Full offline accessory key full life cycle management system and method

Abstract

This invention discloses a fully offline accessory key lifecycle management system and method, belonging to the field of smart terminal accessory security management technology. This invention constructs a six-stage, closed-loop management system covering key generation and programming, factory pre-binding, initial activation verification, continuous usage control, offline key revocation, and physical destruction upon disposal. This invention utilizes a PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) circuit to generate unique key pairs for each device. The private key is permanently embedded within the chip, unreadable and unexportable. A physical unidirectional programming link eliminates the risk of internal key leakage, enabling offline pre-binding between the terminal and accessories, offline key revocation, and hardware-level physical key destruction capabilities. This invention operates entirely offline in a closed loop on the local terminal, without requiring cloud-based network data interaction. It effectively solves the security flaws of traditional accessory key systems, such as easy key leakage, easy mass forgery, lack of offline revocation capabilities, and the possibility of reused discarded keys. This provides a full-process, hardware-level, and highly reliable security management solution for the fully offline bionic interactive terminal accessory ecosystem.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the fields of security authentication for smart terminal accessories and hardware security chip key management technology, and is particularly applicable to the full lifecycle security management of original accessories for fully offline bionic interactive terminals from the time they leave the factory to the time they are scrapped. Background Technology

[0002] Existing smart terminal accessory authorization and authentication schemes only focus on single-access verification and generally lack a closed-loop management system for the entire key lifecycle, posing numerous security risks: the key burning process lacks hardware isolation, allowing staff to access plaintext keys, which can easily lead to internal leaks and mass unauthorized key burning; terminals and accessories lack a factory pre-binding mechanism, making it difficult to identify genuine products, and allowing counterfeit and refurbished accessories to be mixed in; there is a lack of effective offline revocation methods after key leakage, making it unsuitable for fully offline terminal scenarios without network access; and there is no mandatory key destruction mechanism during the accessory disposal stage, posing a security risk that discarded keys can be recycled, replicated, and misused again. Summary of the Invention

[0003] This invention provides a fully offline accessory key lifecycle management system and method, covering six complete stages: secure key generation and burning, pre-binding of accessory terminals at the factory, initial activation verification of terminals, authorization control during use, offline key revocation, and key destruction when accessories are scrapped. The entire process runs in a closed loop in a local offline environment without relying on cloud servers for data interaction.

[0004] The system of this invention includes: an original manufacturer key management center, a terminal local trusted key library, an accessory-side security authentication chip, an accessory authorization status table, a hardware encrypted data carrier interface, and a terminal main control module.

[0005] The method of this invention comprises six core stages: Secure Key Generation and Programming: The accessory-side PUF chip generates a unique key pair exclusive to the device. The private key is stored inside the chip and is not output in plaintext. Only the public key is exported and stored in the original manufacturer's database. The programming process uses a physical unidirectional transmission link, and the operation record is automatically cleared after the operation is completed. Accessories and terminals are pre-bound at the factory: The original manufacturer uses a hardware encryption carrier to offline input the unique identifier of the accessory and the corresponding public key into the trusted key library of the terminal to complete the factory binding configuration; Terminal initial activation verification: When the terminal is powered on for the first time, it will automatically detect the connected accessories and complete the identity verification. If the verification is correct, the accessory status will be marked as activated. Continuous authorization management during use: The terminal locally counts the frequency and duration of accessory usage. When the parameters reach the preset threshold, the authorization level is automatically downgraded or an authorization renewal reminder pops up. Offline key revocation: Import the revocation data package carrying the original manufacturer's digital signature through a hardware encrypted carrier, and complete the revocation marking of the parts locally without the need for an internet connection; Secure disposal of components: The terminal issues an irreversible destruction command, physically damaging the chip's storage array and key circuit, rendering the internal key permanently invalid. Attached Figure Description

[0006] Figure 1. Overall system architecture block diagram of the present invention Figure 2. Schematic diagram of the six stages of the key lifecycle of the present invention Figure 3. Schematic diagram of the offline revocation process of the present invention. Figure 4. Schematic diagram of the scrapping and disposal process of the accessories of this invention. Explanation of icon numbers: 1 - Original Manufacturer Key Management Center; 2 - Terminal Main Control Module; 3 - Accessory-side Security Authentication Chip; 4 - Local Trusted Key Store; 5 - Accessory Authorization Status Table; 6 - Hardware Encrypted Data Carrier Interface; 7 - PUF Key Generation Circuit; 8 - Physical Destruction Execution Circuit. In Figure 2, ①-⑥ represent the six stages of the key's entire lifecycle: key generation and burning, factory pre-binding, initial activation verification, in-use authorization control, offline key revocation, and physical destruction upon disposal. Detailed Implementation

[0007] Example 1: Secure Key Generation and Burning During the factory testing phase, the security authentication chip on the accessory side is triggered by the original manufacturer's key management center using a dedicated programming device to generate a unique key pair for the device via its built-in PUF circuit. The programming process only supports issuing control commands and prohibits reading private key data. The public key is archived and stored in the original manufacturer's key management database, while the private key is permanently stored in a secure area of ​​the chip, making it unreadable and unexportable. After programming is complete, the device automatically clears the operation log and cache records, completely blocking any channels for key leakage.

