond to the technical solutions of the first and second aspects of the present application, and the beneficial effects achieved by each aspect and the corresponding feasible implementation methods are similar and will not be repeated here. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0053] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of an application scenario applicable to the method provided in the embodiment of the present application;

[0054] Figure 2 is a structural schematic diagram of a car provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0055] Figure 3 is a schematic flow chart of an electronic component authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0056] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the specific process of the authentication platform for first-time access authentication provided by the embodiment of the present application;

[0057] Figure 5 Schematic diagram of the specific process of the authentication platform issuing the first credential provided in the embodiment of the present application;

[0058] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a specific process for authenticating the second credential provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0059] Figure 7 This is a flowchart of determining whether a digital certificate has been revoked, as provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0060] Figure 8 1 is a schematic diagram of an example of an electronic component authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0061] Figure 9 is a schematic block diagram of an electronic component authentication device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0062] Figure 10 This is another schematic block diagram of the electronic component authentication device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0063] The technical solution in this application will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0064] In the embodiments of the present application, the terminal can be a terminal on land, including indoor or outdoor, handheld, wearable or vehicle-mounted; the terminal can also be a terminal on the water (such as a ship, etc.); the terminal can also be a terminal in the air (such as an airplane, a balloon, and a satellite, etc.). The terminals in the embodiments of the present application include vehicles such as cars, airplanes, and ships that can be on land, in the air, or on the water, and also include electronic devices such as mobile phones, tablet computers, computers with wireless transceiver functions (such as laptops, PDAs, etc.), mobile internet devices (mobile internet devices, MIDs), virtual reality (VR) devices, augmented reality (AR) devices, etc. It should be understood that the above examples of terminals are only examples and should not constitute any limitation on the embodiments of the present application.

[0065] It should be noted that the following describes the authentication method for electronic components provided in the embodiments of the present application using a car as an example.

[0066] In the embodiments of the present application, an electronic component can be a single part or a component composed of multiple parts. It should be understood that a component can independently perform a function. Taking a car as an example, the electronic components of a car include but are not limited to: a motor control unit (MCU), a telematics box (TBOX), a power distribution unit (PDU), etc.

[0067] Taking a car as an example, the following describes in detail scenarios in which the authentication method for electronic components provided in the embodiments of the present application is applicable.

[0068] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of an application scenario applicable to the method provided in the embodiment of this application. Figure 1 A brief description of the application scenarios applicable to the method provided in this application is given.

[0069] like Figure 1 As shown, the entire application scenario 100 includes: a car 110, an MCU of electronic components of the car, a PKI server 120 and a car cloud 130. The car 110 can communicate data with the PKI server 120 and the car cloud 130 through a communication network, and the PKI server 120 and the car cloud 130 can also communicate data through a communication network. Among them, the PKI server can be a device deployed in the cloud, a specific entity, or a functional unit that is part of a large cluster server, and the embodiments of the present application are not limited to this. The communication network can be Bluetooth, wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi), a mobile cellular network or a dedicated local area network, etc., as long as data interaction can be achieved. The car cloud can be used to determine whether the digital certificate of electronic components has been revoked.

[0070] It should be understood that the car shown in the figure is only an example, and the car can be any type of motor vehicle, such as a van, a truck, a car, etc. It should also be understood that the car 110 also has other replaceable electronic components, such as a TBOX, a PDU, etc.

[0071] Typically, the electronic components of the car 110, such as the MCU, require daily repair and maintenance. This repair and maintenance process often generates significant economic benefits, and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) can protect their own interests by controlling 4S stores. However, if the car does not undergo post-maintenance and repair at a 4S store, or if the OEM cannot truly control the 4S store, then the interests of the car's electronic components in the back-end market cannot be guaranteed. For example, during the repair and replacement process, inferior products may be used to replace the original electronic components. If the authenticity of the electronic components cannot be identified, the OEM's interests cannot be protected. At the same time, the performance of the electronic components is also difficult to guarantee.

[0072] Currently, there is a technology that authenticates electronic components using digital certificates pre-installed during the chip production process. Specifically, the electronic component being authenticated has a chip integrated into it, and the chip has a digital certificate pre-installed during the production process. When the electronic component is connected, the digital certificate is first authenticated. Only after the authentication is passed are the functions and services of the electronic component enabled. The digital certificate needs to be authenticated every time the electronic component is started. However, the authentication of digital certificates is a complex and time-consuming process. For cars, if each electronic component needs to wait for the time-consuming authentication process at startup, the car will start very slowly, making it impossible to quickly authenticate the electronic components when the car starts.

[0073] Therefore, the present application proposes an authentication method for electronic components. When the electronic component is connected for the first time, the terminal completes the authentication process of the digital certificate and issues a first certificate so that the electronic component can obtain a second certificate based on the first certificate. When the electronic component is connected again, the terminal only needs to authenticate the second certificate. Since the authentication process of the second certificate is relatively simple and time-consuming, the electronic component can quickly complete the authentication when the terminal starts, without affecting the quick startup of the terminal.

[0074] In order to better understand the embodiments of the present application, Figure 2 The structure of the car 110 suitable for the authentication method provided in this application is briefly described. Figure 2 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a car 110 provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0075] like Figure 2 As shown, the car 110 includes: TBOX 210, PDU 220, battery management system (BMS) 230, cockpit domain controller (CDC) 240, MCU 250, vehicle integrated unit (VIU) 260, vehicle domain controller (VDC) 270, radar 280 and lidar 290.

[0076] Figure 2The VIU 260 shown in the figure includes four VIUs, namely VIU 2601, VIU 2602, VIU 2603, and VIU 2604. VIU 2601 is connected to CDC 240 and TBOX 210, VIU 2602 is connected to PDU 220, BMS 230 and MCU 250, and VDC is connected to radar 280 and lidar 290. VIU 260 and VDC 270 can be used as authentication platforms to authenticate other electronic components, such as the electronic components connected to each VIU shown in the figure. For example, VIU 2602 authenticates the electronic component MCU250. If the authentication fails, VIU 2602 does not forward the signal of MCU 250, that is, MCU 250 cannot start normally, that is, the functions and services of the electronic component cannot be enabled. It is understandable that Figure 2 The number of VIUs shown and the connection relationship between each VIU and the electronic components and the connection relationship with the VDC are merely examples and should not constitute any limitation to the embodiments of the present application. For example, the PDU 220 and the BMS 230 may also be connected to the VIU 2601, etc., which is not limited in the embodiments of the present application.

