A traffic monitoring data tamper-proofing method based on blockchain hash verification

Abstract

The application discloses a traffic monitoring data anti-tampering method based on a blockchain hash check, relates to the field of traffic monitoring data security, and aims at the problem that data in the high-speed cross-node overlapping coverage area is easy to be forged. The method calculates the intersection of a mobile data source and a connection line between front and rear edge nodes on a reference surface of an anti-glare plate, maps and outputs a predecessor last page and a relay first page position, matches a method dictionary, splices the page position to construct a plate gap page turning seal piece representing a space topology sequence, generates a voucher by a predecessor node for a historical chain value and a page position signature, generates a first packet chain type hash and encapsulates a load for chaining by a relay node in combination with monitoring data, a historical chain value, a voucher and a seal piece, and finally performs consistency and space anti-fake checks by a blockchain accounting node. The application binds the coherent and staggered features of a physical space with cryptography in depth, effectively blocking the path of the pollution of the underlying account book by a fake first packet.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of traffic monitoring data security, and specifically to a method for preventing tampering of traffic monitoring data based on blockchain hash verification. Background Technology

[0002] With the development of intelligent transportation systems and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technology, a large number of edge computing nodes have been deployed along highways and urban expressways to collect and forward traffic monitoring data packets in real time. To ensure the authenticity and tamper-proof nature of traffic monitoring data during its multi-node flow, the industry generally adopts a blockchain-based hash digest verification mechanism for data ownership confirmation and notarization. Existing solutions can guarantee the integrity of data content in a static, single-point communication environment.

[0003] In complex road sections such as highway interchanges and diverging noses, anti-glare panel arrays are typically continuously deployed in the central median. When a moving data source traverses the overlapping coverage area of ​​adjacent edge nodes, the solid slats and perforated gaps of the anti-glare panels cause high-frequency alternating obstruction and exposure of the radio electromagnetic wave propagation path. The signal connectivity between the data source and different edge nodes before and after it undergoes regular alternating switching with three-dimensional spatial displacement. Existing technologies mainly focus on the cryptographic operations of plaintext fields within data packets, completely decoupling digital space security verification from real-world three-dimensional spatial displacement.

[0004] The aforementioned decoupling results in a significant security blind spot in existing anti-tampering schemes during cross-node relay scenarios. When monitoring data streams undergo relay handover in overlapping coverage areas, the existing hash binding mechanism cannot identify the legitimate spatial interleaving exposure order caused by the occlusion patterns of physical gaps, and cannot convert the spatial handover relationship generated by parallax into verifiable chain-like security constraint parameters. When attackers use asynchronous switching windows to forge a fake relay first packet that conforms to the normal network topology but violates the geometric continuity of real space, the existing pure data layer verification mechanism will determine its legitimacy, allowing the abnormally forged data packet to successfully bypass node review and be attached to the preceding historical hash chain, ultimately polluting the underlying blockchain ledger. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To address the shortcomings of existing technologies, this invention proposes a method for preventing tampering of traffic monitoring data based on blockchain hash verification. This method solves the problem that in high-speed cross-node overlapping coverage areas, existing hash verification mechanisms cannot extract the spatial geometric misalignment features of anti-glare panels due to spatiotemporal state decoupling, which makes it easy for abnormal forged data to bypass security verification and pollute the underlying blockchain ledger by using asynchronous switching windows.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution: Obtain the traffic monitoring data packet containing the unique identifier of the data source object and the previous valid chain hash. Calculate the intersection of the line connecting the historical position of the data source node with the preceding edge node, the line connecting the current position with the relay edge node, and the anti-glare plate reference surface. Map the intersection to the gap page position table and output the preceding last page position and the relay first page position respectively. The relay edge node compares the page position of the predecessor's last page and the page position of the relay's first page according to the page sequence book to extract the unique identifier of the target page sequence record. The unique identifier of the target page sequence record, the page position of the predecessor's last page, and the page position of the relay's first page are spliced ​​together to construct the gap flip cover. The predecessor edge node signs the previous valid chain hash and the page position of the predecessor's last page to generate a page tail seal voucher; After the relay edge node verifies the signature and seal of the end page, it performs a hash operation on the traffic monitoring data packet, the previous valid chain hash, the signature and seal of the end page, and the page-turning cover to generate the first packet chain hash; The relay edge node submits a transaction payload to the blockchain, which includes the unique identifier of the data source object, the identity identifier of the predecessor edge node, the previous valid chain hash, the first packet chain hash, the end-of-page signature voucher, and the page-turning cover. The blockchain ledger node verifies the hash of the previous valid chain based on the unique identifier of the data source object, verifies the signature of the signed document at the end of the page based on the identity identifier of the predecessor edge node, and verifies the page flip cover included in the transaction payload. After verification, it is written into the ledger.

[0007] Furthermore, the spherical position data of the externally input data source node is obtained. Using the fixed installation coordinates of the corresponding predecessor edge node and the fixed installation coordinates of the successor edge node as the local reference origin, the spherical position data of the data source node is uniformly transformed to the local Cartesian coordinate system, and the historical position and current position of the data source node are output respectively. The process of calculating the intersection point of the connecting line and the anti-glare panel reference surface includes: constructing a three-dimensional connecting line trajectory equation with variable connecting line parameters; constructing an anti-glare panel reference surface equation based on the reference point and normal vector of the anti-glare panel reference surface; and solving for the connecting line parameters by simultaneously solving the three-dimensional connecting line trajectory equation and the anti-glare panel reference surface equation.

[0008] Furthermore, after solving the connection parameters, the spatial physical error distance is calculated by combining the nominal circular probability error of the vehicle positioning module and the physical thickness of the anti-glare panel physical strip. The spatial physical error distance is then normalized by dividing it by the spatial straight-line distance between the data source node and the edge node to generate a tolerance threshold. Determine whether the connection parameters to be solved fall within the interval limited by the tolerance threshold. If the interval condition is met, substitute the connection parameters back into the three-dimensional connection trajectory equation to solve and output the three-dimensional coordinates of the predecessor intersection point and the relay intersection point. If the interval condition is not met or the denominator is zero when solving, then block the process.

