Computer network data secure transmission system and method

Abstract

The invention discloses a computer network data secure transmission system and method, and particularly relates to the technical field of network data secure transmission, and the system comprises a dynamic key management module which generates a key seed through a quantum random number generator, generates a dynamic key bound with a data packet in combination with a timestamp, and transmits the dynamic key to a server; after being encrypted by a receiving end public key, the data are transmitted through an independent verification channel; the dual-path transmission control module is used for establishing dual channels of a main path and a shadow path, a data packet of the main path is embedded into a random camouflage protocol header to simulate a non-sensitive protocol, and a blank data packet is filled in the shadow path to maintain traffic characteristics; according to the real-time verification engine, a receiving end constructs an encrypted hash tree to achieve fragment-level integrity verification, and meanwhile, requests key state three-state verification from the key management module. Through key dynamic generation and separation transmission, dual-path adaptive fragmentation distribution, fragmentation hash tree reconstruction and key linkage verification, and abnormal triggering fragmentation level retransmission, the problems of long-term effectiveness of a static key, predictable transmission path and verification lag are solved.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of network data security transmission, and more particularly, to a computer network data security transmission system and method. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the evolution of new attack methods such as quantum computing and advanced persistent threats (APTs), traditional network transmission security mechanisms are facing severe challenges. In high-sensitivity scenarios such as financial transactions and government communications, static key encryption is vulnerable to brute-force attacks, single-path transmission is at risk of link hijacking, and passive data verification mechanisms are difficult to resist man-in-the-middle attacks. According to the Gartner 2024 report, the global economic losses caused by data transmission vulnerabilities are growing at an average of 37% per year, with key leaks accounting for 52% and path hijacking accounting for 31%. In this context, there is an urgent need to build a new security transmission architecture that integrates dynamic key management, active path defense, and real-time verification to address the threat escalation posed by state-level attack organizations and quantum computing;

[0003] The current mainstream technology has three defects:

[0004] (1) Key management is rigid: the static key system based on IPSec or TLS has been effective for a long time, attackers can accumulate cracking materials through traffic sniffing, and key distribution relies on centralized CA institutions, which poses a single point of failure risk;

[0005] (2) Transmission path is vulnerable: in single-path transmission mode, attackers can implement full-link monitoring through BGP hijacking or DNS pollution, and although multi-path transmission technology (such as MPTCP) improves reliability, it does not solve the problem of protocol feature exposure, leading to encrypted traffic being identified by deep packet inspection (DPI);

[0006] (3) Verification mechanism is lagging: traditional hash verification (such as SHA-256) is performed after data reorganization, which cannot real-time intercept tampered fragments, and lacks key state linkage verification, attackers can inject historical packets using replay attacks;

[0007] Therefore, a computer network data security transmission system and method are proposed to address the above problems. SUMMARY

[0008] To overcome the above-mentioned defects of the prior art, embodiments of the present application provide a computer network data security transmission system and method to solve the problems raised in the background art.

[0009] To achieve the above object, the present application provides the following technical scheme: a computer network data security transmission system, comprising: a dynamic key management module, which generates a key seed using a quantum random number generator, generates a dynamic encryption key that is uniquely bound to each data packet according to the timestamp of the transmission session, the life cycle of the key is strictly bound to the data packet transmission time and the maximum survival time does not exceed 2 times the average network delay, and the key destruction mechanism is automatically triggered after the data packet reaches the target node; a dual-path transmission control module, which establishes a dual-channel architecture of a main transmission path and a shadow path, dynamically allocates data fragments to the optimal path by collecting real-time path packet loss rate, delay and jitter indicators, wherein the data packet header of the main transmission path is embedded with a camouflage protocol header to simulate the HTTP / ICMP non-sensitive protocol; a real-time verification engine, which is deployed at the receiving end, verifies data integrity by constructing a fragment hash tree, and submits the key identification and timestamp combination to the key management module to obtain the key validity three-state verification result (valid / destroyed / non-existent).