[0077] It should be understood that the various electronic components mentioned above can be connected through buses such as a controller area network (CAN) bus, a local interconnect network (LIN) bus, a flex ray bus, and a media oriented systems transport (MOST) bus. The above-mentioned types of buses can be used to transmit information between various parts. It should also be understood that the form or format of the signals transmitted on different buses connected to the above-mentioned different parts may be different, and the gateway can convert signals of different forms or formats before sending them to the recipient of the signal. Here, the gateway is only a name, and it can also be replaced by other processors that can convert the signals between the above-mentioned parts.

[0078] It should be understood that the illustrated structure of the embodiment of the present application does not constitute any limitation on the vehicle 110. In other embodiments, the vehicle 110 may include more or fewer components than shown, or may combine or separate certain components, or have different component arrangements. The illustrated components may be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of hardware and software.

[0079] In order to facilitate the clear description of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, in the embodiments of the present application, words such as "first" and "second" are used to distinguish between identical or similar items with substantially the same functions and effects. For example, the first key service and the second key service are intended to distinguish between key services in different electronic components, and do not limit their order. Those skilled in the art will understand that words such as "first" and "second" do not limit the quantity and execution order, and words such as "first" and "second" do not necessarily limit them to be different.

[0080] The following, in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, describes in detail the electronic component authentication method provided by the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that the embodiments shown below describe the specific process of the method from the perspective of the interaction between the electronic component and the authentication platform, but should not constitute any limitation on the execution entity of the method. As long as a program that records the code of the method provided by the embodiments of the present application can be run, the method provided by the embodiments of the present application can be executed. The embodiments of the present application do not limit this.

[0081] It should be understood that the authentication platform can be a platform deployed inside the terminal to authenticate electronic components, specifically a controller inside the terminal, etc., to realize the function of authenticating connected electronic components. Since the authentication platform is deployed in the terminal, the authentication platform's authentication of electronic components in the following scheme can be regarded as the terminal's authentication of electronic components. For example, the authentication platform in a car can be Figure 2 The VIU or VDC shown is deployed in a car to implement authentication functions for connected electronic components.

[0082] It should also be understood that the following embodiments use automobiles as an example to describe in detail the authentication method for electronic components provided in the embodiments of the present application, but this does not constitute any limitation on the embodiments of the present application. The method provided in the embodiments of the present application can also be applied to other terminals, such as airplanes, mobile phones, etc. When the automobile in the embodiments below is replaced with other terminals, the authentication platform can be a platform deployed in the other terminals. In addition, the authentication platform is only an exemplary name and can also be other names. As long as the authentication method provided in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented, the embodiments of the present application do not limit this.

[0083] It should also be understood that the authentication platform can also be deployed in the cloud to authenticate electronic components. When the authentication platform is deployed in the cloud, the following solution can also be considered to be executed by the cloud server.

[0084] Figure 3 3 is a schematic flow chart of an electronic component authentication method 300 provided in an embodiment of the present application. Figure 3 The method 300 shown may include S310 to S350. Figure 3 Detailed description of each step.

[0085] S310: When the electronic component accesses the authentication platform for the first time, the electronic component sends a digital certificate to the authentication platform.

[0086] The authentication platform is specifically a platform for authenticating electronic components of a car, which can be deployed inside the car, for example, Figure 2 VIU or VDC shown in . Electronic components are electronic components that need to be certified and connected to the car, for example, Figure 2 MCU, BMS, etc. shown.

[0087] Optionally, the digital certificate may be pre-installed in the electronic component, or the digital certificate may be generated by the electronic component based on a digital signature obtained from a PKI server.

[0088] It is understood that the electronic component can have a pre-stored digital certificate, or can obtain a digital signature from a PKI server and generate a digital certificate with a digital signature, which is not limited in this embodiment of the present application. Among them, the digital certificate can be used by the authentication platform to authenticate the electronic component that is connected to the car for the first time.

[0089] An electronic component's first access to the authentication platform refers to the first time the component has been connected to the platform. For example, if an electronic component has been replaced, the replaced component is considered a first-time access component. The electronic component sends a message requesting access to the authentication platform, which then checks whether this is the first time the component has been connected. If so, the platform can request a digital certificate from the component and authenticate the component's digital certificate.

[0090] Illustratively, when an electronic component is connected to an authentication platform for the first time, a digital certificate may be sent to the authentication platform so that the authentication platform can authenticate the electronic component.

[0091] S320. The authentication platform verifies the digital certificate.

[0092] After receiving the digital certificate, the authentication platform verifies it. It should be understood that the digital certificate contains a digital signature. The authentication platform verifies the digital certificate, for example, by authenticating the certificate SN of the digital certificate and the digital signature in the digital certificate. If the authentication platform fails to verify the digital certificate of the electronic component, the authentication of the electronic component fails. If the authentication platform succeeds in verifying the digital certificate of the electronic component, the authentication of the electronic component succeeds. Figure 4 Describe the verification process in detail.

[0093] Figure 4This is a schematic diagram of the specific process of authenticating electronic components that are connected for the first time by the authentication platform provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0094] like Figure 4 As shown, when an electronic component is connected to the authentication platform for the first time during vehicle repair or replacement, its digital certificate needs to be authenticated. Specifically, the authentication platform first requests a digital certificate (referred to as a certificate in the figure) from the electronic component. The electronic component then sends the digital certificate to the authentication platform for verification. The specific process for requesting and verifying a digital certificate from the authentication platform can be found in the prior art and will not be described in detail here for the sake of brevity.

[0095] If the verification of the digital certificate fails, the authentication of the electronic component fails and the electronic component cannot be used.

[0096] If the digital certificate is successfully verified, the electronic component is successfully authenticated and can be used.

[0097] It should be understood that during the verification of the electronic component's digital certificate, the authentication platform and the electronic component may negotiate a SK, which can be used to encrypt and decrypt data. For example, if authentication is successful, the authentication platform may further use the SK to encrypt the identity identifier used to identify the electronic component and the first key used to encrypt and decrypt the identity identifier to generate a first credential, and send this first credential to the electronic component to facilitate authentication of the electronic component when the electronic component reconnects to the authentication platform.