[0009] Furthermore, the process of mapping the intersection point to the output of the board gap page position table for the predecessor and successor first page positions includes: A local two-dimensional coordinate system is established with the anti-glare panel reference surface as the reference surface, and the three-dimensional intersection points are transformed into the local two-dimensional coordinate system to output the two-dimensional intersection points; The point-surface inclusion test algorithm is used to find the two-dimensional intersection point that falls into the closed quadrilateral region set in the plate gap page position table, and the plate gap number corresponding to the closed quadrilateral region is extracted. Calculate the one-dimensional geometric offset of the two-dimensional intersection point relative to the page position centerline of the closed quadrilateral region, and determine the page position acceptance direction mark based on the one-dimensional geometric offset; When the two-dimensional intersection point falls on the common boundary of two adjacent closed quadrilateral regions, the two-dimensional intersection point is assigned to the closed quadrilateral region with the smallest gap number and the gap number is extracted. When the two-dimensional intersection point falls on the center line of the closed quadrilateral area, the compatible ownership of the second half of the page in the direction of the vehicle's travel is determined by the page position bearing the direction mark. The combined plate gap number and page position continuation direction mark are output as the last page position of the predecessor and the first page position of the successor, respectively.

[0010] Furthermore, the node-to-page sequence book is generated offline using the following method: Acquire high-precision map data, generate a parallel virtual driving trajectory along the lane centerline contained in the high-precision map data and within the lane boundary width range according to a preset lateral step size, generate a discrete sampling point set along the virtual driving trajectory according to a fixed spatial sampling interval, the fixed spatial sampling interval is not greater than half of the minimum longitudinal physical length of the anti-glare panel gap; Extract adjacent sampling points within the discrete sampling point set and use them as the coordinates of the previous and current time points in the offline simulation for calculation. Output the page position of the last page of the offline predecessor and the page position of the first page of the offline relay. All solution results are deduplicated to obtain valid page sequence records, and the valid page sequence records are bound to the unique identifier of the target page sequence record.

[0011] Furthermore, the process of constructing the page-turning cover by splicing the target page sequence record unique identifier, the preceding and last page positions, and the following first page position includes: An ordered tuple is established with a fixed byte order. The page position of the last page of the predecessor is forced to be arranged in the preorder data segment before the page position of the first page of the relay, and the page position of the first page of the relay is placed in the subsequent data segment. The consistency between the data flow relay direction and the physical movement direction of the physical vehicle is ensured by the byte arrangement order. The ordered tuples are assembled with the unique identifier of the target page sequence record to construct the output gap flip-page cover.

[0012] Furthermore, when the relay edge nodes generate the first packet chain hash, they use a serialization encoding standard with a length prefix delimiter to assemble the byte stream; The process of relaying edge nodes to submit transaction payloads to the blockchain includes: performing hash operations on the jointly signed and sealed slips at the end of the page and the flip-page seals between the boards to generate on-chain qualification storage units; simultaneously using a serialization encoding standard with a length prefix delimiter to assemble byte streams when generating on-chain qualification storage units; and encapsulating the on-chain qualification storage units into the transaction payload for submission. The process of blockchain ledger nodes verifying the gap-turning seal fragments contained in the transaction payload includes: extracting the on-chain qualification seal unit from the transaction payload, performing rehashing operations, and verifying consistency through comparison.

[0013] Furthermore, the process by which the blockchain ledger node verifies and seals the voucher at the end of the signature page based on the identity identifier of the preceding edge node includes: Based on the identity of the preceding edge node, the public key of the preceding edge node is located and read through the blockchain's internal certificate authorization center. The page position of the predecessor and the last page are extracted from the inside of the page-turning cover of the transaction payload. The previous valid chain hash in the transaction payload and the page position of the predecessor and the last page are serialized and concatenated in plaintext according to the preset byte order to reconstruct the original signature text. The public key of the predecessor edge node is invoked to verify the validity of the digital signature of the sealed voucher at the end of the transaction payload based on the reconstructed signature text.

[0014] Furthermore, if the relay edge node does not find the target page sequence record in the page sequence book according to the node, the subsequent signature and hash encapsulation process is terminated. The relay edge node performs a hash operation based on the traffic monitoring data packet, the relay home page position, and the fixed installation coordinates of the relay edge node to generate a local anomaly record summary and write it to the local audit log. If the signature verification at the end of the relay edge node fails to be sealed, the subsequent chain hash construction of the first packet is blocked. The relay edge node performs a hash operation based on the traffic monitoring data packet, the page flipping seal, and the fixed installation coordinates of the relay edge node to generate a local anomaly record summary and write it to the local audit log.

[0015] Furthermore, if the signature decryption of the signed voucher at the end of the verification page of the blockchain ledger node is abnormal or the comparison with the on-chain qualification sealing unit fails, the blockchain ledger node returns a rejection instruction to the relay edge node. The relay edge node extracts the first packet chain hash, the gap flipping cover, and the fixed installation coordinates of the relay edge node based on the rejection instruction, performs hash hashing operations, generates an on-chain interception corresponding to the abnormal record summary, and writes it to the local audit log.

[0016] Compared with existing technologies, it has the following advantages: This solution proposes a blockchain-based hash verification method for preventing tampering of traffic monitoring data. Addressing the challenge of data flow and spatial trajectory disconnection within overlapping high-speed cross-node communication zones, it establishes a novel mechanism that deeply integrates geometric dimensionality reduction and cryptography. The solution introduces the spatial occlusion pattern formed by an anti-glare panel array as a security verification anchor point. By calculating the intersection points of the lines connecting the moving data source and the preceding and following edge nodes on the anti-glare panel reference surface, the continuous three-dimensional spatial displacement is reduced to a discrete sequence of panel gap topology. Based on this, the system assembles structural parameters representing the spatially intersecting exposure order into a flip-page cover, and performs joint hashing and signature encapsulation with the traffic monitoring plaintext data and historical chain hashes. This design overcomes the limitations of traditional integrity verification, which only operates at the digital plaintext level. It forcibly binds cross-node data relay behavior to an unforgeable, continuous real-world spatial trajectory, fundamentally eliminating the security risk of data flow paths being separated from physical displacement trajectories.