[0010] Preferably, the dual-path transmission control module executes an adaptive fragmentation allocation strategy, when the main path packet loss rate exceeds 5% or the delay exceeds 100ms, the data unit marked as a critical fragment is switched to the shadow path transmission, the identification of the critical fragment is based on the positioning of sensitive fields in the data stream by a semantic analysis engine, the sensitive fields include 0.5% of the file header data segment, the financial transaction amount field and the personal identity information block, wherein the file header data fragment is always given the highest transmission priority.

[0011] Preferably, the real-time verification engine includes an anti-replay attack mechanism, which forcibly checks the continuity of the timestamp sequence when reconstructing the data packet at the receiving end, and rejects data fragments with a timestamp deviation of more than ±50ms; the hash tree construction uses the SM3 national encryption algorithm or the BLAKE3 encryption hash function, and the tree depth is at least 3 layers to realize fragment-level integrity verification, and each leaf node corresponds to the hash value of the fragment, which is pre-calculated by the sending end and independently transmitted to the verification channel.

[0012] Preferably, the dynamic key management module interacts with the public key infrastructure (PKI) system, encrypts the dynamic key using the receiving end digital certificate in the key distribution stage to form the key encapsulation data packet (KEP); the key destruction instruction is realized by the block chain smart contract to realize the non-tamperable record, and the destruction operation includes: erasing the key from the memory, submitting the invalidation declaration to the key registration center, and updating the key state to destroyed.

[0013] A method for secure data transmission includes the following steps: when a transmission session is initiated at a transmitting end, a quantum random number generator generates a 256-bit key seed, which is combined with the current UTC timestamp to generate a data packet-specific dynamic key. The key is encrypted with the receiving end's public key to form a key-encapsulated data packet (KEP), which is transmitted through a verification channel independent of the data channel; the original data packet is fragmented according to the sensitive field identification result, with critical fragments marked as red and non-critical fragments marked as blue. The fragments are dynamically assigned to a primary path or a shadow path based on a path weight formula calculated in real time, where the weight formula is: W = 0.7 × (1-packet loss rate) + 0.3 × (1 / delay), and dual-path parallel transmission is initiated when the primary path weight is lower than 0.6; after receiving the fragments, the receiving end first reconstructs a hash tree to verify the fragment integrity, and then submits the key identifier and timestamp combination to a key management module. When the key status returns to "valid" and the hash check passes, the data packet is reassembled; otherwise, a retransmission protocol is triggered.

[0014] Preferably, the path weight calculation is dynamically updated with a period of 50ms, and a path camouflage operation is performed at the same time: the protocol type field in the IP packet header of the main transmission path is set to a preset camouflage value, which is randomly selected from a protocol type library, which contains protocol codes corresponding to HTTP / 80, DNS / 53, and NTP / 123 ports; the shadow path uses a real transmission protocol but is filled with blank data packets to maintain consistency in traffic characteristics.

[0015] Preferably, the key verification phase performs strict lifecycle checks, including: verifying whether the timestamp is within the valid window (current time ±100ms), whether the key identifier exists in the registration center, and whether the key status is not destroyed; when the verification fails three times in a row, the security enhancement mechanism is automatically triggered: updating the chaos function parameters in the key seed generation algorithm, rebuilding the transmission path topology, and sending a high-risk attack alarm with the code 0xAE to the security management platform.

[0016] Preferably, during the data reassembly phase, if it is detected that the shard hash check fails but the key status is valid, the shard-level retransmission protocol is started and only the invalid shard is retransmitted; if the key status is abnormal, the received shard is destroyed and the full-link key update process is triggered, including: terminating the current session, generating a new key seed, and renegotiating the transmission path.