[0098] S330: When the digital certificate is successfully verified, the authentication platform sends the first credential.

[0099] If the authentication platform successfully verifies the electronic component's digital certificate, it sends a first credential to the electronic component. This first credential can be used to generate a second credential, so that the electronic component can use the second credential for authentication when it reconnects to the authentication platform. When the electronic component reconnects to the authentication platform, the authentication platform does not need to verify the digital certificate again and can authenticate the electronic component based on the second credential. The second credential is obtained by the electronic component based on the first credential. Compared with the verification of the digital certificate, the authentication platform's authentication process for the second credential is relatively simple and takes less time, which helps the authentication platform quickly complete the authentication of the electronic component.

[0100] The first credential may include an encrypted second credential, for example, an encrypted identity and a first key encrypted using SK, wherein the identity is used to identify the electronic component, and the first key is used to encrypt the identity.

[0101] The key used to encrypt the identity identifier and the first key can be negotiated during the key exchange process with the electronic component when the authentication platform successfully verifies the digital certificate of the electronic component, for example Figure 4 In the authentication process for first access shown, if the authentication platform successfully verifies the digital certificate, it uses the key negotiation algorithm to negotiate SK with the electronic component.

[0102] One possible design is that the first credential is obtained based on the encryption of the identity identifier and the first key, the identity identifier is used to identify the identity of the electronic component, the first key is used to encrypt the identity identifier, and the second credential includes an encrypted identity identifier obtained by encrypting the identity identifier based on the first key.

[0103] The specific process is as follows:

[0104] The electronic component first obtains the identity and the first key. Corresponding to S330, after receiving the first credential, the electronic component uses SK to decrypt it, obtains the identity and the first key, and stores them locally.

[0105] Optionally, the aforementioned identity includes a token. The token includes the DID of the electronic component and the certificate SN of the digital certificate. The first key can be used to encrypt the token.

[0106] One possible implementation is that, upon successful verification of the electronic component's digital certificate, the authentication platform can sign a token using the VIU's private key to obtain a signed token. The platform then encrypts the signed token and the first key using the SK to obtain a first credential. In other words, the first credential includes the encrypted token and the encrypted first key. After receiving the first credential, the electronic component can decrypt it using the SK to obtain the signed token and the first key. The electronic component can then verify the signed token using the VIU's public key to obtain a new token. The electronic component can then store the token and the first key locally.

[0107] The following combination Figure 5 Describe in detail the specific process of the authentication platform issuing the first certificate. Figure 5As shown, the authentication platform uses the VIU as an example. The VIU includes an access service, a first key service, a token module, and an authentication service. The electronic components include an access authentication agent and a second key service. The token module is a functional module within the VIU that generates and signs tokens. It should be understood that this token module is merely an example and can be implemented using other functional modules. The naming of the functional modules can also be used in other ways, and this is not limited in this embodiment.

[0108] The authentication service sends a "Get Token" message to the Token module. The Token module signs the Token using its private key and sends the signed Token to the authentication service. The authentication service further sends a "Get First Key" message to the First Key Service. The First Key Service generates the first key and sends a "Success" message to the authentication service. The authentication service sends a "Request to Encrypt Token and First Key" message. The First Key Service encrypts the Token and first key using the negotiated SK, obtains the first credential, and sends the first credential to the Second Key Service. After receiving the first credential, the Second Key Service decrypts it using the SK to obtain the Token and first key, saves them, and sends a "Success" message to the authentication service. The authentication service records the log, DID, certificate SN, time, and vehicle identification number (VIN), and sends a "Device Activation Successful" message to the Access Service. The Access Service sends a "Success" message to the Authentication Service, which then sends a "Access Authentication Successful" message to the Access Authentication Agent. Thus, when an electronic component first accesses the authentication platform, activation is successful, enabling the electronic component's functionality.

[0109] Optionally, the above-mentioned identity includes a certificate SN, and the first key can be used to encrypt the certificate SN.

[0110] One possible implementation is that, when the digital certificate of the electronic component is successfully authenticated, the authentication platform can use SK to encrypt the certificate SN and the first key to obtain the first credential. In other words, the first credential includes the encrypted certificate SN and the first key. The specific process of the authentication platform issuing the first credential is the same as Figure 5 The process of issuing Token and first key is similar, please refer to Figure 5 For the sake of brevity, the relevant description is not repeated here.

[0111] As can be seen, in both implementations described above, the authentication platform needs to generate a first key and send it to the electronic component. When there are multiple electronic components connected to the authentication platform, the first key can correspond to the authentication platform or the electronic component.

[0112] Optionally, the first key corresponds to the authentication platform, and the same authentication platform can assign the same first key to different electronic components. In other words, each VIU has only one first key, and all electronic components connected to the VIU share the same first key, saving some storage space.

[0113] Optionally, the first key corresponds to an electronic component, and the same authentication platform can assign different first keys to different electronic components. In other words, each VIU can manage multiple electronic components, and thus the VIU has multiple first keys, one for each electronic component connected to the VIU.

[0114] S340: When the electronic component is connected to the authentication platform again, a second certificate is sent to the authentication platform. The second certificate is obtained based on the first certificate.

[0115] Re-connecting an electronic component to the authentication platform occurs when the vehicle is restarted. When the electronic component is restarted, it sends a request to the authentication platform. The authentication platform then checks whether this is the first time the electronic component is connected. If not, the authentication platform authenticates the electronic component based on the second credential. To save authentication time and ensure a quick start, the authentication platform only needs to authenticate the second credential, rather than the digital certificate, when the vehicle is restarted.

[0116] When the electronic component is connected to the authentication platform again, the second credential is sent to the authentication platform for the authentication platform to complete the authentication. The second credential can be an encrypted identity obtained by encrypting the identity based on the first key.

[0117] In one possible scenario, the first credential issued by the authentication platform includes an encrypted first key and a token, meaning the identity is the token. When the electronic component is reconnected, the token can be encrypted using the first key and sent to the authentication platform for authentication.