[0017] This solution puts credential units with spatial topological constraints on the blockchain and relies on decentralized blockchain ledger nodes to perform strict global consensus comparisons. When an abnormal node attempts to inject a forged first packet using the asynchronous window of communication switching, it cannot deduce a legitimate alternation sequence that conforms to the staggered arrangement of anti-glare panels without actual movement. Therefore, the false message it constructs will inevitably fail the correlation verification of the decentralized ledger. This judgment mechanism extends the anti-tampering defense depth from a single edge computing node to the entire network consensus layer, effectively blocking the tampering penetration path that relies solely on recording and replaying message data. This invention cleverly reuses the occlusion and concealment rules of existing highway infrastructure, establishing a trust transmission chain with a unique spatial orientation in a multi-entity cross-data relay network without the need for additional hardware encryption equipment, effectively ensuring the objectivity, authenticity, and immutability of traffic monitoring data in cross-domain flow environments. Attached Figure Description

[0018] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the method flow of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0019] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0020] Please see Figure 1This application provides a method for preventing tampering of traffic monitoring data based on blockchain hash verification. In interchanges and divergence sections of highways or urban expressways, anti-glare panel arrays are typically installed continuously in the central median. Because the solid strips and perforated gaps of the anti-glare panels are arranged alternately, the signal propagation path between a moving vehicle and edge nodes at different locations on the roadside will fall at different points when crossing the anti-glare panel plane due to spatial parallax. The differences in signal crossing points caused by multi-point perspective geometry constitute a spatiotemporally unique staggered distribution. This solution utilizes this geometric constraint to bind the legitimacy of data packets to the actual driving trajectory.

[0021] In this embodiment, the entities performing the data relay include mobile vehicles as data source nodes, leading edge nodes and relay edge nodes deployed along the road, and a distributed blockchain network responsible for global consensus. The specific processing flow is as follows: Step 1: The system acquires the current traffic monitoring data packet to be verified received by the relay edge node. Among them, traffic monitoring data packets Internally, it carries a unique identifier of the data source object that generated the data packet. .

[0022] The system obtains the fixed installation coordinates of the predecessor edge node. And the spatial location of the data source node corresponding to the previous valid data packet stored in the predecessor node. (i.e., the historical location of the data source node), and based on the above spatial parameters, construct a three-dimensional connection trajectory equation with variable connection parameters (specifically, the predecessor propagation connection equation here):

[0023] The system retrieves the preset static parameters of the anti-glare panel reference surface and abstracts the main plane where the central divider anti-glare panel array is located as the reference surface. And construct the equation for the anti-glare panel reference surface, which is algebraically represented as:

[0024] Connect the precursor propagation lines With reference plane Solve the simultaneous equations to find the intersection and calculate the intersection parameters. :

[0025] In the formula, For the trajectory of the precursor propagation line; These are variable connection parameters; Let be any known reference point on the anti-glare panel reference surface; n is the normal vector of the anti-glare panel reference surface; r is any three-dimensional spatial position vector on the reference surface; This represents the dot product of vectors.

[0026] The system obtains the intersection parameters Execution based on preset tolerance threshold Physical validity check to determine whether it meets the requirements. The system determines the interval conditions. If these conditions are not met or the denominator is zero during calculation, the system will directly block subsequent processing, treating it as if there are no valid intersection points, and will generate an exception record summary to be written to the local audit log. If the interval conditions are met, the system will substitute the obtained parameters back into the original line equation to solve for the three-dimensional coordinates of the predecessor intersection point. :

[0027] Specifically, the process of calculating the predecessor intersection point visualizes the abstract radio wave propagation path as a geometric ray with definite three-dimensional start and end points and a penetration point. By solving algebraic simultaneous equations, the invisible radio frequency obstruction phenomenon is transformed into discrete geometric points that can be quantified and computed. Introducing an interval validity determination with a tolerance threshold allows the system to objectively identify whether a physical anti-glare panel truly exists at the mid-interception location of the communication link, while taking into account the positioning errors of the vehicle-mounted sensors. This connectivity determination mechanism based on a three-dimensional physical coordinate system eliminates forged messages that simply replay radio frequency signals under asynchronous windows, providing a reliable spatial geometric isolation benchmark for subsequent authentication.

[0028] It should be noted that before performing the 3D spatial intersection calculation, the system performs coordinate reference alignment based on the unified object trajectory module. Specifically, it uses a conversion algorithm from the WGS84 spherical latitude and longitude coordinate system to the Northeast ENU local Cartesian coordinate system. Using the fixed installation coordinates of the corresponding edge nodes as the local reference origin, it uniformly converts the spherical position data of the data source nodes (including the heading angle field reported by the vehicle-mounted inertial measurement unit) and the fixed installation coordinates of the edge nodes into this local Cartesian coordinate system. This eliminates calculation errors caused by the incompatibility between the spherical coordinate system and the linear equations in linear algebraic space. Furthermore, the aforementioned tolerance threshold... The system calculates the spatial physical error distance based on the nominal circular error of the vehicle positioning module and the preset physical thickness of the anti-glare panel strips. This spatial physical error distance is then divided by the straight-line distance between the data source node and the edge node, resulting in a dimensionless dynamic boundary parameter. Simultaneously, the anti-glare panel reference surface... benchmark The static parameters, such as the normal vector n, are extracted from pre-loaded high-precision maps or road as-built survey data, and the normal vector is uniquely determined by the road orientation.

[0029] The system retrieves the offline pre-configured gap page position table. Reference surface for anti-glare panel Using the reference plane and establishing coordinate axes along the longitudinal vector of the road, a local two-dimensional coordinate system is established, and the three-dimensional precursor intersection points are... The coordinate reference is transformed to this local two-dimensional coordinate system. The system traverses all closed quadrilateral regions corresponding to the plate gaps in the plate gap page position table. By using a point-to-surface inclusion test algorithm, we find the target region into which the preceding intersection point falls, and extract the corresponding plate gap number for that target region. Assign the value to the front-end launch number. Subsequently, the system calculates the two-dimensional precursor intersection point relative to the corresponding plate gap region's page centerline. One-dimensional geometric offset. If the intersection point is located in the first half of the road travel direction, then assign a direction marker to the page position. The value is F, and if it is located in the latter half of the region, it is assigned the value r. The system integrates the predecessor ejection number and the page position continuation direction mark, and outputs a structured predecessor last page position. .