[0017] The technical effects and advantages of the present invention are as follows:

[0018] Compared with the existing technology, the core advantage of the present invention lies in solving the problem of long-term key validity through dynamic key binding and millisecond-level destruction mechanism, using a quantum random number generator combined with a transmission timestamp to generate a data packet-specific key, which is encrypted by the public key of the receiving end and transmitted through an independent verification channel. The blockchain evidence destruction process is triggered immediately after the data packet arrives, eliminating the risk of key reuse from the root; dual-path dynamic sharding and active camouflage technology are used to overcome the predictable defects of the transmission path, and random camouflage of the protocol header is implemented on the main path to simulate non-sensitive protocol traffic. At the same time, blank data packets are filled in the shadow path to maintain the consistency of traffic characteristics. Combined with an adaptive sharding algorithm based on real-time network quality indicators, attackers cannot identify the real data path through traffic analysis; with the help of a shard-level real-time verification engine, the coordinated optimization of transmission and security is achieved. The integrity of the shard is verified layer by layer through a pre-built encrypted hash tree at the receiving end, and three-state verification (valid / destroyed / non-existent) is performed in conjunction with the key management module. Abnormal shards are intercepted before data reorganization and shard-level retransmission is triggered, significantly reducing transmission overhead while ensuring security. Each module forms a closed-loop protection system: dynamic key management ensures encryption strength, dual-path control provides active defense, and the real-time verification engine achieves precise anomaly blocking, ultimately achieving a coordinated improvement in transmission efficiency and security level. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0019] Figure 1 It is the workflow diagram of the present invention.

[0020] Figure 2 It is the overall framework structure diagram of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0021] The following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0022] Example 1

[0023] As attached Figure 1-2As shown, (1) a computer network data security transmission system, comprising: a dynamic key management module, which uses a quantum random number generator to generate a key seed, generates a dynamic encryption key uniquely bound to each data packet according to the timestamp of the transmission session, and the life cycle of the key is strictly bound to the data packet transmission time and the maximum survival time does not exceed 2 times the average network delay, and automatically triggers the key destruction mechanism after the data packet reaches the target node; a dual-path transmission control module, which establishes a dual-channel architecture of a main transmission path and a shadow path, and dynamically allocates data fragments to the optimal path by collecting path packet loss rate, delay and jitter indicators in real time, wherein the data packet header of the main transmission path is embedded with a disguised protocol header to simulate the HTTP / ICMP non-sensitive protocol; a real-time verification engine, which is deployed at the receiving end, verifies data integrity by constructing a fragment hash tree, and submits a key identifier and timestamp combination to the key management module to obtain a three-state verification result of key validity (valid / destroyed / non-existent), wherein the dynamic key management module uses quantum entropy source hardware (such as IDQ Quantis chip) generates the original random number, which is extracted by SHA-256 to form a 256-bit key seed; when the data transmission session is started, the UTC timestamp (accuracy 1ms) and the seed are calculated by the HMAC algorithm to generate an AES-256 dynamic key that is uniquely bound to the data packet. The key life cycle is set to "1.8 times the delay from the time the data packet is sent to the time the data packet is received", and the key encapsulated data packet (KEP) is transmitted through an independent UDP verification channel. The KEP structure contains a key identifier, an encrypted key body, and a timestamp triplet; in the initialization phase of the dual-path transmission control module, the BGP protocol is used to detect and establish the primary path (such as the telecom backbone) The real-time verification engine is deployed as an FPGA hardware accelerator at the receiving end. After receiving the shards, it immediately constructs a BLAKE3 hash tree. The leaf nodes correspond to the hash values ​​of the shard data, and the intermediate nodes are the hash values ​​of the child nodes. At the same time, a verification request containing the key identifier and the receiving timestamp is sent to the key management module through the gRPC interface.