[0118] Another possible scenario is that the first credential issued by the authentication platform includes the encrypted first key and the certificate SN, meaning the identity identifier is the certificate SN. When the electronic component is reconnected, the certificate SN is encrypted using the first key and sent to the authentication platform.

[0119] It should be understood that the first key can be used to encrypt and decrypt the identity when the electronic component is connected again to generate a second credential, thereby avoiding re-authentication of the digital certificate of the electronic component. Therefore, the first key can be called an alive key.

[0120] S350: The authentication platform authenticates the electronic component based on the second credential.

[0121] The authentication platform receives a second credential from the electronic component, such as an encrypted identity identifier, and can use the first key to decrypt the encrypted identity identifier to obtain an identity identifier. The electronic component is then authenticated based on the decrypted identity identifier and the locally stored identity identifier. If the decrypted identity identifier is the same as the locally stored identity identifier, authentication of the electronic component is successful and the electronic component can be enabled. If the decrypted identity identifier is different from the locally stored identity identifier, authentication of the electronic component fails and the electronic component cannot be enabled.

[0122] Here, enabling an electronic component can be understood as starting the electronic component. In other words, the electronic component can receive or send signals in the enabled state to realize the corresponding function of the electronic component. In the disabled state, the electronic component cannot receive or send signals, that is, the electronic component cannot be started, and thus cannot realize the corresponding function. For example, if the authentication of the electronic component is successful, the electronic component can be enabled, that is, the electronic component can be started to realize the corresponding function of the electronic component. If the authentication of the electronic component fails, the electronic component is prohibited from being enabled, that is, the electronic component cannot be started, that is, the corresponding function of the electronic component cannot be realized.

[0123] As mentioned previously, an identity identifier includes a token or a certificate SN. If the identity identifier obtained by the authentication platform from an electronic component is a token, the authentication platform can update the token upon successful authentication of the electronic component, obtain an updated token, and issue the updated token to the electronic component. This updated token can be used to authenticate the electronic component the next time it connects to the authentication platform.

[0124] The following takes the identity identifier Token as an example to describe in detail the specific process of the authentication platform authenticating electronic components.

[0125] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a specific process for authenticating the second credential provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 6 The specific process of the authentication platform authenticating the second credential of the electronic component is described in detail.

[0126] like Figure 6 As shown, the authentication platform takes VIU as an example. VIU includes access service, first key service, Token module and authentication service. The electronic components include access authentication agent and second key service. The following is a description from the perspective of the interaction between various services.

[0127] It should be understood that Figure 6 The access service, first key service, Token module, authentication service, access authentication agent and second key service shown are only examples, and may also be interactions of other functional modules that implement the above functions. The embodiments of the present application do not limit this.

[0128] like Figure 6 As shown, the VIU first initializes authentication. Specifically, the access service queries the list of electronic components to determine the electronic components that require authentication during access. The list of electronic components requiring authentication is then synchronized with the VIU's authentication service. In response, the authentication service responds with a "synchronization successful" message to the access service.

[0129] When an electronic component accesses the authentication platform, the access authentication agent sends a "Request Access" message to the authentication service. The authentication service generates a challenge value and sends a "Request Verification" message to the second key service, which carries the challenge value generated by the authentication service. The second key service encrypts the challenge value, token, and DID using the first key and sends the ciphertext to the first key service, which decrypts it using the first key. The decrypted challenge value, token, and DID are then sent to the authentication service. The authentication service first verifies the DID and challenge value, for example, by comparing the DID with a locally stored DID and then comparing the decrypted challenge value with the challenge value generated by the authentication service. Furthermore, the authentication service sends a "Request Verification Token" message to the token module, which carries the decrypted token. The token module verifies the token and sends the certificate SN to the first key service to further determine whether the digital certificate has been revoked. After the first key service determines that the digital certificate has not been revoked, it sends a "Success" message to the authentication service. It should be understood that the PKI server sends the revoked digital certificate to the VIU, and the first key service compares the certificate SN of the digital certificate with the certificate SN of the revoked digital certificate to determine whether the digital certificate is revoked.

[0130] After receiving the successful authentication message, the authentication service sends a "request to update token" message to the Token module. The Token module updates the token so that the electronic component can be authenticated the next time it accesses the authentication platform. The Token module sends the updated token to the authentication service. The authentication service sends a "request to encrypt" message containing the updated token to the first key service. The first key service encrypts the updated token using the first key and sends the ciphertext to the second key service. The second key service decrypts it using the first key, saves the updated token, and sends a "success" message to the authentication service.

[0131] Finally, the startup authentication information is synchronized. Specifically, the authentication service records the log, VIN, DID, certificate SN, and time, and sends a "Startup authentication successful" message to the access service. The access service sends a "Success" message to the authentication service, which in turn sends a "Startup authentication successful" message to the access authentication agent. This completes the authentication platform's second credential authentication of the electronic component.

[0132] Furthermore, the authentication platform can continuously authenticate the second credential of the electronic components. It should be understood that after the car is started, the authentication platform performs startup authentication on the electronic components, wherein the car startup refers to the car ignition and engine start. When the vehicle is stopped and in an unturned state, the authentication platform can continuously authenticate the electronic components. Continuous authentication can prevent electronic components from being replaced when hot-plugged during the parking phase, that is, it prevents electronic components from being replaced when the vehicle is parked but not turned off. The process of continuous authentication is basically the same as the process of startup authentication, the difference is that continuous authentication does not require updating the Token. For the sake of brevity, the process of continuous authentication will not be described in detail here. For the specific process, please refer to the description of the above startup authentication.

[0133] It should be noted that the authentication platform can further enhance its assessment of vehicle safety during the ongoing authentication of electronic components. For example, if the authentication platform fails to authenticate an electronic component while the vehicle is operating normally, the electronic component will be disabled only after the vehicle is safely parked.

[0134] If the authentication platform receives the second credential, which is an identity identifier encrypted with the first key, where the identity identifier is the certificate SN, then after the electronic component requests access, the authentication platform generates a challenge value and sends it to the electronic component. The electronic component encrypts the challenge value and the certificate SN using the first key and sends them to the authentication platform. The authentication platform decrypts the challenge value using the first key pair, obtains the certificate SN and the challenge value, and verifies them. For the specific verification process, please refer to the above description of the challenge value. Figure 6 Description.