[0008] Example 2: Offline Revocation Process When the manufacturer detects risks such as batch key leakage, stolen parts, or illegal circulation, it generates an encrypted revocation data packet with the manufacturer's digital signature and distributes it offline via a hardware encryption carrier. The terminal uses a locally pre-installed manufacturer public key to verify the signature. If the verification is successful, the corresponding part is marked as revoked in the local authorization status table. When the part is subsequently connected to the terminal again, even if the signature verification passes, the system will still refuse to enable any functions, achieving a purely offline access ban.

[0009] Example 3: Safe Disposal of Scrapped Parts When a user or system triggers a disposal command, the terminal sends an irreversible destruction command to the accessory's security chip. The chip activates its built-in high-voltage circuit or fuse structure to physically destroy the PUF key circuit and storage unit, permanently invalidating the internal private key and making it unrecoverable. After destruction is complete, the chip sends a destruction confirmation signal to the terminal, and the terminal simultaneously updates the accessory's status to "destroyed," completely avoiding the risk of old keys being recycled, copied, or misused again.

Claims

1. A full offline accessory key full life cycle management method, characterized in that, It includes the following six execution phases: Phase 1, Key Security Generation and Burning: The accessory-side security authentication chip generates a unique key pair through its internal PUF circuit. The private key is permanently stored in the secure area inside the chip and cannot be read or exported. Only the public key is exported and archived to the original manufacturer's key management database. The key burning process uses a physical one-way data transmission link, which can only issue commands and cannot read keys. After burning is completed, the operation log and cache records are automatically cleared. Phase Two: Pre-binding of Accessories and Terminals at the Factory: The original manufacturer injects the unique identifier of the accessory and its corresponding public key offline into the local trusted key store of the terminal through a hardware encrypted data carrier, thus completing the pre-binding of accessories and terminals at the factory. Phase 3, Terminal Initial Activation Verification: When the terminal is powered on for the first time, it automatically scans for connected accessories and performs identity authorization verification. After the verification is successful, the status of the accessory is updated to activated. Phase 4: Continuous Authorization Management During Use: The terminal locally tracks the cumulative number of times accessories are used and the cumulative usage time in real time. When the operating parameters reach the preset threshold, the accessory authorization level is automatically downgraded or an authorization renewal reminder pops up. Phase 5, Offline Key Revocation: The terminal receives the encrypted revocation data packet issued by the original manufacturer through a hardware encrypted data carrier. After the original manufacturer's public key verifies the signature, the corresponding accessory is marked as revoked in the local accessory authorization status table. Phase Six: Secure Destruction of Components: The terminal sends an irreversible physical destruction command to the security authentication chip on the component. The chip physically destroys the PUF key circuit and storage array, making the internal private key permanently invalid and unrecoverable. The method operates entirely in a closed loop on a local terminal without any wireless communication modules, and no data is transmitted to the external network, making it fully suitable for offline use scenarios.

2. The fully offline accessory key lifecycle management method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Phase 2 supports a one-to-one exclusive binding of a designated accessory's unique identifier with a designated terminal's hardware unique identifier, enabling exclusive management and control of a single terminal matching a single accessory.

3. The fully offline accessory key lifecycle management method according to claim 1, characterized in that: In Phase 4, when the cumulative number of times or the cumulative duration of use of an accessory exceeds a preset threshold, the terminal automatically downgrades the full function authorization of the accessory to a limited function authorization, thereby achieving tiered permission control.

4. The fully offline accessory key lifecycle management method according to claim 1, characterized in that: In Phase 5, the revocation data packet contains a built-in original manufacturer's exclusive digital signature. The terminal calls the locally preset original manufacturer's public key to complete the legality verification of the signature. Only after the signature verification is passed can the accessory revocation operation be executed to prevent illegal forgery of revocation instructions.

5. The full off-line kit key full life cycle management method of claim 1, wherein: In Phase 6, the security authentication chip on the accessory end physically destroys the key hardware circuit through a built-in high-voltage circuit or a fuse blowing mechanism, and returns a destruction completion confirmation signal to the terminal after the destruction is completed.

6. A fully offline accessory key lifecycle management system, characterized in that, The method for implementing the fully offline accessory key lifecycle management method according to any one of claims 1–5 includes: The original manufacturer's key management center is used to uniformly complete key generation control, public key archiving and storage, and issue public key injection data packets and accessory revocation instruction data packets. The terminal main control module is a local embedded processing chip without any wireless communication, used to coordinate and execute local management logic throughout the entire key lifecycle; The accessory-side security authentication chip has a built-in PUF key generation circuit and physical destruction execution circuit. The chip's private key is never output in plaintext and cannot be exported. A local trusted key store is used to store the unique identifiers and corresponding public key data of original factory authorized accessories offline. The accessory authorization status table is used to record the activation status, authorization level, usage statistics, revocation status, and destruction status of each accessory locally. The hardware encrypted data carrier interface is used to receive externally imported public key injection data packets and original manufacturer revocation instruction data packets offline.

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