[0024] (2) The dual-path transmission control module implements an adaptive fragment allocation strategy. When the packet loss rate of the main path exceeds 5% or the delay exceeds 100 ms, data units marked as critical fragments are switched to the shadow path for transmission. The identification of critical fragments is based on the positioning of sensitive fields in the data stream by a semantic analysis engine. The sensitive fields include the file header 0.5% data segment, the financial transaction amount field, and the personal identity information block. The file header data fragment is always assigned the highest transmission priority. The adaptive fragment allocation strategy execution process is as follows: first, scan the data stream through the semantic analysis engine (based on the pre-trained BERT model). When the bank card number regular expression \d{13,19} or the identity card number pattern \d{17}[\dXx] is detected, it is marked as a sensitive field. The file header data takes the first 0.5% bytes (such as the first 5KB of a 1MB file). The critical fragment (red level) allocation logic is as follows: continuously monitor the packet loss rate (calculated by ICMP echo) and delay (measured by TCP timestamp option) of the main path. When the packet loss rate > 5% or the delay > 100 ms, switch the critical fragment routing to the shadow path through the SDN controller. Non-critical fragments (blue level) maintain original path transmission. The transmission priority queue management uses weighted round-robin scheduling. The file header critical fragment weight is set to the highest level 9, the financial transaction field weight is 7, and the normal data weight is 1.

[0025] (3) The real-time verification engine includes an anti-replay attack mechanism that enforces the continuity of the timestamp sequence when reconstructing data packets at the receiving end, and rejects data fragments with a timestamp deviation exceeding ±50 ms. The hash tree construction uses the SM3 national encryption algorithm or the BLAKE3 encryption hash function, with a tree depth of at least 3 layers to achieve fragment-level integrity verification. Each leaf node corresponds to the hash value of a fragment, which is precomputed by the sending end and transmitted independently to the verification channel. The anti-replay attack mechanism implementation: the sending end appends a strictly increasing timestamp sequence (initial value is the session start UTC millisecond) to each fragment. The receiving end verification engine maintains a timestamp cache pool and rejects fragments with a timestamp deviation exceeding ±50 ms or a discontinuous sequence number. The hash tree construction process is as follows: divide the data packet into 1024-byte fragments, perform BLAKE3 hash on each fragment to generate leaf nodes, and hash the concatenated 8 leaf nodes to generate parent nodes. Iterate until the root node, with a fixed tree depth of 4 layers. All leaf node hash values are precomputed at the sending end and transmitted to the protected memory area of the receiving end verification engine through the DTLS encrypted tunnel.

[0026] (4) The dynamic key management module interacts with the public key infrastructure (PKI) system, encrypts the dynamic key using the receiving end digital certificate in the key distribution stage, and forms a key encapsulation data packet (KEP); the key destruction instruction is recorded by the block chain smart contract to achieve unalterable record, and the destruction operation includes: erasing the key from the memory, submitting the invalidation declaration to the key registration center, and updating the key state to destroyed, wherein the PKI system interaction process: the key distribution unit calls the OpenSSL library to parse the receiving end X.509 certificate, extracts the RSA-3072 public key to encrypt the dynamic key to form the KEP data packet, and the KEP structure conforms to the PKCS#7 standard; the block chain storage adopts the Hyperledger Fabric framework, and the key destruction instruction triggers the smart contract to execute: 1) calling the chain code invokeKeyDestruction to write the key identification into the block, 2) overwriting the key data as 0x00 in the memory safety area, and 3) sending the HSET key_status[keyID]destroyed command to the key registration center (based on the Redis cluster) to update the state, all operations are atomized and completed within 150 ms.

[0027] (5) A data security transmission method, comprising the following steps: when starting a transmission session at the sending end, generating a 256-bit key seed by a quantum random number generator, and generating a data packet-specific dynamic key in combination with the current UTC timestamp, the key is encrypted by the receiving end public key to form a key encapsulation data packet (KEP), and is transmitted through an authentication channel independent of the data channel; the original data packet is fragmented according to the identification result of the sensitive field, the key fragments are marked as red level, and the non-key fragments are marked as blue level, and are dynamically allocated to the main path or the shadow path based on the real-time calculated path weight formula, the weight formula is: W = 0.7 x (1-packet loss rate) + 0.3 x (1 / delay), when the main path weight is lower than 0.6, the dual-path parallel transmission is started; after the receiving end receives the fragments, the hash tree is reconstructed to verify the integrity of the fragments, and then the key management module is submitted with the key identification and timestamp combination, when the key state returns "valid" and the hash check is passed, the data packet is reorganized, otherwise the retransmission protocol is triggered, wherein the transmission method executes the following steps:

[0028] Key generation stage: the quantum entropy source outputs 4MB random data per second, which is compressed into a 256-bit seed by HMAC-SHA256, and the dynamic key is generated in combination with the UTC timestamp (format: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSmmm) of the data packet sending time;

[0029] Fragment transmission phase: after the semantic analysis engine marks the sensitive fields, the fragment data is encrypted using the Rabbit stream cipher, and the results are calculated according to the path weight formula W = 0.7 x (1-P_loss) + 0.3 x (1 / Delay) (updated every 50 ms), where W is the path weight, P_loss and Delay are the packet loss rate and network delay respectively, when the main path weight <0.6, the red level fragment is distributed to the shadow path;

[0030] Verification reorganization phase: the receiving end reconstructs the hash tree according to the fragment sequence number, compares the root node with the pre-stored value of the sending end, and sends a JSON-RPC request to the key registration center: {"method":"verifyKey","params":{"keyID":"K123","timestamp":1712345678123}}, only when {"status":"valid"} and the hash match, the data packet is reorganized.

[0031] (6) The path weight calculation is dynamically updated every 50 ms, and the path camouflage operation is performed: the protocol type field in the IP packet header of the main transmission path is set to a preset camouflage value, which is randomly selected from the protocol type library, and the protocol type library contains the protocol codes corresponding to the HTTP / 80, DNS / 53, NTP / 123 port pairs; the shadow path uses the real transmission protocol but uses blank data packets to fill in to maintain the consistency of the traffic characteristics, wherein the path camouflage operation is specifically implemented: the protocol type library is preloaded with 10 camouflage protocol codes (such as 0x06-TCP, 0x11-UDP, 0x01-ICMP), and each transmission session randomly selects one item in the library and sets it in the main path IP packet header; the shadow path blank packet generation rule: the length is strictly consistent with the protected fragment, the payload area is filled with 0xFF (simulating encrypted data characteristics), and the IP packet header TTL value is synchronized with the main path packet; the path weight calculation period is driven by the Linux high-precision timer (hrtimer), which triggers QoS index collection every 50 ms (packet loss rate is obtained through the netlink interface, and delay is measured through the SO_TIMESTAMP socket option).

[0032] (7) The key verification phase performs strict life cycle checks, including: verifying whether the timestamp is within the valid window period (current time ± 100 ms), whether the key identifier exists in the registration center, and whether the key state is not destroyed; when 3 consecutive verification failures occur, the security enhancement mechanism is automatically triggered: update the chaotic function parameter in the key seed generation algorithm, rebuild the transmission path topology, and send a high-risk attack alarm with code 0xAE to the security management platform, wherein the key life cycle check mechanism: after the verification engine receives the fragments, the timestamp T1 in the KEP is extracted and compared with the current system time T2, and the valid window period determination condition is |T1-T2|≤100 ms; the key state verification adopts three-stage filtering: 1) query the Redis cluster to check whether the key identifier exists, 2) verify the validity of the timestamp window, and 3) check whether the key state is not "destroyed"; when 3 consecutive verification failures occur (failure counter ≥ 3), the security enhancement mechanism is executed: update the Logistic chaotic mapping parameter μ in / proc / sys / net / chaos_parameter through sysctl, call OSPF protocol to rebuild the routing table, and send an <134> %ATTACK-0xAE: Critical key verification failure alarm to Syslog.

[0033] (8) In the data recombination phase, if the fragment hash check fails but the key state is valid, the fragment-level retransmission protocol is started, and only the invalid fragments are retransmitted; if the key state is abnormal, the received fragments are destroyed and the full-link key update process is triggered, including: terminating the current session, generating a new key seed, and re-negotiating the transmission path, wherein the fragment-level retransmission protocol: when the receiving end detects a hash check failure, an NACK packet containing a list of invalid fragment sequence numbers (such as {seq: [15, 29, 37]}) is generated and sent to the source end through a dedicated retransmission channel (UDP port 8888), and the source end only retransmits the specified fragments; the full-link key update process: 1) sends an RST packet to terminate the current session, 2) generates a new key seed under the driving of a quantum entropy source, 3) calculates a new transmission path (avoiding the original path nodes) through the OSPF-TE protocol, and 4) re-executes the key generation and fragment allocation process described above.