[0030] Specifically, the mapping process utilizes a benchmark transformation and inclusion test algorithm to align the intersection trajectories caused by continuous motion to the periodic physical microstructure of the anti-glare panel. Based on a static configuration dictionary, the intersections of physical connections are converted into machine-readable structured grid states, and the continuous physical space is segmented into discrete topological identifiers. This spatial dimension discretization provides spatial anti-counterfeiting label input for subsequent blockchain hash verification, enabling high-frequency cross-node switching behavior to be precisely described as discrete state transitions in the spatial geometric dictionary.

[0031] It should be noted that the plate gap page position table The data is generated based on high-precision maps or offline scanning by roadside LiDAR and pre-stored in the local memory of edge nodes. The closed quadrilateral regions in this configuration table accurately map the radio wave transmission window boundaries of each entity slat gap. To ensure the uniqueness of the 2D transformation and page mapping, the system presets several mandatory constraint rules: when the intersection point falls on the common boundary of two adjacent closed quadrilateral regions, the system forcibly assigns it to the region with the smaller number; when the intersection point falls on the blind region corresponding to the slat entity occlusion, the system determines it as a radio frequency physical blockage and directly generates an abnormal record; when the intersection point falls exactly on the page centerline, the system, based on the vehicle driving direction extracted from the aforementioned heading angle field, uniformly assigns it to the second half of the page in the vehicle driving direction and forcibly assigns the page receiving direction marker value to 'r'. These rules eliminate the ambiguity of state assignment caused by fluctuations in floating-point precision.

[0032] The system acquires the first traffic monitoring data packet to be verified received by the relay edge node. The current 3D position of the corresponding data source node (i.e., the current position of the data source node), combined with the fixed installation coordinates of the relay edge node. Construct the equation for the relay propagation line:

[0033] In the formula, The relay transmission route; The current 3D position of the data source node; These are variable connection parameters.

[0034] The system calculates the relay propagation connection and the anti-glare plate reference surface. Intersection parameters Execute synchronously on this parameter The validity of the interval is checked. After the check passes, the coordinates of the relay intersection point are calculated. :

[0035] In the formula, Intersection parameters; These are the coordinates of the relay intersection point.

[0036] Specifically, the process of calculating the relay intersection point is mirror-symmetric to the preceding node in the mathematical model. For the roadside calculation units at both ends of the preceding and relay points with large spatial spans, a completely shared and consistent reference plane is used for joint analysis. The coordinate system alignment mechanism of the aforementioned unified reference plane reduces measurement parallax interference caused by differences in the physical installation positions or antenna elevation angles of different sensing nodes, ensuring that the spatial intersection features have a consistent rigid measurement scale during cross-domain comparison and relay handover.

[0037] The system will display the current three-dimensional relay intersection point. The coordinate datum is transformed to the local two-dimensional coordinate system of the reference surface and then fed into the plate gap page position table. Perform point-to-surface matching. Locate the closed quadrilateral region into which the target falls and extract the corresponding plate gap number. Assign a value to the gap number of the relay side plate. Following the predecessor mapping rule, based on the one-dimensional offset of the centerline, if the relay intersection point is located in the first half of the road's direction of travel, then a receiving direction mark is assigned to the relay side page. The value is F, and if it is located in the second half, it is assigned the value r. Finally, the structured relay homepage position is integrated and output. .

[0038] Specifically, the aforementioned relay mapping process extracts a spatial topology snapshot at the moment of cross-node switching. In terms of temporal evolution, the latest captured spatial position state of the current edge node is combined with the historical spatial state left by the previous edge node to form a physically dependent page-turning order. This verification mechanism, which directly binds the relay qualification of communication messages to the microscopic physical projection footprint, enables subsequent security verification modules to compare based on real geometric misalignment features, thereby blocking attacks that rely solely on recording and replaying message data.

[0039] It should be noted that the last page position of the preceding node represents the last valid physical window traversal state before the data source node leaves the communication coverage area of ​​the preceding node, while the first page position of the relay node represents the first physical window traversal state confirmed by the system after the data source node enters the communication coverage area of ​​the relay node. These two together constitute the core spatial structure data characterizing the legality of topological connectivity between vehicular network nodes.

[0040] Step 2: The system reads the dedicated node pairing sequence book that matches the current predecessor edge node identifier and the successor edge node identifier. The system traverses the above nodes to access the page sequence book. Contains multiple valid page sequence records , the last page position of the predecessor and relay homepage position Each valid page sequence record Includes the reference preceding last page position and the benchmark relay homepage position Perform a comparison to find the target page sequence record that satisfies the equality criterion:

[0041]

[0042] In the formula, The reference page position parameter that is allowed as the preceding last page for the m-th valid page sequence record; The m-th valid page sequence record is allowed as the base page position parameter for the relay homepage.

[0043] Specifically, the above comparison process transforms the data relay behavior across edge nodes into a rigorous spatial structure matching verification. Based on the staggered seam phenomenon caused by continuous anti-glare panels in the physical world, data source nodes in overlapping coverage areas will only generate a limited number of spatially continuous page bit flipping combinations during their movement. By verifying the page bit succession pairs extracted at the current moment in a preset spatial geometry dictionary, the system can accurately identify whether the first data packet across nodes conforms to the objective continuity of the physical topology space, thereby objectively filtering out forged jump connections that do not conform to the physical movement rules.

[0044] It should be noted that the nodes correspond to the page sequence book. This is a valid mapping dictionary generated for offline system calculations. The specific generation process involves the system acquiring high-precision map data of the monitored road segment jointly covered by the corresponding leading edge node and relay edge node. Multiple parallel virtual driving trajectories are generated along the center lines of each lane and within the lane boundary width, with a preset lateral step size. Subsequently, along each virtual driving trajectory, the system generates a discrete sampling point set with a fixed spatial sampling interval not exceeding half the minimum longitudinal physical length of the anti-glare panel gap. The system iterates through the discrete sampling point set, extracting any two adjacent sampling points as the previous and current time coordinates for the offline simulation, respectively. The aforementioned spatial intersection calculation and page position mapping algorithm is reused to calculate a pair of offline leading edge last page positions and offline relay first page positions. The system deduplicates all traversal results to obtain a valid page sequence record containing all physically feasible page-turning combinations. For each valid page sequence record, the system pre-assigns an incrementing sequence code or performs a deterministic hash operation to generate and bind a unique identifier to the corresponding target page sequence record. .