[0135] Based on the above technical solution, the authentication platform can issue the first certificate to the electronic component after the electronic component is connected for the first time and the authentication is completed, so as to obtain the second certificate. When the electronic component is connected to the authentication platform again, there is no need to authenticate the digital certificate of the electronic component again, but it is replaced by the authentication of the second certificate. If the first certificate is an identity identifier and a first key, and the second certificate is an encrypted identity identifier obtained by encrypting the identity identifier with the first key, then when the electronic component is connected again, the authentication of the second certificate is the authentication of the identity identifier. It can be seen that the authentication process of the identity identifier is greatly simplified compared to the authentication based on the digital certificate, which can shorten the authentication time and improve the authentication efficiency. In addition, the electronic component only needs to perform encryption and decryption during the authentication process, without the need for excessive calculations, and this process can be completed through hardware acceleration, making it possible for the electronic component to be quickly authenticated and enabled when the authentication is successful.

[0136] Figure 7 This is a flow chart of determining whether a digital certificate is revoked according to an embodiment of the present application. Figure 7 As shown, the authentication platform takes VIU as an example. VIU includes authentication service and vehicle history report (VHR). The following describes the specific process of determining whether a digital certificate is revoked from the perspective of the interaction between authentication service, VHR, vehicle cloud and PKI server.

[0137] like Figure 7 As shown, the VIU's VHR obtains logs from the authentication service and sends them to the Car Cloud's VHR, which responds with a "success" message. Furthermore, the Car Cloud's VHR regularly verifies the validity of the electronic component's digital certificate to determine if it has been compromised. For example, the certificate's SN time period (i.e., the length of time the certificate's SN has been used) can be used to determine whether the digital certificate has been revoked. The certificate's SN time period is calculated from the time the digital certificate is authenticated by the authentication platform to the last time the electronic component was used.

[0138] One possible design is that the revoked digital certificates include multiple digital certificates with the same certificate serial number and at least partially overlapping usage times. For example, when an electronic component is connected to the authentication platform for the first time, it is necessary to verify the digital certificate, and the time period of the certificate SN of the digital certificate of the electronic component is calculated from the authentication time. Specifically, under normal circumstances, the time period of the certificate SN is from time 1 to time n, or from time n+1 to time 2n, where time 1 to time n means that the certificate authentication time of the digital certificate of a certain electronic component is time 1, the last usage time of the electronic component is time n, and the electronic component has not been replaced in the middle; time n+1 to time 2n means that a certain electronic component is changed from one car to another. Under abnormal circumstances, the time period of the certificate SN is from time i to time m, where 1<i<n.

[0139] One possible implementation method is that the authentication platform verifies the digital certificate in the above process, including: determining whether the digital certificate of the electronic component is revoked based on the certificate serial number of the revoked digital certificate; and if the digital certificate of the electronic component is revoked, determining that the verification of the digital certificate of the electronic component has failed.

[0140] Specifically, the PKI server sends a list of certificates to be revoked to the authentication platform. The authentication platform then compares the certificate SN of the electronic component's digital certificate with the certificate SNs in the list of revoked certificates. If they match, the digital certificate verification fails. The revoked digital certificate is determined based on the verification results of multiple logs, including logs of the electronic component. Each of the multiple logs contains a digital certificate's certificate serial number and the usage time of the certificate serial number.

[0141] It can be understood that if two certificate SNs are the same in multiple logs received by Cheyun, and the time periods of the certificate SNs overlap, then one of the certificate SNs is counterfeit, or both certificate SNs are counterfeit, that is, the digital certificate is leaked, and the digital certificate corresponding to the certificate SN is determined to be a revoked digital certificate. For example, among the logs received by Cheyun, one log shows that the time period of a certain certificate SN is from January 1st to March 1st, and another log shows that the time period of the same certificate SN is from January 1st to March 12th. The two certificate SNs are the same and the time periods overlap, which means that one of the digital certificates is counterfeit, that is, the digital certificate has been leaked. After the judgment is completed, if there is a digital certificate leak, Cheyun's VHR can notify the PKI server to revoke the leaked digital certificate. Based on the received notification, the PKI server replies to Cheyun's VHR with a "success" message, and updates and publishes the certificate revocation list (CRL). The PKI server further sends a list of revoked digital certificates to the authentication platform. When the authentication platform verifies the certificate SN, the verification of the revoked digital certificates fails.

[0142] Based on the above technical solution, the validity of digital certificates is regularly verified through the car cloud, and the leaked digital certificates are notified to the PKI server. The revoked digital certificates are then published to the authentication platform through the PKI server. When the authentication platform verifies the certificate SN of the electronic component, it can query whether the current certificate is revoked through the certificate SN, thereby preventing the digital certificate from being counterfeited and enabling effective ecological control of electronic components.

[0143] It should be understood that the above description Figure 3 The embodiment shown is Figure 7 The embodiments shown can be used in combination or separately. When used in combination, they can shorten the authentication time, allow the car to start quickly, and improve the user experience. They can also prevent digital certificates from being counterfeited, thereby effectively controlling the ecology of electronic components.

[0144] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of an example of an electronic component authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present application. Figure 3 The embodiment shown and Figure 7 The embodiments shown are combined with specific processes for use.

[0145] like Figure 8As shown in the figure, the authentication platform first activates and authenticates the electronic components. During the repair and replacement process, the electronic components are connected to the authentication platform for the first time, and the electronic components are activated and authenticated. For example, the digital certificate of the electronic component is authenticated as described above. If the authentication is successful, the first certificate is issued. For the specific authentication process, please refer to Figure 4 and Figure 5 The relevant description will not be repeated here.

[0146] Secondly, the authentication platform performs startup authentication on the electronic components. When the car is restarted, that is, when the electronic components are connected to the authentication platform again, the authentication platform performs startup authentication on the electronic components, that is, authenticates the electronic components through the second certificate. The specific process can be found above. Figure 6 The authentication platform then performs continuous authentication of electronic components. This continuous authentication does not require token updates, and the remaining steps are identical to the startup authentication process. Therefore, when the car is restarted, it no longer requires digital certificate authentication; only the second credential needs to be authenticated. This second credential authentication process is relatively simple and takes less time, allowing for faster car startups and an improved user experience.