[0034] Embodiment Two: Multi-source Data Joint Modeling Scenario

[0035] Stage 1: Transmission Session Initialization

[0036] The sender uses quantum entropy source hardware (IDQ Quantis chip) to generate the original random stream, and extracts the 256-bit key seed S_seed through SHA-256. At the same time, the network topology is detected through the OSPF-TE protocol, and the path with the lowest latency is selected as the main path Path_main (for example, IP routing: 192.168.1.1→10.8.0.34), and the path with the lowest jitter is selected as the shadow path Path_shadow (for example, IP routing: 192.168.1.1→172.16.5.21). The semantic analysis engine is initialized to load the regular rule library (including the bank card number pattern \d{13,19} and the ID card number \d{17}[\dXx]), and the file header interception ratio is set to 0.5% (that is, the first 5MB of a 1GB file is taken).

[0037] Phase 2: Dynamic Key Binding and Encapsulation

[0038] For each data packet Data_pkt to be transmitted: extract the current UTC timestamp T_send (format: 20250706153025120, accurate to milliseconds); calculate the dynamic key: Key_dynamic = HMAC(S_seed, T_send) (output AES-256 key); use the receiving end public key Pub_recv (extracted from the X.509 certificate) to encrypt the key: KEP = RSA_Encrypt(Pub_recv, Key_dynamic||T_send); then send the KEP to the receiving end through an independent UDP verification channel (port 5000), and start the key life timer T_life = 2×Avg_Delay (Avg_Delay is the historical average delay).

[0039] Phase 3: Data sharding and dual-path transmission

[0040] Step 3.1 Sensitive Shard Marking:

[0041] Data_pkt is input into the semantic analysis engine, and the fields that match the regular rules are marked as red fragments (critical data). The first 0.5% bytes of the file are marked as red fragments (highest priority), and the rest are blue fragments (non-critical data).

[0042] Step 3.2 Dynamic Path Allocation:

[0043] Path quality assessment is performed every 50 ms: the primary path packet loss rate (P_loss) is measured (calculated using ICMP echo responses), followed by the primary path delay (TCP timestamp difference). The weight is then calculated (according to the weight formula): W = 0.7 × (1-P_{loss}) + 0.3 × [1 / (min(Delay,500) / 1000)] (Note: Delay is measured in milliseconds, and the denominator is divided by 1000 to convert it to seconds), where min(Delay,500) / 1000 is the normalized delay. The decision logic is: if W ≥ 0.6, red fragments follow Path_main, and blue fragments follow Path_shadow. If W < 0.6, all red fragments switch to Path_shadow.

[0044] Step 3.3 Protocol masquerade execution:

[0045] Main path Path_main: Set the protocol field in the IP packet header to a random disguised value (selected from {0x06 (TCP), 0x11 (UDP), 0x01 (ICMP)});

[0046] Shadow path Path_shadow: A blank packet with matching fill length (payload area is all 0xFF), and the TTL value is synchronized with the main path packet.

[0047] Phase 4: Real-time verification at the receiving end

[0048] Step 4.1 Shard Hash Tree Construction: The receiver reassembles the data by shard sequence number, calculates the BLAKE3 hash H_i for each 1024B shard Seg_i, concatenates every 8 H_i and hashes them to generate the parent node P_j = BLAKE3(H_1||H_2||...||H_8), then iterates to generate the root hash H_root (depth 4 layers), and finally compares it with the root hash pre-stored on the sender (obtained through the DTLS secure channel).