[0045] When traversing nodes in the page sequence book If no target page sequence record satisfying the equality determination equation is found, the current traffic monitoring data packet to be verified is determined to be invalid. If the first packet is found to be invalid due to a lack of valid page order, the subsequent signing and hash encapsulation process is terminated, and the current traffic monitoring data packet is used as the basis for the process. Relay homepage position and the fixed installation coordinates of the relay edge nodes Calculate and generate local anomaly record summaries Write to the local audit log.

[0046] Once the target page sequence record that satisfies the equality criterion is found, the unique identifier corresponding to the target page sequence record is extracted. Subsequently, ordered tuples are created using a fixed byte order, and the page bit of the previous last page is set. Placed in the preorder data segment, it will take over the homepage position. Placed in the subsequent data segment, and finally followed by the unique identifier. Perform splicing and assembly to construct the output plate gap flip-page sealing sheet. :

[0047] In the formula, For assembly output of the board gap flip-page cover; A unique identifier parameter for the target page sequence record; ordered tuple It replaces the abstract direction reversal symbol and strictly defines the prior spatial displacement order of the predecessor and successor in the underlying data structure.

[0048] Specifically, the aforementioned construction output process encapsulates the isolated physical parallax mapping results into a cryptographically sealed component with complete temporal and spatial order. The gap-flipping seal abstracts and solidifies the topological connection between the previous and current communication coverage areas. By adopting assembly rules based on index order or byte high and low bits, the originally detached link state is transformed into a credential entity that can be directly retrieved and verified by subsequent blockchain smart contracts. If a forged message tamperes with the timing of location data occurrence, it will cause the extracted relay and predecessor page positions to be reversed in the ordered tuple, which will then be identified and intercepted by the underlying system during the subsequent hash verification and comparison stage. This objectively cuts off the tampering path for attackers to use the legitimacy of a single point location to cover up the discontinuity of the driving trajectory.

[0049] It should be noted that the fixed byte order assembly rule requires the page position of the previous and last pages to be specified. It must be placed on the relay homepage. Previously, the above-mentioned sequential structure definition ensured the consistency between the relay direction of cross-node data streams and the physical movement direction of the physical vehicles, enabling the underlying verification mechanism to intercept unproven reverse data streams by recognizing the legality of byte ordering.

[0050] Step 3: Extract the previous valid chain hash from the internal storage of the predecessor edge node. Page position of the predecessor and last page generated in step one The data concatenation operation is performed according to a preset fixed byte order, and the private key of the predecessor edge node is invoked. Perform digital signature calculations on the concatenated dataset and output the sealed voucher at the end of the page. :

[0051] In the formula, The end-of-page signature slip output by the predecessor edge node; For the private key of the predecessor edge node The executed digital signature function; The previous valid chain hash; This refers to the page position of the preceding and last pages; symbol This indicates a bitwise data concatenation operation.

[0052] Specifically, the aforementioned signature operation cryptographically binds the historical legitimate chain value stored by the predecessor edge node to the physical topological boundary anchor point when the data source node finally leaves the communication coverage area. Since only the previous legitimate chain hash and the occupancy of the predecessor's last page bit are signed, rather than the entire payload of the previous data packet, the system establishes a clear source of responsibility for cross-node data relay with extremely low computational overhead. The introduction of a signature action incorporating asymmetric encryption mechanisms makes the predecessor edge node's endorsement of the spatial state non-repudiable, objectively providing a cryptographically encrypted credential for subsequent relay edge nodes to verify historical spatiotemporal continuity.

[0053] It should be noted that the private key of the predecessor edge node To pre-allocate and encrypt confidential parameters written into the trusted execution environment hardware of the predecessor edge node. Previous valid chain hash. This refers to the historical ledger summary generated and locally held by the predecessor edge node for the same object identifier corresponding to the preceding legitimate data packet in the corresponding data stream. The digital signature function can employ well-known asymmetric signature standards in the field, such as elliptic curve digital signature algorithms. After the predecessor edge node generates the end-of-page signature, it will include the hash of the previous legitimate chain. Previous and last page positions and the signed voucher at the end of the page The cross-domain handshake data packet is sent to the relay edge node through the inter-node communication network.

[0054] The relay edge node receives the aforementioned cross-domain handshake data packet through the inter-node communication network and extracts the plaintext data and signature value. At the same time, it reads the public identity credentials of the corresponding predecessor edge node to extract the predecessor edge node's public key. The relay edge node calls the public key of the predecessor edge node. Based on the extracted plaintext data concatenated from the previous valid chain hash and the last page position of the predecessor, the signature slip at the end of the page is sealed. Perform a signature verification operation. If verification fails, the relay edge node will perform a signature verification based on the current traffic monitoring data packet. Step 2 output: the gap-turning cover sheet and the fixed installation coordinates of the relay edge nodes Calculate and generate a local anomaly record summary according to a preset length. Write to the local audit log and block the subsequent on-chain encapsulation process of the current first package.

[0055] Specifically, the aforementioned signature verification and interception process constructs a security checkpoint for trust transfer across edge nodes. By pre-verifying the cryptographic validity of the end-of-page signature, the system can pre-identify and eliminate malicious traffic attempting to bypass spatial order authentication. Once the preceding end-of-page endorsement cannot be verified through public key decryption, it means that the structural inheritance chain of the current first packet has been broken, thus blocking subsequent hash construction and objectively preventing dirty data from polluting the blockchain main ledger.

[0056] It should be noted that the public key of the predecessor edge node The relay edge node retrieves the key from the system's pre-configured public key distribution list or a blockchain certificate authority. (Exception log summary) The generation uses a standard hash algorithm, whose input is a forced concatenation of the fixed installation coordinates of the relay edge nodes. This aims to provide a clear physical location identifier for subsequent network anomaly tracing.