[0147] Finally, Cheyun determines whether the digital certificate of the electronic component needs to be revoked based on the log sent by the authentication platform. Cheyun determines whether the certificate needs to be revoked based on the log uploaded by the authentication platform. The log includes the certificate SN of the electronic component and the usage time of the certificate SN. Based on the certificate SN and the usage time of the certificate SN, it determines whether the digital certificate of the electronic component has been counterfeited. Furthermore, the administrator can determine whether the digital certificate needs to be revoked. For example, when the number of times a digital certificate has been counterfeited reaches a preset value, the digital certificate needs to be revoked. After the judgment is completed, Cheyun sends the certificate SN of the digital certificate that needs to be revoked to the PKI server. The PKI server further sends the list of digital certificates that need to be revoked to the authentication platform. When the authentication platform verifies the certificate SN of the digital certificate, the revoked digital certificate fails the verification.

[0148] Based on this technical solution, when an electronic component first connects to the authentication platform, the platform authenticates the component and issues a primary credential. The next time the component connects, it only needs to use a secondary credential, derived from the primary. This simplifies the authentication process, shortens authentication time, allows for quick vehicle startup, and improves the user experience. Furthermore, the vehicle cloud determines whether the digital certificate has been counterfeited, preventing the passing of inferior goods as genuine products and ensuring effective ecological control of electronic components.

[0149] Figure 9This is a schematic block diagram of an electronic component authentication device 900 provided in an embodiment of the present application. Device 900 may be a system-on-a-chip, or may be a device configured with a system-on-a-chip to implement the electronic component authentication functionality described in the method embodiments above. In the embodiments of the present application, the system-on-a-chip may consist of a chip alone, or may include a chip and other discrete components.

[0150] like Figure 9 As shown, the apparatus 900 may include a processor 910 and a communication interface 920. The communication interface 920 may be used to communicate with other devices via a transmission medium, so that the apparatus in the apparatus 900 may communicate with other devices. The communication interface 920 may be, for example, a transceiver, an interface, a bus, a circuit, or a device capable of implementing transceiver functions. The processor 910 may use the communication interface 920 to input and output data, and to implement Figures 3 to 8 The electronic component authentication method described in the corresponding embodiment. Specifically, the device 900 can be used to implement the function of the authentication platform or the function of the electronic component in the above method embodiment.

[0151] Exemplarily, if the device 900 corresponds to a terminal and is used to implement the function of the authentication platform in the method provided in the embodiment of the present application, the processor 910 can be used to obtain a digital certificate from the electronic component when it is detected that the electronic component is connected for the first time; verify the digital certificate; when the verification of the digital certificate is successful, send a first credential to the electronic component, the first credential including an encrypted second credential; when it is detected that the electronic component is connected again, obtain a second credential from the electronic component, the second credential being obtained based on the first credential; and authenticate the electronic component based on the second credential.

[0152] Exemplarily, if the device 900 corresponds to an electronic component and is used to implement the function of the electronic component in the method provided in the embodiment of the present application, the processor 910 can be used to send a digital certificate to the terminal when accessing the terminal for the first time; receive a first credential from the terminal; and send a second credential to the terminal when accessing the terminal again, where the second credential is obtained based on the first credential.

[0153] Optionally, the device 900 further includes at least one memory 930 for storing program instructions and / or data. The memory 930 is coupled to the processor 910. The coupling in the embodiments of the present application is an indirect coupling or communication connection between devices, units, or modules, which can be electrical, mechanical, or other forms, and is used for information exchange between devices, units, or modules. The processor 910 may operate in conjunction with the memory 930. The processor 910 may execute program instructions stored in the memory 930. At least one of the at least one memory may be included in the processor.

[0154] The specific connection medium between the processor 910, the communication interface 920 and the memory 930 is not limited in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 9 The processor 910, the communication interface 920 and the memory 930 are connected via a bus 940. The bus 940 is connected to the processor 910, the communication interface 920 and the memory 930. Figure 9 The connections between the other components are shown in bold lines, which are only for illustration and are not intended to be limiting. The bus can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For ease of illustration, Figure 9 Only one thick line is used in the diagram, but this does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.

[0155] Figure 10 FIG. 1 is another schematic block diagram of an electronic component authentication device 1000 provided in an embodiment of the present application. Figure 10 As shown, the device 1000 may include: a transceiver unit 1010 and a processing unit 1020.

[0156] Optionally, the device 1000 may correspond to the terminal in the above method embodiment, and may be used to implement the functions of the authentication platform. For example, the device 1000 may correspond to the terminal in the above method embodiment, or a component configured in the terminal, such as a chip, a chip system, etc. Furthermore, each unit in the device 1000 may be used to implement Figures 3 to 8 The corresponding process executed by the authentication platform in the method shown.

[0157] Optionally, the device 1000 may correspond to the electronic component in the above method embodiment. For example, the device 1000 may correspond to the electronic component in the above method embodiment, or a component configured in the electronic component, such as a chip, a chip system, etc. Moreover, each unit in the device 1000 may be used to implement Figures 3 to 8 The corresponding process performed by the electronic components in the method shown.

[0158] It should be understood that the division of units in the embodiments of the present application is illustrative and is merely a logical functional division. In actual implementation, other division methods may be used. Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of the present application may be integrated into a single processor, or may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into a single unit. The aforementioned integrated units may be implemented in the form of hardware or software functional units.

[0159] The present application also provides a computer program product, which includes: a computer program (also referred to as code or instruction), which, when executed, causes a computer to execute Figures 3 to 8 The method performed by the authentication platform or electronic component in the illustrated embodiment.

[0160] The present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program (also referred to as code or instruction). When the computer program is executed, the computer executes Figures 3 to 8 The method performed by the authentication platform or electronic component in the illustrated embodiment.

[0161] It should be understood that the processor in the embodiments of the present application can be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capabilities. During implementation, each step of the above-mentioned method embodiment can be completed by hardware integrated logic circuits in the processor or by software instructions. The above-mentioned processor can be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, or discrete hardware components. The various methods, steps, and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented or executed. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor. The steps of the method disclosed in the embodiments of the present application can be directly implemented and executed by a hardware decoding processor, or by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor. The software module can be located in a storage medium well-known in the art, such as random access memory, flash memory, read-only memory, programmable read-only memory, electrically erasable programmable memory, registers, etc. The storage medium is located in the memory, and the processor reads the information in the memory and, in conjunction with its hardware, completes the steps of the above-mentioned method.