[0049] Step 4.2 Key three-state verification: Send a verification request to the key registration center (partial code is as follows):

[0050]

[0051] Then, the verification logic is performed. For the time window check: |T_recv - T_send| ≤ 100ms; for the key status query: the Redis cluster retrieves the keyID status (valid / destroyed / non-existent); finally, the result is returned. Verification is passed only when the status is valid and the time window is legal.

[0052] Phase 5: Exception handling and recovery

[0053] Scenario 5.1: Fragment verification failure: If the hash tree verification fails but the key is valid → Generate a NACK message {type:0xAE,bad_segs:[15,29]} and request retransmission of the specified fragment through the retransmission channel (UDP 8888).

[0054] Scenario 5.2 Key verification exception: If invalid is returned three times in a row (status ≠ valid or timed out), a safety fuse is triggered: the chaos parameter is updated: sysctl -w net.chaos_μ = 3.92 (original value 3.99), the transmission path is rebuilt, and an OSPFLSA refresh request is sent; then a high-risk alarm is generated: Syslog (priority: 134, msg: "ATTACK-0xAE").

[0055] Scenario 5.3: Path quality deteriorates: When the Path_main weight W is less than 0.6 for five consecutive times, the network switches to full shadow path transmission and initiates BGP rerouting detection.

[0056] Phase 6: Session Termination and Destruction

[0057] (1) Normal termination process: The receiving end sends an ACK_FIN message to confirm that the data reassembly is complete, and the sending end triggers the key destruction chain code (the solidity part is as follows):

[0058] function destroyKey(bytes32 keyID)public{

[0059] keyStatus[keyID] = "destroyed"; / / Blockchain status update

[0060] emit KeyDestructed(keyID,block.timestamp);

[0061] }

[0062] Then clean up the memory and overwrite S_seed to 0x00 in the Intel SGX enclave.

[0063] (2) Abnormal termination process:

[0064] When a continuous attack is detected (e.g., >10 alarms per minute), an RST message is sent to forcibly close the session and a forensic log is generated and uploaded to the security operation center.

[0065] Example scenario demonstration:

[0066] Financial transaction file transfer case:

[0067] File: payment_20250706.csv (Size 80MB, contains 100,000 transaction records);

[0068] Key shards: File header 4MB (marked red) + transaction amount field (spread across 15 shards);

[0069] Event in transmission: The burst packet loss rate of the main path rises to 12% (W=0.41<0.6);

[0070] System response: All red shards switch to the shadow path; shard 29 hash check fails → triggers shard-level retransmission; receiving end key verification timestamp deviation 8ms → state valid;

[0071] Result: The overall transmission delay increases by 23ms, but the sensitive data is 100% complete.

[0072] Finally, it should be noted that in the description of the present application, it should be noted that unless otherwise specified and limited, the terms "installation", "connection", "connection" should be broadly understood, which can be mechanical connection or electrical connection, or the communication between two elements, or direct connection, "up", "down", "left", "right" and the like are only used to indicate the relative positional relationship, when the absolute position of the described object changes, the relative positional relationship may change;

[0073] Secondly: The present application discloses the structure involved in the embodiment of the present application, and other structures can refer to the usual design, and in the case of no conflict, the same embodiment and different embodiments of the present application can be combined with each other;

[0074] Finally: The above only describes the preferred embodiments of the present application and does not limit the present application. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. within the spirit and principles of the present application shall be included in the protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A computer network data security transmission system, characterized in that include: The dynamic key management module uses a quantum random number generator to generate key seeds and generates a dynamic encryption key uniquely bound to each data packet based on the timestamp of the transmission session. The life cycle of the key is strictly bound to the data packet transmission time and the maximum survival time does not exceed twice the average network delay. The key destruction mechanism is automatically triggered after the data packet reaches the target node; the dual-path transmission control module establishes a dual-channel architecture of the main transmission path and the shadow path. By collecting the path packet loss rate, delay and jitter indicators in real time, it dynamically allocates data fragments to the optimal path. The data packet header of the main transmission path is embedded with a disguised protocol header to simulate the HTTP / ICMP non-sensitive protocol; the real-time verification engine is deployed at the receiving end. It verifies data integrity by constructing a shard hash tree and submits the key identifier and timestamp combination to the key management module to obtain the three-state verification result of the key validity (valid / destroyed / non-existent).