[0057] Once the signature verification is successful, the relay edge node extracts the current traffic monitoring data packet to be processed. Previous valid chain hash Seal at the end of the page and the gap-opening cover The system performs a secure concatenation operation according to a preset sequence and fixed-length identifier, and calls a hash function to calculate the generated data stream, outputting the chained hash of the first packet. :

[0058] In the formula, The first packet chain hash generated for the relay edge node; A cryptographically secure hash function; This is the current traffic monitoring data packet; The verified signature on the end of the page is used to seal the voucher. For page turning and sealing between the plates.

[0059] Specifically, the hash construction process described above integrates the latest collected business communication data, historically valid chain values, spatiotemporal responsibility confirmation of predecessor edge nodes, and the physical spatial structure flipping relationship within the current overlapping coverage area. This multi-dimensional joint hashing upgrades ordinary content integrity verification to a dynamic security verification encompassing both topological space and temporal inheritance dimensions. This high-dimensional binding mechanism ensures that any single-point tampering attempt targeting the current first packet's business data, previous historical states, or the current physical switching trajectory will result in an avalanche-like distortion of the final output hash value, thereby disqualifying it from being linked to the legitimate hash chain.

[0060] It should be noted that when performing the above data concatenation operation, the system strictly adopts a serialization encoding standard with a field length prefix (as a length prefix delimiter) or a fixed byte padding rule for byte stream assembly. The above-mentioned serialization concatenation mechanism with length limits eliminates the boundary ambiguity caused by concatenating adjacent parameters of different lengths, effectively blocking engineering vulnerabilities that attackers might exploit to launch hash length expansion attacks or hash collision attacks using variable-length fields from the underlying data structure design level.

[0061] Step 4: Relay edge nodes extract the first packet chain hash generated in Step 3 With the signature slip at the end of the page And the gap-turning cover sheet output from step two. The system performs data concatenation operations in a preset fixed order, calls a hash function to calculate the generated dataset, and constructs and outputs a single on-chain eligibility storage unit. :

[0062] In the formula, An on-chain qualification sealing unit constructed for relay edge nodes; A cryptographically secure hash function; The first packet is a chained hash; For the signature and seal of the voucher at the end of the page; For page turning and sealing between the plates; This indicates a bitwise data concatenation operation.

[0063] Specifically, the above construction process further compresses and abstracts the multi-dimensional composite fact that the current first packet data has been bound to legitimate page-turning inheritance and predecessor sealing responsibility into a single digest unit with fixed length that can be stored on the blockchain. Independently constructing high-level digest units avoids the storage bloat problem caused by directly writing massive amounts of underlying concatenated plaintext into the blockchain ledger. Objectively, it achieves a unified expression of the set of preceding topological space mapping, temporal inheritance relationships, and cryptographic responsibility confirmation with minimal space overhead.

[0064] It should be noted that the aforementioned data concatenation operation also follows the serialization encoding standard with field length prefixes. After generating on-chain eligibility storage units, the relay edge nodes construct transaction payloads by establishing ordered data tuples. To ensure the data integrity and identity addressability required for subsequent blockchain-wide consensus verification, the transaction payload... It should at least include the identity of the predecessor edge node, the unique identifier of the data source object, and the hash of the previous valid chain. First Packet Chain Hash Seal at the end of the page , gap-turning cover and on-chain qualification preservation unit :

[0065] In the formula, The transaction payload constructed for relay edge nodes and submitted to the blockchain network; This serves as the identity identifier for the preceding edge node; A unique identifier for the data source object. Transaction payload. Optional business fields such as sequence numbers can be added, but in the underlying consensus verification logic, the core qualification verification must rely on the aforementioned cryptographic structured credentials and object identifiers.

[0066] The relay edge nodes transmit the transaction payload through the underlying peer-to-peer communication protocol of the blockchain. The transaction payload is submitted and broadcast to all blockchain ledger nodes in the distributed blockchain network. The blockchain ledger nodes receive the transaction payload. Next, the unique identifier of the data source object in the transaction payload is extracted. Based on this, the global state tree of the distributed ledger is queried to extract the latest valid chain hash of the data source object that is actually registered on the chain, and this hash is compared with the previous valid chain hash carried in the transaction payload. A consistency check is performed. After confirming that they are a continuation of the same legitimate chain, the blockchain ledger node extracts the identity identifier of the predecessor edge node. Based on the extracted identity identifier of the predecessor edge node, the public key of the corresponding predecessor edge node is located and read through the blockchain's internal certificate authorization center. Subsequently, the blockchain ledger node flips through the gaps in the transaction payload to create a new cover. Internal parsing extracts the page position of the previous and last pages. The transaction payload contains the hash of the previous valid chain. The extracted page bits of the predecessor and last page are combined with plaintext serialization and concatenated according to a preset byte order to reconstruct the original signature text, and the read public key is then invoked. Verify the signed voucher at the end of the transaction payload. The validity of digital signatures.

[0067] Simultaneously, the blockchain ledger node extracts the first packet chain hash from the transaction payload. Seal at the end of the page and the gap-opening cover The pre-defined serialization concatenation rules and hash function are reused to recalculate the verification digest, and the recalculated verification digest is compared with the on-chain qualification storage unit carried in the transaction payload. Does it possess strict consistency?

[0068] Specifically, the aforementioned distributed verification process executes a qualification sealing operation that only allows the first packet across nodes to enter the ledger after completing a legitimate page-turning succession in the gap. By requiring blockchain ledger nodes to complete the plaintext parameters, independently recalculate the digest, and verify the predecessor's digital signature, the system shifts the tamper-proof trust anchor from a single roadside relay edge node to a decentralized network-wide consensus layer. If abnormally forged data attempts to disguise itself as a legitimate first packet by using the gap projection misalignment zone, the forged local topology data cannot simultaneously pass the spatial page-turning verification, historical chain value verification, and asymmetric signature verification of the decentralized ledger, objectively and effectively blocking the penetration path of dirty data contaminating the globally trusted traffic network trajectory.