[0162] It should also be understood that the memory in the embodiments of the present application may be a volatile memory or a non-volatile memory, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memories. Among them, the non-volatile memory may be a read-only memory (ROM), a programmable read-only memory (PROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or a flash memory. The volatile memory may be a random access memory (RAM), which is used as an external cache. By way of example and not limitation, many forms of RAM are available, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDR SDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous link DRAM (SLDRAM), and direct RAM bus RAM (DR RAM). It should be noted that the memory of the systems and methods described herein is intended to include, but is not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.

[0163] The terms "unit", "module" and the like used in this specification may be used to refer to a computer-related entity, hardware, firmware, a combination of hardware and software, software, or software in execution.

[0164] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the various illustrative logical blocks and steps described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented using electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professionals and technicians may use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application. In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed devices, equipment, and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For example, the division of the units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not performed. In addition, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interface, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, and can be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0165] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of these units may be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0166] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.

[0167] In the above embodiments, the functions of each functional unit can be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware or any combination thereof. When implemented using software, it can be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions (programs). When the computer program instructions (program) are loaded and executed on a computer, the process or function described in the embodiment of the present application is generated in whole or in part. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium. For example, the computer instructions can be transmitted from one website, computer, server or data center to another website, computer, server or data center via wired (e.g., coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server or data center that includes one or more available media integrated therein. The available medium may be a magnetic medium (eg, a floppy disk, a hard disk, a magnetic tape), an optical medium (eg, a digital versatile disc (DVD)), or a semiconductor medium (eg, a solid state disk (SSD)).

[0168] If the functions are implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or the part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media that can store program codes, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory ROM, RAM, a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.

[0169] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present application, but the scope of protection of the present application is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by a person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in this application should be included in the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be based on the scope of protection of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for authenticating electronic components, characterized in that: include: When detecting that an electronic component is connected for the first time, obtaining a digital certificate from the electronic component; Verifying the digital certificate; If the verification of the digital certificate is successful, sending a first credential to the electronic component, wherein the first credential includes an encrypted second credential; When it is detected that the electronic component is connected again, obtaining a second credential from the electronic component, where the second credential is obtained based on the first credential; authenticating the electronic component based on the second credential; The first credential is obtained based on encryption of an identity identifier and a first key, the identity identifier is used to identify the identity of the electronic component, and the first key is used to encrypt the identity identifier; The second credential includes an encrypted identity obtained by encrypting the identity based on the first key.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein Authenticating the electronic component based on the second credential includes: Decrypting the encrypted identity using the first key to obtain the identity; authenticating the electronic component based on the decrypted identity and the locally stored identity; and If the electronic component is successfully authenticated, enabling the electronic component; or If the electronic component fails to be authenticated, enabling the electronic component is prohibited.

3. The method according to claim 1, wherein The identity identifier includes a token or a certificate serial number of the digital certificate.

4. The method according to claim 3, wherein The token includes a decentralized identity DID and a certificate serial number of the digital certificate.

5. The method according to claim 3, wherein The identity includes the token, and The method further comprises: If the electronic component is successfully authenticated, the token is updated to obtain an updated token, and the updated token is used to authenticate the electronic component when the electronic component is accessed next time; encrypting the updated token using the first key to obtain an encrypted updated token; The encrypted updated token is sent to the electronic component.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that The method is applied to a terminal, the first key corresponds to the terminal, and the first keys allocated to different electronic components by the same terminal are the same first key.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that The method is applied to a terminal, the first key corresponds to the electronic component, and the first keys allocated to different electronic components by the same terminal are different first keys.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that The step of sending a first credential to the electronic component when the digital certificate is successfully verified includes: If the digital certificate is successfully verified, a session key SK is negotiated with the electronic component, wherein the SK is used for encryption and decryption of data transmission; Based on the SK, encrypt the identity identifier and the first key assigned to the electronic component to obtain the first credential; The first credential is sent to the electronic component.

9. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that The verifying of the digital certificate includes: determining whether the digital certificate of the electronic component is revoked based on the certificate serial number of the revoked digital certificate; and In the case where the digital certificate of the electronic component is revoked, determining that the verification of the digital certificate of the electronic component has failed; wherein, The certificate serial number of the revoked digital certificate comes from a public key infrastructure (PKI) server. The revoked digital certificate is determined based on verification results of multiple logs including the log of the electronic component. Each of the multiple logs includes the certificate serial number of a digital certificate and the usage time of the certificate serial number.

10. The method according to claim 9, wherein The revoked digital certificates include: a plurality of digital certificates having the same certificate serial number and having at least partially overlapping usage times.

11. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that The digital certificate is pre-installed in the electronic component, or the digital certificate is generated by the electronic component based on a digital signature obtained from a PKI server.

12. A method for authenticating electronic components, characterized in that: The method comprises: In the case of first access to a terminal, sending a digital certificate to the terminal; receiving a first credential from the terminal, wherein the first credential includes an encrypted second credential; When accessing the terminal again, sending a second credential to the terminal, where the second credential is obtained based on the first credential; The first credential is obtained based on encryption of an identity identifier and a first key, the identity identifier is used to identify the identity of the electronic component, and the first key is used to encrypt the identity identifier; The second credential includes an encrypted identity obtained by encrypting the identity based on the first key.

13. The method according to claim 12, wherein: The sending of the second credential to the terminal when accessing the terminal again includes: Decrypting the first credential to obtain the identity identifier and the first key; Encrypting the identity using the first key to obtain an encrypted identity; The encrypted identity is sent, where the encrypted identity is used by the terminal to authenticate the electronic component.

14. The method according to claim 13, wherein The decrypting the first credential to obtain the identity identifier and the first key includes: Negotiate a session key SK with the terminal, where the SK is used for encryption and decryption of data transmission; Based on the SK, the first credential is decrypted to obtain the identity identifier and the first key.

15. The method according to any one of claims 12 to 14, characterized in that The identity identifier includes a token or a certificate serial number of the digital certificate.

16. The method according to claim 15, wherein The token includes a decentralized identity DID and a certificate serial number of the digital certificate.