2. A computer network data security transmission system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The dual-path transmission control module implements an adaptive fragment allocation strategy. When the packet loss rate of the main path exceeds 5% or the delay exceeds 100ms, the data units marked as critical fragments are switched to the shadow path for transmission. The identification of critical fragments is based on the semantic analysis engine's positioning of sensitive fields in the data stream. Sensitive fields include the 0.5% data segment in the file header, the financial transaction amount field, and the personal identity information block. Among them, the file header data fragment is always given the highest transmission priority.

3. A computer network data security transmission system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The real-time verification engine includes an anti-replay attack mechanism that forces the continuity of the timestamp sequence to be verified when the receiving end reconstructs the data packet, and refuses to receive data fragments with timestamp deviations exceeding ±50ms; the hash tree is constructed using the SM3 national secret algorithm or the BLAKE3 encrypted hash function, and the tree depth is at least 3 layers to achieve fragment-level integrity verification. The hash value of each leaf node corresponding to the fragment is pre-calculated by the sending end and independently transmitted to the verification channel.

4. A computer network data security transmission system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The dynamic key management module interacts with the public key infrastructure (PKI) system and uses the receiving end's digital certificate to encrypt the dynamic key during the key distribution phase to form a key encapsulation data packet (KEP). The key destruction instruction is recorded as tamper-proof through blockchain smart contracts. The destruction operations include: erasing the key from the memory, submitting a cancellation statement to the key registration center, and updating the key status to destroyed.

5. A data security transmission method based on the system of any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that The following steps are involved: When the sender initiates a transmission session, a 256-bit key seed is generated by a quantum random number generator. This seed is combined with the current UTC timestamp to generate a packet-specific dynamic key. This key is encrypted with the receiver's public key to form a key-encapsulated packet (KEP), which is transmitted via a verification channel independent of the data channel. The original packet is fragmented based on the results of sensitive field identification. Critical fragments are marked as red, and non-critical fragments are marked as blue. These fragments are dynamically assigned to the primary or shadow path based on a real-time calculated path weight formula: W = 0.7 × (1-packet loss rate) + 0.3 × (1 / delay). When the primary path weight falls below 0.6, dual-path parallel transmission is initiated. After receiving the fragments, the receiver first reconstructs the hash tree to verify the fragment integrity and then submits the key identifier and timestamp combination to the key management module. When the key status returns to "valid" and the hash check passes, the packet is reassembled; otherwise, a retransmission protocol is triggered.

6. A data security transmission method according to claim 5, characterized in that: The path weight calculation is dynamically updated with a period of 50ms, and a path camouflage operation is performed at the same time: the protocol type field in the IP packet header of the main transmission path is set to a preset camouflage value, which is randomly selected from a protocol type library. The protocol type library contains protocol codes corresponding to HTTP / 80, DNS / 53, and NTP / 123 ports; the shadow path uses the real transmission protocol but is padded with blank data packets to maintain traffic feature consistency.

7. A data security transmission method according to claim 5, characterized in that: The key verification phase performs strict lifecycle checks, including: verifying whether the timestamp is within the valid window (current time ±100ms), whether the key identifier exists in the registration center, and whether the key status is not destroyed; when the verification fails three times in a row, the security enhancement mechanism is automatically triggered: updating the chaos function parameters in the key seed generation algorithm, rebuilding the transmission path topology, and sending a high-risk attack alarm with the code 0xAE to the security management platform.

8. A data security transmission method according to claim 5, characterized in that: During the data reassembly phase, if a shard hash check fails but the key status is valid, the shard-level retransmission protocol is started and only the failed shard is retransmitted; If the key status is abnormal, the received shards are destroyed and the full-link key update process is triggered, including: terminating the current session, generating a new key seed, and renegotiating the transmission path.

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