[0069] It should be noted that a blockchain ledger node can transmit a transaction payload only if both the digital signature validity verification and the digest consistency comparison pass. The packet is packaged into a block and written to the distributed ledger, while a successful write receipt is returned to the relay edge nodes. Upon receiving the receipt, the relay edge nodes update the current status of the first packet locally to indicate that the gap page order qualification has been completed. If the blockchain verification fails or a signature decryption anomaly occurs, the relay edge nodes extract the chain hash of the first packet based on the rejection instruction returned by the blockchain ledger node. , gap-turning cover and the fixed installation coordinates of the relay edge nodes Call the hash function to calculate and generate a local anomaly record digest. (As a summary of the exception record corresponding to the on-chain interception):

[0070] In the formula, A local anomaly record summary generated after the relay edge node intercepts illegal on-chain behavior; This specifies the fixed installation coordinates for the relay edge nodes. The relay edge nodes will record anomaly summaries. Writing to the local audit log and forcibly introducing physical installation coordinates aims to provide a trusted traceability stub with physical location identification after blocking malicious attacks or network anomalies.

[0071] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical methods of the present invention and are not intended to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications or equivalent substitutions can be made to the technical methods of the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical methods of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for preventing tampering with traffic monitoring data based on blockchain hash verification, characterized in that, include: Obtain the traffic monitoring data packet containing the unique identifier of the data source object and the previous valid chain hash. Calculate the intersection of the line connecting the historical position of the data source node with the preceding edge node, the line connecting the current position with the relay edge node, and the anti-glare plate reference surface. Map the intersection to the gap page position table and output the preceding last page position and the relay first page position respectively. Among them, the leading edge node and the relay edge node are edge nodes deployed along the road and participating in the data relay. The leading edge node saves the historical position of the data source node corresponding to the previous valid data packet and the previous valid chain hash, and calculates the intersection of the corresponding connection line and the anti-glare panel reference surface based on the historical position of the data source node, and maps and outputs the leading last page position. The relay edge node receives the current traffic monitoring data packet to be verified, and calculates the intersection of the corresponding connection line and the anti-glare panel reference surface based on the current position of the data source node corresponding to the traffic monitoring data packet, and maps and outputs the relay first page position. Among them, the traffic monitoring data packet is generated by the mobile vehicle that acts as the data source node. The unique identifier of the data source object is used to uniquely identify the mobile vehicle that generated the traffic monitoring data packet. The historical position of the data source node is the spatial position of the data source node corresponding to the previous valid data packet stored by the predecessor edge node. The current position is the current three-dimensional position of the data source node corresponding to the current traffic monitoring data packet to be verified that is first received by the relay edge node. The previous valid chain hash is the historical ledger summary generated and held locally by the predecessor edge node for the previous valid data packet of the data stream corresponding to the same object identifier. The gap page position table is an offline pre-configured configuration table containing all closed quadrilateral regions corresponding to gaps and pre-stored in the local memory of the edge nodes. The process of mapping intersection points to the gap page position table to output the predecessor last page position and the successor first page position specifically includes: establishing a local two-dimensional coordinate system with the anti-glare plate reference surface as the reference surface, transforming the three-dimensional intersection points to the local two-dimensional coordinate system to output two-dimensional intersection points, using the point-surface inclusion test algorithm to find the two-dimensional intersection points falling into the closed quadrilateral region set in the gap page position table, extracting the gap number corresponding to the closed quadrilateral region, calculating the one-dimensional geometric offset of the two-dimensional intersection point relative to the page position center line of the closed quadrilateral region, determining the page position acceptance direction mark based on the one-dimensional geometric offset, and outputting the predecessor last page position and the successor first page position by combining the gap number and the page position acceptance direction mark. The predecessor last page position represents the last legal physical window crossing state before the data source node leaves the communication coverage range of the predecessor edge node, and the successor first page position represents the first confirmed physical window crossing state after the data source node enters the communication coverage range of the successor edge node. The relay edge node compares the page position of the predecessor's last page and the page position of the relay's first page according to the page sequence book to extract the unique identifier of the target page sequence record. The unique identifier of the target page sequence record, the page position of the predecessor's last page, and the page position of the relay's first page are spliced ​​together to construct the gap flip cover. The node-to-page sequence book is a valid mapping dictionary generated offline, which matches the current front-end edge node identifier and the relay edge node identifier, and contains multiple valid page sequence records. The relay edge node compares the front-end last page position and the relay first page position with the reference front-end last page position and the reference relay first page position contained in each valid page sequence record. When the front-end last page position is equal to the reference front-end last page position in a valid page sequence record, and the relay first page position is equal to the reference relay first page position in the valid page sequence record, the valid page sequence record is determined as the target page sequence record. The unique identifier corresponding to the target page sequence record is extracted, and an ordered tuple is established with a fixed byte order. The front-end last page position is forced to be arranged in the preorder data segment before the relay first page position, and the relay first page position is placed in the postorder data segment. The consistency between the data flow relay direction and the physical movement direction of the physical vehicle is ensured by the byte arrangement order. The ordered tuple and the unique identifier corresponding to the target page sequence record are spliced ​​and assembled to construct the output gap flip-page cover. The predecessor edge node signs the previous valid chain hash and the page position of the predecessor's last page to generate a page tail seal voucher; After the relay edge node verifies the signature and seal of the end page, it performs a hash operation on the traffic monitoring data packet, the previous valid chain hash, the signature and seal of the end page, and the page-turning cover to generate the first packet chain hash; Among them, the traffic monitoring data packet is the current traffic monitoring data packet to be verified that is first received by the relay edge node. When the relay edge node generates the first packet chain hash, it assembles the traffic monitoring data packet, the previous valid chain hash, the end-of-page signature voucher, and the page-turning cover into a byte stream according to the preset order and using the serialization encoding standard with a length prefix delimiter. The relay edge node extracts the first packet chain hash, the end-of-page signature voucher, and the gap-turning cover, performs data splicing operation in a preset fixed order, and calls the hash function to calculate the spliced ​​dataset to construct the output chain qualification sealing unit. The relay edge node submits a transaction payload to the blockchain, which includes the unique identifier of the data source object, the identity identifier of the predecessor edge node, the previous valid chain hash, the first packet chain hash, the end-of-page signature voucher and the page-turning cover, and the on-chain qualification storage unit. Blockchain ledger nodes verify the previous valid chain hash based on the unique identifier of the data source object. The verification process is as follows: extract the unique identifier of the data source object in the transaction payload, query the global state tree of the distributed ledger based on this identifier, extract the latest valid chain hash of the data source object that is actually registered on the chain, and perform a consistency comparison with the previous valid chain hash carried in the transaction payload. The signature verification process for the end-of-page sealed voucher based on the identity of the preceding edge node is as follows: Based on the identity of the preceding edge node, the public key of the preceding edge node is located and read through the internal certificate authorization center of the blockchain. The page position of the preceding last page is extracted from the inside of the page flipping cover of the transaction payload. The previous valid chain hash in the transaction payload and the page position of the preceding last page are serialized and concatenated in plaintext according to the preset byte order to reconstruct the original signature text. The public key of the preceding edge node is called to verify the validity of the digital signature of the end-of-page sealed voucher in the transaction payload based on the reconstructed original signature text. The process involves verifying the page-turning envelopes in the transaction payload. The verification process is as follows: extract the first packet chain hash, the end-of-page signature voucher, and the page-turning envelopes from the transaction payload. Recalculate the verification digest using the preset serialization splicing rules and hash function. Then, compare the recalculated verification digest with the on-chain qualification sealing unit carried in the transaction payload to see if they have strict consistency. The verification is considered successful when the consistency comparison of the previous valid chain hash, the validity verification of the digital signature of the end-of-page sealed voucher, and the consistency comparison of the recalculated verification digest with the on-chain qualification sealing unit all pass. Once verified, it is written into the ledger.