17. The method according to claim 15, wherein The identity includes the token, and The method further comprises: receiving an encrypted updated token from the terminal, where the encrypted updated token is obtained by encrypting the updated token based on the first key, and the updated token is used by the terminal to authenticate the electronic component when the terminal accesses the terminal next time; The encrypted updated token is decrypted based on the first key to obtain the updated token.

18. The method according to any one of claims 12 to 14, 16 and 17, characterized in that The digital certificate is pre-installed in the electronic component, or the digital certificate is generated by the electronic component based on a digital signature obtained from a PKI server.

19. A terminal, characterized in that: include: a transceiver unit, configured to obtain a digital certificate from an electronic component when detecting that the electronic component is connected for the first time; a processing unit, configured to verify the digital certificate; The transceiver unit is further configured to send a first credential to the electronic component if the digital certificate is successfully verified, wherein the first credential includes an encrypted second credential; The transceiver unit is further configured to, when detecting that the electronic component is connected again, obtain a second credential from the electronic component, wherein the second credential is obtained based on the first credential; The processing unit is further configured to authenticate the electronic component based on the second credential; The first credential is obtained based on encryption of an identity identifier and a first key, the identity identifier is used to identify the identity of the electronic component, and the first key is used to encrypt the identity identifier; The second credential includes an encrypted identity obtained by encrypting the identity based on the first key.

20. The terminal according to claim 19, wherein The processing unit is specifically configured to: Decrypting the encrypted identity using the first key to obtain the identity; authenticating the electronic component based on the decrypted identity and the locally stored identity; as well as If the electronic component is successfully authenticated, enabling the electronic component; or If the electronic component fails to be authenticated, enabling the electronic component is prohibited.

21. The terminal according to claim 19, wherein The identity identifier includes a token or a certificate serial number of the digital certificate.

22. The terminal according to claim 21, wherein The token includes a decentralized identity DID and a certificate serial number of the digital certificate.

23. The terminal according to claim 21, wherein The identity includes the token, and The processing unit is further configured to: If the electronic component is successfully authenticated, the token is updated to obtain an updated token, and the updated token is used for authenticating the electronic component the next time the electronic component accesses the terminal; encrypting the updated token using the first key to obtain an encrypted updated token; The encrypted updated token is sent to the electronic component.

24. The terminal according to any one of claims 19 to 23, characterized in that: The first key corresponds to the terminal, and the first keys allocated to different electronic components by the same terminal are the same first key.

25. The terminal according to any one of claims 19 to 23, characterized in that The first key corresponds to the electronic component, and the first keys allocated to different electronic components by the same terminal are different first keys.

26. The terminal according to any one of claims 19 to 23, characterized in that: The processing unit is specifically configured to: If the digital certificate is successfully verified, a session key SK is negotiated with the electronic component, where the SK is used for encryption and decryption of data transmission; Based on the SK, encrypt the identity identifier and the first key assigned to the electronic component to obtain the first credential; The first credential is sent to the electronic component.

27. The terminal according to any one of claims 19 to 23, characterized in that: The processing unit is specifically configured to: determining whether the digital certificate of the electronic component is revoked based on the certificate serial number of the revoked digital certificate; and In the case where the digital certificate of the electronic component is revoked, determining that the verification of the digital certificate of the electronic component has failed; wherein, The certificate serial number of the revoked digital certificate comes from a public key infrastructure (PKI) server. The revoked digital certificate is determined based on verification results of multiple logs including the log of the electronic component. Each of the multiple logs includes the certificate serial number of a digital certificate and the usage time of the certificate serial number.

28. The terminal according to claim 27, wherein: The revoked digital certificates include: a plurality of digital certificates having the same certificate serial number and having at least partially overlapping usage times.

29. The terminal according to any one of claims 19 to 23, characterized in that The digital certificate is pre-installed in the electronic component, or the digital certificate is generated by the electronic component based on a digital signature obtained from a PKI server.

30. The terminal according to any one of claims 19 to 23, characterized in that The terminal is a car.

31. An electronic component, characterized in that: include: a transceiver unit, configured to send a digital certificate to the terminal when the terminal is accessed for the first time; The transceiver unit is further configured to receive a first credential from the terminal, wherein the first credential includes an encrypted second credential; The transceiver unit is further configured to send a second credential to the terminal when accessing the terminal again, where the second credential is obtained based on the first credential; The first credential is obtained based on encryption of an identity identifier and a first key, the identity identifier is used to identify the identity of the electronic component, and the first key is used to encrypt the identity identifier; The second credential includes an encrypted identity obtained by encrypting the identity based on the first key.

32. The electronic component according to claim 31, wherein The electronic components also include: a processing unit, configured to decrypt the first credential to obtain the identity identifier and the first key; The processing unit is further configured to encrypt the identity using the first key to obtain an encrypted identity; and The transceiver unit is specifically used to send the encrypted identity identifier, and the encrypted identity identifier is used by the terminal to authenticate the electronic component.

33. The electronic component according to claim 32, wherein: The processing unit is specifically configured to: Negotiate a session key SK with the terminal, where the SK is used for encryption and decryption of data transmission; Based on the SK, the first credential is decrypted to obtain the identity identifier and the first key.

34. The electronic component according to any one of claims 31 to 33, wherein: The identity identifier includes a token or a certificate serial number of the digital certificate.

35. The electronic component according to claim 34, wherein The token includes a decentralized identity DID and a certificate serial number of the digital certificate.

36. The electronic component according to claim 34, wherein The identity includes the token, and The transceiver unit is further configured to receive an encrypted updated token from the terminal, wherein the encrypted updated token is obtained by encrypting the updated token based on the first key, and the updated token is used by the terminal to authenticate the electronic component when the electronic component is connected to the terminal next time; The encrypted updated token is decrypted based on the first key to obtain the updated token.

37. The electronic component according to any one of claims 31 to 33, 35, and 36, wherein: The digital certificate is pre-installed in the electronic component, or the digital certificate is generated by the electronic component based on a digital signature obtained from a public key infrastructure (PKI) server.

38. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The invention comprises a computer program which, when running on a computer, causes the computer to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 18.

39. A computer program product, characterized in that The invention comprises a computer program which, when being executed, causes a computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 18.

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