2. The method for preventing tampering of traffic monitoring data based on blockchain hash verification according to claim 1, characterized in that, Obtain the spherical position data of the externally input data source node, and use the fixed installation coordinates of the corresponding predecessor edge node and the fixed installation coordinates of the relay edge node as the local reference origin. Transform the spherical position data of the data source node to the local Cartesian coordinate system, and output the historical position and current position of the data source node respectively. The process of calculating the intersection point of the connecting line and the anti-glare panel reference surface includes: constructing a three-dimensional connecting line trajectory equation with variable connecting line parameters; constructing an anti-glare panel reference surface equation based on the reference point and normal vector of the anti-glare panel reference surface; and solving for the connecting line parameters by simultaneously solving the three-dimensional connecting line trajectory equation and the anti-glare panel reference surface equation.

3. The method for preventing tampering of traffic monitoring data based on blockchain hash verification according to claim 2, characterized in that, include: After solving the connection parameters, the spatial physical error distance is calculated by combining the nominal circular probability error of the vehicle positioning module and the physical thickness of the anti-glare plate. The spatial physical error distance is then normalized by dividing it by the spatial straight-line distance between the data source node and the edge node to generate the tolerance threshold. Determine whether the connection parameters to be solved fall within the interval limited by the tolerance threshold. If the interval condition is met, substitute the connection parameters back into the three-dimensional connection trajectory equation to solve and output the three-dimensional coordinates of the predecessor intersection point and the relay intersection point. If the interval condition is not met or the denominator is zero when solving, then block the process.

4. The method for preventing tampering of traffic monitoring data based on blockchain hash verification according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of mapping the intersection point to the page position table outputting the predecessor's last page position and the successor's first page position also includes: When the two-dimensional intersection point falls on the common boundary of two adjacent closed quadrilateral regions, the two-dimensional intersection point is assigned to the closed quadrilateral region with the smallest plate gap number and the plate gap number is extracted. When the two-dimensional intersection point falls on the center line of the closed quadrilateral area, the direction of the second half of the page in the direction of travel of the physical vehicle is determined by the corresponding page assignment direction mark.

5. The method for preventing tampering of traffic monitoring data based on blockchain hash verification according to claim 1, characterized in that, The node-to-page sequence book is generated offline using the following methods: Acquire high-precision map data, generate a parallel virtual driving trajectory along the lane centerline contained in the high-precision map data and within the lane boundary width range according to a preset lateral step size, generate a discrete sampling point set along the virtual driving trajectory according to a fixed spatial sampling interval, the fixed spatial sampling interval is not greater than half of the minimum longitudinal physical length of the anti-glare panel gap; Extract adjacent sampling points within the discrete sampling point set and use them as the coordinates of the previous and current time points in the offline simulation for calculation. Output the page position of the last page of the offline predecessor and the page position of the first page of the offline relay. All solution results are deduplicated to obtain valid page sequence records, and the valid page sequence records are bound to the unique identifier of the target page sequence record.

6. The method for preventing tampering of traffic monitoring data based on blockchain hash verification according to claim 1, characterized in that, When generating on-chain qualification sealing units, a serialization encoding standard with a length prefix delimiter is used simultaneously to assemble the byte stream.

7. The method for preventing tampering of traffic monitoring data based on blockchain hash verification according to claim 1, characterized in that, include: If the relay edge node does not find the target page sequence record in the page sequence book according to the node, the subsequent signature and hash encapsulation process will be terminated. The relay edge node will perform a hash operation based on the traffic monitoring data packet, the relay home page position, and the fixed installation coordinates of the relay edge node to generate a local anomaly record summary and write it to the local audit log. If the signature verification at the end of the relay edge node fails to be sealed, the subsequent chain hash construction of the first packet is blocked. The relay edge node performs a hash operation based on the traffic monitoring data packet, the page flipping seal, and the fixed installation coordinates of the relay edge node to generate a local anomaly record summary and write it to the local audit log.

8. A method for preventing tampering of traffic monitoring data based on blockchain hash verification according to claim 6, characterized in that, include: If the blockchain ledger node encounters a signature decryption error on the signature verification page of the signed and sealed voucher or fails to pass the comparison with the on-chain qualification sealing unit, the blockchain ledger node returns a rejection instruction to the relay edge node. The relay edge node extracts the first packet chain hash, the gap flipping cover, and the fixed installation coordinates of the relay edge node based on the rejection instruction, performs hash hashing operations, generates an on-chain interception corresponding to the abnormal record summary, and writes it to the local audit log.

Images